1. Aone-wayticket?
MigrationinEurope
fromtheperspective
ofCEEcountries

2. Sharedexperience,commondevelopment
CEED

3. A one-way ticket?
Migration in Europe from the perspective of CEE countries

4. PublishedbytheCentralandEasternEuropeDevelopmentInstitute
(CEEDInstitute)Warsaw2015
©CENTRALANDEASTERNEUROPEDEVELOPMENTINSTITUTE2015
www.ceedinstitute.org
NoreproductionofanypartofthisreportmaytakeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionoftheCEEDInstitute
Authors:
Prof.MaciejDuszczyk,CEEDInstituteExpert,
InstituteofSocialPolicy,
CentreofMigrationResearch,UniversityofWarsaw
KamilMatuszczyk, InstituteofSocialPolicy,UniversityofWarsaw
Toquotethisreport:
DuszczykM.,MatuszczykK.(2015),Aone-wayticket?MigrationinEuropefromtheperspectiveofCEEcountries,
CentralandEasternEuropeDevelopmentInstitute,Warsaw2015
ThisreporthasbeenpreparedincooperationwiththeWorkService.
WorkServiceisthePoland’slargestHRcompanyprovidinginnovativeworkforcesolutionsrangingfrompermanentplacement
andtemporarystaffing,tooutplacementandoutsourcingservicesthroughoutCentralandEasternEurope.
WorkServiceS.A.
Gwiaździsta66,53-413Wrocław,Poland
phone:(+48)713710900
e-mail:work@workservice.pl
www:workservice.com
TheCEEDInstitute,foundedbyDr.JanKulczykin2010,isathink-tankwhoseaimistopromotetheachievementsand
economicpotentialtheCEEcountries.Itsambitionistosupportbusinessinitiatives,aswellasdebatesonindispensable
reformsintheregion,includingmeasurestoboostsustainablegrowthandinnovativecapacities.TheobjectiveoftheCEED
InstituteisthedisseminationofideasandprojectsonhowbesttoimproveefficiencyandcompetitivenessoftheCEEregion.
CEEDInstitute
Krucza24/26,00-526Warsaw,Poland
phone:(+48)882054546
e-mail:ceed@ceedinstitute.org
www:ceedinstitute.org

5. Contents
Introduction
Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries – what has changed in recent years
MigrationswithintheEuropeanUnion– stabilisationbutwithsomeexceptions
ForeignersinEUmemberstates– growthinthesignificanceofinternalmigrations
ImmigrationtoCEEcountriesfromotherEUmemberstatesandthirdcountries
– aretheyslowlybecomingimmigrationstates?
ThemigrationbalanceinEUmemberstates
Mainconclusionsfromthechapter
What does a Polish emigrant think about going abroad and returning?
Researchmethodology
Demographicfeaturesoftherespondents
Discussionoftheresearchresults
Summary
Mainconclusionsfromthechapter
Will immigrants solve the problems of Central and Eastern Europe?
Migrationanddemography
DemandforimmigrantsintheEuropeanUnion
ImmigrationattractivenessofEuropeanstates
Summary
Mainconclusionsfromthechapter
Appendix
Migration scenarios for CEE countries – or what can happen in the future
Youthaboutmigrations
WhoismostmobileandwhowillbeneededinlabourmarketsofCEEcountries?
Migrationscenarios
Summary
Mainconclusionsfromthechapter
Conclusion
References
Chapter I:
Chapter II:
Chapter III:
Chapter IV:
3
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12
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16
17
20
23
26
26
26
27
35
36
40
40
43
47
51
52
53
56
56
57
60
62
63
64
67

6. Migrationprocessesandtheireffectsareaproblem
whichconstantlyinterestsexperts,politiciansandthepublic.
Theyalsoplayanincreasingpartinmediadiscussions.
Unfortunately,manyunverifiedhypothesesandunjustified
conclusionsaredrawninthem.Inmanycasesthiscreates
afalsepicturebothoftheeffectsofPolesemigratingtoother
EUmemberstatesandoftheinfluxofforeignersintoPoland.
Atthesametime,wehavetorealisethatmigrationispartof
ourpresentreality,i.e.amodern,free-marketanddemocratic
Europe.SomePolesmakeuseofthisfreedomtotrytheirluck
abroad.Afteraperiodabroad,manyofthemwillreturnto
Poland,butatthesametimePolandwillbeanincreasingly
attractiveplaceforforeignerstotrytheirluckforabetter
future.Thatiswhyitisveryimportantnottospeakofmigration
asaphenomenontobeprevented,butratherintermsofhow
toexploitit.Thisrequireshonestandbalancedreportswhich
canformthebasisfordebateonthesubjectandforformulating
conclusions.Undoubtedlythelatestaswellastheearlierreport
bytheCEEDInstituteonmigrationarestudiesthatattempt
tohonestlypresenttheproblemofmigrationinmodern-day
Polandandaskquestionstowhichwemustfindananswer.
Inthelatestreport,showingthatmanyPolesworkingabroad
donotabandontheideaofwantingtoreturntoPolandisof
particularimportance.TheirrelationshiptoPolandisgenerally
positive,whichdispelsthemythaboutexpatriatesnotwishing
toreturntotheirhomecountry.Alsoveryinterestingisthe
attempttocomeupwithanindicatorwhichwouldspecifythe
attractivenessofvariouscountrieswithrespecttomigration.
Thisattempthasallowedmanyinterestingconclusionstobe
drawn.Iwouldencourageyoutoreadthereportanddiscuss
thepointsraisedinit.
Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz
ThePolishMinisterofLabourandSocialPolicy
4

7. Immigrantshavehistoricallyprovidedoneofthe
greatestcompetitiveadvantagesandplayedamajorrolein
thecountries’growth.Today,intheglobalizedworldaquestion
ariseswhetherweshouldleavethemigrationprocesseson
theirownorrathertrytoadvisedlymanagethemwiththe
countriescompetingtokeepandattractthehumanpotential?
ThekeyaimofthesecondCEEDInstitutereportonmigrations
istoprovideacomplexpictureoftheprocessesinEurope
(CentralandEasternEuropeinparticular)anddisplaythe
short-andlong-termbenefitsforallthestakeholdersinvolved.
Wewishtoshowvariouswaysmigrationsmightbe
perceivedandtriggeradebateontheirprospectiveimpact
bycreatingtheindexofmigrationattractivenessofthestates
oftheEuropeanUnion.Wealsostrivetoanswerthecompelling
questionwhethertheCEEstatesareabletowithstandthe
“braindrain” competitionwiththeEU-15statesregarding
thescopeofhighlyskilledimmigrantssuccessfullyattracted.
Forourparentsandthegenerationspast,theirhome
wastheirentireworld.Today,theworldhasbecomeourhome.
Inthisnewreality,thepolicymakersfromourregionhavebeen
facedwithanewchallengetorearrangeandrefurbishour
portionoftheglobalhome.Toprovidesolutionsandcreate
opportunitiesthatwouldmakeourregionanattractivepart
oftheworldworthstayingatandreturningto.
Jan Kulczyk
FounderoftheCEEDInstitute,
Internationalentrepreneur,
FounderofKulczykInvestments.
5

8. MigrationprocessfromtheCEEregionisamajor
economicandsocialchallengeformostoftheCEEcountries.
CEEDInstituteistheleadingthink-tankorganizationfocusing
onthisphenomenonandourfirstreporthadgainedsignificant
popularityamongexperts,politiciansandmedia.Thisreport
isoursecondpublicationcoveringthesametopic.Itprovides
awiderangeofupdatedinformationandalsoincludesthe
scenarioanalysis.
Wehavebeenusedtohearingaboutthe“Polish
plumber” – clichéwhichsymbolizesthefearofcosteffective
CentralandEasternEuropeanlabourthreateningthejob
marketintheWesternEurope.Buteverycoinhasaflipside.
Itseemslikeweplacemuchlessemphasisonthelossofhuman
capitalintheCEEcountries.InthesecondChapterofourreport
wecanlearnaninterestingperspectiveofaPolishemigrant
whogoesabroadandthendecidestoreturn.Thisresearch
producesmanyinterestingpiecesofinformationrelatedto
themotivationsbehindleavingandfearsandhopesconcerned
withlivingabroadaswellasplansforthefuture.Thanksto
thisreportwemaybetterunderstandthetruereasonsbehind
emigrationandthechallengeswefacewithkeepingourpeople
athome.
Thefinalchapterpresentsfourscenariosfor
migrationdevelopmentinthenextfiveyears.Becauseof
migrationandageingpopulationtheseyearswillbevery
decisiveforourcountries.Iamconfidentourreportwillbe
avitalvoiceinaproductivediscussionabouthowtostimulate
economicdevelopment.Itmayalsohelpthosewhoshapethe
socialpoliciestomakebetterandmoreinformeddecisions.
Indrek Neivelt
Estonianbusinessman,
MemberoftheProgrammeBoard
CEEDInstitute.
6

9. PolishcompaniesandPolishcitizensparticipatein
thedevelopmentoftheEuropeanlabourmarket.Theyareable
tofreelyusethebenefitsofferedbythewealthiereconomies,
inparticularthoseofGermany,UnitedKingdomandthe
Netherlands.Themajorityofmorethan2millionmigrantPoles
workinthesecountries,thebulkofwhomhavesettledthere
permanently.Conclusionsfromtheanalysisofeconomic
migrationshouldbeutilizedwhendesigningthePolishlabour
market.Althoughin2013thenumberofpeoplewhoemigrated
fromPolandtofindajobwashigherthanbefore(according
toestimatesoftheCentralStatisticalOfficebyapprox.70,000),
westillhaveasurplusoflabourresources.Fromthisviewpoint,
wecansaythatwearenotconcernedabouttheoutflowof
workers,asunemploymentstillremainsatatwo-digitlevel.
Ontheotherhand,thegrowingshortageofworkersinselected
occupationalgroupsisanimportantfactor.Willingnessof
doctorsorITprofessionalstoemigrateisacauseofconcern.
Amajorchallengeistokeeptheeminentprofessionalsinthe
country,sincehigherearningsarethemainstimulustoleave.
UntilwecatchupwiththeWestintermsofwagesandsalaries,
agreatermarketliberalizationinhiringworkersfromtheEast
willbenecessary.Thiswillsolvetheproblemofthetemporary
lackofprofessionalsinPoland.
Tomasz Misiak
President
oftheManagementBoard
ofWorkServiceS.A.
7

11. Introduction
ThefirstreportoftheCEEDInstituteaboutmigrationsinCentralandEasternEuropewasreceivedwith
greatinterestbyexperts,politiciansandthemedia.Awide-rangingdebatewassparkedbytheresultsofanalyses
demonstratingtheconsequencesoftheemigrationofnationalsofCEEcountriestootherEUmemberstates.
Atthesametime,discussionsalsoconcernedchallengesrelatedtoimmigration.Inthiscontext,solutionswere
soughtthatwouldhelpCEEcountriesavoidtheproblemsexperiencedbystateswithahighproportionof
foreignerswithinsociety,andwhicharerelatedtofailuretoutilisethepotentialofforeignersandtoproblems
withtheirintegration.DuringthedebateaboutmigrationfromtheperspectiveofCEEcountries,theideaemerged
thatthereisaneedtosupplementthereportwiththeresultsofempiricalresearchconductedamongemigrants
andtocarryoutanalysesthatwouldhelpanswerthequestionwhetherCEEcountriesarereadytoreceivegreater
numbersofimmigrantsandhowtheycancompeteagainstbetterdevelopedstatesinattractinghighlyskilled
foreigners.Thisreportprovidesaresponsetotheseproposals.Itcomplementsthefirstreportonmigrationsin
theCEEregion,whileupdatingitwiththemostrecentdatapublishedwithinthelastsixmonths.
SuchupdatesconstitutethemajorpartofChapterI.Amongotherthings,wemanagedtoupdate the
figures related to the scale of emigration and return migrations.Moreover,newdataconcerningemigration
trendsispresented.Theperiodthatelapsedsincepublicationofthefirstreportwastooshortforany
fundamentalchangestotakeplaceinthetrendsthatweseeinmigrationprocesses.Atthesametime,theupdated
datayieldednewpiecesofinformation,whichmayberelevantfromtheviewpointofthelong-termconsequences
thatwedealwithofmigrationbothwithintheEUandfromthirdcountriestotheEU.
ChapterIIdescribestheresultsofempiricalresearchperformedamongPolesworkingabroadwho
havebeenrecruitedbyWorkService,oneofthebiggestemploymentagencies.Thisresearchproducedmany
interestingpiecesofinformation,concerningthe motivations for leaving, fears and hopes related to living
abroad, and – what is particularly important – plans for the future.Onthebasisoftheresearch,wecallinto
question,amongotherthings,afactorindicatedinotherstudiesasinfluencingthewillingnesstostayabroad
relatedtoemigrants’negativeviewsaboutPoland.IntheresearchresultspresentedinChapterII,respondents
citedstrictlyeconomicandfamilyreasonsfortheirdecisiontostayabroadorreturnfromabroad.Politicalfactors
wereofabsolutelytertiaryrelevance.
ChapterIIIdescribesissuesconnectedwithimmigration.Itconsistsmainlyofanindex of migration
attractiveness of the member states of the European Union.Itwasdevelopedjustforthisreportwiththeaim
ofattemptingtoanswerthequestionwhetherCEEstatescansuccessfullycompeteagainsttheEU-15states
inattractinghighlyskilledimmigrants.Theindexofmigrationattractivenessofthestatesisaproposal–aproject
– whichrequiresalotofdiscussion.Iftheconceptofdevelopingsuchanindexgeneratesinterest,itwillbe
updatedandpublishedannually,soastoenableregularstudyofchangesintheattractivenessofEuropeanstates
forimmigrants.
ChapterIVisakindofrecapitulationofChaptersIandIIoftheCEEDInstitutereportonmigrations.
Itpresentsfour scenarios for the development of migration processes until 2020.Theyallseemlikelyand
theiremergencewilldependmainlyontheactionsofthegovernmentrelatedtostimulationofeconomic
developmentandenhancingoflivingstandards.Thereisnodoubtthatthisisdirectlycorrelatedwiththe
propensitytoemigrateandtheattractivenessofagivenstateforforeigners.Inthecaseofcountrieswherethe
mostnegativescenarioforthedevelopmentofmigrationprocessesmaterialises,wewillbedealingwiththe
declineoftheircompetitivenessand–inthelongrun–withrealimpoverishmentoftheirnationals.Butifthemost
positivescenariofordevelopmentofmigrationprocessesmaterialises,thiscouldcontributetorapidnarrowing
byagivencountryofthegapseparatingitfromthebestdevelopedEUstatesandconsequentlyfordynamic
improvementofthelivingstandardsofitsresidents.
Migrationsareasocial,economicandpoliticalphenomenonthatfuelconstantdebate.Thesecond
reportoftheCEEDInstituteonmigrationshastheambitiontobringorderintothisdebateandputitontheright
track.Wehopethisgoalhasbeenatleastpartiallyattained.
9

