Stefanie entered into a 5-year contract with Madam Dora to receive dance training. However, Stefanie was a minor at the time. Generally, contracts entered into by minors are void due to lack of capacity. There are exceptions for necessaries, beneficial contracts, and scholarships. While dance training could potentially fall under a beneficial contract exception, the contract imposed unreasonable restrictions on Stefanie like not allowing other engagements or marriage without consent. Based on past cases, such unreasonable provisions in a contract with a minor are not enforceable. Therefore, the contract between Stefanie and Madam Dora was void, and Stefanie would not be liable for its breach.

1. PY Contract Dec 2014 (Part B Q2)
ISSUE : Whether Stefanie could be liable for breach of contract?
PRINCIPLE OF LAW :
One of the elements to form a valid contract is capacity as stated in Section 10 (1) , all agreements
are contract if there are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful
consideration and with a lawful object and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.
Section 11 stated that every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according
to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting
by any law to which he is subject.
However, the general rule is a contract is said to be void if it is entered by a minor as governed in
Section 2(g) that states an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. According to Age
of Majority Act 1971, a minor is below the age of 18.
The general principle can be seen in the case of Mohori Bibee v Dharmodas Ghose. Dharmodas
Ghose lent the minor the sum of 20,000 rupees at 12% interest and secured the loan by way of
mortgage executed by the minor in favor of the Dharmodas Ghose. Later the mother of the children
claim that the mortgage was void for lack of capacity. Agent of defendant advanced money to
plaintiff, an infant, fully knowing his incompetency to contract, against mortgage of property
belonging to latter. The council held the contract by the minor as void because the minor has no
capacity to contract hence the mortgage was not valid.
In the local case of Leha binte Jusoh v Awang Johari bin Hashim, the court has applied the
principle in the case of Mohori Bibee. In this case, the respondent alleged that he had entered into
an agreement to purchase certain lands belonging to an estate of which appellant was the
administratrix. At the time of the alleged agreement, the respondent was a minor. The purchase
price had been paid in full and the respondent had been let into possession. The court held that the
agreement was void and applied Section 66 of the Contract Act to order and refund of the purchase
of the price to the minor,on condition that the minor vacate the land which he had occupied. Section
66 provides that any party receiving any advantage from an agreement discovered to be void must
restoe the benefit received.
Next, in the case of Tan Hee Juan v Teh Boon Keat where the plaintiff, a minor executed transfer
of land in favour of the defendant. The transfer were witnessed and subsequently registered. The
plaintiff later applied to the court for an order setting aside the transfer. The court held that the
transactions were void and ordered restoration of the land to the minor and have the advantage of
not returning the money’s received.
There are some exceptions to this general principle which is necessaries, beneficial contract,
scholarships, insurance and contract made under Age of Majority Act. In Stefanie’s case, it falls
under beneficial contract.

2. Firstly, necessaries was the subject of judicial interpretation in Government of Malaysia v
Gurcharan Singh. In this case, the Government of Malaysia sued the first defendant as the promisor
and the second and third defendants as sureties for breach of an agreement entered into by them
with the plaintiff for providing a course of training at a Malayan teachers’ Training Institutions in
1960-1961. The cause of action was founded on the breach of the agreement by the first defendant
to serve the government as a teacher for five years after his training. The first defendant submitted
that the contract was void as it was entered into during his minority. The court held that Gurcharan
is liable for repayment of the sum expended on his education and training. This is because under
Section 69 of Contract Act, when the contract is suited the minor’s condition of life, actual needs
and nature of goods, it is considered as a valid contract.
An early case which gave an exposition of necessaries is Chapple v Cooper which held that
necessaries comprise of things and services essential for a reasonable existence in life. In this case,
the burial expenses incurred by the defendant , a widow who was a minor, for the funeral of her
late husband was held to amount to necessities.
Besides, the exception of necessaries is laid down in Section 69 of the Contract Act which stated
that a minor is liable to the contracts for necessaries. Necessaries includes goods and services
necessary for a minor’s life. This can be seen in the case of Nash and Imran where the plaintiff
had supplied to the defendant clothing to the value of $145, the plaintiff then claimed for the
payment from the defendant. The defendant contended that at the time the clothes were supplied
to him, he was still a minor and that the clothes were not necessaries as his father had provided
him with proper clothes according to his condition in life. The court held that the clothes supplied
to the defendant were not necessaries to the defendant’s actual needs as his father had provided
him with suitable and necessary clothes sufficiently. Therefore, the defendant was not bound to
the contract and the contract was void.
In the case of De Francesco v Barnum, the defendant who is an infant, entered into a contract of
apprenticeship for seven years, to taught stage dancing by the plaintiff. The contract provided that
the infant would not set any professional engagement or marry during the term of seven years
without the consent of her master. The infant entered into professional engagement to perform as
stage dancer with a third party. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant to enforce the
contract and claim damages for its breach. The court held that the provision of the contract were
unreasonable and could not be enforced against the defendant
Secondly, in the relation to services, education and training that will benefit a minor are considered
as necessaries. In the case of Roberts v Gray, the defendant, a minor entered into a contract to go
on a world tournament with the plaintiff, a professional billiard player. The plaintiff alleged that
under the contract, he had expanded much time and trouble incurred liabilities in making
arrangements for billiard matches. Subsequently a dispute arose and the defendant repudiated the
contract. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for damages for breach of contract.
The court held that the contract was binding upon the defendant and he could not repudiated any
part of it.

