Defence white paper

Information & Public Affairs
White Paper
Prepared for the
Ministry of Defence
By
Aruna Kulatunga & iMeetingpoint Pty. Ltd.
Melbourne, Australia

Information and Public Affairs White Paper for Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka
Page 3 of 36 Prepared 1 April 2003 (A.Kulatunga). Confidential
Introduction
In modern governance where freedom of information is guaranteed by leg-
islation while privacy of the individual is somewhat paradoxically considered
paramount, affairs concerning the general public, (Public Affairs) take on a
form of complexity hitherto little understood in the government service, other
than in high level political propaganda exercises.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has become a focal point in terms of han-
dling the public affairs component of its many responsibilities, in a scenario
fraught with fragility and even more complexity of waging peace and keeping
peace.
While the Peace Secretariat should be the primary driver of the information
flow regarding the peace initiative, the MoD is being drawn into situations
where credibility and timeliness of information provided to the public through
the media, the access and control of such information and the correct flow of
the information itself has taken on critical proportions. Such instances can af-
fect the peace negotiations and the very important opinion formation process
of the public.
In normal circumstances, when there is no conflict and “crisis” is considered
only on ad-hoc basis, information management and the provision of informa-
tion to both internal and external stakeholders including the public and the
media, is demoted in the list of priorities. In conflict circumstances, this is
revised.
In a situation where a country is coming out of conflict, but where inappro-
priate or non-credible information can damage the processes that are involved
in boot-strapping conflict resolution, it becomes imperative that information
management under a comprehensive and coherent public affairs policy is rap-
idly implemented, if not already in place.
In order to help achieve the objective of implementing such a policy for
the Ministry of Defence, research was carried out utilising available resources
including existing diplomatic and defence linkages, of the Public Affairs poli-
cies and infrastructures of the Defence and defence related organisations in
the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Republic of Macedonia,
India and Pakistan.
In each of these countries, there exists a central department within the
Ministry of Defence (or its equivalent) covering public affairs and information,
providing an umbrella cover for all the organisations that come under each
Ministry of Defence. In each of the organisations studied, it was noted that
the Ministry supersedes the military organisations in terms of public affairs
functions and responsibilities, with very high priority given to the relationship
between the Ministry personnel and the military personnel and within the mili-

tary organisations with the ministry acting as the primary conduit.
In most cases, the head of the unit responsible for public affairs is a civilian,
with representatives from the various military and other Ministry of Defence
components grouped under the civilian command.

Proposal
In order to achieve a streamlined, effective, comprehensive and coherent
public affairs and information policy for the Ministry of Defence, it is proposed
that a new unit within MoD, provisionally named as Directorate of Information
& Public Affairs (DIPA) is immediately established.
The unit will be headed by a professional with at least 15 years of experience
in Public Affairs, including at least 5 years of experience in senior management
positions, either in the public sector or the private sector.
It will initially consist of six other senior staff, including a Deputy Director,
who would be from the Sri Lanka Administrative Service (or the Sri Lanka
Foreign Service) with at least some experience in Public Affairs, three assistant
directors who will be attached to the Unit from the Armed Forces and would be
of the seniority of Lt. Colonel or above, a senior operative from the Directorate
of Internal Intelligence or its current equivalent and a senior operative from the
Directorate of External Intelligence or its current equivalent.
General administrative staff and a librarian will support the unit.
The general policies, functions, role and operating procedure for Director
and by extension of the Directorate are enumerated in Annexure 1. Some
emphasise is laid on the provision and enhancement of Combat Camera (or
COMCAM) operations, due to recent operational “incidents” and the heavy
reliance of COMCAM by other agencies.
Linkages to other agencies are specifically left out of this report due to con-
tingencies of confidentiality.

Background
In 1997, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tasked former Director of Information
at the Ministry, Mr. Ravinatha Aryasinghe to come up with a comprehensive
plan to revamp the information management structure of the Ministry, supply
and management of information to external (foreign) sources and the resourc-
es available to achieve a comprehensive counter-propaganda campaign.
At Mr. Aryasinghe’s request, two reports were submitted by myself in my
capacity as a corporate communications executive to look at information man-
agement in times of crisis and to provide a coherent external “web window”
bringing together all of the government’s resources in one external portal with
internal linkages. Subsequent to submitting these reports, a “web window”
was launched under the url: www.lk following a number of meetings held at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where all government agencies that have an ex-
ternal linkages participated (including the Ministry of Defence – represented
by then additional secretary W.A.Silva) under my general guidance. However,
the project came to a standstill following CINTEC insistence on control and
my departure as counsellor (information) to the UK High Commission. I am
happy to see that subsequently Policy Research & Information Unit (PRIU) of
the Presidential Secretariat created a series of sites under its umbrella and also
initiated the .gov.lk campaign, which was one of the initial suggestions made
in my report.
Some of the ideas enumerated below is from the first report with additional
material gathered in the past two weeks from the US Department of Defence
(US DoD) and the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD). Sections 1 to 8 in annexe
1, setting out the policies, responsibilities etc of a new functionary role of a
Director (Information and Public Affairs) in the Ministry of Defence is some-
what a direct adaptation from US DoD Public Affairs directives and policies as
currently set out and Annexure 2 detailing a Code of Practise on access to MoD
information is an adaptation of work done for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the current Code of Practise for access to government information in the
UK.

The need for information management
Information management in times of Crisis
In times of severe stress or crisis it is important that the public are provided
with fast, clear and complete information from authorities and the media. In
extreme circumstances, this may be a question of sustaining faith in a demo-
cratic society. Authorities that act openly and keep citizens well informed are
better equipped for dealing with the situations that can arise in times of severe
stress or strife.
The relationship between the public, the authorities and the media is stud-
ied and research has shown that the more openness and better relations that
exist when dealing with a crisis, the more credibility is gained. The concept
of information preparedness can be seen as a reflection of the importance of
information when serious events are unfolding. Such preparedness requires
technical resources as well as human skills and endurance.
The concept of information preparedness relates to how well those respon-
sible for the dissemination of information are prepared to meet the demands
for information and communication in the event of a serious crisis or emergen-
cy. It is a question of the extent to which an organisation understands, and can
satisfy, the needs for communication with the media and general public before,
during and after a period of serious stress, for example, and of the adequacy
and sustainability of the technical resources that are available for information
purposes.
The general definition of information preparedness is:
• A public agency’s capability for informing the media and citizens
in times of accidents, disasters, crises and war.
The main characteristics of a crisis are that it is unexpected, connected with
risks or threats, creates uncertainty and insecurity, there is very little time and
there is great pressure to act. Pressure from the media and the public is enor-
mous.
The importance of readiness and speed when starting up an information
organisation in a crisis, in order to avoid dealing with an information vacuum
is also critical. Most research and experience shows that information in a crisis
makes up about70-80% of crisis management. Information forms the basis for
decisions, and if a management does not have access to correct, fast and rele-
vant information, it cannot make correct, fast or relevant decisions. All of these
activities are aimed at gaining the public’s trust in how crises are handled.
Building trust in crisis management is based on four areas;
• competence when dealing with a crisis;
• total openness with all information, not just the good news but

