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Child Development 9th
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH STRATEGIES
CHAPTER-AT-A-GLANCE
Chapter Outline Instruction Ideas Supplements
From Theory to Hypothesis pp. 41–42 Learning Objective 2.1 Test Bank Items 1–4
Please contact your Pearson publisher’s
representative for a wide range of video
offerings available to adopters.
Common Research Methods pp. 42–53
Systematic Observation • Self-Reports:
Interviews and Questionnaires •
Neurobiological Methods • The Clinical, or
Case Study, Method • Methods for Studying
Culture
Learning Objective 2.2
Lecture Enhancement 2.1
Learning Activities 2.1–2.2,
2.4–2.5
Ask Yourself p. 52
Test Bank Items 5–53, 125–127
Reliability and Validity: Keys to
Scientifically Sound Research pp. 54–55
Reliability • Validity
Learning Activity 2.5
Ask Yourself p. 55
Test Bank Items 54–63, 128
General Research Designs pp. 55–60
Correlational Design • Experimental Design •
Modified Experimental Designs
Lecture Enhancements 2.2–2.3
Learning Activities 2.3, 2.5
Ask Yourself p. 60
Test Bank Items 64–88
Designs for Studying Development
pp. 60–66
The Longitudinal Design • The Cross-
Sectional Design • Improving Developmental
Designs
Lecture Enhancement 2.4
Learning Activities 2.4–2.6
Ask Yourself p. 66
Test Bank Items 89–113, 129–130
Ethics in Research on Children pp. 66–69 Learning Objective 2.6
Learning Activities 2.4, 2.7
Ask Yourself p. 69
Test Bank Items 114–124, 131
BRIEF CHAPTER SUMMARY
Researchers face many challenges as they plan and implement studies of children. First, they must develop a researchable idea,
either a hypothesis—a prediction drawn from a theory—or a research question. Next, they must develop a research strategy.
Knowing the strengths and limitations of various research strategies is important in separating dependable information from
misleading results.
Researchers must choose the research methods they will use in their investigation. Common methods include naturalistic
and structured observations, self-reports, neurobiological measures, clinical, or case studies, and ethnography. Investigators
must ensure that their procedures are both reliable and valid—two keys to scientifically sound research.
Next, the researcher must choose a research design. Two main types of designs, correlational and experimental, are used in
all studies of human behavior. Scientists who study child development extend these approaches to special developmental
research strategies—longitudinal and cross-sectional designs—that include measurements at different ages. Modified

developmental designs, such as the sequential design, build on the strengths of both approaches. The microgenetic design
allows researchers to track change as it occurs to gain insights into processes of development.
The ethical issues that arise in all research into human behavior are especially significant with children, who are
particularly vulnerable to harm and often cannot evaluate the risks and benefits of research. To ensure that children’s rights are
protected, child development researchers follow special ethical guidelines and may seek advice from institutional review boards
established to weigh the potential benefits of proposed studies against the costs to participants.

Instructor’s Resource Manual for Berk / Child Development, 9e Chapter 2 Research Strategies
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After reading this chapter, you should be able to answer the following:
2.1 Describe the role of theories, hypotheses, and research questions in the research process. (pp. 41–42)
2.2 Describe research methods commonly used to study children, noting strengths and limitations of each. (pp. 42–53)
2.3 Explain how reliability and validity apply to research methods and to the overall accuracy of research findings and
conclusions. (pp. 54–55)
2.4 Distinguish correlational and experimental research designs, noting strengths and limitations of each. (pp. 55–60)
2.5 Describe designs for studying development, noting strengths and limitations of each. (pp. 60–66)
2.6 What special ethical issues arise in doing research on children? (pp. 66–69)
LECTURE OUTLINE
I. FROM THEORY TO HYPOTHESIS (pp. 41–42)
A. Research usually begins with a prediction drawn from a theory, called a hypothesis.
1. Research may pit a hypothesis taken from one theory against a hypothesis taken from another, or it may test
predictions drawn from a single theory.
2. If little or no theory exists on a topic of interest, the investigator may start with a research question.
3. Hypotheses and research questions help investigators choose research methods and designs.
B. Understanding the research process enables individuals who work directly with children to link research and practice
by conducting studies, either on their own or in partnership with experienced investigators.
II. COMMON RESEARCH METHODS (pp. 42–53)
A. Choosing a research strategy involves two main tasks.
1. The researcher must choose from a variety of research methods—participants’ specific activities, such as taking
tests or responding to interviews.
2. The researcher must then choose a research design—an overall plan for the study that will permit the best test of
the research idea.
B. Systematic Observation (pp. 42–46)
1. Observations of the behavior of children, and of adults who are important in their lives, can be made in different
ways.
2. Naturalistic observation: The researcher goes into the field, or natural environment, and records the behavior of
interest.
a. The great strength of naturalistic observation is that investigators can see directly the everyday behaviors they
hope to explain.
b. A major limitation is that not all children have the same opportunity to display a particular behavior in
everyday life.
3. Structured observations: The investigator sets up a laboratory situation that evokes the behavior of interest so
that every participant has an equal opportunity to display the response.
a. Strengths of structured observation
(1) It permits greater control over the research situation than does naturalistic observation.
(2) It is useful for studying behaviors that researchers rarely have an opportunity to see in everyday life.
b. The great disadvantage of this approach is that we cannot be certain that participants behave in the laboratory
as they do in their natural environments.
4. Collecting Systematic Observations
a. Investigators describe everything the participant says and does over a certain time period, or they may use
event sampling, recording all instances of a particular behavior during a specified time period.

b. Another approach is time sampling, recording whether certain behaviors occur during a sample of short
intervals.

5. Limitations of Systematic Observation
a. A major problem is observer influence—the effects of the observer on the behavior studied.
b. Another serious danger is observer bias: When observers are aware of the purposes of a study, they may see
and record what they expect to see rather than what participants actually do.
C. Self-Reports: Interviews and Questionnaires (pp. 46–47)
1. Self-reports ask research participants to provide information on their perceptions, thoughts, abilities, feelings,
attitudes, beliefs, and past experiences.
2. Clinical Interviews
a. In a clinical interview, researchers use a flexible, conversational style to probe for the participant’s point of
view.
b. Strengths of clinical interviews
(1) They permit people to display their thoughts in terms that are close to the way they think in everyday life.
(2) They can provide a large amount of information in a fairly brief period.
3. Limitations of Clinical Interviews
a. Participants do not necessarily report their thoughts, feelings, and experiences accurately.
b. Because clinical interviews depend on verbal ability, they may underestimate the capacities of individuals
who have difficulty putting their thoughts into words.
c. Interviews on certain topics are particularly vulnerable to distortion.
d. The clinical interview’s flexibility means that when questions are phrased differently for each participant,
variations in responses may reflect the manner of interviewing rather than real differences in thinking.
4. Structured Interviews, Tests, and Questionnaires
a. In a structured interview, each individual is asked the same set of questions in the same way.
b. Strengths of structured interviews
(1) They eliminate the chance that the interviewer might prompt some participants more than others.
(2) They are more efficient than clinical interviews.
c. Limitations of structured interviews
(1) They can still be affected by inaccurate reporting.
(2) They do not yield the same depth of information as clinical interviews.
D. Neurobiological Methods (pp. 47–50)
1. Researchers seeking to uncover the biological bases of perceptual, cognitive, and motor responses use
neurobiological methods, which measure the relationship between nervous system processes and behavior.
a. Involuntary activities of the autonomic nervous system—such as heart rate, respiration, pupil dilation, and
stress hormone levels—are highly sensitive to psychological state.
b. Distinct patterns of autonomic activity—indicated by heart rate, levels of the hormone cortisol, and other
physiological measures—are related to aspects of temperament, such as shyness and sociability.
2. Autonomic indicators have been enriched by measures of brain functioning, especially those that detect changes in
electrical activity in the cerebral cortex.
a. In an electroencephalogram (EEG), researchers examine brain-wave patterns for stability and organization,
signs of mature functioning of the cortex. Today, researchers use an advanced tool, a geodesic sensor net
(GSN) that yields improved brain-wave detection.
b. Event-related potentials (ERPs) detect the general location of brain-wave activity as a child processes a
particular stimulus.
c. Neuroimaging techniques include positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI).
(1) Both techniques yield detailed, three-dimensional computerized pictures of the entire brain and its active
areas and provide the most precise information about which brain regions are specialized for certain
capacities and about abnormalities in brain functioning.
(2) Unlike PET, which depends on X-ray photography, fMRI magnetically detects changes in blood flow
and oxygen metabolism throughout the brain when a child is exposed to a stimulus.
(3) PET and fMRI are not suitable for infants and young children because they require the child to remain
motionless for a long period of time.

d. A neuroimaging technique that works well in infancy and early childhood is near-infrared spectroscopy
(NIRS), which uses infrared light to measure blood flow and oxygen metabolism while the child attends to a
stimulus. NIRS examines only the functioning of the cerebral cortex.
e. Strengths of neurobiological methods
(1) They can be used to infer the perceptions, thoughts, and emotions of infants and young children, who
cannot report their psychological experiences clearly.
(2) They are powerful tools for uncovering relationships between the brain and psychological development.
f. Limitations of neurobiological methods
(1) Researchers cannot be sure that a consistent pattern of autonomic or brain activity in response to a
stimulus means that an individual has processed it in a certain way.
(2) Extraneous factors, such as hunger, boredom, or fatigue, may influence physiological responses.
E. The Clinical, or Case Study, Method (pp. 50–51)
1. The clinical, or case study, method brings together a wide range of information about one child, including
interviews, observations, test scores, and sometimes neurobiological measures.
2. Strengths of the clinical method
a. It yields detailed case narratives that offer valuable insights into the many factors that affect development.
b. It is well suited to studying the development of types of individuals who are few in number but vary widely in
characteristics, such as prodigies.
3. Limitations of the clinical method
a. Because information often is collected unsystematically and subjectively, researchers’ theoretical preferences
may bias their interpretations.
b. Investigators cannot assume that their conclusions apply to anyone other than the child studied.
F. Methods for Studying Culture (pp. 51–53)
1. To study the impact of culture, researchers adjust the methods just considered or tap procedures specially devised
for cross-cultural and multicultural research.
2. To study characteristics that are believed to be universal but that vary in degree from one culture to the next,
researchers adapt observational and self-report procedures so they can be understood in each cultural context.
3. To uncover the cultural meanings of children’s and adults’ behaviors, researchers use a method called
ethnography, borrowed from the field of anthropology.
a. Like the clinical method, ethnographic research is a descriptive, qualitative technique.
b. Instead of aiming to understand a single individual, ethnography is directed at understanding a culture or a
distinct social group through participant observation, whereby the researcher spends months or years in the
cultural community, participating in its daily life.
c. A strength of ethnographic research is that by entering into close contact with a social group, researchers can
understand its members’ beliefs and behaviors in a way that is not possible with an observational visit,
interview, or questionnaire.
d. Limitations of ethnographic research
(1) Investigators’ own cultural values and theoretical commitments may lead them to observe selectively or
misinterpret what they see.
(2) Findings cannot be assumed to generalize beyond the people and settings in which the research was
conducted.
III. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY: KEYS TO SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND RESEARCH (pp. 54–55)
A. To be acceptable to the scientific community, research procedures must be both reliable and valid.
B. Reliability (p. 54)
1. Reliability refers to the consistency, or repeatability, of measures of behavior.
2. In observational research, reliability is determined by obtaining inter-rater reliability—agreement between
different observers evaluating the same behaviors.
3. Test–retest reliability measures the reliability of self-report and neurobiological data by comparing responses to
the same measures on separate occasions or, for self-reports, answers on different forms of the same test or
questionnaire.

