Dissertation_Social Media and Politics_July 2015_S Chetcuti
1. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 1 | 106
Examining the influence of Maltese politicians’ use of
Facebook and Twitter on voters: promoting dialogue or
manipulating the public sphere?
Stephen Chetcuti
Submitted for the degree of
MA in Communications, Media and Public Relations
July 2015
University of Leicester
Department of Media and Communications
2. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 2 | 106
Abstract
Social media did not exist at the turn of the millennium, but now feature as an
important part in the way we conduct our lives. Malta is no exception, and social
media has entered into practically every household on the islands. This
dissertation explores the manner in which a traditional aspect of Maltese life,
people’s relationship with politicians, plays out on Facebook and Twitter. This
research used a sequential model of the mixed methods research (Wimmer and
Dominick, 2013:121) with qualitative and quantitative tools, and determines that
while the Maltese people have retained their near-obsessive relationship with
politicians, the country’s oral culture has transitioned from village squares and
grocery small talk to social media platforms. It concludes that politicians lack
certain digital skills and often use these platforms as billboards, but they also play
an important role is creating a public sphere where they influence and are
influenced by voters.
Word Count: 15,305
3. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 3 | 106
Acknowledgements
My heartfelt thanks go to Alex Grech, Fr Joe Borg and Carmen Sammut for their
guidance and support, to long-time friend and Herman Grech for his constant
availability, and Martin Debattista and Kristina Chetcuti for their time.
My gratitude extends to Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, Opposition Leader Simon
Busuttil and Alternattiva Demokratika Arnold Cassola for fitting me into their busy
schedules.
To all the people who took part in the voters’ survey, especially Stephen Muscat,
Lawrence Pisani and Patricia Tabone, who all accepted my request for an in-depth
interview.
To all the politicians who completed the politicians’ survey.
Finally, my appreciation goes out to my tutor, Eileen Sheppard, to the academic
and administrative staff at the University of Leicester, and to
Andreas Anastasiou – I would have never made it without you.
4. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 4 | 106
Dedication
To my brother Michael, who is fighting a brain tumour.
To my four girls: I can’t promise I won’t start any other academic courses, but I‘ll
try my best.
To my late father: Sorry I never got to tell you I was doing a master’s degree – it
was meant to be a surprise.
And finally, to my mother and sister, simply for being there.
5. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 5 | 106
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 8
1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 8
Chapter 2: Politics in Malta .......................................................................................................... 10
2.1 Politics in Malta explained............................................................................................ 10
2.1.1 Recent election results.......................................................................................... 12
Chapter 3: Theoretical Concept and Literature Review........................................................... 14
3.1 Theoretical Aspects of the Public Sphere.................................................................. 14
3.1.1 Participation in the public sphere ........................................................................ 15
3.1.2 The public sphere versus the private sphere .................................................... 16
3.1.3 Different times, same principle ............................................................................ 18
3.2 Literature review ............................................................................................................ 19
3.2.1 Virtualisation of debates ....................................................................................... 20
3.2.2 Habermas, the public sphere and the internet .................................................. 21
3.2.3 Other public spheres............................................................................................. 24
3.3 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 25
Chapter 4: Methodology ............................................................................................................... 27
4.1 Methodology................................................................................................................... 27
4.2 Quantitative survey among voters............................................................................... 27
4.3 Politicians’ survey .......................................................................................................... 29
4.4 In-depth interviews ........................................................................................................ 30
Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion........................................................................................... 31
5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 31
5.2 Survey among voters .................................................................................................... 31
5.3 Politicians’ survey .......................................................................................................... 32
5.4 In-depth interviews ........................................................................................................ 34
5.5 Findings and discussion .............................................................................................. 34
5.5.1 Debate? What debate?......................................................................................... 35
5.5.2 Politicians on social media ................................................................................... 38
5.5.3 Pressing ‘like’.......................................................................................................... 43
Chapter 6: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 47
6.1 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 47
6.2 Limitations....................................................................................................................... 50
6.3 Further research ............................................................................................................ 50
Appendices..................................................................................................................................... 52
7. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 7 | 106
7.2.17 Appendix AK: Politicians’ survey Q16.................................................................... 89
7.2.18 Appendix AL: Politicians’ survey Q17..................................................................... 90
7.2.19 Appendix AM: Politicians’ survey Q18 ................................................................... 91
7.3 Appendix AN: Pool questions for semi-structured interviews .................................. 91
7.3.1 Appendix AO: Bios .................................................................................................... 100
References ................................................................................................................................... 103
8. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 8 | 106
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
From seventeenth century coffee houses, the public sphere has transformed
from a geographically limited area reserved for the literate to the cyberspace era of
the twenty-first century. Jürgen Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere (1989) introduced a theory by which discussion of societal problems
has an influence on political action and which has been widely utilised to
understand, frame, and inform public opinion. The information superhighway has
created vast opportunities for political participation, and this is no exception in
Malta, a country with a pluralist polarised political system. The discussion will
focus the hyperlocal context of the islands, which highlights the closeness and
personal contact between politicians and people, and how this relationship has
transferred from village squares to social media. This dissertation is organised as
follows:
Chapter 2 explains the political and voting system in Malta, namely the single
transferable vote. It highlights the extreme polarisation on the islands, which often
lead to fierce – sometimes violent – election campaigns, and a system that allows
political parties to own TV and radio stations, newspapers, and other media. This
chapter also explains how Maltese people feel it is their ‘duty’ to vote, and that
turnout for elections is always above 90 per cent – one of the highest in the world
(Grech, 2009). The results are often too close to call, with the difference between
the main two parties as low as 0.5 percent, giving new meaning to the expression
‘every vote counts’.
Chapter 3 explores the theory that informs this research. For this research
project, the Habermasian public sphere theory is used. In principle, it suggests that
public opinion can be formed through debate in a public sphere which is open to
everyone, where status is irrelevant, everyone is treated as equals, and the better
argument prevails. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
the public sphere theory as hypothesised by Habermas. This chapter considers
literature related to the use of two social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter,
as a public sphere and the virtualisation of debates.
9. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 9 | 106
The methodology is outlined in Chapter 4, namely a sequential model of the
mixed methods research (Wimmer and Dominick, 2013:121) with qualitative and
quantitative tools. Two surveys were conducted followed by in-depth interviews.
The first was administered to 200 semi-randomly selected people of voting age
(18-74) in Malta. The people were questioned in relation to their usage of social
media vis-à-vis politics and politicians. At the same time, a survey was held among
all 130 party-affiliated politicians on the islands (parliamentarians, members of the
European Parliament, and party-approved candidates). They were questioned
about their use of social media, feedback they receive and related topics. In the
second part, 12 people – including three voters who had taken part in the survey,
and the leaders of the three political parties in Malta – participated in in-depth
interviews. These six interviews also served for triangulation purposes.
Furthermore, a number of academics, experts and journalists gave their insights
on politicians’ presence and influence on social media.
Chapter 5 brings together all the findings of this research. This section explores
a number of issues, including the manner in which Maltese people debate, their
oral cultural and the Maltese people’s obsession with politicians. The research
highlights the lack of digital literacy among Malta’s political elite, but comes to the
conclusion, explained in Chapter 6, that a networked public sphere without
politicians would not be sustainable and concludes that while politicians influence
people, the opposite is also true. Study limitations and possible further research is
suggested at the end of this chapter.
10. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 10 | 106
Chapter 2: Politics in Malta
2.1 Politics in Malta explained
Malta is an archipelago in the middle of the Mediterranean that has a population
of just over 425,000 (National Statistics Office of Malta, 2014). As Fenech
(2008:1,049) notes, Malta is fiercely partisan in its political thinking and elections
are “polarised and fiercely fought”. Since 1966, two parties have dominated
parliament, the Labour Party (LP) and Nationalist Party (PN) – in the 2008
elections, these two parties were separated by barely over 1,500 votes, or 0.5
percent (ibid). Attempts by numerous other political groups failing to make
significant inroads (University of Malta, undated). A third party, the Malta Green
Party, or Alternattiva Demokratica (AD), which literally translates as ‘democratic
alternative’, was founded in 1999, but has not managed to win a parliamentary
seat despite its 5,506 first count votes. However, AD has been more successful in
local council elections.
Political groupings in Malta are akin to tribes, leading Baldacchino (2002,
quoted in Sammut, 2007:26) to claim that the conflicts between the LP and PN are
similar to “ethnic hostilities” that has led the island to be described as a “’nationless
state’”, with the church acting as the uniting institution. Grech (forthcoming:107)
maintains that, “in Malta, structures are socially created by dominant institutions,
and are inert and resistant to change”. This is furthered by an openly partisan
press (Sammut, 2007:10, 25) since political parties are legally allowed to own
media, with both PN and LP operating television and radio stations, newspapers
and news web portals. This is exacerbated by the “technology of othering” (original
emphasis) (Fine, 1994 in Sammut, 2007:34), which creates identities among one
grouping and demonises the other with an “ʽus-them’ partisan paradigm”
(Baldacchino, 2002:203). This animosity has been prevalent since independence
in 1964 and escalates tremendously during general election periods (Sammut,
2007:28). This is because elections are a winner-takes-all affair and apathy can
result in defeat:
The electoral pendulum swings slightly from one side to the other,
according to the voting decisions of a small segment of the electorate.