13. ChapterI
Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries
– what has changed in recent years

14. Theperiodthathaselapsedsincepublicationofthefirstreportaboutmigrationfromtheperspective
ofCEEcountriesistooshortforthechangestakingplacetobeconsideredfundamental.Itmustbeborneinmind
thatmigrationprocesses,unlesswedealwithsucheventsaswarsornaturaldisasters,takeplaceslowly.
Animpulseforachangeinthescaleofmigrationcanalsocomefromsucheventsastheliftingorintroductionof
restrictionsonmovementsofpeople.Nosuchfactorswerepresentineither2013or2014.Nevertheless,the
migrationprocessestakingplaceintheEuropeanUnionremainamatterofgreatinteresttobothpoliticiansand
publicopinion,whichmakesitessentialtomonitoranddrawconclusionsregardingtrends.Itistobeexpected
thatin2015theissueoffreemovementofworkersandemigrationtotheEUfromthirdcountrieswillbebackon
theEU’sagenda.ThisassumptionissupportedbythestatementmadebythenewPresidentoftheEuropean
1
Councilafterhisappointmenttotheposition.
MigrationswithintheEuropeanUnion–stabilisationbutwithsomeexceptions
AnanalysisofEurostatdatashowsthatin2013thepercentageofEUcitizensresidinginadifferent
memberstatethantheircountryoforiginwasthesameasayearearlier.Thesituationwasquitesimilarinthe
period2009-2010( ).
Itwouldbeamistaketodrawfar-reachingconclusionsfromananalysisofthedatacontainedinthe
chartabove.Neverthelessonecanventuretoindicatecertainrelationships.Eurostatdatasuggeststhatinearly
2013thenumberofcitizensofCEEcountriesresidingintheEU-15statesincreasedby114,000.Thismeansthatin
viewofthedatacontainedinChart1,adeclineinthenumberofmigratingcitizensofEU-15stateswasrecordedin
thatperiod.Atthesametime,thegrowthinthenumberofcitizensofCEEcountriesresidingintheEU-15inthe
analysedperiodwasverymoderateandlowerthaninprecedingyears.Onthisbasis,onecanassumethat2013
2
and2014wereyearsofstabilisationofmigrationprocessestakingplacewithintheEuropeanUnion.
Chart1
Chapter I
Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries
– what has changed in recent years
Chart 1
ChangesinthepercentageofEUcitizensresidinginadifferentmemberstatethantheircountryoforigin
Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroup
andcitizenship,Eurostat
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2007
2.1
2008
2.4
2009
2.5
2010
2.5
2011
2.6
2012
2.8
2013
2.8
1
ThestatementbyDonaldTuskduringthepressconferenceafterhisappointmenttothepositionofthePresidentoftheEuropeanCouncil,announcingfutureeffortstomeetthe
demandsoftheUnitedKingdomrelatedtochangesintherulesgoverningmovementofworkerswithintheEU.
Thisconclusionisbasedonestimates.Atthetimeofwriting,notallrequireddatafor2013and2014isavailable.Thelastcompletesetofdataisfor2012.2
12

15. GrowthinthenumberofthecitizensofCEEcountriesresidingintheEU-15wasrecordedinallstates
oftheregionexceptRomania,wherethenumberofcitizensofthatstateinEU-15countriesdeclinedslightly.
AlsonotableisthesignificantgrowthinthenumberofcitizensofHungaryandLatviaremaininginemigration
( ).Moreover,it must be stressed that, although small, the growth in the number of citizens of CEE
countries residing in EU-15 states continued the trend from previous years, despite expectations that the
worsening of the situation in the labour markets in EU-15 states resulting from the crisis would reduce
emigrationsandincreasethescaleofreturns.ThiswouldmeanthatthenumberofthecitizensofCEEcountries
stayinginemigrationshouldhavedropped,somethingthatdidnothappenin2012andperhapsneitherin2013
norin2014,foranycountryexceptRomania.
ForallCEEcountries,growthinthepercentageofemigrantswasrecorded( ).Inpercentage
terms,thisgrowthisgreaterthanwouldfollowfromthegrowthoftheoverallnumberofthecitizensofCEE
countriesresidinginEU-15( ).Thisresultsfromdecliningpopulationsofthestatesoftheregion.
Forexample,Romaniasawadeclineinthenumberofemigrantsaccompaniedbyariseintheirpercentageshare
3
ofthepopulation.Forseveralyears,Romaniahasrecordedpopulationdecline,andconsequentlydespitethe
reductioninthenumberofcitizensofthatcountryresidingabroad,theirpercentageshareinthetotalpopulation
hasgrown.
OnlyinthecaseofSlovakia,theCzechRepublicbecamethemaindestinationstate,whileGermanyremainsthe
mainrecipientofSlovaksamongEU-15states.
Table1
Table2
Table1
Table 1
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
TOTAL
EstimatesofthenumberofcitizensofCEEcountriesresidingintheEU-15andtherelatedpercentagechange
180
45
140
100
455
410
210
345
140
25
240
2004-2012
(%)
Source:OwncalculationbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,EurostatandD.Hollandetal.,LabourmobilitywithintheEU:theimpactofenlargementandtransitional
arrangements,NIESRDiscussionPaperno.379,NationalInstituteofEconomicandSocialResearch,London2011.
482,000
108,000
68,000
184,000
128,000
254,000
1,798,000
2,400,000
158,000
43,000
5,623,000
2012
437,000
105,000
59,000
152,000
80,000
193,000
1,497,000
2,218,000
166,000
41,000
4,948,000
2010
333,000
113,000
45,000
131,000
57,000
167,000
1,328,000
1,640,000
150,000
38,000
4,002,000
2008
229,000
71,000
34,000
92,000
32,000
99,000
776,000
882,000
99,000
36,000
2,350,000
2006
171,000
74,000
28,000
92,000
23,000
50,000
580,000
541,000
66,000
34,000
1,659,000
2004
505,000
112,000
75,000
221,000
141,000
268,000
1,883,000
2,322,000
165,000
45,000
5,737,000
2013
195
50
170
140
515
440
225
330
150
30
245
2004-2013
(%)
3
Atthesametime,itmustbepointedoutthatin2014Eurostatreviseddataconcerningpopulationsofmemberstates.Ifthosedifferencesareveryslightforthemajorityofstates,inthe
caseofRomaniathecorrectionexceeds1millionpeople.
AsconcernsthemainstatesreceivingemigrantsfromCEE
countries,nosignificantchangestookplace.
13

16. ThelimitedgrowthinthenumberofthecitizensofCEEcountriesresidinginemigrationrecordedin
2012wasalsoaccompaniedbyagrowth in the scale of return migrations in the case of a majority of the
states of the region.Comparedto2011,morecitizensreturnedtoLatvia,Lithuania,Hungary,Poland,Romania
andSlovakia.ThegreatestincreaseinthenumberofreturningmigrantswasrecordedbyPoland(33%)and
Romania(12%).Theremainingstatesrecordedadeclineinthenumberofreturnmigrants.Estoniarecorded
adeclineof33%,Slovenia21%,theCzechRepublic20%andCroatia12%( ).Table3
Table 2
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Romania
EU-11citizensresidingintheEU-15on1January2013andmaindestinationcountries
Spain
Germany
Germany
Finland
Germany
UnitedKingdom
UnitedKingdom
UnitedKingdom
CzechRepublic/Germany
Germany
Italy
Main destination stateCountry of origin
Source:OwncalculationbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat,D.Hollandetal.,LabourmobilitywithintheEU:theimpactofenlargementandtransitional
arrangements,NIESRDiscussionPaperno.379,NationalInstituteofEconomicandSocialResearch,London2011andOECD,InternationalMigrationOutlook2013,OECDPublishing2013
6.90
8.00
1.10
5.70
2.20
9.00
7.00
4.90
3.00
2.20
11.60
Percentage of
emigrants in 2013
(%)
7,285,000
4,262,000
10,516,000
1,320,000
9,909,000
2,972,000
2,024,000
38,533,000
5,411,000
2,059,000
20,020,000
Population
505,000
340,000
112,000
75,000
221,000
268,000
141,000
1,883,000
165,000
45,000
2,322,000
Emigrants
in EU-15
6.60
7.60
1.00
5.15
1.85
8.40
6.20
4.70
2.90
2.10
11.20
Percentage of
emigrants in 2012
(%)
Table 3
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Croatia
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Returnmigrantsandtheirshareintotalimmigrants
Source:OwncalculationbasedonImmigrationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
35
20
58
47
72
87
40
62
93
18
46
2012
%oftotal
immigrants
return
4,964
6,765
1,532
4,208
9,637
17,357
13,362
135,910
155,613
2,741
2,479
30
55
55
72
89
20
65
94
24
22
2011
%oftotal
immigrants
return
8,141
2,034
4,720
7,373
14,012
5,504
101,945
138,397
3,318
1,078
38
57
11
80
6
69
91
18
8
2010
%oftotal
immigrants
return
18,267
1,611
254
4,153
1,635
107,378
136,799
2,711
1,111
29
43
19
74
8
75
92
10
8
2009
%oftotal
immigrants
return
21,744
1,655
521
4,821
2,312
142,348
124,936
2,903
1,205
14

17. ComparisonofthedatafromTables1and3demonstratesthat2012witnessedanincreaseinthe
dynamicsofmigrationprocessesbetweenCEEcountriesandEU-15states.In the majority of cases, there was
growthinthenumberofcitizensresidingabroad,despitetheincreasedscaleofreturnmigrations,leading
to the conclusion that emigration increased as well. Thismeansthatthenumberofpeoplewithmigration
experiencesisalsoontherise.
In2014theEuropeanCommissionpublishedareportenablingcomparisonsbetweenmemberstates
oftheEuropeanUnionintermsofmobilityratesandlengthofstayabroadofcitizensofagivenstate( ).
ThedatasuggeststhatinthemajorityofCEEcountries,citizensofthosestatesremaininemigrationforupto
10years.Atthesametime,thisgroupstillcontainsalargenumberofpeoplewholefttheanalysedcountriesnot
earlierthanfiveyearsago.Intheircase,thereisarealchancethattheywilldecidetoreturntotheircountriesof
origin.ThesituationisquitedifferentinsuchcountriesasPortugal,IrelandorSpain(so-calledoldemigration
stateswithintheEuropeanUnion).Inthesecases,mostemigrantsresideabroadformorethan10years.
Chart2
Chart 2
Mobilityratesbysending
country– mobileEUcitizens
livinginanotherEUmember
state,byyearsofresidence
(agegroup15-64,2013,
in%ofworking-agepopulation
ofcountryofcitizenship)
Source:EuropeanCommission,
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/
pdf/themes/27_skills_gaps_and
_labour_mobility.pdf 0.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.0
Latvia
Lithuania
Romania
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Luxembourg
Poland
Estonia
Slovakia
Hungary
Portugal
Ireland
Greece
Netherlands
Austria
Croatia
Belgium
CzechRepublic
Denmark
Italy
Finland
Spain
France
Sweden
Germany
UnitedKingdom
16.0
Morethan10years
5to10years
Lessthan5years
15

18. ForeignersinEUmemberstates–growthinthesignificanceofinternalmigrations
ThedebatewearehavingintheEuropeanUnionleadsonetotheconclusionthatamajorityofmember
statestendtofavourrestrictingimmigrationfromthirdcountries.Hereargumentsaboutthenegativeimpactof
immigrationonthelabourmarketandanincreaseinsocialunrestprevail.Howevermanyofthoseargumentsare
strictlypopulistinnatureandarenotbasedonreliableresearchresults.
AnanalysisofEurostatdatademonstratedthat2013sawareversalofthetrendconcerninginflowof
foreignersfromthirdcountriesthathadbeenobservedsince2007( ).Thenumberofforeignersresiding
in EU states dropped. Thecomingyearswillprovideananswertothequestionwhetherthisisjustaone-year
decline,asitwasin2006and2007,orwhetherthiswillbeamulti-yeartrend.
DespiterelativestabilisationofmigrationprocesseswithintheEUmanifestedinthemoderategrowth
inthenumberofthecitizensofCEEcountriesresidinginEU-15statesandadeclineinthenumberofthirdcountry
nationalsintheEU-27,theEuropeanimmigrationstatesrecordedariseinthepercentageofforeignersinthetotal
population.InthecaseofGermanyandtheUnitedKingdom,itwasmainlycitizensofmemberstates,chieflyfrom
CEEcountries,whowereresponsibleforthisgrowth.InthecaseofFrancewecouldobserveagrowthinthe
numberofimmigrantsmainlyfromthirdcountries( ).
Chart3
Table4
Chart 3
ChangesinthepopulationofthirdcountrynationalsresidinginEU-28countries,2004-2013(inmillions)
25
20
15
10
5
0
2004 200620072008200920102011 2013
20.420.720.019.318.719.0
17.4
16.4
2005 2012
20.4 20.5
Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
Table 4
Germany
France
United Kingdom
EUcitizensresidinginthemostpopulatedEU-28states,2012and2013(in%)
3.70
2.15
3.85
Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
Citizens of other EU member statesTotalCountry
Non-nationals
2012 2013
3.40
2.10
3.70
9.40
6.20
7.70
2012 2013
9.05
5.90
7.60
16

