The document proposes a system-of-systems approach to achieve more discriminate and scalable weapon effects in urban warfare. It involves deploying sensor packages to detect and identify civilians, then using autonomous weapon control to safely redirect or modify weapon effects if civilians are present. A notional scenario is described where sensor packages are deployed into a building to identify enemy and civilian locations and signatures. Based on the sensor data, an autonomous weapon either redirects itself or uses tailored effects to minimize civilian harm. Technical challenges and relevant discrimination and weapon technologies are discussed. A demonstration program and advanced concept development roadmap are proposed.
This document discusses containment strategies for emerging dual-use technologies and makes three key points:
1) Current containment strategies are ineffective and based on outdated Cold War assumptions. Containment is also inherently immoral as it privileges states that already possess weapons.
2) A game theory model shows that the risk of attack decreases as the number of states with weapons increases, making a multi-polar world more stable than the Cold War bi-polar standoff.
3) The conclusion is that free proliferation of weapons beyond a few states is ultimately less risky than containment, as the costs of attack rise with each additional state possessing weapons. Open development of technologies is also more ethical than containment.
SAVIOHM Design is an interior design consulting company that aims to transform clients' dreams into reality through unique, personalized designs. They work closely with clients at every step of a project to deliver high-quality, stylish spaces. Their mission is to be a premier interior design provider through professional integrity, exceptional ideas, extraordinary service, and strong performance. They have experience designing residential, corporate, and retail interiors and aim to become the top name in those sectors through innovation and client satisfaction.
CCJO-Scalable and Tailorable Effects WeaponsGabe Pei
This document discusses the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) program called Delivering Scalable and Tailorable Effects Weapons (STEW). The goal is to develop capabilities to match urban combat targeting objectives while minimizing collateral casualties. Key challenges include discriminating combatants from non-combatants in dense, cluttered environments with compressed timelines. The program aims to develop accurate discrimination systems, controllable weapon effects, and autonomous decision making. It outlines notional operational scenarios and discusses technologies like structure-penetrating sensors, discrimination modalities, sensor packages, penetrators, scalable effects weapons, and a demonstration program to integrate and test the concepts.
1. APL developed optical kill assessment technology to determine the results of ballistic missile intercepts. This included developing physics-based models to predict intercept signatures and high-speed sensors to observe the signatures.
2. APL's RISK model uses an energy balance approach to model the vaporization, fragmentation, and expansion of debris from intercepts, and the resulting optical flashes. It has been used to analyze data from missile defense flight tests.
3. High-speed sensors developed by APL include imaging and spectrographic sensors that were integrated onto telescopes to observe intercepts in flight tests and collect signature data.
SEAS - Systems Effectiveness Analysis Simulation - Space Surveillance Radar Study for US Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Presented at Spring SMC 2007. Approved for Public Release.
Future Short Range Ground-Based Air Defence: System Drivers, Characteristics ...Ashwin Samales
The aim of this paper is to describe how ground-based air defence concepts for the timeframe beyond 2015 may be synthesised from an assessment of the operational drivers and the technological factors, to produce robust modular concepts applicable to both warfighting and peace support regimes.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. The roadmap establishes six goals to improve effectiveness through integration, standardization, policies/procedures, control measures, prototyping processes, and cost control. It identifies key mission needs like reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification, counter-mine warfare, and CBRNE reconnaissance to guide research priorities.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. Key points include:
- Unmanned aircraft, ground, and maritime systems have increased contributions to military operations and are highly desired by combatant commanders for missions like reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The roadmap establishes goals to improve effectiveness, interoperability, and cost control of unmanned systems through increased integration, common standards, and prioritizing validated capabilities.
- Top priority missions for unmanned systems are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification and designation, counter-mine warfare, and chemical
This document discusses containment strategies for emerging dual-use technologies and makes three key points:
1) Current containment strategies are ineffective and based on outdated Cold War assumptions. Containment is also inherently immoral as it privileges states that already possess weapons.
