The document describes a survey conducted in Japan that measured preferences for income redistribution policy. The survey presented respondents with a fictional society consisting of three households with different incomes. It asked respondents to indicate how much tax each household should pay and benefits each should receive. It also asked about an unemployment benefit amount and the policy's perceived effect on economic growth. Regression analysis found higher education correlated with preferring more redistribution, while higher household income correlated with preferring less redistribution.

1. Concrete and Whole-Picture Type Indices to Measure Policy
Preference over Income Redistribution Policy:
A Report from Japanese Nationwide Survey Data
Koji YAMAMOTO
(Hylab LLP and Senshu University)
Presentation at Waseda University, October 29, 2018

2. Introduction
• Focus:
– Preference for redistribution policy
• Background:
– How could people come close to agreement, instead of
conflict, over public policy?
2

3. Introduction
• What do we need?
– Measurement:
• Concrete level
“How strong redistribution one prefers”
Not “How strongly one agrees with redistribution”
• Respondents look at “whole picture” of society
“Be-the-Government”
3

4. Introduction
• Concrete level
– Usually policy implementations involves “levels”
– Natural language expressions are subject to different
interpretations
• Whole-picture
– Some may think “if richer people pay much tax, then
poorer people should be left as they are, but if we can
make the rich pay more tax, then the poor should receive
more”
– You can do that by the whole-picture answers
4

5. Questionnaire
• Data
– JHPS: Japan’s nationwide panel survey
– Use responses in 2011 and 2012
• Item: Looking at the whole picture of “a fictional society”…
– Concrete amounts of money for desired redistribution
– Perceived external effect on economic growth
5

6. Questionnaire
6
調査項目1. 使用するデータを生み出した項目
Source: 筆者が作成した文書をもとにしたJHPS2011調査票
このページでは、政府による、税・社会保険料の徴収と、生活を保障する給付について、
お考えをうかがいます。
問１. 以下の架空の社会において、政府の政策としてどのようなものが望ましいかをお考え
ください。
架空の社会：
Ａさんの世帯、Ｂさんの世帯、Ｃさんの世帯という、3 つの世帯から社会が成り立っています。
どの世帯も 4 人世帯です。政府は税・社会保険料を徴収して、人々の生活の保障のために使用す
ることができます。政府が税・社会保険料を徴収しない場合、Ａさんの世帯の年収は 350 万円、
Ｂさんの世帯の年収は 700 万円、Ｃさんの世帯の年収は 1250 万円です。
(1) この架空の社会で政府は、1 年間に、各世帯からどのくらい税・社会保険料を徴収して、各世
帯にどのくらい生活の保障のための給付を行なうべきだと思いますか。それぞれの金額を万円
単位でお答えください。税と社会保険料は区別せずに総額をお答えください。徴収または給付
の必要がないとお考えの箇所は金額を「0」としてください。
各世帯から
税・社会保険料として
徴収するべき金額
各世帯に
生活の保障のために
給付するべき金額
Ａさんの世帯（年収 350 万円） 万円 万円
Ｂさんの世帯（年収 700 万円） 万円 万円
Ｃさんの世帯（年収 1250 万円） 万円 万円
(2) この架空の社会で、仮に、いずれかの世帯で、働いていた人が失業してしまい、世帯の収入
がゼロになってしまったとき、政府はその世帯の生活を保障するために、その世帯に対して、
1 年間にどの程度の給付を行なうべきだと思いますか。金額を万円単位でお答えください。
万円
(3) 政府が各世帯から税などを徴収したり、各世帯に給付を行なったりすると、経済成長に影響
する、と考える人もいますし、そう考えない人もいます。この架空の社会で、あなたが上記の
(1)と(2)でお答えになったような政策を政府が採用した場合には、政府が何もしない場合と比
べて、経済成長はどのようになると思いますか。
１ 経済成長の度合いは大幅に悪化する
２ 経済成長の度合いは少し悪化する
３ 経済成長の度合いは変わらない
４ 経済成長の度合いは少し改善する
５ 経済成長の度合いは大幅に改善する
６ わからない