19. Thesituationinthestateswiththegreatestpercentagesofimmigrantsinthepopulationvaried
greatly.ForexampleagrowthintheproportionofforeignerswasrecordedinLuxembourg.Thisprocess
concernedbothEUcitizensandthirdcountrynationals.Thepercentageofforeignersresidinginthatstate
approaches50%.Atthesametime,adeclinewasrecordedinCyprusandLatvia,butintheformeraslightincrease
inthenumberofEUcitizensresidingontheislandwasobserved( ).
ImmigrationtoCEEcountriesfromotherEUmemberstatesandthirdcountries–aretheyslowlybecoming
immigrationstates?
TogetafullpictureofmigrationprocessestakingplacewithinCEEcountries,itisalsonecessaryto
4
analyseEurostatdatapresentingindetailimmigrationtothosecountries.Thisdatasuggeststhatin2012
a majority of the states of the region recorded growth in the inflow of foreigners both from EU member
states and from third countries.InCroatia,theCzechRepublic,Lithuania,PolandandSlovenia,immigration
growthwasrecordedbothfromEUmemberstatesandthirdcountries.Estoniarecordedagrowthinimmigration
fromEUmemberstatesandadeclinefromthirdcountries.TheoppositehappenedinthecaseofHungary.Latvia
andSloveniarecordedadeclineinimmigrationinthecasesofbothaforementionedgroupsofstates( and
5
).ThosetrendsillustratethehighlydiversifiedpictureofCEEcountriesasconcernsimmigration
processes.Itmustbeassumedthatthescaleofimmigrationisinfluencednotonlybytheeconomicsituationofa
givenstate,butalsobyimmigrationpolicy.ThismayexplainanotheryearofgrowthinimmigrationtoPoland,but
itsdeclineinthecaseofHungaryandSlovakia.ThesituationissimilarinLatviaandEstonia,whichhaverecently
decidedtomaketheirregulationsgoverningtheinflowofRussiancitizensmorestringent.
Table5
Table6
Chart4
Table 5
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Latvia
EUmembersstateswiththelargestshareofforeignersinthetotalpopulation,2012and2013(in%)
38.4
13.0
0.3
Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
Citizens of other EU member statesTotalCountry
Non-nationals
2012 2013
37.9
12.6
0.3
44.5
19.6
15.6
2012 2013
43.8
21.0
16.3
4
Thestatisticspresentedsofarhaveshowntheshareofforeignersinthepopulationofagivencountry.OnenotableexceptionisdataconcerningreturnmigrationstoCEEcountries.
Whenthecalculationsweremade,comparabledataforBulgariaandRomaniawasmissing.
5
17

20. Table 6
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
ImmigrationfromEU-27statesandfromthirdcountriestoCEEcountries,2011and2012
45
28
44
6
51
15
30
30
30
18
82
Source:OwnworkbasedonImmigrationbyfiveyearagegroup,sexandcitizenship,Eurostat
% of immigrantsTotalCountry
EU-27
2011 2012
28
56
4
55
19
30
25
37
18
84
4,136
1,342
12,075
70
10,358
539
738
24,446
3,450
2,179
2,418
2011 2012
1,052
10,706
62
12,451
1,085
503
13,896
3,412
1,990
3,162
Main country of origin
Greece
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Romania
Germany
Latvia
Germany
Italy
Croatia
Hungary
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
55
72
56
94
49
85
70
70
70
82
18
% of immigrantsTotalCountry
Third countries
2011 2012
72
44
96
45
81
70
75
63
82
16
4,989
3,409
15,495
1,036
9,981
3,127
1,748
57,070
8,151
10,102
522
2011 2012
2,758
8,265
1,612
9,854
4,687
1,170
41,116
5,864
8,775
589
Main country of origin
Turkey
BosniaandHerzegovina
Ukraine
Russia
Ukraine
Russia
Russia
Ukraine
Turkey
BosniaandHerzegovina
Ukraine
18

21. AdetailedanalysisofthechangesintheshareofforeignersinthepopulationsofCEEcountriesthat
tookplaceintheperiod2012-2013demonstratedthat,comparedtothepreviousyear,in2013stillthegreatest
numberofforeignersresidedinLatviaandEstonia,althoughinbothcasesadeclineinthepercentageof
foreignersinthetotalpopulationswasobserved(by0.7and0.8percentagepoints(pp)respectively).Hungary
alsorecordedadeclineintheshareofforeigners.AgrowthinthissharewasrecordedinSlovenia(by0.2pp),
Romania(by>0.2pp),Bulgaria(by0.1pp).Intheremainingstates,thesituationin2013wasthesameasinthe
previousyear( ).Table7
CzechRepublic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Slovakia
Romania
Hungary
Slovenia
110,000
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2005
Chart 4
InflowofimmigrantstoCEEcountriesfromEU-27countriesandthirdcountries,2005-2012
2006 2008 2010 20112007 2009
Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
(since2008)
2012
19

22. Table 7
Latvia
Estonia
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Hungary
Slovakia
Croatia
Bulgaria
Romania
Poland
TheshareofforeignersinCEEcountries,2012and2013(in%)
0.30
0.60
0.30
1.50
0.80
1.00
0.20
0.20
0.10
0.05
Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
Citizens of other EU member statesTotalCountry
Non-nationals
2012 2013
0.30
1.10
0.30
1.40
1.30
1.00
0.10
0.03
0.05
15.60
14.90
4.40
4.00
1.40
1.30
0.70
0.60
0.40
0.15
2012 2013
16.30
15.70
4.20
4.00
2.10
1.30
0.50
0.17
0.15
Onthebasisofthedatafromtheabovetable,oneshouldalsopointoutthedeclineinthenumberofEU
citizensresidinginEstonia(by0.5pp)andinHungary(by0.5pp).AgrowthwasrecordedinthecaseoftheCzech
Republic(by0.1pp),Bulgaria(by0.1pp)andRomania(by<0.1pp).
Polandstillremainsthecountrywiththelowestshareofforeigners(0.15%oftheentirepopulation).
ThisconcernsbothEUcitizens,andthirdcountrynationals.
AnanalysisofthestatesfromwhichthegreatestnumberofforeignerscometoCEEcountriesindicates
thataveryhighlevelofdiversityregardingdirectionsofmigrants’inflowisaccompaniedbymaintenanceofthe
migrationnetworkscreatedinthepast( ).InthecaseofthestatesintheBalkanregion,migrationstake
placemainlybetweenthem.AmongEUmemberstates,thelargestnumberofGreeksmigratetoBulgaria,Slovaks
totheCzechRepublic,FinnstoEstonia,RomanianstoHungary,GermanstoLatviaandPoland,Latviansto
Lithuania,ItalianstoRomania,andHungarianstoSlovakia.Itmustbeassumedthatamongthoseimmigrants
therearealsopeoplewhochangedcitizenshipandreturnedtotheirstateoforigin/birth.Moreover,itcanbeseen
thatmigrationstakeplacemainlybetweenstatesborderingwitheachother.
Thepermanenceofmigrationnetworksisalsoconfirmedbyananalysisofinflowsfromthird
countries.InthecaseoftheBalticstates,despitetheintroductionofrestrictions,citizensoftheRussian
Federationstillconstitutethelargestgroupofimmigrants.InthecaseofSloveniaandCroatia,thelargestgroup
consistsofcitizensofBosniaandHercegovina,i.e.oneofthestatesthatemergedafterthecollapseofYugoslavia.
UkrainianstraditionallygotoPoland,theCzechRepublic,SlovakiaandHungary.TurksgotoBulgariaand
Romania.ItcanbepointedoutthataswithimmigrationfromEUmemberstates,theinflowofthirdcountry
nationalstoCEEcountriestakesplacemainlyfromstatesneighbouringthem.
ThemigrationbalanceinEUmemberstates
Themostrecentdatafor2012andestimatesfor2013presentingthemigrationbalanceindicate
severalchangesrelatedtomigrationprocessestakingplacewithintheEuropeanUnion.Nevertheless,these
cannotbeconsideredfundamental.AsChart5shows,in2013thegreatestvalueofnetmigrationswasrecordedby
Italy(19.7per1,000inhabitants– thisisthreetimesthelevelofthepreviousyear)andLuxembourg(19– an
increaseof0.1%).Thebiggestnegativemigrationbalancein2013wasrecordedinCyprus(-13.9per1,000
inhabitants;in2012itwas-0.7)andLithuania(-7.1;in2012itwas-5.8).Ireland,whichratedlastintheprevious
year,improveditspositiongoingfourplacesup.Atthesametime,itimproveditsnetmigrationrateonlyslightly.
Table6
20

23. In2013theratewas-5.6,whilein2012itamountedto-7.6.Inthecourseofoneyear,thedifferencebetweenthe
countrieswiththehighestandlowestnetmigrationrateschangedtoo(in2013thedifferencewas33.6points,
whilein2012itwas26.5points).
TheCEEcountriesthatrecordedapositivenetmigrationratein2013wereHungary(0.6),Slovakia
(0.4)andSlovenia(0.2).Otherstatesrecordedanegativenetmigrationrate,withLatviahavingthelowestrate
(-7.1).InthecaseofsuchcountriesasHungary,Romania,LatviaortheCzechRepublictherewasaperceptibly
significantdeclineinthenetmigrationrate.InthecaseofLatvia,theratewas1.3percentagepoints.Hungary
recordedadeclineof1pp,whileRomaniaandtheCzechRepublicsawaslumpof1.1pp.Consequentlyin2013those
twostatesrecordedanegativenetmigrationrate,whereasin2012itwaspositiveinbothcases.Bothin2012and
in2013Latviahadanegativemigrationbalance.AdifferentsituationtookplaceinEstoniaandLithuania.Both
thosestatesimprovedtheirnetmigrationrate:Estoniaby3.7ppandLithuaniaby1.7pp.Howeverboththose
statesstillrecordedanegativemigrationbalance.
Thechangesinnetmigrationratesinotherstateswereminimal.Forexample,inPoland,thenet
migrationratedroppedby0.3percentagepointsfrom-0.2in2012to-0.5in2013,andinCroatiaby-0.3pp,from
-0.9in2012to-1.2in2013.InSlovakiatherewasadeclineof0.2pp,andinSlovenia0.1pp.However,boththose
statesrecordedapositivemigrationbalance( ).Chart5
Chart 5
Migrationbalance
inEU-28countries,2013
(per1,000inhabitants)
Source:Cruderateofnetmigrationplusadjustment
(Per1000inhabitants),Eurostat2014 -15-10-5 05 101520
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Sweden
Austria
Germany
Denmark
Finland
United Kingdom
Belgium
Netherlands
France
Hungary
Slovakia
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
Romania
Poland
Croatia
Estonia
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Ireland
Lithuania
Latvia
Cyprus
19.7
19.0
7.6
6.9
6.6
5.8
3.8
3.3
3.1
2.3
1.2
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.2
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.5
-1.2
-2.0
-3.5
-4.7
-5.5
-5.6
-5.7
-7.1
-13.9
21

24. RecentlyEurostatpublishednewdata,whichhelpstoshowtrendsasregardsmigrationswithintheEU
andfromthirdcountries.Ananalysisofthisdataindicatesthatthe share of citizens of EU member states
among migrants is increasing while the share of third country nationals among them is declining ( ).
Thisisapracticalconfirmationofthepoliticaldecisionsofrecentyearsaimedatrestrictingimmigrationfrom
thirdcountrieswhilenotintroducinganysignificanthindrancestofreemovementofworkers.Itshouldbenoted,
st
however,thattheEuropeanUnionenlargementsmadeinthe21centurychangedthestatusofcitizensofnew
memberstates.Theyhavebecomeinternalmigrants.Thiswasboundtoresultinchangesinmigrationstatistics.
Nevertheless,thedeclineintheshareofthethirdcountrynationalsamongmigrantsalsocontinuedinno-
enlargementyears,soitcanbeassumedthatmigrationswithintheEUtoasmallextentsubstitutefor
immigrationfromthirdcountries.Suchaconclusionmightchangeifwecouldestimatetheillegalinflowofthird
countrynationalsintotheEU.However,thisisanimpossibletaskgiventhelackofdataandreliableanalytical
methodologies.
Duetothelongprocessofcollectionandpublicationofcomparabledata,analysesofmigration
processesareboundtobeperformedwithacertaindelay(usuallytwoyears).Thishampers,butdoesnot
preclude,thedrawingofconclusionsandmakingofshort-termrecommendations.Astheresultsofanalyses
presentedinChapterIhaveshown,thechangesinmigrationflowswithinagivenyearareverysmall.Atthesame
time,theyindicatebothmaintenanceoftheexistingtrends(migrationsbetweenCEEcountriesandtheEU-15)and
theshapingofnewrelationships(adeclineofimmigrationfromthirdcountries).Conclusionsdrawnfromthose
analysesshouldbetakenintoaccountwheneconomicandsocialstrategiesarebeingdeveloped.Failuretotake
migrationtrendsintoaccountmayleaddoerroneousconclusionsandtoothermistakesbeingmadeonthatbasis.
Analysesofmigrationprocessesareparticularlyimportantwhendemographicchangesandtheiroutcomes,
particularlyinthelabourmarket,areforecast.
Chart6
Chart 6
ShareofcitizensofEUmemberstatesandthirdcountrynationalsintheperiod2010-2012intheEU-27(in%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
OtherEU-27countries
Thirdcountries
38.2
61.8
201320122011
39.3
60.7
40.2
59.8Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,
agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat
22

25. Thedatafor2012andestimatesfor2013asregardsmigrationprocesses
takingplacewithintheEuropeanUnionindicatethatwe are dealing with
a stabilisation of the migration situation.ThenumberofEUcitizensresiding
inamemberstateotherthantheirstateoforiginhasremainedvirtually
unchanged.
Despitethestablemigrationsituation,the number of citizens of CEE
countriesin EU-15 states increased again.Growthwasrecordedinallstatesof
theregionbesidesRomania.However,the scale of return migrations also
increased in the same period.ThismeansthatmigrationflowsbetweenCEE
countriesandtheEU-15increased.2012and2013provedtobethenextyears
whenexpectationsthatmigrationflowswoulddiminishfailedtomaterialise.
But,atthesametime,thegrowthinthenumberofthecitizensofCEEcountries
residingintheEU-15islowerthaninpreviousyears.
The number of foreigners residing in the European Union on
1January2013waslowerthanin2011and2012.Atthesametimethesituation
wasvariedinthecaseofCEEcountries.InCroatia,theCzechRepublic,Lithuania,
Poland,HungaryandSlovenia,growthinthescaleofimmigrationfromthird
countrieswasrecorded.Otherstatesrecordeddeclines.Itshouldalsobepointed
outthatthestatesreceivingthelargestnumberofforeigners,i.e.Germany,
FranceandtheUnitedKingdom,onceagainrecordedagrowthinthepercentage
offoreignersinthetotalpopulation.
No fundamental changes took place in the migration balance of EU
member states. Italyrecordedthegreatestgrowthwithregardtonetmigration
rate,whileCyprusrecordedthegreatestdrop.InthecaseofCEEcountries,we
weredealingwithquitealargevarietyofsituations.In2013animprovementin
thenetmigrationratewasrecordedinEstoniaandLithuania,whiledeterioration
wasnotedinHungary,Romania,LatviaandtheCzechRepublic.Thesituation
remainedvirtuallyunchangedinotherstates.
ComparisonofthedirectionsofmigrationstakingplacewithintheEU
showsthatinrecentyearswehavebeendealingwithanincreaseintheshare
of citizens of EU member states accompanied by a decline in the share of
thirdcountrynationals.
Main conclusions from the chapter:
1
5
2
3
4
23

