This policy paper analyzes the cycle of foreign policy decision-making through the lens of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It outlines the stages of the policy cycle, including situation analysis, issue identification, problem setting, policy formulation, adoption, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, illustrating how the U.S. government navigated the crisis. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of 'soft power' and the emergence of the 'mutual assured destruction' doctrine as valuable lessons for future policymakers.

1. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT (INPUMA)
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
KUALA LUMPUR
POLICY PAPER:
‘A brief analysis on policy cycle in a foreign policy decision-making context using Cuban
Missile Crisis as a case study’
PREPARED BY:
MOHD HASIM UJANG (ZGA110011)
Submitted to: Prof. Datuk Dr. John Anthony Xavier
ZIGP 6114: FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY
31/12/2012

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INTRODUCTION
Like domestic policies, foreign policy formulation, adoption and implementation always follow a
recognizable and often a recurring cycle that can be used as a template to understand why
governments adopt a certain policy in favour of other alternatives. This paper aims to briefly
describe a foreign policy cycle by using the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study. Foreign
formulation and adoption follows a recognizable pattern of gestation and implementation
which can be summarized as follows:
1. Condition/Situation;
2. Issue;
3. Problem;
4. Agenda;
5. Policy Formulation;
6. Policy Adoption;
7. Policy Implementation; and
8. Monitoring & Evaluation.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which happened in the United States during President John F.
Kennedy’s (JFK) administration can be analyzed along this policy cycle, as demonstrated in the
following sections.

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FOREIGN POLICY CYCLE: THE UNITED STATES’ 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AS A CASE STUDY
Condition/Situation
Firstly, a particular situation arises that slowly or quickly captures the policymakers’ attention. A
situation can range from a small and isolated incident to a widespread and recurring incident at
community, national, regional or global scale. In 1962, the Soviet Union felt threatened by the
United States’ superiority in terms of strategic defense, offensive and nuclear missile capability.
At that point of time, the Soviet Union did not possess first-hand nuclear strike capability against
the United States which the latter has against the Soviet.
To counter the perceived threat, in May 1962, the then President Nikita Krushchev of Soviet
Union made an agreement with President Fidel Castro of Cuba to allow the deployment of
Soviet’s Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBM) in Cuba. The missiles were deployed discreetly in strategic locations throughout Cuba
beginning in August 1962. The purpose of the missiles was to provide the Soviet with first-hand
nuclear strike capability against important targets in the United States while simultaneously
protecting Cuba, a Soviet ally against any possible invasion by the United States.
Issue
Repetitive and continuous media coverage and public responses makes an issue out of a
particular situation. Some scholars such as Lawrence R. Jacobs, Robert Y.Shapiro and Stuart N.
Soroka refer to this as ‘issue priming’. However for issues of national security that involves
covert operations, continuous feedback from intelligence gathering teams regarding the same

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situation could cause it to become an issue amongst policymakers who are privy to that
information. Such was the case during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
On 15th
October 1962, a set of reconnaissance photographs from US Air Force revealed the
presence of Soviet’s nuclear MRBM and IRBM in Cuba and this information immediately
became an issue in Kennedy’s administration. The President quickly recognized the new level of
nuclear threat posed by the Soviet against the United States and he quickly formed the
Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EX-COMM) resolve the situation.
The EX-COMM was a group of Kennedy’s important advisors which consisted of the following
people:
1. John F. Kennedy, President
2. Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President
3. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
4. C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
5. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
6. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General
7. McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor
8. John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence
9. General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
10. George Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural
Affairs
11. Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
12. Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense

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13. Dean Acheson, Former United States Secretary of State.
The EX-COMM started out as a loose group of advisors who were initially summoned by
President JFK following the discovery of Soviet’s nuclear missiles in Cuba. As their discussions
progressed, the group was referred to as EX-COMM in official documentations.
Problem and Agenda Setting
An issue becomes a problem when there is a perceived negative results that might arise from
policymakers’ non-interference into the issue. As the scale of attention and public response
towards the issue escalates and the need for immediate resolution arises, the issue becomes a
problem that demands policymakers’ intervention to provide immediate solutions. However, in
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, initially there was no public response due to the secrecy of the
President’s administration in handling the issue. Instead, the issue became a national problem
due to the following reasons:
1. Dramatization by the representatives from military leadership and security intelligence in
EX-COMM who insisted that the threat of a nuclear strike against the United States was
imminent and government must take swift actions;
2. There is a possibility that the United States’ global dominance in military and politics
might undermined if it does nothing to stop the Soviet’s nuclear weapons expansion
program in Cuba;
3. President Kennedy realized that the safety and security of American citizens are under
threat as long as the nuclear missiles are not removed from Cuba; and
4. The Kennedy’s administration viewed the Soviet’s missile program in Cuba as illegal
because it directly contravenes various diplomatic arrangements and understanding

