Dissertation FINAL FINAL copy

The European Union as Empire?
A study of the EU integration process in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bethany Archer (092697496)
Supervisor: Prof Anthony Zito
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of
Masters in European Union Studies
School of Geography, Politics & Sociology, Newcastle upon Tyne
September 2015
Words: 13,071

Abstract
This dissertation presents an investigation into the ‘EU as empire’ theory, from
three different perspectives; empire of the pen, empire by example, and a superior, and
hierarchical empire. The investigation will be carried out through the case study of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, examining the ways in which the status quo relates to the different
theoretical perspectives.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Anthony Zito, for supervising this dissertation. He
has been a great help and support throughout the process, and always on hand for
advice. My thanks are also extended to Dr Jocelyn Mawdsley, for being a supportive
personal tutor, as well as putting up with my borderline obsessive interest in the Western
Balkans class after class. I would like to thank my family and friends for their moral support
over the course of my Masters year, and for bearing with my varying stress levels. Last
but definitely not least, I would like to thank all those I have met during my travels in
Bosnia, they have been an inspiration. I will continue to pursue my interest in Bosnia, with
an optimism for its political future.

Table of Contents
Abstract.............................................................................................................................................ii
Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................................iii
Table of Contents..............................................................................................................................iv
Abbreviations...................................................................................................................................vi
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................7
Research Question..........................................................................................................................8
Methodology and Structure........................................................................................................... 12
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework............................................................................................... 15
Empire of the pen ......................................................................................................................... 15
Empire by example........................................................................................................................ 19
Superior Empire............................................................................................................................ 22
Chapter Two: Empire of the pen.......................................................................................................25
The Legacy of the Dayton Constitution........................................................................................... 25
The EU’s Bureaucratic Demands on Bosnia..................................................................................... 30
The Stabilisation and AssociationProcess................................................................................... 30
The acquis communautaire........................................................................................................32
Chapter Three: Empire by example...................................................................................................35
The Copenhagen Criteria.................................................................................................................5
Type chapter title (level 3)...........................................................................................................6

Chapter Three: An Empire byexample................................................................................................4
Type chapter title (level 2)...............................................................................................................5

Abbreviations
BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU – European Union
EUFOR Althea– European Union Force in BiH
FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ICTY – International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IPA – Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OHR – Office of the High Representative
SAA – Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP – Stabilisation and Association Process
SFOR – NATO Stabilisation Force
RS – Republika Srpska

Introduction
The European Union (EU) currently comprises of 28 countries with five candidate
states1 and two potential candidates, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH
or Bosnia).2 This dissertation will focus specifically on the relationship between BiH and
the EU and the European integration process. The ongoing process of European
integration for BiH has been lengthy and difficult, though when one considers the
obstacles the country has faced in the past and the continued problems the country has
to contend with, steady progress can be observed. In June 2015, BiH’s Stabilisation and
Association Agreement finally entered into force after a long and turbulent process3 which
takes it one step further to EU membership. After war raged in the country from 1992-
1995, BiH was left with an ethnically divisive system and constitution under the Dayton
Peace Agreement, set up in order to bring peace to the conflicted states by the United
States.4 This remains important when analysing Bosnia, because not only does it
continue to function under this system imposed by the international community, it
continues to be a “quasi-protectorate”5 of European international organisations under the
auspices of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the EU Special
1 European Commission,‘Economic and Financial Affairs:Accedingand candidatecountries’[Online]
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/non_eu/candidate/index_en.htm) [Accessed 13th June 2015]
2 European Commission,‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations’ [Online]
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm) [Accessed 24th June 2015]
3 European Commission,‘European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Bosnia and Herzegovina’
[Online] (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-
herzegovina/index_en.htm) [Accessed 6th July 2015]
4 David Brooke, ‘Dayton five years on’, BBC News (21st November 2000) [Online]
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1032685.stm) [Accessed 1st July 2015]
5 Jan Zielonka,‘Europe as a global actor:empire by example?’, International Affairs, 84 (2008): 472

Representative and Head of the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, currently Lars-Gunnar
Wigemark.6
The question must be asked as to why we should study Bosnia. The compelling
legacy of war and ethnic genocide are significant especially when it happened on the
European continent and that the genocide which occurred in Bosnia was the most
devastating since the Holocaust of World War Two.7 It is also interesting to note the
failures and time taken to act by the international community during the Bosnian War
which is often linked to the varying and sometimes difficult relationship with the rest of
Europe today. A rich imperial history and a population comprised of different ethnicities
and religions (primarily Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Orthodox Bosnian Serbs, and Catholic
Bosnian Croats as well as a small proportion of other ethnicities) has led to debates about
what constitutes ‘Bosnian’ identity. This also raises issues with regard to the EU
enlargement process – whether its people can be ‘Bosnian’ and ‘European’. It is also an
interesting and relevant case study for EU enlargement because thee still exists no
predominantly Muslim member state of the EU, bringing about debates on the institutions’
cultural priorities.
Research question
It has been widely reported and especially criticised by Eurosceptic media
that in 2007, the President of the European Commission at the time, José Barroso
6 European Commission,‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Bosnia and Herzegovina’
[Online] (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-
herzegovina/index_en.htm) [Accessed 6th July 2015]
7 BBC News, ‘General guilty of Bosnia genocide’ (2nd August 2001) [Online]
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1470928.stm) [Accessed 1st July 2015]

compared the EU to an empire; “We are a very special construction unique in the history
of mankind… Sometimes I like to compare the EU as a creation to the organisation of
empire. We have the dimension of empire.”8 As expected, this caused some controversy
amongst some member states as well as showing that in some respects the EU regards
itself as an empire, albeit as a positive force. Barroso clarified that he meant a “non-
imperial empire”9, referring to the fact that it is about the pooling of power and not about
a quest for expansion, or extensive military aspirations. This is supported by many writers
on this issue such as Gary Marks or Jan Zielonka who write that the EU is not a coercive
empire10, though questions have been raised as to how this empire-like comparison can
be viewed and has manifested itself in a negative light.
The research question for this dissertation will focus on the school of thought that
the EU is, and resembles an empire, with regard to its relations with prospective member
states, and more specifically, for this dissertation, towards BiH. There are other European
integration theories that can and have been applied to the study of enlargement and the
Western Balkan states such as Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism11 which
focuses on conditionality and the drive of incentives for candidate states. This is often
theoretically opposed by social constructivism which claims that the ‘pull of Brussels’
8 Bruno Waterfield,‘Barroso hails theEuropean 'empire'’, The Telegraph (11th July 2007) [Online]
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1557143/Barroso-hails-the-European-empire.html) [Accessed 4th
July 2015]
9 Honor Mahony, ‘Barroso says EU is an empire’, EU Observer (11th July 2007) [Online]
(https://euobserver.com/institutional/24458) [Accessed 4th July 2015]
10 Gary Marks,‘JCMS Annual Lecture 2011 – Europe and Its empires: From Rome to the European Union’, Journal
of Common Market Studies, 50 (2012): 7
11 Andrew Moravcsik,‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist
Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (1993)

focuses on a European sentiment and identity for the countries on the periphery.12 It
would be possible to utilise both these theories with regard to analysing Bosnia’s
integration process but the empire theory has been chosen because it is somewhat
controversial. I also feel it is increasingly relevant with regard to the negative outlook
some countries are beginning to hold towards the EU in terms of it having too much power
and countries losing their sovereignty. It is interesting to see how this theory can be
applied to states such as BiH, in both a negative and positive manner, as will be explored
in the following chapters.
There are two ways to evaluate whether the relationship between the two actors
is that of coloniser/colony. A theory chapter will follow examining the ideas and literature
surrounding the EU as an empire but it is also possible and important to look at Bosnia
as the ‘colony’, examining the fact it is been part of many different empires and that it only
became an independent self-governing state in 1991. Due to the fact that both these
angles can be explored at length and can add something to the analysis, this dissertation
will focus on the former – the ways in which the EU is an imperial power and how this has
affected and shaped its relationship with BiH and the country’s path to membership.
Bosnia’s imperial history and how this has shaped its identity can be briefly outlined. It
has been a colony under the Byzantine, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires as well
as being part of pre and post-World War Two Yugoslavia and all of these and more add
to the complexities of Bosnian identity, in terms of an East/West dichotomy as well as the
issue of religion.
12 Jelena Subotic, ‘Europe is a State of Mind: identity and Europeanization in the Balkans’,International Studies
Quarterly, 55 (2011)

