1. Et Tu Caesar?
Julius Caesar: Another traditional republican aristocrat or a genuine political
innovator?

2. Contents
Acknowledgments P.1
Introduction P.2-3
Chapter 1: Caesar as a man: Does Caesar present a new personality to Rome? P.3-5
Chapter 2: Caesar’s political dealings and manoeuvres P.5-7
Chapter 3: Are Caesar’s reforms innovative? P.7-9
Chapter 4: Caesar’s Ideology: Popularis, traditionalist or something different? P.9-12
Chapter 5: Did Caesar aim for sole power from an early age? P.12-14
Conclusion P.14-15
Bibliography P.16-17

3. Acknowledgments
For Granddad: Thank you for making History fun for me and inspiring me to carry on learning. I
would not have been here without you!
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4. Introduction
“There are individualswhose livesburnthroughthe mistsof historylike the pathof acomet”
(Griffin,2009, 1). JuliusCaesaris undoubtedlyone of these individuals.Bornaroundthe turnof the
firstcenturyBC to a patricianfamilythathad notbeenrecentlydistinguished (Badian,2009, 14),
Caesarproceeded tobecome aconstant figure of fascinationeveninthe presentday andperhaps
one of the mostfamousmento have everlived.Regardlessof whatone maythinkof Caesar’s
politicsandrulings,he undoubtedlywasagreat man,thoughnot necessarilyagoodone.
Whenone considershisfabledskill inthe areasof militaryleadership, soldiery,oratory,politicsand
literacy(Suet. Jul. 55-60; Goldsworthy,2006, 1), one beginstounderstandwhyandhow Tatum
creditedhimwithhavingachievedmore thanmostfictional heroescouldeverhope to (Tatum, 2008,
21). Harnessingthese talentsandcoupling themwithakeenmindandamagneticpersonality,
Caesarcarved a legendarybutcontroversialpaththroughthe fabricof the Roman Republicwhich
culminatedinavictoriouscivil war andwhatsome may call a despoticdictatorship (Cic. Phil. 2.114).
Whilstsaiddictatorshipwascutshort byhis historicmurderinthe senate house, Caesar
undoubtedlystartedthe republicona paththat ledto a firmly entrenchedmonarchy thatchanged
the face of Rome and thus,Europe permanently.Naturally,Caesar’slife hasattractedaconsiderable
amountof attentioninthe proceeding millenniasince hisdeath.Caesar’s commentaries have been
readthe worldoverbyleadersandgenerals lookingtolearnfromhispolitical style,suchasCharles
V,KingLouisXVIand the two Napoleons(Canfora,2009, 431; Nicolet,2009, 411-416). The awe and
respectthatemanatesfromCaesar’slegacycouldbe seeninEurope as late as the twentiethcentury
withfiguressuchas KaisersandTsars still usingaderivativeof hisname,somethingthatwas
universallyidentifiedasbeingsynonymouswithexcellencyandpower.
Althoughhe isconsideredanawe-inspiringfigure wholivedinawell-documentedage there are
considerable gapsinknowledgeconcerningCaesar. Specificdetailsof hisearlyyears,forexample,
remainshroudedinmystery.Thatwhich we doknow has beenregularly contestedwhichservesto
intensifyinterestinCaesarandfeed the seeminglyendlesssupplyof literature thathopesto
encapsulate hisextraordinarylife.
Caesar’slegacyattracts controversyand debate inspite of the factthat hisera is oftenregardedas
one of the bestrecordedinRomanHistory(Goldsworthy,2006, 6). However,whenstudyingthe
ancientsources,one must alwaysconsideranumberof issues.Evenif one hasa wealthof material
to hand,as one may thinktheydowithCaesar,generallyonlyafractionof one percentof ancient
material survivestoday(Goldsworthy,2006, 6). One mustalsorememberthatnoancientwriterever
startedwritingwithouthisownbiases,trepidationsandmotives andtheirwork,inturn, waslikely
basedon otherbiasedandpotentiallyunreliablesources(Goldsworthy,2006, 8).
Those sourceswhichspecifically pertaintoCaesarharbourthese difficultiesandmore besides.
Caesar’sCommentaries, forexample,asidefromobviousconcernsaboutitsbiasedauthorare
reportedtohave beensaidto have beenincomplete roughdrafts fromwhichotherscoulddraw a
more elegantprose byCaesarhimself (Cic. Brut. 262).Othercontemporarysourcesare somewhat
sparse.The writingsof Oppiusand Pollio,whichare losttous now,are saidto have beenusedin
bothSuetoniusandPlutarchbuteventheyaren’twithouttheirproblems(Pelling,2009, 252-3).
Plutarchnotesinhis life of Pompey thatOppiuswasnot to be trustedwhentalkingaboutCaesar’s
friendsandenemies,likelybecauseof hisextensive patronage under Caesar(Plut. Pomp.10.7-9;
Gelzer,1968, 273). There are the extensivewritings of Cicerotoconsult,butas a lifelongopponent
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5. to Caesarand an admirerof the optimates,one mustinterprethisworkswithcaution (Mitchell,
1991, 1-2). Sallustpresentsafairlybalancedview of Caesarinspite of beingaclientof his.Evenhis
works,however, are hindered withaview thatall thatailedthe republicwasthe faultof the
increasinglyamoral nobilitas (Goldsworthy, 2006, 7). Movingon fromcontemporarysources,later
sourcesfindthemselves taintedbythe godlylegacyof Caesar.Afterdeificationnomortal couldbe
expectedtore-write the worksof agodwhichallowedthe blatantpropagandainthe variousworks
of Caesar(muchof whichare eitherlostoronlyfragmentarytoday) toperpetuate (Evans,2003, 67-
8). Thiscritique canbe intensifiedwhenone considersthathissuccessors,regardlessof their
opinionsof the dictator,were forcedtohonourhimincertainwayssuch as the annual games
celebratingthe Victoria Caesaris whichcouldnotbe feasiblycutoutof the people’scalendars
(Levick,2009, 209). Whilstithas beenarguedthatAugustus’attitude towardsCaesarisambiguous
at best,Cicerorecordsthat, as Octavian,he owedeverythingtohisname (Cic. Phil. 13.11.24). One
can theorise fromsuchthat if one was tocriticise Caesartoomuch one may have accidentally
slurredAugustus,somethingthatmayhave deterredancient writersfromrevisingthe contentsof
Caesar’sworkstoo thoroughly
Therefore,foralot of our informationonCaesarwe relyonsourcessuchas Appian, Suetonius,
Plutarchand CassiusDio,all writtenatleasta centuryanda half afterthe deathof Caesar.Whilst
these sufferfrommuchof the problemsof being derivedfromearlierflawedsourcesthey cannotbe
expectedtofullyandaccuratelyrepresent the idealsof the firstcenturyBC,a time vastlydifferentto
the principate underwhichtheywrote (Goldsworthy,2006, 8).
For these reasonsdiscussed,muchaboutCaesar’s documented life isupforinterpretation.Muchof
the ancientsources,forexample,agree thatCaesarhadset out fromthe start for autocracy,
somethingthatsome modernauthorsstrive toprove iswrong(Plut. Caes. 3.2-4,11.3-6; Cic. De Off.
3.82; Gardner,2009, 60). One can see thatCaesar’spolitical charactercan be interpreted indifferent
ways,dependingonthe political affiliationsof the observer.AsAristotlesaid,''manisa political
animal''withthe powerof speechandmoral reasoning(Politics. 1.1253a). Therefore,one will apply
theirownmoral reasoningtoCaesar's political decisionsandwill be incapable of beingtruly
objective inthe assessmentof hisreign.
Withsuch logicinmind,thisdissertationwill strivetouse all availableworksandwritingstoassess
the political manoeuvresof Caesarandevaluate the extenttowhichhe can be calledinnovative
Caesar as a man: Does Caesar presenta newpersonalityin Rome?