27. ChapterII
What does a Polish emigrant think
about going abroad and returning?

28. Chapter II
What does a Polish emigrant think
about going abroad and returning?
ManystudiesconductedbothinPolandandabroadhaveaddressedtheissueofdefiningtheprofileof
Polishemigrants,identifyingthereasonsunderlyingtheirdecisiontoleavePolandandplansforthefuture.Dueto
theimpossibilityofdefiningacollectiveprecisely,noneofthosestudieswasrepresentative,andinamajorityof
casesrespondentswereselectedusingamethodcalled“snowballsampling”.Consequently,theresearchresults
showonlyapartofmigrationrealityandshouldnotbegeneralisedtoapplytoanentirecollectiveofemigrants.
But,atthesametime,theresultsofsuchresearchhaveprovidedmanyusefulpiecesofinformation,whichcould
havenotbeenacquiredthroughothermethods,e.g.expertopinionsurveysoranalysesofstatisticaldata.
Therefore,itisdesirabletoconductqualitativeresearchamongemigrantsinordertodeterminetheiropinions
andneedstothegreatestpossibleextent.
ThischapterpresentsresultsofqualitativeresearchcarriedoutamongPolesworkingabroadwho
havebeenrecruitedbyoneofthebiggestemploymentagenciesinPoland,i.e.WorkServiceS.A.
Researchmethodology
Whentheresearchsamplewascreated,thedatabaseofWorkServicecontained2,355peoplewho
undertookworkabroadthroughtheagency.Onthisbasis,aclustersamplecontaining235personswaseventually
established.Computer-AssistedTelephoneInterviews(CATI)wereperformedbyemployeesofthecall-incentreof
WorkService.TheCATIswereperformedinlateAugustandearlySeptember2014andhadbeenprecededby
apilotsurveycoveringeightrespondents.Despitethefactthatthepersonsundertakingthesurveywerefaced
withanumberofrefusalsandinanumberofcasesthepersonscompletingthequestionnairefailedtoprovide
answerstoallthequestions,theresearchenabledcollectionofinterestingempiricalmaterial,ananalysisof
whichispresentedinthischapter.Duetotheconstraintsinvolved,thereportonlycontainschartswith
breakdownsintosectors.Itwasdecidedthattheycontributethegreatestaddedvaluetosourceliterature.
BoththequestionnaireaswellasthefullreportonthisresearchareavailableonthewebsiteoftheCEEDInstitute.
Demographicfeaturesoftherespondents
Menoverwhelminglyprevailedamongtherespondentswhotookpartintheresearch.Women
constitutedamere12.8%ofallrespondents.Suchaselectionfollowedmainlyfromthespecificsofthemain
databaseofWorkService,wherewomenwereinadecisiveminority,andthesectorsinwhichworkersrecruitedby
theagencyareemployed.Forthatreason,inamajorityofcasesthischapterforegoesdetailedanalysesbysex.
Inamajorsimplification,onecanstatethattheresultsoftheresearchcanbecomeasourceofknowledgeabout
theopinionsofemigrantsrecruitedbyemploymentagenciesandemployedinfoursectors(industry,
construction,manufacturing,services)instatessuchasGermany,FranceandBelgium.
Atthetimeofsampleselectionandperformanceoftheinterviews,incontrasttosex,asignificant
diversityintheageofrespondentswasobtained.Thebestrepresentedwerepeopleaged21-25(22.4%ofthe
respondents)andaged26-30(21%).Thesmallestwasthegroupofrespondentsaged31-35(17.6%).Persons
aged36-40accountedfor20.6%,whilethoseagedover40accountedfor18.4%oftherespondents.Thisselection
ofrespondentsbyagewassimilartotheprofilesofPolishemigrantsacquiredinotherstudies.Theystresstheir
youngage(under40).Intheanalysedresearch,suchrespondentsconstitutedover80%oftheentiregroup,
i.e.adecisivemajority.
26

29. Moreover,thestudyobtainedagreatdiversityofrespondentsbysectorsinwhichtheywereemployed
abroad.Thebiggestgroupwascomprisedbyworkersemployedinthemanufacturingsector(32.4%),whilethe
smallestconsistedofthoseworkinginindustry(15.7%).Representativesofservicesandconstructionaccounted
for26.8%and25.1%respectively.
TherespondentswhoparticipatedintheresearchworkedinthreeEuropeanUnionmemberstates:
Germany,BelgiumandFrance.MostofthemworkedinGermany(55.8%).France(25.5%)camesecondand
Belgiumthird(nearly18.7%).Suchgeographicaldistributionoftheemploymentofemigrantsbringsasignificant
addedvaluetotheknowledgeaboutthemostrecentemigrationsofPoles.Mostanalysesperformedafter2004
havefocusedmainlyontheUnitedKingdom,IrelandandScandinavia(chieflyNorway),i.e.thecountriestowhich
thegreatestnumberofPoleswentaftertheaccessiontotheEuropeanUnion,whileresearchdescribingthe
situationandpositionofPolesgoingtothestatesof“typical”emigrationhavebeenneglected.
Discussionoftheresearchresults
Thereasonsunderlyingthedecisiontoundertakeworkabroadisoneoftheissuesmostfrequently
addressedinthediscussionaboutemigration.Inmanypapersitisclaimedthatthemainreasonforleaving
Polandisunemployment.Buttheanalysisoftheanswersofrespondentsinthisstudyindicatedthatmostofthem
hadajobinPoland,butwerenotsatisfiedwiththeremunerationtheyreceived.Ineverysector,suchananswer
wasprovidedbyover70%oftherespondents.Therefore,themajorfactorstimulatingemploymentmigration
was the opportunity to obtain salaries higher than those available in Poland ( ).Havingnojobin
Polandwasmostfrequentlyindicatedinthecaseofworkersemployedinindustry(over34%oftherespondents),
whileitwasleastfrequentlycitedbythoseworkingintheconstructionsector(almost12%).Atthesametime,the
lattergroupmostfrequentlypointedouttheywantedtotrytheirhandsatworkingabroad(35.6%)andthatthey
wantedtoacquirenewqualifications(23.7%).Approximately30%ofrespondentsworkinginmanufacturingand
servicesnamedlackofemploymentastheirreasonforleavingPoland.
Reasonsforundertakingemploymentabroad
Chart7
Chart 7
Reasonsforundertaking
employmentabroad
withabreakdown
bysector(notmore
thantwoanswers,in%)
IhadajobinPoland
butwagesweretoolow
NojobinPoland
Iwantedtotrymyhands
atworkingabroad
Iwantedtoobtain
newqualifications
Ireceivedaspecific
jobofferabroad
Iwasencouraged
byfamily/friends
Other
Constructionsector(n=59)
Manufacturing(n=75)
Industry(n=35)
Services(n=63)
79.6
74.6
74.3
84.1
11.9
28.0
34.3
30.2
35.6
24.0
11.4
27.0
23.7
9.3
11.4
14.3
5.1
16.0
8.6
11.1
1.7
6.7
11.4
11.1
11.9
6.7
8.6
6.3
27

30. Ashasbeenalreadypointedout,financialconsiderationswerethemostimportantreasonfor
undertakingemploymentabroad.TherespondentshadjobsinPoland,buttheirsalariesweretoolow.Inthe
breakdownbyagegroup,thisanswerwasmostfrequentlygivenbypersonsaged21-25(86.5%),andleast
frequentlybythoseaged31-35(72.5%).Theanswer“Iwantedtotrymyhandsatworkingabroad” wasmost
frequentlygivenbypeopleintheoldestagegroup,theover-40-year-olds(39.5%).LackofemploymentinPoland
wasmostfrequentlycitedasthereasontoleavebypeopleaged36-40(42.6%).Thisanswerwasgivenleast
frequentlybyrespondentsinthetwoyoungestagegroups.Onerespondentinfouragedover40stressedtheir
willingnesstoacquirenewqualificationsasthereasonforundertakingemploymentabroad.
Atthetimetheresearchwasconducted,a decisive majority of respondents were satisfied with
theirdecisiontoundertakeemploymentabroad.Suchananswerwasgivenby84.5%oftherespondentsinthe
constructionsector,87.7%ofthoseworkinginmanufacturing,91.7%ofthoseworkinginindustry,and91.9%of
respondentsworkinginservices( ).
ThedatacontainedinChart8suggeststhatanswersunambiguouslyindicatingdissatisfactionwith
undertakingofemploymentabroadweregivenextremelyrarely.Inthecaseofindustryandservices,notasingle
respondentgavesuchanswer.However,otherresearchresultssuggestthatalargegroupofPolesarenotsatisfied
withworkingabroad.Thepositiveanswersobtainedinthisstudycanresultfromseveralcircumstances.First,
personswhoagreedtoprovideanswersweresatisfiedwhilethosehavingdifferentopinionssimplyrefusedto
takepartinthesurvey.Second,peoplehiredthroughemploymentagenciescanbefrequentlysatisfiedsimply
becausetheyhadtodovirtuallynothingtoobtainemploymentabroad.Andlastbutnotleast,thosepeoplewere
employedinGermany,FranceandBelgium,wherestandardsconcerningobservanceofemployeerightsarevery
stringentandemployeesareveryrarelyexploited.
Theanalysisoftheanswerstothequestionconcerningsatisfactionwithundertakingofemployment
abroadindicatedabroadconsensusintermsoftheageofrespondents.Differencesinanswerswereminimal.
Themostsatisfiedweretherespondentsaged36-40(almost91.5%weresatisfied),whiletheleastsatisfiedwere
personsaged26-30(almost86%weresatisfied).
Satisfactionwithundertakingemploymentabroad
Chart8
Chart 8
Satisfactionwithundertakingemploymentabroadwithabreakdownbysector(in%)
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Hardtosay
Constructionsector(n=58)
Manufacturing(n=73)
Industry(n=36)
Services(n=62)
84.5
87.7
91.6
91.9
5.2
4.1
0.0
0.0
10.3
8.2
8.4
8.1
28

31. Ashasalreadybeenindicated,financial considerations were the main reason for going abroad.
Therefore,toevaluatethedecisiontoleavePoland,itisessentialtodeterminewhethertherehasbeenareal
improvementinthefinancialsituationofagivenrespondent.Over90%oftherespondentsdeclaredthatworking
abroadimprovedtheirfinancialsituation.Suchanswersweremostfrequentlygivenbypeopleworkingin
manufacturing(98.6%).Atthesametimealmostallrespondentsoftheoldestandyoungestagegroupsanswered
thatworkingabroadimprovedtheirfinancialsituation( ).
Amongotherpositivefactorsrelatedtomigration,respondentsindicatedimproved self-esteem.
Forexample,nearlyhalftherespondentsworkinginservicescitedthisfactor.Suchanswerwasgivenalsoby
44.4%oftherespondentsworkinginindustry,39.3%ofthoseintheconstructionsectorand30.1%ofthose
employedinmanufacturing.
OneinthreerespondentsworkinginmanufacturingandservicespointedoutthatleavingPoland
enabledthemtoacquirenewqualifications,whichtheywilluseafterreturningtoPoland.
Chart9
Chart 9
Impactofundertakingemploymentabroadonlivesofemigrantswithabreakdownbysector(anynumberofanswers,in%)
Improvement
offinancialsituation
Improvement
ofself-esteem
(Isucceededabroad)
Acquiringnew
qualifications
Disappointment
withemployment
conditions
Familyproblems
Other
Constructionsector(n=56)
Manufacturing(n=73)
Industry(n=36)
Services(n=61)
91.0
98.6
94.4
95.0
39.3
30.1
44.4
49.2
26.8
32.9
16.7
32.8
8.9
2.7
0.0
3.3
8.9
6.8
5.5
1.6
3.6
4.1
8.3
1.6
29

32. Fearsrelatedtogoingabroad
Chart10
Amongallrespondentsthe most important fear related to going abroad was the fear of being
cheated.Itwastickedby35%ofallrespondents.Notmuchless,namely31%,indicatedfamily-relatedfearssuch
aslongingorfearoffamilyproblemscausedbythedeparture.10%statedtheyfearedtheirskillswouldprovetoo
poorandtheywouldlosetheirjobfast.
Ananalysisoftheanswersoftherespondentswithabreakdownintothesectorsinwhichtheywere
employedindicatedaveryhighlevelofconvergence( ).Thelargestgroup,almost60%oftherespondents
workinginmanufacturing,fearedtheywouldbecheatedabroad(e.g.theywouldnotreceivetheagreed-upon
remuneration).Suchanswersweregivenalsoby38%oftherespondentsworkinginservices,32%ofthe
respondentsintheconstructionsectorand17.6%ofthoseworkinginindustry.Thismeansthattheissueofthe
reliabilityofemployers,particularlyinthemanufacturingsector,likelyleavesmuchtobedesired.Itshouldbe
assumedthatrespondentseitherthemselvesexperiencedsituationswhereremunerationwasnotpaidor
obtainedsuchinformationfromcrediblesources.Thenumberofanswersstronglypointsoutthatthereisa
problemoffailuretopaywagesorofwagesforperformedworkbeingsubstandard.Buttherewerealsoissues
connectedwithfamily.Mostfrequently(38%),problemsconnectedwithfamilyrelationsinthecontextof
undertakingemploymentabroadwereindicatedbyworkersintheconstructionsector,andleastfrequentlyby
thoseworkinginindustry(23.5%).Otherproblemswereindicatedmuchmorerarely,withanswersnot
exceeding10%.
Chart 10
Fearsrelatedtogoingabroadwithabreakdownbysector(anynumberofanswers, )in%
Iwillbecheated(e.g.Iwillnotreceive
theagreedremuneration,Iwillnot
getajobandwillhavetoreturn
tothehomecountry)
Fearsrelatedtothefamily
(e.g.longingorfearoffamilyproblems
causedbygoingabroad)
Myskills/competenceswillprove
toopoorandIwilllose
thejobfast
Difficultieswithadjustment
FearofaversiontoPoles
amongresidentsofthecountry
whereIwillwork
Iwillbecomeill
andwillhaveto
returntoPoland
Noneoftheabove
Constructionsector(n=50)
Manufacturing(n=54)
Industry(n=17)
Services(n=50)
32.0
57.4
17.6
38.0
38.0
27.8
23.5
32.0
24.0
20.4
23.5
18.0
20.0
20.4
29.4
20.0
18.0
20.4
0.0
10.0
16.0
11.1
0.0
10.0
24.0
18.5
35.3
28.0
30