4. The reliability of qualitative methods, such as clinical and ethnographic studies, must be determined by other
methods—for example, having a judge examine the qualitative records to see whether the judge agrees with the
researcher’s conclusions.

C. Validity (pp. 54–55)
1. To have high validity, research methods must accurately measure the characteristics that the researcher set out to
measure.
2. Reliability is essential but not sufficient for valid research; methods that are implemented carelessly, unevenly,
and inconsistently cannot possibly represent what an investigator intended to study.
3. In setting up an investigation, researchers must consider two types of validity:
a. Internal validity is the degree to which conditions internal to the design of the study permit an accurate test
of the researcher’s hypothesis or question.
b. External validity is the degree to which researchers’ findings generalize to settings and participants outside
the original study.
IV. GENERAL RESEARCH DESIGNS (pp. 55–60)
A. Correlational Design (pp. 55–56, 57)
1. In a correlational design, researchers gather information on individuals, generally in natural life circumstances,
without altering their experiences. Then they look at relationships between participants’ characteristics and their
behavior or development.
2. Correlational studies have one major limitation: They do not allow researchers to infer cause and effect. Because
one variable is related to another does not mean that one causes the other.
3. Investigators often examine relationships using a correlation coefficient, a number ranging in value from +1.00
to –1.00 that describes how two measures, or variables, are associated with each other.
a. The magnitude, or size, of the number shows the strength of the relationship.
b. The sign of the number (+ or –) refers to the direction of the relationship.
(1) A positive sign (+) means that as one variable increases, the other also increases.
(2) A negative sign (–) means that as one variable increases, the other decreases.
B. Experimental Design (pp. 56–58)
1. An experimental design permits inferences about cause and effect because researchers use an evenhanded
procedure to assign people to two or more treatment conditions.
2. In an experiment, the events and behaviors of interest are divided into two types:
a. The independent variable is the one the investigator expects to cause changes in another variable.
b. The dependent variable is the one the investigator expects to be influenced by the independent variable.
3. To detect cause-and-effect relationships, the researcher directly controls or manipulates changes in the
independent variable by exposing participants to treatment conditions, and then compares their performance on
measures of the dependent variable.
4. A laboratory experiment explores cause-and-effect relationships by dividing participants into different treatment
conditions.
5. Researchers must take special precautions to control for participants’ characteristics that could reduce the internal
validity of their findings—for example, the problem of confounding variables, which are so closely associated
that their effects on an outcome cannot be distinguished.
a. To address this, researchers engage in random assignment of participants to treatment conditions to ensure
that participants’ characteristics will be equally distributed across treatment groups.
b. Random assignment can be combined with matching, in which participants are measured ahead of time on
the factor in question. Then children high and low on that factor are assigned in equal numbers to each
treatment condition. Thus, the experimental groups are made equivalent on characteristics likely to distort the
results.
C. Modified Experimental Designs (pp. 58–60, 61)
1. Most experiments are conducted in laboratories, where researchers can achieve the maximum control over
treatment conditions. However, their findings may not apply to everyday situations.
2. In field experiments, researchers capitalize on opportunities to randomly assign participants to treatment
conditions in natural settings.
3. Natural, or quasi-, experiments compare treatments that already exist, such as different family environments or
preschool programs.
a. These studies differ from correlational research only in that groups are carefully chosen to ensure that their
characteristics are as much alike as possible.

b. They permit researchers to examine the impact of conditions that cannot be experimentally manipulated for
ethical reasons, such as the influence of premature birth.
V. DESIGNS FOR STUDYING DEVELOPMENT (pp. 60–66)
A. To answer questions about child development, researchers must learn how research participants change over time.
B. To do this, they use special developmental research strategies in which age comparisons form the basis of the research
plan.
C. The Longitudinal Design (pp. 60–62)
1. In a longitudinal design, participants are studied repeatedly at different ages, and changes are noted as they get
older.
2. Advantages of the Longitudinal Design
a. It allows researchers to identify common patterns as well as individual differences in development.
b. It permits investigators to examine relationships between early and later events and behaviors.
3. Problems in Conducting Longitudinal Research
a. A common difficulty is biased sampling—the failure to enlist participants who represent the population of
interest.
b. Selective attrition occurs when some participants move away or drop out for other reasons, and those who
continue are likely to differ in important ways from those who drop out.
c. If participants become “test-wise” with repeated testing, their performance may improve as a result of
practice effects—better test-taking skills and increased familiarity with the test—and not because of factors
associated with development.
d. Another threat to the validity of longitudinal findings is cultural–historical change, commonly called cohort
effects.
(1) Longitudinal studies examine the development of cohorts—children developing in the same period who
are influenced by particular cultural and historical conditions. Results based on one cohort may not apply
to children developing in other times.
(2) Cohort effects also occur when specific experiences influence some children but not others in the same
generation.
e. Changes within the field of child development may create problems for longitudinal research, if the theories
and methods that inspired the study become outdated.
D. The Cross-Sectional Design (pp. 62–63)
1. A more convenient strategy for studying development is the cross-sectional design, in which groups of people
differing in age are studied at the same point in time.
2. Advantages of the Cross-Sectional Design
a. It is an efficient strategy for describing age-related trends.
b. Because participants are measured only once, difficulties such as practice effects are not a factor.
3. Problems in Conducting Cross-Sectional Research
a. It yields only age-group averages but does not provide evidence about development at the individual level.
b. Because of cohort effects, comparisons of groups born and reared in different years may not really represent
age-related changes but, rather, may reflect unique experiences associated with the period in which the age
groups were growing up.
E. Improving Developmental Designs (pp. 63–65)
1. Researchers have devised ways to build on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of the longitudinal and
cross-sectional approaches.
2. Sequential Designs
a. In the sequential design, researchers conduct several similar cross-sectional or longitudinal studies, called
sequences. The sequences might study participants over the same ages but in different years, or they might
study participants over different ages but during the same years.
b. Some sequential designs combine longitudinal and cross-sectional strategies, which is efficient and yields
these other advantages.
(1) Researchers can discover whether cohort effects are operating by comparing participants of the same age
who were born in different years.

(2) Researchers can make both longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons and, if outcomes are similar,
can be confident about their findings.

3. Examining Microcosms of Development
a. The microgenetic design, an adaptation of the longitudinal approach, presents children with a novel task and
follows their mastery over a series of closely spaced sessions.
b. Within this “microcosm” of development, researchers observe how change occurs—an approach that is
especially useful for studying cognitive development.
c. Limitations of microgenetic studies
(1) They are difficult to carry out because researchers must analyze each participant’s behavior many times.
(2) The time required for children to change depends on a careful match between the child’s capabilities and
the demands of the task.
(3) Practice effects can distort microgenetic findings.
4. Combining Experimental and Developmental Designs
a. Causal information, which is not provided by longitudinal or cross-sectional studies, is desirable both for
testing theories and for finding ways to improve children’s lives.
b. If a developmental design indicates that children’s experiences and behavior are related, researchers may be
able to explore the causal link by experimentally manipulating the experiences.
VI. ETHICS IN RESEARCH ON CHILDREN (pp. 66–69)
A. Research into human behavior creates ethical issues because of the potential for exploitation—a concern that is
especially complex when children take part in research.
1. Children are more vulnerable than adults to physical and psychological harm.
2. Children lack the maturity to evaluate for themselves the risks of participation in research.
B. Ethical guidelines for research on children have been developed by the federal government, by funding agencies, and
by research-oriented professional associations.
1. Special committees known as institutional review boards (IRBs) assess proposed studies on the basis of a risks-
versus-benefits ratio, which involves weighing the costs to participants in terms of inconvenience and possible
psychological or physical injury against the study’s value for advancing knowledge and improving conditions of
life.
2. Basic rights of research participants include the following:
a. Protection from harm: If there are any risks to the safety and welfare of participants that the research does
not justify, preference is always given to the research participants.
b. Informed consent means that people have a right to an explanation of all aspects of a study that might affect
their willingness to participate. Parental consent is meant to protect the safety of children whose ability to
decide is not yet fully mature.
c. Researchers must take special precautions in the use of deception and concealment when children are
research subjects.
d. Debriefing, in which the researcher provides a full account and justification of the research activities after the
research session is over, should be done with children as well as with adults.
LECTURE ENHANCEMENTS
LECTURE ENHANCEMENT 2.1
An Illustration of Cross-Cultural Research: Findings on Autobiographical Memory in Young Children (pp. 51–52)
Time: 10–15 minutes
Objective: To examine cross-cultural differences in maternal reminiscing style and autobiographical memories in young
children.
To examine cross-cultural differences in maternal reminiscing style and autobiographical memories in young children, Wang
(2008) recruited 189 3-year-olds and their mothers. The sample included three distinct populations—native Chinese in China,
Chinese immigrants in the United States, and European Americans. Two female researchers visited each participant’s home and
conducted interviews in the language with which each family was most comfortable. At the beginning of the home visit, one

researcher played with the child to establish rapport, while the other explained the procedure to the mother. Next, mothers were
instructed to talk to their child about two specific, one-time events that both had experienced and that had occurred within the

past two months (so children were likely to recall them), such as a trip to a museum or an amusement park. Mothers were asked
to talk about one event that was emotionally positive for the child, and one was that emotionally negative. At the end of the
home visit, a researcher conducted a short interview with each child to assess various aspects of self-concept (personal
qualities, attributes, and beliefs). The purpose of the interview was to determine whether maternal reminiscing style also
predicted self-concept in young children.
Following the mother–child conversation, the researcher again played with the child, telling him or her, “Your mom just
told me that . . . (for example, you went to the museum last weekend). I’ve never been there before. Tell me what you did.” To
elicit details, the researcher used prompts like, “What else happened?” “Can you tell me more about it?” To assess various
aspects of self-concept, the researcher conducted a short self-description interview with each child. She explained to the child,
“I would like to write a story about you. What’s the first thing I should put in the story?” She then used prompts as needed, such
as “What else should I write about you?” Finally, mothers completed questionnaires about their child’s self-concept and
language development.
Home visits were video recorded for later coding. Mothers’ utterances during the mother–child conversation were coded as
elaborations or evaluations. Elaborations included introducing a topic for discussion or adding information. Evaluations
included confirming, negating, questioning, or emphasizing any part of the child’s previous statement. Children’s utterances
were coded as shared memory reports whenever they requested more information or provided new information about the event.
When recounting past events to the researcher, children’s utterances were coded as independent memory reports whenever they
provided new information that was not discussed in the mother–child conversation.
Results indicated that European-American mothers used more elaborations and evaluations with their children than
Chinese and Chinese-immigrant mothers. European-American children, in turn, demonstrated greater recall when sharing
memories with their mothers and with the researcher than Chinese and Chinese-immigrant children. Regardless of cultural
background, children whose mothers were more elaborative and evaluative recalled more information than children whose
mothers were less elaborative and evaluative. European-American children also provided more specific information about
themselves in their personal narratives—that is, included more personal qualities, attributes, and beliefs—than either group of
Chinese children. Although there were no cultural differences in proportion of favorable attributes or beliefs children included
in their self-concepts, once again European-American children (who were more likely to have elaborative-style mothers)
provided more details about themselves compared with their Chinese counterparts.
Have students review the text discussion on individualistic and collectivist societies (Chapter 1, p. 35). How might
these cultural orientations explain differences in mother–child conversations?
Wang, Q. (2008). Relations of maternal style and child self-concept to autobiographical memories in Chinese, Chinese
Immigrant, and European American 3-year-olds. Child Development, 77, 1749–1809.
Demonstrating the Correlational Design: Parents’ Management of Their Teenagers’ Romantic Relationships
(pp. 55–56)
Objective: To illustrate the correlational design using a study of parents’ management of their teenagers’ romantic
relationships.
To extend existing research on dating in late adolescence, Madsen (2008) recruited 104 adolescents between the ages of 17 and
19 (29 boys, 75 girls) and at least one of their parents. The majority of the participants were from middle-SES families. The
researchers collected the following information:
(1) Parents completed the Parents of Adolescents Separation Anxiety Scale (PASAC). The PASAC assesses adults’
comfort with their parenting role. For example, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree), “I
like knowing that my teenager will come to me when he/she feels upset.”
(2) Participants reported on their parents’ use of psychological control. For example, on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = not like
him/her; 3 = a lot like him/her), “My mother [father] is a person who is always trying to change how I feel or
think about things.”
(3) Participants completed the Network of Relationship Inventory (NRI), which measures various aspects of romantic
relationships—satisfaction, intimacy, affection, admiration, conflict, and antagonism. Sample questions include:
On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = little or none; 5 = the most),