PoliticsinRome’s late republicwere aratherpersonal affair. Unlikepoliticiansof the modernera,
one didnot have organisedpartiestorelyonand thus candidates hadto use theirowninitiative,
connectionsandcharm toclimbtheirwayto success (Yakobsen,1999, 148; Steel,2009, 112). One
can therefore perceive fromthis Caesar’spersonalitymighthave constitutedanintegral partof his
success. We must,however,remaincautiouswhenattemptingtounderstandCaesar ona personal
level.Muchof that whichalludestohispersonality orability inthe ancientsourcesderivesfrom
exaggeratedanecdotal evidencefromsourcessuchasOppiuswhich,ashas beenstatedabove,
cannot be fullytrusted(Plut. Pomp. 10.7-9).There are however,certainaspectsof Caesar’slifeand
character that have strongevidentialbasesandthuscannotbe discardedsoeasily.Many of the
traitsdiscussedinCaesar’sbiographiesandhisworksshine throughinhislegislation andhisactions.
The recallingof hisenemiesfromexile,forexample,goessome waytoprovingCaesar’sclemency
and Cicerohimself attests tohisgreatoratorical skill (Yavetz,1983, 96; Cic. Brut. 2.62). Therefore,
3

6. whilstitistrue that we cannot wholly plumbthe depths of Caesar’spersonality,we canuse
reasoningtoattemptconclusions
One aspectin whichCaesar’s personalityshines isinhispolitical intrigue.If one see’sCaesar’scareer
as a plan fordomination,one mustacceptthathe isan accomplishedmulti-taskeranda forward
thinker.If one thinks thatCaesar’scareerisreactionary,one mustpermitthathe hada phenomenal
abilityforquick-thinkingandmustalsoacceptthat he worked extraordinarily well underpressure
(Gardner,2009, 60). Therefore,regardlessof Caesar’sbenevolence/malevolence,one must
appreciate actssuch as the conciliationof PompeyandCrassus underthe triumvirateforthe
ingenuitythattheyrepresent. The factthathe managesat all to getthese two politicianstowork
togetheristestamenttohispolitical persuasion initselfgiventhatthey are thoughttohave loathed
each other(Suet. Jul. 19).
On topof thisfeathowever,one mustconsiderthe variousfavoursthatthe act allowedhim, suchas
the avoidance of responsibilityforhisconsularcrimes andextendedgovernorshipinhisprovince
(Suet. Jul. 24). It isfair to saythat the triumviratewasnot flawlesshoweverasthe hiringof tribunes
was still necessarywhich whencoupledwithCaesar’seffortsatkeepingtiesof kinshipwithPompey,
indicate thatthere wasmuch distrust withinthe relationship(Evans,2003, 70, 91; Balsdon,1967,
93). Anotheraction of Caesar’sthat speaksof excellence ishistreatmentof the army.Whilst
Suetonius’ talesof the heroicdeedsundertakenbyCaesar’ssoldiersare likely exaggeratedpiecesof
propagandafromdubioussources,we cancertainlytake some storiesasindicative of Caesar’s
genius.The storyof Caesar’squellingof the Campanianmutiny,regardlessof whetherornotcertain
facts mayhave beenexaggerated,certainlyspeaksforCaesar’srapportwithhistroops(Suet. Jul.
70). So much so doesthe legendof thiseventendure thatGermanicusimitatesCaesar’sactions
some yearslaterand achievesa similarresult(Tac. Ann. 1.42-3).To give furtherproof of Caesar’s
militarylegacy,one needonly looktomilitaryhonorificeventssuchasthe Feriale Duranum. Unlike
Caesar’scultin the city,whichat timeswasrather uncomfortable,Caesarwascelebrated
uninterruptedlywithinthe military(Levick,2009, 216). One can put thisdownnot onlytoCaesar’s
militaryachievements,butalsotohis prowessinleadershipandhisstrengthof character. We know,
by otherexamplesof generals,suchasLucullus,thatcircumstance alone isnotenoughtomake a
republicanarmylove theirgeneral.A personal relationshipisclearlyalsorequired (Goldsworthy,
2009, 217).
One reasonfor Caesar’ssuccesswithleadershipishisfabledclemency. NotonlydoesCaesarsecure
the loyaltyof his troopswithsuch behaviour,asinthe eventwhere he borrows money fromhis
officersandcenturionstogive ittohis soldiers(Caes. BCiv.1.39.3), he alsoemploysgood-
naturedness incivil life.Caesaralwaysseekstouse anddevelophispopularitywiththe people that
he inheritedfromhislinkswithMarius,butsimultaneouslydidnotdismissthe powerof the ruling
classes(Steel,2009, 116; Yavetz,1983, 166). Thispolicyof tryingto appeal to everyone canbe seen
inthe landdistributionbill issuedduringhis59BCconsulshipthatnoopponentof hiswassaid to find
faultwithbesidesthatitcame fromhim(Dio. 38.2-3). Caesar isseentoact ina waythat pleasesthe
mostpeople possible ofteninhiscareer,leadinghimtopossessmanyfriendsinvariouswalksof life.
Caesar’srenowned clementia undoubtedlyresultedinhisfabledmassof clientes. Byputtingso many
people inhisdebt,Caesarcreatedavast networkof people whowere readyand willingtohelphis
cause.Thiscan be evidencedby Caesar’sliberalhiringof tribuneswhoall benefitedgreatlyfrom
theirespousingof Caesar’scause (Evans,2003, 91). Good-naturedness towardsthe populace also
had itsbenefitsinthattheywere more likelytobe more receptive tohislegislation,and more likely
to grant himspecial honours,like thattostandfor the consulship in absentia whilsthe wasstill in
Gaul (App. BCiv, 2.25).

7. If one combines Caesar’sclemencyandleadershipskillswithhishistoryof successandhisexpertise
as a soldier,one canbegintounderstandthatCaesar wasa hard figure to denounce inthe late
republic.Caesar’ssuccessspeaksforitself of course,withthe conquestof Gaul and the invasionsof
Britain.These,inspite of whatthe senate mayhave thoughtof him, were requiredtobe publically
celebrateddue tothe gloryandricheswhichtheybroughtto Rome and were infact giventhe some
of the longesttermsof publiccelebrationknowninRomanhistory (Balsdon,1967,79). Hissoldiery is
alsowell attested, startingwithhisbeingawardedamilitarytribuneshipandthe Corona Civica ata
youngage (Suet. Jul. 2, 5). Withsuch an impressive record,one wouldnotbe wrongin partially
believingthe outlandishtalesof hisphysical courage inthe accountsof Plutarchand Suetonius.
Caesar’ssuccess,aspreviouslymentioned,requiredthe senate tocelebratehim, buthis excellency
as a soldierdemanded theirrespectandthe awe of the people. WhencombinedwithCaesar’s
clementia,and thus hispopularitywiththe populace,thisessentiallyforcesthe senateintoacorner,
leavingthemwithnoalternativebuttohumour to hiswhims,somethingthatcanbe seeninBibulus’
retreatintoprivacyafterhislack of successagainstCaesar (Plut. Caes.14.9). The futilityof the
senate’sdefence tothe over-whelmingtide of Caesar’swillcanperhapsbe seeninthe perpetuation
of the pettyattackson Caesar’scare of his appearance thatsurvivedtobe writtenintothe account
of Suetonius(Jul. 45). WhilstattackingCaesar’spolicywouldattimes,make hisdetractors
unpopular,one couldimagine thatthe proud,ever-masculine elite,personifiedbythe hardyimage
of Cato(Plut. Cato. 7-10),wouldfindnoissue inattackingCaesarfor hisrumouredaffairwith
Nicomedes (Suet. Jul. 2) or the effeminatecare he supposedly tookwithhisappearance.Indeed,
evenhissoldiersweresaidtoindulge insuchmockerywiththe good-humourof theirgeneral (Dio.