Because of the narrow margin between the two main parties, at the polling
11. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 11 | 106
booths every vote counts. Elections are won or lost because of a few
thousand votes.
The winning party can then make sure their supporters are given “privileged
access to … resources” (Mitchell, 2002, quoted in Grech, forthcoming:130). Voters
are strongly encouraged to carry out ‘their duty’ to vote – a term used to present
the idea as though it were an obligation rather than a right. Families go to great
lengths to take sick or elderly relatives to polling booths (ibid:29), often with help
from their party of allegiance. As Pirotta (1994, quoted in Grech, forthcoming:131)
notes:
On Election Day, cloistered nuns have been known to abandon the
seclusion of their convents to join other voters at the polls. Other voters,
sometimes only a few days away from the grave, can also be seen being
ferried, frequently at their own volition, from their sick beds to some polling
station in order that they too may register a preference
In what has become an election tradition, the national airline offers heavily
subsidised flights to bring Maltese voters back to Malta to vote (Debono, 2013:4)
as voting is only allowed in designated places, not electronically, nor in mobile
booths or embassies. The primary interest of the political system is in maintaining
a hold on power rather than consensus (Grech, forthcoming:126). Political parties
can mobilise their voters because they have a clear indication of people’s voting
preferences by street and even by house (Hirczy, 1995:258).
Politics in Malta is personal and politicians, candidates and MPs all carry out
door-to-door canvassing, especially during election periods (Sammut, 2007:29).
This close personal contact with people leads parties to often select medical or
legal professionals as candidates as they have experience in dealing with people
and are generally trusted (ibid:30). This is very important because Malta is one of
the few countries to use a single transferable vote system. While the system helps
to ensure that a vote really counts, it has other less desirable consequences.
Thus, for example, “a contender’s worst rivals are one’s own party contestants
[because] in each district a number of candidates compete to obtain votes to
represent their party in parliament” (ibid:30). Voters are presented with a relatively
long list of candidates from all parties and independents, and they vote by inserting
a number in appropriate boxes next to a candidate’s name. For a vote to be
considered valid, a voter must include the number ‘1’ next to a candidate’s name.
12. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 12 | 106
Adding second, third and more preferences is possible but not obligatory. Most
voter do. In the 1987 elections, just 3.4 percent of votes were not transferable
(Hirczy, 1995:261). This system results in candidates putting in a great deal of
effort to secure enough votes from their supporters, and to secure second or third
preference votes from supporters of other candidates, irrespective of party
allegiance. With Malta being so small, the quota needed to secure election is
relatively small and therefore a candidate would more or less know who his
supporters are. Once a candidate reaches a quota, calculated by dividing the total
number of valid votes cast and divided by the seats available form that district plus
one, his/her remaining votes become second preference votes and the process
continues down the preferences until all 65 members of parliament are elected.
The number ‘1’ votes are also used to determine which party wins the election and
has a right to form the next government. Malta is also one of a handful of countries
that does not have candidate lists decided by the party. Ballot papers include
candidates in alphabetical order, with many speculating that having a surname
with a letter early in the alphabet increases the chances of election significantly.
This is because, after deciding who gets their first preference, the voter continues
with the subsequent preferences in alphabetical order. The system encourages
candidates work very hard to win as much support as possible:
Candidates go to great lengths in building their personal network of
supporters, ‘nursing’ prospective constituencies for months before the
election, holding public meetings, conducting house-to-house calls and
seeking to establish themselves – or to reemphasise an already established
position – as local patrons, doing favours and trying to win friends (Howe,
1987, quoted in Hirczy, 1995:263).
People, for their part, do their utmost to choose a winning candidate, as “only a
successful candidate can share the spoils of victory” (Hirczy, 1995:264). In
practice, Malta’s electoral single transferrable vote system makes it next to
impossible for a small party to get a candidate elected to parliament (Fenech,
2008:1053).
2.1.1 Recent election results
The closeness of results in general elections is staggering. Since 1966, the two
major political parties have been divided by a maximum of four percentage points,
13. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 13 | 106
within the 48 per cent to 52 per cent region (University of Malta, undated). The
elections held in 2008 were extremely close, with 0.55 percent separating the two
parties, or 1,580 votes from a voting population exceeding 290,000. The only
exception was the last election, held in 2013, where the Labour Party (LP)
trounced the Nationalist Party (PN) by an unprecedented 36,000 votes (ibid). An
LP victory was expected, but the margin surprised most commentators. The
election victory for the LP came after nearly 25 uninterrupted years of PN
governments. AD also had its best showing ever, managing just under two percent
of the vote.
14. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 14 | 106
Chapter 3: Theoretical Concept and
Literature Review
3.1 Theoretical Aspects of the Public Sphere
The ideals of the public sphere are synonymous with democracy, participation,
communication and self-determination. First expounded by Jürgen Habermas in
his book Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), the public sphere
incorporated the gathering of people to discuss matters of mutual interest, with the
resultant formation of an opinion. Habermas explained that “the public sphere was
constituted in discussion (lexis), which could also assume the forms of consultation
and of sitting in the court of law, as well as in common action (praxis), be it the
waging of war or competition in athletic games” (Habermas, 1989:3). Habermas, a
critical theorist who formed part of the second generation of the Frankfurt School
(Thomassen, 2010:16), suggests in his theory that a public sphere is created when
people freely engage in any form of discussion, irrespective of the space where
they are. Everybody has equal access to the public sphere and all participants are
considered equal. Discussions in the public sphere should be conducted without
any limitations caused by fear of reprisal, and there should be no control over the
public sphere. In fact, Habermas asserts that there should be no State interference
in the public sphere, which “itself remain[s] a part of the private realm” (Habermas,
1989:11, 18, 141):
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere
of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public
sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to
engage in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the
basically privatised but publically relevant sphere of commodity exchange
and social labour (ibid:27).
In the public sphere’s infancy, the bourgeois met in coffee houses to discuss
literature and politics. As time passed, and more people became literate, the public
sphere grew exponentially and a larger ʽspace’ was needed. This came in the form
of the press (ibid:24). Habermas observes that the eighteenth century “moral
weeklies” (ibid:42) were an integral part of the early public sphere and even helped
15. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 15 | 106
expand the coffee house discussions to include thousands of newly-literates. The
mass media were used as a way of extending the public sphere (ibid:169), even
though the political aspect of the sphere was later lost to commercialism and
propaganda (ibid:175). The problem with this new situation was that the private
interests of media owners did not reflect the interests of private people as a public
(ibid:189), the general good. Habermas complains of the introduction of public
relations that led to “opinion management”, with companies or individuals
introducing material in the press that made its way into the public sphere as being
of genuine interest to the public when in actual fact it was propaganda or
misinformation (ibid:193, 194). However, he also saw publicity as a democratic
idea as anyone, in theory, could state their opinion and this could be discussed in
the public sphere and eventually become public opinion (ibid:219). Habermas
believes that the modern public is passive and interested in ‘infotainment’,
rubberstamping any decision taken by the authorities without debate, a position he
would later soften. A number of scholars, as this paper explores, believed
Habermas was too critical on this point (Thomassen, 2010:35).
3.1.1 Participation in the public sphere
Habermas wrote his public sphere theory more than 50 years ago, but after its
publication in English in 1989, it became the dominant public sphere theory.
Habermas has had both support for his theory, but also considerable criticism.
One of the biggest critics of Habermas is feminist thinker Nancy Fraser
(1997:110), who asserts that the public sphere
designates a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is
enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens
deliberate about their common affairs…; it is a site for the production and
circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the State.
Fraser (1997:111) maintains Habermas’ theory needs “to undergo some critical
interrogation and reconstruction” as his notion of a bourgeois or liberal model of
the public sphere no longer holds true, replaced as it were by the “current ‘welfare
State mass democracy’”. She criticises the liberal model of the public sphere as
discussions in the public sphere did not materialise, a situation also recognised by
Habermas. The “utopian” public sphere ideal never happened, she reiterates
16. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 16 | 106
(ibid:113), and institutional machinery resulted in certain groups being excluded,
including women and minorities. Fraser calls into question the assumption made
by Habermas that debate in the public sphere was possible on socially equal
terms. Writing in 2006, Habermas stated that “an all-inclusive civil society must
empower citizens to participate in and respond to a public discourse that, in turn,
must not degenerate into a colonising mode of communication” (quoted in Benson,
2009:182). Habermas, however, also makes it clear that “universal access” was a
fundamental part of the public sphere, despite harsh criticism from many quarters,
suggesting that “a public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso
excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all”
(Habermas, 1989:85). Participation is a fundamental issue in any debate regarding
the public sphere. Unlike in Greek times, membership of the public sphere is open
to anybody who is interested in participating and, in theory, “there can be no
agenda to predefine the topic of public conversation” (original emphasis;
Benhabib, 1997:79). At the same time, the distinction between social and political
does not make any sense in the modern world. According to Habermasian theory,
participation is a “chief prerequisite” in a modern world (ibid:86). She comments
that this modern view of participation is not intended as a space where politicians
can battle it out, but rather “it is viewed democratically as the creation of
procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and collective political
decisions can have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption” (ibid:87).