7. • Questionnaire Item
– Originally in
Japanese
In fictional society…
– Tax and benefit for
each household
– Unemployment
benefit
– External effect on
economic growth
7
Questionnaire Item 1. Equalization Policy Preferences
Source: JHPS Questionnaire. The item was originally created by the author in Japanese, and later
translated into English by the survey-supervising organization.
This page concerns tax and social premiums collected by the government, and benefits to ensure one's living.
Q1. In the fictional society below, please suggest the most desirable policy to be taken by the government.
Fictional society:
The society includes households A, B, and C. Each household has 4 persons. The government collects
taxes and social insurance, and uses them to ensure one’s living. If the government does not collect taxes
or social insurance, household A’s income would be 3.5 million yen, B’s 7 million yen, C’s 12.5 million
yen per annum.
(1)How much in taxes and social insurance premiums do you think should be collected, and paid as benefits to
the households? Answer each question in 10,000 yen units. Do not separate taxes and social insurance
premiums, and answer the total amount. If you think no collection or payment is necessary, write 0.
Amount per household that
should be collected
as taxes and social insurance
Payment per household that
should be made to
ensure one’s living
Household A (3.5 million yen per annum) ten thousand yen ten thousand yen
Household B (7 million yen per annum) ten thousand yen ten thousand yen
Household C (12.5 million yen per annum) ten thousand yen ten thousand yen
(2) If someone from one of the households in this society became unemployed, and the income became 0, how
much should the government pay the household per year to ensure their living? Write your answer in
10,000 yen units.
ten thousand yen
(3)Some may think that if the government collects taxes, or pay benefits to every household, it affects
economical growth. If the government in this fictional society decided to introduce the policy that you
suggested in (1) and (2), compared with the government not taking any action, what would happen to
economical growth?
１ It would worsen dramatically.
２ It would worsen slightly.
３ It would not change.
４ It would improve slightly.
５ It would improve dramatically.
６ Not sure.

8. Questionnaire
• Questionnaire Item
8
Fictional society:
The society includes households A, B, and C. Each household has
4 persons. The government collects taxes and social insurance,
and uses them to ensure one’s living. If the government does not
collect taxes or social insurance, household A’s income would be
3.5 million yen, B’s 7 million yen, C’s 12.5 million yen per annum.
(1) How much in taxes and social insurance premiums do you
think should be collected, and paid as benefits to the
households? Answer each question in 10,000 yen units. Do not
separate taxes and social insurance premiums, and answer the
total amount. If you think no collection or payment is necessary,
write 0.

9. Questionnaire
• Questionnaire Item
9
(2) If someone from one of the households in this society became
unemployed, and the income became 0, how much should the
government pay the household per year to ensure their living? Write
your answer in 10,000 yen units.
(3) Some may think that if the government collects taxes, or pay
benefits to every household, it affects economical growth. If the
government in this fictional society decided to introduce the policy
that you suggested in (1) and (2), compared with the government not
taking any action, what would happen to economical growth?
[Alternatives: 1. It would worsen dramatically. / 2. It would worsen
slightly. / 3. It would not change. / 4. It would improve slightly. / 5. It
would improve dramatically. / 6. Not sure. ]

10. Questionnaire
• Questionnaire Item: Enlarged
– Only three households
• Can look at whole picture
– Answer concrete amount of money
10

11. Questionnaire
• Too simple?
– OK, and what about natural-language quenstions?
• Too complicated?
– I know, and how can we know what we want to know?
• Experiment? Conjoint?
11

12. Questionnaire
• What we will measure: Policy implementation
– Not “choosing desirable income distribution”
– Not “personal satisfaction with income”
• Someone may think…
– “Personally, low income would be fine, but the
government should redistribute more”
– “Personally, I would need more money, but the
that’s not the government should do”
• We will see policy implementation
12

13. Data: SQ(1)
• SQ(1), Valid cases
– At least 2,494 (79%)
13
Table 1. Frequencies of Valid Cases, SQ(1)
n %
Whole Respondents 3,160 100.0%
Not Answered to All in SQ(1) 582 18.4%
Answered to All in SQ(1) 2,578 81.6%
(Subcategories)
Order Changed 19 0.6%
Perfect Equality 14 0.4%
Zero to All 51 1.6%
Other Response 2,494 78.9%

14. Data: SQ(1)
• SQ(1), Descriptive Statistics
– Not much deviated from our intuition (?)
14
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Post-Redistribution Income
Statistics Household A Household B Household C
25 percentile 345 630 1,000
50 percentile 360 664 1,130
75 percentile 400 696 1,206
Mean 386.7 665.0 1,115.9
SD 77.77 95.96 180.42
Pre-Redistribution 350 700 1,250
Source: JHPS2011
Note: n = 2,578. Unit is ten thousand yen. Statistics are calculated for the cases in
the category "Answered to All in SQ(1)".