43.20). One can imagine thatsuch allegationswouldnotbe sowelcome fromthose whoopposed
himpolitically.
Whilstitisa temptingconcepttolookuponCaesaras a completelynew personalitytoRome,thisis
not the case.One cannot merelydismissthe legaciesof those likePompeyandMariuswhoalso
courtedthe favourof the populace (Plut. Mar. 4;Pomp. 52) or indeedotherswhoshowedmilitary
leadershipandprovedthemselvesadmirable Romans.However,whatcanbe concludedisthat,to
use the wordsof Gruen,Caesarwas “simplybetteratitthan anyone else”(Gruen,2009, 35). Caesar
was giftedinbirthbybeingapatrician,and earlyinhiscareerencampedhimselffirmlyinthe camp
of Mariusby denyingSulla’srequestthathe divorce Cornelia(Suet. Jul, 1;Steel,2009, 114-116).
Caesarthenwenton to make the mostof these wide-reachingconnectionsbycourtingalmost
anyone with whichhe came intocontact. One anecdote hashimcourtingeventhe slavesof those
whose supporthe sought(Suet. Jul. 27). He is saidto have outdone all before himinthe gamesthat
he puts onin hisaedileshipandusedhisgod-givencharismatoclaimall the praise forhimselfand
none forhis colleague,Bibulus(Suet, Jul. 10). In this,and more inwhichhe outdoeshis colleagues,
Caesarcan be saidto be politicallyinnovative.Caesarmastersthe game thatisRepublicanpoliticsin
a way that none before himhadquite managed.
Caesar’s political dealingsand manoeuvres
The political worldintowhichCaesarenteredwasone of turbulence.AsayoungmanCaesar would
have grownup watchingmenlike Marius,SullaandCinnabringthe Republictothe brinkof
extinction(Billows,2009, 38). If thiscannot be seenasenoughof an influence onCaesar’slater
actionsinpolitics,hisfamilywerealsoconnectedbymarriage tothe Mariansunderwhom, Caesar
wouldhave likelyconductedsome formof political apprenticeship(Billows,2009,34). These facts
undoubtedlyhave somebearingonthe eventual circumstance of Caesar’s eventful career.Having
saidthis,some argue that the happeningsinCaesar’serahasmore to do withthe existingpolitical
4
5

8. climate ratherthanthe manhimself (Gardner,2009, 60). WhilstPlutarch’sinsistence thatthe
populace were cryingoutthatmonarchy wasthe onlysolutiontothe Republic’swoesislikelyan
exaggeratedclaim,one cansee thatinsuch turmoil the thoughtwouldlikely have beenonthe
mindsof some (Plut. Caes, 28).Strengtheningsuchaviewpointisthe factthat inmany regards,
Caesar’scareercan be consideredconventional.Gruengoessofar tostate that none of Caesar’s
activitybreakswithconventional modesof political behaviour(Gruen,2009, 28). Caesar,after all,
rose to each office atthe age whichwas consideredconventional (Gruen,2009,28). Hispeer
Pompey,frequentlydisregardedsuchcustoms,anexampleof whichbeingthe eventwhichsaw him
gaininga triumphbefore he wasof age to be consideredasenator(Plut. Pomp. 14-15). Thischapter
will assessthe conventionalityof Caesar’scareerinregardto hispolitical manoeuvres. Caesar’s
legislationandideologyoverthisperiodwillbe assessedinlaterchapters.
It can be reasonablyarguedthatCaesarwasnot a ground-breakingpolitician.Muchof Caesar’searly
political actionsare tobe expectedof ayoungaristocrat whois enteringthe political forum.
Therefore ithasbeena muchpositedquestion,one arguablyyettobe answered,whatsetsCaesar
apart? The possible answerliesinanumberof differentareas.WhilstCaesardoesfollow asimilar
careerprogressiontothose before him,he tendstoexcel atthatwhichhe does.For example,
Caesar,lookingtoprove himself capablein the skillsof oratory takeson the law casesthat were
customaryto one of hisage and social standing (Billows,2009, 62). One case againstDolabella
however, resultsinCaesarmakingaremarkable name forhimself,withhiseloquentresponse being
studiedforcenturiestocome (Plut. Caes, 4;Canfora,2007, 6). Suchdisplaysof excellence couldonly
workto gain Caesarfriends andprestige amongstthe populace andthe nobilitas of Romansociety.
Caesaralso cultivatessuchprestigeamongstthe populace withthe cases andpolitical dealings that
he choosesto participate in,manyof whichare concerned withlesseningthe corruptionof senators
and repealingSulla’sfreedom-bucklinglegislation(Steel,2009, 115). He is alsosaidto have earned
theirrespectthroughhisgoodnature and the “easyfriendliness”with whichhe conductedhimself
(Plut. Caes, 4).Furthermore, Caesarchampionssome high-profilepopularis causesfromanearly
stage in hiscareersuch as supportingPompey’sover-archinganti-piracy commandinthe
Mediterranean andagainwhenhe isgivencommandinthe eastagainstMithridates (Plut. Pomp.
25.4; Dio 36.43.2-4). What isinteresting,however,isthatinspite of suchactions,whichcan of
course be considerednormal actionsfora political aristocrat,Caesarnevertiedhimself downtoone
political campor another(Steel,2009, 112; Gruen,2009, 24). In the periodbefore hisfirstconsulship
Caesaris saidto have usedhisallies,whichspannedthe entirepolitical spectrum, ina“flexibleand
opportunisticmanner”(Steel,2009, 116). Whilstchampioningthese causes,Caesarkept close with
those of a more conservative persuasionthroughactssuchas marriage ties,like thatwithSulla’s
granddaughter(Plut. Caes. 5).He alsoneverseemed tofullybenefitfromthe ample patronage
opportunitiesthatbeinginthe campof Pompeymightoffer(Billows,2009,81). Althoughitislikely
that he didbenefitpartlyfromPompey’sinfluence,perhapsinhiselectiontothe Pontifex Maximus
overCatalus (Gruen,2009, 25). Suchobservationleadstothe conclusionthatCaesarwasnot
preparedtostreamline himself politically.Whetherornot Caesar’sintentionswere forthe goodof
the Republic(Billows,2009, 81) or for hisownpolitical needs(Gruen,2009, 25), it cannotbe argued
that Caesarwas notsomewhatof a political maverick inregardtohiswide-reachingcontacts.Itis
onlywhenapproachinghisfirstconsulshipthatCaesarbeginstonarrow hispolitical optionswithin
the confinesof the triumvirate.
Contraryto popularopinion,the triumvirateneedn’tbe consideredwhollyunconventional.Many
politicianscouldbe seentoformfactionsinthe Republicanera,indeed eventhe placementof
BibulusasCaesar’sconsularcolleague issaidto have beendue tothe meddlingof optimates figures
(App. BCiv, 2.2.9). One therefore,mightbe correctinsayingthatthe awful reputationof the 6

9. triumviratemay have more likelyemanatedfromthe recordedutterancesof disgruntledandbitter
senators,muchakinto the reasonbehindthe survival of the allegationsof Caesar’seffeminacy.
Gruenstatesthat in general,the triumvirs operatedwithin the conventionsof the republicandthat
theirviolence andstrong-handtacticsoriginatedfromposturingandpoliticaltheatre rather than
fromchallengingthe institutionsof the republic(2009, 35). Furthermore,Gruensuggeststhatthe
enactmentsbackedbyCaesarand hisfactionwere genuineandthatmanyof the eventsthatrecord
theirbrutalitywere orchestratedbythe opposingfactions(2009,34, 1974, 282-5). Perhaps,what
can be witnessedhere ismore akintothe hypocrisyrecorded bythe tribune Memmiuswhostates
that political co-operationamong“goodmen”isconsideredfriendshipandamongthe “wicked”
factions(Sall. BJ. 31.15). Havingsaidthis,the outspokennessof the triumviratewasclearlya cause
for concernamongstthe elite.CaesarandPompeywere notsecretaboutthe creationof their
marriage alliance,somethingthatcan be seentoalarm the optimates basedonthe reactionof Cato
(Plut. Caes. 14.4; Steel,2009, 117). One couldstipulate fromthisthatthe scale and openness of such
a pairing,one whichwascomprisedof three successful, ambitiousfigures, wasaworryinginnovation
inpolitical life (Steel,2009,117).