• Satisfaction: “How satisfied are you with your relationship?”
• Intimacy: “How much do you tell this person about everything?”
• Affection: “How much does this person really care about you?”
• Admiration: “How much does this person like or approve of the things you do?”
• Conflict: “How much do you and this person get upset or mad at each other?”
• Antagonism: “How much do you and this person get on each other’s nerves?”
(4) Parents who were currently involved in a romantic relationship reported on their satisfaction and insecurity. For
example, on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = low; 7 = high), “How satisfied are you with your relationship?” On a scale of
1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), “I worry that my partner doesn’t care as much for me as I do my
partner.”
(5) Parents indicated whether the family had any rules about dating. If so, they were asked to indicate who set these
rules—mostly me; me; mostly my spouse; my spouse and I set the rules together; my spouse; my child; or my child
and I set the rules together. There were three types of rules included in this study:
• Supervision: Rules that require the adolescent to provide information regarding his or her dating
activities
• Restriction: Rules that place some limitation or constraint on the adolescent’s dating activity, such as no
dates on school nights or only double dates
• Prescription: Rules that specify expectations regarding how the adolescent should behave with a date or
in a dating relationship, such as use good judgment, leave an uncomfortable situation
Findings indicated that most parents (64%) had dating rules for their teenager. Overall, parents were more likely to impose
dating rules on daughters than sons. In addition, mothers were more involved in setting dating rules than fathers. Of the three
types of rules, supervision was most common and predicted healthy parent–child relationships. That is, parents who engaged in
moderate levels of supervision were more secure in their parenting role and their children tended to report healthy levels of
psychological control. In contrast, adolescents who experienced high levels of restriction also reported high rates of parental
psychological control. Interestingly, parents who were dissatisfied with their own romantic relationships used more prescription
rules than supervision or restriction rules. According to Madsen, while supervision and restriction rules tend to focus on
monitoring and safety, prescription rules provide expectations associated with more satisfying relationships. Thus, dissatisfied
parents may be more likely to impose their own expectations or wishes onto their teenagers.
Finally, parents’ use of dating rules had no impact on the quality of adolescents’ romantic relationships. That is,
relationship satisfaction, intimacy, affection, admiration, conflict, and antagonism were unrelated to the number and types of
rules. Instead, dating rules were a reflection of the parent–child relationship, as well as parental satisfaction with their own
romantic relationships.
Madsen, S. D. (2008). Parents’ management of adolescents’ romantic relationships through dating rules: Gender variations and
correlates of relationship qualities. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 37, 1044–1058.
Illustrating Research Designs for Studying the Child: Marital Conflict, Conflict Resolution, and Children’s Adjustment
(pp. 56–58)
Objective: To examine the effects of marital conflict and conflict resolution on children’s adjustment.
To examine the effects of marital conflict, including resolution of the conflict, on children’s emotional adjustment, Goeke-
Morey, Cummings, and Papp (2008) recruited 163 children between the ages of 8 and 16 years and their parents. The
researchers collected the following information:
(1) For 15 consecutive days, mothers and fathers were instructed to complete separate diaries of naturally occurring
marital conflict. The researchers defined marital conflict as “any major or minor interparental interaction that
involved a difference of opinion, whether it was mostly negative or even mostly positive.” For each entry, parents
recorded how the conflict ended—for example, compromise, giving in, a spouse apologizing, agreeing to
disagree, or withdrawal. Parents also recorded the degree of their own and their spouse’s emotional reaction to
each conflict—anger, sadness, fear, and positive emotional expression. If a target child was present during the

conflict, parents recorded his or her emotional reaction as well. Because the entries for spouses were highly
similar, the researchers only used the mothers’ entries in the final data analyses.

(2) Target children participated in an analogue laboratory procedure. A researcher presented each child with one of
two common conflict scenarios. Children were asked to visualize interparental conflict over a messy house or an
expensive purchase. Specifically, they were told to imagine that their own parents had “a big fight” over the mess
or purchase. Next, children were shown a video depicting two adults (who represented their own parents) ending
the conflict through compromise, giving in, an apology, agreeing to disagree, or withdrawal. In some instances,
the “mother” ended the conflict; in others, the “father” ended the conflict. Finally, the researcher asked each child
a series of questions about the conflict scenario. For example, children were asked to answer the following
questions by using a 10-point scale (1 = not at all; 10 = a whole lot): “How much do you think the problem has
been worked out?” “How did that make you feel—happy, mad, scared, sad, or OK?” Children were also asked an
open-ended question: “What would you do if you were in the same room with them?” The researchers were
interested in children’s attempts to mediate or avoid the conflict.
(3) Parents completed the Child Behavior Checklist, which rates a broad range of internalizing (anxiety, somatic
complaints, depression) and externalizing (aggression, impulsivity, hyperactivity) problems.
Results indicated that parental conflict resolution is a particularly important predictor of children’s psychological
adjustment, perhaps more so than exposure to the initial conflict. According to the diary entries, of all possible outcomes,
compromise was the most frequent end to conflict and had the greatest impact on children’s reactions. Specifically, children
who experienced parental compromise had fewer negative reactions like sadness and fear and rated the laboratory scenarios
more positively. In contrast, withdrawing from marital conflict was associated with increased child distress. Children who
frequently observed parental withdrawal were less positive and rated the laboratory scenarios more negatively. According to
Goeke-Morey, Cummings, and Papp, this finding suggests that marital conflict is not a uniformly negative experience for
children. In fact, marital conflicts can actually end in ways that are positive and constructive to the child. Such conflicts may
also serve as a model for children’s own conflict resolution strategies.
Ask students to consider the various research designs for studying development. What design was utilized in this
study? What are the strengths and limitations of this design? Can students think of any special ethical considerations
that might arise with this type of study? Explain.
Goeke-Morey, M. C., Cummings, E. M., & Papp, L. M. (2008). Children and marital conflict resolution: Implications for
emotional security and adjustment. Journal of Family Psychology, 21, 744–753.
An Example of the Longitudinal Research Design: The Effects of Trauma on Children (pp. 60–62)
Objective: To examine the long-term effects of trauma on children.
To examine the long-term effects of trauma on children, Mullett-Hume and colleagues (2008) recruited 204 adolescents
between the ages of 12 and 16 years. The participants attended schools near “Ground Zero”—that is, within 10 blocks—of the
World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001. The participants completed the following surveys:
(1) The New York University Child and Adolescent Stressors Checklist–Revised (NYU–CASC). The NYU–CASC
focuses on various types of trauma and life adversities. Participants were asked about exposure to domestic
violence, community and school violence, significant illnesses or death of close family members, accidents or
injuries to self, natural disasters, and war. The researchers were interested in the types of trauma that participants
had experienced, as well as cumulative trauma.
(2) The Child PTSD Symptom Scale (CPSS). The CPSS assesses reactions to trauma. For example, participants were
asked to answer the following questions by using a 4-point scale (0 = not at all; 3 = 5 or more times a week/almost
always): “How often do you feel upset, scared, or angry when you think about or hear about the event?” “How
often do you avoid activities, people, or places that remind you of the event?”

Results indicated that history of trauma exposure—rather than direct exposure to the 9/11 terrorist attack—predicted
severity of stress reactions. Specifically, children who were exposed to the terrorist attack but had little or no history of other
life traumas continued to experience stress symptoms 2.5 years after exposure. However, stress reactions associated with 9/11
were significantly greater for children who had experienced other traumatic events prior to the terrorist attack. According to
Mullett-Hume and colleagues, these findings suggest that a history of multiple traumas may be a more potent risk factor for
long-term adjustment difficulties than exposure to a single, severe traumatic event.
Have students review research on cohort effects. How might cohort effects explain why specific experiences, such as
exposure to 9/11, influence some children but not others in the same generation?
Mullett-Hume, E., Anshel, D., Guevara, V., & Cloitre, M. (2008). Cumulative trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder among
children exposed to the 9/11 World Trade Center attack. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 78, 103–108.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
LEARNING ACTIVITY 2.1
Matching: Common Methods Used to Study Children (pp. 42–52)
Present the following exercise as an in-class activity or quiz.
Directions: Match each term with its description.
Terms:
1. Naturalistic observation
2. Structured observation
3. Clinical interview
4. Structured interview, questionnaires, and tests
5. Neurobiological methods
6. Clinical, or case study, method
7. Ethnography
Descriptions:
A. To fully understand one child’s psychological functioning, this method combines interviews, observations, test scores,
and sometimes neurobiological assessments.
B. Using this method, the researcher tries to capture a culture’s unique values and social processes.
C. A strength of this method is that it grants each participant an equal opportunity to display the behavior of interest.
D. A limitation of this method is that it cannot reveal with certainty the meaning of autonomic or brain activity.
E. Using this research method, each participant is asked the same question in the exact same way.
F. This method comes as close as possible to the way participants think in everyday life.
G. Using this method, researchers observe behavior in natural contexts.
Answers:
1. G 5. D
2. C 6. A
3. F 7. B
4. E

Making Systematic Observations of Young Children (pp. 44–45)
Ask students to find a child to observe by, for example, visiting a nearby park or the home of a family they know. The
procedures used to collect systematic observations vary, depending on the research problem posed. One common approach is
event sampling, in which the observer records all instances of a particular behavior of interest during a specified time period.
Another option is time sampling. Using this procedure, the researcher records whether certain behaviors occur during a sample
of short intervals. The chart below is an example of a simple time sampling instrument:
Target Behavior: Aggression
Minute 1 Minute 2 Minute 3 Minute 4 Minute 5
15 30 45 60 15 30 45 60 15 30 45 60 15 30 45 60 15 30 45 60
Students should choose target behaviors that are easy to identify, such as aggressive behavior (for example, hitting),
prosocial behavior (for example, comforting other children, sharing toys), crying, or instances of adult–child interaction. Once
students have completed their observations, ask them to share their findings with the class, including any challenges they
encountered.
True or False: General Research Designs (pp. 55–60)
Present the following activity to students as an in-class assignment or quiz.
Directions: Read each of the following statements and determine if it is True (T) or False (F).
Statements:
1. In a correlational design, researchers can infer cause and effect.
2. A researcher who finds a +.78 correlation between parent self-reports of harsh discipline and child behavior
problems has found a moderate correlation.
3. The independent variable is the one the investigator expects to cause changes in the other variable.
4. In experimental research, investigators directly control or manipulate the dependent variable.
5. To protect against the effects of confounding variables, researchers engage in random assignment of participants to
treatment conditions.
6. One strength of laboratory experiments is that findings often apply to everyday situations.
7. Natural, or quasi-, experiments differ from correlational research only in that groups of people are carefully chosen
to ensure that their characteristics are as much alike as possible.
Answers:
1. F 5. T
2. F 6. F
3. T 7. T
4. F
Thinking About Research Methods and Designs (pp. 42–52, 60–64, 66–69)
Pose the following questions to students for an in-class discussion:
(1) An investigator is interested in determining whether infant child care leads to an insecure attachment bond
between children and their mothers during the first year of life as well as into the preschool years. What research

method and design would you use for this study, and why? Would there be any special ethical considerations with
this type of study? If so, what are they?