15. Data: SQ(1)
• SQ(1), Income share plot (Households A vs C)
– Most cases made society more equal
15

16. Data: SQ(2) “Minimum”
• SQ(2), Unemployment benefit
– We see it as “Minimum” income assured by policy
16
Table 3. Frequencies of Valid Cases, SQ(2)
n %
Whole Respondents 3,160 100.0%
Not Answered to SQ(2) 405 12.8%
Answered to SQ(2) 2,755 87.2%
(Subcategories)
Too High Minimum 77 2.4%
Answered Zero 56 1.8%
Other Response 2,622 83.0%

17. Data: SQ(2) “Minimum”
• SQ(2), Unemployment benefit, “Minimum”
– Again the stats are not deviated so much from our
intuition (?)
17
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, Minimum (Unemployment Benefit)
Statistics
Minimum
(Unemployment Benefit)
25 percentile 120
50 percentile 200
75 percentile 250
Mean 202.2
SD 110.33
Source: JHPS2011
Note: n = 2,755. Unit is ten thousand yen. Statistics are calculated for the cases in the
category "Answered to SQ(2)".

18. Data: SQ(3) “Growth”
• SQ(3), Growth
– Many cases in “Not Sure” and NA categories…
18
Table 5. Perceived Exernal Effect on Economic Growth
Worsen Dramatically 171 5.4% 171 8.7%
Worsen Slightly 325 10.3% 325 16.6%
Not Change 624 19.7% 624 31.8%
Improve Slightly 768 24.3% 768 39.2%
Improve Dramatically 73 2.3% 73 3.7%
Not Sure 950 30.1%
NA 249 7.9%
Total 3,160 100.0% 1,961 100.0%
---
---
Effect on
Economic Growth
Excluding NA and DKWhole Respondents
n % n %

19. Conceptual Model
• Preference formed by normative criteria and perceived facts
19
Figure 3-2. Hypothetical Factors Forming Policy Preference, Simplified
(a) Policy Preference
(d) Perceived External
Effect and Restriction
(c) Normative
Evaluation Criteria
(e) Purer Normative
Evaluation Criteria
(f) Attribution and
Position
(b) Perceived Status
Quo
Perceived
Facts
(g) Perceived
Involvedness
×

20. Conceptual Model
• We wanted to control “Status Quo” and “Involvedness” by
showing the whole-picture of a fictional society
20
Figure 4. Hypothetical Factors Forming Policy Preference, After Controlling Out
(a) Policy Preference
(d) Perceived External
Effect and Restriction
(c) Normative
Evaluation Criteria
(e) Purer Normative
Evaluation Criteria
(f) Attribution and
Position

21. Simple Analysis
• OLS
• DV:
– Minimum
– Minimum / (Household B’ income after redist.)
– Raw-type Gini: Gini coefficient calculated from the three
household income values after redist.
• Covariates:
– Age, Univ. Educ., Married dummy, Household Inocme
(Logged), Jobless dummy, Female dummy
– Separate parameters between both genders
21

22. Simple Analysis
22
Table 5a. Covariates of Preference Indices: Regression Results
Coef. (p) Coef. (p) Coef. (p) Coef. (p)
Male
Age/100 -24.90 (0.298) -6.089 (0.107) 0.195 (0.420) 0.201 (0.404)
Univ. Educ. 6.80 (0.250) 0.779 (0.403) -0.184 **
(0.002) -0.186 **
(0.002)
Married 3.89 (0.618) 1.260 (0.307) -0.031 (0.698) -0.044 (0.572)
Household Income (Log) 16.20 **
(0.000) 2.203 **
(0.002) -0.070 (0.130) -0.092 *
(0.046)
Jobless 5.42 (0.536) 0.529 (0.702) -0.058 (0.515) -0.047 (0.597)
Female
Age/100 14.18 (0.518) 2.060 (0.552) -0.289 (0.192) -0.295 (0.181)
Univ. Educ. 17.68 *
(0.034) 3.290 *
(0.013) -0.230 **
(0.006) -0.252 **
(0.003)
Married -3.34 (0.645) -0.426 (0.709) -0.019 (0.795) -0.010 (0.888)
Household Income (Log) 5.94 (0.199) 0.626 (0.391) 0.042 (0.372) 0.027 (0.566)
Jobless -3.30 (0.626) -0.702 (0.511) 0.106 (0.120) 0.114 +
(0.094)
Female Dummy 43.84 (0.289) 5.582 (0.392) -0.390 (0.350) -0.436 (0.295)
Constant 105.66 **
(0.000) 18.842 **
(0.000) 5.763 **
(0.000) 6.353 **
(0.000)
2,242
Note: +:p<0.10, *:p<0.05, **:p<0.01
OLS regression results are shown. The cases used are those who answered to all in SQ(1) and SQ(2), and are
classified neither in “Order Changed” nor “Too High Minimum,” and answers for their own household income are
Model 3 Model 4
DV: DV:
Raw-type Gini MC-type Gini
0.016 0.018
2,242
R2
0.012 0.012
N of Obs. 2,242 2,242
Covariates
Model 1 Model 2
DV: DV:
Min (Min /YB )×100