33. Fearsrelatedtobeingcheatedabroad(e.g.notreceivingtheagreeduponremuneration)were
expressedmostfrequentlybyrespondentsaged26-30(57.1%).Suchfearswereexpressedbyamuchsmaller
percentageofpersonsaged36-40(22.6%).
Theanalysisofanswerstothequestionsconcerningfearsrelatedtogoingabroadindicatesthat
problemswithpaymentofremunerationaremostfearedbypersonsaged26-30employedinthemanufacturing
sector.Thisisaveryimportantpieceofinformation,requiringin-depthqualitativeresearch,whichwouldhelp
explainwhypeopleinthisagegroupemployedinmanufacturingmuchmorefrequentlythanothersindicatethe
possibilityofbeingcheatedwhentheyundertakeemploymentabroad.
Over30%oftherespondentsofthegroupagedover26pointedouttofearsrelatedtofamily.Inthe
youngestagegroup,oneinfourrespondentsgavesuchananswer.Ontheotherhand,31.4%oftherespondents
aged26-30fearedbeforegoingabroadthattheirskillswouldprovetobetoopoorandthattheywouldhave
problemswithadjustment.Morethan40%oftherespondentsaged36-40and28%ofrespondentsfromthe
oldestandtheyoungestagegroup,respectively,didnotexpressanyoftheaforementionedfears.
Despitethereservationspointedoutabove,itseemsimportanttoanalysetheanswersbythesexof
therespondents.Familyissuesasnegativeconsequencesofemploymentemigrationweremorefrequentlycited
bywomen.Suchissueswerecitedbynearly41%offemalerespondentsandonly30%ofmalerespondents.This
showsthatemigrationentailsgreateremotionalcostsforwomenthanformen.Generally,itindicatesthatthere
areadditionalchallengesconnectedwiththephenomenonofso-calledfeminisationofmigration,i.e.slowly
progressingdominationofwomeninmigrationprocesses,notonlyinPolandandEurope,butalsoglobally.
Amajorityoftherespondentsare planning in the near future to extend their employment abroad
or to go abroad again ( ).Respondentsworkinginthemanufacturingsectorwereabsolutelycertainthat
theywouldcontinueworkingabroad(97.3%oftherespondents).Itisinterestingthattheymadesuchdeclarations
despitetheirfearsofnotreceivingtheirdueremuneration,whichwasidentifiedintheanalysisofanswerstothe
previousquestions.Respondentsemployedinindustrywerenotmuchlessresolved(89%).Inthecaseofthose
employedintheconstructionsectorandservices,thepercentageofrespondentscertaintocontinueemployment
abroadwassignificantlylower,althoughintheircaseaswellpositiveanswersdefinitelydominate–80.7%ofthe
respondentsintheconstructionsectorand73.8%ofthoseemployedinservices,respectively.
Thelargestpercentageoftherespondentsinterestedinextendingtheiremploymentabroadorgoing
abroadagainconsistedofpeopleaged26-30(91.5%.)andagedover40(92.9%).Peopleoftheyoungestagegroup
displayedthelowestlevelofinterestinextendingemploymentabroad(73.1%).
Plansforthefuture
Chart11
Chart 11
Declarationsoftherespondentsconcerningplanstocontinueemploymentabroadwithabreakdownbysector(in%)
Yes
No
Idon’tknow
Constructionsector(n=57)
Manufacturing(n=73)
Industry(n=36)
Services(n=61)
80.7
97.2
89.0
73.8
10.5
1.4
5.5
11.5
8.8
1.4
5.5
14.7
31

34. Declarationsregardingcontinuationofemploymentabroadshouldbecomparedwiththewillingness
ofrespondentstoremainpermanentlyinemigration.Asonecaneasilyimagine,plans to remain abroad
permanently are much more rarely stated than the willingness to continue employment emigration for
some more time ( ).Amongtherespondents,awillingnesstostayabroadwasmostfrequentlyexpressed
bythoseworkinginindustry(61.1%),followedcloselybypersonsworkinginthemanufacturingsector(54.8%).
Amongrespondentsworkinginservices,only37.7%statedthatweregivingseriousconsiderationtoremaining
abroadpermanently.Evenlessfrequentlyweresuchplansstatedbythoseemployedintheconstructionsector
(31.6%).Inthecaseofthelattersector,thepercentageofrespondentsrulingoutstayingabroadwashigherthan
thosedeclaringawillingnesstoremainabroadpermanently.
Significantdifferencesregardingdeclarationsaboutplansforthefuturewereidentifiedbytheageof
therespondents.Respondentsaged26-30mostfrequentlyplantostayabroadpermanently(61.7%).Inthecase
ofotheragegroups,thepercentageofthosewillingtoremainabroaddoesnotexceed50%.Intheyoungestage
group(21-25),46.2%considerstayingabroadpermanently,while8percentfewerrespondentsstilldonotknow
whatdecisiontheywillmake.Intheoldestagegroup,onlyslightlymorethan35%oftherespondentsareplanning
tostayabroad.Intheircase,declarationsononlytemporaryemploymentabroaddominated,whichtranslates
intoawillingnesstoreturntoPoland.
Ananalysisofanswersgiventothequestionaboutplansforthefuturewithabreakdownbyage
indicatesthatgenerallyspeakingelderly,moreexperiencedpersonslessfrequentlydeclareawillingnesstostay
abroadpermanently.Youngpeople,whosesituationinthePolishlabourmarketisparticularlydifficult,are
determinednotonlytocontinueemploymentabroad,butalsotostaytherepermanently.Thisisaverynegative
trendrequiringactionbythePolishgovernment.
Themostimportantreasonunderlyingthe willingness to stay abroad is the conviction that this
will lead to improvement of living conditions.Suchananswerwasgivenby30%oftherespondentsdeclaring
awillingnesstostayinemigrationpermanently.Overone-fourth(26%)answeredthattheyhavepermanent
employmentthere,and16%indicatedfinancialmatters.
Chart12
Chart 12
Declarationoftherespondentsconcerningwillingnesstostayabroadpermanentlywithabreakdownbysector(in%)
Yes
No
Idon’tknow
Constructionsector(n=57)
Manufacturing(n=73)
Industry(n=36)
Services(n=61)
31.6
54.8
61.1
37.7
42.1
16.4
13.9
31.1
26.3
28.8
25.0
31.2
32

35. Themostoptimisticabouttheirprospectsinthelabourmarketsofthereceivingstatesareemployees
workingintheconstructionsector,whiletheleastoptimisticarethoseemployedinmanufacturingandservices
( ).Over70%oftherespondentsemployedintheconstructionsectorstatedthattheyhadapermanentjob
abroadorgoodchancesofgettingone.Nearlyhalf(46.1%)oftherespondentsalsoansweredtheyfeltmore
secureabroadwithregardtothelabourmarket.Amongtherespondentsworkinginthemanufacturingsector,
“only”56.4%answeredthattheyconsideredstayingabroadbecausetheyhadapermanentjobthere,and53.8%
thoughttheirlivingconditionswouldimprovethere.
Forpeopleworkinginindustry,themostimportantargumentinfavourofstayingabroadwasthefact
theyhadapermanentjob.Thiswasindicatedby68%oftherespondentsinthatgroup.Atthesametime,56%of
therespondentsemployedinthissectornamedtheopportunitytoimprovetheirlivingconditionsasthemain
reasonunderlyingtheirwillingnesstostayabroad.Thisargumentwasalsoindicatedbythebiggestgroupfrom
amongthoseemployedinservices,namely61.5%.Equallyimportantforthemwashavingapermanentjob
(57.7%).
Ascanbeinferredfromtheprovidedanswers,security in labour market is the decisive factor in
declarations to stay abroad.Thelevelofwagesislessimportant.Thisprobablymeansthatdeclarationsabout
stayingabroadwouldchangeifthePolishlabourmarketofferedmorestableemploymentconditions.
Nevertheless,itshouldbepointedoutthatfactorsmentionedinsomeotherstudiesrelatedtobadperceptionsof
PolandasoneofthemajorreasonsunderlyingthedecisiontoleavePolandanddeclarationsonstayingabroad
havenotbeenconfirmedbythisstudy.
Issuesrelatedtothelabourmarketwerealsodominantamongthereasonsforstayingabroadwithin
certainagegroups.Thefactofhavingapermanentjobabroadorprospectsforobtainingoneasthefactorbehind
thedecisiontostayinemigrationpermanentlywasmostfrequentlyindicatedbypeopleaged36-40(66.7%),
whileitwascitedleastfrequentlybyrespondentsintheoldestagegroup(52.8%).Hereagaintheissueofdiversity
ofanswersbyagehassurfaced.Anopportunitytoimprovelivingconditionsbystayingabroadismostfrequently
perceivedbypeopleagedover40(76.9%),andleastfrequentlybyrespondentsaged31-35(40%).Over60%of
21-25year-oldsand36-40year-oldsfeelmoresecureabroadwithregardtothelabourmarket.Fortheoldest
respondents,thepossibilityoftakingadvantageofbenefitsthataremissinginPolandismuchmoreimportant
thanforyoungerrespondents.
Chart13
Chart 13
Reasonsforstayingabroad
withabreakdownbysector
(anynumberofanswers,
in%)
Ihaveapermanentjob
abroadorgoodchances
ofobtainingone
Ifeelmoresecureabroad
regardinglabourmarket
(evenifIloseajob
Iwillgetitbackfast)
Iwillbeabletotakeadvantage
ofthebenefitsthatare
missinginPoland
Iwillimprovemyliving
conditionsabroad
Myfamily
wantstoleave
Inolongerwant
toliveinPoland
Constructionsector(n=17)
Manufacturing(n=39)
Industry(n=25)
Services(n=26)
70.6
56.4
68.0
57.7
47.1
35.9
68.0
46.1
52.9
10.3
20.0
26.9
64.7
53.8
56.0
61.5
29.4
28.2
44.0
34.6
11.8
12.8
4.0
3.8
33

36. IfthemainreasonsunderlyingthedecisionsofPolestogoabroadandthewillingnesstostayabroad
revealedinthisstudywerefinancialfactorsandthoserelatedtosecurityinthelabourmarket,thenthedecisions
to return to Poland are mainly motivated by family factors.Almost40%oftherespondentsnamed
oppositionfromfamiliesagainstcontinuationofthestayabroadasthemainfactorstimulatingthedecisionto
return.Inthecaseof27.3%oftherespondents,themainreasonunderlyingdeclarationsonreturningwasthe
beliefinthepossibilityofobtainingemploymentinPolandorthefactofalreadyhavingajob.Ontheotherhand,
15.2%oftherespondentscouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutsidePolandand9.1%statedtheycanusetheir
qualificationsbetterinPoland.
Definitely,familyreasonswerenamedmostfrequently(almost70%)asthereasonunderlyingthe
decisiontoreturntothehomecountrybyrespondentsintheconstructionsector( ).Almosthalfofthem
answeredtheycouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutsidePoland,and36.4%statedthattheyhaveajobin
Polandorachanceofobtainingone.Similarargumentswerenamedbypersonsemployedinindustry.Among
employeesofthemanufacturingsector,54.5%answeredthattheirfamiliesopposedtheirstayabroadforlonger,
and45.5%hadajobinPoland,sotheydidnotwanttoleavePolandpermanently.Almosthalfofthoseworkingin
servicescouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutsidePoland,and43.5%hadajobinPolandorachanceof
findingone.
TheanalysisofthefactorsunderlyingdecisionsaboutreturningtoPolandaftertheendof
employmentindicatedthatitwaspersonsaged31orolderwhomostfrequentlyindicatedanaversiononthepart
oftheirfamiliestotheirstayingabroadasanargumentforgivingupemigration.Thisismostlikelybecausealarge
numberofyoungerpersonshavenotstartedtheirownfamilyyet,sooppositionfromaspousedoesnotapplyin
theircase.Atthesametime,57.1%oftherespondentsaged26-30cannotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutside
Poland,oralternativelyhaveajobinPolandorachanceofobtainingone.Onerespondentinthreeintheyoungest
agegroupansweredtheywouldnotstayabroadbecausetheycouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutside
Poland.
Chart14
Chart 14
Mainreasonsunderlyingdecisionstoreturnwithabreakdownbysector(anynumberofanswers,in%)
Myfamily
isagainstleaving
Icannotimagine
livingpermanently
outsidePoland
IhaveajobinPoland
orgoodchances
ofobtainingone
InPolandIcanuse
myqualificationsbetter
Idon'tfeel
secureabroad
Idon'tlike
socialrelations
abroad
Constructionsector(n=33)
Manufacturing(n=11)
Industry(n=7)
Services(n=23)
69.7
54.5
71.4
30.4
45.4
36.4
71.4
47.8
36.4
45.4
28.6
43.5
24.2
18.2
28.6
30.4
21.2
27.3
14.3
21.7
15.1
18.2
28.6
13.0
34

37. Thepost-accessionemigrationsofPolesarethetopicofmanystudies,academicpapersaswell
ascriticalarticlesinnewspapers.Thisismainlyduetothedesiretofindanswerstoquestionsaboutthecauses
andeffectsofprocessesthatprovedtobefarmoresignificantthanhadbeenearlierexpected.Itisalsoessential
toidentifythefactorsthatarecurrentlydecisivefordeclarationsbyemigrantsoftheirwillingnesstostayabroad
ortoreturntoPoland.Ashasbeenalreadyindicatedintheintroduction,althoughunrepresentative,thisstudy
producedmanyinterestingresultsthatexpandourknowledgeofthemostrecentemigrationsofPoles.Thisis
attributablefirstandforemosttothefactthattheresearchwasconductedamongaspecificgroupofPolish
workersemployedabroad,namelythoserecruitedbyoneofthedominantemploymentagenciesinthePolish
market,andbythefactthattheyundertookemploymentinthosestatesthathavehardlybeencoveredbyrecent
studies.ThisconcernsGermanyinparticular,acountrythatdidnotopenupitslabourmarketuntil2011,i.e.seven
yearsaftertheUnitedKingdomandIreland,whichhavedominatedmigrationanalysesperformedbybothPolish
andforeignresearchersinrecentyears.Aparticularlyvaluableaspectofthisresearchisthededicationofalotof
spacetotheissueoffactorsinfluencingspecificmigrationdecisionsofPoles.Theopinionsoftherespondents
presentedinthisreportdefinitelyconstituteabasisfordrawingconclusionsanddevelopingprogrammesand
instrumentsthatmightinfluencedecisionstoemigrate,stayabroadorreturntoPoland.Let’shopetherewillbe
asmanyreturnsinthenearfutureaspossible.
Summary
35