This leads us to briefly examine a strand of postcolonial theory which will be
important in linking to notions of an imperial EU further in this dissertation. Maria Todorova
coined the idea of Balkanism in her 1997 book, which explores the notion of Balkan states
as the ‘Other’ and explores how their heavy imperial history greatly affects their conflicting
and problematic identity. She posits that Westernization and Europeanization as
processes are a contributing factor to their loss of identity13, suggesting that Balkan and
European identities cannot exist simultaneously, making this theory relevant for
examining the EU as an imperial power over states on its periphery.
There are many different avenues that can be explored with regard to the EU
resembling an empire and being an imperial-type power. The following chapter will
provide an in-depth analysis of these particular theories which will be split into three
different perspectives. Firstly, the EU as an empire of the pen, focusing primarily on the
work of Gary Marks, examining the stringent and complex rules regarding the adoption of
the acquis communautaire and the Treaties. Secondly, the EU as an empire by example,
suggesting its spread of normative values and ideals is not necessarily a bad thing,
particularly in post-conflict states such as Bosnia that struggle with ethnic tensions and
are undergoing a process of reconstruction and statebuilding. It implies that peripheral
states should model themselves on existing members who have aligned themselves with
the EU’s supposed exemplary values. Finally, the theory chapter will explore the idea of
the EU’s imperial projection as negative, that they possess a superiority complex. This
chapter will also aim to provide criticisms of these particular elements of the ‘EU as
13 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press,1997): 6

empire’ theory in the sense that they cannot be conclusive and apply to every situation
and country.
Essentially, this work will aim to answer the question; is the EU an empire in the
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Methodology and structure
As previously stated, the dissertation will explore the theoretical literature on ‘EU
as Empire’ both independently, and then in connection with the situation in Bosnia through
literature and data. The empirical chapters will utilise EU primary documents such as the
European Commission’s Progress Reports on BiH, which detail progress made in the
state and what steps the EU still requires it to take. These will be analysed in connection
with the theoretical perspective and the image that the EU portrays of itself through these
primary sources. It is possible to critique this imperialist theory with regard to all EU
enlargement candidates but this dissertation will just use the single case study of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. There is so much to be analysed and as previously stated, its rich
imperial history and complex political system lend itself well to this critical European
integration theory. The dissertation will engage with key writers on the situation in Bosnia
and the country’s relationship with the EU and the accession process, as well examining
news sources in order to gain the most current and up to date analysis possible.
It is important to acknowledge that there will be limitations to the study of this
research question. As already mentioned, in order to provide an in depth analysis, only
the actions and role of the EU will be evaluated with regard to whether it acts as empire
in Bosnia. It would be interesting to fully analyse and take into account the fact that BiH

has been part of imperial-type structures throughout history which would of course shape
its relationship with a powerful external force such as the EU. This would provide a twofold
analysis which would also reinforce my previously made statements about why Bosnia is
unique.
Another limitation and difficulty that comes across in this paper, is that decisive
changes have taken place in the relationship between BiH and the EU. In June 2015, at
the time of beginning research and writing, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) entered into force, meaning that there is a shortage of academic writing, and even
primary sources, on the altered status quo.
The dissertation will use the three aforementioned approaches of empire theory to
shape the analytical and empirical focus of the question, of whether, and how they can
be applied to the potential enlargement case of BiH. Following the extended literature
review and theory chapter on the EU as empire theory, there will be individual chapters
dedicated to the notions of ‘Empire of the Pen’, ‘Empire by Example’ and ‘the Superior
Empire’ which will examine how the current situation in Bosnia, the EU’s actions and the
relationship between the two actors can relate to these ideas. The first one of these
empirical chapters will look at Bosnia’s problematic Dayton constitution and the EU’s role
in its conception and its subsequent reform, as well as the Stabilisation and Association
Process, and the acquis communautaire. The chapter focusing on the EU as a normative
empire will analyse the Copenhagen criteria and the effects of EU conditionality in BiH.
The final chapter, examining the EU as a hierarchical and superior empire will look at
mistakes the EU has made in Bosnia, and its arrogance about the attractiveness of the
enlargement process. It will also look at the realist perspective of military and strategy

and the imperial role of the EU in these aspects with regard to BiH. The dissertation will
conclude, bringing all of these ideas together and suggesting which one of these aspects
of empire, if any, is more conducive to the case of Bosnia. The conclusion will answer the
research question and suggest what the future may hold for EU-BiH relations. It will
comment on how the three perspectives of the ‘EU as empire’ theory all have their merits
and faults. Despite many convincing arguments and compelling empirical evidence which
will be presented throughout, neither perspective is sufficient or adequate when used as
a standalone theory, to operationalise the status quo in Bosnia with regard to its
relationship with the EU.

Chapter One: Theoretical Framework
There are many different perspectives on the ‘EU as empire’ theory, as outlined
in the introduction. Many authors have explored this alternative and controversial
European integration theory and from many different perspectives which contribute to
this theory as a whole. They have written on the subject, from many different
perspectives and see the ‘EU Empire’ in different forms, performing different imperial
and empire-like functions. It is seen by some, such as Zielonka, more of a normative
power, acting as an empire in the sense that countries that are EU protectorates or
prospective member states benefit from the promotion and spread of EU values and
norms. Others, such as Marks term the EU an empire, in an administrative sense, in the
fact that it enforces states wishing to become members to adopt extensive laws, the
acquis communautaire, and the existing EU treaties. The final aspect of this theory to be
explored in this chapter and dissertation is that which is most commonly associated with
empire theory – that the EU acts with a kind of superiority complex and does not
prioritise these states best interests but rather is just on an expansionist quest.
Regarding this aspect, the work will primarily analyse the work of Hartmut Behr. These
perspectives will in turn be criticised with regard to how far these characteristics are in
fact imperialist or portray the EU as an empire.

Empire of the pen
The EU is often criticised for its extensive and complex network of institutions,
and rules and regulations, and not just in terms of those placed on enlargement
candidates. Gary Marks subscribes to the theory that the EU is an empire but he affirms
that empires are not always a malevolent force, and that they ‘do not homogenize’14. He
posits that the EU holds an empire structure and the key element that contributes to this
is the complex administrative side of enlargement. In this, he is primarily referring to the
adoption of the acquis communautaire which as Zielonka commented “is made up of
some 20,000 laws, decisions and regulations spanning nearly 80, 000 pages and still
growing.”15 This reflects just how much is expected of prospective member states with
regard to integrating existing laws and treaties into their legal systems. In addition, there
are extensive conditionality requirements to contend with, as well as ‘the European
ideal’ in terms of aspirations and values, all of which are embedded in the stringent
requirements placed on enlargement candidates; “The EU is an empire of the pen, not
the sword.”16 Marks goes further to say that it is only in this sense that the EU functions
as an empire, with regard to various definitions and characteristics such as not having a
centre of direction or working on a system of coercion.17
14 Marks,‘ Europe and Its Empires’, 1
15 Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2006):56
16 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Availableat:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gInki7kN2YIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Beck+and+Grande+2007+Cosmopoli
tan+Europe&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAGoVChMIse7Ow5SAxwIVwesUCh3KQwXZ%20-
%20v=onepage&q=Beck%20and%20Grande%202007%20Cosmopolitan%20Europe&f=false#v=snippet&q=Beck%20
and%20Grande%202007%20Cosmopolitan%20Europe&f=false ): 66 and Marks,‘Europe and Its Empires’, 7
17 Marks,‘Europe and Its Empires’, 7

However, his work compares the EU with other famous European empires. He
looks at the Roman Empire and makes comparisons between the two. He notes the
federal-like structures and the complex bureaucracy present in both ‘empires’ and that
rules are adapted to “accommodate” as opposed to “annex”18, affirming that the Roman
Empire too was not a homogenising power and also functioned on a system of
multilevel governance.19 In addition, Marks compares the acquis communautaire to the
fundi factio which played a similar role to the acquis in that pre-existing imperial law is
laid out in Treaties and other documents for new conquest territories to adopt.20 It is
interesting to see how Marks differs from other authors and subscribers to this theory
who state for the most part that the EU is a different type of empire by comparing the
EU to one of the most famous and historically prominent empires to have existed, even
though centuries separate the two.
It is clear that the EU places strict and extensive requirements on states wishing
to become a member of the EU, such as Bosnia, but the extent to which this is solely an
imperial trait can be utilised and questioned without bringing in other elements of the
EU’s empire-like characteristics. However, it can be argued, as it was by Beck and
Grande in 2007, that the complex administrative and legal set up signifies that the EU
resembles more than a state structure. They claim that Europe is a cosmopolitan “post-
imperial”21 empire of states that have given up their sovereignty in the form of treaties
and legal requirements of the EU.22 This notion of cosmopolitanism will be explored
21 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, 55

further in the section on the EU as a normative empire as the two concepts are linked,
but this implies that it is through extensive bureaucratic requirements, that the EU has
become more of an empire, as states lose their sovereignty. In addition, the use of
‘post-imperial’ gives a subtle reminder of the history of some states which make up the
large EU ‘empire’.
Writing in the context of the 2004 eastern enlargement of the EU, Beck and
Grande state that the EU’s legal system and acquis were the path to integration for
these countries and it “demonstrates the constitutive importance of law and consensus
for the European empire.”23 This suggests that it is this supposed imperial element that
was the most effective in previous cases of enlargement so it will be useful to examine
whether this is the case for the potential candidate, BiH. One criticism of this aspect of
the Europe as empire theory is whether this enough for the EU to qualify as an imperial
actor or whether this just renders it “a bureaucratic nightmare.”24 However, Beck and
Grande examine this idea in the sense that the EU must be conceptualised as some
kind of actor and the fact that it functions supranationally with regard to laws and
treaties with priority over its member states makes it more than a state.25 Zielonka
declares that although this is a very important factor for European integration and also
agrees that the administrative requirements of the EU are an imperial characteristic, the
EU is an “enormous import of diversity,”26 which gives an indication to its many
elements. The topic cannot be solely addressed by the adoptions of laws and
24 Cathy Newman, ‘European Commission insider labelsBrusselsa 'bureaucraticnightmare',The Financial Times’
(1st July 2005) [Online] (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/115bd1c0-e9aa-11d9-ba15-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3hNYSqp1V) [Accessed 2nd July 2015]
26 Zielonka,Europe as Empire, 1