(2) An investigator is interested in determining whether sociability in children is related to school achievement and
whether this relationship varies for children in preschool, grade school, and middle school. What research method
and design would you use for this study, and why? Would there be any special ethical considerations with this
type of study? If so, what are they?
Critiquing Journal Articles (pp. 42–52, 55–58, 60–65)
Have students select and read two articles about child development published during the past four years. Each article should
present an empirical study on a topic related to child development. Some journals to consider for this activity are American
Psychologist, Child Development, Developmental Psychology, Early Childhood Research Quarterly, Journal of Adolescence,
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, and Developmental Science.
Next, have students (1) prepare a brief summary of the problem, method, results, discussion, and conclusions of the two
articles; (2) indicate the type of research method(s) and design(s) used; and (3) identify any potential problems for achieving
accurate results posed by the research design(s). Students can then discuss their findings in small groups or as a class.
Cross-Sectional, Longitudinal, and Sequential Research Designs (pp. 60–64)
Present the following exercise as an in-class activity or quiz.
Directions: The following list contains descriptions, challenges, and examples of cross-sectional, longitudinal, and sequential
research designs. For each statement, determine which research design (CS = cross-sectional, L = longitudinal, or
S = sequential) is being described.
1. The researcher studies groups of participants who differ in age at the same point in time.
2. The researcher is interested in whether frequent exposure to violent television in early childhood predicts
aggressive and antisocial behavior in adulthood.
3. May have the same problems as longitudinal and cross-sectional strategies, but the design itself helps identify
difficulties.
4. Age-related changes may be distorted because of biased sampling, participant dropout, practice effects, or cohort
effects. Theoretical and methodological changes in the field can make findings obsolete.
5. The researcher follows a sequence of samples (two or more age groups), collecting data on them at the same points
in time.
6. Does not permit the study of individual developmental trends. Age differences may be distorted because of cohort
effects.
7. The researcher is interested in age-related changes in children’s problem-solving skills. The researcher selects three
samples—preschool-age children, school-age children, and adolescents—and tracks them for five years.
8. The researcher is interested in how children of different ages process traumatic events, such as terrorism or natural
disasters. The researcher recruits children in grades 3, 6, 9, and 12 for the study and interviews them about the
Japan earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident, the 2011 tornado outbreaks across the U.S., and the Norway
terrorist attacks.
9. The researcher studies the same group of participants repeatedly at different ages.
Answers:
1. CS 6. CS
2. L 7. S
3. S 8. CS
4. L 9. L
5. S

Exploring Ethical Guidelines for Research with Children (pp. 66–69)
To supplement the text coverage of ethics in child research, have students visit the following website: www.srcd.org. On the
homepage, under About SRCD, have students choose “SRCD Ethical Standards” under the “About SRCD” heading. As
students review the website, have them compare ethical guidelines for children with those presented in the text. What are some
special ethical considerations for research with children? Do the ethical guidelines presented on the website adequately protect
child research participants from undue risk? Explain.
ASK YOURSELF . . .
REVIEW: Why might a researcher choose structured observation over naturalistic observation? How about the
reverse? What might lead the researcher to opt for clinical interviewing over systematic observation? (pp. 42–44, 46)
In naturalistic observation, researchers go into the field, or natural environment, and record the behavior of interest.
Researchers choose this approach when it is important for them to see directly the everyday behaviors they hope to explain.
In structured observation, the investigator sets up a laboratory situation that evokes the behavior of interest, giving every
participant an equal opportunity to display the response. Structured observation permits greater control over the research
situation than does naturalistic observation. It is especially useful for studying behaviors, such as parent–child or friendship
interactions, that investigators rarely have an opportunity to see in everyday life. However, there is no way to ensure that
participants will behave in the laboratory as they do in their natural environments.
Systematic observation provides information about how people behave but says little about the reasoning behind their
responses. Therefore, researchers who are interested in exploring participants’ perceptions, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, beliefs,
or past experiences often use the clinical interview—a flexible, conversational style used to probe for the participant’s point of
view. The clinical interview permits people to express their thoughts in terms that are as close as possible to the way they think
in everyday life. This method also provides a large amount of information in a fairly brief period—far more than could be
captured by observing for the same amount of time.
CONNECT: What strengths and limitations do the clinical, or case study, method and ethnography have in common?
(pp. 50–52)
Both the clinical method and ethnography are descriptive, qualitative research techniques. Whereas the clinical method is a
way of obtaining as complete a picture as possible of a single individual, ethnography is directed toward understanding a
culture or distinct social group through participant observation. A major strength of both methods is that they yield rich,
detailed descriptions that offer insights into the many factors affecting development. A limitation of both methods is that
investigators’ cultural values and theoretical preferences may lead them to observe selectively or misinterpret what they see.
Another limitation is that findings cannot be assumed to generalize to other individuals or cultures.
APPLY: A researcher wants to study the thoughts and feelings of children who have a parent on active duty in the
military. Which method should she use? Why? (pp. 46–47)
Because the researcher wants to learn about children’s thoughts and feelings, the best method is the clinical interview,
which permits children to display their thoughts in terms that are as close as possible to the way they think in everyday life.
This method also provides a large amount of information in a fairly brief period.
The researcher might also consider using a structured interview, in which each participant is asked the same set of
questions in the same way. The structured interview eliminates the possibility that variations in children’s responses may reflect
the manner of interviewing rather than real differences in their thoughts about the question. It is also more efficient: Answers
are briefer and can be gathered from an entire group at the same time. However, structured interviews do not yield the same
depth of information as a clinical interview.

REVIEW: Explain why, although a research method must be reliable to be valid, reliability does not guarantee validity.
(p. 54)
Reliability refers to the consistency, or repeatability, of measures of behavior. To be reliable, observations and evaluations
of people’s actions cannot be unique to a single observer. Instead, observers must agree on what they see. For research methods
to have high validity, they must accurately measure characteristics that the researcher set out to measure. Therefore, reliability
is essential for valid research. But the reliability of a study is not enough to guarantee that the researcher is actually measuring
what he or she set out to measure. Even the most carefully designed experiment can be rendered invalid if the research methods
do not reflect the investigator’s goals.
CONNECT: Why is it better for a researcher to use multiple methods rather than just one method to test a hypothesis
or answer a research question? (pp. 54–55)
To be scientifically sound, research methods must be both reliable and valid. Qualitative research methods, such as the
clinical, or case study, method and ethnographic studies, do not yield quantitative scores that can be matched with those of
another observer. Therefore, the reliability of these methods must be determined by using other procedures as well. Using
multiple research methods also helps to ensure validity by allowing investigators to determine whether findings from one study
generalize to settings and participants outside the original study.
APPLY: In studying the development of attention in school-age children, a researcher wonders whether to make
naturalistic observations or structured observations. Which approach is best for ensuring internal validity? How about
external validity? Why? (pp. 42–44, 54–55)
Because structured observations give each participant an equal opportunity to display the behavior of interest, they are the
best option for ensuring internal validity. On the other hand, naturalistic observations are the best approach for ensuring
external validity, because they reflect participants’ everyday behaviors, increasing the likelihood that findings can be
generalized to other individuals and settings.
REVIEW: Why are natural experiments less precise than laboratory and field experiments? (pp. 56–58, 60)
In natural, or quasi-, experiments, the researcher compares treatments that already exist, such as different family
environments, schools, child-care centers, or schools. These studies differ from correlational research only in that groups of
participants are carefully chosen to ensure that their characteristics are as much alike as possible.
Field experiments are more precise than natural experiments because the investigator randomly assigns participants to
treatment conditions in natural settings and is therefore able to generalize experimental findings to the real world. In laboratory
experiments, in addition to random assignment of participants to treatment conditions, the investigator manipulates an
independent variable and looks at its effect on a dependent variable, allowing more confident inferences about cause and effect.
CONNECT: Reread the description of the study of aggressive boys and their friendships on page 44. What type of
design did the researchers use, and why? (pp. 44, 56–58)
The researchers used structured observation and a correlational design. Structured observation allowed them to study
behaviors—in this case, friendship interactions—that they would rarely have an opportunity to see in everyday life. The
correlational design allowed them to measure the strength of the relationship between the boys’ aggressiveness and the extent to
which their peer interactions were angry and uncooperative. Although they were not able to infer a cause-and-effect
relationship between the two variables, they found evidence that aggressive boys’ close peer ties, rather than being warm and
supportive, provided a context in which the boys practiced hostility and other negative behaviors.
APPLY: A researcher compares children who went to summer leadership camps with children who attended athletic
camps. She finds that those who attended leadership camps are friendlier. Should the investigator tell parents that
sending children to leadership camps will cause them to be more sociable? Why or why not? (pp. 55–56)
No. This study has a correlational design, in which the researcher looks at relationships between participants’
characteristics and their behavior or development. Although a correlational design allows researchers to gather information on
individuals in their natural life circumstances, it does not permit them to infer cause and effect. Therefore, the researcher cannot
conclude that attending summer leadership camps causes children to be more sociable. As an alternative explanation, perhaps
children who are more sociable are also more likely to choose leadership camps over athletic camps, or perhaps a third variable
that the researcher did not even consider contributed to the research findings.