38. Financial issues remain the main reasons underlying employment
emigration of Poles. Unemploymentisofmuchlesserimportance.Adecisive
majorityofrespondentshadajobinPoland,buttheremunerationtheyreceived
wasunsatisfactoryforthemandthereforetheymadethedecisiontoemigrate.
Hence,onecanstatethatitisthelevelofremuneration,notthelevelof
unemployment,whereoneshouldlookforasolutiontotheissueofemployment
emigrationofPoles.
Polesemployedabroadwhotookpartintheresearchare
overwhelmingly satisfied with employment abroad.Nosignificant
differenceshavebeenidentifiedregardingrespondents’sectorsofemployment
orage.Buttheresearchresultsaredefinitelyaffectedbythefactthatthe
respondentswererecruitedbyemploymentagenciesandsentdirectlyto
employersandbythefactthattheyworkedinBelgium,FranceandGermany,
becausebothwagesandemploymentstandardsinthosecountriesareamong
thebestintheworld.
Asaresultofundertakingemploymentabroad,therespondents
improved their financial situation.Over90%oftherespondentswereofthis
opinion.Manyofthem,intherangeof30-50%,dependingonthesector,also
improvedtheirself-esteem.Thisisbecausetheysucceededabroad.
Themostfrequentfearrelated to going abroad is the fear of not
receiving due remuneration.Itmustbestressedthatthisfearwasuniversal
(e.g.over57%ofthoseemployedinthemanufacturingsectorexpressedsuch
afear)despitethefactthattherespondentswereemployedthroughanagency
registeredinPoland,i.e.oneofferinggreatercertaintyofremunerationthanis
thecasewhenjob-seekersfindemploymentontheirown.Thismeansthatthe
issueofemployerscheatingmigrantworkersisstillaproblemdespitethefact
thatmigrationtakesplaceundertheframeworkoffreemovementofpersons.
Adecisivemajorityoftherespondentsdeclared a willingness to
continue working abroad,butatthesametimeamuch smaller group was
certain that such employment would turn into permanent emigration.
Thismeansthatrespondentstreatemploymentabroadasatemporary
opportunitytoenhancetheirremuneration.Themostscepticalasconcerns
stayingabroadpermanentlywererespondentsemployedintheconstruction
sector,whilethemostwillingtomoveabroadpermanentlywereemployeesof
theindustrialsector.
Main conclusions from the chapter:
1
2
3
4
5
36

39. Themostimportantreasonfordeclarationsaboutstayingabroadwas
the conviction that such a decision would lead to improvement of living
conditions and having a permanent job in the state of employment.
Therefore,financialfactorsandthoserelatedtosecurityinthelabourmarket
againprovetobetheprimarypro-emigrationfactorsunderlyingdecisionsto
stayabroadpermanently.
Themainfactorsbehind return to the home country are family-
related.Respondentsstatedthatoppositionoftheirfamilytocontinuationof
employmentabroadledtothedecisiontoreturn.Atthesametime,overone-
fourthoftherespondentspointedoutthatthefactofhavingajobinPolandis
veryimportantforthemasafactorinfavourofreturning.Thisshowsagainthat
therespondentswerequiteoptimisticabouttheirchancesoffinding
employmentinPoland,whilethelevelofremunerationwasaproblem.
Thisresearchdidnotconfirm theopinion,basedonotherstudies,that
aversion to Poland as a country is both a pro-emigration factor andonethat
mattersfordecisionstostayabroadpermanently.
6
7
8
37

41. ChapterIII
Will immigrants solve the problems
of Central and Eastern Europe?

42. Chapter III
Will immigrants solve the problems
of Central and Eastern Europe?
InthefirstreportoftheCEEDInstituteonmigrationsinCentralandEasternEurope,alotofattention
wasdevotedtotheissueofthetransformationofCEEcountriesfromtypicalemigrationintoemigration-
immigrationstates,i.e.onessharingmigration-relatedfeatureswithamajorityofEuropeanUnionmember
states.Thisreportcontinuesthosedeliberations,butinsteadoffocusingonpresentationofthescaleand
directionsoftheinflowofforeignersintoCEEcountries,itdemonstratesthefactorsthatshouldbetakeninto
considerationwhendecisionsconcerningimmigrationpolicyaremade.Wewillalsoattempttoanswerthe
questionofwhetherCEEcountriescanbeattractivetoemploymentimmigrantsandconsequentlycompete
againsttheEU-15statesinattractingthoseforeignersthatbringthegreatestbenefitstotheireconomies.
Migrationanddemography
Inthevastmajorityofpapersdescribingthepotentialconsequencesoftheinflowofforeignersinto
agivenstate,demographicissuesarementionedfirst.Foreignerswhodecidetostayinthereceivingstatemay
contributetovaryingdegreestolimitingtheadverseoutcomesofadecliningpopulationandanageingsociety.
However,thereisaconsensusthatgiventhepaceofthesechanges,theinflowofforeignerswillnotbyitselfsolve
theseproblems,butcanbecomeanelementofawiderpackageofmeasures.Despitefrequentanti-immigration
rhetoric,immigrationisstilltreatedbythoseinpowerasaninstrumentforcopingwithdemographicchallenges.
ThisapproachshouldalsobetakenbyCEEcountries.However,onereservationmustbemadeinitially.
Therearemanyexamplesofstates,which,althoughnotverypopulousorlargeinarea,areneverthelessamong
thebestdevelopedcountriesintheworld.Thisisattributabletoaverygoodpopulationstructureandadoptionof
amodeloptimisingtheuseofthepotentialoftheirpeople.Givensuchanapproach,itturnsoutthattheroleof
immigrantscanbefargreaterinresolvingdemographicproblemsthanisrecognisedinmanyanalysesofthe
6
impactofimmigrationonpopulationsize.Thefactisthatthepopulationstructureofforeignersresidinginthe
EU-28statesisdefinitelybetterthanthatofindigenes.Chart15suggeststhatforeigners are definitely
younger than indigenes.Thegreatestdifferencesinpopulationstructuresarefoundbetweenagegroupswith
thegreatestoccupationalactivity,i.e.20-44year-olds( ).Thismeansthatwithoutimmigrationthe
populationstructureintheEU-28wouldbemuchworsethanitisnow.
Chart15
Itisnotthesizeofthepopulationpersethatisproblematic,
butitsstructure(sharesofoccupationallyactiveandpassive
peopleinthepopulationstructureofagivenstate).
6
Theseanalyses,forexample,demonstratetheimpactofimmigrationonthetotalfertilityrate.Womenimmigrantsaresupposedtohavehighertotalfertilityrates,whichwould
positivelycountertheeffectsofthedecliningpopulationsizeofagivenstate.
40

43. Chart 15
Agepyramidwithabreakdownintonon-nationalsandnationals.DatafortheEU-28(in%)
95-99
90-94
85-89
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
02 46 810121402468101214
ageFemales Males
Nationals
Non-nationals
Source:Owncalculationsonthebasisof:
Populationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship
(migr_pop1ctz),Populationbysex,age
andbroadgroupofcitizenship(migr_pop2ctz),
Eurostat
41

44. WefindasimilarsituationifweseparatedataforCEEcountriesfromthedatafortheentireEU-28.
Inthecase ofCEEcountriesaswell,foreignerslivingthereareyoungerthanindigenes,butthedifferences
are smaller than in the case of all EU-28 states ( ).ThismeansthatwithintheEuropeanUnionitis
the EU-15 states that are greatly improving their population structure,whichpositivelytranslatesinto
competitivenessandtheabilitytocopewithdemographicchallenges.
Chart16
Chart 16
Agepyramidwithabreakdownintonon-nationalsandnationals.DatafortheEU-11(in%)
95-99
90-94
85-89
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12024681012
ageFemales Males
Nationals
Non-nationals
Source:Owncalculationsonthebasisof:
Populationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship
(migr_pop1ctz),Populationbysex,age
andbroadgroupofcitizenship(migr_pop2ctz),
Eurostat
42

45. Onemoremajorconclusionfollowsfromcomparisonofthetwoagepyramids.Thegeneraldataforthe
EU-28suggeststhatbothinthecaseoffemaleandmaleforeigners,theirimpacton“rejuvenation” ofthe
populationofthereceivingstatesiscomparable.ButwhenweanalysetheagepyramidfortheEU-11,itisclearly
visiblethatmalescontributetoamuchgreaterextenttoimprovementofthepopulationstructuresofthose
states.ThisprobablymeansthatCEE countries are at an early stage of transformation towards the
emigration-immigration model.Giventhissituationanddespitetheprocessesoffeminisationofmigration,we
aredealingratherwithimmigrationofmales,whoonlyaftersometimebringtheirfamiliesin(familyreunion
process).Buttheymustmakesurethatthedecisiontoimmigrateistherightone.Bigdifferencesintheage
pyramidsbetweenfemaleforeignersandmaleforeignersintheEU-11countriesmayresultfromstilllimited
scaleofdecisionsonfamilyreunions,whichhavealreadybecomeapartoftheexperiencesoftheEU-15states.
DemandforimmigrantsintheEuropeanUnion
Intheprevioussectionitwasshownthattheinflowofimmigrantsisextremelyimportantfordealing
withdemographicproblemsrelatedtodisturbancesinpopulationstructure.Atthesametime,itshouldbe
pointedoutthatthedemandforforeignersisnotthesameinspecificlabourmarketsegments.Mostfrequently
thegreatestdemandforforeignersfromemployersisintheprofessionswherethereisashortageofindigenous
workers,andconcernsbothhighlyskilledworkers,inwhosecasesalariesareofminorimportancebecausethese
individualshaveuniqueskills,andthoseworkerswhoselowerrequirementsregardingremunerationareofthe
greatestimportance.Thelattersituationcanleadtorivalrybetweenimmigrantsandnationals.Onecanassume
thatindigenesarereadytoundertakeemploymentinagivenprofessionorsector,butforahigherremuneration
thanimmigrants.Howeveremployersareoftennotwillingtomeettheirexpectationsbecausetheyhavecheaper
workersavailablefromabroad.Inthiscase,itistheroleofthegovernmentsofparticularstatestoconsider
whethertoblockaccesstothelabourmarketforforeignersandconsequentlystimulatesalaryrises,risking
howeveranexpansionofthegreyeconomyorrelocationofeconomicactivitytowhereverlabourcostsarelower.
ResearchbyaninternationalcompanyManpowerGroupsuggeststhatin the vast majority of
European Economic Area (EEA) member states there are significant shortages of highly skilled employees
with unique skills (commonlycalledtalents).ButthegreatestshortageoftalentsisfoundinCEEcountries– in
HungaryandBulgaria( ).Chart17
Chart 17
TalentshortageinselectedEEAmemberstates,2014(in%)
Source:TheTalentShortageContinues:HowtheEverChangingRoleofHRCanBridgetheGap,ManpowerGroup2014,p.4
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Hungary
Bulgaria
Austria
Greece
Germany
Romania
Italy
Finland
Poland
Sweden
Slovakia
France
Norway
Slovenia
Belgium
UnitedKingdom
CzechRepublic
Netherlands
Spain
Ireland
45 44
42 42
40 40
34 33 33 33
22 21 20 19
13 12 11
5
3 2
43

46. ThedatacontainedinChart17showsthataninflowofevenasignificantnumberofforeigners
characterisedbyuniqueskillswouldnotresultindeteriorationofthesituationinthelabourmarket,orin
enhancedcompetitionbetweenforeignersandindigenes.Inthiscontext,theproblemratheristofindthe
instrumentsthatwouldstimulateinflowofthiscategoryofforeignersthantorestricttheirinflow.Thereforethe
vastmajorityofEUmemberstatespursueapolicyofremovingobstaclestothemigrationofhighlyskilledworkers
ratherthanimposingrestrictionsonthem.
Ashasbeenalreadymentioned,highlyskilledworkerscontributealottothecompetitivenessofthe
stateswheretheyareemployed.InternationalcomparisonsshowthattheUSisbyfarthestatethatderivesthe
greatest benefits from the immigration of highly skilled workers ( ).ItisfollowedbyCanada,butwith
muchpoorerresults.TwoEuropeancountriesthathavebeenstrivingforyearstoacquirehighlyskilledworkers,
i.e.GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom,camethirdandfourth,respectively.AmongCEEcountries,Polandand
Hungarywerecoveredintheranking,buttheycameoutinthegroupofstatesattheverybottomoftheranking.
ThismeansthatCEE states definitely lose out in the competition for highly qualified immigrants,which
adverselyimpactstheirdevelopmentprospects.
Table8
Inrecentyearswehavewitnessedatleastadozeninitiativesaimedatincreasingtheinflow
ofhighlyskilledforeignersintotheEuropeanUnion.Forexample,intheyear2000,German
ChancellorGerhardSchröderannouncedestablishmentofadedicatedprogrammetargeted
atforeignersemployedintheITsectorwhowouldliketoundertakeemploymentin
Germany.20,000“greencards”wereofferedtothesetypesofimmigrants.Theprogramme
wasonlymoderatelysuccessful,becauseslightlymorethan17,000ofthe“greencards”
weredistributed,whichmeansthequotawasnotmet.In2004theprogrammecametoan
end.AsimilarconceptwasputforwardbytheEuropeanCommission,whichannounced
introductionofadirectiveontheso-calledBlueCardtargetedathighlyskilledforeigners.
Afterlongnegotiations,thedirectiveintroducingtheBlueCardenteredintoforcein2009,
butitprovedafailure.Withinfiveyearsofthedirective’simplementation,onlyafew
thousandBlueCardswereissuedinallmemberstates.Moreover,theUnitedKingdom
introducedascoringsystemthatgrantedmanyprivilegestohighlyskilledworkers.Among
CEEcountries,theCzechRepublichaditsownprogrammetargetinghighlyskilledworkers.
Theexamplesaboveshowthatattractinghighlyskilledworkerstogivenstatesisan
extremelydifficulttaskandonewithahighriskoffailure.
Acquisition of highly skilled workers by EU member states
44

47. Thedemandforforeignersisgeneratedbothinthefirst,moreattractive,andthesecondlabour
7
marketsegments.Theanalysesofdemandinthelabourmarketdemonstratethatdemandforthelatterismuch
greater! Thisismainlybecausesectorsrequiringuniqueskillsemploymuchfewerworkersthanlabour-intensive
onesdo.Thesituationisaggravatedbythegrowingdemandforhighlyskilledworkersinthehomecaresector,
whichistheresultofdemographictransformations.Whilethosepersonsdonotneedtohaveuniqueskills,theydo
needtobehighskilledinprovisionofcare.
Table 8
USA
Canada
Germany
United Kingdom
Australia
France
United Arab Emirates
Spain
Switzerland
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
Ireland
Portugal
Sweden
New Zeland
Greece
Mexico
Luxembourg
Norway
Denmark
Poland
Hungary
Finland
Significantcontribution
ofhighlyskilled
immigrantstoeconomies
(2007GDPatPPP)
Host
country
Source:StimulatingEconomies
throughForecastingTalentMobility,
WorldEconomicForum,2010,p.11
12
22
9
11
26
9
87
5
20
9
9
10
15
12
8
22
7
1
39
5
5
1
4
2
1,661
274
254
227
197
184
128
73
60
55
35
31
28
27
27
25
23
18
16
14
9
8
7
4
Share of highly skilled migrants
in highly skilled workforce
(%)
Average contribution of highly skilled
immigrants to GDP
(US$billions)
7
Labourmarketisdividedintotwosegments.Thefirstsegmentcontainswell-paid,highlyprestigiousjobs,withalotofpotentialforpursuingcareerpath.Thesecondsegmentincludes
poorlypaidjobswithlowprestige,offeringverylimitedcareerdevelopmentpotential.Sotoreceiveahigherremunerationandobtainanopportunitytocontinuecareerdevelopment
path,oneneedstochangeaprofessionandtransitfromthefirstintothesecondlabourmarketsegment.Amajorityofemploymentimmigrantsfindjobsinthesecondlabourmarket
segment.
45