23. Simple Analysis
• No evidence that “those with lower SES prefer stronger
redistribution”
• Male:
– Higher Household income  Higher Minimum
• Female:
– Univ. Educ.  Higher Minimum
• Both genders:
– Univ. Educ.  Lower post-redist. Gini
• Yes, R-squared is small…
– There is no clear systematic difference in concrete-amount
preference?
23

24. Considering “Minimum”
• How to integrate minimum into other 3 household income
values?
– Respondents answered the packaged of the policy
• Assume continuous income distribution
– Continuous dist.:
• More comparable with real societies
(Small freq. makes Gini biased)
• Introduce the idea of Income Transformation Function (ITF)
24

25. Considering “Minimum”
• Introduce the idea of Income Transformation Function (ITF)
25
Figure 1. Income Transformation Function (ITF), Setting Various Minimum Income Values
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
0 250 500 750 1,000 1,250
Post-RedistributionIncome
Pre-Redistribution Income (Unit: Ten Thousand Yen)
Median
Response
High-Minimum
Low-Minimum

26. Considering “Minimum”
• Continuous dist. fitted to pre-redist. fictional society
26
Figure 2. Continuous Distribution Fitted to Pre-Redistribution Income
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
Income (Unit: Ten Thousand Yen)

27. Considering “Minimum”
• Transformation using different ITFs
27
Figure 3. Resultant Distribution from ITF-Transformation
0.0
0.1
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
Income (Unit: Ten Thousand Yen)
(a) "Median Response" ITF
0.0
0.1
0.2
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
Income (Unit: Ten Thousand Yen)
(b) "High-Minimum" ITF
0.0
0.1
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
Income (Unit: Ten Thousand Yen)
(c) "Low-Minimum" ITF

28. Considering “Minimum”
• Different Minimum values are reflected in inequality
measures
28
Table 3. Difference in Inequality Indices Caused by ITFs with Various Minimum Income
ITF Used Gini Theil
Atkinson
(ε = 0.5)
Atkinson
(ε = 1.0)
Atkinson
(ε = 2.0)
Atkinson
(ε = 3.0)
Median Response 0.267 0.113 0.056 0.109 0.207 0.288
High-Minimum 0.254 0.103 0.050 0.097 0.177 0.241
Low-Minimum 0.279 0.126 0.064 0.130 0.274 0.430
"Low-Minimum" vs "High-Minimum"
Ratio 1.097 1.225 1.280 1.350 1.543 1.783

29. Table 4. Calculation of MC-type Indices for Each Case: Illustrative Example
A B C Gini Theil … Gini Theil …
Q 360 664 1130 200 0.238 0.098 … 0.267 0.113 …
R 600 700 1000 480 0.116 0.024 … 0.137 0.032 …
S 340 690 1240 120 0.264 0.122 … 0.298 0.142 …
…
…
…
…
Each Household's Post-
Redistribution Income
Respondent
Responses
Raw-type Indices MC-type Indices
Min
29
These values are
directly used in
calculation of Gini, and
we obtain Raw-type
Gini
Considering “Minimum”
• How to calculate

30. Table 4. Calculation of MC-type Indices for Each Case: Illustrative Example
A B C Gini Theil … Gini Theil …
Q 360 664 1130 200 0.238 0.098 … 0.267 0.113 …
R 600 700 1000 480 0.116 0.024 … 0.137 0.032 …
S 340 690 1240 120 0.264 0.122 … 0.298 0.142 …
…
…
…
…
Each Household's Post-
Redistribution Income
Respondent
Responses
Raw-type Indices MC-type Indices
Min
30
From these valuse
we obtain Q’s ITF
This ITF makes
transformation like the
right figures
Gini is calculated from
this dist.