regulations, but there has to be another element to explain European integration in the
enlargement countries.27
Empire by example
The aforementioned theoretical inadequacy felt by Zielonka concerning the EU
as an empire of the pen leads us to examine the notion of the EU being an empire by
example. He links this to the widely explored concept of the EU as a normative power
but takes it further in saying that the normative element of the EU spreading its values
particularly in its “immediate neighbourhood”28 can fit an imperial analogy. Normative
power is a concept covered primarily in the work of Ian Manners, writing in 2002, and it
is important to understand this concept in order to be able to analyse in the sense that
Zielonka intended, that these characteristics make the EU an imperial actor. Manners
describes the EU as representing “neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental
nature utilising economic tools, nor a military power of a supranational nature using
armed force, but a normative power of a ideational nature characterised by common
principles.”29 This helps to conceptualise the EU due to its difficult and ever-changing
nature, and gives an indication to the EU’s role in peripheral states such as Bosnia, as
will be further explored with regard to the role of conditionality and the use of the
Copenhagen criteria.
Manners identifies five core norms that have been developed under the broad
normative basis of the EU which are: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and
28 Zielonka,‘Europe as a global actor’,471
29 Ian Manners,‘Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40
(2002): 239

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms which are set out in Article 6 of the
Treaty on European Union.30 In connection to this, the Copenhagen criteria can and will
be analysed with regard to normative and imperial power. These criteria require states
wishing to join the EU to have “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and
the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”31 Zielonka asserts
that the EU resembles a “cooperative and voluntary empire”32, something that is
reflected in the Copenhagen criteria because their fulfilment is obligatory but for the
most part, countries comply in order to reap the ultimate benefit – to join the EU. These
requirements will be further analysed with reference to Bosnia’s enlargement and
integration process and the criteria will be used to represent the EU’s imperialist
normative aims.
Zielonka claims that the EU’s imperial politics are most present in its periphery,
such as BiH. He has previously asserted that the EU is an empire in a coercive sense
because it “assert[s] political and economic control over various peripheral actors”33 and
states that its “imperial instruments”34 are “economic and bureaucratic rather than
military and political.”35 This leads to a discussion of Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power,
30 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe, 241
31 European Commission,‘European Neighbourhood policy and enlargement Negotiations: Conditi ons for
Membership’ [Online] (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm) [Accessed
6th July 2015]

especially with regard to diplomacy and how the EU has come to use its impressive soft
power to become an empire by example, and an influential normative power.36 Similar
to the aforementioned work of Marks he notes the imperial nature of EU bureaucracy
and the fact that conditionality on enlargement candidates is extensive and stringent
and even refers specifically to BiH, and the “detailed package of 18 major reforms”37 to
be implemented in the country.
Zielonka also refers to the EU in an imperial sense by stating that “states can
become empires by default because they try to bring some order to unstable neighbours
or try convert barbarians into ‘good’ citizens.”38 This implies that even if not intended,
the EU became this kind of normative empire by assisting the states on its periphery.
This idea of the EU playing a normative and stabilising role is supported by Beck and
Grande who write about the EU as a ‘Cosmopolitan Empire’ which itself connotes that
the empire is multicultural, benign and accepting, which will also be explored in
connection to Bosnia. The authors state that the periphery “enjoys a greater degree of
autonomy”39 and that the cosmopolitan empire “respects differences and is based on
mutual respect”40 which exemplifies the EU’s normative aims.
One criticism of this element of the ‘EU as empire’ theory is whether normative
power and good intentions is enough to say that the EU is an imperial power when
38 Zielonka,Europe as empire, 13
39 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Empire, 70

dealing with enlargement candidates without the combination of other elements. This
will be examined with regard to BiH and the EU’s work in the country.
Superior Empire
There are scholars who claim that the EU is not a benign imperial power but a
negative force that is expansionist and/or acts with a superiority complex over other
states, and for the purposes of this dissertation, enlargement candidates and
“imperializable peripheries”.41 This notion of the EU is beginning to appear more and
more in literature especially with regard to its dealings with states on its periphery and
those involved in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Writing in 2007, Hartmut Behr
states that the EU has set a “standards of civilisation”42 precedent for prospective
member states to follow which refers to the EU’s view that some of these states to not
correlate to the supposed ‘European ideal’. This will be interesting to examine in
connection to states such as BiH that have a remarkably diverse culture and are of
majority Islamic faith, as well as an examination of what these so-called standards of
civilisation are.
On the topic of expansionism and it connection to EU enlargement, Behr posits
that “geographical projections are never politically neutral”43 which reflects the fact that
the EU has an interest in its enlargement candidates but also suggests there may be
42 Hartmut Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession PoliticsViewed from a
Historical ComparativePerspective’,European Journal of international Relations,13 (2007),239
43 Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule?’, 242

more elements to its political decisions which the author equates to the establishment of
the EU as a “new empire”.44 With regard to geopolitics, Behr draws upon Halford
Mackinder’s Heartland Theory from ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ written in 1942
which links to the aforementioned superiority complex of Western Europe due to its
“higher civilisation”.45 Though this theory is outmoded, it connects geography to
civilisation which is important when analysing imperialist tendencies and also leads us
to look further into this issue of the EU’s possible superiority complex and whether it
acts this way towards its candidates.
Behr writes that the EU functions on a belief of “hierarchical thinking”46 which
indicates that the EU acts and applies policy towards other states in a manner
demonstrating that they know what is best. This could be applied for example in the fact
that all states wishing to join the EU have similar requirements to fulfil, and even for the
Western Balkan candidates the Stabilisation and Association Processes are almost
identical. This shows that the EU has assumed a one size fits all policy works with
regard to enlargement. These elements will be examined with regard to Bosnia, and an
analysis will be carried out into whether the EU feels it is superior to those states
joining, that it is indeed more civilised and that it need these states on its periphery to
become an empire.
As previously stated, these three aspects of the ‘EU as empire’ theory will be
examined individually with regard to the EU’s relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina
45 Halford Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History (1942) in Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of
Imperial Rule?’, 247

and whether the EU acts in these particular imperialist ways. Using the theoretical
framework of the authors outlined above, I will note what is happening in Bosnia and
consult work of scholars on the subject with regard to the enlargement process and its
relationship with the EU and analyse it with respect to whether the EU’s role and actions
can be seen as imperialist in the sense of that particular chapter; empire of the pen,
empire by example or superior empire. It is clear that these three aspects of EU imperial
theory can be complex and interchangeable so in my final concluding piece, I will
ascertain whether one element, if any, is more prominent and whether the EU is or
wishes to be an empire, in the case of Bosnia.

Chapter Two - Empire of the pen
This chapter will focus on the idea that the EU resembles an empire in an
administrative and bureaucratic sense – an “empire of the pen.”47 The chapter will
examine this notion with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will examine the
problematic nature of the internationally established constitution from the Dayton Peace
Accords of 1995 and the EU’s role in its establishment and implementation. An analysis
will follow of the extensive requirements placed on BiH by the EU, such as the acquis
communautaire and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). The chapter
will explore the effectiveness of this perspective of the ‘EU as empire theory’ in BiH, and
whether these elements really render the EU an ‘empire of the pen’. In addition, it will
critique this perspective in terms of whether it is theoretically adequate to assess the
status quo in Bosnia without drawing on other elements of empire theory outlined in the
previous chapter.
The Legacy of the Dayton Constitution
The General Framework for Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace
Agreement/Peace accords) was reached in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio in the
United States and formally signed in Paris of the same year, with the main participants
of the agreement being President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan
Milošević (who represented the Bosnian Serb interests due to the absence of their
leader, Radovan Karadžić), President of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, and President of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović with his Foreign Minister, Muhamed
47 Marks,‘Europe and itEmpires’, 7

