Briefly discusses the proposal to laterally induct officers from outside government of India as Joint Secretary. The article analyses the debate and concludes that such lateral recruitments ignore the reality of a crying need for reform of India's colonial civil service

1. Indian Civil Services: Lateral Recruitment or Systemic Reform
On Jun 14, 2018, Government of India’s Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued a
public advertisement inviting application from eligible candidates for ten posts of Joint Secretary
to the Govt. of India for appointment, one post each among Ministries/Departments of Revenue,
Financial Services, Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers’ Welfare, Road
Transport & Highways, Shipping Environment, Forests and Climate Change, New & Renewable
Energy, Civil Aviation and Commerce. The criteria required a minimum age of 40 years as on
July 1, 2018; graduate from a recognized University/Institute (higher qualifications would be an
added advantage). Eligibility was limited to Officers of any State/UT Government who are
already working at equivalent level or were eligible for appointment to equivalent level in their
cadre, with relevant experience, individuals working at comparable levels in Public, Sector
Undertakings (PSUs), Autonomous Bodies, Statutory Organisations, Universities, Recognized
Research Institutes, Private Sector Companies, Consultancy and International/Multinational
Organisations, all with minimum of 15 years’ experience. These officers would be recruited on
contract basis initially for three years from the date of commencement extendable up to 5 years,
depending upon performance. Selection would be recommended for shortlisted candidates on the
basis of a personal interaction with a Selection Committee.
Tomes were written about this advertisement. Many denounced it for introducing back-door
entry into the services for candidates owing allegiance to a particular ideology while others
described the move in glowing terms, praising it to the Heavens for ‘infusing much-needed fresh
blood.’ Those that denounced it, many retired civil servants amongst them, did so on ideological
apprehension while those that welcomed it were blissfully unaware of this practice. Where then
did the truth lie?
For one, this practice dates back to the 1950s when PM Nehru nominated several outstanding
outsiders into the system, notable amongst them being NP Sen, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, PC
Mahalanobis, Kuruvilla Zachariah and many more luminaries, all of them at the level of
Secretaries to Govt. of India. This practice continued down the years as PM’s discretion and
included many more like HY Sharada Prasad, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Parthasarathi Shome,
Manmohan Singh, IG Patel, Ashok Mitra, Deepak Nayyar, Lovraj Kumar, N. Krishnamurthy,
DV Kapur, RV Shahi, Mantosh Sondhi, Raghuram Rajan and my College mate Arvind
Subramaniam, among many others, all again at the Secretary level. Not just this, PMs have
historically exercised their discretion in ambassadorial appointments outside of the Indian
Foreign Service. Vijaylakshmi Pandit, General JN Choudhury, ACM IH Latif, and many others
had creditably represented India overseas. And these were Secretaries that had large financial
powers. I cannot recall Lovraj Kumar having given preferential treatment as Petroluem Secretary
to his former employer, Burmah Shell, or Mantosh Sondhi as Steel Secretary to Tata Steel. These
men interacted and often crossed swords with overbearing ICS stalwarts ranging from LK Jha to
NR Pillai, LP Singh and BN Chakrabarty, etc. yet were seconded by PM Nehru to the Common
Management Pool from where they made stellar contributions.
What is new in this proposal is that it is confined to the level of Jt. Secretary that has raised the
hackles of many on grounds of ideological infiltration of the civil service. However, there are
several caveats due here. First, the 450+ posts of Joint Secretary under the Govt. of India’s
Central Secretariat are required to be distributed among about 30 established services, all-India