also what doesn’t go so well;
• fairness,
• treating everybody equally;
• and empathy.
Research shows very clearly that how the receiver sees you handling a crisis
is very important.
Managing Defence Information
Defence information must be managed as a corporate asset within a struc-
tured framework. The current environment is characterised by information
overload on the one hand and lack of access to, or knowledge of, relevant in-
formation sources on the other. Both hinder individual and group productivity,
the operational capability of the Armed Forces, exploitation of MOD’s corpo-
rate knowledge base and the ability to plan and use resources effectively.
A systematic and structured approach to information management, includ-
ing research and analytical processes, will enable information assets to be used
far more productively than has been possible in the past. It will also assist in
dealing with litigation action and provide improved support to the achieve-
ment of MoD objectives,
There must be a strategic assumption that all defence information is share-
able within an appropriate security framework. The key to delivering this objec-
tive is to develop a better understanding of where decisions need to be made
and of the supporting processes and information needs.
Underpinning much of this line of action will be the building blocks of data
definition and data management that, pragmatically and systematically applied,
enable information management.
MoD must provide a range of information access and exchange services
that support greater joined-up working between the constituent parts of MoD,
between MOD and the rest of Government and with external stakeholders.
Traditionally, the constituent parts of MoD have developed local systems
hosted on closed networks, leading to information belonging to one group
not being readily accessible to other groups within MOD or to external parties.
Greater information accessibility within a better-connected environment can
be achieved by various means, including:
• of fundamental importance, establishing a Defence-wide infor-
mation infrastructure and set of common computing services,
including intranets, that together improve internal connectivity
and hence enable electronic delivery of information and internal
processes, facilitating increased sharing of information and col-
laborative working throughout Defence;
• providingpointsofaccessorgatewaystopartners,servicefamilies,

Other Government Departments, Parliament, the media, research
organisations, the general public and others, via for example the
PRIU Government Portal, to enable secure and legitimate access
to a range of information content and transaction processing serv-
ices and thus dramatically improving connectivity between MOD
and the outside world;
The move to greater joined-up information must be accompanied by consid-
eration of potential increased risk to operational and business processes.
MOD must ensure that it has access to appropriately skilled, competent,
and well-motivated staff if it is to be able to implement The MoD Information
Strategy as well as to conduct the need-driven change programmes that should
form part of the impetus towards transforming working practices.
This objective may well present the most significant implementation chal-
lenges, as it will require change in deep-rooted organisational and personal
competencies and cultures and affect the way that individuals and groups think
and work; from the very highest levels of the Department downwards.
Related to developing and sustaining changes to attitudes and culture is the
issue of “knowledge”, which is an attribute of people which enables them to
make expert and effective judgments on the basis of the information presented
to them.
In order to exploit its information assets more fully, MOD must put in
place an effective governance regime comprising management processes,
structures, roles, responsibilities, and control mechanisms to take forward the
planning and management of the constituent parts, as well as the totality, of the
Information Strategy. The governance framework must be capable of allowing
information requirements to be captured; enabling investment priorities to be
determined based on better quality planning information, so that the right de-
cisions are made concerning the investments in information capabilities; and
providing support for the procurement of information capabilities in a timely,
cost-effective, coherent and controlled manner, without being overly specified.
It must allow the resource needs of the Strategy to be identified and prioritised.
It must also allow the impact of the Strategy on MoD to be monitored and
measured using meaningful performance indicators so that areas for improve-
ment can be identified and acted upon.
There also needs to be a clear hierarchy of accountability for local infor-
mation strategies and plans. These information plans will cascade down to
functional unit or team level, with information plans likely for every significant
operation, setting out amongst other things, the information management ar-
rangements to be followed within command levels and with other agencies.
Overall responsibility for the new information governance framework will
rest with Director (Information & Public Affairs) D(IPA) Information, although

its operation will be delegated as appropriate.
In common with other public sector bodies, MOD must meet Information
Age Government targets for electronic service delivery as a means of improving
the quality and availability of services to the public and to business. In MOD’s
case, this will additionally apply to services provided to the wider defence com-
munity, including service families and ex-Service and MOD personnel, together
with other Defence related Departments and organisations.
In this, as with all of the other Lines of Development, it should be remem-
bered that the focus is on information in the round, and not just on the
technology aspects. Records, libraries, documents, research, archives, and all
information processes and resources must be deployed in achieving our objec-
tives.
Inmovingtowardsthestrategicoutcome,theMoDmustcontinuetobalance
the benefits to be achieved from greater joined-up working with the inherent
risk of operational information or activities being compromised as a result of
connecting systems into a larger and more diverse community of interests.
Provision will need to be made to judge and mitigate risks and for operational
continuity, reversionary modes of working and resilience.
The MOD must ensure that it has the means of monitoring threats to its
information, and of detecting and responding quickly and effectively to inci-
dents, including deliberate electronic attacks when they occur. These systems
and procedures must address the full spectrum of Departmental activity, must
be flexible and responsive to changes in the threat, and must take account of
MOD’s national and international obligations.
In so doing, business and operationally driven balances must be struck be-
tween exploiting the opportunities of the information, especially in the front-
line, and protecting information and sustaining processes that rely on informa-
tion. Judgements on the balance between sharing information, protection of
information and maintaining robust services will have a profound impact on
how the strategy is realised.
Strategies rapidly become obsolete unless constantly reviewed and adjusted
as part of a permanent strategic management process. Director (Information
& Public Affairs) D(IPA) will maintain the currency of the Defence Information
Strategy, involving stakeholders formally through Secretary of Defence,
other existing and emerging groups, as needed. The work on Information
Governance will consider the intimate relationship between this strategy and
wider Departmental strategic planning and management processes. It is essen-
tial that The Defence Information Strategy, and its on-going implementation
and maintenance processes, are integrated fully into the wider corporate plan-
ning processes; to inform and be informed by, the operational and business
imperatives of the day and to ensure that managers and planners at all levels
are aware of how information can support and enhance the delivery of Defence