2) A game theory model shows that the risk of attack decreases as the number of states with weapons increases, making a multi-polar world more stable than the Cold War bi-polar standoff.
3) The conclusion is that free proliferation of weapons beyond a few states is ultimately less risky than containment, as the costs of attack rise with each additional state possessing weapons. Open development of technologies is also more ethical than containment.
SAVIOHM Design is an interior design consulting company that aims to transform clients' dreams into reality through unique, personalized designs. They work closely with clients at every step of a project to deliver high-quality, stylish spaces. Their mission is to be a premier interior design provider through professional integrity, exceptional ideas, extraordinary service, and strong performance. They have experience designing residential, corporate, and retail interiors and aim to become the top name in those sectors through innovation and client satisfaction.
CCJO-Scalable and Tailorable Effects WeaponsGabe Pei
This document discusses the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) program called Delivering Scalable and Tailorable Effects Weapons (STEW). The goal is to develop capabilities to match urban combat targeting objectives while minimizing collateral casualties. Key challenges include discriminating combatants from non-combatants in dense, cluttered environments with compressed timelines. The program aims to develop accurate discrimination systems, controllable weapon effects, and autonomous decision making. It outlines notional operational scenarios and discusses technologies like structure-penetrating sensors, discrimination modalities, sensor packages, penetrators, scalable effects weapons, and a demonstration program to integrate and test the concepts.
1. APL developed optical kill assessment technology to determine the results of ballistic missile intercepts. This included developing physics-based models to predict intercept signatures and high-speed sensors to observe the signatures.
2. APL's RISK model uses an energy balance approach to model the vaporization, fragmentation, and expansion of debris from intercepts, and the resulting optical flashes. It has been used to analyze data from missile defense flight tests.
3. High-speed sensors developed by APL include imaging and spectrographic sensors that were integrated onto telescopes to observe intercepts in flight tests and collect signature data.
SEAS - Systems Effectiveness Analysis Simulation - Space Surveillance Radar Study for US Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Presented at Spring SMC 2007. Approved for Public Release.
Future Short Range Ground-Based Air Defence: System Drivers, Characteristics ...Ashwin Samales
The aim of this paper is to describe how ground-based air defence concepts for the timeframe beyond 2015 may be synthesised from an assessment of the operational drivers and the technological factors, to produce robust modular concepts applicable to both warfighting and peace support regimes.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. The roadmap establishes six goals to improve effectiveness through integration, standardization, policies/procedures, control measures, prototyping processes, and cost control. It identifies key mission needs like reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification, counter-mine warfare, and CBRNE reconnaissance to guide research priorities.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. Key points include:
- Unmanned aircraft, ground, and maritime systems have increased contributions to military operations and are highly desired by combatant commanders for missions like reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The roadmap establishes goals to improve effectiveness, interoperability, and cost control of unmanned systems through increased integration, common standards, and prioritizing validated capabilities.
- Top priority missions for unmanned systems are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification and designation, counter-mine warfare, and chemical
Control Systems For Projectile DefenseRyan MendivilMar.docxmaxinesmith73660
Control Systems For Projectile Defense
Ryan Mendivil
March 20, 2015
Abstract
In this paper, I will describe various methods for defending against airborne projectiles. This includes
tracking mechanisms for following objects in three dimensional space and predicting what paths they will
take. In addition, methods of calculating interception trajectories and the factors involved will be discussed.
Contents
I Introduction 1
II Assumptions 2
III Model 2
1 Projectile Tracking 3
1.1 Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Calculating Trajectories 4
2.1 Line and Curve Fitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Kalman Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Intercepting 5
3.1 Aim and Travel Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Solving For Trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 Verification 7
5 Discussion 7
6 References 8
1
Part I
Introduction
In our modern world, we live in relatively peaceful times. However, there are still may places with ongoing
conflicts. Every year there are around hundreds of soldiers and civilian injured or killed in combat. A good
portion of these casualties come from the use of projectile based weaponry. When used properly, projectiles
can be very accurate and cause minimal collateral damage. Unfortunately, this is not the case in many
modern war zones. Projectiles are launched with the intent to cause harm to anyone from the opposing
side, be they civilians or soldiers. Producing systems that can properly prevent this kind of attack is of
vital importance. There are already many systems on the market but most are extremely expensive and
proprietary. Producing open systems that can be used across a wide range of hardware would be beneficial
to all. This paper will discuss a general model of control that can be applied to projectile tracking and
defense.
