Il 31 gennaio 2016 è l’ultimo giorno utile per i datori di lavoro che, nel corso del 2015, hanno stipulato contratti di somministrazione, per inviare alle rappresentanze sindacali la comunicazione obbligatoria annuale.
Il 31 gennaio 2016 è l’ultimo giorno utile per i datori di lavoro che, nel corso del 2015, hanno stipulato contratti di somministrazione, per inviare alle rappresentanze sindacali la comunicazione obbligatoria annuale.
CAMBRIDGE AS GEOGRAPHY REVISION: SETTLEMENTS - 6.3 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF ...George Dumitrache
A comprehensive presentation of subchapter 6.3 The Changing Structure of Urban Settlements, from the third chapter of Human Geography, AS Cambridge, Settlements.
I
V
I
/
,�\
\
I.
• I¸
It's public knowledge that ill-fitting O-rings in
the space shuttle solid rocket boosters (SRB), com-
bined with low air temperatures before the sched-
uled launch, precipitated the actual explosion. But the
reality is not that simple. Tragically, there were several
opportunities to break this deadly chain of events dur-
ing the 14 years leading up to the event.
But what went wrong? What kept this ultimately di-
sastrous process in motion? At the time, there was no
shortage of quality assurance tools and best practices
being used, but the chain that caused the Challenger
disaster was completely impervious to virtially all
known quality tools available at the time.
What advancements in quality thinking have we
seen since then? How can we apply this thinking to
other complex systems and processes? What can we
learn from this tragedy?
System vs. process
What happened in the chain that led to the Chal-
lenger disaster is the direct result of an obvious but
often overlooked fact: Tools designed for process
improvement are not always scalable to the level of
complex systems.
In most cases, process tools are largely quantitative,
focused on functional sequences and are mostly iso-
lated from external influence. Moreover, variables in
proýesses are usually more easily identifiable and con-
trollable than they were in the Challenger example.
The same isn't true of larger complex systems,
Logical thinking pr
i Intermediate objectives (10) map
Defines the expected standard of overal
success factors, and necessary conditioj
FCuirrent reality tree (CR~T)A:deta'olted , logically verifiable cause and
Oevia tions i n system performance from'
Evaporating cloud
A means of identifying hidden conflict th
opportunity to create breakthroughs for
Future realilty tree (FRT)
A detailed, :logcaly verifiable cause aind
outcomes of changes contemplated to e
Prerequisite tree
A parallel sequential arrangement of the
identified in the FRT. Includes obstacles
Iprojectizing system change implementat
"ocess / TABLE 1
I system performance. Establishes a goal,
ns.
effect diagram depicting critical root caus
the desired standard set forth in the 10 ml
iat frustrates policy change. Provides the
resolving the conflict.
effect diagram projecting the anti cipated
liminate the deviations identified in the C
tasks required to execute the changes
to be overcome. Provides the basis for
tion.--- -- --
which experience much more significant interaction
with the external environment. Not only can that inter-
action give rise to greater uncertainty and variability,
but decisions on the most important issues often can't
be evaluated quantitatively.
Processes are repetitive. They're governed by stan-
dard operating procedures and best practices, which
are designed to guide consistently and precisely re-
peatable situations.
Systems are governed by policies, which are intend-
ed to address a much wider variety of circumstances
and still remai ...
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R DCOLUM.docxransayo
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D
COLUMBIA
1 9 5R e p o r t V o l u m e I A u g u s t 2 0 0 3
The Board began its investigation with two central ques-
tions about NASA decisions. Why did NASA continue to fly
with known foam debris problems in the years preceding the
Columbia launch, and why did NASA managers conclude
that the foam debris strike 81.9 seconds into Columbiaʼs
flight was not a threat to the safety of the mission, despite
the concerns of their engineers?
8.1 ECHOES OF CHALLENGER
As the investigation progressed, Board member Dr. Sally
Ride, who also served on the Rogers Commission, observed
that there were “echoes” of Challenger in Columbia. Ironi-
cally, the Rogers Commission investigation into Challenger
started with two remarkably similar central questions: Why
did NASA continue to fly with known O-ring erosion prob-
lems in the years before the Challenger launch, and why, on
the eve of the Challenger launch, did NASA managers decide
that launching the mission in such cold temperatures was an
acceptable risk, despite the concerns of their engineers?
