The document discusses Germany's commitment to establishing a Green Fund to support Ukraine's energy transition. Key points:
- Germany has allocated €150 million to create the fund and drafted an initial concept, with KfW establishing the fund using existing Ukrainian partners like Ukrgasbank.
- The fund will be operational by September 2022 to support projects through grant and loan programs administered by Ukrgasbank.
- Contributors will determine support areas and criteria. KfW will oversee disbursements and guarantees.
- Some countries and private entities have expressed interest in contributing. Initial projects could start in early 2022 before the fund is fully established.
Report on CEE security and political development by Dr. Iulian Chifu, Professor at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Romania, at International Security Forum, Lviv, April 15-16, 2010
Essay based on the crisis in Ukraine and the role of the access to energy resources (oil and natural gas) in developing/resolving the conflict, with the focus on relations between two super powers EU and Russia.
Memorandum of the 5th Section of International Security Forum - "ENERGY SECURITY BETWEEN THE EU-UKRAINE-RUSSIA: FROM CRISIS TO TRUST GAINING MEASURES", April 16, 2010, Lviv, Ukraine
The EU has prolonged economic sanctions against Russia for six months until July 2019. The sanctions target specific sectors of the Russian economy such as finance, energy, and defense in response to Russia's actions destabilizing Ukraine. The sanctions will remain in place as no progress has been made in implementing the Minsk agreements. The EU also maintains individual restrictive measures such as visa bans and asset freezes against 164 people and 44 entities related to the Ukraine crisis until March 2019.
On September 2015, Russian Gazprom and list of European energy giants announced an agreement on further constructing of the Nord Stream 2 (NS 2) – another one gas pipeline from Russia under the Baltic Sea landing in Germany. At once it became clear, that constructing the pipeline is a kind of a threat for Ukraine who now is a crucial important gas transporter from Russia to the European Union (EU) member states and thereafter would undermine Ukrainian positions bringing economic losses, political and security threats .
From Ukrainian prospective the Nord Stream 2 is treated as a mostly politically driven project, at somehow aimed against Ukraine, which will also increase dependence of the EU states on Russian gas, and consequently make those more vulnerable to Russia’s policy in future. Such arguments are widely used by Ukrainian politicians and in official statements.
However, such perception does not take into consideration arguments and befits of those EU member states, who support the project and current internal political conditions. At final extent, such approach brings to a kind of misunderstanding between supporters and opponents of the Nord Stream 2 construction and achieving of the Ukrainian aim is rather questionable.
Nord Stream 2 problem in general consist of two dimensions: economic and political. Those are at somehow contradictory for the project’s actors. The first one is based on benefits that some countries (first of all Russia and certain EU member states) expect to gain with the NS 2 project. The political one is in the domain contradiction of supporting Russia in its energy business during its violating of the international law, threats for Ukraine and its concerns regarding loosing gas supply interdependence with the EU. Current ways and attempts to impact on the NS 2 development do not manage to bundle both those dimensions to find a solution that will acceptable for all parties involved in all developments and outcome related to construction and future operation of the NS 2 pipeline.
Future of the Nord Stream 2 is not clear yet and this means necessity for Ukraine to continue taking steps aimed on protecting its own position. This paper aims to describe main drivers and benefits for parties, involved in supporting the NS 2 comparing to Ukrainian perceptions and official statement on this matter.
However, NS 2 is not a unique threat for Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and corresponding resulting benefits. This drives not only necessity of efforts to cope with the NS 2, but also strengthening Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and energy security in general. Authors offered (Final remarks chapter) for Ukraine and its main ally in energy security – US actions frameworks to contain Russia regarding the NS 2 project, strengthen and secure Ukraine
The document provides an overview of the complex security environment in the South Caucasus region and EU security policy challenges there. It describes the region as a security complex with two main axes - a horizontal axis linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the EU, and a vertical axis linking Armenia, Iran and Russia. Conflict dominates across the axes, while cooperation occurs along them. Key security issues include the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and separatist conflicts involving Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU has strategic interests in the region related to conflict resolution and energy security, but its security policies have been tangled and ineffective. The document concludes with recommendations for how the EU could take a
Report on Ukraine and European energy security by Amb. Keith C. Smith, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA, at Lviv International Security Forum, 15-16 April, 2010
The document discusses the issue of energy security within the European Union. It notes that the EU imports around half of its total energy needs and will become more dependent on foreign energy imports over time. This dependence creates challenges for ensuring stable, affordable, and reliable energy supplies. The document examines some of the EU's key energy relationships and policies around securing supplies, including its dependence on Russia as a major energy exporter, efforts to diversify energy imports from other countries and routes, and the need for a coherent EU energy policy to strengthen its position internationally.
Report on CEE security and political development by Dr. Iulian Chifu, Professor at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Romania, at International Security Forum, Lviv, April 15-16, 2010
Essay based on the crisis in Ukraine and the role of the access to energy resources (oil and natural gas) in developing/resolving the conflict, with the focus on relations between two super powers EU and Russia.