Šaćirbeg. The Accords were witnessed in Paris by French president Jacques Chirac,
U.S. president Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister John Major, German chancellor Helmut
Kohl and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.48 The Agreement reached at
Dayton was first and foremost to bring peace to the region which is an “undeniable
accomplishment”49, though there are problematic elements, particularly in the
constitution, which still holds today in BiH.
As previously established, there are many elements and endeavours that can be
examined from the perspective of Bosnia as the actor, and this is particularly true
regarding the Dayton constitution. Issues come into play regarding political inertia over
the implementation of constitutional reform for example. Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace
Accords, which is the section containing the Bosnian constitution, established the
current state structure by dividing the country into three separate ethnic entities; the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), Republika Srpska (RS), and the Brĉko
District. It is only the ethnicities of three entities (Bosniak Muslim, Bosnian Serb, and
Bosnian Croat) that are recognised in an official capacity which has been an issue since
the conception of the constitution, which will be further explored. Another problem
caused by this division into entities is increased Ethnonationalism and entity voting,
which in turn halt reforms and the EU integration process due to disagreement amongst
48 University of Minnesota: Human Rights Library,‘Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-
Herzegovina’ (30th November 1995) [Online] (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonsum.html)
[Accessed 20th August 2015]
49 Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘The Fractured soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement’ in F Sokolović,D and F Bieber ed.
Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Aldershot: Ashgate PublishingCompany,
2001): 63

the ethnicities and deliberate blocking of legislation.50 This contributes to difficulties in
the relationship between BiH and the EU due to its complex and divisive nature.
It is clear that internal problems in BiH regarding the constitution are of vital
importance but it must be established as to why this constitutional legacy in BiH makes
the EU an ‘empire of the pen’, and the extent as to whether this is really the case. As
well as representatives from individual countries at the Dayton Peace Accords,
international organisations were also present, including the EU. This signifies that the
EU was an orchestrator of the complicated constitutional structure,51 as well as affirming
its role in administration of BiH immediately after the war. In addition, constitutional
reform has been on the international agenda for BiH for a long time, as well as it being a
key element for EU conditionality and Bosnia’s path to EU integration and eventual
membership. The EU has highlighted in Commission documents such as the 2014
Progress Report that the constitution is a problematic element to the country’s progress,
stating that it consists of a “complex institutional architecture that remains inefficient and
is subject to different interpretations.”52 The international community has played a
considerable role in assisting Bosnia with constitutional reform over the years under the
auspices of the Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High
representative, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU.
50 BirgitBahtić-Kunrath,‘Of veto [players and entity-voting: institutional gridlock in theBosnian reform process’,
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 39 (2011),902.
51 Officeof the Committee for European Integration, The Western Balkans and the European Integration:
Perspectives and Implications (Warsaw,2008):8
52 European Commission.‘Commission Staff WorkingDocument: Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report’ (2014) (
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-bosnia-and-herzegovina-progress-
report_en.pdf) [Accessed 18th June 2015]

One of the biggest issues arising from the constitutional issues and the strict
separation of the state, and one of the ways the EU has manifested itself as an empire
of the pen, is the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci vs Bosnia and Herzegovina
case. The decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in
December 2009 concerned the two defendants who took the state to court, Dervo
Sejdić of Bosnian Roma ethnicity and Jakob Finci, a Bosnian Jew. The issue was that
according to the Bosnian constitution and official recognition only being applicable to
Bosniak, Serb and Croat ethnicities in Bosnia, the two individuals did not have the right
to stand as candidates for the presidency of BiH.53 Lack of Implementation of this
decision and the required changes to the constitution has left Bosnia at a standstill for
seven years in the integration process and this one particular issue has been repeatedly
emphasised as a key reform needed to be put into place in order for the SAA to enter
into force.
When examining the EU’s role in the debates and the implementation of this
decision, it can be said that the EU acted as an empire of the pen because it was
repeatedly affirmed that this reform has to be made for BiH to move forward and that it
was administrative and constitutional changes that were key here. However, the EU
used the ‘stick’ element of conditionality to castigate the country for its inaction
regarding this issue by cutting its financial support through the Instrument for Pre-
Accession (IPA) by 54% from €103.5 million to €47 million54, as was highlighted in the
53 Adnan Rahimic,‘Back on the EU track – Bosnia and Herzegovina on the path towards becoming a candidate
country’, Future Lab Europe (30th March 2015) [Online] (http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/blog/back-on-the-eu-
track-bosnia-and-herzegovina-on-the-path-towards-becoming-a-candidate-country/) [Accessed 1st June 2015]
54 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff WorkingDocument: Bosnia And Herzegovina 2013 Progress Report’
(16th October 2013) [Online]

2013 European Commission Progress Report for BiH. This shows that perhaps the EU
represents a different kind of empire, one that is more forceful and that uses the tools of
conditionality to push for change, as will be further explored in later chapters. In
addition, this cutting of the IPA perhaps represents a realisation by the EU that ruling
and relating with BiH in a purely administrative sense is not enough.
Moreover, at the end of 2014, German and British foreign ministers Frank-Walter
Steinmeier and Philip Hammond proposed to implement to SAA finally after seven years
stagnation, following its ratification in 2008, in exchange for a set of socioeconomic and
administrative reforms.55 Although this could represent an imperial role of the EU in the
sense that ministers of more powerful Western Europe countries are asserting rules and
conditionality over Bosnia and that it could be an empire of the pen as there is a still a
focus on administration, this new initiative dropped the rhetoric on the importance of the
implementation of the Sejdić-Finci ruling. This is meant in the sense that the EU no
longer demanded a “credible effort”56 to resolve the issue just a continued commitment
to work towards its implementation. The backtracking over this issue suggests that in
this respect, the EU is not an empire of the pen as it seems as though progression in
the integration and accession process has taken precedence over the strict bureaucratic
nature of the requirement of reform implementation.
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf) [Accessed 14th June
2015]: 6
55 Eric Maurice,‘EU to implement Bosnia association pact’, EU Observer (17th March 2015) [Online]
(https://euobserver.com/enlargement/128018) [Accessed 1st June 2015]
56 European Commission,‘Commission Staff WorkingDocument: Bosnia And Herzegovina 2013 Progress Report’, 6

The EU’s bureaucratic demands on Bosnia
The Stabilisation and Association Process
As the previous section outlined, the SAA is one of the most prominent tools that
the EU has in place in Bosnia. The SAA for BiH was established in 2008 but following
many instances of reforms not being implemented and the aforementioned standstill on
progress regarding the Sejdić-Finci ruling, the Agreement did not enter into force until
the 1st June 201557 after lengthy negotiations and a weakening of the demands and
requirements.
These agreements are in place for each one of the Western Balkan states on the
path to EU membership58 and they “largely mirror”59 similar agreements which the EU
signed with Central and Eastern European states wishing to join in the 1990s. Some of
the conditions for the SAA to enter into force in BIH were the reform of police system,
improvement of cooperation with the ICTY, and regional reconciliation as some.60 Aybet
and Bieber have also referred to the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and
Agreements as a “classic tool of enlargement’”.61 This suggests that in the Western
Balkan states, the EU have employed similar, if not identical tools and steps towards
membership, having even modelled them on previous agreements. This is problematic
57 European Commission,‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Bosnia and
Herzegovina’ [Online] (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-
herzegovina/index_en.htm). [Accessed 6th July 2015]
58 European Commission,‘Enlargement: Stabilisation and Association Agreement’ (7th September 2012) [Online]
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm) [Accessed: 2nd September 2015]
59 Gulnur Aybet and Florian Bieber,‘From Dayton to Brussels:The impactof EU and NATO Conditionality on State
Buildingin Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (2011): 1919
60 warsawbook pg 49
61 Gulnur Aybet and Florian Bieber,‘From Dayton to Brussels:The impactof EU and NATO Conditionality on State
Buildingin Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (2011): 1919

as it shows the employment of a ‘one size fits all’-type policy, rendering country-specific
assistance vague and incoherent. Every country in the Western Balkans holds its own
sensitive situation requires different types of involvement and assistance and none of
these countries are ‘classic’ cases of enlargement, so the EU would be faced with
difficulty when trying to employ a ‘classic’ tool of enlargement. This could also offer a
reason as to why it has taken so long for the SAA in BiH to enter into force - because
the EU did not adapt its policy or examine more what individual countries needed or had
the capacity to achieve.
Moreover, the issues regarding the SAA and its utilisation by the EU can be seen
to represent the EU as an empire of the pen, because as already stated, except for a
few individual elements, they remain very similar for each of the Western Balkan states,
consisting of a certain amount of chapters to be negotiated one by one. Vachudova
states that the process involved in the SAA is lengthy and each chapter is negotiated at
length, with the starting chapters being those requiring the most scrutiny. She writes
that the EU employs “benchmarking” as a tool, placing high standards on SAA states.62
This shows that requirements of the SAP and SAA are very demanding on states and
the EU has acted as an empire of the pen, in this regard until very recently with the
Agreement entering into force.
62 Milada Anna Vachudova,‘EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans:The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten
Years On’, Journal of Common Market Studies,52 (2014): 132