2. and central. That seldom happens and the ratio is more in the range of 80-90% for the IAS and
the balance for the Central services, many posts of which do not deserve to exist. Second, none
of these 450+ posts are encadred (not earmarked for a service) and ten posts from this large pool
is therefore no great charity. Third, these ten posts will not affect promotion prospects of either
central or all-India services that have their respective state and parent cadres to seek faster
promotional avenues. In any case, every year there are several officers that revert to their home
state/dept. in search of promotions. Fourth, in the last 2-3 years there is a marked reticence
amongst IAS officers to opt for Central Secretariat assignments. While the vacancies have been
filled with central service officers (for whom this was windfall), more often than not, the lack of
experience in many such officers has not exactly helped his/her performance or that of the
Ministry/Dept. Filling critical vacancies with outside experts is therefore not a bad idea at all.
Fifth, IAS officers have, by dint of their variegated roles, are Jacks of many trades but masters of
none. And that is not their fault but that of a far larger issue of systemic reform that I will
address subsequently in this feature. Sixth, is the subterfuge civil services, particularly the IAS,
suffer by way of superannuated but politically-compliant senior colleagues staffing posts in CIC,
CEC, CVC, CAG, CAT, CEA, and other tribunals, even the National Consumer Commission,
and innumerable more, apart from the hordes that never seem to finally superannuate in states–
in a classical cradle to grave employment. A young professional is definitely eons ahead of most
of these retired civil servants, many of whom are severely technology-challenged, let alone
mining and interpreting data. Last, but not the least, a Jt. Secretary must report not just to an
Additional Secretary/Secretary but also to the Financial Adviser, a parallel Secretary in a
Ministry who most often is entirely unqualified for the job. It is therefore unlikely that a lateral
entrant, even at 25% of the total posts, will be able to sway a policy decision.
On the flip side, there are legitimate concerns too. First, there are concerns of the composition of
the members of the proposed selection committee. It is also not clear whether the choice of this
committee would be accepted by the Govt. of India, leaving identical scope for manipulation as
has been historically present in selection for the Central Staffing Scheme. It is not as if the
UPSC is flawless, yet that is a standardized protocol. Can a subjectively-appointed selection
committee supplant the UPSC? Second, there is no quality certification (as by the UPSC) for
non-governmental candidates. Who will certify their eligibility, competence and personal
integrity for the job?
Third, these greenhorns would obviously have to be initiated into the nether world of babudom.
Is it feasible to have a year’s training for such inductees in a 3-5 year contract? Fourth, what
mechanisms would checkmate any conflict of interest of private individuals applying from the
private sector? Although all appointees will be deemed to be public servants for the purpose of
the CCS (Conduct) Rules and such other statutes as notified by the Government from time to
time and their employment contract terminable by either side with a minimum notice period of 3
months, save for terminating a contract, what other disciplinary action can the Govt. of India take
against delinquent recruits? Criminal litigation in our glacial-speed judicial administration will
end in God’s lifetime alone, particularly if sensitive documents or policy-decisions were to leak
since about 90% of all Govt. of India actions end at the Jt. Secretary’s desk. Of course, many
would counter-argue that such malfeasance is common in the civil service too. Yet what such
arguments ignore is the fact that a career civil servant not only has his pension at stake but can
also be charge-sheeted up to 3-5 years after his/her superannuation from service. Finally, how
many candidates from the private sector with 15 years of seniority would give up their cushy

3. lifestyles and join Govt. of India for a pittance, that too for a pitiable three years, extendable by
patronage, to five years, more so when their sale bonuses are manifold more than their salaries?
The sparks and foam that this proposal and attendant debate storm has generated unfortunately
ignores fundamental systemic reforms a colonial civil service needs. It equally speaks volumes
for proponents and detractors and their level of understanding of the system. The first target of
reform ought to be the recruitment system.
On the one hand, Govt. of India agencies that discharge far less critical functions than the civil
service are obsessed with an academic first division with 2-5 years of service for a paltry salary.
On the other hand, we have the civil service where an academically and linguistically-challenged
third divisionary in the world’s largest bouquet of academic disciplines, is enough for applying
for a better-paying vacancy. To top it all, the UPSC runs an annual ritual called the Combined
Civil Services Examination that, from date of application for the preliminary examination to date
of joining at their training institution is a colossal 18 months. Why not instead limit the
recruitment to candidates who have secured at least 55% aggregate in their honors undergraduate
degree or 50% aggregate in their Master’s degrees in subjects like law, management, economics,
statistics, public policy/administration, social work, hydrology, PCM, sociology, environment
sciences, psychology, accounting & finance, agronomy and agriculture, medicine, engineering
etc. instead of history, botany & zoology, Indian languages, politics and pass courses, etc. and
UPSC hold a computer-based GRE-type exam twice every year instead? UPSC has no business
to verify the quality of a university degree by a Neanderthal method of separation the wheat from
the chaff, that too by teachers that have taught candidates while in university. It should only be
the nodal agency for determining allocation of sector upon the educational qualifications and
marks obtained in the civil services examination. Interviews are far from being above board and
may be dispensed with. Second, why not consolidate the civil services into social, economic and
general services following the layout of the Union Budget? That way each sector would have
composite technical and non-technical personnel possessing domain knowledge, instead of
indulging in inter-Ministerial slugfests and holding governance to ransom.
Third, why not group Ministries/depts. at the Centre and States along identical lines so as to
provide for attractive promotional avenues evenly for all recruits? Fourth, specialization in a
domain need not be insisted upon in the first eight years of service which is the formative period
for all officers. Instead, why not mandate apportionment and retention of civil servants in the
three above sectors on the basis of a limited departmental examination by the UPSC and enact
fresh enabling legislation to this effect? Fifth, it is necessary to separate the policy-making and
implementation cycles to separate each Ministry from its implementation agencies. The unity of
policy-making and implementation is the main factor for grand corruption and political
patronage, indeed the centerpiece of the perpetuation of some civil services. Sixth, promotions in
a combined civil service ought to made only on the basis of an annual general written
examination instead of entirely subjective, even openly fraudulent and nepotism-ridden Annual
Performance Appraisal reports and other methods like hearsay-based and secretive 360-degree
evaluation that seemingly violate the Constitution.
Seventh, induction and most in-service training schedules are not only jaded but also smack of a
colonial mindset of teaching by rote. Even the instruction of several new items of training syllabi
is based more upon normative delivery than upon any scientific data-based teaching. Occasional
external faculties are hardly a substitute for well-paid in-house trainers that have ample
promotion prospects in their cadres. Advanced data processing, mining and interpretation is a