Memorandum of the 5th Section of International Security Forum - "ENERGY SECURITY BETWEEN THE EU-UKRAINE-RUSSIA: FROM CRISIS TO TRUST GAINING MEASURES", April 16, 2010, Lviv, Ukraine
The EU has prolonged economic sanctions against Russia for six months until July 2019. The sanctions target specific sectors of the Russian economy such as finance, energy, and defense in response to Russia's actions destabilizing Ukraine. The sanctions will remain in place as no progress has been made in implementing the Minsk agreements. The EU also maintains individual restrictive measures such as visa bans and asset freezes against 164 people and 44 entities related to the Ukraine crisis until March 2019.
On September 2015, Russian Gazprom and list of European energy giants announced an agreement on further constructing of the Nord Stream 2 (NS 2) – another one gas pipeline from Russia under the Baltic Sea landing in Germany. At once it became clear, that constructing the pipeline is a kind of a threat for Ukraine who now is a crucial important gas transporter from Russia to the European Union (EU) member states and thereafter would undermine Ukrainian positions bringing economic losses, political and security threats .
From Ukrainian prospective the Nord Stream 2 is treated as a mostly politically driven project, at somehow aimed against Ukraine, which will also increase dependence of the EU states on Russian gas, and consequently make those more vulnerable to Russia’s policy in future. Such arguments are widely used by Ukrainian politicians and in official statements.
However, such perception does not take into consideration arguments and befits of those EU member states, who support the project and current internal political conditions. At final extent, such approach brings to a kind of misunderstanding between supporters and opponents of the Nord Stream 2 construction and achieving of the Ukrainian aim is rather questionable.
Nord Stream 2 problem in general consist of two dimensions: economic and political. Those are at somehow contradictory for the project’s actors. The first one is based on benefits that some countries (first of all Russia and certain EU member states) expect to gain with the NS 2 project. The political one is in the domain contradiction of supporting Russia in its energy business during its violating of the international law, threats for Ukraine and its concerns regarding loosing gas supply interdependence with the EU. Current ways and attempts to impact on the NS 2 development do not manage to bundle both those dimensions to find a solution that will acceptable for all parties involved in all developments and outcome related to construction and future operation of the NS 2 pipeline.
Future of the Nord Stream 2 is not clear yet and this means necessity for Ukraine to continue taking steps aimed on protecting its own position. This paper aims to describe main drivers and benefits for parties, involved in supporting the NS 2 comparing to Ukrainian perceptions and official statement on this matter.
However, NS 2 is not a unique threat for Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and corresponding resulting benefits. This drives not only necessity of efforts to cope with the NS 2, but also strengthening Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and energy security in general. Authors offered (Final remarks chapter) for Ukraine and its main ally in energy security – US actions frameworks to contain Russia regarding the NS 2 project, strengthen and secure Ukraine
The document provides an overview of the complex security environment in the South Caucasus region and EU security policy challenges there. It describes the region as a security complex with two main axes - a horizontal axis linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the EU, and a vertical axis linking Armenia, Iran and Russia. Conflict dominates across the axes, while cooperation occurs along them. Key security issues include the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and separatist conflicts involving Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU has strategic interests in the region related to conflict resolution and energy security, but its security policies have been tangled and ineffective. The document concludes with recommendations for how the EU could take a
Report on Ukraine and European energy security by Amb. Keith C. Smith, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA, at Lviv International Security Forum, 15-16 April, 2010
The document discusses the issue of energy security within the European Union. It notes that the EU imports around half of its total energy needs and will become more dependent on foreign energy imports over time. This dependence creates challenges for ensuring stable, affordable, and reliable energy supplies. The document examines some of the EU's key energy relationships and policies around securing supplies, including its dependence on Russia as a major energy exporter, efforts to diversify energy imports from other countries and routes, and the need for a coherent EU energy policy to strengthen its position internationally.
The document discusses the need for the EU to develop a unified foreign policy approach on energy security. It proposes that the EU should:
1) Reduce vulnerabilities from import dependence by fostering mutual dependence between the EU and producer countries.
2) Integrate energy security considerations more prominently into the EU's external policies towards both producer and transit countries.
3) Improve dialogue and cooperation with major energy consumer countries like China and India to help stabilize international energy markets.
European Union VS Germany : Nord Stream 2iakovosal
The document discusses the Nord Stream 2 pipeline agreement between Russia's Gazprom and several European energy companies to transport natural gas from Russia to Europe. This agreement bypasses existing pipeline infrastructure in Ukraine and could violate the European Union's Third Energy Package. While Germany supports the project, many other EU members and countries like Ukraine oppose it as it could increase Europe's dependence on Russia and reduce energy revenues for Ukraine. There are concerns the project ignores European unity and that Germany and Russia's economic cooperation could escalate tensions, especially with Poland and Baltic states.
While an agreement reached between Ukraine and Russia on gas supplies this winter was hailed by the European Commission, the deal may not solve all issues. Key elements include Ukraine repaying $3.1 billion of its gas debt to Russia in installments by end of year, and Russia providing gas at a reduced price until March. However, not all details are public and sources of payments are unclear. The EU says it will not pay Ukraine's debt, but the Ukrainian central bank and national gas company will pay initially, with EU taxpayers potentially having to pay the bill in the long run. The negotiated price is significantly lower than Russia's initial request, but sustainability of the deal is uncertain beyond this winter.