Part II
Assumptions
• The projectile is within tracking distance of our system and is distinguishable from it’s surroundings.
• The system will have a clean line of sight to the enemy projectile when it fires.
• A hit will be considered successful when both the enemy projectile and our intercepting projectile
occupy the same space.
• The time it takes the system to aim is constant or is set to large enough to account for any possible
amount of movement.
• The accuracy and sampling rate of the projectile tracker is high enough to provide reasonable data.
• The acceleration of the enemy projectile is constant.
• The velocity of our projectile is consistent and the time it will take to reach the point of interception
is calculable.
• The force of gravity on both.
This document summarizes the results of a study analyzing the effectiveness of a Future Combat Systems Brigade Combat Team (FCS-BCT) given varying priorities of information requests from space-based radar and unmanned aerial vehicles. The study found that the combination of organic FCS-BCT sensors and space radar led to increased system effectiveness, minimized blue casualties and reduced battle duration compared to using either system alone. However, there were still sensor interactions that could not be fully explained by the current analysis. The document recommends further studies varying communication delays, modeling stochastic UAV survivability, incorporating non-continuous UAV coverage, including other global UAV assets, and using more complex scheduling algorithms.
Evaluate the battlefield’s effects on friendly and enemy operations.
Determine the enemy’s possible COAs and arrange them in the order that the enemy will do them.
Identify key enemy assets (High Value Targets (HVTs)) for each enemy COA and where they will appear on the battlefield (Target Area of Interest (TAIs)).
Identify the activities, or lack of activities, and where they will occur on the battlefield. These activities will assist in identifying which COA the enemy adopts
The document discusses Collaborative Response Graphics (CRGs), which are geospatially relevant images created using BAE Systems' SOCET GXP software. CRGs overlay location-specific information like building floor plans, evacuation routes, and critical infrastructure onto aerial or satellite imagery. This allows first responders to visualize emergency plans and coordinate multi-agency responses in real-time on mobile devices. The integration of CRGs is said to improve emergency planning, response capabilities, and overall efficiency for law enforcement and other public safety personnel.
Alexandros kolovos on_'esdp and space'_initiative_presented_on_eumc_on_24th s...alexanderkolovos
This document discusses the importance of integrating space assets into the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) framework. It outlines key areas where space capabilities could provide advantages, such as command and control, intelligence gathering, early warning, navigation and timing. However, it notes there are still shortfalls in European space-based capabilities for secure communications, precision guidance, search and rescue, and weather forecasting. The aim is to provide background for developing an EU concept to better utilize space assets and address gaps to strengthen European crisis response and military operations.
Network Centric to Data Centric Networks (Data Distribution Service)Adil Khan
This document discusses the transition from net-centric networks to data-centric networks for modern military tactical systems. Net-centric networks focus on transporting data between known endpoints, while data-centric networks abstract data away from its source and make it available globally on the network. This allows data to remain available even if individual sources are lost. Data-centric networks provide benefits like quality of service, automatic discovery of nodes, and platform-independent data exchange formats to address challenges of dynamic and distributed military environments. Several US military programs have already adopted data-centric networking standards.
This document summarizes a workshop on precision indoor personnel location and tracking technologies for emergency responders. It discusses the need for these technologies to help save lives and reduce injuries among first responders. Currently, responders lack accurate location information and ability to communicate status inside buildings. The document reviews various indoor positioning sensor technologies and accuracy requirements for emergency response applications. It also outlines efforts by organizations like DHS, NRIC, IBWA to develop and regulate indoor location solutions to help emergency responders and civilians. A survey was conducted at the workshop to assess the current status of indoor location tracking technologies for rescue and tactical deployment applications.