Moreover,itcan also be arguedthat Caesardoesnot show unconventionalityinthe waythathe
dealswithtribunesandsubordinates.If one wastounderstandCaesarasa manof the people,one
wouldexpectinnovationinthisareaoverall others. Atfirstglance,one mightassume thatCaesar
doeslookaftersuchpeople,afterall he takestribuneslike Vatiniusintohisstaff inGaul whenhe
facedprosecutioninRome afterespousinghis causes(Billows,2009, 128). Indeed,many of the
tribunes whoCaesartakesunderhiswing are seentohave profitedlucratively fromassociationwith
him(Evans,2003, 91). Delvingdeeper,however,one beginstosee flawsinthisposition.Firstly,
whenone considersCaesar’swritings,one cansee thattribunesare rarelyreferenced andoften,
theircontributionstoCaesar’ssuccessare completelyignored(Evans,2003, 68). Thisattitude
towardstribunes,asa political tool,ratherthana valuedally,isvery familiarin the practisesof other
politiciansof the late republicanera(Evans,2003, 91). One couldperhapssee the mirroringof this
attitude towardstribunesaspolitical tools inthe examplesetbyMariuswith Saturninus(Plut. Mar,
30). Caesar can alsobe seento frequentlyactagainstand condemnthe powerof certaintribunes
whowere supposedlythe representativesof the people.Anexample of suchlivesin Caesar’sviolent
conduct towardsthe tribune,Metelluswhilst breakingintothe treasury(Plut. Caes. 35.4).Caesar
naturallyattempts toportraythe eventinanon-violentmanner, butone ismore inclinedtobelieve
the eventtobe an unfriendlyone judgingbyhisgeneral apathytowardstribunes andtheiroffice.In
Caesar’sBellum Civale, for example, whenaddressinghistroopsCaesarexpressesannoyance atthe
tribune’sdeclarationof martial lawatRome in response tohispresence inItaly(1.7). Evenif one
doesnotregard this eventasan unfoundedcriticismone cannothelpbutview Caesar’sgrumpiness
and disrespecttowardstribunePontusAquillaas a betrayal of hisaristocraticarrogance andsense of
superioritytowardsthe popularinstitution(Evans,2003,79). If thiswas notthe case and Caesar
trulywas the championof the people he claimedtobe,he wouldnotopenlyshow the
aristocraticallyinheriteddistasteforthe office thathe does.
In conclusion,itiswithoutbasis tosaythat Caesar’scareerinregard to hispolitical dealingswasa
conventional one onall levels.The depthof Caesar’sunique personalityclearlyshinesinhis contact
withotherpeople whichnaturallyhelpshimtoaccumulate amass of willingcompanionsonwhich
he basedhisfuture career.In spite of thishowever,one cannothelpbutonce againbringto mind
the viewpointof Gruenthat Caesarissimplymore adeptat the political game thananyone else
(2009, 35). Beingbetteratthese political dealingshowever,iswhere Caesar’sinnovationends.
Caesaris merelyintelligentenoughtokeephisfingersinmanypies,if youwill,anddeterminedor
fearlessenough toplaythe field.If Caesarwasa true innovatorinthisarea, one wouldnotexpectto 7

10. see the betrayal of hisaristocraticbackgroundas frequentlyasone does.Caesar’sidentitytherefore,
can be describedasacarefullyconstructedone andoccasionally,whenhe isincontactwithsome
people,one cansee the guarddrop.This arrogance,combinedwithruthlessambitioncanbe clearly
seentofuel hisincreasingalienationwiththose of aconservative persuasion.
Are Caesar’sreforms innovative?
Legislationisalwaysbyfarthe biggesttestimonytothe actionsof a dictatorial leaderandCaesaris
no exceptiontothisrule (Yavetz,1983,59). However,whenattemptingtojudge the rule of aleader
whohas beendeadforovertwo-thousandyearssome uniqueproblems arise.Alongsidethe obvious
concerns,suchas lack of survivingmaterial,the historianhastodeal witha numberof more
complex issuesspecificallypertainingtothe material regardingCaesar’sreign.Firstly,of the thirty-
eightlaws,actionsanddecrees thatare saidto have beenattachedtoJuliusCaesar’sname (Yavetz,
1983, 57) two cannotevenbe traced definitivelybacktoCaesar,and five,inspite of bearingthe
name Lex Julia, cannot be linkedtoCaesarat all (Yavetz,1983, 176). This is due to a varietyof
reasons,one of whichbeingthatthere isconsiderable confusionbetweenthe lawsof Caesarand
those of Augustus,some of whichalsobore the name Lex Julia. (Yavetz,1983, 85). A potential
example of sucha confusionisrecordedinSuetonius(42.3) where he recordsalaw regarding
Collegia that isunrecordedinanyof the contemporarysources,andthusisthoughtto have possibly
come from Augustus(Yavetz,1983, 85). Anotherreasonwe mustalsobe careful whenlookingatthe
Leges Juliae isbecause some of them are likelyinnovationsby Caesar’ssuccessorswhowere looking
to use hisname for theirownneeds.The Lex Julia de Insula Creta for example,abill thatwasto
abolishCrete asa provicnce afterBrutus’governorship,waslikelyabill thatAnthonyfabricatedto
increase his clientela (Yavetz,1983, 98). Cicero,pointsoutthat the bill couldnothave come from
Caesaras Brutus’ placementinCrete wasnotannounceduntil afterhisdeath(Cic. Phil.2.97). In
spite of these flawsinthe record,thischapterwill seektoassessthe level of innovationthatis
presentinCaesar’slegislation.
It iscommon opinionamongstsome scholarsthatCaesar’slegislationisunoriginal (Fuller,1965,
312). Indeed,suchapositionisnotinvalid. Whenone looks athisearlypolitical manoeuvres one can
see that Caesarwasquite careful topublicise the factthathe was backinghighprofile popularis
causes(Gruen,2009, 26-7). Furthermore,inpositionsof powerCaesarcanbe seentoembrace many
causesthat have previouslybeenchampionedbyother popularis politicians.The distributionof land
to the plebeiansduringhisconsulshipforexample,hadonlyrecentlybeensuggestedbythe likesof
RullusandFlavius(Goldsworthy,2006,203). In the simple wordsof Syme itisclearthat Caesar was
not a revolutionary(1939,52). Duringhis Consulship,whilstCaesarwasperhapslessbotheredabout
causingoffence thanhispredecessors,suchaswiththe clause requiringsenatorstoswearbyhis
landbill (Dio.38.2),hislegislation still hadfamiliaraimsinmind (Gruen,2009, 35). He can alsobe
seen,throughthe actionsof the triumvirate,to be scheminghiswayto a rich pro-consulshipjust as
any otherpoliticianof histime mighthave done (Gruen,2009, 33). Much the same can be saidof
Caesar’slegislationasadictator.Gardner pointsoutthat innovationcannotbe seeninanyclause of
the Tabula Heracleensis (2009, 60-61).
Havingsaidthis,one mightregardsuch viewsasoverly simplistic.Whenone analysescertainpieces
of Caesar’slegislation,whilstitmayhave the same aimsof hispredecessors,itcannotbe deniedthat
the way inwhichsome are fashionedcanbe describedasingenious.The landbill of Caesar’s
consulshipperhapsprovidesthe mostillustrativeexampleof saidingenuity.Caesarhadquite clearly
studiedthe failingsof previousbillsandmade adjustmentsbasedonthis(Goldsworthy,2006, 203).