План відбудови України \ Marshall Plan for UkraineNGOANTS
The document outlines Ukraine's proposed recovery plan following Russia's invasion and ongoing war. Key points of the plan include:
- Rapidly restoring and modernizing Ukraine's damaged infrastructure, industry and economy through sectors like defense, technology and renewable energy.
- Enhancing investment through deregulation and ensuring rule of law/governance to rebuild confidence.
- Establishing an international management board representing Ukraine, partner countries, and organizations to oversee funding allocation and project compliance over 5 years.
- Conducting thorough assessments of war damage and economic/regional needs to inform detailed annual recovery programs and financing of vetted projects through independent auditing.
This document provides an assessment of Ukraine's application for membership in the European Union. It discusses Ukraine's history of integration with the EU, including through an Association Agreement. It finds that Ukraine meets the political criteria for membership as a stable democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law. While reforms are still needed, Ukraine has shown resilience and commitment to European values. The document concludes by assessing Ukraine's ability to meet the economic and administrative requirements for membership.
The European Union’s (EU) consumption of natural gas has been growing rapidly over the last two decades. Gas has become an increasingly important component of the EU’s energy mix, with gas-fired power plants gradually replacing less environmentally friendly coal plants. Domestic gas production covered close to 60 percent of the EU’s consumption needs during the 1990s, but by 2007 it declined substantially around 40 percent (see Figure 1). The rest is imported from three main sources: Russia (around 40 percent of total gas imports), Norway (around 25 percent) and various African countries among them Algeria, Nigeria, Libya and Egypt which account for around 25 percent. The last few years have also heightened public worries in Europe over the security of its gas supplies, primarily those imports coming from Russia. These fears were partly confirmed in January 2009 when several EU and non- EU countries faced a sudden cut in their gas supplies. The Russian- Ukrainian stand-off only reinforced the argument that more needs to be done to strengthen the reliability of access to vital energy resources.
Authored by: Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2009
Ukraine has undertaken significant reforms across its economy and society in recent years while committing to democratic values, though it faces challenges from Russia's actions. A report outlines Ukraine's progress in implementing agreements with the EU, including starting a free trade area in 2016. Key reforms include anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and decentralization, though some areas like privatization and social services still require work. The EU has provided substantial financial and technical support to Ukraine as it continues its reform process.
The document discusses EU-Ukraine energy relations and makes several recommendations. It notes that EU-Ukraine energy cooperation is important for achieving the goals of the EU Green Paper on energy security and efficiency. It recommends that the EU develop a common external energy policy to strengthen its position with partners like Russia. It also recommends diversifying energy sources and routes, with Ukraine playing a role in new pipelines from the Caspian Sea. The document argues that integrating Ukraine into the European energy market would benefit both sides through increased security, emergency response capabilities, and trade opportunities.
The document provides summaries of key developments in various EU policy sectors that affect clients. In agriculture and fisheries, negotiations are ongoing regarding new vineyard plantation rights and the implementation of a discard ban for fisheries. In energy, a new regulatory framework was adopted to accelerate approval and funding of priority energy infrastructure projects, while the European Parliament continues to call for improvements to nuclear safety. Cross-sectoral issues like competition, consumer protection, intellectual property, taxation and trade are also briefly outlined.
Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on RussiaPaulina Pospieszna
In response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, the EU introduced
sanctions on Moscow. Despite increasing polarisation among member
states after imposition, the sanctions package was consistently
renewed. How can sanctions persistence be explained? While scholarly
accounts highlight German leadership, commitment to norms,
and policymakers’ engagement, the EU’s ability to uphold the
sanctions in the face of uneven support among member states
remains puzzling. With the help of a two-level game framework,
according to which actors make decisions based on the interplay
between the domestic and international levels, we argue that the
interaction between the Council and domestic politics helped sustaining
the consensus. To illustrate this dynamic, in an exploration
of domestic factions in Spain and Poland, two member states
displaying opposite attitudes towards Russia, we identify the presence
of at least one actor whose preference deviates from the core,
thereby facilitating consensus.
This document summarizes a strategic foresight analysis on the future of the EU and Ukraine conducted between June 2022 and June 2023. It developed four scenarios for EU-Ukraine relations in 2035 based on the level of integration between the EU and Ukraine and the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. The scenarios are: 1) "Fair Stability" assumes Ukraine regains territory and joins the EU and NATO; 2) "Cold War II" assumes a stuck front leads to a bipolar world with partial Ukrainian integration; 3) "Frozen Conflict" assumes trade-offs lead to Ukrainian neutrality and a stagnant EU accession; 4) "Devastated Europe" assumes escalated war leads to expanded NATO but a weakened EU
Hungary supports the European Commission's efforts to develop a common European energy policy to address energy challenges. The policy should focus on competitiveness, security of supply, and sustainability. Hungary agrees with the Green Paper's identification of key policy areas including energy markets, infrastructure, renewable energy, and energy efficiency. Hungary emphasizes the importance of diversifying energy sources and routes to improve security of supply, highlighting several proposed pipeline and LNG projects as important to central Europe. Hungary supports common EU research and development objectives to improve energy security, reduce consumption, and develop alternative energy sources.