outputs.
Implementation of The Defence Information Strategy will not be cost neu-
tral. There will be some need to invest in order to exploit the information and
co-evolution opportunities and to meet the objectives
At the very least existing programmes, whether Short Term Plan (STP) or
Equipment Programme (EP) funded, will need to be adjusted to achieve the
greater level of coherence needed to make progress along the lines of action.
Some programmes and capabilities will need to be managed centrally, requir-
ing the re-brigading of STP, EP resources and a consequential impact on finan-
cial delegations.
As the implementation of this strategy proceeds and a coherent picture of
Defence’s overall information assets and priorities for investment develops,
increasingly quantitative assessments for the costs and benefits should be pos-
sible and details of performance relative to best practice become available.
There is clear scope for improvements in the efficiency of current invest-
ments, especially in areas of duplicated infrastructure and increasingly in
terms of application coherence, as the developing understanding of processes
reveals commonality amongst organisations and business units. Transparency
of the resources expended on information related capability through MoD is
essential to developing the coherent picture.
Experience suggests that in the long term money can be saved. Using
information in better ways reduces reliance on capital investment and is an
increasingly important factor in the commercial sector as the use of ebusiness
techniques spreads. Commercial experience of just-in-time instead of just-in-
case logistics is a well known example, and the exponential growth of more
powerful and cheaper information capabilities is widening the scope to apply
this type of benefit beyond logistics into more administrative processes, as
seen in the Banking Sector.
In the operational context, the benefits of timely and accurate information
are well known and historically proven. However, the necessary cultural and
organizational changes needed to realise the benefits should not be
The revolution in Information Technology is transforming all areas that af-
fect our lives. Defence is no exception, and the new technologies make the
effective exploitation of information - long recognised as a key component of
military effectiveness – even more important.

Annexe 1
Policies, guidelines, responsibilities and functions of the Directorate of Information and
Public Affairs (DIPA).
1. Assumptions : It has been assumed that the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) consists of both military and non-military components (MoD
Components), the military components consists of a Unified Chain
of Command (UCC) under a General Office Commanding (GOC),
that operational activities are undertaken jointly and concurrently
under a Joint Forces (JF) command structure. In the case where
such structures may not be in place, appropriate amendments will be
made dependent on existing structures and future exigencies.
2. Statement of MoD Principles for News Media Coverage of MoD
Operations
2.1. It is MoD policy to make available timely and accurate information
so that the public, the Parliament, and the news media may as-
sess and understand the facts about national security and defence
strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private
citizensshallbeansweredquickly.IncarryingoutthatMoDpolicy,
the following principles of information shall apply:
2.1.1. Information shall be made fully and readily available, con-
sistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is
precluded by national security constraints or valid statu-
tory mandates or exceptions.
2.1.2. A free flow of general and military information shall be
made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the
men and women of the Armed Forces and their depend-
ents.
2.1.3. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld
to protect the Government from criticism or embarrass-
ment.
2.1.4. Information shall be withheld when disclosure would
adversely affect national security, threaten the safety or
privacy of Government personnel or their families, vio-
late the privacy of the citizens of Sri Lanka, or be contrary
to law.
2.1.5. The Ministry of Defence’s obligation to provide the pub-
lic with information on MoD major programs may require
detailed Public Affairs (PA) planning and coordination in
the Ministry of Defence and with the other Government

Agencies. Such activity is to expedite the flow of informa-
tion to the public; propaganda has no place in MoD pub-
lic affairs programs.
2.1.6. Open and independent reporting shall be the principal
means of coverage of military operations.
2.1.7. Media pools (limited number of news media who rep-
resent a larger number of news media organizations for
news gatherings and sharing of material during a speci-
fied activity), are not to serve as the standard means of
covering military operations. However, they sometimes
may provide the only means of early access to a military
operation. In this case, media pools should be as large as
possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (in 24
to 36 hours, when possible). The arrival of early-access
media pools shall not cancel the principle of independ-
ent coverage for journalists already in the area.
2.1.8. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be
applicable for specific events, such as those at extremely
remote locations or where space is limited.
2.1.9. Journalists in a operational zone shall be credentialed by
the military and shall be required to abide by a clear set
of military security ground rules that protect the Armed
Forces and their operations. Violation of the ground
rules may result in suspension of credentials and expul-
sion from the combat zone of the journalist involved.
News organizations shall make their best efforts to assign
experienced journalists to operational areas and to make
them familiar with military operations.
2.1.10. Journalists shall be provided access to all major military
units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in
some cases.
2.1.11. Military PA officers should act as liaisons, but should not
interfere with the reporting process.
2.1.12. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders
should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on mili-
tary vehicles and aircraft when possible. The military shall
be responsible for the transportation of pools.
2.1.13. Consistent with its capabilities, the military shall sup-
ply PA officers with facilities to enable timely, secure,
compatible transmission of pool material and shall make
those facilities available, when possible, for filing inde-

pendent coverage. If Government facilities are unavail-
able, journalists, as always, shall file by any other means
available. The military shall not ban communications
systems operated by news organizations, but electromag-
netic operational security in battlefield situations may
require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
2.1.14. Those principles in paragraphs above, shall apply as well
to the operations of the standing MoD National Media
Pool system.
3. OPERATIONAL POLICIES
3.1. It is MoD policy that commanders and heads of the MoD
Components involved in joint, combined, and unilateral military
operations shall plan for, resource, and conduct public affairs ac-
tivities to support such missions.
3.2. In implementing the MoD Principles of Information, the combat-
ant commanders shall grant the news media, both civilian and
military, access to unclassified joint, combined, and unilateral op-
erations, consistent with operations security and prevailing public
affairs guidelines (PAG). Concern over the personal safety of jour-
nalists shall not be a factor in deciding the degree of access.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS of DIPA
4.1. The Director (Information & Public Affairs) D(IPA)is the princi-
pal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and the Additional
SecretaryofDefenceforMinistryofDefencenewsmediarelations,
public information, internal information, community relations,
public affairs and visual information training, and audiovisual mat-
ters and shall:
4.1.1. Develop policies, plans, and programs in support of MoD
objectives and operations.
4.1.2. Ensure a free flow of news and information to the news
media, the general public, the internal audiences of the
Ministry of Defence, and the other applicable fora, lim-
ited only by national security constraints and valid statu-
tory mandates or exemptions. Sections 2 and 3 delineate
principles that guide the Department regarding public
access to information and media coverage of MoD activi-
ties.
4.1.3. Ensure Defence WEB (http://www.defenseweb.gov.lk) is
operated and maintained as the official primary point of

