3. 2
Abstract
The three meetings that took place at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich during Neville
Chamberlain’s attempt at preventing World War two in 1938 have defined not only British
history but that of the name associated with appeasement, Neville Chamberlain. Even today
appeasement is seen as a ‘dirty word’; one which has tarnished Chamberlain’s premiership
for many decades and continues to do so. Although there have been arguments for and
against the policy, to this day, it is still looked down upon and continues to be studied.
During 1938, the fear of a new war frightened many within Europe; this was mainly due to
the creation and advancement in modern technology, not to mention the rise of Communism
and Fascism around the world. There were even those within Germany who disagreed with
Hitler’s suggestion to begin his war campaign in 1938, arguing that the people were just
simply not yet ready. Many historians have argued that all the Prime Minister did was to
carry on a policy which had been engraved into British diplomacy for many years, however,
there are also those who believe Chamberlain did the wrong thing and was foolish enough
to believe Hitler would not start World War Two. This dissertation will focus on the three
diplomatic ventures made by Neville Chamberlain and will critically analyse his decision
making.
4. 3
Introduction
Neville Chamberlain has been dubbed as ‘The Guilty Man’ by many historians for the events
that unfolded under his premiership, most notably that of the Munich agreement. It has been
argued that his ‘face off’ with Adolf Hitler over the Sudeten crisis at Berchtesgaden,
Godesberg and Munich were all in vain and as a result of Chamberlain’s incompetence to
take a firmer stance against Hitler, Chamberlain was outmanoeuvred and out of his depth
during the diplomatic voyages. Winston Churchill described Chamberlain's trip as ‘the
stupidest thing that has ever been done’.1 However, there are those who disagree with this
statement, for example, Paul M. Kennedy argues that Chamberlain only continued a policy
which had been installed in British diplomacy since the middle of the nineteenth century.2
Therefore, Chamberlain cannot solely be to blame for the events that occurred after the
Munich agreement. This introduction will focus on the progression of Neville
Chamberlain’s rise to the premiership and look at the reasons why Chamberlain chose the
policy of appeasement as a means to obtaining peace.
Firstly, the historiography towards the Prime Minister’s decision to follow the policy of
appeasement is of interesting value. In the early post 1945 era, it was suggested that
Chamberlain was one of many ‘guilty men’ who had led Britain into a war which could have
been averted. Sidney Aster argues the post 1945 era of historiography on appeasement
suggests that the people associated with Chamberlain or those who profoundly agreed with
his policy of appeasement severely underestimated ‘the dynamism of Nazism.’3 This line of
thinking was the traditional theory, however, during the 1960s this changed with the
1 Harvey Diary, 15 September, 1938, Found in, Peter Neville, Hitler and appeasement :
the British attempt to prevent the Second World War, (London : Continuum, 2006), p.180
2 Paul M. Kennedy, ‘The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865-1939’,
British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1976), p.196
3 Sidney Aster, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy & Statecraft,
Vol.19, No.3 (2008), p.444
5. 4
introduction of memoirs and documentation which were now allowed to be released, thus
leading to revisionism on the subject. The revisionist aspect, as Aster has pointed out, led
many to believe that Britain during the 1930s had to follow the policy of appeasement as
structurally Britain was limited by her ‘politics, finance, economics, empire and culture.’4
This created a shift in argument between traditionalists and revisionists who both have made
valid points on the matter. Most recently, post-revisionists now take the view that there were
miscalculated steps by not only Chamberlain but those around him; instead they argue that
there were fatal mistakes made and credible alternatives that were brushed aside. Andrew
Stedman has argued, ‘the perceived weakness of the alternatives to appeasement partly
explain why Chamberlain took the path he did.’5 The Prime Minister’s reasons for following
a policy of appeasement are difficult to understand as there are many arguments for the case,
however, post-revisionism seems to weigh up factors for both arguments but there is, in
general, agreement that mistakes were made on Chamberlain’s part.
During Chamberlain’s early career as a politician he had proved himself to be a formidable
politician. His father and brother had experienced similar successes in government but had
never risen to the premiership. Chamberlain gained a reputation for being efficient and
professional and his record when compared to his other cabinet colleagues according to
David Dutton, ‘helped strengthen his position in the national government.’6 As a result of
his successes, Chamberlain became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1931 for a second time.
He is given credit for helping Britain’s economy to weather the economic turmoil at home
and for bringing about a sensible plan for rearmament during the 1930s. According to Peter
Neville, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain was well rehearsed in foreign policy
4 Ibid, p.444
5 Andrew David Stedman, Alternatives to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler's
Germany, (I.B.Tauris, 2014), p.238
6 David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain, (Arnold, 2001), p.39
6. 5
affairs and defence planning.7 Thus ensuring his rise to the premiership in 1937 due to his
vast wealth of knowledge and experience. Professor McKercher has suggested that when
Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937, ‘the strategic basis under-pinning British
external policies, under-went profound change.’8 The new Prime Minister was a different
and dynamic character, for William R. Rock, Chamberlain’s successfulness as a business
man meant he had learned that the best way to solve a dispute was through ‘a quiet and
orderly process of face-to-face negotiation’.9 This was the type of diplomatic approach
Chamberlain took when meeting Hitler and with his wealth of experience it was expected
that only a positive outcome could come from the two leaders’ meetings.
After World War One, most countries including Britain, did not want to see a return of a
situation in which millions of people would lose their lives for the sake of a few. According
to Christopher Thorne, the policy of appeasement was more a case of preventing a repeat of
the disasters which ensued Europe from 1914-1918. For example, he states, ‘Appeasement
did not rest solely upon the political prejudices or wishful thinking of few… Its greatest
strength was drawn from the deep-seated horror of war which had gripped the country since
1918’.10 This was a horror which had ‘gripped’ Chamberlain more so than anyone else; for
instance, Peter Neville has argued that as Prime Minister, the foreign policies Chamberlain
pursued both reflected his hatred for war and the memory of his cousin Norman’s death.11
It has been said that Chamberlain never recovered from the death of his beloved cousin
Norman and, as a result, it is clear to see why he pursued a policy of appeasement. For Rock,
7 Peter Neville, Hitler and appeasement, p.40
8 B. J. C. McKercher, ‘National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and
Appeasement, 1930-1939’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.19, No.3 (2008), p.392
9 William R. Rock, British appeasement in the 1930s, (London : Edward Arnold, 1977),
p.29
10 Christopher Thorne, The approach of war, 1938-1939, (London : Macmillan ; New
York : St. Martin's Press, 1967), p.11
11 Peter Neville, Hitler and appeasement, War, p.39
7. 6
the destruction of a generation during the ‘holocaust of 1914-18’ left a lasting impression
on Chamberlain.12 The loss of lives during the First World War steered Chamberlain and the
public to support appeasement. But there was also a firm belief that war would reignite the
horrors of World War One, which Britain had only just come to terms with.