The document discusses the recent gas crisis in Europe and what it reveals about the EU's energy security and dependence on Russian gas imports. It argues that while decreasing reliance on Russian gas may improve energy security, it is not feasible in the short-to-medium term due to the EU's green transition goals and increased gas demand. The EU has made some progress in diversifying suppliers and infrastructure but risks remain from high gas prices, competition for LNG, and Gazprom's market power. The best solution is for the EU to implement a coordinated energy policy to strengthen its bargaining position with Russia as a large buyer of gas.
The document provides answers to frequently asked questions about the crisis in Ukraine, the EU's Eastern Partnership, and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It summarizes that the EU has not destabilized Ukraine and has condemned violence while supporting democratic elections. It outlines the significant financial and economic support provided by the EU to Ukraine. It also discusses the EU's support for a ceasefire and political solution in eastern Ukraine based on the Minsk Agreements, as well as the EU's humanitarian assistance efforts in the country.
This document summarizes key events in Ukraine's energy sector during September 2016. It discusses progress made on reforms related to natural gas, including adoption of laws establishing an energy regulator and reducing gas companies' required reserves. However, issues around unbundling Tranzgaz from Naftogaz remained. The electricity sector also saw some legislative progress but implementation continues to lag. Environmental reforms showed little progress. Renewables development advanced despite regulatory issues, while efficiency reforms stalled.
The document summarizes the Czech Republic's position on the European Commission's Green Paper on energy strategy. Key points include:
- The Czech Republic supports creating a common EU energy policy that respects sovereignty over energy sources and local conditions.
- Completing the EU's single energy market is important, but new rules or institutions are not needed until existing legislation is fully assessed. Regional cooperation can help integrate markets.
- Investments in cross-border infrastructure need to be prioritized to improve interconnection between states according to EU targets. Coordination between transmission system operators is also important for reliability.
- Ensuring stable long-term regulation and including energy projects in EU funding programs can stimulate investments in infrastructure and production
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the associat...DonbassFullAccess
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the association agreement with the European Union in the areas of energy and environment, August 2017
The document provides background information on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It discusses Ukraine gaining independence from Russia in 1991. In 2014, a separatist insurgency began in eastern Ukraine. Russia sees Ukraine as important due to their shared history and Ukraine's strategic position providing access to the Black Sea. Reasons for Russian aggression include economic factors like Ukraine refusing to join a Russian-led trade bloc, as well as geo-political factors like NATO expansion. The document outlines developments in the conflict including Russia's military buildup and demands to limit NATO's expansion. It discusses implications for India and recommends diplomatic efforts like dialogue and reviving previous peace agreements.
The document analyzes reasons for perceived "blunders" in EU policy towards Ukraine. It argues that EU policy was based on an overestimation of the EU's ability to influence Ukraine and an underestimation of Russia's potential reaction. As a result, when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, the EU was unprepared. This conflict has significantly changed dynamics in world politics and left Ukraine unstable, with ongoing fighting, Russian occupation of Crimea, and economic sanctions between Russia and the EU. The document examines power competition between Russia and the EU over influence in Ukraine as a contributing factor.
projet de traité négocié à Istanbul (anglais).pdfEdouardHusson
Ceci est le projet de traité qui avait été négocié entre Russes et Ukrainiens à Istanbul en mars 2022, avant que les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ne détournent Kiev de signer.
The document discusses the need for the EU to develop a unified foreign policy approach on energy security. It proposes that the EU should:
1) Reduce vulnerabilities from import dependence by fostering mutual dependence between the EU and producer countries.
2) Integrate energy security considerations more prominently into the EU's external policies towards both producer and transit countries.
3) Improve dialogue and cooperation with major energy consumer countries like China and India to help stabilize international energy markets.
European Union VS Germany : Nord Stream 2iakovosal
The document discusses the Nord Stream 2 pipeline agreement between Russia's Gazprom and several European energy companies to transport natural gas from Russia to Europe. This agreement bypasses existing pipeline infrastructure in Ukraine and could violate the European Union's Third Energy Package. While Germany supports the project, many other EU members and countries like Ukraine oppose it as it could increase Europe's dependence on Russia and reduce energy revenues for Ukraine. There are concerns the project ignores European unity and that Germany and Russia's economic cooperation could escalate tensions, especially with Poland and Baltic states.
While an agreement reached between Ukraine and Russia on gas supplies this winter was hailed by the European Commission, the deal may not solve all issues. Key elements include Ukraine repaying $3.1 billion of its gas debt to Russia in installments by end of year, and Russia providing gas at a reduced price until March. However, not all details are public and sources of payments are unclear. The EU says it will not pay Ukraine's debt, but the Ukrainian central bank and national gas company will pay initially, with EU taxpayers potentially having to pay the bill in the long run. The negotiated price is significantly lower than Russia's initial request, but sustainability of the deal is uncertain beyond this winter.