access to MoD information on the Internet in accordance
with Web Site Administration Policies and Procedures
established by the Director
4.1.4. Act as the sole spokesperson and release authority for
MoD information and audiovisual materials to news me-
dia representatives; evaluate news media requests for
MoD support and cooperation; and determine applicable
levels of MoD participation.
4.1.5. Establish and exercise procedures for the administra-
tive management, activation, and direction of the MoD
National Media Pool.
4.1.6. Oversee and coordinate, as necessary, the activities of
the MoD National Media Pool for potential use in military
contingency operations and other activities.
4.1.7. Monitor, evaluate, and develop systems, standards, and
procedures for the administration and management of
MoD-approved policies, plans, and programs relating to
Public Affairs.
4.1.8. Issue public affairs guidance to the MoD Components.
4.1.9. Participate with the relevant authorities in planning, pro-
gramming, and budgeting activities, as required.
4.1.10. Promote coordination, cooperation, and mutual under-
standing among the MoD Components and with the
other agencies, and the civilian community.
4.1.11. Serve on boards, committees, and other groups, and
represent the Secretary of Defence outside of the
Department in matters relating to Public Affairs.
4.1.12. Prepare speeches, public statements, parliamentary tes-
timony, articles for publication, and other materials for
public release by the Secretary of Defence, and other
selected MoD and government officials, as required.
4.1.13. Serve as official point of contact for public and media
activities by the Secretary of Defence; develop short- and
long-range plans to communicate policies and programs;
and support the execution of such plans, including ad-
vance programming and event coordination with other
Agencies of Government and with private, public and
media organizations.
4.1.14. Receive, analyze, and reply to inquiries on MoD policies,
programs, or activities that are received from the general
public, either directly or from the other Government

Agencies. Prepare, and provide to the referring office,
replies to inquiries from the general public that are for-
warded from other government agencies including but
not limited to the President’s Office, the Parliament, the
Prime Minister’s Office and the Office of the Cabinet of
Ministers.
4.1.15. Evaluate, coordinate, approve and provide policy guid-
ance regarding:
4.1.15.1. Requests for MoD support and cooperation in pro-
grams involving relations with the public, national
associations, and non-governmental organizations.
Such programs include, but are not limited to,
those involving MoD participation in national and
international events held in the Sri Lankan terri-
tory, and other events receiving national media
coverage.
4.1.15.2. Requests by news media representatives or other
non-MoD personnel for travel in military carriers
for public affairs purposes,
4.1.15.3. All proposed public affairs guidance, plans, and an-
nexes.
4.1.16. Provide MoD assistance to non-Government and enter-
tainment-oriented motion picture, television, and video
productions.
4.1.17. Evaluate and coordinate the MoD responses to requests
for speakers received by the Department and, as re-
quired, assist in scheduling, programming, and drafting
speeches for the participation of qualified personnel.
4.1.18. Develop, coordinate and oversee the implementation
of public affairs policy and plans for MoD participation
in activities supporting Sri Lanka’s. international public
information programs, in coordination with appropriate
MoD officials.
4.1.19. Perform such other functions as the Secretary of Defence
may prescribe.
5. RELATIONSHIPS
5.1. In the performance of assigned functions and responsibilities, the
D(IPA) shall:
5.1.1. Report directly to the Secretary of Defence.
5.1.2. Exercise authority, direction, and control over the Joint

Forces Information Service
5.1.3. Coordinate and exchange information with other MoD
and Joint Forces (JF) officials, the Heads of the MoD
Components, and State Departments and Agencies hav-
ing collateral or related functions.
5.1.4. Use existing facilities and services of the Ministry of
Defence and other Agencies, when possible, to avoid du-
plication and achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
5.1.5. Maintain liaison with, and provide assistance to, rep-
resentatives of the news media, non-Government and
entertainment-oriented industry, and members of the
public seeking information on the responsibilities and
functions in sections above.
5.2. Other JF officials and the Heads of the MoD Components shall co-
ordinate with the D(IPA) on all matters related to the authorities,
responsibilities and functions assigned in this Directive.
6. AUTHORITIES
6.1. The D(IPA) is hereby delegated authority to:
6.1.1. Issue MoD Instructions, Publications, and one-time
directive-type memoranda, which carry out policies ap-
proved by the Secretary of Defence in assigned fields of
responsibility. MoD Instructions that have operational
implications shall be coordinated with the General Office
Commanding (GOC).
6.1.2. Obtain reports, information, advice, and assistance, con-
sistent with the MoD policy as necessary.
6.1.3. Communicate directly with the Heads of the MoD
Components. The channel of communications with the
Combatant Commands on public affairs matters shall
be between the D(IPA) and the Commanders of the
Combatant Commands. Communications that have op-
erational implications shall be coordinated with the GOC.
Joint Staff communications that have public affairs policy
or guidance implications shall be coordinated with the
D(IPA).
6.1.4. Communicate with the other State Departments and
Agencies, the representatives of the Legislative Branch,
the news media, the non-Government and entertain-
ment-oriented industry, and the members of the public.
6.1.5. Establish arrangements for MoD participation in those

non-MoD Government programs for which the D(IPA)
has been assigned primary staff cognizance.
6.1.6. Act as the sole agent at the Seat of Government for the
release of official MoD information for dissemination
through any form of public information media. This may
be delegated to MoD Components, as appropriate.
6.1.7. Establish accreditation criteria similar to the UK Green
Book and serve as the approving and issuing authority
for credentials for newsgathering media representatives
travelling with coverage of official MoD activities.
6.1.8. Approve participation of MoD Components in public ex-
hibitions, demonstrations, and ceremonies of national or
international significance.
6.1.9. Portions of the authorities listed in this section may be
delegated to MoD Components as appropriate to that
Agency or Service.
6.2. Director (Information and Public Affairs) shall:
6.2.1. Retain primary responsibility for the consistent imple-
mentation of MoD information policy in this
6.2.2. Determine who shall serve as the initial source of infor-
mation about joint, combined, and unilateral operations
and decide whether to delegate public affairs release au-
thority to combatant command level.
6.2.3. Review, coordinate, approve, and disseminate PAG, pub-
lic affairs plans, and public affairs annexes
6.2.4. Establish and exercise procedures for the administra-
tive management, activation, and direction of the MoD
National Media Pool; and direct the deployment of the
MoD National Media Pool when ordered by the Secretary
of Defence.
6.2.5. Coordinate public affairs matters within the Ministry of
Defence and with other State Departments and Agencies
outside the Ministry of Defence.
6.2.6. Provide policy guidance for the employment of joint
combat camera teams (COMCAM) (see below for de-
tailed policy on COMCAM) and the distribution of their
products. The audiovisual products of combat camera
teams shall be appropriately classified at the source and
may be cleared for public release in accordance with
MoD Directive on Camera Assets