31. Considering “Minimum”
31
Figure 5. Characteristics of MC-type Indices
Raw-type Indices
Minimum IncomeCovariate X1
MC-type Indices
Covariate X2
Covaraite X1
Covariate X2

32. Considering “Minimum”
32
Table 5a. Covariates of Preference Indices: Regression Results
Coef. (p) Coef. (p) Coef. (p) Coef. (p)
Male
Age/100 -24.90 (0.298) -6.089 (0.107) 0.195 (0.420) 0.201 (0.404)
Univ. Educ. 6.80 (0.250) 0.779 (0.403) -0.184 **
(0.002) -0.186 **
(0.002)
Married 3.89 (0.618) 1.260 (0.307) -0.031 (0.698) -0.044 (0.572)
Household Income (Log) 16.20 **
(0.000) 2.203 **
(0.002) -0.070 (0.130) -0.092 *
(0.046)
Jobless 5.42 (0.536) 0.529 (0.702) -0.058 (0.515) -0.047 (0.597)
Female
Age/100 14.18 (0.518) 2.060 (0.552) -0.289 (0.192) -0.295 (0.181)
Univ. Educ. 17.68 *
(0.034) 3.290 *
(0.013) -0.230 **
(0.006) -0.252 **
(0.003)
Married -3.34 (0.645) -0.426 (0.709) -0.019 (0.795) -0.010 (0.888)
Household Income (Log) 5.94 (0.199) 0.626 (0.391) 0.042 (0.372) 0.027 (0.566)
Jobless -3.30 (0.626) -0.702 (0.511) 0.106 (0.120) 0.114 +
(0.094)
Female Dummy 43.84 (0.289) 5.582 (0.392) -0.390 (0.350) -0.436 (0.295)
Constant 105.66 **
(0.000) 18.842 **
(0.000) 5.763 **
(0.000) 6.353 **
(0.000)
Source: JHPS2011
2,242
Note: +:p<0.10, *:p<0.05, **:p<0.01
OLS regression results are shown. The cases used are those who answered to all in SQ(1) and SQ(2), and are
classified neither in “Order Changed” nor “Too High Minimum,” and answers for their own household income are
neither NA nor zero. In Models 3 and 4, DVs are standardized, i.e., divided by their own SDs.
Model 3 Model 4
DV: DV:
Raw-type Gini MC-type Gini
0.016 0.018
2,242
R2
0.012 0.012
N of Obs. 2,242 2,242
Covariates
Model 1 Model 2
DV: DV:
Min (Min /YB )×100

33. Figure 2-1. Diagram for Estimated Equations, Base
E xplained Variable EQi
Policy Preference
"How much redistribution
should Gov't conduct?"
Parameter Theta (θi)
Perceived Fact
"How much does redistribution
improve economic growth?"
Parameter Tau (τi)
N ormative Criterion for E quality
"W hat is the desirable equality,
other factors being the same?"
E xplanatory Variables
Individual Characteristics
e.g. Higher Education
Application 1:
Decomposition
• Diagram:
– Four components
33

34. Figure 2-1. Diagram for Estimated Equations, Base
E xplained Variable EQi
Policy Preference
"How much redistribution
should Gov't conduct?"
Parameter Theta (θi)
Perceived Fact
"How much does redistribution
improve economic growth?"
Parameter Tau (τi)
N ormative Criterion for E quality
"W hat is the desirable equality,
other factors being the same?"
E xplanatory Variables
Individual Characteristics
e.g. Higher Education
Application 1:
Decomposition
• Effect through perceived fact exists
34

35. Figure 2-1. Diagram for Estimated Equations, Base
E xplained Variable EQi
Policy Preference
"How much redistribution
should Gov't conduct?"
Parameter Theta (θi)
Perceived Fact
"How much does redistribution
improve economic growth?"
Parameter Tau (τi)
N ormative Criterion for E quality
"W hat is the desirable equality,
other factors being the same?"
E xplanatory Variables
Individual Characteristics
e.g. Higher Education
Application 1:
Decomposition
• Still, separately from Theta (θi), education has effect on EQi
– Better-educated people tend to be more pro-
redistribution regardless of improvement of growth
35

36. Application 2:
Collective Preference
• Figure 1:
the idea of
Individual
Evaluation
Function, IEF
36
Figure 1.IndividualE valuation Function on S tatus ofS ociety
Status A
Gini=0.30
Growth=0%
Status B
Gini=0.40
Growth=2%
Individual Evaluation Function
(IEF) represents individuals'
subjective evaluation on status
of society
Status of society is
described by
Objective Indices