Caesarmade sure that the bill waswater-tightfromsenatorial disapprovalonthe basisof not
involvinghimself,notunlawfullytakingland,fixingthose attachedtothe landfor20 yearsand 8

11. makinga committee of 20 to oversee the affairtoensure againstcorruption.Caesarwasevensure
to add ina clause that statedthat he wouldamendanythingtowhichanysenatorraisedobjection
(Dio.38.1-7). Due to Caesar’searlierlegislationregardingthe publishingof senatorial meetings,
none were likelytoraise anunfairobjectionlightly(Suet. Jul. 20).Naturally,consideringthis
legislationandthe factthat no-one spoke againstthe measure immediately,one canassume that
the laterrejectionfrom Catomerelyreflectsthe attitude of an elite whoopposedanyinnovationin
the publicsphere (Goldsworthy,2006,204; Billows, 2009, 70; Dio.38.2).
Much like hispersonality,Caesar’slegislationwasmuchmore complex thanthatof the standard
popularis (Tatum,2008, 4; Cic. Phil. 116). The complexityof Caesar’svariouspiecesof legislation,
whichoverlapnumerousdemographicsthroughoutthe empire issomethingthat cannotbe under-
appreciated. Variousdecrees,astheyare naturallyexpected todo,are seentohave done a
disservice toone grouporanother.No-one,forexample,wasgrantedfreedomfromdebtin
entirety,somethingthatpreviousup-startslike Catiline hadsupposedlypromised(Sall. Cat. 21),and
CiceroreportswasexpectedinRome atthe start of the civil war(Cic. Att, 9.7.4; 10.8.2). This
evidentlywonthe respectof the money-lendersatthe expense of those of hisfollowerswhowere
heavilyindebt,aconstantproblemamongstthe aristocracyof Rome (Yavetz,1983, 134). However,
Caesarwas alsosaidto have beenaware of the how interesthadgottenoutof hand and thusacted
uponit (Suet. Jul. 42.2). Caesar, by lookingtocompensate those whichhe hadto disenfranchise,
showshisingenuity. One mightexpectthatwithactionssuchas confiscatingsome of the powersof
the corrupt Publicaniin Asiaone mightexpecttosee Caesar’spopularitydrop.The opposite
however,isoftenclosertothe truth. The Publicaniare keptloyal throughthe powerof a
compromise,leavingthemwithsome powerremainingoverindirecttaxes(Yavetz,1983, 103-4).
Such compromisesare characteristicof Caesar’slegislationandworkto assure hispopularitywhich
onlybeganto floundertowardsthe endof hisreign.Thiswas perhaps more due tohisincreasingly
questionable conducttowardsthe republicanditscitizenry ratherthanany of hispolicies (Yavetz,
1983, 183-4). Nevertheless, toholdtogetherthe republicatsucha critical stage ina dubiousposition
requiredaspecial sortof person (Yavetz,1983, 183).
In conclusion,itcanbe said thatCaesar’slegislationclearlydoesconstitutemore innovationthanis
leton at firstglance.This,however,doesnotmeanthatFuller’sstatementisuntrue.One wouldbe
fairin sayingthat,judgingCaesar’sbillsinarudimentaryfashion,theygenerallyappeartobe old
popularis pointsof concernthat have beendressedmore attractively.One mightputthisdownto
unoriginalityinlegislationorperhapsthatCaesarwasrushedand reactionary inhisdictatorship.
Whilsteitherpositionmaybe true one mustnot undermine the vastwealthof subjectsthatwere
targetedbysuch legislationagainstthe vastswathesof clientesthat Caesarmanagedto cultivate.
The innovationinCaesar’slegislationliesnotinthe aimsof each law,decree ormeasure butinthe
wayin whichtheywere crafted tooffendthe leastamountof people andthe wayinwhich theyall
inter-twine andfittogetherwith the surprisingeffectof bolsteringCaesar’spopularity.One mustnot
fail to appreciate thiswhenjudgingthe complexpolitical characterthatisCaesar.
Caesar’s ideology:Popularis, traditionalistorsomethingdifferent?
Much like Caesar’spersonality,Caesar’spolitical ideologycanbe seentobe somewhatelusive inthe
sources.Ascan be evidencedinhis BellumCivale, Caesar wantedtoportray himself asaman of the
people,andthe saviourof the republic(9,29). Contrastingly,the picturefromcontemporariessuch
as Cicero(Att. 13.37.2) and laterbiographerssuchasPlutarch(Caes. 11.3-6; Pelling,2009,255) is
one of an ambitiousdespotwhoaimedatsupreme powerfromveryearly oninhiscareer. When 9

12. one combinessuchviewswiththe ambiguityof otheraspectsof Caesar’scareerone can see whythe
questionof Caesar’sideologyisamajorcause for academiccontention. Ratherconverselytomuch
of the contemporaryandancientsources,the view of Mommsen,thatCaesarwasalone in
possessingthe knowledge necessarytoremedy the illsof the republic(1854-6, 171-4) isone thatstill
has itsadvocates.Sucha view however,isbyno meanswithoutcontention.Gardner,forexample,is
rather firmonher belief thatCaesarhadno plansfor the future of the republic(Gardner,2009, 60).
Consideringthis,one wouldnotbe surprisedinfindingthatthere are views thatconsiderCaesarasa
strictly popularis andanti-sullanpolitician (Meir,1995, 130-2; Baltrusch,2004, 44-8, 51), and others,
such as Syme,who viewedCaesarasa traditionalistwhowasdismayedtofindhe had“wreckedthe
playground”whenhe achievedsupremepower (Syme,1988, 705). A numberof modernscholars
have takena mediatingview onthe political ideologyof Caesar,condemningthe pigeon-holingof
Caesarintoone political campor another(Gruen,2009, 25; Fuller,1965, 49). Thischapterwill seek
to explore the political ideologyof Caesarinregardto hispolitical innovation,andwill seekto
answerthe questionof howdifferentCaesarcanbe consideredtobe compared tohis
contemporaries.
In spite of the aforementionedcriticismof pigeon-holingCaesar,one wouldnotbe un-foundedin
regardingCaesaras a popularis politician.ItisundeniablethatCaesar’scareercertainlytakeson
manyof the traits thatone mightconsidertobe attachedto that political camp.Notonlydoes
Caesarchampiona numberof popularis causes,suchas landredistribution(Dio.38.1-7),he can also
be seento act in a typically popularis fashion.One ratherillustrativeexample canbe seeninhis
attemptsto bypassthe resistance of the ever-conservative senatebytakinghis reformsdirectlyto
the people.Infrontof themthe unfoundedcriticismsof the senate daren’tbe mentioned(Dio.
38.4). Such popularposturingcanbe evidencedinprevious popularis figuressuchasCaiusGracchus
(Plut. CG. 3). On a similarvein,Caesarcanbe seentobuildvastswathesof clientes amongstthe
massesbythe way of lavishgamesandpublicspending(Plut. Caes. 5;Suet. Jul. 10). It isquite clear
that, like previouspopularposturers,Caesardoesthisto winfavourforhimself (Suet. Jul. 11;
Yakobsen,1999, 148). One can alsosee that the people hadbeenknownto actviolentlyonCaesar’s
behalf.Anexampleof thisis providedbyBibulus’escape toprivacyinthe face of violence and
threatstowardshislife whilsthe wasinthe forum (Plut. Caes. 14). Furthermore,Caesarisquite
happyto be associatedwithMariusthroughmarriage and repeatedlyemphasises thisassociation
withacts such as the re-introductionof Mariantrophiestothe publicafterSullahaddisposedof
themand alludingtohismarital linksinhisfuneral speechforhisauntJulia(Suet. Jul. 11; Plut. Caes.
5; Billows,2009,81).