The acquis communautaire
The acquis communautaire comprises of around “20,000 laws, decisions and
regulations spanning nearly 80, 000 pages and [is] still growing”.63 It is expected that all
prospective states and members of the EU will adopt all of the existing legislation which
is clearly more difficult for states such as BiH who as well as lacking funds and the
administrative capacity for many of the elements of the acquis, also bear the
aforementioned constitutional problems which come into play when attempting to
implement reforms and legislation.
It is clear that harmonisation between Bosnian and EU legislation has been
difficult for BiH, as can be seen from EU primary documents such as the European
Commission’s 2014 Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The document states
that “only four new laws and 21 amendments…have been adopted”64 in general and
that overall “very limited progress”65 has been made in the adopting of EU legislation.
As it was highlighted in the chapter on the theoretical framework, Gary Marks claims it is
the acquis which makes the EU most like an empire of the pen.66 This is an important
comparison when examining the acquis because it must be borne in mind that this
applies to every member states and in theory, none of the legislation is optional. The
notion that the acquis has administratively imperial elements is supported by Basseuner
63 Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2006):56
64
European Commission.‘Commission Staff WorkingDocument: Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report’ (2014)
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-bosnia-and-herzegovina-progress-
report_en.pdf) [Accessed 18th June 2015] page 8
65 European Commission.‘Commission Staff WorkingDocument: Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report’ (2014)
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-bosnia-and-herzegovina-progress-
report_en.pdf) [Accessed 18th June 2015] page 8

and Weber who note that with regard to prospective members, the EU uses its “off the
shelf integration playbook”67 which again implies that similar actions and policies are
applied in each enlargement case.
In addition, Vachudova notes that in the Balkans, the EU has only addressed
country specific issues such as corruption “indirectly”68 through the acquis. This again
highlights the fact that the EU feels that this requirement to implement legislation is
sufficient enough, even when these countries face serious problems. It shows the EU as
an empire of the pen, as already stated in the fact that the implementation of this
extensive list of laws and decisions is compulsory and is not at all country specific.
At the same time, it could be said that the EU plays more than a role of just an
empire of the pen because the SAA has already entered into force (June 2015) despite
the lack of harmonisation with the acquis on so many levels. It leads us to question to
what extent the SAA, and especially the acquis really have any power in the integration
process when the process appears to be continuing to move forward. This chapter
examined bureaucratic and administrative elements of the EU’s role in Bosnia, and
although there are many that could be analysed, it singled out the legacy and
problematic elements of the Dayton constitution, the SAA and the acquis
communautaire as the most important and influential. Although these were analysed
under the notion that the EU can be seen as an empire of the pen, it is possible to
67
Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, “Are we there yet?” International impatiencevs.a long-term strategy for a
viableBosnia’,Democratization Policy Council (31 May 2010) [Online]
(http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/policybrief1.pdf) [Accessed 12th August 2015]
68 Vachudova,‘EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans:The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On’,
(2014): 124

question whether despite lengthy administration processes and requirements, these
elements do in fact render the EU imperialist in this sense. It is difficult to argue that just
because the EU employs many administrative tools and requires a high level of
bureaucratic cooperation, that this makes it an empire as opposed to solely a
“bureaucratic nightmare”.69 However, when examining such tools and processes under
Mark’s analysis and comparison with the fundi factio of the Roman Empire, you can see
the similarities and where the comparisons come from.
This leads us once again to examine the theoretical inadequacy pointed out in
the theoretical framework chapter of this element of EU as empire theory, which I will
attempt to tackle in the following two chapters focusing on the EU as a normative
empire and a superior, hierarchical empire.
69 Cathy Newman, ‘European Commission insider labelsBrusselsa 'bureaucraticnightmare',The Financial Times’
(1st July 2005) [Online] (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/115bd1c0-e9aa-11d9-ba15-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3hNYSqp1V) [Accessed 2nd July 2015]

Chapter Three – An empire by example
Following the inadequacies presented in the previous chapter regarding the
aspect of ‘EU as empire’ theory that the EU resembles an empire of the pen, this
chapter will examine a different element of this theory. It will take the concept of the EU
as a normative power a step further, as presented by authors such as Zielonka and
Beck and Grande, that the normative and cosmopolitan elements of the EU in the
enlargement process contribute to the EU being a benevolent empire. As outlined in the
theoretical framework chapter, Zielonka terms this an “empire by example”70 in
reference to the EU’s endeavours to spread its common beliefs and values throughout
the enlargement process. This chapter will examine this notion primarily through the
Copenhagen criteria, the conditionality mechanism and in connection to this, the
attractiveness of membership. As early as 1999, the EU had a Stability Pact with South-
Eastern European countries, including BiH, focused on returning stability and peace to
the region,71 which highlights the EU’s normative aims as well as a long-term
commitment to the region. In addition, despite it being a well-known fact that the post
conflict states of the Western Balkans served as a “test case”72 for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP), its military capabilities were limited, as they are today. The
EU undertook “civilian responsibilities”73, such as humanitarian assistance programmes
71 European Commission,‘Enlargement: Stability Pactfor South-Eastern Europe’ (7th September 2012) [Online]
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/stability-pact_en.htm) [Accessed 4th September 2015]
72 Elizabeth Cousens and Charles Cater, Towards peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords. (Colorado,
USA: Lynne Rienner PublishersInc,2001):22
73 Cousens and Cater, Towards peace in Bosnia, 39

(PHARE AND OBNOVA) along with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation In
Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. The EU also took over the administration of
the Bosnian city of Mostar following serious destruction and political turmoil.74
The Copenhagen criteria
In 1993, the European Council established political and economic criteria that
candidates for membership would need to fulfil. The criteria are;
 “the political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities;
 the economic criteria: the existence of a functioning market economy as well as
the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the
Union;
 the institutional criteria: the ability to take on the obligations of membership
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. It
includes the whole range of policies and measures that constitute the acquis of
the Union that candidate countries must adopt, implement and enforce. This
requires the administrative capacity to transpose European Community
legislation into national law, to implement it and to effectively enforce it through
appropriate administrative and judicial structures.”75
The normative element mostly concentrates on the political criteria and the
importance placed upon the EU’s core values such as democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for minorities. The EU has undertaken an extensive role on
the ground in BiH in bringing about reform in these areas. As Anastasakis affirmed,
writing in 2008 about the Western Balkans, the EU’s normative agenda was “particularly
75 European Commission,‘Economic and Financial Affairs: Economic accession criteria’(9th October 2014) [Online]
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/index_en.htm) [Accessed 28th August
2015]

evident in its calls for respect of the rule of law”.76 He states that this is achieved
through assistance and guidance on reforms in Justice and Home Affairs, the fight
against corruption and organised crime as well as something specific to the Western
Balkan states – cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal of the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). He also states that the EU has placed a great importance on justice
for victims of massacres and genocides and the return of refugees following conflict.77
All of these elements present the EU in a benevolent and positive light, and reinforce
the importance of the Copenhagen criteria to the EU in prospective member states such
as BiH.
With regard to human rights and the protection of minorities, the aforementioned
Sejdić-Finci case can be analysed, but from a normative perspective. As previously
highlighted, the case concerned the constitutional issue of people of minority ethnicity
being unable to stand as political candidates. From the perspective of the EU being an
‘empire by example’, the fact that until 2015, it was the non-implementation of the
Court’s decision on this case that halted progress for BiH in the accession and
integration process with the EU highlights the importance of the protection of minorities
element of the Copenhagen criteria.
However, the softening of the requirements for BiH on this issue can be analysed.
This is one of the examples where a crossover appears between the elements of
empire theory addressed in this dissertation. Anastasakis notes that despite that
positive elements that come from all that the EU does in its candidate and potential
76 O Anastasakis,‘The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans:towards a more pragmatic approach’,
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8 (2008): 369
77 Anastasakis,‘The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans’,369

candidate states, what is seen as good and “normal”78 by the EU is not necessarily what
is best for the country in question. This can be linked to the concept of the EU’s
“hierarchical thinking”79, as will be explored in the following chapter. Another criticism of
the Copenhagen criteria is that it is broad and vague. Memisević notes that this leaves
too much scope for “negotiation and compromise”.80 This suggests that despite the
normative nature of the Copenhagen criteria and the values and standards they attempt
to set for states like Bosnia, the EU is not an empire because this presents it as a weak
and easily-influenced actor.
It could also be said that this represents the EU as a normative power because the
SAA was allowed to enter into force after the dropping of required reforms, allowing
Bosnia to move forward. This reflects a genuine commitment from the EU to Bosnia’s
progress. This could suggest that the EU has finally recognised the difficulty in
implementing some of these reforms due to BiH’s limited capacity to do so. In
connection to this, authors for the Democratization Policy Council observed that
following many failed attempts to assist in the implementation of the Sejdić-Finci ruling,
there was a marked shift in the EU blaming BiH politicians to a “revisionist and quasi
self-critical” view of their policy in the country.81 This self-evaluation and recognition that
EU policy has not always been exactly what BiH has needed most, presents the EU as
80 Tija Memisević,‘EU Conditionality in Bosniaand Herzegovina:PoliceReform and Legacy of War Crimes’, in J Batt
and J Obradovic-Wochnik (eds),War Crimes, Conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans, European
Union Institute of Security Studies, 2009: 55
81
Oscar Fernandez, Valery Perry and Kurt Bassuener,‘Making the Market on Constitutional Reformin BiH in the
Wake of the EU Initiative’, Democratization Policy Council (March 2015) [Online]
(http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/DPC%20Policy%20Brief%20-
%20CR%20after%20the%20new%20EU%20initiative.pdf) [Accessed 18th August 2015]:4