The echoes did not stop there. The foam debris hit was not
the single cause of the Columbia accident, just as the failure
of the joint seal that permitted O-ring erosion was not the
single cause of Challenger. Both Columbia and Challenger
were lost also because of the failure of NASA̓ s organiza-
tional system. Part Two of this report cites failures of the
three parts of NASA̓ s organizational system. This chapter
shows how previous political, budgetary, and policy deci-
sions by leaders at the White House, Congress, and NASA
(Chapter 5) impacted the Space Shuttle Programʼs structure,
culture, and safety system (Chapter 7), and how these in turn
resulted in flawed decision-making (Chapter 6) for both ac-
cidents. The explanation is about system effects: how actions
taken in one layer of NASA̓ s organizational system impact
other layers. History is not just a backdrop or a scene-setter.
History is cause. History set the Columbia and Challenger
accidents in motion. Although Part Two is separated into
chapters and sections to make clear what happened in the
political environment, the organization, and managers ̓and
engineers ̓decision-making, the three worked together. Each
is a critical link in the causal chain.
This chapter shows that both accidents were “failures of
foresight” in which history played a prominent role.1 First,
the history of engineering decisions on foam and O-ring
incidents had identical trajectories that “normalized” these
anomalies, so that flying with these flaws became routine
and acceptable. Second, NASA history had an effect. In re-
sponse to White House and Congressional mandates, NASA
leaders took actions that created systemic organizational
flaws at the time of Challenger that were also present for
Columbia. The final section compares the two critical deci-
sion sequences immediately.
Could iso 31000 Risk Management Guidelines have saved the TitanicDavid Patrishkoff
The Titanic pursued 3 common objectives: Low cost design, cheap manufacturing materials and a suspected race across the Atlantic to break a speed record. The individual risk opportunities that Titanic pursued were not terribly unusual, but collectively, they created an unforgiving perfect storm fueled by three linked cascading risks that sank her in less than 3 hours with 1,502 passengers lost:
1) Ship design shortcomings influenced by cost cutting efforts
2) Rivet material quality flaws
3) Vessel operation and evacuation mistakes
This paper builds on my beliefs that the prevailing theory of project management has failed us with respect to large complex projects. I have written extensively on this including highlighting that the assumptions of Gantt and Fayol fall short at scale and complexity. In this paper I examine the successes that underpin modern project management theory and seek to understand how the resulting approach to project management has failed to deliver comparable successes with regularity. As I explored these questions, I sought to understand the unique characteristics of the Atlas and Polaris missile programs; the subsequent institutionalization of the perceived success factors; and importantly, did perception and reality align. In other words, have we made an incomplete set of assumptions and institutionalized them?
NDT Trends: Uncovering the Untold Narrative of Titan SubmersibleManaswiMumbarkar
We bring you the captivating cover story covering the Titan Submersible Fiasco.
However, as we unveil the details of the Titan Submersible's tragic journey, we
must also reflect on the lessons learned and the implications for future sub-sea
expeditions.
Nel seminario viene descritta una piattaforma informatica integrata, basata su tecnologie GIS, generatori di griglia, simulatori numerici e visualizzatori, finalizzata ad indagare l'impatto sulla qualità delle acque derivante da fonti di inquinamento localizzate e diffuse e a quantificare l'incertezza nell'applicazione dei modelli.
Write your thought on the following1. petroski notes that most en.pdfarihantstoneart
Write your thought on the following:
1. petroski notes that most engineering failures are much more involved than simple technical
mis-calculations and involve the failure of the design process or management culture.However,
not all engineering failures involve ethical issue.The infamous collapse of the first Tacoma
Narrow Brodge, and the losses of the Mars polar lander and Mars Climate Orbiter were technical
and design process failures.
Solution
In the face of new technology, how do we balance public welfare and progress? If Moisseiff had
designed a bridge similar to the ones which had already proven their stability, Tacoma Narrows
Bridge would never have collapsed costing thousands of dollars and endangering many lives. It
would also have been significantly more expensive. On the other hand, if engineers had never
tried innovative techniques, suspension bridges may never have been built at all. At the time of
their introduction, no one believed that a suspension bridge could safely accommodate trains.