4. rarity even today in Digital India. Eighth, the rules and regulations similarly move upon the
Machiavellian presumption of everyone in the logistics chain being a thief, civil servant and
vendor alike. If civil servants are trained in business theory and practice, contract-negotiation
and monitoring, evaluation teamed with manifold enhancement and vastly enhanced delegation
of financial and administrative powers in implementing agencies and policy-making and
implementation separated, there is no reason for them to perform. Such training will also make
institutions flatter and more dynamic in their response. Ninth, why should powers of financial
sanction vest in policymakers, save for administrative sanction? The unity of administrative
approval in policy-making and financial sanction for implementation by the same
officer/Minister violates the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.
Tenth, is the need for constituting a National Civil Service Commission (NCSC) headed by a
five-member collegium – three Secretary-level from implementing agencies and two from
policy-making units - rotated every year, and whose decision on appointments shall be final and
not need any ministerial approval at any level. Eleventh, all posts, including presently encadred
ones, ought to be brought under the purview of the NCSC as also centralized promotions and
deployment of officers across India. There were occasions in the past when IAS/ICS officers
served as Accountants General and CAsG while officers of the Indian Audit & Accounts Service
served as Governor of RBI, Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Chairman Central Board of
Revenue (before bifurcation) and Principal Finance Secretary and many other Secretaries to
Govt. of India? For a well-trained recruit, leveraging the knowledge and experience of dedicated
subordinate cadres should not be difficult. Self-imposed professional silos would be eliminated
and governance with accountability would improve.
Twelfth, no civil servant can afford to serve the nation for altruistic reasons of public service nor
is it reasonable to expect them to do so. If a private sector executive does not serve his employer
for the same corporate reason, is it fair to treat civil servant in a literal application of the term
‘public servant’? For a civil servant is not a personal servant. Then why not permit the chief
executives of implementing and policy-making agencies the freedom to apportion lump sum
budget allocations made to them and permitting them to hire personnel and frame service
regulations for their agencies, depending upon the financial health of that agency, without any
interference from policy-making agencies? The straitjacket of service rules denies the difference
between apples and oranges and is a built-in disincentive for performance. If govt. is to do
credible business and perform, the autonomy of deciding who they will hire and their
performance ought to be the outlook of the agency head, not of the UPSC that has probably
outlived its utility, nor is it professionally staffed.
Thirteenth, there is an urgent need to train Indian investigative, vigilance and audit agency
personnel to distinguish between a business decision and malfeasance. In the absence of any
worthwhile training, these agencies have assumed the garb of a Hellish Father that believes that
men/women are necessarily Machiavellian, identical to rules and regulations of the Govt. of
India. If a chief executive has to constantly worry as how to ‘behavior unbecoming of a civil
servant’ in the relevant Conduct Rules could be applied to him/her, he/she would much rather
play safe while the freeze in governance continues. Fourteenth, lateral recruitments need to be
confined to 25% of the total sanctioned strength of a civil service and no caste/community-based
reservations must apply to his category. Last, but not the least, a contract recruit ought to be
provided a minimum tenure of five years, extendable up to a ceiling of 15-20 years with

5. promotions factored in line with what a regular civil servant is entitled to. Career progression
would not be an issue if the 25% earmarking ends at the Secretary level.
The country can no longer ignore the need for massive civil service reform. The three all-India
services are relics of our colonial past and medieval present and ought to be abolished. Instead a
composite civil service that is academically accomplished (to be able to absorb further training
inputs) and empowered, administratively and financially, alone can deliver governance. The
march of technology can empower a single senior and middle-rung officer to discharge the duties
of probably 5-6 or more posts, a huge lifetime cost saver. Similar steps with state services would
make India a far more livable land. Involving state civil service officers and giving those berths
in the Central Secretariat and other Govt. of India departments would also bridge the class divide
that permeates the relationship between state and all-India services and bring states and the
Centre together in the common task of accountable and responsive governance.