This document discusses military radar systems. It describes three main types of radar used in military systems: land-based air defense radar, spaceborne radar systems, and airborne surveillance radar. It provides details on the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), a space-based system developed by the Missile Defense Agency to identify and track ballistic missiles. The STSS uses sensors on two satellites to detect visible and infrared light to track objects in space and provide data to missile defense systems. Military radar continues to evolve to identify more targets in different environments and conditions to support military operations.
Persistent Surveillance is more than a stare from space or Full Motion Video. Added to a COmmon Operating Picture, it can transform how we operate in the 21st Century.
This document discusses multisensor data fusion for defense applications. It describes data fusion as integrating data from multiple sensors to provide a more complete picture than from individual sensors alone. Some key defense applications discussed include surveillance, intelligence analysis, and missile guidance systems. The document also provides an example of using a Kalman filter for multisensor data fusion to estimate the state of a moving target tracked by multiple sensors.
Global InfoTek will develop concepts of operations (CONOPS) for an Emergency Mobile Phone Incident Reporting System (EMPIRES) that leverages mobile phones and infrastructure to collect and share situational data from citizens during crises. The 6-month project will cost $90,000. Global InfoTek will conceptualize a system using mobile phones to collect incident reports, environmental effects data, and real-time audio/video from citizens. They will integrate existing programs and technologies to disseminate this data to emergency responders through an integrated display. Global InfoTek will focus on communication challenges faced by responders during crises when infrastructure may be unavailable and develop solutions using emerging technologies like sensors and GPS on mobile
The document discusses various military communication systems and procedures. It describes systems like ADNS, CUDIXS, and VERDIN that transfer data between Navy ships and networks. It also explains procedures for emergency messages through the Red Cross, handling potential deception on communications networks through "GINGERBREAD", and protecting sensitive information by identifying Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) that should not be disclosed.
ArtOS is an artillery fire control system that optimizes the performance of artillery batteries through communication, reconnaissance data gathering, ammunition tracking, and resupply ordering. It allows a typical artillery strike to be performed in 5 steps in around 1 minute by integrating data between fire direction centers, firing sections, and gunlayers. Key advantages include compatibility with different weapon types and sensors, encrypted data transmission, automatic logging, and integration with complementary systems like MilStaff for operations planning and MilChat for mobile communications.
This document describes a SBIR proposal to develop algorithms to optimize searches using multiple sensors deployed from aircraft or UAVs to find stationary and moving targets over water and land. The algorithms would integrate information on environmental conditions, sensor capabilities, and target characteristics to generate near-optimal search plans. They would account for factors like varying sensor detection ranges in different environments and interference between simultaneous sensors. The goal is to improve on traditional search patterns that do not optimally allocate effort. Phase I would design the conceptual approach and simulate sensor performance data. Phase II would build a prototype decision support system for naval coastal warfare.
This chapter discusses how the human operators exercise control over the UAV and its payloads.
There r some key functions av
Piloting the aircraft: making the inputs to the control surfaces and propulsion system required to take off, fly some specified flight path, and land.
Controlling the payloads: turning them on and off, pointing them as needed, and performing any real-time interpretation of their outputs that is required to perform the mission of the UAS.
Commanding the aircraft: carrying out the mission plan, including any changes that must be made in response to events that occur during the mission.
Mission planning: determining the plan for the mission based on the tasking that comes from the “customer” for whom the UAS is flying the mission.
Target Detection, Recognition, and Identification:Imaging sensors are used to detect, recognize, and identify targets.
The successful accomplishment of these tasks depends on the interrelationship of the system resolution, target contrast, atmosphere, and display characteristics
One of the most common missions for a UAV is reconnaissance and/or wide-area surveillance.
