This document discusses the need for the Indian Army to adapt its approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. It argues that the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins these types of conflicts. The Indian Army needs to develop an institutional consensus on a new CI/CT doctrine and learn lessons from its experiences. It also needs to incorporate aspects of governance, economic development, and public administration into officer training programs to better prepare soldiers for the non-military challenges of counterinsurgency operations. Establishing local training centers and rapidly disseminating lessons learned from the field are also important for adapting to changing conditions.

1. ADAPTABILITY – A KEY INGREDIENT IN CI/CT ENVIRONMENT
LT COL KC MONNAPPA
Introduction
1. The security challenges facing India are varied and complex. India has two unsettled borders; she is
engaged in an externally abetted proxy war for the last several years in Jammu and Kashmir and has been
combating terrorism perpetuated by militant and terrorist groups sponsored by a foreign State. At the same
time, a number of insurgencies, spurred by tribal and ethnic aspirations in addition to left wing ideologies are
being tackled in various parts of the country
1
. Today it can be authoritatively said that terrorism, both
domestic and international, remains one of the deadliest and most persistent threats to Indian security. It is in
such an environment that the Indian Army is required to fulfill its roles in varied conditions across the
spectrum of terrorist related conflict. The relative conventional military superiority of India has rendered its
enemies to fight its forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with primeval techniques of
insurgency and terrorism. The enemies do not try to defeat India with conventional operations or do not limit
themselves to purely military means; they try to exhaust the national will, aiming to win by undermining and
outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Indian Army, meeting it
requires creative efforts by all involved in combating forces that are inimical to the Nations’ security.
Requirement for Change in Perception
2. Since 1947, the Indian Army is constantly learning and re-learning the principles of counter-
insurgency while conducting operations against adaptive insurgent enemies in the North-East and J&K. The
relatively recent threat posed by LWE opens a new frontier in counter-insurgency front. Though the
insurgencies of the North-East/J&K/LWE are different; however, broad historical trends underlie the factors
motivating them. Most insurgencies follow a similar course of development
2
. The tactics used to successfully
defeat them are likewise similar in most cases. One common feature of insurgencies in India is that the
government generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occurring. Insurgents take advantage
of that time to build strength and gather support. Thus, the forces committed, often has to “come from
behind” when fighting an insurgency
3
. Another common feature is that forces conducting CI/CT operations
usually begin poorly. One principle reason for this can be attributed to the neglect of study of insurgency in
the Indian security establishment. The other factors are the preponderance of the Army establishment to
focus to a large extent only on conventional warfare during war games aimed to evolve paradigms for
ensuring the safety of the country against external aggression
4
. They believe that armies trained to win large
conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. An epistemological shift is
there necessary to change this present mindset.
Adaptability – The Key?
3. In CI/CT operations, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning
organization — usually wins
5
. History has shown that the military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies
are usually those that are able to overcome their Institutional inclination to wage conventional war against
insurgents. The recent defeat of LTTE by the SLAF with its army spearheading the operation is a case in
point. Successful armies learn how to practice CI/CT operations and apply that knowledge. If learning is
done before deployment then it naturally results in fewer lives lost and less national treasure spent relearning
past lessons in combat. Counterinsurgencies have been called learning competitions
6
. “Learn and Adapt” is
a modern CI imperative for forces involved in CI operations that they would be best to understand and
implement
7
. Adapting occurs as organizations wholly/individually apply what they have learned through study
and experience, assess the results of their actions, and continue to learn during operations. As learning
organizations go, the Indian Army should encourage its officers and soldiers to pay attention to the rapidly
changing situations that characterize CI/CT operations
8
. Current tactics, techniques, and procedures
sometimes do not achieve the desired results. When this happens, successful leaders should engage in a
directed search for better ways to defeat the insurgent
9
, which would entail that the Indian Army rapidly
develop an institutional consensus on a new CI/CT doctrine, publish it, and carefully observe its impact on
mission accomplishment. This learning cycle should repeat continuously as counterinsurgents need to learn
faster than the insurgents. If past experiences are any indication, the side that learns faster and adapts more