48. Table 9
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
NO
EU-12
EU-15
EU-27
Unemploymentrateassumptions
(age15-64,in%)
Source:The2012AgeingReport:UnderlyingAssumptions
andProjectionMethodology,EuropeanEconomy,2011,p.319
4.1
7.4
7.5
4.7
6.2
6.1
4.8
8.2
8.9
6.6
7.5
8.1
7.8
7.1
7.3
8.6
4.3
8.8
6.7
3.5
7.4
8
6.7
6.5
6
8.1
5.9
3.3
7.3
6.8
6.9
.0
.0
2030
4.1
7.4
7.7
4.9
6.3
6.1
4.8
10.9
12.6
6.6
7.7
8.9
9.5
10
7.3
12.4
4.3
13.3
6.7
3.5
7.5
9.6
6.8
6.6
7.1
10.4
6.3
3.4
8
7.5
7.5
.0
.0
2025
4.1
7.6
8.2
5.3
6.4
6.1
4.8
14.0
17.2
6.6
8
10.6
11.4
13.4
7.3
16.7
4.5
18.3
6.8
3.5
7.6
11.6
6.9
6.6
8.3
13.1
6.9
3.4
8.8
8.3
8.4
.0
2020
4.5
8.4
10.5
6.8
7.3
7.2
7.5
17.2
20.2
8.6
9.4
12.8
11.3
13.7
8.5
18.1
4.4
19
6.9
4.5
9.8
11.4
7.6
8.5
7.4
14.4
8
3.6
10
9.7
9.7
.0
.0
.0
2010
Theresultsofananalysisofjobofferspostedon
aEuropeanjobmobilityportalconfirmthefactthatdemandfor
employeesisparticularlyfrequentinthesecondsegmentofthe
labourmarket.Theprofessionswiththegreatestshortagesinclude:
housekeepingandrestaurantservicesworkers(Austria,Cyprus,
CzechRepublic,Greece,Finland,France,Portugal)andfinancial
andsalesassociateprofessionals(CzechRepublic,Germany,Spain,
Finland,Ireland,Italy,Luxembourg,Sweden).Otherprofessionsfor
whichemployersfromEUmemberstatesfrequentlylookfor
employeesthroughEURESare:
Shopsalespersonsanddemonstrators(Austria,
Greece,Estonia)
Domesticandrelatedhelpers,cleanersand
launderers(Cyprus,Estonia,Malta)
Metalmoulders,welders,sheetmetalworkers
(Lithuania,Latvia,Slovakia)
Buildingframeandrelatedtradesworkers:
(Liechtenstein,Poland,Slovenia)
Alltheaboveprofessionscanbedeemedascharacteristicofthe
secondsegmentofthelabourmarket.
Oneofthemainfearsrelatedtothegrowinginflowof
foreignersisdeteriorationofthelabourmarketsituation,which
mayresultfromenhancedrivalrybetweennationalsandnon-
nationals.Inthereportpub-lishedseveralmonthsago,weshowed
thatsuchsituationsarerareandlimitedtojustafewemployment
sectors.Tocomplementthisthesis,onecancitetheargumentthat
anincreaseinunemploymentinreceivingstatesattributabletoan
inflowofforeignersinthecomingyearsisevenlesslikelythan
today.Thisisbecauseofdemographicchangeandshrinkinglabour
resources.AforecastdevelopedbytheEuropeanCommission
clearlyshowsthatin all EU member states, including CEE
countries, the unemployment rate will decline despite the
expected increase in the inflow of foreigners entering the
labourmarket( ).
•
•
•
•
Table9
46

49. Theaforementioneddemographicchangesareforcingparticularstatestotakemeasuresthatare
intendedtomeettheforeseenchallenges.Quitecertainlytheincreasedinflowofimmigrants,althoughunableto
solvedemographicproblems,maybecomeone of the factors contributing to maintenance of a population
structure that is optimal for economic and social development.DatapublishedbytheWorldBanksuggests
thatCEEcountrieswillbeaffectedbydemographicchangetoahighdegreeandconsequentlytheyshouldbe
interestedingettinganinflowofforeigners.Forexample,Polandshouldallowtheentryofnearly800,000
immigrantsby2020.Thiswouldenablemaintenanceofthecurrentratiosbetweenactiveandpassivepersonsin
thelabourmarket.InthecaseoftheCzechRepublic,theneedednumberofimmigrantsisnearly500,000,andin
thecaseofBulgaria–nearly120,000( ).
Nevertheless,thefigurescontainedinTable10shouldnotbedeemedveryrealistic.Onecanhardly
expectstatessuchasPolandortheCzechRepublictobeabletoacceptand,crucially,tointegrateintothelabour
marketsuchahighnumberofimmigrants,particularlyastheywouldhavetocomefromcountriesofdifferent
cultures.ThedataoftheWorldBankhasveryclearlydemonstratedthechallengesfacedbyCEEcountries.
ImmigrationattractivenessofEuropeanstates
Migrationprocessesintheworldtakeplacealonghistoricallyshapedpaths.Onlyinveryfewcasesdo
theyleadthroughCEEcountries.Onecanindicatehere,amongotherthings,theinflowofUkrainianstoPoland
andtheCzechRepublic,wheretheyundertakemainlyshort-termemployment.Inthisconnection,wehaveasked
ourselvesinthisreportwhetherinthecomingyearssomenewpathscanbetraced,agreaterproportionofwhich
willleadtoCEEcountriesthantoday?Toanswerthisquestion,an index will be created showing the
attractiveness of particular CEE countriesfor immigrants.Itwasbuiltthroughidentificationoftheindicators
thatseemtobedecisiveforforeignerswhoundertakemigrationandareinterestedinfindingemployment
outsidetheircountryoforigin.Theindexofattractivenessforimmigrantstakesintoaccountneithermigration
networksnormigrationpolicy.Thereforewefocusedonobjectivesocio-economiccriteria.Theindexwas
developedwiththeuseofthesameindicatorsseparatelyforCEEcountriesandEU-15states,andthentheresults
forbothsampleswerecomparedtoshowthecompetitionbothwithinCEEcountriesandEU-15states,butalso
withintheentireEU.ThestudyleavesoutonlyMaltaandCyprusinrecognitionthattheirsituationisdifferentfrom
thatoftheotherstates.This,however,doesnotinfluencetheconclusionsdrawnonthebasisoftheperformed
analyses.
Theselectionoftheindicatorsusedtocreatetheindexwasbasedonthecriteriaofuniversality,
availabilityandrelativetransparency(adescriptionoftheindicatorscanbefoundintheappendix).Therankingof
stateswasbasedonratingsaccordingtothevalueofagivenindicator.So,astatewiththebestvalueforagiven
indicatorwasassignedascoreof11points(forCEEcountries)orof15points(forEU-15states),whileastatewith
thepoorestvalueforagivenindicatorwasassignedascoreof1point.Forexample,thestatewiththelowest
unemploymentlevelamongCEEcountrieswasassigned11points,whiletheonewiththehighestunemployment
levelreceived1point.Consequently,arankinglistofstateswascreatedforeachindicator.Theassignedscores
wereadded,whichenableddevelopmentofarankinglistintermsofattractivenessforimmigrantsandofthe
index.Thestatewiththehighestscore(EU-11andEU-15)wasdeemedtobethemostattractiveforimmigration.
Thestatewiththelowestscorewasconsideredtobetheleastattractiveforforeigners.Atthesametime,CEE
countriesandEU-15stateswerecompared.Thestatewiththebestresultunderagivenindicatorreceived26
points,whiletheonewiththeworstresultreceived1point.
Table10
Table 10
WAP needed in 2020 to keep
LF/Pop constant
Number of migrants needed using
ILO projection
Resultsofprojectionexercise
toestimatenetmigrationneeds
by2020inthreecountries
Estimation
WAP=workingagepopulation
LF/Pop=ratiooflabourforcetopopulation
Source:DemographicChangeandLaborMarkets,p.85,http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/publications/454763-1181939083693/chaw_073-116_ch02.pdf
(accessedon:19.10.2014)
7,030,000
491,000
Czech Republic
26,422,000
789,000
Poland
4,726,000
119,000
Bulgaria
47

50. MigrationattractivenessofCEEcountries
Table11
Table11
AnanalysisoftheindicatorsusedtocreatetheindexofattractivenessofEuropeanstatesfor
immigrantsshowedthatamong CEE countries, the Czech Republic is likely to be the most attractive for
foreigners ( ).Sloveniawasratedsecond,whileEstoniawasthird.RomaniaandBulgariaprovedtobethe
leastattractiveforforeigners.Theperformedanalysissuggeststhatalthoughthedegreeofeconomic
development(measuredasGDPpercapita)isasignificantvariableandgreatlyinfluencestheattractiveness
ofagivencountryforimmigrants,theCzechRepublic,whichleadstheranking,isworsedevelopedthan
Slovenia,butstillitspositionisattributabletoitslowunemploymentlevelandthreatofpoverty.Similarly,
PolandisratedhigherthanSlovakia( ),althoughincomepercapitaismuchlowerthere.
Table 11
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Estonia
Poland
Slovakia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Croatia
Romania
Bulgaria
AttractivenessofCEEcountriesforimmigrants(thebestresultforagivenindicator– 11points,theworstresult– 1point)
*
**
#11
#14
#31
#23
#19
#21
#46
#39
#26
#35
#32
23%
41%
38%
57%
37%
31%
45%
19%
41%
50%
37%
Low
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High
High
36,201
52,039
26,562
20,803
21,579
22,657
18,664
19,605
21,169
11,191
13,693
39.4
40.2
34.3
42.6
40.1
37.4
34.6
34.9
40.6
42.2
34.1
6.6
6.7
7.6
11.9
10.2
26.8
16.0
24.0
14.7
28.5
43.0
10,649
14,286
8,556
9,122
9,568
7,512
7,352
6,615
7,258
3,737
6,056
72.2
62.7
75.9
67.0
66.4
67.0
73.0
68.7
60.4
65.5
65.7
8.6
14.5
18.6
17.3
12.8
14.3
20.6
19.4
19.5
22.4
21.0
73.3
70.1
74.9
67.4
69.8
65.7
72.7
73.8
64.1
64.3
68.6
19,845
23,289
18,783
13,648
18,047
13,481
15,538
15,375
13,608
9,499
7,499
7.0
10.1
8.6
10.3
14.2
10.2
11.8
11.9
17.3
7.1
13.0
111
100
90
89
87
68
65
57
51
46
31
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
*
Country
Place
Points
Unemploymentrate
GDPpercapita
Activityrate
Atriskofpovertyrateaftersocialtransfer
IndexofEconomicFreedom
Median–equivalisednetincomeinPPS
Severematerialdeprivationrate
HappyPlanetIndex
Wealth
Socialunrest
Positiveimpactofimmigration
GlobalPeaceIndex
**
estimatebythereport’sauthors
thefollowingscoreswereassigned:low– 11points,medium– 6points,high– 1point
Source:SeeAppendix,page53
48

51. MigrationattractivenessofEU-15states
Table12
Ashasbeenalreadymentioned,ananalysiswasperformedforEU-15statessimilartotheonedonefor
CEEcountries.Itdemonstratedthatthe most attractive state for immigrants is Sweden ( ).
Luxembourgcameinsecond,whileDenmarkwasratedthird.PortugalandGreeceprovedtobetheleast
attractiveforimmigrantsamongtheEU-15states.AsinthecaseofCEEcountries,theaffluenceofagivenstate
wasrelevantfortheratingofthatstate,butthisvariablewasnotthedecisivefactor.
Table 12
Sweden
Luxembourg
Denmark
Austria
Netherlands
Finland
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Belgium
Ireland
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Greece
MigrationattractivenessofEU-15states(thebestresultforagivenindicator– 15points,theworstresult– 1point)
*
**
#11
#7
#2
#3
#20
#6
#17
#47
#48
#9
#13
#34
#26
#18
#86
81%
72%
64%
47%
67%
66%
63%
55%
51%
46%
55%
47%
55%
65%
32%
Low
Verylow
Verylow
Verylow
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High
Veryhigh
232,106
241,695
194,032
163,382
142,521
133,485
157,882
186,768
224,523
198,253
134,235
195,925
99,214
71,193
83,442
46.2
29.0
36.6
47.1
43.1
42.7
47.2
47.9
46.5
37.1
42.4
46.4
44.1
38.7
40.5
1.4
1.8
3.8
4.2
2.5
2.5
5.4
8.3
5.1
5.1
9.8
12.4
6.2
10.9
20.3
20,527
27,266
19,108
20,925
19,355
19,116
19,334
16,469
19,380
19.791
16,188
15,342
14.238
9,508
9,093
73.1
74.2
76.1
72.4
74.2
73.4
73.4
74.9
63.5
69.9
76.2
60.9
67.2
63.5
55.7
14.8
15.9
12.3
14.4
10.4
11.8
16.1
15.9
13.7
15.1
15.7
19.1
20.4
18.7
23.1
80.5
70.6
77.3
76.3
79.7
73.7
77.8
76.6
71.2
67.4
69.8
63.9
74.3
73.4
67.2
60,430
110,697
59,832
50,547
50,793
49,147
46,269
41,787
42,503
46,878
50,503
35,926
29,863
21,733
21,956
8.0
5.9
7.0
4.9
6.7
8.2
5.2
7.6
10.3
8.4
13.1
12.2
26.1
16.4
27.5
144
138
133
132
129
117
114
100
94
91
86
59
59
51
19
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
12
14
15
Country
Place
Points
Unemploymentrate
GDPpercapita
Activityrate
Atriskofpovertyrateaftersocialtransfer
IndexofEconomicFreedom
Median–equivalisednetincomeinPPS
Severematerialdeprivationrate
HappyPlanetIndex
Wealth
Socialunrest
Positiveimpactofimmigration
GlobalPeaceIndex
datafor2012
thefollowingscoreswereassigned:verylow– 15points,low– 11points,medium– 8points,high– 4points,veryhigh– 1point
* * *
**
Source:SeeAppendix,page53
49