When the Wall Street crash occurred in 1929 most countries around the world were left in
economic disarray, one of them being Britain. According to Lars S. Skalnes, Britain’s
economic vulnerability forced Britain and its government to seek good relations with all
nations including its enemies and above all Germany.13 Britain was weak, both economically
and militarily and it had to face up to this. The policy of appeasement for many was a means
of securing Britain’s empire and economic security. When Chamberlain became the Prime
Minister in 1937, he immediately initiated a review into how well prepared Britain’s defence
was. McKercher argues that all aspects were looked at including the ‘crucial issue of the
allocation of financial and material resources.’14 However, by the mid-1930s when it became
apparent that Germany was growing as a military threat to Britain, rearmament had already
begun though it was at a slow rate. Kennedy has argued that during the 1930s it was simply
not possible to rearm as quickly as military experts wished.15 As a result, appeasement had
to be pursued as a means of buying time for Britain to prepare for any eventuality which is
the traditional argument for why Chamberlain followed the policy of appeasement.
Another reason why Chamberlain persisted with the policy of appeasement was due to
Britain’s weakness in terms of allies. For example, France, like Britain, did not want a war
with Germany if she could prevent it. The relationship between the British and French
12 William R. Rock, British appeasement in the 1930s, p.42
13 Lars S. Skalnes, ‘Grand Strategy and Foreign Economic Policy:
British Grand Strategy in the 1930s’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (1998), p.593
14 B. J. C. McKercher, ‘National Security and Imperial Defence’, p.422
15 Paul M. Kennedy, ‘The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865-1939’,
p.205
8. 7
governments was also not on good terms with both regarding each other in low affection.
According to Rock, ‘Britain’s lack of faith in France was another spur to appeasement.’16
But despite Britain and France’s low regard for one another, the French did support the
policy of appeasement thus giving Chamberlain belief in his approach towards Hitler.
According to McKercher, Europe also had been the priority of the British in terms of
strategic capability; if one of the colonies fell, it could easily be recovered. However, should
an attack at home weaken Britain’s credibility and strength then it could prove to be a lethal
blow.17 Throughout its history Britain had always wanted to ensure that no one power
dominated Europe; Britain was not in a positon to defend both her empire and her homeland.
Stephen R. Rock has suggested that appeasement was also looked upon as a success prior to
the events that took place after Munich. For example, he argued, ‘Concessions to the United
States during the 1890s had led to a dramatic improvement in relations.’18 Thus British
appeasement had worked in the past and should have worked in Chamberlain’s view for the
future.
Another issue Chamberlain faced was America’s isolationist attitude towards Europe,
Thorne has pointed out that during the Sudeten crisis Franklin D. Roosevelt made it clear to
the British government that even if America was to become involved in a war, only a
substantial invasion would allow him to send troops to Europe.19 Therefore, if Germany
somehow managed to break through British and French defences it might be too late before
American assistance could be of any use. Other countries such as Russia were deemed by
the Chamberlain government as unreliable and untrustworthy, even with the existing treaties
16 William R. Rock, British appeasement in the 1930s, p.45
17 B. J. C. McKercher, ‘National Security and Imperial Defence’, p.410
18 Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics, (University Press of Kentucky,
2015), p.52
19 Christopher Thorne, The approach of war, 1938-1939, p.8
9. 8
between Czechoslovakia and Russia. According to Rock, it was believed that Joseph Stalin
had destroyed any structure the Russian military had with his purges.20 Lastly, there was the
issue of how the British dominions would react to war, Rock suggests that the majority of
the dominions were against the idea of Britain going to war over the Czechoslovakia issue.21
There was, in fact, widespread support by Britain’s dominions for Chamberlain’s approach
towards Germany as they too had suffered previously from their involvement in World War
One. This once again reinforced Chamberlain’s determination to secure peace without war.
Through the use of both primary sources and secondary material this dissertation focuses
upon the three main meetings between Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain. The first
chapter will focus upon Chamberlain’s bold move to face Hitler one to one and will look at
both notes of the conversation between the two leaders but will also take account of the
British cabinets’ response by looking at various cabinet papers and member’s attitudes
towards the proposals laid out by the Germans. Thereafter the next chapter will focus on the
events at Godesberg using notes of the conversations and cabinet papers. However, this
chapter will explore the change and shift in attitude towards the policy of appeasement,
especially the role of Lord Halifax in this regard. Finally, the last chapter will focus on the
final meeting concentrating on the Prime Minister’s naivety and foolishness at the Munich
conference, with a rounding conclusion. This paper will attempt to assess whether
Chamberlain’s trip really was ‘the stupidest thing that has ever been done’ and will argue
the case that the Prime Minster made crucial errors and mistakes which could have been
avoided.
20 Ibid, p.51
21 Ibid, p.48
10. 9
Neville Chamberlain Sets the Stage: Berchtesgaden
Neville Chamberlain’s decision to have a ‘face off’ with Hitler one to one has been seen by
many historians as a bold step. At the time, many contemporaries also regarded
Chamberlain’s decision to fly to Germany as a daring move and one which was with good
intentions. Even the press in England were very enthusiastic about the Prime Minister’s
gallant move. Roy Douglas points to how the Daily Herald, which was a Labour paper,
headlined, ‘Good Luck, Chamberlain!’22 However, David Reynolds believes that Hitler got
the better of Chamberlain and within a matter of hours Chamberlain had given into Hitler’s
demands and surrendered the Sudetenland to Germany.23 This chapter will explore the
discussions between Hitler and Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden and will question whether
Chamberlain really was as naïve as he has been portrayed.
After the annexation of Austria in March 1938, events in Europe were really heating up. In
Britain, there was a growing sense of fear amongst the public that Hitler’s aims were not
solely rested upon one aspect; they believed Hitler was out for blood and his speeches more
than less reinforced this perception. After Hitler had achieved the annexation of Austria, he
moved his attention elsewhere to Czechoslovakia. It is well known that far from obtaining
peace, Hitler was determined to bring about war. The British government was growing ever
more concerned and this was emphasised by Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador in
Germany, when he wrote a letter on 6 September 1938 stating, ‘It is no exaggeration to say
the world is awaiting with anxiety… the chances of Hitler coming out at Nuremberg with
22 Roy Douglas, In the year of Munich, (London : Macmillan, 1977), p.50
23 David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century, (Penguin
Books, 2008), p.58
11. 10
what will amount to peace or what will amount to war… are about 50-50.’24 It was clear to
many that Czechoslovakia was Hitler’s next target.
The Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia was occupied with numerous amounts of
indigenous populations, most notably that of the 3.5 Million Sudeten Germans. Hitler knew
he could bring about chaos and use the Sudeten Germans as a springboard for war and from
the 12-13 of September 1938, Hitler encouraged Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten
Nazis, to rebel and demand a union with Germany. After the situation became untenable in
the Sudetenland, the Czechoslovakian government had no other choice than to declare
martial law. This was the perfect opportunity for Hitler to begin his war campaign and as a
result of the Czechoslovakian government’s enforcement of marital law, Hitler threatened
to go to war. As the world held its breath Chamberlain intervened.
Chamberlain’s bold move to propose a meeting with Hitler threw him off balance. Hitler
could have said no, yet this was not just any minister this was the Prime Minister of Great
Britain. According to John Charmley, Chamberlain had not only taken the initiative in
suggesting to meet with Hitler, he had astonished him with his boldness.25 Chamberlain did
not inform his cabinet colleagues that he was going to meet with Hitler until the last moment;
this can be seen as a mistake on the part of Chamberlain as he was not well rehearsed in
knowing some of the thoughts from cabinet members on the matter before he left, nor was
he fully prepared. While some within the cabinet were not best pleased, the majority agreed
and thought it best to allow Chamberlain to have an open discussion with the Fuhrer.
Reynolds argues that it was in fact the French Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier’s
24 TNA, Transcript of Extract from a letter from Neville Henderson, British Ambassador in
Germany, September 6, 1938, (FO 371/21737)
25 John Charmley, Chamberlain and the lost peace, (London : Hodder and Stoughton,
1989), p.108
12. 11
suggestion that both himself and Chamberlain should go to meet the Fuhrer.26 This has led
some historians to suggest that Chamberlain only jumped on someone else’s idea in the first
place. Nevertheless, Chamberlain decided to go it alone which to many historians is one of
the key mistakes he made before facing Hitler. Had Chamberlain gone together with
Daladier, it might have shown more willingness on the part of the French and British to
show some form of united strength. Alas this did not happen and Chamberlain would have
to go it alone.
On the 15 of September 1938, Chamberlain flew to Munich before continuing by train to
Berchtesgaden. Chamberlain was full of hope and willingness to solve the Sudeten crisis by
means of diplomacy. For Hitler on the other hand, this would have been a time of
nervousness. According to Reynolds, Hitler believed that Chamberlain, despite coming
alone, was coming to tell him that Britain was ready to march if necessary.27 From this point,
it could be argued that had Chamberlain’s approach been more firm when meeting Hitler for
the first time, the outcome may possibly have been different. From the notes of the Prime
Minister’s visit, it is interesting to see that on arrival Chamberlain was greeted by crowds in
the towns and villages. Along his route, they saluted and welcomed him.28 One might
question as to whether the German people themselves welcomed Chamberlain’s policy of
appeasement and saw him themselves as the saviour of Europe, though Hitler would say
otherwise.
On arrival, Chamberlain noted his first impressions of Hitler stating that he was,
‘undistinguished… You would never notice him in a crowd and would take him for the
26 David Reynolds, Summits, p.47
27 Ibid, p.50
28 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at 10 Downing Street, 17 September, 1938,
(CAB 23/95/3)
13. 12
house painter he once was.’29 From the outside it would seem Chamberlain was confident
of obtaining a peaceful resolution to the Sudeten crisis due to his opponent’s lacklustre
looks, however, looks can be deceiving and this was something that Chamberlain would
later discover. After some small talk, Hitler asked how the Prime Minister wished to
proceed. Chamberlain replied that ‘he would prefer a private talk with Herr Hitler alone.’30
This was one of many mistakes made by Chamberlain. For example, when leaving to meet
Hitler, Chamberlain also decided to leave his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax at home.
Although this was brave, many would also see it as stupid. Chamberlain had now jumped
into the diplomatic arena unprepared and was now without his Foreign Secretary; leaving a
sour taste in the foreign office’s mouth. As a result, Chamberlain was now relying upon the
German ministry to provide him with an interpreter. This more or less emphasises
Chamberlain’s disorganisation and rush into the diplomatic main stage, bolstering the
argument that Chamberlain was naïve at Berchtesgaden.
According to Reynolds, Chamberlain’s aim at the start with Hitler was to slowly ease the
conversation into talking about the Sudetenland in order to seek out his opponent.31 The
Prime Minister tried at first to discuss how better the two could improve Anglo-German
relations, though this took a quick turn as Hitler argued that the Sudeten question was of the
upmost urgency.32 Within minutes, Chamberlain had let Hitler set the tone and with
reluctance he agreed to discuss the Sudeten issue first. Hitler reflected on how, from a young
29 Peter Neville, Hitler and appeasement, p.96
30 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at 10 Downing Street, 17 September, 1938,
(CAB 23/95/3)
31 David Reynolds, Summits, p.56
32 TNA, Translation of notes made by Herr Schmidt, the German interpreter. Of Mr.
Chamberlain's conversation with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, September 15, 1938,
(PREM 1/266A)
14. 13
age, he himself had been obsessed with the racial theory. To him ‘the Germans were one.’33
According to Charmley, Chamberlain saw nothing wrong with Hitler’s racial views with
regards to the Sudeten Germans.34 In fact it was the view of not only Chamberlain, but also
the view of the British public that Germany had been treated harshly by the Treaty of
Versailles. It could be argued that this view by Chamberlain is one of the reasons as to why
many have seen his diplomatic venture to promote peace to Hitler as a failure; if
Chamberlain’s mind-set was in agreement with Hitler even before they had met, then Hitler
had already won the political battle even before their first meeting.
Hitler further spoke of how he wanted to bring the ethnic Germans into the Reich but was
then interrupted by Chamberlain. The Prime Minister said, ‘Hold on a minute… you say that
the three million Sudeten Germans must be included in the Reich: would you be satisfied
with that and is there nothing more that you want?’35 Hitler’s long tangent rants had been
supressed by Chamberlain’s wit. For some historians this proves that the Prime Minister did
not exactly get the run around which has been depicted; the Fuhrer would now have to
backtrack. Hitler now tried to avoid Chamberlain’s answer by arguing his outrage at how
three hundred Sudeten Germans had been killed which was, of course an over exaggeration.
He claimed that he was determined to settle the issue saying, ‘I do not care whether there is
a world war or not… I am prepared to risk a world war rather than allow this to drag on.’36
Hitler had now gone on the offensive assuming that his comment would stun the Prime
Minister but unexpectedly it did the opposite. Chamberlain now frustrated with Hitler
33 TNA, Transcript of Extracts from the Minute of the conversation between Neville
Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden, 15 September, 1938, (FO 371/21738)
34 John Charmley, Chamberlain and the lost peace, p.109
35 TNA, Transcript of Extracts from the Minute of the conversation between Neville
Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden, 15 September, 1938, (FO 371/21738)
36 Ibid
15. 14
bitterly said, ‘what did he [Hitler] let me come here for? I have wasted my time.’37 This was
something Hitler had not expected from the elderly looking Chamberlain. Hitler had again
been taken aback by Chamberlain’s comments and the Prime Minister had finally shown
some signs of fight.