2. rapidly wins. The world over where forces have successfully been able to quell insurgency, it has been seen
that they display the following organizational traits
10
:-
(a) Developed counterinsurgency doctrine and practices locally.
(b) Established local training centers during counterinsurgency operations.
(c) Regularly challenged hypothesis, both formally and informally.
(d) Learned about the broader world outside the military and requested non-military assistance
in understanding political, cultural, social and other situations beyond their experience.
(e) Promoted suggestions from the field.
(f) Fostered open communication between senior officers and their subordinates.
(g) Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned.
(h) Coordinated closely with governmental and non-governmental partners at all command
levels.
(j) Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the conflict zone.
4. These are not always easy practices for an organization to establish. Adopting them is particularly
challenging for an army engaged in a conflict. However, these traits are essential for any organization
confronting an insurgent who does not fight using conventional tactics and who adapts while waging irregular
warfare. Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not
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. Promoting learning
should be a command function at all levels. It is time that the Indian Army developed a system that allow for
collecting and rapidly disseminating information from the field in the form of interactive ‘lessons learned’
processes. But these systems only work when commanders promote their use and create a command
climate that encourages bottom-up learning. Junior leaders in the field often informally disseminate lessons
based on their experiences. However, incorporating this information into institutional lessons learned, and
then into doctrine, requires commanders to encourage subordinates to use institutional ‘lessons-learned’
processes. As starting point, institutions which impart basic and junior level training in tactics/administration
to officers and PBOR in the Indian Army, can be an option that needs to be seriously considered.
Need for Systemic Change
5. Experience has shown that the nature of counterinsurgency still presents challenges to traditional
lessons-learned systems that are generally discussed in various forums/schools of instructions in the Indian
Army today; many nonmilitary aspects of CI ops do not lend themselves to rapid tactical learning. This is
because performing the many non-military tasks in CI/CT environment requires knowledge of many diverse,
complex subjects. These include governance, economic development, public administration, and the rule of
law. Commanders with a deep-rooted knowledge of these subjects can help subordinates understand
challenging, unfamiliar environments and adapt more rapidly to changing situations. To ensure that this
lacunae is addressed there is a need for a systemic change. This can be achieved at three levels;-
(a) Ab-initio Level. Training presently at the Training Academies of the Indian Army
presently needs to incorporate aspects of governance, economic development, public administration,
sociology, psychology and the rule of law in their academic curriculum presently being imparted to
the cadets. This would ensure that a cadet on being commissioned and inducted into CI/CT
environment is better able to grasp the nuances other than military, which is relevant in this complex
warfare.
(b) Mid Career Level. Presently officers after commanding a unit or if superseded are
given an option to avail study leave. But it has been seen that the kind of courses being opted for by
a vast majority of officers are firstly not those that can be effectively used in the Indian Army, let
alone in countering insurgency. Officer’s who fail/do not want appear for staff college should be
given an option to avail study leave and encouraged to pursue courses dealing with governance,
economic development, public administration, etc. This would enrich the Army’s intellectual prowess
and will also help in giving it flexibility to operate in LIC scenario.
(c) Cadre Management. The MS branch at the IHQ of MoD is responsible for placing officers
in various appointments to manage operations in the different theatres of the country. A data base
needs to be maintained by the MS branch of officers qualified in governance, economic

3. development, public administration, etc so that they could be posted in LIC environment and act as
force multipliers to aid the cdr conducting ops.
Conclusion
7. CI/CT ops are often long and difficult. Progress can be hard to measure, and the insurgent may
appear to have many advantages. Insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the
tools of global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions. They often carry out barbaric acts
and do not observe accepted norms of behavior
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. However, by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and
support of the local populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function as learning organizations, the
Indian Army has to constantly adapt and re-invent itself to successfully curb the spread and reach of the
insurgent through imagination and innovation.
1
Indian Army Doctrine: Downloaded from http://indianarmy.nic.in/indianarmydoctrine.htm on 6/8/2008.
2
Beckett, I.F.W. 2001. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their Opponents since 1750. London: Routledge.
3
Private views of author.
4
Discussions of author with cross section of senior/junior/mid level Indian Army Officers and proponents of a non-conventional approach
towards solving the Insurgency problem in India.
5
Modified from Peter Senge’s ‘Fifth Column’.
6
Anderson, E.G., Jr. 2007a. A Proof-of-Concept Model for Evaluating Insurgency Management Policies Using the System Dynamics
Methodology. Strategic Insights, 6 (5). Electronic journal, permanent website: www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/. Accessed on 4/3/2009.
7
O’Neill, B.E. 1990. Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Brassey’s: Washington.
8
Private views of author.
9
Modified from Peter Senge’s ‘Fifth Column’.
10
FM 3-24. 2006. The U.S. Army – Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
11
Modified from Peter Senge’s ‘Fifth Column’.
12
Beckett, I.F.W. 2001. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their Opponents since 1750. London: Routledge.