a benevolent power that puts the best interests of member states first. It could also
reflect a recognition that previously the EU worked more on its own agenda (as will be
explored in the following chapter), but that following changes in the relationship between
the two actors in 2015, the EU’s role and self-projection has also changed; “the EU is
ready to support Bosnia and Herzegovina.”82
Conditionality as a normative mechanism
The use of EU conditionality in enlargement candidate states is often associated
with normative power. The EU has been noted for its effective use of soft power as well
as the ‘carrot and the stick’, which refers to the use of incentives and punitive measures.
Conditionality will also be covered in the following chapter on the EU as a hierarchical
empire, as once again, this crossover between the two perspectives can be observed
with regard to conditionality.
Firstly, it can be observed that following the elections in October 2014, a new
government was elected that is implementing reforms and BiH is moving forward, as
can be seen from new initiatives and the SAA entering into the next stage. Furthermore,
on 23rd February 2015, when Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, visited Sarajevo, the Bosnian parliament
82 Srecko Latal,‘Bosnia exults as EU activates stability deal’, The Journal of Turkish Weekly (21st April 2015) [Online]
(http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/04/21/news/bosnia-exults-as-eu-activates-stability-deal/) [Accessed 1st June
2015]

“unanimously adopted a declaration committing the country to EU demands.”83 This
suggests that the benefits of cooperating with the EU and complying with requirements
would outweigh the difficulties of doing so and/or maintaining the status quo. This also
supports the point made by Zielonka in 2006, that the EU resembles a “cooperative and
voluntary empire”84, which states want to be part of.
Incentives offered for compliance can be seen to be effective in the case of visa
liberalisation which has been in place in BiH since 2010, enabling citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to travel freely to the Schengen area.85 This sent a strong message to
Bosnian politicians and citizens because it gave an indication as to the benefits of
membership hence its power as an incentive. The EU often cites the visa liberalisation
programme in BiH as a success story, and that integration provides good incentives that
encourage compliance.86 This reflects the notion of ‘empire by example’ because the
EU showed Bosnia some of the benefits they could experience with full membership if
they continued to comply with the EU’s demands, just as other countries had done
previously.
It has been said that the ultimate incentive of conditionality is membership of the
EU – the “carrot of membership”87, which would encompass and amplify many of the
incentives Bosnia has benefitted from such as visa liberalisation and financial
83 Eric Maurice,‘EU to implement Bosnia association pact’,EU Observer (17th March 2015) [Online]
(https://euobserver.com/enlargement/128018) [Accessed 1st June 2015]
85 European Commission,‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report’, 6
86 Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, “Are we there yet?” International impatiencevs.a long-term strategy for a
viableBosnia’, Democratization Policy Council (31 May 2010) [Online]
(http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/policybrief1.pdf) [Accessed 12th August 2015]: 6
87 Gianfranco Fini,‘The carrotis EU membership’, New York Times (16th January 2006) [Online]
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/16/opinion/16iht-edfini.html?_r=0) [Accessed 10th September2015]

assistance. This carrot of membership is in some ways affirmed by the aforementioned
initiative by the French and German foreign ministers to make things easier for BiH by
simplifying and softening the requirements and demands of the EU for them to move
forward. It shows, as has already been mentioned, that the EU is committed to Bosnia’s
progress in the accession process as well as a renewed international presence.88
Regarding the ‘stick’ aspect of conditionality, that is to say the punishments for
non-compliance with the EU’s requirements, the EU has in some ways used this to set
an example. Anastasakis states that in order for conditionality to work effectively there
needs to be sufficient use of both the ‘carrot’ and the stick’.89 The EU could be said to
be an ‘empire by example’ in a more punitive sense, as seen in the example of the
substantial reduction of the IPA funds following the standstill after the Sejdić-Finci case.
This shows the power the EU has if a country chooses not to comply, showing other
countries the consequences other candidates, namely BiH, have suffered.
Despite all these elements of conditionality which present the EU in a normative
light, and as an ‘empire by example’, there are aspects of the conditionality mechanism
that come under criticism. One of these, which is noted by Džhić and Weiser, is that
despite being equipped with the tools to implement effective conditionality, the “EU were
unable to precisely define the scope and content of the ‘carrot’ and find a new way of
using the ‘stick’ in a constructive way”.90 This suggests again, that the EU is
inexperienced in this field and holds them back from being an influential actor. This in
88 Adis Merdzanovic ‘Bosnia:A new opportunity for getting closer to the EU?’ EU Observer (4th December 2014)
[Online] (https://euobserver.com/opinion/126780) [Accessed 1st June 2015]
90 Vedran Džhić and Angela Weiser,‘Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in
Bosnia & Hercegovina, Europe-Asia studies, 63 (2011):, 1818

turn implies that the EU is not an imperial actor, as it signifies that it cannot exert control
over states such as BiH at least with regard to conditionality.
There is also an issue regarding the credibility of conditionality. Aybet and Bieber
use the example of police reform, something that has been on the conditionality and
reform agenda for the EU for some time. The authors note that the process has been
long and cumbersome, and stringent demands for reform were made regarding the
issues of corruption and violence. During this difficult process of reform for both the EU
and BiH, the EU actually dropped most of the conditionality clauses and softened its
demands.91 They state, however, that police reform was never mentioned in
conditionality related documentation. This presents the EU as an incoherent actor as
well as damaging the credibility of EU conditionality. This instance of police reform could
be interpreted a number of ways regarding the ‘EU as empire’ theory. The mere fact
that Bosnia achieved notable reform in this area could reflect a successful relationship
and again, the softening of demands could show a normative aspect of the EU as they
just want BiH to make progress. However, most analysis in this realm is negative,
stating the EU is weak and has shown that countries can get away with not meeting all
demands or reforming aspects to the desired levels.
91 Aybet and Bieber, ‘From Dayton to Brussels’,1918

Other normative elements
As well as the Copenhagen criteria and the tools employed in the conditionality
process, there are other ways in which the EU presents itself as a normative actor and
an ‘empire by example’. An example of this is the severe flooding that hit the region in
early 2014. The EU provided immediate financial and humanitarian assistance, as well
as organising a donor’s conference for member states.92 This shows a level of support
from the EU and an ability to act quickly in a time of crisis as well as a recognition that
funds are required in times of crisis.
Another element and role played by the EU in Bosnia is that of statebuilding. This
is something that has been undertaken by many different international organisations
since the end of the war in 1995. The way in which this can viewed as the EU being a
normative power is with regard to the gradual movement away from a complete
international presence and an encouragement for Bosnia to take ownership of its own
politics and institutions. This represents a normative element to the presence of the
international community in Bosnia because they are pushing for BiH to take its own
initiative in making changes and becoming a viable and functioning state. It could also
be said that the imperial element is also removed in this case because this suggests
more of a distance between the two actors. However, this could connote a sense of
empire because the EU (and other organisations) have undertaken the role of
statebuilding and orchestrated this ‘ownership’, even if it is well-meaning and
supportive.
92 European Commission,‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report’, 1

With regard to this issue of ownership, the problem arises once again of Bosnia
not having the capacity to fulfil the requests of the EU. As has already been alluded to,
the constitutional and institutional structures are complex, making ownership difficult,
which is affirmed by Kurt Bassuener;
“asking Bosnians to take ownership of an inherently dysfunctional constitutional
system and asking them to reform it was as disingenuous as asking them to ride
a bicycle with square tires, crooked handlebars and no chain all the way to
Brussels.”93
This reaffirms the notion that the EU has not assisted sufficiently in constitutional reform
and the extent to which this affects the accession process is highlighted in the above
quote.
One final element that could present the EU as an ‘empire by example’ is the
attraction of membership. It could be said that as well as being the most key aspect of
conditionality, there must be something in the EU’s normative and soft power that
makes membership so desirable, the “pull of Brussels.”94 Bassuener and Weber also
note that the “EU’s transformational power seen as inexorable in the Balkans”,95 which
as a contradiction to many affirmations made throughout this paper, shows that the EU
has made real changes in the region. This implies its normative power has been
effective, though the extent to which this makes it an empire is uncertain. However,
93 K Bassuener,J Lyon and E Witte. ‘Slidingtoward the Precipice:Europe’s Bosnia Policy’,Democratization Policy
Council (7 November 2008) [Online] (http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/policybrief4.pdf) [Accessed
12th August 2015]:5
94 The Economist, ‘The Balkans and Europe: The pull of Brussels’(15th October 2011) [Online]
(http://www.economist.com/node/21532306) [Accessed 2nd September 2015]
95 Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, ‘House of Cards:the EU’s “reinforced presence” in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Proposal for a new policy approach’,Democratization Policy Council (May 2013) [Online]
(http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/may.pdf) [Accessed 12th August 2015]