Roebling, however, took a gamble, pushed the limits of the current technology, and built a
suspension bridge that he believed could safely support rail traffic. Luckily he was correct, and
suspension bridges soon became widely accepted (Petroski. Moisseiff also took a gamble, trying
to create a longer, sleeker, less expensive bridge, by pushing the limits of technology. He,
however, was not as lucky, and what could have been a breakthrough in technology turned into a
catastrophic failure. Every time engineers push the limits of technology they risk a similar loss
like losses of mas polar lander and mass climate orbiter in which there were technical error like
Mass polar lander
1. Inadequate specifications which includes what the software was supposed to do, but no
mention of what it must not to do.
2. Flawed review process: Violation of basic engineering safety pracitices in the digital part of
the system.
Mass Climate Orbiter
1. Units communication and attention to detail failure. The primary cause of this discrepancy
was that one piece of ground software supplied by Lockheed Martin produced results in a United
States customary unit, contrary to its Software Interface Specification (SIS), while a second
system, supplied by NASA, expected those results to be in SI units, in accordance with the SIS.
Specifically, software that calculated the total impulse produced by thruster firings calculated
results in pound-seconds. The trajectory calculation software then used these results - expected to
be in newton-seconds - to update the predicted position of the spacecraft.
sometimes even It can cause a loss of life. How much is too much? When is a possible advance
worth a risk to public safety? What can the engineering profession do to make the
implementation of new technology safer? Do our current peer review and building code
committee processes adequately protect public safety?.
CAMBRIDGE AS GEOGRAPHY REVISION: SETTLEMENTS - 6.3 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF ...George Dumitrache
A comprehensive presentation of subchapter 6.3 The Changing Structure of Urban Settlements, from the third chapter of Human Geography, AS Cambridge, Settlements.
I
V
I
/
,�\
\
I.
• I¸
It's public knowledge that ill-fitting O-rings in
the space shuttle solid rocket boosters (SRB), com-
bined with low air temperatures before the sched-
uled launch, precipitated the actual explosion. But the
reality is not that simple. Tragically, there were several
opportunities to break this deadly chain of events dur-
ing the 14 years leading up to the event.
But what went wrong? What kept this ultimately di-
sastrous process in motion? At the time, there was no
shortage of quality assurance tools and best practices
being used, but the chain that caused the Challenger
disaster was completely impervious to virtially all
known quality tools available at the time.
What advancements in quality thinking have we
seen since then? How can we apply this thinking to
other complex systems and processes? What can we
learn from this tragedy?
System vs. process
What happened in the chain that led to the Chal-
lenger disaster is the direct result of an obvious but
often overlooked fact: Tools designed for process
improvement are not always scalable to the level of
complex systems.
In most cases, process tools are largely quantitative,
focused on functional sequences and are mostly iso-
lated from external influence. Moreover, variables in
proýesses are usually more easily identifiable and con-
trollable than they were in the Challenger example.
The same isn't true of larger complex systems,
Logical thinking pr
i Intermediate objectives (10) map
Defines the expected standard of overal
success factors, and necessary conditioj
FCuirrent reality tree (CR~T)A:deta'olted , logically verifiable cause and
Oevia tions i n system performance from'
Evaporating cloud
A means of identifying hidden conflict th
opportunity to create breakthroughs for
Future realilty tree (FRT)
A detailed, :logcaly verifiable cause aind
outcomes of changes contemplated to e
Prerequisite tree
A parallel sequential arrangement of the
identified in the FRT. Includes obstacles
Iprojectizing system change implementat
"ocess / TABLE 1
I system performance. Establishes a goal,
ns.
effect diagram depicting critical root caus
the desired standard set forth in the 10 ml
iat frustrates policy change. Provides the
resolving the conflict.
effect diagram projecting the anti cipated
liminate the deviations identified in the C
tasks required to execute the changes
to be overcome. Provides the basis for
tion.--- -- --
which experience much more significant interaction
with the external environment. Not only can that inter-
action give rise to greater uncertainty and variability,
but decisions on the most important issues often can't
be evaluated quantitatively.
Processes are repetitive. They're governed by stan-
dard operating procedures and best practices, which
are designed to guide consistently and precisely re-
peatable situations.
Systems are governed by policies, which are intend-
ed to address a much wider variety of circumstances
and still remai ...