REFLECT: Design a study to investigate whether time devoted to adult–child picture-book reading in the preschool
years contributes to reading readiness at school entry. List steps you will take to protect the internal and external
validity of your investigation. (p. 55)
This is an open-ended question with no right or wrong answer.
REVIEW: Explain how cohort effects can distort the findings of both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies. How does
the sequential design reveal cohort effects? (pp. 62–64)
Both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies can be influenced by cohort effects—the particular set of historical and
cultural conditions that affect individuals born in the same time period. Therefore, results based on one cohort may not apply to
children developing at other times. For example, a longitudinal study of social development carried out around the time of
World War II would probably result in quite different findings than if it were carried out in the first decade of the twenty-first
century, during the decade of the 1960s, or during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Similarly, a cross-sectional design
comparing 5-year-old cohorts and 15-year-old cohorts—groups born and reared in different years—may not really identify age-
related changes. Rather, the results may reflect unique experiences associated with the different historical time period in which
each age group grew up.
In a sequential design, researchers overcome some of these limitations by conducting several similar longitudinal or cross-
sectional studies, or sequences, at varying times. Sequential designs permit researchers to find out whether cohort effects are
operating by comparing participants of the same age who were born in different years. If the samples do not differ on the
measured variables, the researcher can rule out cohort effects.
CONNECT: Review the study on music lessons and intelligence reported in the Social Issues: Education box on page 59.
Explain how it combines an experimental with a developmental design. What advantage does this approach offer?
(pp. 56, 59, 60–61)
The study on music lessons and intelligence combines an experimental with a longitudinal design (a type of developmental
design). The researchers experimentally manipulated participants’ experiences by randomly assigning 6-year-old children to
one of four experimental conditions—two groups who received music lessons (piano and voice, respectively), one group who
received drama lessons, or a no-lessons control group—and then measuring changes in each child’s mental-test performance
over time. The two music groups consistently gained more in mental-test performance than either the drama or the no-lessons
control group.
The advantage of this approach is that it allowed researchers to draw causal inferences from the results—in this case, to
infer that sustained musical experiences can lead to small increases in intelligence among 6-year-olds that do not arise from
comparable drama lessons.
APPLY: A researcher wants to know whether children enrolled in child-care centers in the first few years of life do as
well in school as those who are not in child care. Which developmental design is appropriate for answering this
question? Explain. (pp. 60–61)
A longitudinal design would be the most appropriate method for investigating this question because it would allow the
researcher to track the performance of children who attend child-care centers in the first few years of life versus those who do
not, to identify common patterns and differences in development between the two groups, and to examine any relationships
between early child-care experiences and later school performance.
REFLECT: Suppose a researcher asks you to enroll your baby in a 10-year longitudinal study. What factors would lead
you to agree and to stay involved? Do your answers shed light on why longitudinal studies often have biased samples?
Explain. (pp. 61–62)

REVIEW: Explain why researchers must consider children’s age-related capacities to ensure that they are protected
from harm and have freely consented to research. (pp. 66–68)
When children participate in research, the ethical concerns are especially complex. Children are more vulnerable than
adults to physical and psychological harm. The ethical principle of informed consent—people’s right to have all aspects of a
study explained to them that might affect their willingness to participate—requires special interpretation when individuals
cannot fully appreciate the research goals and activities. Parental consent is meant to protect the safety of children whose ability
to decide is not yet fully mature. As soon as children are old enough to appreciate the purpose of the research, certainly by
age 7, their own informed consent should be obtained in addition to parental consent. Around age 7, changes in children’s
thinking permit them to better understand basic scientific principles and the needs of others. Researchers should respect and
enhance these new capacities by giving school-age children a full explanation of research activities in language they can
understand.
CONNECT: In the experiment on music lessons and intelligence reported in the Social Issues box on page 59, why was it
ethically important for the researchers to offer music lessons to the no-lessons control group during the year after
completion of the study? (p. 66)
One of the research rights established by the American Psychological Association states that when researchers are
investigating experimental treatments believed to be beneficial, children in control groups have the right to alternative
beneficial treatments if they are available. Once researchers identified a positive relationship between music lessons and
children’s mental test performance, it was important to give the no-lessons control group an opportunity similar to the
advantage provided to the experimental group.
APPLY: As a researcher was engaged in naturalistic observation of preschoolers’ play, one child said, “Stop watching
me!” Referring to the research rights listed in Table 2.5, indicate how the researcher should respond, and why. (p. 66)
Children’s research rights include the right to be protected from physical or psychological harm as well as the right to
discontinue participation in research at any time. Because this child has verbally expressed a desire to discontinue the
observation, the researcher is ethically obligated to terminate the observation.
REFLECT: Would you approve the study on stereotyping and prejudice, in which summer-school students (without an
explanation) were asked to wear colored T-shirts that identified them as members of “majority” and “minority”
groups? Explain. What ethical safeguards do you believe are vital in research that requires deception of children to
ensure internal validity? (pp. 66–69)
SUGGESTED READINGS
Coll, C. G., & Marks, K. (2009). Immigrant stories: Ethnicity and academics in middle childhood. New York: Oxford
University Press. A longitudinal study of first- and second-generation immigrant youths, this book examines the
unique challenges and strengths of these children and their families. Topics include cultural attitudes and identity
development, academic achievement, the importance of community resources, and the importance of public policies
for immigrant families.
Freeman, M., & Mathison, S. (2008). Researching children’s experiences. New York: Guilford. Presents an extensive overview
of research methods commonly used to study children and adolescents. The authors also present information on
recruiting minors for research, the roles and responsibilities of researchers, the importance of understanding the child’s
developmental level, and ethical considerations and challenges.
Stark, L. (2011). Behind closed doors: IRBs and the making of ethical research. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Examines the history of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), including where our rules for the treatment of human
subjects originated; the responsibilities of researchers, universities, medical facilities, and laboratories; and current
guidelines for making ethical research decisions.

MEDIA MATERIALS
For details on individual video segments that accompany the DVD for Child Development, Ninth Edition, please see the DVD
Guide for Explorations in Child Development. The DVD and DVD Guide are available through your Pearson sales
representative.
Additional DVDs that may be useful in your class are listed below. They are not available through your Pearson sales
representative, but you can order them directly from the distributors. (See contact information at the end of this manual.)
Experimental Research Methods in Psychology (2004, Films Media Group, 28 min.). Drawing on laboratory and field
experiments, this program compares and contrasts experimental research methods through a study of attractiveness involving
young adults. Experts also explore some of the issues common to both experimental methods, including ethical concerns and
reductionism. A part of the series Understanding Psychology.
Exploring Qualitative Methods (2005, Films Media Group, 46 min.). Through experiments about sleep and dreams designed
and conducted by students, this program provides insight into the process of collecting and using qualitative data. It covers
creating effective questionnaires, preparing participant interviews, assembling case studies, and conducting observational
studies. The program also explores the use of content analysis and the correlational method, employed to make qualitative data
more meaningful. An instructor’s guide is available online.
Nonexperimental Research Methods (2006, Films Media Group, 34 min.), Part of the series Understanding Psychology, this
program presents nonexperimental research methods—questionnaires, interviews, and naturalistic observation—through three
studies on the effects of cell phone use. Section one explains good questionnaire design and considers the advantages and
limitations of this method. Section two examines the use of unstructured interviews, and section three spotlights the
performance and practical difficulties of naturalistic observation.
Observation I: The Eyes Have It! (2004, Magna Systems, Inc., 27 min.). This module, part of the Authentic Assessment series,
illustrates why, in the words of education coordinator Theresa Collado, “A good observer is a good teacher.” The module
explores authentic assessment techniques used in preschool settings to document children’s cognitive growth. Teachers discuss
systems they have developed for observing children in their own classrooms and are shown interacting with children in ways
that allow them to observe children’s physical, cognitive, and social and emotional development.
Observation II: Making the Connection (2004, Magna Systems, Inc., 27 min.). Teachers and education coordinators
demonstrate systems they use to collate observational data gathered on young children. These data include work samples,
observations, story dictation, and pictures of children engaged in activities. This module, part of the Authentic Assessment
series, also demonstrates how educators use computers to collate data on children’s progress throughout the year.
Parents: Our Most Important Resource (2004, Magna Systems, Inc., 27 min.). This module, part of the Authentic Assessment
series, highlights a group parent–teacher meeting and presentation focusing on the process of developing the portfolio, the
formal checklist, and the parent’s reporting form. The program emphasizes the importance of communicating with parents
throughout the assessment process. In a later segment, a teacher screens and observes a preschool child in the classroom and
then shares her observations with the child’s mother during school conferences and a home visit. The teacher and parent are
seen discussing the child’s progress and collaborating to set goals for him.
Research Ethics (2008, Insight Media, 21 min.). This program examines ethical issues in social science, natural science, and
health research, including plagiarism, crediting and citing sources, the use of human and animal subjects, informed consent,
debriefing, privacy, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest.
Research Methods in the Social Sciences (2005, Films Media Group; 4-part series, 23 to 46 min. each). Focusing primarily on
research in psychology, this series explores qualitative and quantitative research methods used in a wide range of disciplines.
Hosted and narrated by students, each program demonstrates how to test hypotheses, prepare experiments, and analyze data.
Instructors’ guides are available online.
Setting the Stage (2004, Magna Systems, Inc., 24 min.). In this module, the first in the Authentic Assessment series, educators
discuss current research and theories on the assessment of young children. The validity of authentic assessment techniques to
chart children’s growth and development is contrasted with the use of standardized tests. The limits of standardized tests are
discussed by center directors, education coordinators, and advocates of authentic assessment techniques. This first module of

the series helps new teachers see how children can be observed in the context of their play as well as their culture, and how
these observations can help teachers understand a child’s overall development.

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moves are the same; and as the substance of what is thought is
thought, what is thought is the absolute cause which, itself
unmoved, is identical with the thought which is moved by it; the
separation and the relation are one and the same. The chief moment
in Aristotle’s philosophy is accordingly this, that the energy of
thinking and the object of thought are the same; “for thought is that
which is receptive of objects of perception and the existent. When in
possession of these it is in a condition of activity (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων);
and thus all this” operation by which it thinks itself, “is more divine
than the divine possession which thinking reason supposes itself to
have,”—the content of thought. It is not the object of thought that is
the more excellent, but the very energy of thinking; the activity of
apprehension brings that to pass which appears as something that is
being apprehended. “Speculation (ἡ θεωρία) is thus the most
pleasing and the best. If then God has eternally subsisted in such
surpassing excellence as for a limited time pertains to us” (in whom
this eternal Thought, which is God Himself, occurs only as a
particular condition), “He is worthy of admiration; if He possesses it
in a more eminent degree, His nature is still more admirable. But this
is His mode of subsistence. Life is also inherent in Him, for the
activity of thought is life. But He constitutes this efficient power;
essential energy belongs to God as His most excellent and eternal
life. We therefore say that with God there is life perfect and
everlasting.” From this substance Aristotle moreover excludes
magnitude.
We in our way of speaking designate the Absolute, the True, as
the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, which is therefore neither
the one nor the other, and yet just as much the one as the other;
and Aristotle busied himself with these same speculations, the
deepest forms of speculation even of the present day, and he has
expressed them with the greatest definiteness. With Aristotle it is
thus no dry identity of the abstract understanding that is indicated,
for he distinguishes subjective and objective precisely and decisively.
Not dead identity such as this, but energy, is for him what is most to
be reverenced, God. Unity is thus a poor, unphilosophic expression,

and true Philosophy is not the system of identity; its principle is a
unity which is activity, movement, repulsion, and thus, in being
different, is at the same time identical with itself. If Aristotle had
made the jejune identity of understanding, or experience, his
principle, he would never have risen to a speculative Idea like this,
wherein individuality and activity are placed higher than universal
potentiality. Thought, as the object of thought, is nothing else than
the absolute Idea regarded as in itself, the Father; yet this First and
unmoved, as distinguished from activity, is, as absolute, simply
activity, and is first through this activity set forth as true. In what he
teaches respecting the soul we shall find Aristotle recurring to this
speculative thought; but to Aristotle it is again an object, like other
objects, a kind of condition which he separates from the other
conditions of the soul which he understands empirically, such as
sleep, or weariness. He does not say that it alone is truth, that all is
summed up in Thought, but he says it is the first, the strongest, the
most honourable. We, on the other hand, say that Thought, as that
which relates to itself, has existence, or is the truth; that Thought
comprehends the whole of Truth, even, though we ordinarily
represent to ourselves sensation and so on, besides thought, as
having reality. Thus, although Aristotle does not express himself in
modern philosophic language, he has yet throughout the same
fundamental theory; he speaks not of a special kind of reason, but
of the universal Reason. The speculative philosophy of Aristotle
simply means the direction of thought on all kinds of objects, thus
transforming these into thoughts; hence, in being thoughts, they
exist in truth. The meaning of this is not, however, that natural
objects have thus themselves the power of thinking, but as they are
subjectively thought by me, my thought is thus also the Notion of
the thing, which therefore constitutes its absolute substance. But in
Nature the Notion does not exist explicitly as thought in this
freedom, but has flesh and blood, and is oppressed by externalities;
yet this flesh and blood has a soul, and this is its Notion. The
ordinary definition of truth, according to which it is “the harmony of
the conception with the object,” is certainly not borne out by the
conception; for when I represent to myself a house, a beam, and so