37. Application 2:
Collective Preference
• Figure 2:
How we
aggregate
individual
preferences
into
Collective
Preference
Order, CPO
37
Figure 2.C ollective P reference O rder
Status A
Gini=0.30
Growth=0%
Status B
Gini=0.40
Growth=2%
Collective Preference Order (CPO)
reflects all individuals' evaluations
collectively, in a well-defined and
transparent way (= objectively)
CPO:
A is more
desirable
than B!
Status of society is
described by
Objective Indices

38. Application 2:
Collective Preference
38
Figure 3. Gini and Growth, Japan, 2005-2014
Data Source: JHPS2011-2012; World Bank; Solt (2009; 2016)
Note: Shown are Japan's Gini coefficients (post-transfer Gini) and growth rates
(annual growth in real GNI per capita) for respective years.
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
0.298 0.299 0.300 0.301 0.302 0.303 0.304 0.305
GrowthRate
Gini

39. Application 2:
Collective Preference
39
Figure 4-1. How Statuses are Ranked (1)
Data Source: JHPS2011-2012; World Bank; Solt (2009; 2016)
Note: Shown are Japan's Gini coefficients (post-transfer Gini) and growth rates
(annual growth in real GNI per capita) for respective years. In the square
brackets with "R" letter are the rank values of the status among ten periods
compared.
2005 [R3]
2006 [R6]
2007 [R5]
2008 [R7]
2009 [R10]
2010 [R4]
2011 [R9]
2012 [R8]
2013 [R2]
2014 [R1]
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
0.298 0.299 0.300 0.301 0.302 0.303 0.304 0.305
GrowthRate
Gini
In this area, a status with
more equality is more
preferred collectively

40. Application 2:
Collective Preference
• Outside the
area of
ordinary
growth, the
pattern turns
different.
40
Figure 4-2. How Statuses are Ranked (2)
Data Source: JHPS2011-2012; World Bank; Solt (2009; 2016)
Note: Shown are Japan's Gini coefficients (post-transfer Gini) and growth rates
(annual growth in real GNI per capita) for respective years. In the square
brackets with "R" letter are the rank values of the status among ten periods
compared.
2005 [R3]
2006 [R6]
2007 [R5]
2008 [R7]
2009 [R10]
2010 [R4]
2011 [R9]
2012 [R8]
2013 [R2]
2014 [R1]
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
0.298 0.299 0.300 0.301 0.302 0.303 0.304 0.305
GrowthRate
Gini
The status of 2010 beats
that of 2007 etc. because of
its exceptionally higher
growth rate, although 2010
is more unequal

41. Application 2:
Collective Preference
• Outside the
area of
ordinary
growth, the
pattern turns
different.
41
Figure 4-3. How Statuses are Ranked (3)
Data Source: JHPS2011-2012; World Bank; Solt (2009; 2016)
Note: Shown are Japan's Gini coefficients (post-transfer Gini) and growth rates
(annual growth in real GNI per capita) for respective years. In the square
brackets with "R" letter are the rank values of the status among ten periods
compared.
2005 [R3]
2006 [R6]
2007 [R5]
2008 [R7]
2009 [R10]
2010 [R4]
2011 [R9]
2012 [R8]
2013 [R2]
2014 [R1]
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
0.298 0.299 0.300 0.301 0.302 0.303 0.304 0.305
GrowthRate
Gini
The statuses of 2008 and
2009 are beaten by more
unequal statuses because
of exceptionally low growth
rates

42. 42
References
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Yet Other References…
Kuziemko, Ilyana, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and
Stefanie Stantcheva. 2015. “How Elastic Are Preferences for
Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey
Experiments.” American Economic Review 105 (4): 1478–1508.
Lara, Bernardo, and Kenneth Shores. 2017. “Identifying
Preferences for Equal Educational Opportunity, Income, and
Income Equality.” Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996575.
Data Sources
Solt, Frederick. 2016. “The Standardized World Income
Inequality Database.” Social Science
Quarterly 97. SWIID Version 6.0, July 2017.
World Bank. 2017. World Development Indicators. (Last
Updated September 18, 2017; Datasets are retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org/country/japan).

44. Thank you for your warm attention!
Comments are welcome!!
E-mail: kojiy@kojiy.org
44
Acknowledgement
This study has been supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP18H00033,
JP16H00287, JP11J06528, and JP18830018. The data for this analysis, Japan
Household Panel Survey (JHPS/KHPS), was provided by the Keio University
Panel Data Research Center. This work was supported by the MEXT-Supported
Program for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities of
Japan, 2014-2018 (S1491003).