These missions require the UAV and its operator to search large areas on the ground, looking for some type of target or activity. An example might be to search a valley looking for signs of an enemy advance.
There are three general types of search:
1. Point
2. Area
3. Route
Every facility has inherent and unique risks, which introduce emergency communication design challenges. Understanding emergency communication system design, installation, and maintenance criteria requires engineers to be familiar with the applicable codes and standards, primarily NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. Whether designing to provide emergency communication for fire or mass notification emergencies, NFPA 72 can be used as a tool to enhance the design, installation, and reliability of fire alarm systems used for emergency communications.
Evaluation of NEAMWave12 and discussion on NEAMWave14
ICG/NEAMTWS-X, Rome, Italy, November 19-21, 2013
Event: http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewEventRecord&eventID=1376
Related paper: http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewDocumentRecord&docID=12084
This document discusses how information is input, processed, and displayed for human perception. It covers measuring and coding information, as well as different types of displays like static, dynamic, quantitative, and qualitative. Good coding systems are detectable, discriminable, meaningful, standardized, and multidimensional. Compatibility is important, including conceptual compatibility between symbols and meanings, movement compatibility between displays and controls, spatial compatibility of layout, and modality compatibility between stimuli and responses.
Control Systems For Projectile DefenseRyan MendivilMar.docxmaxinesmith73660
Control Systems For Projectile Defense
Ryan Mendivil
March 20, 2015
Abstract
In this paper, I will describe various methods for defending against airborne projectiles. This includes
tracking mechanisms for following objects in three dimensional space and predicting what paths they will
take. In addition, methods of calculating interception trajectories and the factors involved will be discussed.
Contents
I Introduction 1
II Assumptions 2
III Model 2
1 Projectile Tracking 3
1.1 Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Calculating Trajectories 4
2.1 Line and Curve Fitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Kalman Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Intercepting 5
3.1 Aim and Travel Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Solving For Trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 Verification 7
5 Discussion 7
6 References 8
1
Part I
Introduction
In our modern world, we live in relatively peaceful times. However, there are still may places with ongoing
conflicts. Every year there are around hundreds of soldiers and civilian injured or killed in combat. A good
portion of these casualties come from the use of projectile based weaponry. When used properly, projectiles
can be very accurate and cause minimal collateral damage. Unfortunately, this is not the case in many
modern war zones. Projectiles are launched with the intent to cause harm to anyone from the opposing
side, be they civilians or soldiers. Producing systems that can properly prevent this kind of attack is of
vital importance. There are already many systems on the market but most are extremely expensive and
proprietary. Producing open systems that can be used across a wide range of hardware would be beneficial
to all. This paper will discuss a general model of control that can be applied to projectile tracking and
defense.
Part II
Assumptions
• The projectile is within tracking distance of our system and is distinguishable from it’s surroundings.
• The system will have a clean line of sight to the enemy projectile when it fires.
• A hit will be considered successful when both the enemy projectile and our intercepting projectile
occupy the same space.
• The time it takes the system to aim is constant or is set to large enough to account for any possible
amount of movement.
• The accuracy and sampling rate of the projectile tracker is high enough to provide reasonable data.
• The acceleration of the enemy projectile is constant.
• The velocity of our projectile is consistent and the time it will take to reach the point of interception
is calculable.
• The force of gravity on both.
This document summarizes the results of a study analyzing the effectiveness of a Future Combat Systems Brigade Combat Team (FCS-BCT) given varying priorities of information requests from space-based radar and unmanned aerial vehicles. The study found that the combination of organic FCS-BCT sensors and space radar led to increased system effectiveness, minimized blue casualties and reduced battle duration compared to using either system alone. However, there were still sensor interactions that could not be fully explained by the current analysis. The document recommends further studies varying communication delays, modeling stochastic UAV survivability, incorporating non-continuous UAV coverage, including other global UAV assets, and using more complex scheduling algorithms.
Evaluate the battlefield’s effects on friendly and enemy operations.