on, I am by no means this content, but something entirely different,
and therefore very far from being in harmony with the object of my
conception. It is only in thought that there is present a true harmony
between objective and subjective; that constitutes me. Aristotle
therefore finds himself at the highest standpoint; nothing deeper can
we desire to know, although he has always the appearance of
making ordinary conceptions his starting-point.
Aristotle (Metaph. XII. 9) now solves many other doubtful
questions, for instance, whether thought is compound, and whether
science is the object of science itself. “Some further doubts arise as
to thought (νοῦς), which seems to be of all things the most divine;
but it is only with difficulty that we can conceive under what
conditions (πῶς δ̓ ἔχων) it is a thing of this sort. When it thinks of
nothing, but is in a state like that of a sleeper, what constitutes its
superiority? And when it thinks, but something else is dominant all
the time (ἄλλο κύριον), that which is its substance is not thought
(νόησις), but a potentiality;” it would not be in eternal activity. “In
this way it would not be the highest substance; for it is” (active)
“thought (τὸ νοεῖν) that gives it its high rank. If now, further,
thought or thinking is its substance, what does it think? Itself or
another? And if another, is it always the same, or something
different? Does it also not make a difference, whether it thinks of
what is beautiful or what is casual? In the first place, if thought is
not thinking, but only the power to think, continuous thinking would
be laborious for it,” for every power wears itself out. “In the next
place, something else would be more excellent than thought, namely
that which is thought (νοούμενον); and thinking and thought (τὸ
νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις) will be present to the mind in understanding
what is most inferior. As this is to be avoided (in the same way that
it is better not to see some things than to see them), thinking would
not constitute the best. Thought is therefore this, to think itself,
because it is the most excellent; and it is the thinking, which is the
thinking of thinking. For understanding and sensation and opinion
and deliberation seem always to have an object other than
themselves, and to be their own objects only in a secondary sense.

Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in relation to
which of the two is the Good inherent in thought? For the Notion[92]
of thinking and that of the object of thought are not the same. Or, in
the case of some things, does the science itself constitute that which
is the object of science? In what is practical the thing is the
immaterial substance and the determination of the end (ἡ οὐσία καὶ
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), and in what is theoretical it is the reason and the
thinking. As therefore thought and the object of thought are not
different, these opposites, so far as they involve no connection with
matter, are the same thing, and there is only a thought of the thing
thought of.” Reason which thinks itself, is the absolute end or the
Good, for it only exists for its own sake. “There still remains a doubt
whether that which thinks is of composite nature or not; for it might
undergo change in the parts of the whole. But the Good is not in this
or that part, for it is the best in the universe, as distinguished from
it. In this way the Thought which is its own object subsists to all
eternity.”
As this speculative Idea, which is the best and most free, is also
to be seen in nature, and not only in thinking reason, Aristotle
(Metaph. XII. 8) in this connection passes on to the visible God,
which is the heavens. God, as living God, is the universe; and thus in
the universe God, as living God, shows Himself forth. He comes forth
as manifesting Himself or as causing motion, and it is in
manifestation alone that the difference between the cause of motion
and that which is moved comes to pass. “The principle and the first
cause of that which is, is itself unmoved, but brings to pass the
original and eternal and single motion,” that is, the heaven of the
fixed stars. “We see that besides the simple revolution of the
universe, which is brought about by the first unmoved substance,
there are other eternal motions, those of the planets.” We must not,
however, enter into further details on this subject.
Regarding the organization of the universe in general, Aristotle
says (Metaph. XII. 10), “We must investigate in what manner the
nature of the whole has within it the Good and the Best; whether as
something set apart and absolute, or as an order, or in both ways, as

in the case of an army. For the good condition of an army depends
upon the order enforced, as much as on the general, and the
general is the cause of the army’s good condition in all the greater
degree from the fact of the order being through him, and not from
his being through the order. All things are co-ordinated in a certain
way, but not all in the same way: take, for example, animals which
swim, and those which fly, and plants; they are not so constituted
that one of them is not related to another, but they stand in mutual
relations. For all are co-ordinated into one system just as in a house
it is by no means permitted to the free inmates to do freely
whatever they like, but all that they do, or the most of it, is done
according to orderly arrangement. By slaves and animals, on the
contrary, little is done for the general good, but they do much that is
casual. For the principle of each is his own nature. In the same way
it is necessary that all should attain to a position where distinction is
drawn” (the seat of judgment) “but there are some things so
constituted that all participate in them for the formation of a whole.”
Aristotle then goes on to refute some other notions; showing, for
instance, the embarrassments into which they fall who make all
things proceed from oppositions, and he corroborates, on the other
hand, the unity of the principle by quoting Homer’s line (Iliad II.
204):
“It is not good that many govern; let one alone bear rule.”
2. Philosophy of Nature.
Amongst the special sciences treated by Aristotle, the Physics is
contained in a whole series of physical treatises, which form a
tolerably complete system of what constitutes the Philosophy of
Nature in its whole extent. We shall try to give their general plan.
Aristotle’s first work is his Treatise, in eight books, on Physics, or on
the Principles (φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις ἢ περὶ ἀρχῶν). In this he deals, as is
fitting, with the doctrine of the Notion of nature generally, with
movement, and with space and time. The first manifestation of
absolute substance is movement, and its moments are space and

time; this conception of its manifestation is the universal, which
realizes itself first in the corporeal world, passing into the principle of
separation. Aristotle’s Physics is what for present physicists would,
properly speaking, be the Metaphysics of Nature; for our physicists
only say what they have seen, what delicate and excellent
instruments they have made, and not what they have thought. This
first work by Aristotle is followed by his treatises concerning the
Heavens, which deal with the nature of body and the first real
bodies, the earth and heavenly bodies in general, as also with the
general abstract relation of bodies to one another through
mechanical weight and lightness, or what we should call attraction;
and finally, with the determination of abstract real bodies or
elements. Then follow the treatises on Production and Destruction,
the physical process of change, while formerly the ideal process of
movement was considered. Besides the physical elements, moments
which are only posited in process, as such, now enter in: for
instance, warmth, cold, &c. Those elements are the real existent
facts, while these determinations are the moments of becoming or
of passing away, which exist only in movement. Then comes the
Meteorology; it represents the universal physical process in its most
real forms. Here particular determinations appear, such as rain, the
saltness of the sea, clouds, dew, hail, snow, hoar-frost, winds,
rainbows, boiling, cooking, roasting, colours, &c. On certain matters,
such as the colours, Aristotle wrote particular treatises. Nothing is
forgotten, and yet the presentation is, on the whole, empiric. The
book On the Universe, which forms the conclusion, is said not to be
genuine; it is a separate dissertation, addressed to Alexander, which
contains in part the doctrine of the universality of things, a doctrine
found already in the other treatises; hence this book does not
belong to this series.
From this point Aristotle proceeds to organic nature, and here his
works not only contain a natural history, but also a physiology and
anatomy. To the anatomy pertain his works on the Locomotion of
Animals, and on the Parts of Animals. He deals with physiology in
the works on the Generation of Animals, on the common Movement

of Animals; and then he comes to the distinction between Youth and
Age, Sleeping and Waking, and treats of Breathing, Dreaming, the
Shortness and Length of Life, &c., all of which he deals with partly in
an empiric, and partly in a more speculative manner. Finally, there
comes the History of Animals, not merely as a history of Nature, but
also as the history of the animal in its entirety—what we may call a
kind of physiologico-anatomical anatomy. There is likewise a
botanical work On Plants (περὶ φυτῶν) which is ascribed to him.
Thus we here find natural philosophy in the whole extent of its
outward content.
As regards this plan, there is no question that this is not the
necessary order in which natural philosophy or physics must be
treated. It is long since physics adopted in its conception the form
and tendency derived from Aristotle, of deducing the parts of the
science from the whole; and thus even what is not speculative still
retains this connection as far as outward order goes. This is plainly
to be preferred to the arrangement in our modern text-books, which
is a wholly irrational succession of doctrines accidentally put
together, and is undoubtedly more suitable to that method of
contemplating nature, which grasps the sensuous manifestation of
nature quite irrespective of sense or reason. Physics before this
contained some metaphysics, but the experience which was met
with in endeavouring unsuccessfully to work it out, determined the
physicists, so far as possible, to keep it at a distance, and to devote
their attention to what they call experience, for they think that here
they come across genuine truth, unspoiled by thought, fresh from
the hand of nature; it is in their hands and before their faces. They
can certainly not dispense with the Notion, but through a kind of
tacit agreement they allow certain conceptions, such as forces,
subsistence in parts, &c., to be valid, and make use of these without
in the least knowing whether they have truth and how they have
truth. But in regard to the content they express no better the truth
of things, but only the sensuous manifestation. Aristotle and the
ancients understand by physics, on the other hand, the
comprehension of nature—the universal; and for this reason Aristotle

also calls it the doctrine of principles. For in the manifestation of
nature this distinction between the principle and what follows it,
manifestation, really commences, and it is abrogated only in genuine
speculation. Yet if, on the one hand, what is physical in Aristotle is
mainly philosophic and not experimental, he yet proceeded in his
Physics in what may be called an empiric way. Thus, as it has been
already remarked of the Aristotelian philosophy in general that the
different parts fall into a series of independently determined
conceptions, so we find that this is the case here also; hence an
account can only be given of a part of them. One part is not
universal enough to embrace the other part, for each is
independent. But that which follows, and which has in great
measure reference to what is individual, no longer comes under the
dominion of the Notion, but becomes a superficial suggestion of
reasons, and an explanation from the proximate causes, such as we
find in our physics.
In regard to the general conception of nature, we must say that
Aristotle represents it in the highest and truest manner. For in the
Idea of nature Aristotle (Phys. II. 8) really relies on two
determinations: the conception of end and the conception of
necessity. Aristotle at once grasps the whole matter in its principles,
and this constitutes the old contradiction and divergence of view
existing between necessity (causæ efficientes) and end (causæ
finales), which we have inherited. The first mode of consideration is
that in accordance with external necessity, which is the same as
chance—the conception that all that pertains to nature is determined
from without by means of natural causes. The other mode of
consideration is the teleological, but conformity to end is either
inward or outward, and in the more recent culture the latter has long
retained the supremacy. Thus men vibrate in their opinion between
these two points of view, seek external causes, and war against the
form of an external teleology which places the end outside of nature.
These determinations were known to Aristotle, and he thoroughly
investigates them and considers what they are and mean. Aristotle’s
conception of nature is, however, nobler than that of to-day, for with