After a momentary pause, Chamberlain told Hitler that he had no problem with the idea of
transferring territory over. He also believed the two leaders should be able to prevent war
on the basis of 3.5 million Sudeten Germans.38 This was a blunder by Chamberlain. By
stating that the two leaders should be able to prevent a war on the basis of the Sudeten
Germans, it seemed as if Chamberlain did not care about them. This idea was further
reinforced when the Prime Minster expressed that for the British government, it was more
about preserving peace.39 The Prime Minister had given away not only his objective but the
goal of the British government. Hitler may have interpreted this as a sign that Britain was
not ready for war, thus it is fair to argue that Chamberlain was clumsy in his approach here.
Hitler, now weary of Chamberlain, asserted that should the British government not accept
the principle of self-determination by the Sudeten Germans, then he saw no point in
continuing the talks. However, if Britain could accept the proposal then he thought himself
and the Prime Minister should be able to get to work and discuss the methods.40 In this sense,
the Fuhrer had just made an ultimatum which he already knew Chamberlain would give into.
This was because Chamberlain had already stated his desire to incorporate the Sudeten
Germans into the Reich in order to preserve peace. The Prime Minister believed it would be
best for him to go back home first to consult with the British cabinet on the matter and then
37 Ibid
38 TNA, Translation of notes made by Herr Schmidt, the German interpreter, (PREM
1/266A)
39 Ibid, p.5
40 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at 10 Downing Street, 17 September, 1938,
(CAB 23/95/3)
16. 15
meet with Hitler again to see whether this was also acceptable for the French and
Czechoslovakian governments. After a few hours Chamberlain had essentially conceded the
Sudetenland to Hitler and now just needed approval from the cabinet, the French, and the
Czechs. From this viewpoint Chamberlain had lost the first battle.
When Chamberlain returned home he immediately wanted to discuss the issues that had
been raised at Berchtesgaden with the cabinet. On 17 September 1938, the cabinet met to
discuss the Prime Minister’s visit and after some discussion about the current situation in
Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain told the cabinet that he believed Hitler’s aims were limited to
the Sudetenland. The Prime Minister said ‘He saw no signs of insanity but many of
excitement.’41 As we know from hindsight, this was not the case and Hitler was most
certainly troubled in terms of his racial views. However, Chamberlain had naively formed
the view that Hitler was a man of his word and believed the Sudeten Germans would be the
final issue the Fuhrer would raise. Many in the cabinet were not too sure as to whether this
really was the case, Sir Thomas Inskip, minister for the co-ordination of defence noted, ‘The
impression made by the P.M.'s story was a little painful… It was plain that H[itler] had made
all the running: he had in fact blackmailed the P.M.’42 There was a clear divide between
those who sided with Chamberlain’s policy and those who believed the Prime Minister had
ultimately failed at his first diplomatic venture. Nevertheless, the cabinet agreed to the
concession so long as when Chamberlain next met Hitler, he too, would be able to gain some
concessions from the Fuhrer. Robert Parker has suggested that throughout the 1930s,
Chamberlain dominated the discussions of the cabinet due to his ‘strength of conviction and
41 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at 10 Downing Street, 17 September, 1938,
(CAB 23/95/3)
42 Found in, David Reynolds, Summits, p.60
17. 16
decisiveness.’43 One might argue that as a result of Chamberlain’s stubbornness and
unwillingness to listen to his other cabinet colleagues, he should be considered as naïve. It
appears he was determined to stick with the policy of appeasement as appose to any other
solutions, as he was now committed and could not turn back.
Overall, for Charmley, Chamberlain would have seen this as a victory between the two
leaders. Charmley notes that in Chamberlain’s mind he had stopped the German war
machine and had gained some extra time in preparation for what was yet to come.44
However, Alan Taylor has claimed that although both Chamberlain and Hitler believed the
meeting went better than the two had hoped for, the British were now trapped by
Chamberlain’s inefficiency and as a result of the meeting at Berchtesgaden, Britain was now
relying upon the ‘dogma’ that Hitler would act in good faith.45 Whilst it is true that
Chamberlain had for now stopped the German war machine, no one knew how long this
would be for. Chamberlain had shown signs of a fighting spirit at some points during the
negotiations, however, he did not take a firm enough stance and as a result of his
disorganisation and delicate approach to the negotiations, Hitler had managed to
outmanoeuvre the Prime Minister of one of the most powerful nations in the world and had
convinced him that he merely wanted to incorporate the Sudeten Germans into the Reich.
43 R. A. C Parker, Chamberlain and appeasement : British policy and the coming of the
Second World War, (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1993), p.4
44 John Charmley, Chamberlain and the lost peace, p.109
45 A. J. P Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (Harmondsworth : Penguin,
1964), p.219
18. 17
The Prime Minister Returns: Godesberg
After Neville Chamberlain’s persistent appeal to the British cabinet there was general
agreement that the Sudetenland must be given to Hitler in order to prevent war, as Britain
was not ready just yet. It was suggested by the cabinet that in order for the Sudetenland to
be handed over, the Prime Minister would need to gain some concessions from the Fuhrer
so that Britain would not be seen as weak on the international stage. However, on arrival for
his second meeting, Chamberlain was shocked to find out that the original proposal was no
longer acceptable and Hitler wanted an immediate military solution to the crisis. Reynolds
argues that the meeting at Godesberg went to prove yet again that Chamberlain had been
outwitted and upstaged just like at Berchtesgaden.46 On the other hand, Alan Taylor has
disputed Reynolds notion, arguing that Chamberlain showed more resilience and was left
with two options by the end of the meeting; either risk war or abandon status as a great
power.47 This chapter will explore the change in Chamberlain’s attitude towards Hitler and
will look at whether or not the two meetings at Godesberg were a disastrous repeat of
Berchtesgaden.
After the cabinet discussions on the Sudeten issue, it was agreed that should Hitler want
nothing more as Chamberlain had argued so vigorously, then they were prepared to give in.