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between the Soviet and the United States which included the Rio Pact, the diplomatic
statements made by the Soviet prior to the crisis and the UN Charter itself. Thus, the
Kennedy’s administration was determined to stop the Soviet from further advancing its
nuclear program in Cuba.
These reasons became the basis for the Kennedy’s administration to regard the crisis as a very
important national agenda which prompted him to address the American public through a live
telecast on the night of October 22nd
, 1962 to inform them about government’s actions in
handling the crisis.
Policy Formulation
As the crisis became a national agenda, the government directed all necessary resources to
monitor the situation. Aerial reconnaissance were stepped up, direct communication were
established between the reconnaissance pilots and President Kennedy himself to keep him
updated and the EX-COMM met regularly and more frequently to maintain control on the
situation. During an EX-COMM meeting with the President, the committee deliberated a few
options to be undertaken by the government in view of the crisis:
1. To do nothing and let the Soviet continue with its missile buildup program in Cuba. This
suggestion was made out of fear that any provocative actions by the United States might
instigate a nuclear war that would cause the largest catastrophe much bigger than the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This suggestion was immediately shot down by
the EX-COMM;

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2. To use diplomatic pressures that could force the Soviet to withdraw its missiles from
Cuba unconditionally. This includes issuing a warning letter to Cuba and Soviet
respectively;
3. To initiate a naval blockade against Cuba to prevent more Soviet missiles from reaching
Cuba and posing further threat to the United States;
4. To initiate an airstrike against all Soviet missiles in Cuba to eliminate all threats; or
5. To launch a full scale invasion against Cuba using ground, air and naval forces which
will eliminate Soviet’s threat forever from the North American continent.
President Kennedy finally agreed to only adopt the second and third options to neutralize
Soviet’s threats without instigating a full scale nuclear war. The President did not agree to the
third and fourth options because any military action against Cuba would prompt a counter-attack
from Soviet against Berlin (West Germany), an important ally of the United States. President
Kennedy feared that the United States’ resources in Europe would not be enough to fully protect
Berlin against any Soviet aggression.
Policy Adoption
The chosen course of actions were informed to the American public by President Kennedy
himself during his live national address on the night of 22nd
October 1962. The main reasons for
him to take such action were:
1. To keep the citizens aware of the critical situation involving national security and most
importantly, to counter any possibility of wide scale panic among citizens should the
crisis get leaked to the public before he himself could announce it;

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2. To preserve his own credibility as the supreme commander of the army and the highest
authority of the country; and
3. To rally democratic support should the crisis escalates into war which could drag the
country into major economic and/or political crisis.
Policy Implementation
After the decision was made, the President sent Dean Acheson, an EX-COMM member and a
former Secretary of State to meet with Charles de Gaulle, the then President of France to garner
Europe’s support for United States’ actions. He also dispatched his Ambassador to the United
Nations, Adlai Stevenson to rally diplomatic support for America from as many countries as
possible.
Robert F. Kennedy, the United States’ Attorney General (he was also the President’s brother)
was tasked with streamlining the legal foundation for a naval blockade against Cuba. Since a
naval blockade constitutes an act of war under international law, the Kennedy administration
changed the word ‘blockade’ into ‘quarantine’ to legitimize the action. The State Department
together with the Justice Department (headed by the Attorney General) formulated a Position
Paper for the President which justifies the naval quarantine against Cuba in line with the Rio
Treaty for defence of the Western Hemisphere which was approved via a 2/3 majority vote for a
resolution in the Organization of American States (OAS). Furthermore, the state of military
readiness throughout the United States was raised to DEFCON 3.
In addition to these measures, the President himself communicated directly with the
commanding officer of a United States’ warship during a critical moment in the naval quarantine
to take full control of the operation. In the meantime, the United States’ Ambassador to the

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Soviet Union and the Attorney General were dispatched to meet with their Soviet counterparts to
communicate and deliberate the final conditions to resolve the conflict which already persisted
for two weeks. The final conditions offered to the Soviet were:
1. The Soviet must dismantle and remove all existing nuclear missiles from Cuba. They
must also guarantee that no more nuclear missiles are going to be placed in Cuba in the
future ever. In return, the United States must publicly pledge not to invade Cuba and it
must also guarantee that the island would not be exposed to any military threat from the
United States;
2. The United States must also agree to dismantle and remove its nuclear missiles from
Turkey and Italy (dubbed ‘Jupiter’ missiles) which were installed prior to the crisis. The
Soviet demanded this as an additional bargain for Soviet’s removal of missiles from
Cuba; and
3. All negotiations and agreements in relation to the crisis should be kept secret and any
public disclosure would effectively negate the deal.
Both President Kennedy of United States and President Krushchev of Soviet finally agreed to
end the crisis based on the conditions stipulated in their secret deal. The crisis formally ended on
29th
October 1962, fourteen days after the crisis started. Through the crisis, it was shown that
leaders of both countries made a diplomatic compromise to avert war. The crisis also served as
an important lesson for other governments on how to resolve crisis through diplomatic means in
favour of military confrontation.
During the crisis, there were two (2) most critical moments when both countries almost launch
nuclear attack against each other. One was when Soviet forces in Cuba shot down a U-2