Benhabib (ibid) further contends that, “the public sphere comes into existence
whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action
engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity”. Additionally, in a
democratic society, there can be as many audiences as there are debates.
Benhabib criticises Habermas’ later work which, she comments, is influenced by
the Frankfurt school of thinking and sees the public change from “a ‘reasoning’ to a
‘consuming’ one” (ibid:88), thus leaving the principle of dialogue in limbo.
3.1.2 The public sphere versus the private sphere
In the early days, people moved in and out of the private sphere to enter and
participate in the public sphere (Habermas, 1989:46, 51). Habermas (ibid:141-142)
explains that the bourgeois public sphere existed in “the tension-charged field
between state and society” and, with the birth of capitalism, “a repoliticised social
17. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 17 | 106
sphere emerged to which the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ could not be
usefully applied”. This, Habermas claims, is what eventually led to the downfall of
the bourgeois public sphere. This fusion of State and society made differentiation
according to private and public complicated (ibid:148). The modern world,
Habermas states, is characterised by the “loss of the private sphere and of
ensured access to the public sphere” especially because of economic and societal
demands (ibid:157). Within the public sphere, the “autonomy of private people”
had to be ensured in both the public civil society and private family (ibid:224). In
fact, “the guarantees of basic rights rest on the demarcation of the public sphere
and of a public sphere operative in the political realm not directly subject to
interference by public authority” (ibid:226). Habermas (1989:231) suggests an
interesting middle sphere that exists between the public and private spheres, one
created as a result of the interconnection between the State and society.
On the other hand, Schudson (1994, quoted in Benson, 2009:189) argues that
the normative idea of free discussion does not exist, and debates can only take
place where rules are laid down; because of this, the State must be included. Even
Habermas, writing in 2007, suggests that in certain cases the State should
intervene (quoted in Benson, 2009:191). Fraser argues that a finite separation
between State and society is not really necessary for a functioning public sphere
(1997:133). However, she counter-argues that a separation is required as the
public sphere acts as a “counterweight” to the authority of the State (ibid:134).
Thomassen (2010:53) insists that Habermas’ ‘lifeworld’ – the process ideated by
Habermas in which people come together and form an understanding based on
their background and a ’shared social world’ – must be protected from the
systems, namely the State and market, but both can also work hand-in-hand with
appropriate legislation enacted by a strong public. Where the public sphere exists,
therefore, is a question that remains under debate. Bernhard Peters, a close
collaborator of Habermas, suggests that society is divided into the centre and
periphery; the former constitutes four layers, namely parliament, the judiciary,
government and civil service, while the latter is composed of the lifeworld and its
private spheres (1993, quoted in Benson, 2009:181). The public sphere is the
space in between the centre and periphery.
18. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 18 | 106
3.1.3 Different times, same principle
Habermas admits that his key ideas on the public sphere were written at a
different time with different circumstances, which led him to come to certain
conclusions he himself disagrees with today (1997:438-439). However, he also
insists that:
in spite of the objections raised, I continue to stay with the intention that
guided the study as a whole. The mass democracies constituted as social-
welfare States… can claim to continue the principles of the liberal
constitutional State only as long as they seriously try to live up to the
mandate of a public sphere that fulfils political functions (ibid:441).
Habermas is somewhat critical of the present day public sphere, which he
claims has been turned into a business with pre-set rules and where “consensus…
has become largely superfluous” (ibid:164). Habermas declares that election
campaigns are not contested within a public sphere any longer as this has become
a field taken over by publicists, even though he concedes that “parliamentary
elections continue to count on the liberal fictions of a public sphere in society”
(ibid:211). He asserts that people prefer to speak within closed circles of family
and friends rather than engage to influence public opinion (ibid:213) and this is
done merely to convince the hesitant. He adds that the all-important floating
voters, the very people who could affect the outcome of an election are “recruited
predominantly from the large reservoir of less interested, less informed, and
apathetic citizens, to the extent that they are not altogether indifferent and do not
ignore the election” (ibid:214). It is these voters who are generally targeted by
electoral campaign managers, Habermas remarks, and all parties try to attract
people from this reservoir (ibid:215). The political public sphere has now been
transformed into one in which political parties, through “staged and manipulative
publicity”, take centre stage in the public sphere with the tacit agreement of an
audience grouped according to their beliefs or opinions, whereby:
a no longer intact public of private people dealing with each other
individually would be replaced by a public of organized private people. Only
such a public could, under today’s conditions, participate effectively in a
process of public communication via the channels of the public spheres
internal to the parties and special-interest associations and on the basis of
19. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 19 | 106
an affirmation of publicity as regards the negotiations of organizations with
the state and with one another (Habermas, 1989:232).
3.2 Literature review
Although social media platforms have been around for more than a decade, its
impact is being felt now with the improvement of both hardware and software
applications that have made it (nearly) possible for people to be always online and
connected. Politicians are using social media tools to connect with their
constituents, bypassing the traditional media (Grant et al, 2010:579). The two
social media being dealt with in this dissertation are Twitter and Facebook. Twitter
is intended for public consumption, meaning that tweets are visible to anyone,
while Facebook is private in that it only allows a user’s feed to become visible once
the user has accepted a person as a ‘friend’ (ibid:580). One key point for Twitter is
that a user can tailor his newsfeed according to his tastes (ibid:597) and select
who and what to see. All social media platforms are online areas where users can
generate and disseminate content, access information, interpret and organise
information, and form part of a framework for presenting information (Klinger and
Svensson, 2014:5). These platforms have changed the way information is
produced, called “produsage” (ibid:6). This means that a great deal of information
comes from “amateur activity”. The internet and social media in particular are
made up of different types of people. A Forrester Research survey has defined six
types of Web 2.0 users, namely: creators, critics, collectors, joiners, spectators
and inactives. These definitions underline the different level of participation.
- Creators write post, take photos, make videos and subsequently upload the
data
- Critics respond to posts and provide ratings and reviews
- Collectors organise content using feeds and tagging
- Joiners use social media in tandem, have multiple profiles
- Spectators, the most common, read posts, watch videos and check reviews
- Inactives have an online presence but never post or create content
(von Brockdorff, undated)
20. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 20 | 106
Unsurprisingly, two camps – for and against social media becoming the new
virtual public spheres that replaces Habermas’ coffee houses – have emerged and
are discussed below.
3.2.1 Virtualisation of debates
Coleman (1999:68) suggests that “the relatively recent emergence of new
media technologies has given rise to initial hopes for the revival of a public sphere
of unmediated discourse“. There is what Kies describes as a “virtualisation of
political debates [that] is taking place” (2010, quoted in Rasmussen, 2014:1,316).
While the lowering of the threshold to join the public sphere has made for greater
participation, it has also resulted in increased scepticism towards political
groupings as ties created on the web are considered weak and the quality of
arguments poor (Rasmussen, 2014:1,317/8). Debates are held in anarchic
structures and people are easily influenced by commentary on the media and
pressure from politicians (ibid:1,318). As a consequence of this, “streams of
communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesised in such a way that
they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions” (Habermas, 1996,
quoted in Rasmussen, 2014:1,319). Benkler asserts that despite the fact that the
internet may not be overly democratic, it still offers users the opportunity to adopt
“practices that lead to the emergence of a new hierarchy” (2006:241). The internet
provides more space for a far greater number of speakers than the mass media,
and adds that the topology of the web boosts certain components of the public
sphere (ibid:246), such as information overload and being heard over the clutter.