Although there were dissenters within the cabinet, they too thought that as a result of
Chamberlain’s diplomatic venture, Britain had no other choice than to agree. It could be
suggested here that far from Chamberlain taking the responsibility for the decision to give
in, the members of the cabinet should also be scrutinised for their feebleness in standing up
to the Prime Minister because ultimately the members rolled over and just accepted his
argument. Nevertheless, the cabinet also realised that this would cause friction amongst the
46 David Reynolds, Summits, p.65
47 A.J.P Taylor, The origins of the Second World War, P.223
19. 18
international community. As Andrew Crozier has pointed out, the Sudeten area was not just
made up of ethnic Germans; it also had populations of Slovak, Hungarian and Polish
inhabitants.48 For example, on 16 September 1938, the Polish ambassador informed the
Secretary of State that should any concessions be made to the Germans, they too would
expect the British to meet their needs, noting, ‘the Polish Government wished to make plain
that they would expect in such an event similar action to be taken in favour of the
predominately Polish area in Czechoslovakia.’49 Although this was another issue for
Chamberlain to deal with, he felt confident that he could balance all the concerns of each
individual case and gain a solution suitable for all parties involved. At this point, the French
were also willing to approve Hitler’s demands as they felt they could not venture into war
without British participation. Whilst the Czechoslovakian government was unhappy with
both the British and French attitude, they also understood that should the basis of war be
prevented by looking over the proposals, then they were willing to do so. As a result,
Chamberlain flew to Godesberg full of optimism and hope as he had achieved more or less
everything Hitler had asked for without any substantial conflicts occurring. Chamberlain
innocently believed the end of the crisis was near but things were about to change.
When Chamberlain met with Hitler again on 22 September 1938, he was sure that the Fuhrer
would be pleased to know that the British and French governments would, in principle, agree
to the Sudeten territory being transferred over. However, after some introductory talks the
two leaders sat down with one another to discuss what the outcome of the Prime Minister’s
efforts were. Hitler asked whether the proposals had been submitted to the Czechs;
Chamberlain replied with confidence that they had. The Prime Minister was now expecting
48 Andrew J. Crozier, The causes of the Second World War, (Oxford : Blackwell, 1997),
p.143
49 TNA, Conversation between the British Secretary of State and the Polish Ambassador,
16 September, 1938, (FO 371/21738)
20. 19
a solution to the crisis but instead was astonished that the outcome was different then he had
anticipated. Hitler told the Prime Minister that the proposals were no longer acceptable, as
a solution to the crisis needed to be arranged immediately. This was a huge blow. Having
set out for his second meeting with the Fuhrer believing that the end to the crisis was near,
in fact, it seemed as though the Prime Minister had been caught off guard, as he did not
expect this would be Hitler’s response at all. Hitler had seemed like a man of his word to the
Prime Minister. Within the cabinet notes, Chamberlain’s foolishness can be seen when he
suggests that Hitler’s reply to the proposals, ‘had been a considerable shock to him.’50
Though, how on earth could this be a shock to the Prime Minister. He should have realised
from his first encounter with Hitler that this was a man willing to risk war. Chamberlain now
had no other alternative than to take a firmer stance against Hitler. The Prime Minister once
again appeared unprepared.
Although the Prime Minister was in a great deal of shock, he decided to go on the offensive.
Chamberlain stated that he had, ‘put his political life on the line’,51 believing that Hitler
would now realise the risks he himself had taken. Yet the Fuhrer was not impressed, uttering
that the Prime Minister, ‘had only been booed by the Left.’52 Chamberlain was now caught
in a verbal stand-off, with Hitler having the upper hand. Although Hitler had initially seemed
not to care at first about Chamberlain risking his political life, he had been struck by the
Prime Minister’s willingness to contest. Chamberlain now caught adrift made a slip up. He
told Hitler that many believed the Fuhrer’s aims were to annex Czechoslovakia, however,
‘He personally did not believe this, but wished Herr Hitler to help him to prove his critics
50 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, On 24 September, 1938, (CAB
23/95/6)
51 TNA, Notes of a conversation held at Godesberg, 22 September 1938, (PREM 1/266A)
52 Ibid
21. 20
that they were wrong.’53 To some this would seem cunning by the Prime Minister as he had
now shifted all the focus and results of the diplomatic venture onto Hitler. However, he had
also said ‘he personally’ did not believe the annexation of Czechoslovakia was Hitler’s aim.
By saying this, Chamberlain had naively portrayed to Hitler that the Prime Minister had self-
belief in him; losing any grip he had in that one moment.
Chamberlain, believing that Hitler would sympathise with him, was once again stunned.
Hitler now realised that the Prime Minister had weakened his position by his previous
statement, and took the offensive. He told Chamberlain, ‘The German people would prefer
a solution by force and a military or strategic frontier.’54 Chamberlain was perplexed by
Hitler. The previous views he had made at their first meeting now disappeared within a
matter of minutes. Reynolds argues that it is at this point that Chamberlain’s ‘blind spot’
was revealed. For example, the Prime Minister had previously assumed that Hitler was
neither irrational, nor crazy. However, Hitler was now behaving in such ways, making
demands that neither the cabinet or British public opinion would accept.55 This yet again
looked as though it was going to be a repeat of Berchtesgaden by Chamberlain’s
inexperience on the diplomatic stage.
The two men left their first meeting on a sour note, with Chamberlain emphasising that
should Hitler resort to force he would not obtain a good friendship with England.56 Although
Chamberlain left the conversation with a firm approach, he had in essence lost the second
round by not being able to reach an agreement with Hitler. The Fuhrer had taken the initiative
once again and the Prime Minister knew it. When Chamberlain returned to his room, he
informed the cabinet by telegram of Hitler’s new demands. The response by them was one
53 TNA, Notes of a conversation held at Godesberg, 22 September 1938, (PREM 1/266A)
54 Ibid
55 David Reynolds, Summits, p.66
56 TNA, Notes of a conversation held at Godesberg, 22 September 1938, (PREM 1/266A)
22. 21
Chamberlain feared. The majority of the cabinet would revolt against him and believed
Britain would be seen as weak if any more concessions were made. According to Reynolds,
the cabinet informed the Prime Minister that in their opinion they could no longer justify
discouraging the Czechs from mobilising.57 Chamberlain’s worst fears had become a reality;
war seemed inevitable.
On 23 September 1938, the two leaders met again. This time Hitler took more of a soft
approach, emphasising how he appreciated the gravity of the situation and the Prime
Minister’s efforts, ‘which involved not merely physical exertion but political risks.’58
Chamberlain replied that should the two leaders be able to achieve a peaceful solution to the
ongoing crisis, ‘even if it was not agreeable to sections of the British public opinion-he was
hopeful.’59 Chamberlain at their last meeting had told Hitler that he had risked his political
life, he had made a thoughtless comment, the Prime Minister gave the impression that his
political life was no longer an issue, as he was willing to go against public opinion back
home losing any ground that he had made, but then suddenly everything changed, a message
was brought through that the President of Czechoslovakia Edvard Benes had ordered general
mobilisation. Hitler told Chamberlain that ‘things were settled.’60 Chamberlain now worried,
had to resort to a direct approach.