План відбудови України \ Marshall Plan for UkraineNGOANTS
The document outlines Ukraine's proposed recovery plan following Russia's invasion and ongoing war. Key points of the plan include:
- Rapidly restoring and modernizing Ukraine's damaged infrastructure, industry and economy through sectors like defense, technology and renewable energy.
- Enhancing investment through deregulation and ensuring rule of law/governance to rebuild confidence.
- Establishing an international management board representing Ukraine, partner countries, and organizations to oversee funding allocation and project compliance over 5 years.
- Conducting thorough assessments of war damage and economic/regional needs to inform detailed annual recovery programs and financing of vetted projects through independent auditing.
This document provides an assessment of Ukraine's application for membership in the European Union. It discusses Ukraine's history of integration with the EU, including through an Association Agreement. It finds that Ukraine meets the political criteria for membership as a stable democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law. While reforms are still needed, Ukraine has shown resilience and commitment to European values. The document concludes by assessing Ukraine's ability to meet the economic and administrative requirements for membership.
The European Union’s (EU) consumption of natural gas has been growing rapidly over the last two decades. Gas has become an increasingly important component of the EU’s energy mix, with gas-fired power plants gradually replacing less environmentally friendly coal plants. Domestic gas production covered close to 60 percent of the EU’s consumption needs during the 1990s, but by 2007 it declined substantially around 40 percent (see Figure 1). The rest is imported from three main sources: Russia (around 40 percent of total gas imports), Norway (around 25 percent) and various African countries among them Algeria, Nigeria, Libya and Egypt which account for around 25 percent. The last few years have also heightened public worries in Europe over the security of its gas supplies, primarily those imports coming from Russia. These fears were partly confirmed in January 2009 when several EU and non- EU countries faced a sudden cut in their gas supplies. The Russian- Ukrainian stand-off only reinforced the argument that more needs to be done to strengthen the reliability of access to vital energy resources.
Authored by: Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2009
Ukraine has undertaken significant reforms across its economy and society in recent years while committing to democratic values, though it faces challenges from Russia's actions. A report outlines Ukraine's progress in implementing agreements with the EU, including starting a free trade area in 2016. Key reforms include anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and decentralization, though some areas like privatization and social services still require work. The EU has provided substantial financial and technical support to Ukraine as it continues its reform process.
The document discusses EU-Ukraine energy relations and makes several recommendations. It notes that EU-Ukraine energy cooperation is important for achieving the goals of the EU Green Paper on energy security and efficiency. It recommends that the EU develop a common external energy policy to strengthen its position with partners like Russia. It also recommends diversifying energy sources and routes, with Ukraine playing a role in new pipelines from the Caspian Sea. The document argues that integrating Ukraine into the European energy market would benefit both sides through increased security, emergency response capabilities, and trade opportunities.
The document provides summaries of key developments in various EU policy sectors that affect clients. In agriculture and fisheries, negotiations are ongoing regarding new vineyard plantation rights and the implementation of a discard ban for fisheries. In energy, a new regulatory framework was adopted to accelerate approval and funding of priority energy infrastructure projects, while the European Parliament continues to call for improvements to nuclear safety. Cross-sectoral issues like competition, consumer protection, intellectual property, taxation and trade are also briefly outlined.
Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on RussiaPaulina Pospieszna
In response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, the EU introduced
sanctions on Moscow. Despite increasing polarisation among member
states after imposition, the sanctions package was consistently
renewed. How can sanctions persistence be explained? While scholarly
accounts highlight German leadership, commitment to norms,
and policymakers’ engagement, the EU’s ability to uphold the
sanctions in the face of uneven support among member states
remains puzzling. With the help of a two-level game framework,
according to which actors make decisions based on the interplay
between the domestic and international levels, we argue that the
interaction between the Council and domestic politics helped sustaining
the consensus. To illustrate this dynamic, in an exploration
of domestic factions in Spain and Poland, two member states
displaying opposite attitudes towards Russia, we identify the presence
of at least one actor whose preference deviates from the core,
thereby facilitating consensus.
This document summarizes a strategic foresight analysis on the future of the EU and Ukraine conducted between June 2022 and June 2023. It developed four scenarios for EU-Ukraine relations in 2035 based on the level of integration between the EU and Ukraine and the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. The scenarios are: 1) "Fair Stability" assumes Ukraine regains territory and joins the EU and NATO; 2) "Cold War II" assumes a stuck front leads to a bipolar world with partial Ukrainian integration; 3) "Frozen Conflict" assumes trade-offs lead to Ukrainian neutrality and a stagnant EU accession; 4) "Devastated Europe" assumes escalated war leads to expanded NATO but a weakened EU
Hungary supports the European Commission's efforts to develop a common European energy policy to address energy challenges. The policy should focus on competitiveness, security of supply, and sustainability. Hungary agrees with the Green Paper's identification of key policy areas including energy markets, infrastructure, renewable energy, and energy efficiency. Hungary emphasizes the importance of diversifying energy sources and routes to improve security of supply, highlighting several proposed pipeline and LNG projects as important to central Europe. Hungary supports common EU research and development objectives to improve energy security, reduce consumption, and develop alternative energy sources.