6.2.7. Provide representation to the JF Crisis Coordination
Centre and establish, as necessary, a crisis and/or war-
time public affairs cell at the Ministry to provide continu-
ous public affairs planning, to gather and disseminate
information, and to evaluate public affairs support of the
operational mission.
6.2.8. Conduct periodic news briefings on issues and events
about ongoing joint, combined, and unilateral opera-
tions.
6.2.9. Support Unified Combatant Command plans for the
command information mission, including the deploy-
ment of broadcast facilities from the Army Radio and
Television Service (ARTS), and distribution of print
media. The on-scene commander shall determine when
these services should begin, but services will be provided
at the earliest practicable opportunity.
6.2.10. Conduct joint public affairs training at appropriate
Defence Training Schools for entry- and advanced-level
military and civilian public affairs personnel of all grades.
6.2.11. In coordination with the Defence Training Schools, the
General Officer Commanding, the Military Departments,
and the Unified Combatant Commands, develop, teach,
and maintain public affairs policy.
6.2.12. Activate the MoD National Media Pool.
6.3. The Chief of Staffs of three Armed Forces shall:
6.3.0.1. Coordinate closely with the combatant command-
ers to determine the resources (personnel and
equipment) needed to conduct successful public
affairs activities in joint or single-Service environ-
ments. Ensure the prompt and sustained availabil-
ity of Active and Reserve component public affairs
resources needed to support any assigned mission.
Ensure that a fully capable public affairs structure,
made up of Active and Reserve component assets,
exists to support short-notice deployments.
6.3.0.2. Organize, train, fund, and equip public affairs per-
sonnel and units to conduct public affairs activities
in support of combatant commanders conducting
operations. Personnel and units needed to sup-
port the earliest stages of any operation should be
immediately available for deployment to assist the

supported commander in chief in addressing news
media information requirements.
6.3.0.3. Conduct Service-unique public affairs programs
required to support joint and unilateral operations.
Included are command information programs that
serve deployed military personnel and the military
forces and families at home station, as well as com-
munity relations programs designed to meet exist-
ing MoD policies and Directives.
6.3.0.4. Ensure that public affairs personnel are properly
trained, qualified, and able to function in joint,
combined, and unilateral operational environ-
ments.
6.3.0.5. Provide public affairs training at Service schools
and encourage programs that improve understand-
ing and cooperation between the military and the
news media.
6.3.0.6. Provide news media training for public affairs per-
sonnel, commanders, and key staff who would be
involved in media relations activities.
6.3.0.7. Support planning and provide resources for con-
tingency and operations of ARTS.

6.3.1. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) shall:
6.3.1.0.1. Promulgate joint public affairs doctrine.
6.3.1.0.2. Ensure that existing operational public affairs plans
comply with published joint public affairs doctrine
and guidance.
6.3.1.0.3. Establish a General Officer Commanding (GOC)
Public Affairs Response Cell within the National
Military Command Centre during times of crisis
and conflict to provide public affairs support to
the Office of the Director (Information & Public
Affairs) D(IPA).
6.3.1.0.4. Support the Ministry of Defence in explaining mis-
sion aspects of joint and unilateral operations by
making available senior officers with expertise on
matters of interest to the news media and the pub-
lic.
6.3.1.0.5. Plan for the employment of combat camera assets
in crisis situations, planned operations, and exer-
cises
6.3.1.0.6. Plan for the employment of Reserve component
public affairs assets to support the unique public
information and command information require-
ments of mobilized Reserve component units.
6.3.2. The Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands
shall:
6.3.2.0.1. Include in operation plans an annex that establish-
es responsive public affairs organizations and struc-
tures; and provides dedicated personnel, facilities,
equipment, transportation, and communications
assets to the public affairs mission. Since resources
should ideally be in place before the beginning of
operations, deployment plans shall assign a high
priority for the movement of public affairs assets.
To ensure that adequate public affairs support is
available to meet news media requirements, there
shall be a high priority assigned for the movement
of public affairs assets by air and ground transpor-
tation.
6.3.2.0.2. Plan to support news media from the earliest plan-
ning and pre-deployment stages of any operation.
Commanders shall ensure that reporters are grant-

ed all possible access to all unclassified activities,
including combat operations. The personal safety
of correspondents is not a reason for excluding
them from such situations. The goal is to treat the
news media as members of units, allowing them to
accompany the organizations during the conduct
of their missions.
6.3.2.0.3. Besides the planning required as above, develop
operational public affairs policy and guidance in
accordance with MoD Instruction which recom-
mends the policy approach (active or passive),
proposes news statements, and provides responses
to anticipated news media questions.
6.3.2.0.4. Prepare for and assist in the deployment and op-
eration of the MoD National Media Pool.
6.3.2.0.5. Conduct a full range of public affairs activities
consistent with current Public Affairs Guidelines
(PAG), public affairs release authority, and opera-
tions security requirements.
6.3.2.0.6. As appropriate, establish, resource, and operate
Joint Information Bureaus (JIBs) to serve as focal
points of interface between the joint forces and the
news media.
6.3.2.0.7. Assist news media in gaining access to the full spec-
trum of military units and personnel conducting
joint and unilateral operations, subject to special
operations restrictions. Access includes command-
ers, staffs, officers, and enlisted personnel directly
involved with combat and sustainment operations.
6.3.2.0.8. As needed, support on a 24-hour basis other
information requirements identified by D(IPA)
Provide daily JIB, CIB, or APIC situation reports to
D(IPA) during current operations as circumstances
require, apprising D(IPA) immediately of major op-
erational developments, incidents, or other news-
worthy events.
6.3.2.0.9. Prepare plans to conduct command information
programs using, as appropriate, component assets
and resources. Plan to employ the capabilities of
ARTS and other internal news media products that
convey information to deployed forces, to those