The Prime Minister proceeded to ask Hitler who had mobilised first. He responded, ‘The
Czechs.61 It was at this point that Chamberlain showed strength. He specified, that the
Czechs were only mobilising for self-protection. The Prime Minister argued that Hitler had
57 David Reynolds, Summits, p.67
58 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, On 24 September, 1938, (CAB
23/95/6)
59 TNA, Notes of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler at Godesberg,
23-24 September 1938, (PREM 1/266A)
60 Ibid
61 Ibid
23. 22
arrived on the Czech boarder with, ‘1.5 million men under arms, and had moved his tanks,
his aeroplanes and his troops to their appropriate stations.’62 The Prime Minister was also
antagonised by Hitler’s attitude and was forceful in sticking up for the Czechs decision to
mobilise. After more deliberation, Chamberlain informed Hitler that ‘there was no purpose
in negotiating any further. He would go home with a heavy heart… But his conscience would
be clear; he had done everything possible for peace. Unfortunately, he had not found an echo
in Herr Hitler.’63 This proved to be a shock to the Fuhrer. Although it seemed that
Chamberlain was showing some backbone, the Prime Minister had no other choice than to
take this approach as he had already been instructed by the cabinet that they would not
support any of the Fuhrer’s new demands.
Herr von Ribbentrop the German Minister for Foreign Affairs was astounded by
Chamberlain’s suggestion not to negotiate any further and proceeded to ask whether he had
read the new memorandum which the Germans had written. According to Reynolds, the
Prime Minister responded stating ‘The memorandum is an ultimatum and not a
negotiation.’64 Chamberlain was putting his foot down, Neville Henderson the British
Ambassador in Germany cut in adding ‘Ein Diktat’, referring to what the Germans had
called the Treaty of Versailles.65 Both Henderson and Chamberlain were determined to try
and reach some kind of settlement. Eventually by all parties it was agreed that the wording
of the proposals would be changed in line with what the British had asked. Chamberlain had
negotiated a concession; all be it a small one. On leaving to return to London, Hitler spoke
briefly to the Prime Minister saying ‘You are the first man to whom I have ever made a
62 Ibid
63 Ibid
64 Found in, David Reynolds, Summits, p.69
65 Ibid, p.69
24. 23
concession.’66 At this point the Prime Minister felt some relief, although there was much
work still to be done. Chamberlain was resolute in his belief that he could convince the
cabinet that he had received a concession in line with what they had asked for, and in return,
they should consider the new proposals put forward. However, he was in for a setback.
On his return to the cabinet on the 24 September 1938, the Prime Minister was greeted with
a frosty atmosphere. He spoke of having had a frank conversation with the Fuhrer and noted
‘he would not deliberately deceive a man whom he respected’.67 The Prime minister further
spoke of how he believed Hitler now had admiration for him and wanted to ensure that
Anglo-German relations were improved. Members of the cabinet were not so convinced or
sympathetic to Chamberlain’s views. For example, Lord Halifax, who had been a staunch
supporter of the Prime Minister for many years argued that the Godesberg demands made
by Hitler were the last straw. In Halifax’s mind, it would have been wrong to pressure the
Czechs into such an agreement. Arguably from this perspective, for someone as loyal as
Lord Halifax to turn on his own Prime Minister, proved to be quite shocking to the rest of
the cabinet. It also showed the reality to which Chamberlain was denying. Ian Kershaw
argues that even the French at this point were willing to go to war rather than allow the new
demands made by the Germans to be enforced upon the Czechs.68 Even though most of the
cabinet agreed with Halifax, the Prime Minister insisted that they give their support to the
new proposals as war was unthinkable. According to the cabinet papers, Chamberlain said
‘the object of his [Hitler’s] policy was racial unity and not the domination of Europe… The
66 Ibid, p.69
67 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, On 24 September, 1938, (CAB
23/95/6)
68 Ian Kershaw, Making friends with Hitler : Lord Londonderry and Britain's road to war,
(London, England ; New York : Allen Lane, 2004), p.244
25. 24
Prime Minister believed that Herr Hitler was speaking the truth.’69 To most of the cabinet
however, what Chamberlain was suggesting was madness. How could they give into the new
demands made by Hitler after he had already agreed to the original proposals made at
Berchtesgaden. The majority of the cabinet asserted to Chamberlain that they were not
willing to agree to these new demands and Chamberlain’s second diplomatic venture looked
to be another failure.
The change in attitude within the cabinet was very meaningful. Had the majority been in
agreement with Chamberlain then the demands made by the Germans would just have been
accepted. However, something triggered the cabinet into a revolt against Chamberlain’s
policy. According to Philip Bell, Hitler’s demands at Godesberg changed the notion of
appeasement towards the Fuhrer. Despite deep Anglo-French reluctance, Bell maintains that
Hitler needed to be challenged.70 Lord Halifax’s decision to go against the Prime Minister
also enabled those who had not previously voiced their opinion to do so. This is highlighted
by the Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, when he wrote in his diary
‘Now Hitler says he must march into the whole area at once (to keep order!)… he
[Chamberlain] was quite calmly for total surrender. More horrified still to find that Hitler
has evidently hypnotised him to a point.’71 The vast majority of cabinet members now
reached the conclusion that Chamberlain was telling a fictional story. This resulted in the
Prime Minister losing both control and support from within his own cabinet. Godesberg had
become a failure on Chamberlain’s watch.
69 TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, On 24 September, 1938, (CAB
23/95/6)
70 P. M. H Bell, The origins of the Second World War in Europe, (London : Longman,
1997), p.240
71 Halifax has second thoughts on Hitler’s Godesberg proposals, 24-5 September 1938,
Found in, Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The making of the Second World War, (London :
Allen and Unwin, 1979), p.193
26. 25
The Climax: Munich
Just before Hitler could march into Czechoslovakia, the Prime Minister wrote to the Fuhrer
urging him to reconsider by saying ‘you can get all the essentials without war and without
delay.’72 For some historians, the Munich agreement epitomised the Prime Minister’s
stubborn attitude and reckless diplomacy. Frank McDonough argues this, noting that
Chamberlain did not discuss the plan with either the French or Czech governments, nor did
he even ask the British cabinet.73 However, Taylor believes the Prime Minister was driven
not by personal ambition or reckless diplomacy but that he went to Munich on the basis of
saving the British population from air attack.74 This chapter will explore the outcome of the
Munich agreement and will look at whether or not Munich was a victory for the Prime
Minister.
As time went by, it looked to many in Britain that war was coming. Chamberlain’s famous
speech on the radio in which he spoke about ‘How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is, that
we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks… because of a quarrel in a faraway
country,75 has personified the Prime Minister’s attitude towards the Czechs. It seemed as
though Chamberlain’s attempt at appeasing Hitler had come to an end, however, when the
Prime Minister wrote to the Fuhrer he was relieved to find that his offer to meet once more
had been accepted. When he informed Parliament of this development there was an uproar
of great satisfaction. Although it should be noted that this was done with the help of Benito
Mussolini. It was agreed that the meeting would take place on the 29 September 1938,
however, the Czechs would not be invited due to the matter being of the upmost urgency.