Determine the enemy’s possible COAs and arrange them in the order that the enemy will do them.
Identify key enemy assets (High Value Targets (HVTs)) for each enemy COA and where they will appear on the battlefield (Target Area of Interest (TAIs)).
Identify the activities, or lack of activities, and where they will occur on the battlefield. These activities will assist in identifying which COA the enemy adopts
The document discusses Collaborative Response Graphics (CRGs), which are geospatially relevant images created using BAE Systems' SOCET GXP software. CRGs overlay location-specific information like building floor plans, evacuation routes, and critical infrastructure onto aerial or satellite imagery. This allows first responders to visualize emergency plans and coordinate multi-agency responses in real-time on mobile devices. The integration of CRGs is said to improve emergency planning, response capabilities, and overall efficiency for law enforcement and other public safety personnel.
Alexandros kolovos on_'esdp and space'_initiative_presented_on_eumc_on_24th s...alexanderkolovos
This document discusses the importance of integrating space assets into the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) framework. It outlines key areas where space capabilities could provide advantages, such as command and control, intelligence gathering, early warning, navigation and timing. However, it notes there are still shortfalls in European space-based capabilities for secure communications, precision guidance, search and rescue, and weather forecasting. The aim is to provide background for developing an EU concept to better utilize space assets and address gaps to strengthen European crisis response and military operations.
Network Centric to Data Centric Networks (Data Distribution Service)Adil Khan
This document discusses the transition from net-centric networks to data-centric networks for modern military tactical systems. Net-centric networks focus on transporting data between known endpoints, while data-centric networks abstract data away from its source and make it available globally on the network. This allows data to remain available even if individual sources are lost. Data-centric networks provide benefits like quality of service, automatic discovery of nodes, and platform-independent data exchange formats to address challenges of dynamic and distributed military environments. Several US military programs have already adopted data-centric networking standards.
This document summarizes a workshop on precision indoor personnel location and tracking technologies for emergency responders. It discusses the need for these technologies to help save lives and reduce injuries among first responders. Currently, responders lack accurate location information and ability to communicate status inside buildings. The document reviews various indoor positioning sensor technologies and accuracy requirements for emergency response applications. It also outlines efforts by organizations like DHS, NRIC, IBWA to develop and regulate indoor location solutions to help emergency responders and civilians. A survey was conducted at the workshop to assess the current status of indoor location tracking technologies for rescue and tactical deployment applications.
This document discusses military radar systems. It describes three main types of radar used in military systems: land-based air defense radar, spaceborne radar systems, and airborne surveillance radar. It provides details on the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), a space-based system developed by the Missile Defense Agency to identify and track ballistic missiles. The STSS uses sensors on two satellites to detect visible and infrared light to track objects in space and provide data to missile defense systems. Military radar continues to evolve to identify more targets in different environments and conditions to support military operations.
Persistent Surveillance is more than a stare from space or Full Motion Video. Added to a COmmon Operating Picture, it can transform how we operate in the 21st Century.
This document discusses multisensor data fusion for defense applications. It describes data fusion as integrating data from multiple sensors to provide a more complete picture than from individual sensors alone. Some key defense applications discussed include surveillance, intelligence analysis, and missile guidance systems. The document also provides an example of using a Kalman filter for multisensor data fusion to estimate the state of a moving target tracked by multiple sensors.
Global InfoTek will develop concepts of operations (CONOPS) for an Emergency Mobile Phone Incident Reporting System (EMPIRES) that leverages mobile phones and infrastructure to collect and share situational data from citizens during crises. The 6-month project will cost $90,000. Global InfoTek will conceptualize a system using mobile phones to collect incident reports, environmental effects data, and real-time audio/video from citizens. They will integrate existing programs and technologies to disseminate this data to emergency responders through an integrated display. Global InfoTek will focus on communication challenges faced by responders during crises when infrastructure may be unavailable and develop solutions using emerging technologies like sensors and GPS on mobile
The document discusses various military communication systems and procedures. It describes systems like ADNS, CUDIXS, and VERDIN that transfer data between Navy ships and networks. It also explains procedures for emergency messages through the Red Cross, handling potential deception on communications networks through "GINGERBREAD", and protecting sensitive information by identifying Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) that should not be disclosed.