remaining at the home station, and to all family
members.
6.3.2.0.10. Ensure that ground rules for releasing information
are applied equally to military reporters assigned
command information tasks and to civilian report-
ers.
6.3.2.0.11. Provide public affairs resources (personnel, equip-
ment, transportation, and communications) to the
supported combatant commander as identified
in approved contingency or operations plans. Be
prepared to reinforce the supported combatant
commander to meet unplanned resource require-
ments.
6.3.2.0.12. Designate an officer as the combat camera repre-
sentative to plan for the employment of combat
camera assets.
6.3.2.0.13. In accordance with reference above, plan for the
employment of combat camera assets in crisis situ-
ations, planned operations, and exercises. Provide
the Joint Combat Camera Centre appropriate com-
bat camera documentary products for release to
the news media through D(IPA).
6.3.2.0.14. Ensure that public affairs personnel and units are
properly prepared to support the assigned opera-
tional mission.
6.3.2.0.15. Support the public affairs requirements of Reserve
component units mobilized and deployed in a
theatre of operations. Unlike active duty forces,
which generally deploy from major installations,
Reserve component units come from communi-
ties throughout the country. Reserve component
personnel leave civilian jobs behind, and Reserve
component family members are generally not ac-
customed to long-term deployments. Support from
family members, community leaders, and former
employers is vital to unit and individual morale and
to recruiting and retention efforts following demo-
bilization. Commanders must ensure that Reserve
component family members and hometown news
media are provided a continuous flow of informa-
tion to dispel rumours and anxieties, sustain public
awareness, and increase understanding of Reserve

component units and their missions in the theatre
of operations.
7. Combat Camera (COMCAM).
7.1. The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in
support of combat, information, humanitarian, special force, in-
telligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and
other operations involving the Military Services.
7.2. COMCAM Forces.
7.2.1. Military personnel trained and employed to acquire,
process, and transmit classified and unclassified still and
motion imagery in support of air, sea, and ground mili-
tary operations.
7.3. COMCAM Imagery.
7.3.1. Still and motion images of military operations, equip-
ment, and people acquired by COMCAM Forces, regard-
less of the medium in which the images are acquired,
transmitted, or displayed.
7.4. Joint-Interest Imagery.
7.4.1. Imagery that depicts subjects of known or probable in-
terest to the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD),
the General Office Commanding (GOC), or more than
one MoD Component. All COMCAM imagery shot in the
joint environment is assumed to be joint-interest im-
agery. Other imagery, both from COMCAM sources and
other-than-COMCAM sources (such as Public Affairs (PA)
and photojournalists), that depicts subjects of known or
probable interest to the OSD, the (GOC), or more than
one MoD Component, is also joint-interest imagery.
7.5. POLICY
7.5.1. It is MoD policy that:
7.5.1.1. COMCAM is an essential battlefield information
resource that supports strategic, tactical, and op-
erational mission objectives. It is a deployable force
multiplier that provides Commanders with combat
trained documentation teams that are primary sup-
pliers of operational imagery to support battlefield
information superiority.
7.5.1.2. The mission of COMCAM is to provide the OSD,
the GOC, the Military Departments, the Combatant
Commands, and the Joint Task Forces (JTF) with

a directed imagery capability in support of opera-
tional and planning requirements during wartime
operations, crises, contingencies, and joint exer-
cises. The COMCAM mission can support, but is
independent from unique imagery operations and
systems designed to meet specific visual informa-
tion (VI) mission requirements, such as is the case
with Intelligence, Operational Test and Evaluation,
and certain other MoD functions.
7.5.1.3. COMCAM Forces shall be tasked, deployed, and
employed as an integral part of operations to en-
sure documentation of the entire scope of military
activities during wartime operations, crises, contin-
gencies, joint exercises and other events involving
the MoD Components having significant national
interest.
7.5.1.4. COMCAM imagery shall be forwarded immedi-
ately to a central MoD reception and distribution
point as a shared resource to simultaneously sup-
port the operational and planning requirements
of OSD, GOC, the Military Departments, and the
Combatant Commands. Those requirements
include situational awareness, information opera-
tions, mission assessment, legal documentation,
and PA.
7.5.1.5. Except when it would delay forwarding, review of
unclassified COMCAM imagery for possible public
release shall be accomplished in theatre, at the
lowest practical level.
7.5.1.6. The MoD Joint Combat Camera Centre (JCCC)
shall serve as the central MoD reception and distri-
bution point for COMCAM imagery. The JCCC shall
distribute COMCAM and other joint-interest image-
ry to the OSD, the GOC, the Military Departments,
the Combatant Commands, the Defence Agencies,
and the other MoD Components.
7.6. D(IPA) RESPONSIBILITIES
7.6.1. The Director (Information & Public Affairs) D(IPA):
7.6.1.1. Serve as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant for the
Joint COMCAM Program.
7.6.1.2. Provide and monitor the implementation of MoD

COMCAM policy and issue supplemental guidance
and instruction, as required, to ensure program ef-
fectiveness.
7.6.1.3. Conduct management oversight of the Joint
COMCAM Program.
7.6.1.4. Operate and maintain the JCCC as the MoD central
reception and distribution point for classified and
unclassified COMCAM and other joint-interest im-
agery.
7.6.1.5. Establish and coordinate communication require-
ments with the Combatant Commands to transmit
COMCAM imagery to the JCCC.
7.6.1.6. Recommend to the Commanders of the
Combatant Commands to deploy and employ
COMCAM Forces to document events likely to
yield high value imagery for public affairs and other
applications.
7.6.1.7. Provide technical training for COMCAM personnel.
7.6.1.8. Distribute information to assist those who plan for
and use COMCAM imagery.
7.6.1.9. Chair the JCCPG to provide contingency, deliber-
ate, and exercise planning support, and to establish
procedural and technical interoperability standards
for COMCAM Forces, equipment, and systems.
7.6.1.10. Operate a central MoD VI records centre to retain,
preserve, catalogue, and make COMCAM-gener-
ated record material accessible.
7.6.1.11. Provide a primary and alternate COMCAM repre-
sentative to the National Military Command Centre
(NMCC) and the OSD Crisis Coordination Centre
when necessary to facilitate COMCAM integration
into operations.
7.6.1.12. Coordinate with the GOC and the Combatant
Commands in the development of joint COMCAM
doctrine.
7.7. The General Office Commanding (GOC)shall:
7.7.1. Identify and include in all applicable implementing or-
ders COMCAM objectives, priorities, and tasking in sup-
port of the OSD, the GOC, the Combatant Commands,
and the Military Departments during wartime operations,
worldwide crises contingencies, joint exercises, and otherworldwide crises contingencies, joint exercises, and other