The internet offers “a limitless discursive space, with dramatically expanded
possibilities for productive and enlightening meaning-formation” (Rasmussen,
2013:98). The internet is described as “the most important development in
contemporary communication, which has produced a global ‘public sphere’”
(Ubayasiri, 2006:4). The political class has recognized this shift, In fact, studies
among politicians in Sweden have shown that digital is the new reality and, as one
politician remarked, “in five years, all will have a thing like this [here he showed his
smartphone]; we are going there, you can’t stop the development” (Nilsson and
Carlsson, 2013:7). They quote Gibson (2004) in maintaining that new media
created “better contact between elected officials and citizens” (ibid:8). However,
they also warn of a darker side, where the interaction between people and voters
21. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 21 | 106
can degenerate into name-calling and the use of vulgar language. Coleman opines
that a great deal of online debate is “bad-tempered”, the result of people failing to
learn proper debating methods following the disappearance of street corner or
village square meetings (1999, quoted in Iosifidis, 2010:624). This has not stopped
a flood of people from taking to social media, especially since Habermas’ original
idea of the public sphere has changed over the years into a “multi-layered sphere
of online and social networks which are increasingly important in engaging and
mobilizing citizenship and in shaping the discourse within which rational discussion
takes place” (Iosifidis, 2010:619). Dutton, following Castell’s description, goes as
far as proclaiming the internet the “Fifth Estate” (2007, cited in Iosifidis:621). The
internet has re-ignited the interest in the public sphere as a virtual venue for
discussion as it allows a high degree of interactivity that was not possible with
other means of communication, and most places on the internet fall outside State
control, allowing unchecked debate and allowing, in theory, anyone to have a
platform to debate (Iosifidis, 2010:622). “What is genuinely novel with the Internet
in a democratic perspective is that it cancelled the social division between
speakers and listeners of the public sphere and made everyone into potential
participants…,” Rasmussen notes (2014:1,316). Grech quotes Castells (2007),
who claimed that the new communication tools give people the opportunity to
“challenge the discourse and operations of dominant institutions and power blocs”
(Grech, forthcoming:1) and operate a “horizontal network of interactive
communication” (ibid:30).
3.2.2 Habermas, the public sphere and the internet
Habermas shows his distaste for new technology by stating that there is a
“decentring of unedited inputs, where the intellectual can no longer constitute a
focal point” (2009, quoted in Rasmussen, 2014:1,319). In 2006, Habermas,
speaking at a ceremony, barely touched upon the internet and deemed it of “little
significance to the public sphere” (Rasmussen, 2014:1,320). Habermas observes
that the “use of the internet has both broadened and fragmented the contexts of
communication” and adding that “the price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism
offered by the internet is the decentralised access to unedited stories,” (quoted in
Ubayasiri, 2006:8). As late as 2005, Habermas still considered the mass media as
the main arena of the public sphere, an assumption that was certainly true for
22. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 22 | 106
Malta. Habermas is not alone in his criticism of the internet as a viable public
sphere. Commentators, quoted in Rasmussen (2014:1,321), have suggested that
internet is not up to the task (Negroponte, 1995), could lead to a decline in civil
engagement (Putnam, 2001), or was detrimental to the formation of public opinion
and creates polarisation (Sunstein, 2009). The internet is a place, Rasmussen
asserts, which gives a loud voice to a small minority. Sunstein suggests that
groups with different opinions do not meet online, with the result that not only is
there no consensus, but views become more extreme (ibid:1,323). Another
warning comes from O’Neill (2010, quoted in Nilsson and Carlsson, 2013:3), who
claims that popular interference could lead to a “trivialisation of politics” and
important legislation may be influenced by “populist” thinking.
Another concern raised was that the supposed “good” contact with voters was
just a misconception of reality (Nilsson and Carlsson, 2013:9), and the “push-the-
button democracy” was potentially dangerous as it produced results based on half
or un-truths. This was further compounded by the anonymous nature of internet,
which has increased polarisation (DiMaggio et al, 2001:321), despite the positive
effect that the internet lowers barriers to access. Nevertheless, while the internet
has contributed to more participation, this has not been to the overwhelming
degree claimed by some, such as Castells or Latour (Benson, 2009:189).
According to Dahlberg (2001, quoted in Ubayasiri, 2006:7), the internet has failed
to fulfil its promise of being the new public sphere. Although Habermas seems to
be ambiguous on the issue of the internet, others have expressed their conviction
that the internet has the criteria required to function according to the theory of
multiple public spheres. From Barber to Schudson, Milioni to Youchai and Benkler,
many believe the internet provides a step towards greater democratic and
participatory public sphere (Rasmussen, 2014:1,322), and observe that it has
removed barriers to communication and participation. Others describe the internet
as the “magic elixir” in terms of people’s participation in politics (Stromer-Galley,
2000, quoted in Klinger and Svensson, 2014:2). Social media platforms have
opened the way for more political commentators and reduced the number of
gatekeepers, thereby increasing the contributions and non-political actors (Elmer
et al, 2012, quoted in Rasmussen, 2014:1,320). Social media provides ordinary
users with the opportunity to use the “online megaphone” to engage in discussions
with others, or have their voice heard, without inhibitions or restrictions (Grech,
23. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 23 | 106
forthcoming:51). This is even more valid with the ability of social media to filter and
collect related items via re-tweets, feeds and hashtags, which allow users to follow
a conversation, giving people the tools to manage the overload of information
(Rasmussen, 2014:1,323). This also creates a network of ideas similar to the
definition given by Castells (2008, quoted in Grech, forthcoming:70), who
compares the public sphere to “networks of communication that relate many-to-
many in the sending and receiving of messages in a multimodal form of
communication that bypasses mass media and often escapes government
control”. Grech (forthcoming:70) continues:
The advent of the internet was a prompt for media theorists to revive the
notion of the public sphere – not as some idealised modern-day version of
the coffee houses and literary salons of early modern Europe, but within the
framework of a network society that organises its public sphere on the basis
of media communication networks.
Grech, however, also suggests that the claim that technology is encouraging
more political participation may be exaggerated (forthcoming:75). He quotes
Papacharissi (2002, in Grech, forthcoming:83), asserting that technology itself
creates a public space but not necessarily a public sphere. By this, he opines that
while technology may create the platform or opportunity to debate, it does not
mean that debate is taking place. There is a tendency for people to become more
passive rather than engage in debate, so the normative Habermasian ideal of
contribution to the public sphere by all parties fails to materialise (Grech,
forthcoming:46). Adut also criticises the dominant (Habermas) public sphere,
claiming it is “characterized by idealism and normativism”, rendering it unrealistic
(2012:238). West (2013:155) questions whether the internet is a real arena for
public debate at all, arguing that the internet is “used by the public for arguments
concerning already settled opinions, a far cry from the fruitful and thoughtful
debates demanded by a true public sphere”. West believes that internet is just a
tool that helps mobilise people in and around existing public spheres, but is not in
itself a public sphere (2013:158). Instead, West (2013:158) proposes that:
at best, the Internet might be half of a public sphere… [with] no more or
no less potential to serve as a deliberative component in a public sphere
24. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 24 | 106
than do other communication media: the only reason it has been proposed
as such is its popularity…
One reason why West comes to this conclusion is that there are no formal
mechanisms in place to ensure that what is discussed in the public sphere ends up
before legislators. There is also little dialogue or critical discussion on Facebook or
Twitter, a fact made worse by certain inherent factors, such as Twitter’s 140-
character word limit. Further, content on the internet is highly partisan (Iosifidis,
2010:624-6), an opinion also shared by Dahlberg (2007:838), who adds that
people are unwilling to listen to the other side and “it is also well known that
asymmetries in power offline are being replicated online, leading to inequalities in
how different discourses are enabled and fostered online”. This leaves weak or
non-influential people without a say, dispelling the notion of the internet as a public
space in the Habermasian sense, where status is unimportant.
One of the biggest criticisms levelled against Habermas is the fact that he only
considered the existence of one bourgeois public sphere as opposed to multiple
spheres, and this also explains his initial pessimism about the state of the public
sphere (Thomassen, 2010:50), a view he was later to change (Habermas,
1997:425). Allen insists that there exists a “post-bourgeois conception” of the
public sphere, and she quotes Fraser’s four assumptions: social equality is a must;
there are a number of public spheres, not just one; there should be no restriction
on what is deliberated; and, rather than distinguish between society and the State,
there should be a distinction between weak publics (those who follow) and strong
publics (those who decide) (1996, quoted in Allen, 2012:823/4). Habermas also
agrees with Fraser’s thinking and takes on a number of her ideas in subsequent
publications (Allen, 2012:824).
3.2.3 Other public spheres
The prevalence of Habermas’ public sphere theory means that other theories
remain under-explored. While it is not within the scope of this dissertation to
include a comparison between public sphere theories, it is interesting to examine
some other options briefly:
The liberal representative (liberal elite) public sphere suggests that
people’s role is to elect representatives who then debate among themselves
without any involvement of voters (Downey et al, 2012:338). The media also
25. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 25 | 106
have a role to play in providing people with the necessary information to
allow them to judge the operations of political parties in power (and
opposition) and make their voices heard through the ballot box.
The participatory liberal (republican) public sphere takes a
diametrically opposite view and believes that people should be included in
every political decision taken. They actively participate in debate by directly
giving opinions and making arguments (ibid:339).
Ari Adut (2012:244), a critic of the dominant Habermas public sphere,
believes in the semiotic public sphere, one made of spaces – be it a public
street or the internet – that contain common semiotics (signs) which shape
the relationship between people who provide and share content. Adut says
it is a realistic sphere, unlike the dominant sphere, composed of a
“collection of strangers whose attention is fixed on the same thing”
(ibid:254).
Contrary to Habermas, Bourdieu believes the public sphere needs to
be large, not small, to achieve its full potential (Benson, 2009:183).