The document discusses the recent gas crisis in Europe and what it reveals about the EU's energy security and dependence on Russian gas imports. It argues that while decreasing reliance on Russian gas may improve energy security, it is not feasible in the short-to-medium term due to the EU's green transition goals and increased gas demand. The EU has made some progress in diversifying suppliers and infrastructure but risks remain from high gas prices, competition for LNG, and Gazprom's market power. The best solution is for the EU to implement a coordinated energy policy to strengthen its bargaining position with Russia as a large buyer of gas.
The document provides answers to frequently asked questions about the crisis in Ukraine, the EU's Eastern Partnership, and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It summarizes that the EU has not destabilized Ukraine and has condemned violence while supporting democratic elections. It outlines the significant financial and economic support provided by the EU to Ukraine. It also discusses the EU's support for a ceasefire and political solution in eastern Ukraine based on the Minsk Agreements, as well as the EU's humanitarian assistance efforts in the country.
This document summarizes key events in Ukraine's energy sector during September 2016. It discusses progress made on reforms related to natural gas, including adoption of laws establishing an energy regulator and reducing gas companies' required reserves. However, issues around unbundling Tranzgaz from Naftogaz remained. The electricity sector also saw some legislative progress but implementation continues to lag. Environmental reforms showed little progress. Renewables development advanced despite regulatory issues, while efficiency reforms stalled.
The document summarizes the Czech Republic's position on the European Commission's Green Paper on energy strategy. Key points include:
- The Czech Republic supports creating a common EU energy policy that respects sovereignty over energy sources and local conditions.
- Completing the EU's single energy market is important, but new rules or institutions are not needed until existing legislation is fully assessed. Regional cooperation can help integrate markets.
- Investments in cross-border infrastructure need to be prioritized to improve interconnection between states according to EU targets. Coordination between transmission system operators is also important for reliability.
- Ensuring stable long-term regulation and including energy projects in EU funding programs can stimulate investments in infrastructure and production
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the associat...DonbassFullAccess
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the association agreement with the European Union in the areas of energy and environment, August 2017
The document provides background information on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It discusses Ukraine gaining independence from Russia in 1991. In 2014, a separatist insurgency began in eastern Ukraine. Russia sees Ukraine as important due to their shared history and Ukraine's strategic position providing access to the Black Sea. Reasons for Russian aggression include economic factors like Ukraine refusing to join a Russian-led trade bloc, as well as geo-political factors like NATO expansion. The document outlines developments in the conflict including Russia's military buildup and demands to limit NATO's expansion. It discusses implications for India and recommends diplomatic efforts like dialogue and reviving previous peace agreements.
The document analyzes reasons for perceived "blunders" in EU policy towards Ukraine. It argues that EU policy was based on an overestimation of the EU's ability to influence Ukraine and an underestimation of Russia's potential reaction. As a result, when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, the EU was unprepared. This conflict has significantly changed dynamics in world politics and left Ukraine unstable, with ongoing fighting, Russian occupation of Crimea, and economic sanctions between Russia and the EU. The document examines power competition between Russia and the EU over influence in Ukraine as a contributing factor.
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Ceci est le rapport publié sous la supervision du sénateur du Kansas Roger Marshall (parti républicain). Avec presque trois ans de retard, ce texte confirme de qu'avait expliqué le Professeur Joseph Tritto, dans "Cina Covid 19. La chimera che ha cambiato il mondo" dès juin 2020 et dont le Courrier des Stratèges vous avait immédiatement parlé. L'épidémie est, selon toutes les preuves circonstancielles convergentes, le résultat d'une (ou deux) fuite(s) de laboratoire à Wuhan en Chine.
Ceci est la Lettre publiée par la Conférence épiscopale scandinave au sein de l'Eglise catholique. Il s'agit d'un rappel de la doctrine morale de l'Eglise et d'un défi lancé aux évêques allemands, ou même au pape François, qui voudraient passer un compromis historique avec les obsessions idéologiques et psychologiques du progressisme occidental.
Le dernier géant du journalisme américain, Seymour Hersh, confirme au terme d'une enquête soigneuse ce que savaient les initiés: le sabotage de Nordstream en septembre dernier a été réalisé par l'OTAN sous commandement américain.
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Pema Khandu, born on August 21, 1979, is an Indian politician and the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh. He is the son of former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Dorjee Khandu. Pema Khandu assumed office as the Chief Minister in July 2016, making him one of the youngest Chief Ministers in India at that time.