ArtOS is an artillery fire control system that optimizes the performance of artillery batteries through communication, reconnaissance data gathering, ammunition tracking, and resupply ordering. It allows a typical artillery strike to be performed in 5 steps in around 1 minute by integrating data between fire direction centers, firing sections, and gunlayers. Key advantages include compatibility with different weapon types and sensors, encrypted data transmission, automatic logging, and integration with complementary systems like MilStaff for operations planning and MilChat for mobile communications.
This document describes a SBIR proposal to develop algorithms to optimize searches using multiple sensors deployed from aircraft or UAVs to find stationary and moving targets over water and land. The algorithms would integrate information on environmental conditions, sensor capabilities, and target characteristics to generate near-optimal search plans. They would account for factors like varying sensor detection ranges in different environments and interference between simultaneous sensors. The goal is to improve on traditional search patterns that do not optimally allocate effort. Phase I would design the conceptual approach and simulate sensor performance data. Phase II would build a prototype decision support system for naval coastal warfare.
This chapter discusses how the human operators exercise control over the UAV and its payloads.
There r some key functions av
Piloting the aircraft: making the inputs to the control surfaces and propulsion system required to take off, fly some specified flight path, and land.
Controlling the payloads: turning them on and off, pointing them as needed, and performing any real-time interpretation of their outputs that is required to perform the mission of the UAS.
Commanding the aircraft: carrying out the mission plan, including any changes that must be made in response to events that occur during the mission.
Mission planning: determining the plan for the mission based on the tasking that comes from the “customer” for whom the UAS is flying the mission.
Target Detection, Recognition, and Identification:Imaging sensors are used to detect, recognize, and identify targets.
The successful accomplishment of these tasks depends on the interrelationship of the system resolution, target contrast, atmosphere, and display characteristics
One of the most common missions for a UAV is reconnaissance and/or wide-area surveillance.
These missions require the UAV and its operator to search large areas on the ground, looking for some type of target or activity. An example might be to search a valley looking for signs of an enemy advance.
There are three general types of search:
1. Point
2. Area
3. Route
Every facility has inherent and unique risks, which introduce emergency communication design challenges. Understanding emergency communication system design, installation, and maintenance criteria requires engineers to be familiar with the applicable codes and standards, primarily NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. Whether designing to provide emergency communication for fire or mass notification emergencies, NFPA 72 can be used as a tool to enhance the design, installation, and reliability of fire alarm systems used for emergency communications.
Evaluation of NEAMWave12 and discussion on NEAMWave14
ICG/NEAMTWS-X, Rome, Italy, November 19-21, 2013
Event: http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewEventRecord&eventID=1376
Related paper: http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewDocumentRecord&docID=12084
This document discusses how information is input, processed, and displayed for human perception. It covers measuring and coding information, as well as different types of displays like static, dynamic, quantitative, and qualitative. Good coding systems are detectable, discriminable, meaningful, standardized, and multidimensional. Compatibility is important, including conceptual compatibility between symbols and meanings, movement compatibility between displays and controls, spatial compatibility of layout, and modality compatibility between stimuli and responses.
CCJO - Scalable Tailorable Effects Weapons white paper (Pei)
1. Dr. Gabriel Pei October 14, 2014
GP&A
Delivering Scalable and Tailorable Weapon Effects (White Paper)
A dominant theme for 21st century warfare will be joint combat and coordinated fires in highly populated urban zones. The likelihood that future combat will occur in densely populated areas increases the pressure to avoid civil casualties and damage along with the concomitant difficulties of applying combat power effectively - particularly if the enemy deliberately uses the population for concealment and cover. Further, such urban combat scenarios should be considered as routine mission assignments for conventional land and air forces against both regular and irregular forces. The DoD Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) v1.01 identifies the following top-level combat concepts for urban warfare:
• Maximize discrimination through precision, scalable actions and informed judgment, while understanding the inherent limits to discrimination in combat (JCC-24).