events involving the MoD Components having significant
national interest.
7.7.2. Plan for and coordinate the deployment of COMCAM
Forces with the Combatant Commands and the Military
Departments.
7.7.3. Promulgate joint COMCAM doctrine.
7.7.4. Establish a position on the Joint Staff to coordinate inte-
gration of COMCAM Forces into operations and identify
imagery requirements for the Joint Staff. The incumbent
shall be the GOC representative on the JCCPG.
7.7.5. Request joint COMCAM representation to GOC response
cell in the NMCC during crises to coordinate imagery
mission requirements and direct imagery distribution.
7.8. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall:
7.8.1. Plan for, task, deploy, and employ COMCAM Forces dur-
ing wartime operations, crises, contingencies, joint exer-
cises, and other events involving the MoD Components
having significant national interest. In all applicable crisis
action and deliberate plans, include a COMCAM Concept
of Operations and initial imagery requirements.
7.8.2. Expeditiously provide classified and unclassified
COMCAM imagery to the JCCC for immediate distribu-
tion.
7.8.3. Assist COMCAM Forces in coordinating facilities, trans-
portation, and communications, and provide other logis-
tical support to sustain deployed personnel.
7.8.4. Plan to employ COMCAM Forces during the initial phases
of an operation to ensure comprehensive mission docu-
mentation. Ensure that COMCAM Forces have full mis-
sion access, as is reasonably and tactically feasible, during
each phase of the operation.
7.8.5. Identify a COMCAM staff position to plan for the em-
ployment of COMCAM Forces. The COMCAM staff posi-
tion shall have the primary responsibility to integrate
COMCAM Forces in theatre, establish mission priorities,
and coordinate imagery requirements for the supported
staff. The incumbent shall be the Combatant Command
representative on the JCCPG.
7.8.6. Ensure that tasking orders and requests for forces iden-
tify the operational controlling authority for COMCAM
Forces in advance of deployment and provide an in-thea-

tre point of contact for initial coordination.
7.8.7. Establish a Joint COMCAM Management Team (JCMT) in
JTFs, when appropriate, to prioritize COMCAM imagery
missions and direct documentation and imagery distribu-
tion efforts. The JCMT shall receive guidance from the
Combatant Command or the supported JTF Commander.
7.8.8. Assign operational control for the theatre Weapons
Systems Video (WSV) COMCAM team to the JTF.
The WSV team shall normally be co-located with the
Commander, Air Force Forces or the Joint Force Air
Component Commander.
7.8.9. Ensure COMCAM imagery is reviewed for protection of
classified information and transmitted in accordance with
applicable security regulations and local instructions.
7.8.10. Ensure that unclassified COMCAM imagery is reviewed
by a PA representative and designated either cleared
or not cleared for distribution to sources external to
the Department of Defence. Authority to clear imagery
for release may be delegated to the JTF or Component
Command PA representative to expedite the movement
of imagery.
7.8.11. Coordinate with the JCCC and publish specific guidelines
for imagery distribution, clearance, and security classifica-
tion requirements.
7.8.12. Include within the Operations Plan the communication
requirements necessary for the transmission of COMCAM
imagery to the JCCC.
7.8.13. Ensure COMCAM Forces participating in joint exercises
receive training based on criteria from the Mission-
Essential Task Listing.
7.9. The Secretary of Defence shall provide the strategic telecommuni-
cations technology and services required to ensure the availability,
reliability, and security of COMCAM imagery commensurate with
its intended use.
7.10.The Chief of Staff’s of the Military Departments shall:
7.10.1. Organize, train, and equip COMCAM personnel and
units to provide highly responsive imagery acquisition,
processing and transmission capabilities in support of
operational and planning requirements during wartime
operations, crises, contingencies, and joint exercises.
COMCAM resources shall be force sized to support the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan force structure.
7.10.2. Ensure that personnel and the units tasked in support
of joint or combined COMCAM missions are properly
trained to effectively function in a joint or combined op-
erational environment.
7.10.3. Establish readily deployable and adaptive COMCAM force
packages that may operate within JTF component com-
mands and /or be integrated into a JTF headquarters
staff.
7.10.4. Coordinate with the Combatant Commands and the GOC
through the JCCPG to ensure that COMCAM personnel,
equipment, doctrine, and training are interoperable and
complementary.
7.10.5. Provide COMCAM or VI personnel to supplement the
imagery capabilities of the JCCC and the Combatant
Commands for extended operational periods.
7.10.6. Designate a qualified officer to be a member of the
JCCPG.
7.11.The Chief of Staff of the Army shall:
7.11.1. As the Network Infrastructure Services Agency for the
Ministry of Defence, provide information technology
services to the JCCC.
7.11.2. As the VI service centre, provide visual information sup-
port to the JCCC.
7.11.3. Ensure availability of static line and free fall jump-quali-
fied COMCAM personnel to support operational require-
ments.
7.12.The Chief of Staff of the Navy shall
7.12.1. Ensure the availability of COMCAM personnel with ship-
board and underway experience.
7.12.2. Ensure the availability of aircrew and diver-qualified
COMCAM personnel with appropriate equipment to sup-
port operational requirements.
7.12.3. Ensure the availability of Special Forces (Navy) COMCAM
personnel to support operational requirements.
7.12.4. Appoint an officer from the Special Forces (Navy) to
serve as a member of the JCCPG.
7.13.The Chief of Staff of the Air Force shall:
7.13.1. Ensure availability of aircrew qualified COMCAM person-
nel to support operational requirements.

7.13.2. Ensure availability of COMCAM personnel qualified and
equipped to centrally manage, process, and distribute
both classified and unclassified WSV collected from each
of the Military Services, to support level-level operational
requirements. Equipment and management process
shall meet interoperability requirements and reporting
timelines of joint-automated systems supporting the joint
targeting cycle, as identified by the Joint Staff and joint
doctrine.