3. Furthermore, in the case Doyle v White City Stadium, a contract between a minor and White City
Stadium for boxing was upheld as valid and binding on the minor because the contract as a whole
was for the benefit of the minor. Under Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act 1966, the
permitted age to enter into contracts is below the age of 18 years old and it also stated that any
child or young person may enter into a contract of service and be employed, however, such person
cannot be an employer.
The next exception of contract for minor is the contract of scholarships which is governed in
Section 4 (a) of Contract (Amendment) Act 1976 which stated that no scholarship shall be
invalidated on the ground that the scholar entering into such agreement is not at the age of majority.
In the case of Government of Malaysia v Gurcharan Singh, the Government of Malaysia sued the
first defendant as the promisor and the second and third defendants as sureties for breach of an
agreement entered into by them with the plaintiff for providing a course of training at a Malayan
teachers’ Training Institutions in 1960-1961. The cause of action was founded on the breach of the
agreement by the first defendant to serve the government as a teacher for five years after his
training. The first defendant submitted that the contract was void as it was entered into during his
minority. The court held that Gurcharan is liable for repayment of the sum expended on his
education and training. This is because under Section 69 of Contract Act, when the contract is
suited the minor’s condition of life, actual needs and nature of goods, it is considered as a valid
contract.
The next exception is insurance. Based on Section 41 of the Insurance Act 1963, 10 years old
minor may enter into an insurance contract and if the minor is under 16 years old, he must get
written consent of the parents or guardians.
The last exception is the matters relating to marriage. Section 21(2) of the Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act 1976 provided that for a female who has completed the 16th year to apply for a
license granted by the Chief Minister under Section 21(2) of the Act. It should be noted that not
withstanding that the minimum age for marriage is 18 years old. In the case of Rajeswary v
Balakrishnan where a marriage agreement was made on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant
by their father. If there is any breach of the contract the penalty is RM5000. The defendant then
refused to perform the contract and the plaintiff brought an action for damages. The defendant
claim the contract was not binding because at the time of the contract, the plaintiff was a minor.
The court held that the contract were binding. As the contract of promise of marriage entered into
by minors or their parents on their behalf are valid.

4. APPLICATION:
In the case of Stefanie, there is no valid contract between Stefanie and Madam Dora although she
has breach the contract as she entered into a professional engagement to perform as a stage
dancer with third party, Free Lance Dancers Sdn Bhd. This is because an infant cannot bind
himself to a penalty and a contract to impose a penalty to an infant is void. There is harsh and
burdensome terms in the contract that were not enforceable against an infant which is; in this
context she would not accept any professional engagement or marry during the term of five years
without the consent of Madam Dora and there were also other restriction imposed by Madam
Dora. This can be seen in the case De Francesco v Barnum as stated above which was held that
provision of the contract were unreasonable and could not be enforced against the defendant. In
this case, there is extraordinary or unusual stipulations contained in a contract, therefore, Stefanie
is not bound by the contract as it is not reasonable, not in a good law and also not maintainable.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, Stefanie may not be liable for breach of contract.