Bourdieu’s field theory (he does not use the term ‘public sphere’) includes a
number of overlapping fields – political, religious, academic, and so on –
and they “compete to impose [their] particular vision of the social world on
society as a whole” (ibid:183). Both Habermas and Bourdieu agree on the
ideal of the better argument prevailing.
3.3 Conclusion
Web 2.0 has revolutionised, or re-awakened, the public sphere. Habermas
himself is philosophical and concedes, despite earlier resistance, that the internet
might, after all, have contributed to changing his public sphere theory:
There is considerable evidence attesting to the ambivalent nature of the
democratic potential of a public sphere whose infrastructure is marked by
the growing selective constraints imposed by electronic mass
communication. Thus if today I made another attempt to analyse the
structural transformation of the public sphere, I am not sure what its
outcome would be for a theory of democracy – maybe one that could give
cause for a less pessimistic assessment and for an outlook going beyond
the formulation of merely defiant postulates (1997:457).
26. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 26 | 106
The public sphere as laid out by Habermas, therefore, must undergo “some
critical… reconstruction” to fit in the present day social media realities, and this is
reflected in the discussion that will be held in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
Habermas’ key principles of equal status and access to the public sphere, no
limitations in discussions and consensus still hold firm. This all plays out in a
scenario where the internet presents “the possibility of a qualitative shift” Coleman
(1999:69) in the means of political communication. It provides the space for more
participation in virtual public spheres, providing people with an “online megaphone”
(Grech, forthcoming:51) to make their opinion heard. It also allows spectators and
collectors the opportunity to build their opinion even if they do not want to be part
of the debate itself. Coleman suggests that new media are a “paradigmatically
distinct and potentially empowering” (1999:69), offers people a great opportunity to
contribute to the decision-making process. However, he notes that new media
provide no guarantee for increased democracy, and may fall into the habits of the
existing media, having a few publish to many rather than many-to-many. It is
universally acknowledged that the utopian public sphere per se does not exist, but
the concept, even if the subject of fierce debate, is a reality. It took decades for
people, including politicians, to get used to the workings of the media as a public
sphere, and it will also take time to adapt to the social media as the new platforms
for a modern-day public sphere. This may be especially hard for politicians used to
doing what was done in the past. These points form an integral part of the themes
explored in Chapter 5.
27. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 27 | 106
Chapter 4: Methodology
4.1 Methodology
The research was carried out in three stages using a sequential model of the
mixed methods research (Wimmer and Dominick, 2013:121). First, qualitative and
quantitative surveys were undertaken to build a picture of the use of social media
among voters (Appendices A and B) and politicians (Appendix T) in Malta. In both
cases, pilot testing (Mytton, 1999:72) was carried out and changes made
according to the feedback received. Also, within the limits imposed by the scope of
this dissertation, reliability and validity issues were addressed (Hansen 2005:18-
19; Deacon et al, 2007:133-136). In the final stage, interviews were held with key
stakeholders as a form of triangulation and to obtain deeper insight into the topic.
4.2 Quantitative survey among voters
In the first instance, a questionnaire (Appendices A and B) was commissioned
to explore people’s use of social media via-à-vis politicians. The universe (Mytton,
1999:23: Wimmer and Dominik, 2012:89) for this survey was the population of
Malta of voting age. MISCO, a local company in Malta, carried out the survey. A
stratified random sample method (Mytton, 1999:29: Wimmer and Dominik,
2012:101: Deacon et al, 2007:49) was chosen to ensure equal representation of
gender, location, age, and occupation (Appendices C, D, E, F, G). This method
was chosen for a number of reasons – first, it encompassed the entire country and
socio-economic grouping, and avoided the potential limitations as is the case with
mall intercepts (Wimmer and Dominick, 2012:95). Second, this type of survey
allows for a better distribution across the different age groups. Thirdly, this type of
survey is time and cost effective. A total of 437 people were contacted randomly
and 200 responses were achieved, resulting in an answer rate of 45.7 per cent.
This figure (200) is described by Comrey and Lee (1992, quoted in Wimmer and
Dominick, 2012:105) as ‘”fair” for a sample for generalisation. The survey was
conducted via mobile phones as mobile telephony coverage in Malta is around 88
per cent (Malta Communications Authority, 2014b), making this medium ideal
because researchers could find the person targeted by the survey, as opposed to
phoning a landline where any member resident in a household could answer. The
28. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 28 | 106
respondents for the survey were aged from 18 to 74 (Appendices C and D). Just
over half (53.5 percent) were male (Appendix E). Respondents came from all over
Malta, including 11 from Gozo (Appendix F), the other inhabited island of the
country. Respondents came from a wide spectrum of backgrounds – from lawyers
and company directors to government employees, housewives and people living
on social benefits (Appendix G). Back calls were also made to ensure the answers
given were as indicated in the survey results (Mytton, 1999:79). To verify the
results through triangulation (Wimmer and Dominick, 2012:49, Helland, 2007:16,
Seiter, 1996:19-20), three participants from the voters’ survey and three from the
politicians’ survey were selected for in-depth interviews. For the voters, a true
random number generator (random.org) was used to give all respondents an equal
chance of being selected for the interviews. This computer system selects a
number between one and a specified number and chooses randomly. Of the 200
respondents, 42 had indicated that they were willing to participate in the in-depth
interviews, hence the computer number generator was set from one to 42. A
number of selections was made before suitable candidates were found. It proved
difficult to convince people to participate in an in-depth interview since the timing of
the requests coincided with local elections and a referendum on spring hunting,
both of which created an intensification of the polarisation in the country (see
Chapter 2, pg:11, 12). Based on sampling and statistical theory, the standard error
of the survey was calculated based on a standard formula (Mytton, 1999:43). This
dissertation used a 95 percent confidence limit. As an example to calculate the
standard error, the percentage of people (49%) who use the internet several times
a day (x) (Appendix J) was used, with the sample size (n) of 200, the total number
of respondents. The formula suggested by Mytton was as follows:
x (100 – x)
n
29. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 29 | 106
There, the standard error, using the example cited above, is calculated as
follows:
The result was a standard error value of 3.5 percent, and with a 95 percent
confidence rate, two standard deviations from the mean were used to find the true
figure for a result (Mytton, 1999:41, 42). Therefore, keeping the same example, the
true figure of people in Malta using the internet many times a day would fall
anywhere between 42 percent and 56 percent.
4.3 Politicians’ survey
At the same time, a descriptive survey (Wimmer and Dominick, 2012:192) was
conducted among politicians to explore their use of social media as a virtual public
sphere platform to connect with the electorate. The universe for the survey was all
politicians, and candidates who were approved to stand for the next elections on
behalf of the three main political parties. No sampling was required as the
relatively small size of the politician population made it easy to include the entire
politicians’ population in Malta. A total of 131 politicians were contacted, but it was
later found that one participant was not a politician. Of the remainder, 35 replied,
with a higher-than-expected response rate of 26.9 percent (Appendix U). The
exercise, conducted online by the service provider Survey Monkey, ran for two
weeks and included one reminder. One risk with this survey was that politicians
could answer according to what they expect people want to hear, and may also
exaggerate their social media use.
Using a similar calculation as the one suggested by Mytton, a more precise
estimate can be determined for the politicians’ survey. The question used as an
example is whether Twitter feedback was positive or somewhat positive, with 60
percent choosing this option (Appendix AH). Therefore:
49 (100 – 49)
200
60 (100 – 60)
130
30. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 30 | 106
In this case, the standard error is 4.3 percent, so the real percentage of positive
or somewhat positive feedback politicians get from Twitter ranges from 55.7
percent to 64.3 percent.
4.4 In-depth interviews
The final qualitative part of the methodology included in-depth interviews with
voters, politicians, journalists and academics. These types of interviews allow for
standard questions to be asked, followed by specific questions based on the
answers received (Wimmer and Dominick, 2012:142) and specific to the research
topic. The semi-structured face-to-face interviews (Deacon et al, 2007:67) allowed
for considerable flexibility and better options to explore the question. However,
there are disadvantages, namely moving off topic, interviewer or interviewee
fatigue, interviewer bias and interviewees mentioning what people expect to hear.
The idea of a focus group (Wimmer and Dominick, 2012:136) including all or some
respondents was not considered because of the high risk of conflict, the potential
for using this research as a political platform and logistical problems. All the
required ethical standards involving human research, following the University of
Leicester guidelines, were adopted for the interviews.
31. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 31 | 106
Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion
5.1 Introduction
This section discusses the findings from the data collected for this research
project, including a survey conducted among voters aged 18 to 74, a survey
among all party-affiliated Maltese politicians, and 12 in-depth interviews with
politicians, journalists, academics and voters. The transcripts of the interviews are
available if required.
5.2 Survey among voters
A survey was conducted among eligible voters in Malta, which totalled just over
333,000 people for the last general elections in 2013 (Electoral Commission Malta,
2013). A total of 200 respondents were interviewed. There was a near equal
percentage of voters from the two major political parties, 30.5 percent from the
Labour Party (LP), 28 percent from the Nationalist Party (PN), and one percent
from Alternattiva Demokratika (AD). A further 30.5 percent refused to state any
party allegiance (Appendix M).