72 Found in, Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road
to War, (Manchester University Press, 1998), p.69
73 Ibid, p.69
74 A. J. P Taylor, The origins of the Second World War, p.228
75 Found in, Harold James, Europe Reborn: A History, 1914-2000, (Routledge, 2014),
p.147
27. 26
Nevertheless, it was decided that the meeting at Munich would be made up of the four major
powers: Britain, France, Italy and Germany, with Mussolini heading the exchange. When
the Prime Minister left for Munich, he was seen as the saviour of Europe. To many, he had
undoubtedly gone to extreme lengths to prevent war; both the British public and politicians
alike appreciated his efforts. When the Prime Minister arrived at Heston Aerodrome airfield,
he told the happy crowd ‘When I was a little boy I used to repeat: if at first you don’t succeed,
try, try, try again.’76 Some within the cabinet, however, believed that meeting with Hitler
once again was a grave error of judgement. This was emphasised by disenchanted critics
who later wrote ‘if at first you don’t concede, fly, fly, fly again.’77 Although there were those
who did not agree with the policy, at that moment in time they became the minority.
Chamberlain had the majority of the country on his side and hoped that at last peace would
be obtained and he would create a legacy for his premiership.
According to Reynolds, when Chamberlain set off for his meeting with the big four, he was
immediately at a disadvantage. For example, whereas both Hitler and Mussolini had
consulted with one another prior to the event, Chamberlain and Daladier had not.78 One
could argue, that the Prime Minister’s decision to rush yet into another new meeting meant
that once again he was disorganised and not prepared. Chamberlain had also made another
crucial mistake by deciding not bring his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, again. If this was
due to Halifax’s rebellion against the Godesberg terms, then the Prime Minister in this
instance seems to have been very foolish. It was clear when the big four met that although
Mussolini was supposedly acting as the ‘go between man’ the new memorandum which was
being discussed had clearly been set out in advance by the Germans and Italians, with no
76 Found in, David Faber, Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II, (Simon and
Schuster, 2009), p.391
77 Found in, David Reynolds, Summits, p.85
78 Ibid, p.85
28. 27
opportunity for further negotiations. This would make sense as both parties had previously
met prior to the meeting. In this regard the Prime Minister had made several crucial errors
even before the event had taken place, just like at Berchtesgaden and Godesberg.
Late into the night after several, long hours of discussion regarding how to transfer territory
over to Germany an agreement was finally reached. To many historians, this agreement at
Munich happened much sooner than was expected. Douglas argues that the briefness of the
conference suggests that little bargaining on the part of the British and French was made.79
From this, we can gather that Chamberlain’s ultimate goal at Munich was to make sure that
war was prevented, rather than risk it over what he saw as insignificant. It was agreed that
along the Czechoslovakian border where there was a large section of Czech speaking
Germans, the territory would be transferred over into German control. In this essence, the
British and French were just handing over the Sudetenland with no questions being asked.
However, Reynolds argues that although there was minimal change to Hitler’s previous
demands at Godesberg, there was a change in how much territory would be given to the
Germans.80 This still meant Chamberlain’s firm stance at Godesberg was completely
forgotten about, and, so to were the Czechs.
In the morning, the Prime Minister met with the Fuhrer once more for a private conversation.
The two leaders were both complementing each other for being able to reach a settlement in
which peace had been obtained. They spoke of the horrors of World War One and
Chamberlain took down some notes as he wished to improve Anglo-German relations in the
future. Hitler, told Chamberlain how he hated the thought of, ‘little babies being killed by
gas bombs.’81 To the Prime Minister, this was a sign of progress yet to come between the
79 Roy Douglas, In the year of Munich, p.70
80 David Reynolds, Summits, p.88
81 TNA, Notes of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler, 30
September, 1938, At the latter’s flat in Munich, (PREM 2/266A)
29. 28
two countries. There was one last issue the Prime Minister wished to settle. Chamberlain
said, ‘it would be a pity if this meeting passed off with nothing more than the settlement of
the Czech question.’82 He suggested that the two leaders should in some way show an
agreement between each other to better Anglo-German relations and reinforce European
stability. Chamberlain showed the Fuhrer his proposal, when asked if Hitler would sign he
responded, ‘Ja! Ja!’83 This for the Prime Minister, was his greatest success. He thought he
had acquired a priceless concession from the Fuhrer which stated, ‘we regard the agreement
signed last night… as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one
another again.’84 To many, the Munich agreement was seen as a betrayal to the Czechs.
Adamthwaite, suggests the justification of the Munich agreement lay in the declaration
signed by Chamberlain and Hitler.85 The Prime Minister genuinely believed this promise
would go down in history. Even though Chamberlain was naïve, his belief that Hitler was a
man of his word led him to hope that a long lasting, peaceful settlement between Britain and
Germany could be obtained.
Whilst the Prime Minister along with the French had given in to Hitler’s demands, the
concessions were somewhat smaller than what had been suggested at Godesberg.
Chamberlain was also able to argue that his personal diplomatic mission was a success
because he had in a sense prevented World War Two, for the time being. However, some
historians have disputed the notion that Munich was a success, arguing instead that it was
Hitler’s brinkmanship which led to the Prime Minister’s success. For example, Reynolds
argues that ‘Hitler had bottled it at the last minute.’86 Therefore, had Hitler been backed by
82 Ibid
83 Ibid
84 Ibid
85 Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The making of the Second World War, p.79
86 David Reynolds, Summits, p.90
30. 29
his military advisors and not to mention his closest ally Mussolini, then the whole dynamic
would have been different. Chamberlain came home with an agreement which was
welcomed and rejoiced by thousands of people in London. He even stood on the balcony
with the Queen and King; it was a momentous occasion. The Prime Minister’s trip to Munich
for the time being, was a success for Britain, but a complete disaster for the Czechs.
31. 30
Conclusion
Neville Chamberlain’s legacy has become somewhat fragmented. For many years, the Prime
Minister’s choice to follow the policy of appeasement is one that some have argued was
necessary, in order to prevent Britain being obliterated as she was not ready for war during
1938. However, there are those who believe that had Chamberlain taken a more forceful
approach when meeting Hitler for the first time at Berchtesgaden, then the outcome would
have been very different. For example, Taylor has mentioned how generals within the
German military later claimed that their plans to overthrow Hitler were thwarted, by the lack
of reassurance from the Western powers, but most of all, from the Prime Minister’s decision
to fly to Berchtesgaden.87 This conclusion, will explore the three meetings that took place
between the Fuhrer and the Prime Minister and will assess, whether Chamberlain was one
of the ‘Guilty Men.’