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R DCOLUM.docxransayo
A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D
COLUMBIA
1 9 5R e p o r t V o l u m e I A u g u s t 2 0 0 3
The Board began its investigation with two central ques-
tions about NASA decisions. Why did NASA continue to fly
with known foam debris problems in the years preceding the
Columbia launch, and why did NASA managers conclude
that the foam debris strike 81.9 seconds into Columbiaʼs
flight was not a threat to the safety of the mission, despite
the concerns of their engineers?
8.1 ECHOES OF CHALLENGER
As the investigation progressed, Board member Dr. Sally
Ride, who also served on the Rogers Commission, observed
that there were “echoes” of Challenger in Columbia. Ironi-
cally, the Rogers Commission investigation into Challenger
started with two remarkably similar central questions: Why
did NASA continue to fly with known O-ring erosion prob-
lems in the years before the Challenger launch, and why, on
the eve of the Challenger launch, did NASA managers decide
that launching the mission in such cold temperatures was an
acceptable risk, despite the concerns of their engineers?
The echoes did not stop there. The foam debris hit was not
the single cause of the Columbia accident, just as the failure
of the joint seal that permitted O-ring erosion was not the
single cause of Challenger. Both Columbia and Challenger
were lost also because of the failure of NASA̓ s organiza-
tional system. Part Two of this report cites failures of the
three parts of NASA̓ s organizational system. This chapter
shows how previous political, budgetary, and policy deci-
sions by leaders at the White House, Congress, and NASA
(Chapter 5) impacted the Space Shuttle Programʼs structure,
culture, and safety system (Chapter 7), and how these in turn
resulted in flawed decision-making (Chapter 6) for both ac-
cidents. The explanation is about system effects: how actions
taken in one layer of NASA̓ s organizational system impact
other layers. History is not just a backdrop or a scene-setter.
History is cause. History set the Columbia and Challenger
accidents in motion. Although Part Two is separated into
chapters and sections to make clear what happened in the
political environment, the organization, and managers ̓and
engineers ̓decision-making, the three worked together. Each
is a critical link in the causal chain.
This chapter shows that both accidents were “failures of
foresight” in which history played a prominent role.1 First,
the history of engineering decisions on foam and O-ring
incidents had identical trajectories that “normalized” these
anomalies, so that flying with these flaws became routine
and acceptable. Second, NASA history had an effect. In re-
sponse to White House and Congressional mandates, NASA
leaders took actions that created systemic organizational
flaws at the time of Challenger that were also present for
Columbia. The final section compares the two critical deci-
sion sequences immediately.
Could iso 31000 Risk Management Guidelines have saved the TitanicDavid Patrishkoff
The Titanic pursued 3 common objectives: Low cost design, cheap manufacturing materials and a suspected race across the Atlantic to break a speed record. The individual risk opportunities that Titanic pursued were not terribly unusual, but collectively, they created an unforgiving perfect storm fueled by three linked cascading risks that sank her in less than 3 hours with 1,502 passengers lost:
1) Ship design shortcomings influenced by cost cutting efforts
2) Rivet material quality flaws
3) Vessel operation and evacuation mistakes
This paper builds on my beliefs that the prevailing theory of project management has failed us with respect to large complex projects. I have written extensively on this including highlighting that the assumptions of Gantt and Fayol fall short at scale and complexity. In this paper I examine the successes that underpin modern project management theory and seek to understand how the resulting approach to project management has failed to deliver comparable successes with regularity. As I explored these questions, I sought to understand the unique characteristics of the Atlas and Polaris missile programs; the subsequent institutionalization of the perceived success factors; and importantly, did perception and reality align. In other words, have we made an incomplete set of assumptions and institutionalized them?
NDT Trends: Uncovering the Untold Narrative of Titan SubmersibleManaswiMumbarkar
We bring you the captivating cover story covering the Titan Submersible Fiasco.
However, as we unveil the details of the Titan Submersible's tragic journey, we
must also reflect on the lessons learned and the implications for future sub-sea
expeditions.
Nel seminario viene descritta una piattaforma informatica integrata, basata su tecnologie GIS, generatori di griglia, simulatori numerici e visualizzatori, finalizzata ad indagare l'impatto sulla qualità delle acque derivante da fonti di inquinamento localizzate e diffuse e a quantificare l'incertezza nell'applicazione dei modelli.
Write your thought on the following1. petroski notes that most en.pdfarihantstoneart
Write your thought on the following:
1. petroski notes that most engineering failures are much more involved than simple technical
mis-calculations and involve the failure of the design process or management culture.However,
not all engineering failures involve ethical issue.The infamous collapse of the first Tacoma
Narrow Brodge, and the losses of the Mars polar lander and Mars Climate Orbiter were technical
and design process failures.