Two out of three respondents use social media (Appendix I), half of whom used
the internet several times a day and a further 33 percent going online at least once
a day (Appendix J). Unsurprisingly, 96.3 percent said they had a Facebook profile
(Appendix K), while 17.8 percent used Twitter (Appendix L). The main reason for
using social media for 45.9 percent was social activities, and 23 percent for news.
Barely five percent of respondents said politics was the most important reason why
they use social media.
The survey showed that 48.7 percent said television was their main sources of
news, with 14.2 per cent and 11.7 percent respectively putting Facebook and
newspapers in second and third places (Appendix H). Twitter was not chosen as
the main source of news by any respondent. Just 37 percent of the electorate
followed politicians on social media (Appendix N). The vast majority of
respondents (83 percent) said they had no objections to politicians having a
presence on social media, with only 8.1 percent objecting (Appendix O). There is a
near equal split on the trustworthiness of politicians in the eyes of the electorate. A
32. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 32 | 106
total of 47.4 percent said they could not speak openly with politicians, compared to
42.2 percent who said they could (Appendix P).
Somewhat contradictorily, 86.5 percent of respondents said social media was a
good tool for politicians to communicate with people, with just seven percent
disagreeing (Appendix Q). Asked if social media was a good place to discuss
issues such as politics and religion, 71 percent agreed (Appendix R). Comments
from respondents varied, from warnings that social media can be misused, to
claims that Facebook in particular should be used for genuine discussion through
informed debate. Another said he felt uncomfortable ‘talking’ on Facebook
because people did not really know who was on the other end.
5.3 Politicians’ survey
A survey was conducted among politicians to determine their use and
perception of social media. The response rate, just under 27 percent (Appendix U),
was higher than expected. This may be explained by the interest politicians have
in the new media platforms. Of the respondents, 97 percent made use of social
media (Appendix W), two-thirds of whom did so “to connect with the electorate,
speak to constituents and get a feel for what people want/need” (suggested
answer) (Appendix X). Publicity, with a weighted average of 1.87 (versus 1.44 for
the most popular answer), was also deemed important. When asked if they felt
they would be disadvantaged (versus other candidates) without social media
accounts, 94 percent agreed (Appendix Y). Politicians in Malta see constituents
from their district as their main target audience (71 percent), but were open to
welcoming anybody from any party and any location (65 percent) to ‘like’ their
page or join them as ‘friends’ (Appendix Z). Practically all politicians, 97 percent,
had a Facebook page and most, 67 percent, used it for both personal and political
goals. Feedback for the overwhelming majority was either very or somewhat
positive (88 per cent). While 30 per cent said they believed feedback was honest,
nearly half (45.5 per cent) said feedback was not always honest. A respondent
said: “Facebook is good to assess trends but feedback is not always genuine.”
Asked whether Facebook is an appropriate site for a public discussion, a near
equal amount agreed and disagreed (27 percent and 24 percent respectively), but
half the respondents said it depended on what subject was being discussed
(Appendices AA-AG).
33. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 33 | 106
Slightly fewer politicians, three in four, have a Twitter account. Similar to
Facebook, 60 percent said feedback was very or somewhat positive, but 40
percent gave no answer. The use of Twitter is not as widespread as Facebook,
and politicians’ reactions were also slightly more cautious. One respondent
claimed that care was required as feedback was “politically motivated”, while
another warned against fake account, a point also raised by Nilsson and Carlsson
(2013:8). Despite the concerns, 44 percent still believed that Twitter was suitable
for public discussions, although 32 percent disagreed (Appendices AF-AJ). The
majority of Maltese politicians (68 percent) believe voters engaged them in
discussion and debate, a theory backed by a further 29 percent who said this
happened sometimes (Appendix AK). Confirming a long-held belief that Maltese
voters were loyal to their party; 71 percent of politicians believed that people vote
for ‘their’ party irrespective of whatever happens or results achieved (Appendix
AL). Despite this belief, a number of respondents said the situation in Malta was
changing:
No party can rely on their core group any more. As shown in previous
elections [in 2013] a great majority of people are ready to switch between
one party to another sometimes out of conviction, and in other instances out
of convenience. But that is democracy after all (PN parliamentarian).
The number of floating voters is increasing. [This is a] positive attitude
(LP candidate).
I was about to press the first answer [people vote for same party
whatever happens], but I believe that the electorate is changing and social
media is key in this shift. Social media users are more connected to their
networks rather than party affiliates (PN candidate).
Although in the past the trend was that a large percentage of people
followed their party whatever happens, this seems to have changed over
the past 10 years, thus making the local political scene more interesting to
follow and making politicians more accountable (LP candidate).
Numerous politicians commented that they used social media to raise
awareness on important issues, for publicity, and to keep abreast of what was
happening. “It’s a very powerful tool to relay your message and share your
thoughts while receiving instant feedback,” one LP candidate said.
34. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 34 | 106
5.4 In-depth interviews
Twelve in-depth interviews were conducted to further explore the question
posed by this research project. The interviewees included Prime Minister Joseph
Muscat and Opposition Leader Simon Busuttil. Their views were not only important
in terms of their role as political leaders, together with AD Chairman Arnold
Cassola, but also because they were among the first adopters of social media
tools in the Maltese politicians’ community. Three people, who had participated in
the voters’ survey, were also interviewed. These six interviews were also included
for triangulation purposes (Deacon et al, 2007:33). Additionally, four academics –
Carmen Sammut (media scholar), Fr Joseph Borg (senior lecturer at the University
of Malta), Martin Debattista (digital media researcher) and Alex Grech (strategist
and social media academic) – and two Times of Malta journalists, Herman Grech
(Head of Media) and Kristina Chetcuti, were also interviewed.
5.5 Findings and discussion
The key question being raised is whether politicians contribute to dialogue
Facebook and Twitter public spheres. To do this, the particularities and history of
Malta as outlined in Chapter 2 must be borne in mind. The “ethnic hostilities”
between political factions (Baldacchino, 2002) are still prevalent in Malta,
especially during election times. Malta, after all, has a typical southern European
polarised pluralist political system. It is evident in the connections between the
people and its political leaders:
Polarized pluralist systems are typically complex political systems with
many contending parties, often themselves made up of contending factions.
This results in a public sphere that is structured differently from the liberal
public sphere in which the central element of political communication is
assumed to be the appeal of political actors to a mass public of individual
citizens. In a multiparty system of this sort, the most important element of
political communication is the process of bargaining that takes place among
parties, factions, and other social actors allied with them. Much of this
process of communication takes place outside the open public sphere, or
enters it tangentially or in coded, cryptic form. (Hallin and Mancini,
2004:132).
35. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 35 | 106
Hallin and Mancini’s description paints a realistic picture of the Maltese political
circumstances, but social media have given people strong platforms from where to
voice their opinions, whether symbolically or vociferously, as individuals or a public
of private people. This section explores how Malta’s oral culture has moved from
village squares to the information superhighway, and how politicians are
influencing users on these platforms, and vice-versa.
5.5.1 Debate? What debate?
Fr Joseph Borg, a seasoned media expert and senior lecturer at the University
of Malta, explains that Malta has an oral culture and the “intervening time between
the oral culture and electronic culture was short and we did not have an
intervening period of print as others did“. It must be remembered, he submits, that
the Maltese alphabet was only standardised in the 1930s. Malta’s psycho-cultural
needs were first satisfied via radio phone-ins after pluralisation in the 1990s and
now by social media. True as this may be, strategist and social media academic
Alex Grech asserts that Maltese “do not have a culture of debate”, adding: “We do
not know how to articulate ideas in this country. It’s only red (LP) or blue (PN). As
long as we remain so polarised, we are incapable of having a debate...” Dahlberg
(2007) also states that opposing factions often do not want to listen to the other
side. This leads like-minded people to create their own private sphere of
discussion, with the inherent risk of further strengthening extreme views rather
than seeking consensus. Dr Grech claims that nobody cares whether Joe Public
says anything, except members of his echo chamber. “This does not mean that
nobody is listening. Some people are very influential in their own group, but that’s
very difficult in the public sphere.” He describes Malta as having a hyperlocal
clientelist populist public sphere, insisting that a Habermasian public sphere
“doesn’t exist and I doubt it will ever happen”. Media scholar Carmen Sammut
agrees that the public sphere in the Habermasian sense does not exist, but this
was true anywhere, as suggested by Fraser (1997:113) and others. She maintains
that “you can have a variety of voices in society who engage in dialogue and
negotiation… Joe Public says his own, too, but in his echo chamber, in his sphere,
in his group of people”, an idea also suggested by Habermas, who claimed that
this also created a “homogenous climate of opinion” (1989:213). A public sphere
does exist, however, and Dr Sammut notes that media personalities act as
36. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 36 | 106
“multipliers” and “opinion leaders” who have their say and create other public
spheres. Herman Grech, of the Times of Malta, is also sceptical about Maltese
people’s ability to debate: “The first thing we do is not think how we can attack an
argument with another argument but calling them names.” Mr Grech observes that
his newspaper’s online platform is “probably the main forum” for online
engagement, but admits that the debate on the newspaper’s portal is not always
“the most intelligent”. This aligns with O’Neill (2010, quoted in Nilsson and
Carlsson, 2013:3), who warned that popular interference could lead to a
“trivialisation of politics” and important legislation may be influenced by “populist”
thinking. Also, Rasmussen’s (2014) affirms that the quality of debate online was
generally poor and the best argument does not necessarily prevail, as is the case
with a Habermasian public sphere. This thinking also ties in with the notion of the
tyranny of the majority (Thomassen, 2010). Digital media researcher Martin
Debattista contends that Maltese people fail when it comes to contributions to the
public sphere because “we are not mature in the way we contribute to the public
sphere. Part of the problem is cultural. We (the Maltese)… are hot headed
Mediterraneans”. Housewife Patricia Tabone, from St Julian’s, insists that it is not
a matter of debate, but rather people expressing an opinion either to create a
controversy or raise awareness, suggesting that, “it’s not a debate where there’s a
conversation… I don’t think there is room for discussion.” This may also be
because for older generations, the days when fear of retribution prevailed may still
be around, making people wary of what to say and to whom. Many interviewees –
AD chairman Arnold Cassola, Kristina Chetcuti, Fr Borg and Dr Grech – contend it
may be just a perception, but it nonetheless exists. The sixties to the eighties were
characterised by political violence and expressing an opinion against the
government could result in being targeted. Those years were blighted by violent
acts, both psychological and physical (Vella, 2015). This has led many people to
be fearful of openly expressing an opinion and may have also affected the
deliberative skills of an entire generation.