Havingsaidthis,there are also aspectsof Caesar’slife andcareerthat one couldtake as indicatorsof
histraditionalism.Caesar,beingof patricianbirth hadthe contacts one mightneedfora successful
traditional political career, somethingthatCaesarcannot be seentoeschew (Gruen,2009, 24). Not
onlycan such connectionshelptoexplainCaesar’searlypolitical advancements,suchashis
placementasmilitarytribune and hisco-optationintothe pontificate (comprisedmainlyonSullan
supporters),Caesarcanbe seento have used hishigh-birthforpolitical advantageatthe eventsof
hiswife andaunt’sfunerals(Gruen,2009, 24; Plut. Caes. 5; Billows,2009, 80). Anotheraspectof
Caesar’scareeris thathe can be understoodto have had a veryaristocraticideaof successin mind.
One wouldfindithardto denythat Caesarwas a giftedpoliticianandhisapparent natural
competence shinesthroughinhisdesire forpolitical success. Caesarcanbe seen on some occasions
to logicallychoose the paththatwouldofferthe mostsuccessandnot letan egotistical greedfor
gloryget inthe way of hiscareer.An example of thisis Caesar’sdenouncingof atriumphwhenhe is
forcedto choose betweenthisandstandingforthe consulship(Suet. Jul. 18).An additional factor
that alludestoCaesar’straditionalismlieswithhisaristocraticallybiasedviewsthatcanbe 10

13. evidencedatvariouspartsof hiscareer.Caesar’s attitudestowardstribunesforinstance [see
above],are indicative of hisaristocraticprivilege (Evans,2003, 65-92). Also,inspite of the triumph
that Caesarpassedup forthe consulship he didcelebrate fourconsecutivetriumphsatRome during
the civil war(Plut. Caes. 55). Triumphswere heldinparticularesteemwiththe elite atRome and
celebratingfourconsecutivelycannaturallybe seen asindicative of traditional arrogance (Beard,
2007, 1). Additionally,Caesarisknowntohave made concessions toformerpompeiansduringhis
dictatorshipwhichshowshisreluctance tocompletelybreakwithhisoriginsandundoubtedlywould
have beenunpopularwiththose of amore radical popularis persuasion (Yavetz,1983, 182).
Alongside lingeringaristocraticvalues,Caesaralsosoughttoalignhimself withthoseof amore
conservative persuasionthroughmarriage,anexampleof whichbeinghismarriage to Sulla’s
granddaughter,Pompeia(Suet. Jul. 6).Sucha move would have providedCaesarwithmore alliesin
highplaces,somethingone mightexpectatrue popularis tohave shunned.
In the face of such evidenceitisclearthat Caesarconstitutessomethingmore thaneithera
popularis or a traditionalistpolitician.Thisis made quite clearbythe fact that hisalliancesspanboth
sidesof the political spectrumandthathislegislationpanderstoall citizens(Gruen,2009, 24;
Yavetz,1983, 183). The remarkabilityof Caesar’spolitical charactercanalso be seeninthe fact that
he inspiredgenuine warmthamongstmanypeoplefromdifferentwalksof life.Matiusforexample,
saysto Cicerothat he followedCaesarintothe civil warnotbecause he believedinhiscause andnot
as a potential beneficiarybutmerelybecause he washisfriend(Cic. Fam. 11.28.2).Thisis striking to
one whomightregard Caesaras a figure whomerelyattractedfollowersbecauseof promisesand
financial reward.Matius,beingafriendof Ciceroandcomingfroma wealthybackgroundwas
intelligentenoughtomake aninformed decisiononhisactionsandwasprobablyevenaware that
Caesar’sfuture intentionsmaycause himfinancial distress(Steel,2009, 123). Whilstinspiringfigures
like Matius,Caesaralsocultivatedgreatrespectamongstthe military[asdiscussedabove].Thisdid
not come as easilytosome otherfigures,suchasCinnawhowas killedbyhisowntroopswhilst
tryingto force themto fightSulla’sveteranarmy.ThatCaesarcan inspire suchconfidence infigures
like Matiuswhilstalsocharmingthe armyproves thatlabelssuchas popularis or traditionalistdonot
hischaracter justice.
The questionof Caesar’sintentionsthenremainslargely unanswered.Itcanbe argued that Caesar
was a self-servingdemagogue,one wholookedforatraditional sense of aristocraticfulfilment,but
one whowas prepared andable to doso by largelyunconventional means.Suchapositionismore
than validwhenone considers Caesar’squestionablepopularis morals.Caesar,wasundeniable
aimingforsomething,butthiscannothave beenplebeianadvancement.WhilstCaesarwas
undeniablykindandgeneroustothe populace he wasalwayscareful tonotgive themanyreal
political power(Yavetz,1983, 179). Caesarcan be seentohave baredno expense tokeepthe people
happy,as detailedbySuetonius’descriptionof the post-civilwarcelebrations(Jul. 39),butall of
whathe grants tothe populace (Suet. Jul. 41-2), wasmerelywhathadbeenpromisedbyother
popularis politicians (Gruen,2009, 35). One mightexpectasincere reformertohave soughtto
genuinelyimprovethe lotof the plebeiansandpossiblyinnovate legislationintheirfavour.Having
failedtodothis,one can regard Caesar’sas eitherhealingthe woundsof the republic causedbythe
previousdecadesof turmoil,ormerelykeepingthe “ignorant”masses inhisfavour(Gruen,2009, 28;
Yavetz,1983, 166). With the popularis positionessentiallyeliminatedone mustlookelsewhere for
Caesar’smainmotivationswhichmustcome inthe formof aristocraticsuccess.Thisis a goal which
Caesarcan repeatedlybe seento strive for,whetherthatbe inthe form of hisscheming withthe
triumvirate tobe givenapotentiallyauspiciousprovince(Plut. Caes. 11.9),or hisstubbornnessinthe
face of senatorial demandsatthe startof the Civil War.The positionof Syme couldbe validinthis
regard,in thatCaesar had nowishto strive aftersupreme power (Syme,1939, 47) and hislack of
11

14. innovationinhisaimsregardingpolitical renovationof the republicperhapsgosome wayto
strengthenthisposition.Buildingonthispositionone couldperhapsargue thatCaesar,whilsthe did
not aimfor supreme power,wasnotcompletelyodiousof hisposition.Whenone regards the
excessivehonourshe accepted,evenif he wasinnopositiontodenyall of what the faux-
sycophanticsenate offeredhim(Gardner,2009, 66; Dio.44.3.1), one wouldnotbe at faultto
questionwhysome of the more ostentatioushonourswere bothacceptedandpubliclyadheredto
(Suet. Jul. 76). A figure suchas Caesar,who has alreadybeennotedtohave shownaristocratic
arrogance in some circumstances [see above],mightwell be expectedtohave hadhisegomassaged
by some of these measures.Thistrendcanperhapsbe witnessedinCaesar’splannedcampaignin
Parthia. Contraryto Syme’sopinion(1939,53) Caesarmay have been fuelledbyhisstrokedego to
attemptto expandhisalreadyfar-reachinglegacy withmore conquest.
To conclude,Caesar’spolitical ideologyisquite clearlyanexample of hispolitical innovationin the
sense thathe presentsa unique figure inthe romanrepublic.Caesarhadthe contactsnecessaryto
soar inthe political spectrumof the elite inner-circle andthe political foresighttoemphasise his
Marian marriage connectionstoo.Alongside these methodsandvirtues,Caesarhadthe sparkof
aristocraticarrogance thatwas all too familiarinhiseracombinedwiththe ruthlessnessandguile to
drive himto successinthe ever-turbulentpolitical worldof the romanrepublic.Toparaphrase
Fuller,Caesarneverallowedidealsandideologiestoleadhimastray(Fuller,1965,49). He was
preparedtouse them,much like he didwithhiscontacts,ina way that wasconvenienttohim in
orderto be successful andthenworryaboutthe consequencesof thisata laterdate.