केरल उच्च न्यायालय ने 11 जून, 2024 को मंडला पूजा में भाग लेने की अनुमति मांगने वाली 10 वर्षीय लड़की की रिट याचिका को खारिज कर दिया, जिसमें सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की एक बड़ी पीठ के समक्ष इस मुद्दे की लंबित प्रकृति पर जोर दिया गया। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति अनिल के. नरेंद्रन और न्यायमूर्ति हरिशंकर वी. मेनन की खंडपीठ द्वारा पारित किया गया
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Document non officiel de travail germano-américain sur l'avenir du pipeline Nord Stream 2
1. Non-paper: Promoting Transatlantic Unity and Ukraine`s energy security in German-
US relations
Germany is fully determined to successfully implement the “Joint Statement of the US and
Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals“ of
July 21 to strengthen both Ukraine’s as well as European energy security and deter Russia
from misusing the pipeline for aggressive political ends. We are concerned that renewed,
unilateral action by US-Congress would undercut this joint effort and seriously weaken
transatlantic unity on Russia.
There are ample reasons why we continue to asses that swift implementation of the Joint
Statement is the best way towards safeguarding the interests of Ukraine:
NoS2 at present no threat to Ukraine as long as a reasonable gas transit is ensured
Implementing the “Joint Statement” allows us to put pressure on Russia to meet its
obligations as a responsible supplier and to honor the current gas transit agreement with
Ukraine and extend it beyond 2024 as publicly called for by the German government.
A Special Envoy for Ukraine gas transit has been appointed to that end.
Huge opportunity for Ukraine to transform its energy sector and diversify Ukraine’s
energy supplies:
Germany and the US will support investments aiming at USD 1 billion via the Green Fund
for Ukraine, including from third states and private-sector entities. Germany will provide an
initial grant to the fund of at least $175 million.
Cooperation ensures that Russia does not use energy as a weapon:
Cooperation with the US on restrictive measures ensures that Russia does not use energy as
a weapon. Measures could include public messaging, political measures, economic
measures and support for victims of Russian malign activities.
Nord Stream 2 has not softened Germany’s foreign policy on Russia:
Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine as a
turning point in relations with Russia, Germany has been leading the EU to align itself with
the US on Russia sanctions and spearheaded the creation of several Russia-related
sanctions’ regimes in the EU and nationally. Germany has sent strong signals to Moscow
when it found Russia breaching international law even at the cost of accepting a strain on
German-Russian relations, but kept dialogue-channels open.
Sanctions against a US-ally would only be a victory for Putin:
US Sanctions targeting Nord Stream 2 would undermine the commitment given to Germany
in the Joint Statement, weaken the credibility of the US government, and endanger the
achievements of the Joint Statement, including the provisions supporting Ukraine. They
would ultimately damage transatlantic unity.
Rise in energy prices is a global phenomenon and cannot be exclusively attributed
to Russia:
Russia is currently fulfilling all delivery obligations, including the gas transit agreement with
Ukraine, but it could do more: Recent announcements by Putin to increase deliveries to
European gas storages are a step in the right direction.
2. Classified
Non-paper: Implementation of the “Joint Statement” – Paragraph 2: Options for
action at the national level in Germany
Paragraph 2 of the Joint Statement stipulates: “Should Russia attempt to use energy
as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine, Germany will take
action at the national level and press for effective measures at the European level,
including sanctions, to limit Russian export capabilities to Europe in the energy
sector, including gas, and/or in other economically relevant sectors. This commitment
is designed to ensure that Russia will not misuse any pipeline, including Nord Stream
2, to achieve aggressive political ends by using energy as a weapon.”
From the day of the publication of the Joint Statement, the German Federal
Government has been actively implementing this commitment. We are in close
contact with the U.S. administration to co-ordinate options for responses in the event
of Russian aggression and malign activities, including Russian efforts to use energy
as a weapon. As the imposition of sanctions lies within the EU’s exclusive sphere of
competence, the German Federal Government is following a two-pronged approach:
We are actively participating in the process to identify options for additional restrictive
measures at the European level that was initiated by EU leaders at their summit on
24 and 25 June 2021 (see European Council Conclusions available at
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) and at the same time, we are working on options for
measures at the national level that could complement action at the European level.
As regards options at the national level, we are thinking in three categories: public
pressure, political measures, and economic measures. Within these categories,
any measure could be either designed to put pressure on the Russian government or
to support the victims of a potential Russian aggression.
1. Public pressure
• Strong public messages using all appropriate channels and fora, condemning
the inacceptable Russian behavior and confirming our unwavering support for
the victim(s) of this behavior. Ideally in co-ordination with the EU and the U.S.
2. Political measures
• Assessing a restriction or, where required, suspension of certain bilateral
political meetings or selected co-operation formats with Russia, as far as
necessary and appropriate.
3. Economic measures
• Engagement that the gas transit via Ukraine continues at a level sufficient to
sustain the supply route via the Ukrainian transit network, which is also the
underlying understanding for the assessment of security of gas supply of
Germany and the EU by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy
in the certification process of the independent transmission systems operator.
A special envoy supports the negotiations for gas transit via Ukraine to
continue beyond 2024.
3. Classified
• Support for countries that are victims of Russia`s use of energy as a weapon,
e.g. by technical assistance and other support for “reverse flow” and/ or further
increasing support for the energy transition in these countries.