Annexe B
Code of Practice on Access to MoD Information
MOD has a responsibility to respond positively to any request for informa-
tion. In general, information should be released in the most cost effective man-
ner. Answers must be open, honest and unambiguous. They must not deceive
or mislead. Information should only be withheld where the Code allows it and
advice to Ministers should identify any information why it is not possible to
publish and explain the reasons why.
It is never acceptable to say, as has been done regularly in the past, that it
is not our practice to release a particular type of information. No categories of
information are automatically excluded from disclosure.
Categories of information that may be exempted from release when it is in
the public interest are listed in Part II of the Code (reproduced at ANNEX B).
Each request must be treated individually and judged on its own merits. There
should not be the assumption that if information has been exempt in the past
it will continue to be so. The emphasis must always be on allowing as much
information as possible to pass into the public domain.
1. Reasons For Confidentiality
The following categories of information are exempt from the commitments
to provide information in this Code. In those categories that refer to harm or
prejudice, the presumption remains that information should be disclosed un-
less the harm likely to arise from disclosure would outweigh the public interest
in making the information available. References to harm or prejudice include
both actual harm or prejudice and risk or reasonable expectation of harm or
prejudice. In such cases, it should be considered whether any harm or preju-
dice arising from disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in making
information available. The exemptions will not be interpreted in a way that
causes injustice to individuals.
1.1. Defence, Security and International Relations
1.1.1. Information whose disclosure would harm national secu-
rity or defence.
1.1.2. Information whose disclosure would harm the conduct
of international relations or affairs.
1.1.3. Information received in confidence from foreign govern-
ments, foreign courts or international organisations.
1.2. Internal discussion and advice Information whose disclosure
would harm the frankness and candour of internal discussion,
including:

1.2.1. Proceedings of Cabinet and Cabinet committees.
1.2.2. Internal opinion, advice, recommendation, consultation
and deliberation.
1.2.3. Projections and assumptions relating to internal policy
analysis; analysis of alternative policy options and infor-
mation relating to rejected policy options.
1.2.4. Confidential communications between Departments,
public bodies and regulatory bodies.
1.3. Communications with the President’s Office
1.3.1. Information relating to confidential communications
between Ministers and the President, or relating to confi-
dential proceedings of the Cabinet of ministers
1.4. Law enforcement and legal proceedings.
1.4.1. Information whose disclosure could prejudice the ad-
ministration of justice (including fair trial), legal proceed-
ings or the proceedings of any tribunal, public inquiry or
formal investigations (whether actual or likely) or whose
disclosure is, has been, or is likely to be addressed in the
context of such proceedings.
1.4.2. Information whose disclosure could prejudice the en-
forcement or proper administration of the law, including
the prevention, investigation or detection of crime, or
the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
1.4.3. Information relating to legal proceedings or the pro-
ceedings of any tribunal, public inquiry or other formal
investigation which have been completed or terminated,
or relating to investigations which have or might have
resulted in proceedings
1.4.4. Information covered by legal professional privilege.
1.4.5. Information whose disclosure would harm public safety
or public order, or would prejudice the security of any
building or penal institution
1.4.6. Information whose disclosure could endanger the life or
physical safety of any person, or identify the source of
information or assistance given in confidence for law en-
forcement or security purposes
1.4.7. Information whose disclosure would increase the likeli-
hood of damage to the environment, or rare or endan-
gered species and their habitats.
1.5. Immigration and nationality Information relating to immigration,

nationality, consular and entry clearance cases. However, infor-
mation will be provided, though not through access to personal
records,wherethereisnoriskthatdisclosurewouldprejudicethe
effective administration of immigration controls or other statutory
provisions.
1.6. Effective management of the economy and the collection of tax
1.6.1. Information whose disclosure would harm the ability of
the Government to manage the economy, prejudice the
conduct of official market operations, or could lead to
improper gain or advantage.
1.6.2. Information whose disclosure would prejudice the
assessment or collection of tax, duties or National
Insurance contributions, or assist tax avoidance or eva-
sion.
1.7. Effective management and operations of the public service
1.7.1. Information whose disclosure could lead to improper
gain or advantage or would prejudice:
1.7.1.1. the competitive position of a Department or other
public body or authority;
1.7.1.2. negotiations or the effective conduct of personnel
management, or commercial or contractual activi-
ties;
1.7.1.3. the awarding of discretionary grants.
1.8. Information whose disclosure would harm the proper and effi-
cient conduct of the operations of a department or other public
body or authority, or of any regulatory body.
1.9. Public employment, public appointments and honours
1.9.1. Personnel records (relating to public appointments as
well as employees of public authorities) including those
relating to recruitment, promotion and security vetting.
1.9.2. Information, opinions and assessments given in confi-
dence in relation to public employment and public ap-
pointments made by Ministers
1.9.3. Information, opinions and assessments given in relation
to recommendations for honours.
1.10.Voluminous or vexatious requests Requests for information which
are vexatious or manifestly unreasonable or are formulated in too
general a manner, or which (because of the amount of informa-
tion to be processed or the need to retrieve information from
files not in current use) would require unreasonable diversion of

resources.
1.11.Publication and prematurity in relation to publication Information
which is or will soon be published, or whose disclosure, where the
material relates to a planned or potential announcement or pub-
lication, could cause harm (for example, of a physical or financial
nature).
1.12.Research, statistics and analysis
1.12.1. Information relating to incomplete analysis, research or
statistics where disclosure could be misleading or deprive
the holder of priority of publication or commercial value.
1.12.2. Information held only for preparing statistics or carry-
ing out research, or for surveillance for health and safety
purposes (including food purposes), and which relates
to individuals, companies or products which will not be
identified in reports of that research or surveillance, or in
published statistics.
2. Privacy of an individual
2.1. Unwarranted disclosure to a third party of personal information
about any person (including a deceased person) or any other
disclosure, which would constitute or could facilitate an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy.
3. Third party’s commercial confidences
3.1. Information including commercial confidences, trade secrets or
intellectual property whose unwarranted disclosure, which would
constitute or could facilitate an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
4. Information given in confidence
4.1. a. Information held in consequence of having been supplied in
confidence by a person who:
4.1.1. gave the information under a statutory guarantee that its
confidentiality would be protected; or
4.1.2. was not under any legal obligation, whether actual or
implied, to supply it, and has not consented to its disclo-
sure.
4.1.3. Information whose disclosure without consent of the
supplier would prejudice the future supply of such infor-
mation.

5. Medical information
5.1 Information provided in confidence if disclosure to the subject
would harm their physical or mental health, or should only be
made by a medical practitioner.
6. Statutory and other restrictions
6.1. Information whose disclosure is prohibited by or under any enact-
ment, regulation, or international agreement.
6.2. Information whose release would constitute a breach of
Parliamentary Privilege.

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