him the principal point is the determination of end as the inward
determinateness of natural things. Thus he comprehended nature as
life, i.e. as that which has its end within itself, is unity with itself,
which does not pass into another, but, through this principle of
activity, determines changes in conformity with its own content, and
in this way maintains itself therein. In this doctrine Aristotle has
before his eyes the inward immanent end, to which he considers
necessity an external condition. Thus, on the one hand, Aristotle
determines nature as the final cause, which is to be distinguished
from what is luck or chance; it is thus opposed by him to what is
necessary, which it also contains within itself; and then he considers
how necessity is present in natural things. In nature we usually think
of necessity first, and understand as the essentially natural that
which is not determined through end. For long men thought that
they determined nature both philosophically and truly in limiting it to
necessity. But the aspect of nature has had a stigma removed from
it, because, by means of its conformity to the end in view, it is
elevated above the commonplace. The two moments which we have
considered in substance, the active form and matter, correspond
with these two determinations.
We must first consider the conception of adaptation to end as the
ideal moment in substance. Aristotle begins (Phys. II. 8) with the
fact that the natural is the self-maintaining, all that is difficult is its
comprehension. “The first cause of perplexity is, what hinders nature
from not operating for the sake of an end, and because it is better
so to operate, but” being, for example, “like Jupiter, who rains, not
that the corn may grow, but from necessity. The vapour driven
upwards cools, and the water resulting from this cooling falls as rain,
and it happens that the corn is thereby made to grow. In like
manner, if the corn of any one is destroyed, it does not rain for the
sake of this destruction, but this is an accidental circumstance.” That
is to say, there is a necessary connection which, however, is an
external relation, and this is the contingency of the cause as well as
of the effect. “But if this be so,” Aristotle asks, “what hinders us from
assuming that what appears as parts” (the parts of an animal, for

instance) “may thus subsist in nature, too, as contingent? That, for
example, the front teeth are sharp and adapted for dividing, and
that the back teeth, on the contrary, are broad and adapted for
grinding the food in pieces, may be an accidental circumstance, not
necessarily brought about for these particular ends. And the same is
true with respect to the other parts of the body which appear to be
adapted for some end; therefore those living things in which all was
accidentally constituted as if for some end, are now, having once
been so existent, preserved, although originally they had arisen by
chance, in accordance with external necessity.” Aristotle adds that
Empedocles especially had these reflections, and represented the
first beginnings of things as a world composed of all sorts of
monstrosities, such as bulls with human heads; such, however, could
not continue to subsist, but disappeared because they were not
originally constituted so that they should endure; and this went on
until what was in conformity with purpose came together. Without
going back to the fabulous monstrosities of the ancients, we likewise
know of a number of animal tribes which have died out, just
because they could not preserve the race. Thus we also require to
use the expression development (an unthinking evolution), in our
present-day natural philosophy. The conception that the first
productions were, so to speak, attempts, of which those which did
not show themselves to be suitable could not endure, is easily
arrived at by natural philosophy. But nature, as entelecheia or
realization, is what brings forth itself. Aristotle hence replies: “It is
impossible to believe this. For what is produced in accordance with
nature is always, or at least for the most part, produced” (external
universality as the constant recurrence of what has passed away),
“but this is not so with what happens through fortune or through
chance. That in which there is an end (τέλος), equally in its
character as something which precedes and as something which
follows, is made into end; as therefore a thing is made, so is its
nature, and as is its nature, so is it made; it exists therefore for the
sake of this.” The meaning of nature is that as something is, it was
in the beginning; it means this inward universality and adaptation to
end that realizes itself; and thus cause and effect are identical, since

all individual parts are related to this unity of end. “He who assumes
contingent and accidental forms, subverts, on the other hand, both
nature itself and that which subsists from nature, for that subsists
from nature which has a principle within itself, by whose means, and
being continually moved, it attains its end.” In this expression of
Aristotle’s we now find the whole of the true profound Notion of life,
which must be considered as an end in itself—a self-identity that
independently impels itself on, and in its manifestation remains
identical with its Notion: thus it is the self-effectuating Idea. Leaves,
blossoms, roots thus bring the plant into evidence and go back into
it; and that which they bring to pass is already present in the seed
from which they took their origin. The chemical product, on the
contrary, does not appear to have itself similarly present, for from
acid and base a third appears to come forth; but here, likewise, the
essence of both these sides, their relationship, is already present,
though it is there mere potentiality, as it is in the product merely a
thing. But the self-maintaining activity of life really brings forth this
unity in all relationships. What has here been said is already
contained in that which was asserted by those who do not represent
nature in this way, but say, “that which is constituted as though it
were constituted for an end, will endure.” For this is the self-
productive action of nature. In the modern way of looking at life this
conception becomes lost in two different ways; either through a
mechanical philosophy, in which we always find as principle
pressure, impulse, chemical relationships and forces, or external
relations generally—which certainly seem to be inherent in nature,
but not to proceed from the nature of the body, seeing that they are
an added, foreign appendage, such as colour in a fluid; or else
theological physics maintain the thoughts of an understanding
outside of the world to be the causes. In the Kantian philosophy we
for the first time have that conception once more awakened in us,
for organic nature at least; life has there been made an end to itself.
In Kant this indeed had only the subjective form which constitutes
the essence of the Kantian philosophy, in which it seems as though
life were only so determined by reason of our subjective reasoning;
but still the whole truth is there contained that the organic creation

is the self-maintaining. The fact that most recent times have brought
back the rational view of the matter into our remembrance, is thus
none else than a justification of the Aristotelian Idea.
Aristotle also speaks of the end which is represented by organic
nature in itself, in relation to the means, of which he says (Phys. II.
8): “If the swallow builds her nest, and the spider spreads her web,
and trees root themselves in the earth, for the sake of nutriment,
there is present in them a self-maintaining cause of this kind, or an
end.” For this instinctive action exhibits an operation of self-
preservation, as a means whereby natural existence becomes shut
up and reflected into itself. Aristotle then brings what is here said
into relation with general conceptions which he had earlier
maintained (p. 138): “Since nature is twofold as matter and form,
but since the latter is end, and the rest are on account of the end,
this is final cause.” For the active form has a content, which, as
content of potentiality, contains the means which make their
appearance as adapted for an end, i.e. as moments established
through the determinate Notion. However much we may, in the
modern way of regarding things, struggle against the idea of an
immanent end, from reluctance to accept it, we must, in the case of
animals and plants, acknowledge such a conception, always re-
establishing itself in another. For example, because the animal lives
in water or in air, it is so constructed that it can maintain its
existence in air or water; thus it requires water to explain the gills of
fishes; and, on the other hand, because the animal is so
constructed, it lives in water. This activity in transformation thus
does not depend in a contingent way on life; it is aroused through
the outward powers, but only in as far as conformity with the soul of
the animal permits.
In passing, Aristotle here (Phys. II. 8) makes a comparison
between nature and art, which also connects what results with what
goes before, in accordance with ends. “Nature may commit an error
as well as art; for as a grammarian sometimes makes a mistake in
writing, and a physician in mixing a medicinal draught, nature, too,
sometimes does not attain its ends. Its errors are monstrosities and

deformities, which, however, are only the errors of that which
operates for an end. In the production of animals and plants, an
animal is not at first produced, but the seed, and even in it
corruption is possible.” For the seed is the mean, as being the not as
yet established, independent, indifferent, free actuality. In this
comparison of nature with art we ordinarily have before us the
external adaptation to end, the teleological point of view, the making
for definite ends. And Aristotle declaims against this, while he
remarks that if nature is activity for a certain end, or if it is the
implicitly universal, “it is absurd to deny that action is in conformity
with end, because that which moves cannot be seen to have
deliberated and considered.” The understanding comes forward with
the determination of this end, and with its instruments and tools, to
operate on matter, and we carry this conception of an external
teleology over into nature. “But art also,” says Aristotle, “does not
deliberate. If the form of a ship were the particular inward principle
of the timber, it would act as nature prompted. The action of nature
is very similar to the exercise of the art whereby anyone heals
himself.” Through an inward instinct the animal avoids what is evil,
and does what is good for him; health is thus essentially present to
him, not as a conscious end, but as an understanding which
accomplishes its ends without conscious thought.
As Aristotle has hitherto combated an external teleology, he
directs another equally applicable remark (Phys. II. 9) against
merely external necessity, and thus we come to the other side, or to
how necessity exists in nature. He says in this regard: “Men fancy
that necessity exists in this way in generation, just as if it were
thought that a house existed from necessity, because heavy things
were naturally carried downwards, and light things upwards, and
that, therefore, the stones and foundation, on account of their
weight, were under the earth, and the earth, because it was lighter,
was further up, and the wood in the highest place because it is the
lightest.” But Aristotle thus explains the facts of the case. “The house
is certainly not made without these materials, but not on account of,
or through them (unless the material so demands), but it is made for

the sake of concealing and preserving certain things. The same
takes place in everything which has an end in itself; for it is not
without that which is necessary to its nature, and yet it is not on
account of this, unless the matter so demands, but on account of an
end. Hence the necessary is from hypothesis only, and not as end,
for necessity is in matter, but end is in reason (λόγῳ). Thus it is clear
that matter and its movement are necessity in natural things; both
have to be set forth as principle, but end is the higher principle.” It
undoubtedly requires necessity, but it retains it in its own power,
does not allow it to give vent to itself, but controls external
necessity. The principle of matter is thus turned into the truly active
ground of end, which means the overthrow of necessity, so that that
which is natural shall maintain itself in the end. Necessity is the
objective manifestation of the action of its moments as separated,
just as in chemistry the essential reality of both the extremes—the
base and the acid—is the necessity of their relation.
This is the main conception of Aristotelian Physics. Its further
development concerns the conceptions of the different objects of
nature, a material for speculative philosophy which we have spoken
of above (pp. 153-155), and regarding which Aristotle puts before us
reflections both difficult and profound. Thus he at first (Phys. III. 1-
3) proceeds from this point to movement (κίνησις), and says that it
is essential that a philosophy of nature should speak of it, but that it
is difficult to grasp; in fact, it is one of the most difficult conceptions.
Aristotle thus sets to work to understand movement in general, not
merely in space and time, but also in its reality; and in this sense he
calls it “the activity of an existent thing which is in capacity, so far as
it is in capacity.” He explains this thus: “Brass is in capacity a statue;
yet the motion to become a statue is not a motion of the brass so far
as it is brass, but a motion of itself, as the capacity to become a
statue. Hence this activity is an imperfect one (ἀτελής),” i.e. it has
not its end within itself, “for mere capacity, whose activity is
movement, is imperfect.” The absolute substance, the moving
immovable, the existent ground of heaven which we saw as end, is,
on the contrary, both activity itself and the content and object of

activity. But Aristotle distinguishes from this what falls under the
form of this opposition, “That moving is also moved which has
movement as a capacity, and whose immobility is rest. That in which
movement is present has immobility as rest; for activity in rest, as
such, is movement.” That is to say, rest is capacity for motion.
“Hence movement is the activity of that which is movable (κινητοῦ),
[93] so far as it is movable; but this happens from the contact of that
which is motive (κινητικοῦ), so that at the same time it is posited as
passive likewise. But that which moves always introduces a certain
form or end (εἶδος), either this particular thing (τόδε), or a quality or
a quantity, which is the principle and cause of the motion when it
moves; thus man, as he is in energy, makes man from man as he is
in capacity. Thus, too, it is evident that movement is in the movable
thing: for it is the activity of this, and is derived from that which is
motive. The activity of that which is motive is likewise not different,
for both are necessarily activity. It is motive because it has the
capacity for being so; but it causes motion because it energizes. But
it is the energetic of the moveable (ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινετοῦ),
so that there is one energy of both; just as the relation between one
and two is the same as that between two and one, and there also is
the same relation between acclivity and declivity, so the way from
Thebes to Athens is the same as from Athens to Thebes. Activity and
passivity are not originally (κυρίως) the same, but in what they are
inherent, in motion, they are the same. In Being (τῷ εἶναι) they are
identical, but activity, in so far as it is activity of this in this” (what is
moved), “and the activity of this from this” (what moves), “is
different as regards its conception (τῷ λόγῳ).” Aristotle subsequently
deals with the infinite (Phys. III. 4-8).
“In like manner it is necessary,” says Aristotle (Phys. IV. 1-5),
“that the natural philosopher should consider the subject of place
(τόπος).” Here come various definitions and determinations under
which space generally and particular space or place appear. “Is place
a body? It cannot be a body, for then there would be in one and the
same, two bodies. Again, if it is the place and receptacle (χώρα) of
this body, it is evident that it is so also of the superficies and the