• Review of possible limitations for new sovereign export credit guarantee
applications concerning the Russian fossil energy sector, in co-ordination with
the EU and the U.S.
• Assessing a suspension of investment guarantees for future projects in the
Russian fossil energy sector, in co-ordination with the EU and the U.S.
4. Non-paper: Nord Stream 2 Certification – a legal process under EU rules
In mid-June 2021, Nord Stream 2 AG of Zug/Switzerland, filed an application for
certification as an independent transmission system operator (ITO) for the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline – insofar as this pipeline is located on EU territory and passes
through EU territorial waters – with the independent regulator, the Federal Network
Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA)1
. Within this certification process, the BNetzA
is required to assess compliance with all relevant legal acts.
Process started in September, but has currently been suspended by the
regulator
Beginning with the receipt of all necessary documents supporting the application,
BNetzA has four months to draw up its draft decision. The four-month period
commenced on September 8, 2021. On November 9, the independent regulator
informed the European Commission of a temporary suspension of the process: to
comply with the relevant EU directive, Nord Stream 2 AG will transfer the assets and
management of the part of the pipeline on German territory and in its territorial waters
to a new German entity which is 100% owned by Nord Stream 2 AG. The remaining
time of the four-month period shall resume once BNetzA receives all necessary
documents in relation to the new company.
Once the draft decision has been adopted, the BNetzA shall issue a respective
notification and will request an opinion from the European Commission, which is to
be provided within a further deadline of two months (this period can be prolonged for
two months if interested third parties, e.g., ACER, are heard). Once the European
Commission has provided its opinion, BNetzA has a final two-month period to adopt
its final decision, which shall to the greatest extent possible take into account the
Commission´s opinion.
Role of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi)
For a company applying for certification as an ITO which is controlled by an entity
from a third (non-EU) country, BMWi is required to provide to BNetzA its assessment
as to whether granting certification will put at risk the security of the energy supply of
the Member State and of the European Union2
. BMWi has consulted the neighboring
EU Member States Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. The Polish undertaking PGNiG as well as the
Ukrainian undertakings Naftogaz and GTSOU have filed applications to be admitted
as third parties to the certification procedure with BNetzA. All statements made in the
course of the consultation as well as statements by PGNiG, Naftogaz, and GTSOU
were taken into account in the assessment. BMWi submitted its assessment to
BNetzA on October 26, 2021 and concluded that the granting of the certification will
not put at risk the security of gas supply in Germany and the EU.
1
in accordance with §§ 4a, 4b, 10, 10a to 10d Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG; the
regulatory provisions transposing the EU Internal Gas Market Directive 2009/73/EC)
2
§ 4b EnWG, Art 11 Directive 2009/73/EC
6. 1
Non-paper: Green Fund for Ukraine
Germany is fully committed to set up a Green Fund to support the energy transition,
energy efficiency, and energy security in Ukraine.
Germany is well on track for setting up the Green Fund in an accelerated
process: The Federal Budget Bill includes the allocation of €150 million to the
budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy with the sole purpose
of creating the fund.
Germany has drafted an initial concept for the establishment of Green Fund. The
German development bank KfW will establish the Green Fund on the basis of
existing Ukrainian partners (e.g. the state bank Ukrgasbank). The fund will be
operational in the in September 2022 at the latest and then be able to support
projects. The Fund will set up promotional programmes for the energy transition.
The Ukrainian bank will administer the programmes and be able to provide grants
and interest subsidies to green loans. Financial beneficiaries can be SME’s and
corporates, private households, municipalities or project developers.
The contributors to the Green Fund will determine the areas for promotional
programmes and a set of criteria for applications of potential beneficiaries. The KfW
as the Project-Executing Agency will monitor the process, provide the money for
grants and set up a credit guarantee mechanism. The German Federal Ministry will
transfer the budget to KfW after the fund is set up. Other contributors (private
entities or countries) to the fund will be involved in the process accordingly.
Some countries and private entities have already signalled their interest in
financially supporting the Green Fund. Germany is also looking forward to a
possible U.S. contribution to the Fund.
The financing of initial “lighthouse projects” can start even before the Green Fund
has been established. The lighthouse projects could be supported through existing
instruments, e.g. the Energy Efficiency Fund or the coal transition project within the
Energy Partnership. Two projects seem feasible in this respect:
- modernisation (energy efficiency, PV roof top etc.) of official and community buildings
in Myrnograd, East Ukraine (affected by coal exit/mine closure).
- creation of an Industrial Zone at the former mine field through renovation and
renaturation. Co-financing by private investors and the Ukrainian Regional Ministry.
These projects can start and be supported in the beginning of 2022.
Dialogue with UKR government on the topics of the Green Fund was conducted by
German State Secretary Feicht during his visit to Kyiv in September 2021. Next
steps:
- determination of promotional programmes and criteria for projects by the contributors
to the Green Fund.
- consultation of Ukrainian government on concrete policy areas that should mainly
profit from the Green Fund
- due diligence including assessment of existing green programmes of Ukrgasbank
- development of a detailed concept, work plan and time table by KfW
- advertising fund and integrate further contributors