Solution
In the face of new technology, how do we balance public welfare and progress? If Moisseiff had
designed a bridge similar to the ones which had already proven their stability, Tacoma Narrows
Bridge would never have collapsed costing thousands of dollars and endangering many lives. It
would also have been significantly more expensive. On the other hand, if engineers had never
tried innovative techniques, suspension bridges may never have been built at all. At the time of
their introduction, no one believed that a suspension bridge could safely accommodate trains.
Roebling, however, took a gamble, pushed the limits of the current technology, and built a
suspension bridge that he believed could safely support rail traffic. Luckily he was correct, and
suspension bridges soon became widely accepted (Petroski. Moisseiff also took a gamble, trying
to create a longer, sleeker, less expensive bridge, by pushing the limits of technology. He,
however, was not as lucky, and what could have been a breakthrough in technology turned into a
catastrophic failure. Every time engineers push the limits of technology they risk a similar loss
like losses of mas polar lander and mass climate orbiter in which there were technical error like
Mass polar lander
1. Inadequate specifications which includes what the software was supposed to do, but no
mention of what it must not to do.
2. Flawed review process: Violation of basic engineering safety pracitices in the digital part of
the system.
Mass Climate Orbiter
1. Units communication and attention to detail failure. The primary cause of this discrepancy
was that one piece of ground software supplied by Lockheed Martin produced results in a United
States customary unit, contrary to its Software Interface Specification (SIS), while a second
system, supplied by NASA, expected those results to be in SI units, in accordance with the SIS.
Specifically, software that calculated the total impulse produced by thruster firings calculated
results in pound-seconds. The trajectory calculation software then used these results - expected to
be in newton-seconds - to update the predicted position of the spacecraft.
sometimes even It can cause a loss of life. How much is too much? When is a possible advance
worth a risk to public safety? What can the engineering profession do to make the
implementation of new technology safer? Do our current peer review and building code
committee processes adequately protect public safety?.
Lyapichev. Problems in numerical analysis of CFRDs (ICOLD Bull.155)6 p.)
CDTitanic
1. Part IV:Objectives&ContextAnalysis –SystemsThinking
Analyze amajorhistorical systemfailurefromthe perspective of conceptualdesign.Assesshow –or
whether–bettersystemsengineeringconceptualdesigncouldhave avertedoramelioratedthe impact
of systemfailure.
a) Sinkingof the Titanic(1912).
The keyflawsassociatedwiththe conceptualdesignmethodforthe Titanicincludealackof
planningof the followingcategories:objectivesanalysis,scenariodevelopment,functional analysis,and
performance requirements.The tragedythatisknownasthe sinkingof the Titaniccouldhave been
avertedoramelioratedif certaincrucial stepsinthe designprocesswere followed.However,due to
insufficientconceptual design,manyliveswerelostunnecessarily.The aforementionedtopicswill be
assessedaccordingtotheirimpacton the systemfailure.
The systemsengineersmade anothermistakebynotdefiningkeyobjectivesinanobjectives
analysispractice.The worst-case scenarioaccountedforinobjectivesanalysiswasaheadon collision.
The shipwas designedtobe able tohandle frontal collisions,yetfailedtoaddressside collisions.
The icebergthat ultimatelyledtothe tragedyof the Titanicwas spottedamere five minutes
before strikingwiththe ship.Duringthese fiveminutes, therewasnotenoughtime tomaneuver
throughthe icebergstobe able toavoidthe collision.Thus,the icebergsidesweptthe Titanic,
puncturingholesintoitshulls,fillingthe airwithwater
Duringobjectivesanalysis,several conflictingobjectiveswouldhave appeared.Forexample,the
battle of safetyvs.aestheticbeautywouldhave materializedindeterminingwhatobjectiveswere
contradictory.The Titanicwas createdtobe the bestof its kind,a luxurioussteamshipcarryingquite
wealthy(andpoor) passengers.However,akeyobjectivethatwasoverlookedwasthe safetyof all of
these passengers.A lineof boatsforevacuatingthe passengerswasremovedfromthe Titanic,due toits
blockingof the oceanview.