Although the ability of Maltese people to debate is quested by many
interviewees, the research shows that many public spheres exist and people are
engaging in debate, even if this does not necessarily take on the form of a
conversation. All three party leaders concur. PN Leader Simon Busuttil claims that
politicians who have thousands of followers (on social media) will inevitably find it
37. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 37 | 106
difficult to carry out a genuine conversation-type debate because of the sheer
volume of feedback. Apart from the personal messages he receives, his strategy is
to raise issues on social media, which generally results in a “flood” of answers. It
may not be a one-on-one conversation, but the results are equally positive. Prime
Minister Joseph Muscat finds the feedback of people who message him privately
(using social media platforms, including Facebook’s Messenger) more valuable.
This results in the creation of the persona of a politician focused on appeasing the
strong polarisation existing on the islands, which, Dr Muscat remarks, still affects
the way in which the Maltese people debate. AD Chairman Prof. Cassola stresses
that through direct messages, for example on Facebook, the party receives
valuable information and also creates meaningful bonds with potential voters. This
creates a valuable tool for two-way conversation, he notes.
Stephen Muscat, a 24-year-old web designer who participated in the voters’ survey,
opines that the internet is a great tool for politicians to communicate with people. His
views match Ubayasiri (2006:4), who terms the internet a “global ‘public sphere’”. Mr
Muscat’s outlook is also backed by statistics which put internet penetration in Malta at 71
percent, and in the 90+ percentage region for people aged 18-49 (Malta Communications
Authority, 2014a). It also means, however, that a considerable proportion of the populatin
does not have access to social media public spheres where, Mr Muscat insists, debate in
the public sphere is taking place, even though content is superficial and often degenerates
and ends up in insults, a common global trend in online debate (Coleman, 1999; Iosifidis,
2010; Nilsson and Carlsson, 2013). Sunstein (2009, quoted in Rasmussen
2014:1,323) suggests that homogenous groups meet online with the result that
views become more extreme. Ironically, the verbal abuse often targeted at the AD
leader on social media has had some beneficial effects, as Prof. Cassola explains:
Unless they are extremely bad, I tend to leave them [the comments], I
prefer having a few insults as they normally get a reaction, [people]
defending [the party and me]. I tend to not intervene as much as possible. It
helps to create a dialogue and more attention... but then you have the
private messages, which I think are the best. Those are the people who are
really involved.
Degenerating into “bad-tempered” tirades is the result of a lack in debating
skills, as suggested by Coleman (1999, quoted in Iosifidis, 2010:624) and Nilsson
38. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 38 | 106
and Carlsson, (2013:7). Foul-mouthed antics are often the result of Maltese
people’s obsession with politics, as Dr Busuttil notes that:
in the absence of having our favourite football team playing in the
Champions League, the national obsession here in Malta is with politics and
politicians. And obviously, the higher your rank as a politician, the higher the
obsession with you – in favour and against. What I realised when I was
elected two years ago (as PN leader) is that from one day to the next, half
the country hated me.
Polarisation in Malta runs deep, making contact between opposing factions
somewhat difficult. Politicians often post or tweet remarks that while seemingly
innocuous, could encourage people into resorting to abusing opponents.
Reflecting Gibson’s (2004, quoted in Nilsson and Carlsson, 2013:8) suggestion
that new media created “better contact between elected officials and citizens”, Dr
Busuttil remarks that:
this is part of the price that one has to pay for this free space, but that’s a
small price to pay for such an ample space, for such a great possibility and
for such great empowerment for people to express their views and for
democracy to flourish.
With such platforms available, and all the opportunities they offer, people have
been quick to flock to social media, especially Facebook. The next section will
discuss politicians’ presence on social media and their interaction with the users of
these platforms, most of whom are the same voters who will determine, through
the ballot box, whether the same politicians are elected to office.
5.5.2 Politicians on social media
When social media became popular in Malta, politicians started populating the
likes of Facebook and Twitter. Some are conversant with the ‘netiquette’ that
governs the use of Facebook and Twitter, others are not. In an article in Times of
Malta (2012), journalist Christian Peregin writes that “social media experts are
neither convinced nor impressed by the ‘conservative’ approaches adopted by the
political parties, where interaction is far from raw and somewhat staged.” Peregin
contends that the PN website only allowed private messages rather than public
comments, and the leaders’ attempts at connecting with people via online chat
39. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 39 | 106
tools were more for show than anything. He quotes blogger Alison Bezzina, who
suggests that “it would make more sense to have open internet forums where
people were left free to criticise and ask questions while someone diligently
addressed issues”. In the same article, social media expert Toni Sant is reported
as stating that “both parties are using social media too blatantly to push their
political messages without a human touch.” Kristina Chetcuti, also from the Times
of Malta, wrote an article in 2013 severely criticising politicians for their dim
approach to Facebook. ‘Good Day to All!!! Politicians’ pathetic use of social media’
(Chetcuti, 2013) argues that people in Malta are polarised, sticking to one group or
another, but never crossing swords in debate. Today, things are not that different,
with social media used as billboards with no dialogue, Ms Chetcuti remarks during
an interview for this research project, adding that “I think in Malta we are still in the
‘I’m happy I’m on Facebook’ stage and many politicians… still haven’t realised
what to use it for.” Even Prime Minister Muscat admits that most politicians use
social media as a billboard. Opposition Leader Simon Busuttil claims that even
though it may have been the case, things are changing:
Maybe initially one might have been a bit overzealous... Sometimes,
when a tool is new, you might not know how to use it well. I think now with
experience, people (politicians) are using it better.
Dr Sammut disagrees, insisting that many politicians still do not know how to
use Facebook and “many end up being ridiculed and use it in a way that shows
exactly what they are – big-headed [and] frivolous…” Asked to rate politicians’
contribution to the networked public sphere, Dr Grech replied: “To the public
sphere? Absolutely nothing, just broadcast. They have no idea of engaging with
anybody except people in the media… That’s what we are doing now, fabricating
our public persona online.” This may stem from the fact that social media platforms
are an extension of Malta’s oral culture, Fr Borg continues, “giving another
dimension to our orality. Instead of being at the grocer, at a bar or on the bus-stop,
I now have, theoretically, a universal forum…”. It is “light-years easier,” Fr Borg
observes, “to post something rather than call a radio station or write a letter to a
newspaper”, which previously were the only means a person had to contribute to
the public sphere. “Phone-in programmes and social media are a technologically
more refined manifestation of our orality,” Fr Borg continues, supporting what
40. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 40 | 106
Klinger and Svensson describe as social media being a “networked-enhanced
word of mouth” (2014:8). Fr Borg opines that this has contributed to create a public
sphere that is “alive and kicking“, noting that there is an attempt by institutions to
influence this space in the same way that they try to influence traditional media, a
concern also raised by Dr Sammut. In this, they corroborate the view of
Rasmussen (2014:1318), who warned of pressure from politicians and media
commentary. Dr Grech concedes that the Maltese “nascent public sphere” is
blighted by political manoeuvring. This was done in a subtle manner, Prof. Cassola
remarks, and authorities try to “depict you as a crackpot” if you contradict them.