Vachudova notes that it is through the "power of enlargement”96, that this
transformational power can take place and that the EU has a duty to do this after many
years of failure in the region.
To build upon this argument that the EU as a normative power does not mean
that it resembles an empire, as claimed by Zielonka, constructivist analyses can be
employed. John O’Brennan uses the notion of the EU as a normative power and its
successes in this field as a counter argument to David Chandler’s affirmation that the
EU is an imperial power in the Balkans; “far from attempting to re-configure the Western
Balkans in a neo-colonial fashion, the EU has sought to use its revolutionary ‘soft
power’ to export its norms and values to the region and draw it into the integration
process.”97 This suggests, in contradiction to Zielonka and the idea of ‘empire by
example’, that normative power and imperial theory cannot be combined. O’Brennan
also takes issue with the imperial thesis and Chandler’s interpretation, referring to
“misconceptions”98 about expansionism and imperial projections with reference to the
constructivist ideology and the notion of collective identity, that these countries are
returning to Europe.
This idea is also covered by Schimmelfennig in his writings on European
integration in 2002. He refers to the concept of “sociological institutionalism”99, which he
states “reject[s] the assumption that international actors generally act egoistically and
96 Vachudova,‘EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans’,126
97 John O’Brennan, ‘The EU in the Western Balkans:Enlargement as Empire? A Response to David Chandler’, Global
Society 22 (2008): 508
98 O’Brennan, ‘The EU in the Western Balkans:Enlargement as Empire?’, 509
99 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of
the European Union’, International Organization 55 (2001): 58

instrumentally”,100 suggesting that he disagrees with the theory that the EU is an
empire. These constructivist views of EU integration and support for the notion that the
EU is an effective and transformative normative power suggest that the EU is not an
empire, but it attempts to be a benign and good actor in the peripheral states.
However, it is Zielonka’s concept of the EU being an empire by example that has
been examined in this chapter. He states that “the EU does what all historical empires
have always done, namely it exercises control over diverse peripheral actors”,101 which
despite the normative elements of the EU that the champions, reinforces that is still
about control and the EU still has more power than these weak peripheral states. This
chapter has examined the ways in which the EU is an empire by example, through the
promotion of its values in the Copenhagen criteria and the ways it uses the
conditionality mechanism and incentives to inspire change and encourage reform. The
chapter also noted how the EU is an effective soft power and that it genuinely supports
BiH with regard to its immediate reactions in times of crisis and the simple fact that the
country still favours and supports membership despite all the difficulties presented.102
The chapter presented criticisms of the EU as a normative power and an empire
by example, which leads us to the final chapter of this dissertation which will examine
the EU as a superior and hierarchical empire, which aims to fill in many of the
100 Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action,and the Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union’, 58
101 Jan Zielonka, ‘The Ideology of Empire: The EU’s Normative Power Discourse –Dahrendorf Symposium Paper
Summary’, Changing the Debate on Europe: 2011 Dahrendorf Symposium (2011)

theoretical gaps concerning the EU’s role in Bosnia and offer an alternative perspective
of the ‘EU as empire’ theory.

Chapter Four - Superior Empire
There remains one perspective of ‘EU as empire’ theory to analyse with regard to
the relationship between the EU and BiH. The theoretical framework chapter examined
the work of Hartmut Behr who posits that “geographical projections are never politically
neutral”,103 which suggests an expansionist agenda regarding EU enlargement. He also
writes that the EU has set “standards of civilisation”104 for enlargement candidates and
the EU’s logic in peripheral states as one of ‘hierarchical thinking’.105 This chapter will
examine the status quo in Bosnia with regard to the EU as a hierarchical empire. This
will be done in three sections; one concerning the military and strategic elements of the
EU’s role in Bosnia, another treating the asymmetry of EU enlargement and a final
section based on this notion of hierarchical thinking. It will explore the accusations that
the EU has double standards in BiH and a certain arrogance that it thinks it knows what
is best for the country.
Military and strategic concerns
It is useful to remember when analysing the EU as an imperial power that Europe
has a varied colonial history and with the variety of states that now make up members
and candidates, it is a history of both the coloniser and the colonised. With this borne in
mind, Beck and Grande note that “the European empire is built on force”106, reinforcing
104 Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule?, 239

the historical legacy that ‘Europe’ has of being a military might and consisting of strong
imperial powers of the past.
In addition to this, which also sets up a discussion of the EU’s military aspects, is
an argument also contributed by Hartmut Behr. He states that “any form of governing is
inevitably violent”.107 This suggests that when one actor has more power than another,
such is the case between the EU and BiH, that power will be exerted in some
questionable ways.
In order to analyse with the EU is an imperial actor with regard to its military
presence in BiH, it can be noted that there have been soldiers on the ground since the
war and this has continued to be the case. The EUFOR Althea mission is the EU’s
military operation in BiH, which began in November 2004, taking over from the NATO-
led Stabilisation force (SFOR).108 In some ways, this represents the gradual emergence
of the EU as the principal international organisation in Bosnia, particularly as it is widely
acknowledged that NATO’s military presence in BiH has been notable and influential
over the years. Any military presence at all, particularly in a country that is not actually
in conflict could portray the EU as an imperial actor and this can be supported by the
fact that the EUFOR mandate has been twice extended.109 Another potentially imperial
107
Hartmut Behr, (forthcoming) ‘“Empire”, ‘Governing from the Distance’, and the Mitigation of Violence: Towards
a novel policy framework for the EU politics’in Yannis Stivachtisand Hartmut Behr (eds) Revisiting the European
Union as Empire (London: Routledge, forthcoming): 8
108 EUFOR PAO, ‘Political/Military Background’,European External Action Service (14 August 2015) [Online]
(http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2821) [Accessed 11th September
2015]
109
Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, “Are we there yet?” International impatiencevs.a long-term strategy for a
viableBosnia’, Democratization Policy Council (31 May 2010) [Online]

element to this, perhaps linked to the fact BiH is no longer a war torn state, is that
according to Kurt Bassuener, the EU’s military presence is “no longer credible”.110 He
expands this point by saying that the EUFOR soldiers are a “psychological prop”111
which could represent an imperial tactic of the EU sending a message to BiH; perhaps
that they are still capable of exerting a military-type power, and that they are in control
of the state.
In addition to this point, David Chandler notes that “the European Union has not
been reluctant to intervene”112, suggesting that from the outset the EU has had no
issues with using military force in the country, which could be seen as a contradiction to
its normative goals. He adds that the EU has, however, been reluctant to assume
political responsibility for these instances of intervention.113 This suggests that military
intervention and its consequences were not always well thought through which could be
linked to the example made previously in this dissertation, that intervention in the
Western Balkans was a test case for the CFSP.114 This has often been criticised from
the perspective of the EU not doing what is best for the country in question, and just
experimenting with its own capabilities and man power, which may present the EU as
an imperial power in this respect.
110 K Bassuener,J Lyon and E Witte, ‘Slidingtoward the Precipice:Europe’s Bosnia Policy’, Democratization Policy
Council (7 November 2008) [Online] (http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/policybrief4.pdf) [Accessed
12th August 2015]:8
111 K Bassuener,J Lyon and E Witte, ‘Slidingtoward the Precipice:Europe’s Bosnia Policy’, 9
112
DavidChandler, ‘EU Statebuilding:Securing the Liberal Peacethrough EU Enlargement’, Global Society 21
(2007): 594
113 Chandler,‘EU Statebuilding:Securingthe Liberal Peace through EU Enlargement’, 594

Anastasakis takes note of the realist element of the EU’s role and states that
“security concerns supersede all other considerations”.115 This not only represents the
EU’s role in the world as a prominent actor but it is the strategic element which must
take priority. He affirms that the EU has “strategic interests in the region”116 which could
explain the continued presence and commitment to BiH.
Another strategic consideration for the EU to take into account is its relationships
with other global powers such as the United States and Russia, and the ways in which
these are and could be affected by its role and strategy in Bosnia. Due to the fact that
the US has been involved in Bosnia since the start of the conflict in 1991 and a major
player in the orchestration of the Dayton Peace Accords, it has been said that a failure
by the EU in BiH would greatly damage EU-US relations.117 This reinforces the strategic
nature of BiH as a geopolitical entity, as well as the importance for the EU of
maintaining a good relationship with the US.
The situation with Russia is somewhat more complex due to the turbulent
relationship between the country and the EU. Firstly, the issue of the Ukraine can be
observed regarding the fact that officials in the Bosnian state supported the annexation
of the Crimea, especially in the Bosnian Serb entity, the RS. In the RS, politicians sided
with Serbia over their support for Russia, which of course the EU was strongly against
117 Ben Knight, ‘Tension in US-EU relations is real,butnot new, experts say’,Deutsche Welle(13th September 2010)
[Online} (http://www.dw.com/en/tension-in-us-eu-relations-is-real-but-not-new-experts-say/a-5988928)
[Accessed 4th September 2015]