Whenconductingobjectivesanalysis,not all of the environmentalactorswere accountedfor,
such as fog.Preparingasystemforunstable environmental conditionsisfundamental tothe design
process.While asystemisoperatinginproductionphase,aplethoraof environmental changescan
occur, all withinamoment’snotice.Duringthe time of the sinkingof the Titanic,there wasaslighthaze
surroundingthe waterinthe ice floats.
Additionally,if the environmentwasconsideredapotential actor,itshouldhave been
subdividedfurtherintotwocategories,the waterandthe atmosphere.The watercategorieswouldhave
includedicebergs,coral reefs,shallowbanks,andunrulywaves.The atmosphere wouldhave accounted
for anyvariancesinvisibility,suchasclearskies,sun,moon,haze,fog,and rain.Byseparatingthe two
environmentactors,the systemsengineersof the Titanicdesigncouldhave accountedforsituations
where bothenvironmentswouldaffectthe Titanic’sabilitytonavigate the waters,akeyobjective.
2. Establishingmeasuresof effectiveness(MOEs) forthe objectivescouldhave helpedthe
conceptual designphase aswell.Hadobjectivesanalysisbeendone,anobjectivesuchasmaneuverthe
boat couldhave beenmeasuredbydetermininghow fastthe shipcouldturnin a knots/minute method.
Maneuveringthe boatthroughanytype of situationwhere timeisof the essence isimportanttoensure
the boat isperformingtomaximumcapability.Bymeasuringthe boat’sabilitytoturnrapidly,systems
engineerscouldhave betteraccountedforthe encounteringof submergedobjects.
Anotherfundamentalissue inthe conceptualdesignprocessof the Titanicwasa lack of
scenarioplanning.Planningfordifferentterrainsisakeyelementduringscenariodevelopment. The
physical terrainisimportanttoconsiderinscenarios,forthe waterenvironmentchangedthroughout
the Titanicjourney.The ice floatsbobbinginthe waterwere ariskto shipstravelingtothe Americas.
Whenscenariosare createdduringthe systemconceptual designphase,situationsthatcouldcause the
systemtomalfunctionwouldmanifest.Once these situationsare depictedinsome form, systems
engineerscanbetterunderstandhowtomitigate the risksthathave become apparent,oravoidthe risk
altogether.
For example,the systemsengineersshouldhave createdascenariomodelingasimilarsituation
to the one the Titanicexperienced.Suchascenariocouldhave manifestedasthis:The Titanichas left
dock fora couple of days,runningsmoothlyontargetasplanned.Systemsare runninggreat,andthe
Titanicisrunningfull speedtoAmerica.The nightfallsuponthe Titanic,andthe shipisnow cruising
throughwaterfilledwithice floats.There isaslightfoginthe air,reducing visibilitytolessthana few
hundredmilesfromship.Anicebergisspottedafew milesupaheadandthe captainis alertedandmust
decide howtoact.
From thisscenario,the systemsengineercangatherseveral keyplanningobjectives.The
systemsengineercanaccountfor lowvisibilityinthe environmentandwhichsystemtoimplementto
helpmitigate thatrisk.The icebergspottingwouldcreate anadditional objective astohow to detect
large objectssubmergedpartiallyorfullyunderwater.The scenarioprovidesbasisforproceduresthat
mustbe draftedincase of an emergency,communicationsbetweendifferentengineersonboard,what
safetymechanismsneedtobe putin place forthe passengers,anytrainingrequiredforthe shipcrew
for evacuationpurposes,andsafetytrainingrequiredforpassengersincase of accidents.Hadthis
scenario(ora similarscenario) beencreatedinthe systemconceptual designphase,perhapsthe simple
act of evacuatingmore passengersinasafe methodwould have beenenforced.
Flawedfunctional analysisalsocontributedtothe downfall of the Titanic.Functional analysis,
beingdependentuponobjectivesanalysis,wouldhave providedaclearunderstandingof what
objectivescanbe tracedto functionsforthe steamship.Forexample,if the objective,“increase ship
survivability”were defined,thenthe potential function,“maneuveraroundicebergs”wouldhave been
created.Inthismethod,the ship’sdesigncouldhave beenequippedtohandle maneuveringaround
large obstaclesthreateningitsfoundation.
Had a thoroughperformance requirementsanalysisbeendrafted,the critical designflawin
non-modularcompartmentswouldhave become abundantlyclear.A crucial stepinensuringsystems