The Prime Minister’s decision to go to Berchtesgaden has, on the most part been credited
by historians. Chamberlain moved out of his comfort zone and showed a willingness to
travel a fair distance. Some historians have even gone as far to say that the Prime Minister’s
bold move led to the foundations of modern summitry. However, it cannot be disputed that
Chamberlain was unprepared and ultimately rushed into a meeting to which he did not fully
understand. The Prime Minister’s decision not to inform the cabinet of what he was
planning, was a mistake. It led to him being manipulated by Hitler and caused friction within
his own government. His decision to also rely upon the German ministry for an interpreter
was at best foolish and in reality completely unprofessional. In fact, the Foreign Office in
Britain was unable to retrieve a copy of notes from the two leaders meeting at
Berchtesgaden, as the Germans refused to send one. Inevitably the cabinet could only rely
87 A. J. P Taylor, The origins of the Second World War, p.213
32. 31
upon Chamberlain’s recollection of what was said or agreed. Bell has suggested that at
Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain's willingness to agree to a transfer of power meant that the
matter was already settled.88 From this view, all that remained was to work out the methods
as the Prime Minister, in principle, had no problem with what Hitler was suggesting.
Although Chamberlain did stand up to Hitler at various meetings he entered the diplomatic
arena with a ‘soft approach’ leading Hitler to believe he could get the better of the Prime
Minister. Chamberlain also naively believed Hitler was a man of his word and saw no signs
of insanity in the man. Historians today have to consider whether Hitler was insane or just
evil, something the Prime Minister failed to do.
At Godesberg Chamberlain’s attitude towards Hitler changed, however, this was only as a
result of the Fuhrer’s new demands. The Prime Minister knew that there was no way the
cabinet would accept the new proposals, though some historians have argued that had
Chamberlain got his way, he would have still continued to concede right up until the end.
As was said in the Godesberg chapter, it should have not been surprising to the Prime
Minister that Hitler no longer accepted the previous proposals, as he had already said he was
willing to risk war rather than wait. As Reynolds pointed out, at Godesberg the Prime
Minister’s blind spot in this instance, was revealed and made him look profoundly gullible.
Godesberg in some ways proved to be more of a failure than Berchtesgaden. This was due
to the fact that although the Prime Minister had agreed to the transfer of territory at
Berchtesgaden, he had not realised his opponent would later rebuff the terms to which they
had previously agreed.
When the two leaders met for their second meeting at Godesberg, it could be argued that
Hitler was surprised by Chamberlain’s willingness to fight and as a result he took a softer
88 P. M. H Bell, The origins of the Second World War in Europe, p.239
33. 32
approach. For example, the conversation started off with compliments about one another.
Whilst the Prime Minister was able to gain a concession at Godesberg, this was in effect a
minimal concession from Hitler and not one of great significance. The reluctance by the
cabinet to agree to the new demands demonstrated the shift in attitude to the Prime
Minister’s policy. Relatively all, including Chamberlain’s most trusted advisor, Lord
Halifax decided that Hitler’s demands were no longer tolerable. Even as the cabinet
disagreed with the Prime Minister, he still put forward the case that in his opinion, Hitler
was a sane man who only wanted to reunite the ethnic German population. This created a
shift within the cabinet and led to the Prime Minister being overruled thus demonstrating
how overwhelming the majority now believed Chamberlain’s policy to be the wrong one.
At the final meeting at Munich, Neville Chamberlain was praised at home by the media and
the general public. However, Chamberlain panicked fearing the worst and essentially gave
in to all but some of Hitler’s demands. Clearly it can be argued that once more the Prime
Minister had lost his nerve and rushed into something which could not be undone. He again
rushed into the diplomatic arena, unrehearsed, unlike his counterparts and he had again
decided to not take his Foreign Secretary with him. This unwise move, further weakened his
position as a strong negotiator at the meeting, the decision not to take Halifax also gave the
impression that the British cabinet was divided. The briefness of the Munich conference also
indicates a lack of fight from both Chamberlain and Daladier leading some historians to
question their motives for the conference. Although Chamberlain was able to get Hitler to
sign his famous document, stating that the two countries would never go to war with one
another ever again, this was folly. The Prime Minister seemed to believe throughout his time
with Hitler that he was a reasonable and truthful man, historical evidence has shown that
this simply was not the case and Chamberlain failed to realise this. The Prime Minister had
left the Czechs essentially for dead as Adamthwaite has pointed out arguing ‘British policy
34. 33
towards Czechoslovakia was ill-informed and unsympathetic.’89 Whilst he had bought
Britain time to prepare, it seems as though this was not his ultimate goal, as all he wished
for was peace.
From his early political career, Neville Chamberlain was highly regarded as being a bold
and charismatic Politician who was not afraid to speak his mind and came across as someone
who passionately believed in peace. His memory throughout history has been a tarnished
one. Erik Goldstein has argued that Chamberlain saw Britain as a ‘preventative medicine’
for the Czech crisis,90 but it could be considered that this was the wrong type of medicine.
Had Chamberlain gone to Berchtesgaden with a firm approach then the outcome may have
been very different. Had he also gone much more prepared and well informed, then the
problems he encountered may not have happened. Had it also not been for the cabinet’s
revolt to the Godesberg demands made by Hitler, then Prime Minister most likely would
have continued to make concessions in order to prevent war.
According to Bell, Chamberlain’s policy was determined by, ‘physiological, economic and
strategic considerations.’91 However, from the outcome of the three meetings held between
Hitler and Chamberlain, it is clear the Prime Minister had wavered and dithered about, thus
leading to Hitler always being in control enabling him to make constant new demands. As
Reynolds has argued, ‘Summitry had made Chamberlain’s name and then destroyed it.’92
Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement is still spoken about today as being a ghastly
error when suggesting how to deal with dictators or bullies. This statement to some degree
is true, and, had Chamberlain threatened war we now know that there may even have been
89 Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The making of the Second World War, p.76
90 Erik Goldstein, ‘Neville Chamberlain, the British Official Mind and the Munich Crisis’,
in The Munich crisis, 1938 : prelude to World War II, ed. Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein,
(London, England ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 1999), p.276
91 P. M. H Bell, The origins of the Second World War in Europe, p.234
92 David Reynolds, Summits, p.102
35. 34
a coup to overthrow his tyrannical reign. Regrettably, the Prime Minister failed to show
resilience and fight at the three meetings. Whilst Neville Chamberlain may be popularly
remembered by some, as a man who believed that war could be prevented by peaceful
negotiations through the policy known as appeasement, from the case that I have put
forward, Neville Chamberlain could simply be regarded as one of the ‘Guilty Men’ who
failed to stop Nazi aggression which subsequently led the inevitability of the Second World
War and its consequences for humanity and future generations.
36. 35
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37. 36
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