52. AttractivenessofCEEcountriesagainstthebackground
oftheEU-15
Table13
Comparisonoftheresultsofanalysesperformedfor
CEEcountriesandEU-15statesshowedthatin terms of
migration attractiveness this division is already partially
outdated ( ).Althoughthefirstelevenplacesweretaken
byEU-15states,theCzechRepublicwasratedtwelfth.Right
behindthemcameSloveniaandEstonia,whichbetteredItaly,
amongothers.ThelastpositionbutonewastakenbyGreece,but
thismaybeduetothehugeeconomicproblemsstillexperienced
bythecountryasaresultoftheeconomiccrisis.Atthesametime,
itmustbepointedoutthatdifferencesbetweensomestatesare
minimalandtherankingresultsmaychangegreatlyinthe
comingyears.
WithintheEuropeanUnion,memberstateshave
limitedfreedomtoshapevisaandasylumpolicies,buttheyhave
stillhavesovereigntywithregardtothepursuitofpoliciesinthe
contextofemploymentmigration.Thismeansthattheycan
createandimplementinstrumentswhichmaybothstimulateand
hinderemploymentimmigration.Thoseactionsshouldbe
correlatedwiththeattractivenessofagivenstateforimmigrants.
Themoreattractivestatesneedtodoverylittlebecausetheywill
bethedestinationsofsignificantimmigrationanyway.
Thesituationisdifferentinthecaseofstateswithpoor
attractivenessforimmigrants.Intheircaseitseemsthatthey
shouldtakepoliticalactiontoliberalisetheirapproachto
migrationsoastobecomemoreattractiveandconsequently
competesuccessfullywithotherstatesintheregion.
Torecapitulatetheimmigrationattractivenessof
EU-11andEU-15states,itcanbestatedthatCEE countries
should definitely rethink their immigration policy, because
at presentthey lag behind a majority of EU-15 states in terms
of attractiveness for immigrants despiteregular
improvementsintheirsituation.Thefactthatthefirsteleven
placesintherankingofmigrationattractivenessaretaken
byEU-15statesleavesnodoubtinthisrespect.Unlessthey
introduceveryintensivemigrationpoliciesaimedatattracting
foreigners,formanymoreyearstocomeCEEcountrieswilllose
theracetoattractthoseimmigrantswhocanmakethegreatest
contributiontoeconomiccompetitivenessandcanpositively
contributetoresolutionofdemographicproblems.
8
BecauseitwasnecessarytoconvertthescorestoabletocreatearankingforallEU-26states,certainsmallchangesofthepositionsintherankingbetweenparticularcountriesare
possiblecomparedtotherankingdrawnupseparatelyforEU-11andEU-15.Asanexample,intherankingdrawnupforEU-11states,PolandandSlovakiawereratedinthesameplace,
whileintherankingforallEU-26statesSlovakiaisratedhigherthanPoland,butthedifferencesareverysmallingeneral.
Table 13
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Finland
Germany
United Kingdom
Belgium
France
Ireland
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Estonia
Poland
Italy
Slovakia
Portugal
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Romania
Croatia
Greece
Bulgaria
Recapitulationofmigrationattractiveness
ofEUstates(thebestresultforagiven
indicator– 26points,theworstresult
– 1point;under‘socialunrest’category
thescoresareasfollows:verylow26points,
low19points,medium13points,
8
high7points,veryhigh1points)
–
– –
– –
266
257
257
250
250
240
236
204
191
188
188
178
152
152
140
136
135
134
132
105
98
87
80
75
65
55
Points
1
2
2
4
4
6
7
8
9
10
10
12
13
13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Place
50

53. Theprojecteddemographicproblemsthatwewillbedealingwithinthecomingyearsandtheensuing
changesinlabourmarketsmakeitnecessarytogiveseriousconsiderationtotheimpactofemployment
immigrationoncopingwithsuchchallenges.However,publicopinioninmemberstatesseemsscepticalaboutthe
benefitstobederivedfromtheinflowofmoreforeigners.Thismeansthatwewillbehavingadebateabout
immigrationaswellassearchingforsolutionsthatwillhelpattractnewimmigrantswithoutaggravatingthe
oppositionofthepublic.ThescenariooutlinedhereledustoreflectonthedemandforimmigrationinCEE
countries,andinvestigatetheattractivenessofthosecountriesforimmigrants.WerecognisedthatwithintheEU
competitionforthoseimmigrants(inthefirstandsecondlabourmarketsegments)whobringthegreatestadded
valuetotheeconomiesandsocietiesofreceivingstateswillbeincreasing.Unfortunately,theresultsofthose
analysesdonotgivegroundsforoptimismaboutCEEcountries.Itseemsthatunlesstheyundertakeactionsinthe
fieldofimmigrationpolicyandmovetowardsgreateropennesstoimmigrationandintegration,withveryfew
exceptionstheywillloseouttothebetterdevelopedEUmemberstates.
Summary
51

54. Ananalysisofdemographicpyramidswithabreakdownintonon-
nationalsandnationalsdemonstratedthatimmigrants comprise a younger
social group than indigenes.Thismeansthattheyexertapositiveimpacton
populationstructuresofparticularstates– bygreatlyrejuvenatingthem.
However,thispositiveeffectisbettervisibleinEU-15statesthaninEU-11ones.
Thelabourmarketsofmemberstatesare generating a demand for
workers in both the first and second segments of the labour market.But,
ifwelookatabsolutenumbers,demandismuchgreaterinthesecondthaninthe
firstsegment.Nevertheless,itshouldbepointedoutthatahighlyskilled
immigrantwhosepotentialisproperlyusedbringsmuchmoreaddedvaluetothe
economythananon-nationalemployedinthesecondlabourmarketsegment.
Thereforethe rivalry of particular states to acquire highly skilled
immigrants is definitely greater than in the case of immigrants with
averageandpoorskills.
Duetothescopeofthedemographicprocessesandtheirimportancefor
thelabourmarket,the inflow of additional immigrants, particularly into the
first labour market segment, does not translate into unemployment
growth.Immigrantsmaybenecessaryforredressingthelabourshortagesthat
willariseinthecomingyears.
CEE countries are losing out to EU-15 states in terms of
attractiveness to foreigners. TheCzechRepublic,SloveniaandEstoniaarethe
mostattractiveamongthem.Thismeansthatifthosecountrieswanttoenterthe
competitionforforeignerswhowillpositivelycontributetotheircompetitive-
ness,theymustundertakeadditionalactionsinthefieldofimmigrationpolicy,
i.e.applyinstrumentsstimulatingtheinflowofthiscategoryofforeigners.Atthe
sametime,itmustbestressedthattheEuropeanUnionasawholeislosingthe
raceagainsttheUnitedStates,CanadaandAustraliawithregardtothepowerto
attractforeignershavingthehighestskills.
Main conclusions from the chapter:
1
2
3
4
52

55. Appendix:
Indicators used for the creation of the index of the attractiveness
of European states for immigrants
Unemploymentrate–Eurostat(Unemploymentratebysexandagegroups,annualaverage),
basedonquarterlyresultsoftheEULabourForceSurvey,2013.
GDPpercapita–WorldBank,inUSD,2013.
Activityrate–Eurostat(Employedandjob-seekersasapercentageofthepopulationaged15-64),
2013Q4.
At risk of poverty after social exclusion – Eurostat(At-risk-ofpovertyaftersocialexclusion),
thepercentageofthepopulationwithincomesbelow60%ofthenationalaverage,2013.
Index of Economic Freedom – publishedbyTheWallStreetJournalandTheHeritageFoundation;using
independentvariables(50)dividedinto10categories,itdescribesthescopeanddegreeofrestrictionsand
limitationsappliedintheeconomicspherein186states(including:taxes,wagesandprices,property
rightsandtradepolicy).Thelowestscoredenotesthegreateststateinterventionintheeconomyandleast
th
economicfreedom;HongKongisratedfirst(90.1points),NorthKoreacomesinlastat178place
(1.0point),2014.
MedianequivalisednetincomeinPPS–Eurostat(Meanandmedianequivalisednetincome),2013.
Severe material deprivation rate – Eurostat(severematerialdeprivationrate,EU-SILC),percentage
ofthepopulationthatisunabletosatisfyatleast4outof9needs,2013.
Happy Planet Index – anindexlaunchedin2006bytheNewEconomicsFoundationformeasurement
ofwelfare(in151countries),2014.
Wealthpercapita–CreditSuisseGlobalWealthDatabook,inUSD,2013.
Social unrest –EconomistIntelligenceUnit;itmeasuresinstitutionalandpoliticalweaknessesinagiven
state,including:democraticcrisis,weakgovernment,incomeinequalities,lowsocialsecurityleveland
ethnictensions,2014.
Positive impact of immigration – thepercentageofrespondentswhowhollyagreewiththestatement
thatimmigration“enriches” theircountryineconomicandculturalterms(AwarenessofHomeAffairs,
Eurobarometer,2012.p.34).
Global Peace Index –InstituteForEconomicsandPeace;theindexhasmeasuredthedegreeofharmony,
peaceandsecurityin162countriessince2007;ituses22indicators,including:incidenceofactsofterror,
relationswithneighbouringcountries,percentageofrefugees,politicalstabilityandhomiciderates,2014.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
53

57. ChapterIV
Migration scenarios for CEE countries
– or what can happen in the future

58. Chapter IV
Migration scenarios for CEE countries
– or what can happen in the future
Thechallengesrelatedtomigrationsandananalysisofthepropensitytoemigrateandstayabroad
amongnationalsofCEEcountriesaswellastheattractivenessofthosestatesforpotentialimmigrants,which
werepresentedinpreviouschapters,urgeustoreflectonpossiblescenariosforthefuture.Certainlyany
scenariosregardingthedevelopmentofthemigrationsituationarejustprojectionsanddonothaveto
materialise,butatthesametimedesigningsuchscenariosishighlyrelevantfordecision-makingconcerning
policiesthatmightinfluencethescaleofemigrationfromandimmigrationintoagivenstate.Butbeforeweput
forwardspecificscenarios,itseemsadvisabletopresentsomeadditionaldatacontributingtotheshapingupthe
saidscenarios.
Youthaboutmigrations
Inouranalysessofarwehaveaddressedtheviewsofyouthonmigrationonlytoasmallextent,whileit
ismainlyyoungpersons,frequentlyimmediatelyaftercompletingtheireducation,whodecidetoemigrate.
Thereforegettingtoknowtheirviewsisimportantforthebuildingofmigrationscenarios.Table14suggests
thatemigration related to acquisition of new qualifications or undertaking of employment abroad is
a universal alternative for youth from CEE countries.OnlyyoungpeoplefromtheCzechRepublicandPoland
morerarelythantheEU-28averagedeclareawillingnesstogoabroadinthecomingyears.Apropensityfor
temporaryemigrationismostfrequentlydisplayedbyyoungpeoplefromSlovenia,Croatia,EstoniaandRomania
( ).Table14
Table 14
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
EU-28
PropensityofyouthfromCEEcountriestogoabroad(in%)
ForeachofthefollowingstatementsregardingmobilitywithintheEuropeanUnion,pleasetellmewhetheritappliestoyou:
1
1
2
2
2
0
3
3
0
3
1
1
Source:EuropeanYouthin2014,Eurobarometer,p.21
Because of the crisis, you feel
competent to study, undergo
training or work in an EU
country other than
(OUR COUNTRY)
Don't know
53
46
83
74
54
77
74
42
46
46
56
73
No
46
53
15
24
44
23
23
55
54
51
43
26
Yes
3
2
4
5
2
0
2
5
3
6
2
3
You want to study, undergo
training or work in an EU
country other than
(OUR COUNTRY)
Don't know
39
35
56
34
45
51
41
52
37
41
34
54
No
58
63
40
61
53
49
57
43
60
53
64
43
Yes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
You have already studied,
undergone training or worked
in an EU country other than
(OUR COUNTRY),
or you are currently doing it
Don't know
79
95
87
79
84
75
73
84
75
70
79
87
No
21
5
13
21
16
25
27
16
25
30
21
13
Yes
56

59. Atthesametime,comparativeresearchsuggeststhatitistheopportunityto obtain better salaries
that most frequently motivates people to emigrate.Thisisconfirmedbyresultsofresearchpresentedin
ChapterIIofthisreport.InallCEEcountrieswageswereindicatedasthemainstimulustoemigrateby70-80%of
therespondents( ).
WhoismostmobileandwhowillbeneededinlabourmarketsofCEEcountries?
Aswehaveshowninthepreviouschapter,emigrationandimmigrationprocessesconcernemployees
fromboththefirstandthesecondlabourmarketsegments.Atthesametime,professions requiring high-level
skills,forwhichthereisademandinthelabourmarkets,areconsideredtobethemostmobileones.Thisis
confirmedbyanalysesbytheEuropeanCommission,whoseresultsshowthatthemostmobileprofessionsare
thoseinmedicine(doctorsofmedicine,dentalpractitioners,andnurses)andtechnicalprofessions(drivers,
electriciansetc.).Interestingly,teachersarealsoconsideredtobemobile( ).
Table15
Table16
Table 15
Mainreasonsbehindthedecisiontogotoworkabroad(in%)
WhatwouldbethemainreasonswhyyouwouldconsiderworkinginanotherEUmemberstate?
(Onlytheitemsmentionedbyatleast10%ofrespondentsatEUlevelareshown-multipleanswersarepossible)
Source:InternalMarketSpecialEurobarometer398,October2013,p.58
50
26
28
22
17
16
13
10
6
1
0
EU-27
81
20
30
19
8
8
8
25
1
0
0
SK
80
31
30
35
9
11
17
26
4
0
0
SI
85
25
15
35
9
13
8
17
2
0
1
RO
78
24
14
23
6
10
9
14
3
0
0
PL
82
29
16
40
9
9
20
16
1
0
0
HU
78
19
18
24
7
14
4
27
2
0
0
LT
70
19
17
22
6
16
6
17
1
1
1
LV
79
15
28
24
12
13
1
21
4
1
1
EE
73
20
28
23
11
12
8
17
6
1
0
CZ
80
30
24
31
8
11
7
18
1
0
0
HR
89
26
18
31
9
8
1
15
0
0
2
BG
To get a better salary
You cannot find a job in (OUR COUNTRY)
Professional development or career
opportunities are better for your
profession in other EU member states
To benefit from working conditions
other than salary
You would like to live or work in
a different country even if economic
conditions are not much better there
For family or personal reasons
To pay lower taxes
There are better social guarantees for
employees in other EU member states
Other
None
Don't know
57