Did Caesar aim for sole power from an early age?
The intentionsof Caesarinregardto the fate of the republicisa pointof seriouscontentionamong
scholarsand the debate hasattracteda vastrange of widelycontrastingview-points.Indeed the
positionthatthere islittle pointinposingthe questionatall due to the scarcity of source material to
answeritis one that isadoptedbysome historianssuchas Meier(1970, 131-5). Whilstthispoint
may holdsome truth,thisdoesnotmeanthat debate onthe topicisfruitless.Thereforethischapter
will seektoassessthe intentions of Caesar,asfaras ispossible todetermine whetherornothe
resembles Syme’splaygroundwreckingtraditionalist (Syme,1988, 705) or Mommsen’srepublic
savingreformer(1854-6, 171-4; Yavetz,1983, 21). In orderto understandCaesar’svalue asa political
reformerina broad sense,one mayfindhavingagrasp uponhis ultimate intentionsconsiderably
helpful.
WhenassessingCaesar’sintentions,one must firstunderstandthat,inspite of whatmuchof the
ancientsourcessay,there isno solidevidence toprove thatCaesardefinitivelysoughttobringabout
the fall of the republicforthe majorityof hislife (Goldsworthy,2006, 574). As has beenmentioned
above,Caesarcan actuallybe seentoact withinthe boundariesof normal political behaviourduring
hiscareer (Gruen,2009, 35). Some scholars,suchas Strasburger,go sofar as to call Caesarthe “last
patrician”and to supportthis he referencedCaesar’schallenge tothe senate tohelphim runthe
state (Strasburger,1953, 225-64; Caes. BCiv. 1.32.7). One wouldbe forgivenfortheorisingthatif
Caesarwishedtooverthrowthe oligarchicclique of noblesatRome he wouldnothave showedthem
respector obeyedtheirrulessostrictly,especiallywhenotherssuchasPompeyhadn’tandhad
gottenawaywithit (Plut. Pomp.14-15).Somethingelsethatcanbe saidto be out of place in the
actionsof a Caesar,whowas scheming forsupreme powerishisdubious actionsas a dictator.One
wouldexpectafigure whoaimedatsole authorityhiswhole life tohave hada ratherdistinctplanin
place for whenhe achievedit.ThatCaesardidhave any suchplansis somethingthatcanbe denied,
as scholarssuch as Gardnerhave done (2009). Ashas alreadybeenestablished,Caesardidnotreally
innovate inhislegislationwhichcanbe seentotarget nothingmore thanthat whichhadbeen 12

15. promisedbypreviouschampionsof popularis causes [seeabove] (Gruen,2009, 35). Indeed,Caesar’s
legislationcanbe seentobe rushedand reactionary,hardlyindicative of the culminationof agrand
plan(Gardner,2009, 60). The state,in fact,witnessedamuchmore all-encompassingchange under
Augustusthanit everdidunderCaesar(Levick,2009, 211-212). Furthermore,muchof Caesar’s
actionscan be understoodasfeverishattemptstorepaythe manypersonal debtsthathe had
contractedduringhisrise to power,suchas the measure whichmade Rebilusconsul fora matterof
hours(Dio.43.46). Thisattracted muchcriticismfromhisdetractorssuch as Cicerowhoquippedthat
Rebiluswassovigilanthe managedtostayawake for hisentire consulship(Cic. Fam. 7.30).One can
see that Caesarwasclearlyhard-pressedto findacceptableavenueswithwhichtoawardhis
supporters,somethingone mighthave expectedCaesartohave thoughtaboutmore clearlyhadhe
alwaysaimedatsupreme power.
Movingfrom the political sphereone cansee some odditiesthatdon’t matchup withthe viewsof
the ancientsourcesinCaesar’sactionsduringthe civil war.AsSyme rightlypointsout,Caesarwas
alwayslookingtoconsolidate hispositionof friendshipwithPompey,evenaftercrossingthe
Rubicon (Syme,1939, 47). Before the outbreakof the civil war,Caesarsoughtto doso throughthe
re-forgingof marital ties,somethingtowhichPompeywasnotreceptive (Suet. Jul. 27; Canfora,
2007, 69). One can understandthismove tohave beennecessarytoCaesarto betterhisposition
whilsthe wasstill inhisprovince andthusisnot problematic.Whatis however,isthe factthat
Caesarcan be repeatedlyevidencedtoattempttocome to termswithPompeyduringthe civil war
(Caes. BCiv. 1.9, 1.24). It couldbe suggestedthatsucha move can be seenasa well-judgedbluff of
sorts,in that CaesarknewthatPompeywouldn’tbackdownwhichgave himauseful piece of
propaganda.Thisviewpointisperhapsaccentuatedwhenone considersthatamongPompey’s
affiliateswere manymembersof the senate, peoplewhowouldnaturallybe loathtoback downto
Caesar(Goldsworthy,2010, 221). Havingsaidthis,the questionstill remains.WhywouldCaesarrun
thisriskon multiple occasions?He alreadypossessedevidence of Pompey’sstubbornnesstocome
to termswithPompey’s denial of Caesar’sfirstcall foranarmistice soit seemstoooddto run the
riskagain if sole poweristo be consideredhis ultimate aim.One mustalsoconsiderthe factthat
Caesarwas ina positiontoaffordwarwithPompeyandtherefore wouldhave noneedtohave held
off a confrontationuntil alaterdate (Evans,2003, 74). One therefore maybe correctin sayingthat
Caesarwas lookingfirstandforemosttoreconcile withhis amicitia andthushad no designsforsole
rule.
Be thatas itmay, there are plentyof indicatorsinCaesar’scareertosuggestthat sole powerwashis
ultimate aim.Firstly,throughouthiscareerCaesarwasknowntohave shownarrogance,
ruthlessness,ambitionandoftenprovedhisabilitytomanipulate.Inthe aristocraticworldof the
republic,where strengthwasvaluedoverbenevolence,Caesarwasclearlyaman capable of great
achievements,asprovedbyhissuccessesinGaul andon the political home-frontinRome (Fuller,
1965, 49). Whilstthisgreatman was busy carvingout an epochal career,the republicwasinturmoil
whichwouldlikelyhave causedmanyof those inthe know tohave consideredthe future of the
republicinregardto itscontemporary corruptformof government(Billows,2009, 1).Such a
statementisproven bythe likelyratherexaggeratedquote of Plutarchstatingthatpeople were
knownto decryinpublicthat monarchywasthe onlywaythat the state’sailscould be cured(Plut.
Caes, 28). Whilstpeople mayhave notcriedoutfor such inpublic,itisnot hard to imagine thatthe
thoughtmusthave beenprevalentinthe mindsof many,especiallydue toRome’sincreasing
contact withthe east (Glayet al,2009, 85), and itsmonarchical past. With thisinmind,itis alsonot
hard to imagine thatone as self-assured,ruthlessandarrogantas Caesarmay have thoughtthat he
was the one to answerthese criesformonarchy.

16. To furtherextendthisargumentone needstoexamineCaesar’sreign incloserdetail.Onlookingat
some of Caesar’slegislationandmeasures,one couldgetthe impressionthatCaesarwasattempting
to bolsterhisownregime andthathe wasloathe togive up sole power. Whilstlawssuchas the
limitingof luxuryandthe definingof the periodsone canholdoffice could be construedasmeasures
whichhelpedtorestore orderto the republic,one canalsotheorise thatCaesarwas loathe togive
anotherfigure the chance to followinthe footstepsthathe had. (Suet. Jul.43.1; Dio.42.25.3,
43.51.4, 43.25.2). Thispointisstrengthenedbythe issue regardingthe honoursthatwere conferred
uponCaesar.Whilstitis true that he was likelynotinapositiontodenymuchof the honoursthat
were conferreduponhim (Dio.44.3.1),there are those whoargue that Caesar’sexpectationswere
fulfilledbysuchhonours (Weinstock,1971,412). One coulddeduce fromthisthat Caesarwas infact
settlingintohisrole assole rulerandperhapswasquite happytoaccept these honours.Ashasbeen
statedabove,one couldcertainlyimagine thatthe sycophantichonoursofferedby the senate would
have servedtoinflate Caesar’sego.