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reconnaissance aircraft on 27th
October 1962, killing its pilot on board while the other was when
the US Navy forced a Soviet B-59 submarine to surface within the heavily guarded quarantine
zone. The United States naval forces almost delivered lethal shots to the submarine, not knowing
that it was armed with 15 kilotons of nuclear torpedoes. The world was already at the brink of a
nuclear war in both instances, however the patience, perseverance and farsightedness of leaders
from both countries managed to avert the catastrophe.
Policy Monitoring
The withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba began immediately after the crisis until 22nd
November 1962 whereas United States’ missiles withdrawal from Italy and Turkey began in
November 1962 until 24th
April 1963. Both withdrawals were witnessed and monitored by
representatives from both governments who ensured that the deal was honoured to the letter. All
official records pertaining to the crisis and the following consequences were kept secret by both
parties until more than 20 years later when both governments declassified them in stages.
Policy Evaluation
Due to the secrecy of the deal, no policy evaluation was ever done immediately after the crisis
because there were no official documents available for references. The first stage of partial
declassification by the United States took place in 1989. Since then, political analysts and
academicians began to conduct policy studies on the crisis based on the declassified records.
Among the methods of policy studies employed after the declassification were:
1. Detailed analysis on the tape recordings of EX-COMM meetings which took place during
the crisis;

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2. Detailed analysis on the photographs taken by the reconnaissance crew before and during
the crisis;
3. Detailed analysis on the correspondences between President Kennedy and President
Krushchev that led to the secret deal which saw the end of the crisis;
4. Detailed analysis on White House documents pertaining to the crisis such as minutes of
meetings, memos and presidential orders; and
5. Detailed analysis on the various interviews and academic conferences given by persons
who were personally involved in the crisis, which included former members of EX-
COMM.
CONCLUSION – WHAT CAN POLICYMAKERS LEARN FROM THE 1962 CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS
Based on various studies conducted upon the crisis, few salient points can be noted which could
serve as important lessons for foreign policy decision-making process:
1. The outcome of the crisis boosted the importance of ‘soft power’ (as opposed to military
or ‘hard power’) as the most viable alternative in resolving international conflicts. Soft
power refers to any non-aggressive approach that a country could adopt to further its own
interests. Bilateral diplomacy, multi-lateral diplomacy and socio-economic
partnerships/exchanges are among the most common forms of soft power that countries
could adopt to pursue and protect national interests.
2. A new military doctrine called ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD) emerged from the
crisis. This doctrine is very noteworthy because it lends enormous credit to soft power as
the most viable tool to achieve international peace. The doctrine stipulates that any war

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that involves the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will eventually result in a
complete and irreversible annihilation to the territories, forces and population who are
embroiled in the conflict. Policymakers should take note of this doctrine to enhance their
decision-making skills in international arena.
3. As military activism increasingly becomes an obsolete idea among many civilians and
policymakers, governments should be able to justify more cuts against military spending.
In return, more resources can be channelled into other public necessities such as
education, health, commerce, tourism and development. This new paradigm for
government budgeting is very useful in countries whose governments were used to big
military spending for very long time. Major superpowers could also adopt this new
paradigm which could produce more economic spill-over into the global economic
system.
REFERENCES
1. Kurt Wiersma & Ben Larson – Fourteen Days In October: The Cuban Missile Crisis
(1997). Source: http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/media/fourteen_days_in_october.pdf
retrieved on 28th
December 2012.
2. President JFK’s address to the American citizens on 22nd
October 1962. Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:John_F_Kennedy_Address_on_the_Buildup_of_Arms_i
n_Cuba.ogg retrieved on 29th
December 2012.
3. Col. Alan J. Parrington (USAF) – Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited,
Strategic Doctrine in Question, published in Airpower Journal, Winter 1997.
Source:

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http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html
retrieved on 30th
December 2012.
4. Prof. Datuk Dr. John Anthony Xavier (2012) – Agenda Setting, Policy
Implementation, Policy Evaluation. Source: UM Spectrum & self-attended
lectures.