However, Fr Borg claims these attempts at influencing the social media space are
drowned out by the sheer numbers of contributors to the public sphere. The
scenario is relatively new for politicians used to one-way communication, with
social media giving people the opportunity to have their opinion heard. There is “a
vibrant debate”, Fr Borg insists, even if people appear to be following party or
church lines:
Now you might say that when people debate, they are mirroring what the
party [they support] or the church is saying. But in reality, they are reflecting
the party because the party is a reflection of the people … I believe that
Maltese people, given a chance, want to express themselves. And
cyberspace is giving them the chance to express themselves without any
constraints.
Unlike in the ‘old’ days of newspapers, when a handful of people wrote letters to
the editor, comments today come from a variety of people. Accordingly, Fr Borg
notes, the reach is incredible, as shown by recent controversies that garnered
support from thousands in a very short time. It is these voices, however muted,
that come together and influence politicians’ decisions. Rasmussen (2014),
quoting Habermas, claims that the public sphere debate was not intended as a
decision-making tool but to allow people to voice their opinions for people in
authority to hear and act accordingly. Dr Busuttil believes Facebook has
strengthened the process of democratisation as it empowers people to speak:
I think it (social media) is an open space, it’s a free space and it’s a
space that politicians would do well to get used to. If you can’t handle social
41. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 41 | 106
media, then you can’t handle people. And I think it is a good opportunity to
have interactive exchanges with people.
Malta may be a ‘Facebook country’, as described by Dr Busuttil, but Mr
Debattista believes that digital literacy needs teaching, because “it’s one thing
pressing a button, but it’s another thing knowing what you are doing when you are
pressing that button.” Politicians who try to create their own rules on Facebook are
bound to fail, Mr Debattista states, adding:
’If I have to be on Facebook, I won’t do this, I won’t do that. I will do this, I
will do that. These are boundaries. Be careful, tread careful[ly] – but I am on
Facebook’. Politicians who act this way are not maximising the potential of
Facebook. They would be erecting a protective wall, but there is a flip side.
It protects you from outside threats but it also hinders you from venturing
outside and engaging with people.
The result is that while politicians may be seen as present, and their efforts may
also influence a number of people to act in certain ways, social media users are
not passive members of the platform and the building barriers may have undesired
results. Institutions and politicians, Mr Debattista comments, are adopting new
technology that could lead to the “emergence of a new hierarchy (Benkler,
2006:241). However, this is not happening:
Here, the usual [Maltese] self-defence mechanisms kick in. So you see a
lot of government departments and ministries on Facebook, but do they
allow contributions on their walls from users? Not all of them, because they
fear losing control when the whole issue of public sphere is not having
control. By its nature, the public sphere should be an open platform and
everyone can contribute. If you control the public sphere, it’s still public and
still a sphere, but it is reminiscent of dictatorial public sphere where
everything is controlled, 1984-like.
Dr Grech reiterates that one of the problems is that politicians “are not educated
in the fine art of digital literacy”. Showing your face and not communicating is mere
distraction, he insists. The crux of social media is not simply posting a message,
but getting a message back and inviting others to talk and debate (Stewart-Weeks
in Grant et al, 2010:594). Proving Dr Grech’s point, Sliema pensioner Lawrence
Pisani, who participated in the voters’ survey, suggests that politicians should learn
42. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 42 | 106
how to use social media, noting that “some comments are childish and ridiculous
and you just want to turn off… and say ‘to hell with them’.” Often, posts are very
superficial and do not delve deeply enough into issues. Mr Pisani argues. He
believes Facebook and Twitter constitute a public sphere, but criticises politicians
for being absent or evasive, noting that “the debate right now is between
individuals and not politicians… From politicians, I’m afraid, they either ignore you
completely or the answer is… vague.” Ms Tabone, a 38-year-old voter who also
participated in the survey, points out that it is not easy to communicate with
politicians on social media, adding: “I don’t think you get through to a politician
through Facebook or Twitter. It’s more for you [to] know what they are doing…”
She notes that before the last election, leaders held Google Hangouts and online
chats with people, but these stopped, which she described as “a pity because… if
it were done on a weekly basis for half an hour, you’d get the people’s pulse of
what they are really going through...”.
On the other hand, Fr Borg submits that ‘meeting’ people on social media is
better for politicians than appearing on television, as the former was as close as
possible to meeting people in real life, permitting “a sort of in between direct
personal contact and mass media [exposure]”. Facebook is tantamount to the
village square where politicians and people can chat about mundane things, but
also about important issues, irrespective of the fact that sometimes politicians
sometimes write senseless posts. This interaction is crucial and helps define the
relationship between politicians and constituents. Fr Borg argues it is fine if
politicians post a picture of their village feast, for example, as this is an important
aspect of the Maltese culture. They should also raise pertinent questions on
important issues, such as noise pollution at these boisterous feasts. This,
however, was not happening, which might explain why this research has shown
that politicians’ contributions fall short of expectations, leading many interviewees
to insist that these contributions were often shallow and lack depth. However, the
vast majority of respondents in the voters’ survey welcome politicians on social
media, and politicians, in a separate survey, also claimed to receive mostly
positive feedback from people. The next section discusses how people act on
social media and the way these platforms can bridge voters and politicians.
43. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 43 | 106
5.5.3 Pressing ‘like’
As mentioned by Mr Debattista in the previous section, there is more to social
media than pressing a button. By pressing ‘like’ on Facebook or ‘favourite’ on
Twitter, you sends a message. “You are taking a position,” Fr Borg opines, as a
large number of likes or signing online petitions is intended to put pressure on the
authorities. So while politicians and institutions try their best to influence people, it
may be more a case of people influencing politicians. It is easy for people, from the
comfort of their home, to support a cause. Mirroring Nilsson and Carlsson’s
concern on what they term a “push-the-button democracy” (2013:9), Dr Sammut
believes it should go deeper than simply pressing ‘like’:
I think it gives you the perception that you are participating in the public
sphere, that you are making your opinion felt, but when it comes to
substantive politics it doesn’t mean anything. There is a difference between
pressing ‘like’ and then following up with total inaction… People fleetingly
like something, more fleetingly look at an issue, and then move on to
discuss something totally different. And they are under the impression that
because they pressed ‘like’ a few times or commented on a subject, they
are changing things. I think it requires a bit more than that.
That is only half the picture, Dr Sammut continues, suggesting that there is a
health debate over and above just pressing ‘like’. She insists that politicians can
hear people directly on social media or through third parties. Dr Sammut uses the
example of political party executives who may be exposed and influenced by
opinions they hear of social media platforms, and adopt these opinions as their
own. This is the true, real concept of the public sphere in action. These opinions,
presented to the executive bodies, can then be assimilated into the party’s line of
thinking. Dr Sammut adds:
Political parties are accepting the fact that you cannot have one
monolithic perspective. Today, whoever is in political structures has to
accept the fact that they are going to be challenged more. And if they want
to remain in their position, they have to feel the pulse of the people. Social
media is a way of doing this…”
Fr Borg takes on a different perspective and insists that influencing anyone,
especially people who have a formed opinion, is difficult. Even the majority of
44. MA in Communications, Media and PR Stephen Chetcuti
P a g e 44 | 106
politicians (70 percent), surveyed for this dissertation, claim that people vote for
their party whatever the party did, a fact that underlines the importance of people’s
political identity, which forms an intrinsic part of Maltese social fabric. Just eight
percent of the people surveyed disagreed with having politicians on social media,
possibly in the belief that their presence leads to further polarisation and division.
The results are unsurprising if you believe Mr Grech (Times of Malta) who insists
that “there are still a lot of people who simply do what their leader tells them”. One
case in point was the spring hunting referendum. Mr Grech suggests that “had Dr
Muscat kept out of it… it would have gone for a No vote. But he decided to speak
out… and he did so because he realised he could sway it.” In the end, the Yes
vote won by a very small majority. Dr Muscat, who admitted to bringing up the
subject twice in the run-up to the vote, disagrees with Mr Grech, suggesting that
such assumptions were an affront to people’s intelligence. Dr Muscat asserts that
politicians’ role is very important in society:
When politicians in any society are absent, a vacuum is created that is
filled by other people, maybe not politicians, but some of these [people]
eventually end up [becoming] politicians... People look for some sort of
leadership, not necessarily to agree with what is being said, but even to
smear them. Most of the times, the debate on a subject or on an idea being
put forward by a leader – be it the cultural sphere, political sphere or
religious – is the raison d’etre of the public sphere. Remove it, and what is
left? One of the key roles of the public sphere is to influence the decisions
you are taking (as a politician). If there is nobody to influence, or nobody is
listening, the whole reason for debate ends.
Dr Busuttil concedes that politicians concurrently manipulate and contribute to
the public sphere:
It’s a bit of both. I suppose that in politics there is a great deal of
manipulation, but there is also a great deal of contribution to achieving the
truth, to pursuing worthwhile objectives. I would like to think that I am in
politics to do that and not to waste my time by fooling around and being
more of a salesman than a statesman.
That might be the case for Dr Busuttil, whose parliamentary seat is safe, but
things may be different for candidates who face serious competition to get elected.