The ideaof Caesar’sinflatedegocouldalsogosome waytoexplainingsome of the peculiaritiesof
Caesar’slaterreigntoo.It isoftenwonderedastowhyCaesar didn’tdesignateadefinitiveheirif he
didaim at supreme power1
.Atface value thisisindeedaproblematicoddityif one istoview Caesar
as one whohad alwaysaimedatsole power.However,whenone combinesthiswithotheroddities
such as Caesar’saccepting of the dictatorshipinperpetuityandthe droppingof hisbodyguard,one
cannot helpbutthinkthatCaesar thoughtmore of hisposition andlessof hisownmortality than
was apparentinreality(Suet, Jul. 76; 86). Perhapsthisexplanationis suitable forhispeculiarities.
Maybe itwas notthat Caesar hadneveraimedatsole powerandwas thusat a losswithwhatto do
withit(Goldsworthy,2010, 222), butthat the words of JohnDalburg-Actonringtrue withCaesarin
that “absolute powercorrupts absolutely”(1887).RevisitingSyme’sinterpretationof Caesar’s
imminentdeparturetoParthia (1939, 52), one can see that bysuch logicCaesarcannot be seento
have beenplanningacampaigndue tofrustrationwitheventsinRome,butthathe was doingso
due to a senatorial inspiredgreedforsuccess.
To summarise,one maystipulate thatthe ideathatCaesarhad aimedatsole powerhisentire lifeis
rather problematic.One feelsthatopportunityhadtoomuchplayinhisplans,especiallyinsomuch
as the eventsof the civil warare concerned.Itistherefore the dutyof the historiantoquestion
sourceslike Plutarchwhosuggestthathisambitionforsole power iswhollytrue (Plut. Caes. 11.3-6).
One can indeedexplainaway the strengthof suchopinions withthe legacyof surviving senatorial
bitterness pertainingtoCaesar’srobbingof theirinfluence (Goldsworthy,2006, 3). Havingsaidthis,
one can quite clearlysee achange in Caesarthroughouthisreign,perhapsexplainingwhypeople
such as Sallustlostfaithinhim asa reformerafter46BC (Yavetz,1983, 53; Collins,1955, 455; Sall.
Letters to Caesar. 1.2.4). Furthermore,the arrogance thatallowedCaesartobe charmedbythe
sycophanticsenate didnotlaydormantuntil thispointinhiscareerand thusmust be broughtinto
questionwhenstudyingCaesar’sintentions.WhilstCaesarmaynothave aimedforhissupreme
positionatRome,he can be understoodashavingenjoyeditandhavingwishedtoperpetuateit.
One wouldbe forgivenforassumingthat whilstsolepowermaynothave beenhisaim, tobe the
“first”in Rome mayhave been.
Conclusion
1 In spite of what Augustus may have claimed later, Caesar’s posthumous adoption of him likely did not
constitute the designation of an heir and was more likely to do with the carryingon of the family name and the
bequeathing of Caesar’s estate(Gardner, 2009,67-9)
13

17. Throughoutwritingthisdissertation,ithas become increasinglyclearthatCaesarshouldbe judged
on hisinnovationasa populistora demagogue beforehe isjudgedasa politician.Torecycle the
analogyof Yavetz,it isCaesar’sepochal skillsasapopulistwhichrunsthroughall hispolitical
dealingslikeagoldenthreadthroughstring(Yavetz,1983, 181). Evenif Caesar cannotbe considered
to have beeninnovative inthe aimsof hislegislation,itisundeniable thathe hada certain je ne sais
quoithat allowedhim,andhimalone amonghiscontemporaries,tomendtogetherthe vastamount
of groupingsthathislegislationeffected. We willof course neverknow if Caesartrulydidhave any
long-lastingplansforthe future of the republic,andif we did,workssuchas thiswouldbecome
largelyredundantinthe face of that whichispurelyfactual.Inthe meantime however,one canat
leaststandinawe at Caesar’sstaggeringabilitytoseeminglyofferverylittle whichisnew and
simultaneouslymaintainthe vastswathesof clinetesthathe didrightup until the veryendof his
career.Whetheror notsuch a featresultedfromCaesar’snatural geniusand good-naturednessor
whetherhiswell-attestedmagnetismwasacarefullyconstructedfaçade islargelyimmaterial,the
featisimpressive nonethelessandshouldnotbe under-appreciatedwhenassessingCaesarasthe
political colossus thathe was.
Havingsaidthiswe must alsobe careful not to laudCaesaras somethingof apolitical superman
(Syme,1938, 2).Caesar wasultimatelykilledbyajealousandbittersenate andthiseventis a
testamenttoCaesar’sultimate failure.Caesarnevermanagedtowinoverthe senate,ironically
because he wasa patrician,the lastpatricianif Strasburgeristo be believed(1955,225-64). His
aristocraticarrogance,ruthlessnessandceaselessself-belief ultimatelylefthimforgettingthat
charm alone wasnot enoughtobe the firstcitizenatRome,somethingthatAugustuswasnotso
carelessinforgetting.One shouldrememberthatitwas infact underAugustusthatthe roman
monarchywhichlastedintolate antiquitywaslargelyconstructed.Caesartherefore,shouldnotbe
viewedasthe one whowasdestinedtorule overthe empire whichproceededhisdeath,butcan
perhapsbe rememberedasaman whowas destinedtotriumphoverthe republic.
Therefore one must conclude thatCaesarissomethingof amediating figure of transition,an
unfortunatelyclichédconclusionsocommonamongsthistorical mattersbutwhichundoubtedly
ringstrue withCaesar. Itcannot be deniedthatinmaterial innovationCaesarwassomewhatlacking.
His unknownpotential designsforthe future aside, Caesar’slegislationwasbynomeans
revolutionaryandhisaimscannothave beensaidtohave beenunambiguouslycentredonsole-
power.Mommsen’sviewpointthatCaesarwasthe saviourof the republicwhoalone knew how to
fix thatwhichwas wrongwithit is seemingly ratherlackinginevidence.Whenone lookscloser
however,the full-force of Caesar’sgeniuscannothelpbutblindsidethose who studyhiscareer.This
perhapsgoessome wayto explainwhysomanyacademicpapersandbiographiesare releasedwith
himat theircentre. What setCaesarapart from hiscontemporariesisthe easy-charmthatPlutarch
commentsonso earlyintohisbiography,somethingthatclearlystruckall those aroundhim,
includinghispolitical enemies(Plut. Caes. 4;Cic.Phil. 2.116). Caesarmanagesto appeal topeople all
overthe social spectrumof the RomanRepublic,asurprisingfeatforone of hissocial standing.
Indeed,apartfromthe occasional slip-upwhere thisbackgroundshows,he canoftenbe seentoturn
it to hisadvantage whendealingwiththose of lesserstandingthanhimself.These skillsin
networking,combinedwithhisgenuine talentasa republicanpoliticianundoubtedlypavedthe way
for hisrise to eminence.Saidrise,howeverwasalwaysgoingtobe limited. The romanrepublic
wouldnotfullyyielduntil it wasmetwithone astalentedasCaesarwho wasnot so taintedwiththe
stainof patricianvalues.Augustus,therefore,mustbe seenasmore of an innovatorthanCaesar.
One isleftwonderinghowever,whethersucharise wouldhave beenpossible withoutthe genius
that wasCaesar to bothpave the way and show hiseventual successorhow notto go aboutcreating
the princeps.
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