and seriously damaged EU/Russia relations.118 In connection to its close relationship
with Serbia, it is no secret as Tony Barber notes, that Russia “intends to ramp up its
influence in the Balkans”,119 suggesting that the region is not only geopolitically strategic
for the EU. Serbia is also an aspiring EU member, so this is arguably something that the
EU needs to concentrate on and assist the country with, before Russia can have too
much influence to the EU’s detriment. Moreover, Russia has continued to make waves
in the international community that counter the EU’s views with regard to Bosnia. This
can be observed with the fact that it holds a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council, along with prominent members of the EU, such as the UK and France.
Using the veto mechanism, Russia has vetoed extending the EUFOR peacekeeping
mission in Bosnia, declaring that the EU was a force “pushing externally.”120 This
connotes an imperialist and expansionist projection with regard to the EU’s role in
Bosnia and makes the relationship between the two actors again more difficult.
Russia’s recent and damaging use of the veto over the genocide that took place
in Srebrenica in 1995 is also noteworthy due to the fact this highlights its close
relationship with Serbia, who deny that the killings constituted as genocide. In addition,
the EU has continually asserted its support for BiH on the issue as well as it being an
additional example of its soft power, with regard to humanitarian and civil society
118
Kurt Bassuener,‘How to pull out of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s dead-end: A Strategy For Success’, Democratization
Policy Council (2009) [Online] (http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/policybrief2.pdf) [Accessed 12th
August 2015]
119
Tony Barber, ‘An EU Vision for Bosnia’, The Financial Times (23rd March 2015) [Online] (http://blogs.ft.com/the-
world/2015/03/an-eu-vision-for-bosnia/) [Accessed 1st June 2015]
120 Merdzanovic ‘Bosnia:A new opportunity for getting closer to the EU?’ EU Observer (4th December 2014)
[Online] (https://euobserver.com/opinion/126780) [Accessed 1st June 2015]

projects for the victims’ families.121 The EU must remain cautious with regard to its
turbulent relationship with Russia and it is clear that Bosnia is a key pawn in this game
of strategy. This strategic element portrays the EU as an empire because it suggests
that its work in BiH is watched on the international stage, and the decisions the EU
makes there, affect its relations with key global powers.
It is crucial to examine the ways in which the enlargement process can be solely
viewed as an imperial and expansionist quest. It was alluded to in the theoretical
framework chapter, that “geographical projections are never politically neutral,”122 which
supports the notion of there being strategic reasons for the enlargement process, and
offers an imperialist perspective on enlargement. This is reinforced by Engel di Mauro
who states that “eastward expansion [is] process of colonisation”, strongly supporting
the imperial thesis with regard to enlargement.
Enlargement asymmetry
This leads us to examine the ways in which the enlargement process is
asymmetrical. Vachudova notes that the enlargement candidates ultimately benefit from
membership more than existing member states. She states that the lessened economic
benefits of continued enlargement are superseded by the geopolitical benefits of
incorporating the states on the periphery.123 This again supports the aforementioned
121 BBC News, ‘Russia vetoes UN move to call Srebrenica 'genocide'’(8th July 2015) [Online]
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33445772) [Accessed 10th September 2015]
123 Vachudova, ‘EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans’,123

strategic claims concerning the lack of political neutrality. However, Vachudova affirms
that because of these lessened economic benefits, more conditions are imposed on the
Western Balkan states, creating a system of “asymmetric interdependence”.124
This asymmetry is supported by Chandler, who states that the relationship
between the EU and BiH is an “unequal “partnership”.125 This idea represents the notion
that the EU is an empire, in the sense that it is clearly the more powerful actor of the
two, and the EU can use the fact that BiH is weaker to push more reform conditions on
the country. This shows a level of control from EU over its enlargement candidate, and
due to the fact that membership appears to be the ultimate goal for the peripheral
states, the EU can manipulate demands because of the power it holds.
However, O’Brennan refutes the claim that the enlargement process is entirely
asymmetrical, in claiming that states in the Western Balkans have frequently expressed
displeasure with the EU.126 This can also be reflected in the fact that BiH has not
implemented all reforms immediately or to the standard demanded by the EU,
suggesting that the EU does not in fact have as high a level of control in Bosnia as
some claim.
Finally, as previously stated, enlargement and membership of the EU for Bosnia
is often seen as the ultimate goal. Enlargement itself is viewed as an incentive to
comply with EU demands, however the EU is often accused of being arrogant in
thinking that this is sufficient to drive the implementation of reforms. In an article for the
125 Chandler,‘EU Statebuilding:Securingthe Liberal Peace through EU Enlargement’, 598
126 O’Brennan, ‘The EU in the Western Balkans:Enlargement as Empire?’, 510

EU Observer, Toby Vogel states that ultimately, despite all of the EU’s efforts in Bosnia,
there is “no other strategy”127 apart from enlargement. This could reflect the ‘empire by
example’ theory, that the EU remains committed to Bosnia’s membership but also the
arrogance shown through thinking that it is enough of an incentive portrays a sense that
the EU feels it is superior as an actor.
Standards of civilisation and hierarchical thinking
The final aspect of the ‘EU as empire’ theory that this dissertation will explore, is
Behr’s affirmation that the EU has set “standards of civilisation”128 for Bosnia to adhere
to, and that it functions through a system of hierarchical thinking.129 To follow from the
previous point made about the EU’s arrogance in thinking it knows what is best for
Bosnia, the EU is often accused of having made mistakes and having not learned from
them. Vachudova supports this in saying that these mistakes have in fact lessened the
EU’s power in the region; “EU leverage in the western Balkans weakened by
inexpertness, illegitimacy and inconsistency.”130 This suggests the EU has been
incoherent as well as illegitimate in its dealings with Bosnia, implying that it does not
always know what is best for the country.
Bassuener and Weber also state that the EU is increasingly aware of its previous
mistakes in the enlargement process, particularly in the 2007 round of Romania and
Bulgaria as well as other Central Eastern European states. Despite this however, the
127
Toby Vogel, ‘No Strategy for Bosnia –other than enlargement’, EU Observer (5th March 2015) [Online]
(https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/127867) [Accessed: 1st June 2015]

authors note that “no policy adjustment or serious debate followed”.131 This portrays the
EU as an empire that believes itself superior because despite recognising previous
errors, no effort has been made to improve the situation. This displays a one size fits all
policy, making life easier for the EU, but more detrimental to the candidate state.
With regard to the standards of civilisation supposedly applied by the EU, Behr
states that policies in peripheral states can be “ignorant of contextual, culture-specific
factors that influence political thought and political agency.”132 These standards are
manifested through EU policy such as the Copenhagen criteria and there is an
arrogance on the part of the EU that to hold these values of democracy and human
rights in the exact way in which the EU also perceives them, represents a kind of
imposition of values.133 This contributes an alternative imperial dimension to EU policies
such as the Copenhagen criteria because perhaps despite the normative agenda
perceived by some, the values displayed are not culturally sensitive and reflect a
sentiment that there is only one ‘civilised’ system.
In addition, it would be impossible to examine the EU’s cultural superiority
complex without drawing upon the Islamic element. The EU has been accused of
“prejudice and double standards”134 with regard to Bosnia, with some suggesting that
131 Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, ‘House of Cards:the EU’s “reinforced presence” in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Proposal for a new policy approach’(May 2013) [Online]
(http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/briefs/may.pdf) [Accessed 12th August 2015]: 3
132 Behr, ‘“Empire”, ‘Governing from the Distance’, and the Mitigation of Violence: Towards a novel policy
framework for the EU politics’,4
133 Behr, ‘“Empire”, ‘Governing from the Distance’, and the Mitigation of Violence: Towards a novel policy
framework for the EU politics’,9
134 Bassuener,K. and Weber, B. “Are we there yet?” International impatiencevs.a long-term strategy for a viable
Bosnia’,Democratization Policy Council (31 May 2010) [Online]

Christian countries progressing quicker in the process. This is a loose claim which the
EU would be very quick to defend, but it is worth mentioning that there still remains no
majority Muslim country as a member of EU, and with the growing public fear of the
religion in current global situation, it will be interesting to see if one of the increasing
‘standards’ becomes more based upon religion.
Chandler also refers to the EU possessing double standards with regard to
democracy. He states that it has turned “a blind eye to democracy”135 and that the
double standards refer to the reiteration of the importance of democracy through the
Copenhagen criteria for example. This suggests that despite its rhetoric on some
issues, the EU will progress nonetheless (as can be seen from the dropping of some
conditionality clauses), in order to pursue its strategic aims in Bosnia.
Vachudova declares that the reason why the EU softened its demands in BiH
and allowed the SAA process to move forward, was to have more influence in the
country.136 This is a contradiction to previous points made concerning ownership and a
move to lessen the international community presence in Bosnia. However, it presents
the EU as an imperial actor because it suggests that with a closer relationship between
the two, and a more solidified promise of progression, the EU can have more of an
influence in the country’s politics and situation. Yet, it is crucial to note that the
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker has announced his
135
David Chandler,‘From Dayton to Europe’, in David Chandler (ed), Peace without Politics? Ten Years of
International Statebuilding in Bosnia (London: Taylor and Francis Group Ltd, 2006): 37
136 Vachudova, ‘EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans’134

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