remaining boundaries; but the same reasoning applies to these, for
where the superficies of water were before, there will now be the
superficies of air,” and thus the places of both superficies would be in
one. “But in truth there is no difference between the point and the
place of the point, so that if place is not different from the other
forms of limitation, neither is it something outside of them. It is not
an element, and neither consists of corporeal nor of incorporeal
elements, for it possesses magnitude, but not body. The elements of
bodies are, however, themselves bodies, and no magnitude is
produced from intelligible elements. Place is not the material of
things, for nothing consists of it—neither the form, nor the Notion,
nor the end, nor the moving cause; and yet it is something.”
Aristotle now determines place as the first unmoved limit of that
which is the comprehending: it comprehends the body whose place
it is, and has nothing of the thing in itself; yet it co-exists with the
thing, because the limits and the limited co-exist. The uttermost
ends of what comprehends and of what is comprehended are
identical, for both are bounds; but they are not bounds of the same,
for form is the boundary of the thing, place is that of the embracing
body. Place, as the comprehending, remains unchangeably passive
while the thing which is moved is moved away; from which we see
that place must be separable from the thing. Or place, according to
Aristotle, is the boundary, the negation of a body, the assertion of
difference, of discretion; but it likewise does not merely belong to
this body, but also to that which comprehends. There is thus no
difference at all, but unchangeable continuity. “Place is neither the
universal (κοινός) in which all bodies are” (heaven), “nor the
particular (ἴδιος), in which they are as the first (πρώτῳ).” Aristotle
also speaks of above and below in space, in relation to heaven as
that which contains, and earth as what is beneath. “That body,
outside of which is a comprehending body, is in space. But the whole
heavens are not anywhere, since no body comprehends them.
Outside the universe nothing is, and hence everything is in the
heavens, for the heavens are the whole. Place, however, is not the
heavens, but its external quiescent boundary which touches the

body moved. Hence the earth is in water, water in air, air in ether,
but ether in the heavens.”
From this point Aristotle goes on (Phys. IV. 6, 7) to empty space,
in which an old question is involved which physicists even now
cannot explain: they could do so if they studied Aristotle, but as far
as they are concerned there might have been no thought nor
Aristotle in the world. “Vacuum, according to ordinary ideas, is a
space in which there is no body, and, fancying that all Being is body,
they say that vacuum is that in which there is nothing at all. The
conception of a vacuum has its justification for one thing in the fact
that a vacuum,” the negative to an existent form, “is essential to
motion; for a body could not move in a plenum,” and in the place to
which it does move there must be nothing. “The other argument in
favour of a vacuum is found in the compression of bodies, in which
the parts press into the empty spaces.” This is the conception of
varying density and the alteration of the same, in accordance with
which an equal weight might consist of an equal number of parts,
but these, as being separated by vacuum, might present a greater
volume. Aristotle confutes these reasonings most adroitly, and first
of all in this way; “The plenum could be changed, and bodies could
yield to one another even if no interval of vacuum separated them.
Liquids as well as solids are not condensed into a vacuum;
something that they contained is expelled, just as air is expelled if
water is compressed.”
Aristotle deals more thoroughly, in the first place (Phys. IV. 8),
with the erroneous conception that the vacuum is the cause of
movement. For, on the one hand, he shows that the vacuum really
abolishes motion, and consequently in vacuum a universal rest
would reign. He calls it perfect indifference as to the greater or less
distance to which a thing is moved; in vacuum there are no
distinctions. It is pure negation without object or difference; there is
no reason for standing still or going on. But body is in movement,
and that, indeed, as distinguished; it has a positive relation, and not
one merely to nothing. On the other hand, Aristotle refutes the idea
that movement is in vacuum because compression is possible. But

this does not happen in a vacuum; there would be established in it
not one movement, but a movement towards all sides, a general
annihilation, an absolute yielding, where no cohesion would remain
in the body. “Again, a weight or a body is borne along more swiftly
or more slowly from two causes; either because there is a difference
in that through which it is borne along, as when it moves through air
or water or earth, or because that which is borne along differs
through excess of weight or lightness.” As regards difference of
movement on account of the first difference—that in the density of
the medium—Aristotle says: “The medium through which the body is
borne along is the cause of the resistance encountered, which is
greater if the medium is moving in a contrary direction (and less if it
is at rest); resistance is increased also if the medium is not easily
divided. The difference in velocity is in inverse ratio to the specific
gravity of the medium, air and water, so that if the medium has only
half the density, the rate of progress will be double as quick. But
vacuum has to body no such relation of differences of specific
gravity. Body can no more contain a vacuum within its dimensions
than a line can contain a point, unless the line were composed of
points. The vacuum has no ratio to the plenum.” But as to the other
case, the difference in weight and lightness, which has to be
considered as being in bodies themselves, whereby one moves more
quickly than another through the same space: “this distinction exists
only in the plenum, for the heavy body, by reason of its power,
divides the plenum more quickly.” This point of view is quite correct,
and it is mainly directed against a number of conceptions that
prevail in our physics. The conception of equal movement of the
heavy and the light, as that of pure weight, pure matter, is an
abstraction, being taken as though they were inherently like, only
differing through the accidental resistance of the air.
Aristotle (Phys. IV. 9) now comes to the second point, to the
proof of the vacuum because of the difference in specific gravity.
“Many believe that the vacuum exists because of the rare and the
dense;” the former is said to be a rare body, and the latter a perfect
continuity; or they at least differ quantitatively from one another

through greater or less density. “For if air should be generated from
a quantity of water, a given quantity of water must produce a
quantity of air the same in bulk, or there must necessarily be a
vacuum; for it is only on the hypothesis of a vacuum that
compression and rarefaction are explicable. Now if, as they say, the
less dense were that which has many separate void spaces, it is
evident that since a vacuum cannot be separated any more than a
space can have intervals, neither can the rare subsist in this manner.
But if it is not separable, and yet a vacuum is said to exist in the
body, in the first place movement could thus only be upwards; for
the rare is the light, and hence they say that fire is rare,” because it
always moves upwards. “In the next place the vacuum cannot be the
cause of motion as that in which something moves, but must
resemble bladders that carry up that which adheres to them. But
how is it possible that a vacuum can move, or that there can be a
place where there is a vacuum? For that into which it is carried
would be the vacuum of a vacuum. In short, as there can be no
movement in vacuum, so also a vacuum cannot move.” Aristotle set
against these ideas the true state of matters, and states generally
the ideal conception of nature: “that the opposites, hot and cold,
and the other physical contraries, have one and the same matter,
and that from what is in capacity that which is in energy is
produced; that matter is not separable though it is different in
essence[94] (τῷ εἶναι), and that it remains one and the same in
number (ἀριθμῷ) even if it possesses colour, or is hot and cold. And
again, the matter of a small body and a large is the same, because
at one time a greater proceeds from a smaller, and at another time a
smaller from a greater. If air is generated from water it is expanded,
but the matter remains the same and without taking to itself
anything else; for that which it was in capacity it becomes in
actuality. In a similar way if air is compressed from a greater into a
less volume, the process will be reversed, and air will similarly pass
into water, because the matter which is in capacity both air and
water, also becomes both.” Aristotle likewise asserts that increase
and decrease of warmth, and its transition into cold, is no addition or

otherwise of warm matter, and also one and the same is both dense
and rare. This is very different from the physical conceptions which
assert more or less matter to correspond with more or less density,
thus comprehending the difference in specific weight as the external
addition of matter. Aristotle, on the contrary, takes this dynamically,
though certainly not in the sense in which dynamics are to-day
understood, viz. as an increase of intensity or as a degree, for he
accepts intensity in its truth as universal capacity. Undoubtedly the
difference must also be taken as a difference in amount, but not as
an increase and decrease, or as an alteration in the absolute
quantity of the matter. For here intensity means force, but again not
as being a thing of thought separated from matter, but as indicating
that if anything has become more intensive, it has had its actuality
diminished, having, however, according to Aristotle, attained to a
greater capacity. If the intensity is again directed outwards, and
compared with other things, it undoubtedly becomes degree, and
therefore magnitude immediately enters in. It then is indifferent
whether greater intension or greater extension is posited; more air is
capable of being warmed to the same degree as less, through the
greater intensity of the warmth; or the same air can thereby become
intensively warmer.
As regards the investigation of time, Aristotle remarks (Phys. IV.
10, 11, 13) that if time is externally (exoterically, ἐξωτερικῶς)
regarded, we are inevitably led to doubt (διαπορῆσαι) whether it has
any being whatever, or whether it has bare existence, as feeble
(μόλις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς) as if it were only a potentiality. “For one part of
it was and is not: another part will be and is not as yet; but of these
parts infinite and everlasting (ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος), time is composed.
But it now appears that time, if composed of things that are not,
may be incapable of existence. And also as regards everything
divisible, if it exists, either some or all of its parts must be. Time is
certainly divisible; but some of the parts are past, others are future,
and no part is present. For the now is no part, since a part has a
measure, and the whole must consist of the parts; but time does not
appear to consist of the Now.” That is to say, because the Now is

indivisible, it has no quantitative determination which could be
measured. “Besides it is not easy to decide whether the Now
remains, or always becomes another and another. Again, time is not
a movement and change, for movement and change occur in that
which is moved and changed, or accompany time in its course; but
time is everywhere alike. Besides change is swifter and slower, but
time is not. But it is not without change and motion” (which is just
the moment of pure negativity in the same) “for when we perceive
no change, it appears as if no time had elapsed, as in sleep. Time is
hence in motion but not motion itself.” Aristotle defines it thus: “We
say that time is, when we perceive the before and after in
movement; but these are so distinguished that we apprehend them
to be another and another, and conceive that there is something
between, as a middle. Now when we understand that the extremes
of the conclusion are different from the middle, and the soul says
that the Now has two instants, the one prior and the other posterior,
then we say that this is time. What is determined through the Now,
we call time, and this is the fundamental principle. But when we are
sensible of the Now as one, and not as a prior and posterior in
motion, nor as the identity of an earlier or later, then there does not
appear to us to have been any time, because neither was there any
motion.” Tedium is thus ever the same. “Time is hence the number
of motion, according to priority and posteriority; it is not motion
itself, unless so far as motion has number. We judge of the more or
less through number, but of a greater or less motion by time. But we
call number that which can be numbered, as well as that with which
we number; but time is not the number with which we number, but
that which is numbered, and, like motion, always is changing. The
Now is, which is the unity of number, and it measures time. The
whole of time is the same, for the Now which was is the same”
(universality as the Now destroyed) “but in Being it is another. Time
thus is through the Now both continuous (συνεχής) and discrete
(διῇρηται). It thereby resembles the point, for that also is the
continuity of the line and its division, its principle and limit; but the
Now is not an enduring point. As continuity of time the Now
connects the past and the future, but it likewise divides time in

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