• Improve the capabilities to apply adequate but discriminate combat power in populated urban settings (JCC-32)
In order to achieve these goals for air-delivered strikes or supporting fires, it is essential to advance the current C4SIR and sensor capabilities to achieve highly accurate identification and discrimination information at the impact area. The accuracy should be maintained throughout the end-game phase prior to time of impact. Further, the weapon or munition should able to adaptively respond to the dynamic engagement environment. To engage non-line-of-sight (NLOS) targets positioned within urban structures, housing non-combatant populations, the following mission capabilities are required:
• Detection of civilian presence within the lethal radius of the impact area, i.e. the weapons effects zone
• Discrimination of civilian presence by age and gender to maximum extent possible
• Autonomous and remote weapon controls for aborting, rendering inert, self-destruct, and redirection
• Scalable and/or tailorable application of weapon effects, including lethal or non-lethal effects
Successful outcomes of the engagement are prioritized in the following order:
• Disengagement and redirection of weapon if unacceptable levels of collateral casualties are estimated at the impact area
• Successful application of weapon effects to enemy presence at the impact area if minimally acceptable levels of collateral casualties may be achieved
• Weapon self-destruct or self-inert of payload if above outcomes cannot be achieved
In summary, the overall concept is to maintain and refine the targeting process and kill-chain throughout the final seconds of engagement, including penetration of urban structures and up to the release of weapon effects. Battlespace resolution must be increased in order to discriminate and separate individuals, by age or gender if possible, in the impact area. This white paper proposes a CONOPS based on a systems-of-systems approach, identifies technical challenges, reviews state-of-art and applicable emerging technologies, and develops a roadmap for program implementation.
1 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Activity Concepts, Department of Defense, 8 Nov 2010 1
2. Dr. Gabriel Pei October 14, 2014
GP&A
CONOPS / Systems-of-Systems (SoS) Concept
For the proposed CONOPS, an operational scenario will consist of (5) five (possibly overlapping) phases:
• (Phase 1) Initial assessment of collateral casualties in the weapon effects zone
• (Phase 2) Collection of proximity sensor discrimination data
• (Phase 3) Weapon release and flyout
• (Phase 4) Autonomous weapon control
• (Phase 5) Follow-up courses-of-action (if necessary)
Scenarios can include air-delivered strikes, indirect fire support, and/or combinations of both. We discuss selected issues associated with the overall CONOPS and each operational phase. Overall mission success is critically dependent on resolving the following concerns:
• Seamless distributed command and control (C2) for asset synchronization, C2 handovers and meeting tactical decision timelines
• Precision guidance and delivery systems to achieve CEP requirements
• Interoperability and reliability of information exchanges between ISR surveillance systems, tactical intelligence data links, C2 nodes and weapon delivery systems
• Tight integration between the weapon targeting package, communications package, guidance and control, sensor payload and weapon actuators to minimize latencies
For Phase 1, it will be assumed that ISR and intelligence assets will provide the initial targeting parameters, including detailed information on the presence, numbers, types and activities of non- combatants in the weapon impact area. ISR data will feed higher echelon collateral casualty models to provide initial collateral casualty assessments. Additionally, detailed sensor models will generate predictions of civilian activities and signatures in the vicinity of the impact area.
During Phase 2, confirmation of civilian presence, civilian activities and signatures is performed by proximity discrimination sensor packages delivered directly to the projected impact area. The collected discrimination data is also fused with continuously ISR collected data to update collateral casualty estimates. Real-time updates of the surveillance and targeting data will be fused and forwarded to the appropriate C2 nodes, fire direction centers (FDC), strike platforms, and onboard weapon command packages.
Assuming the weapon effects zone is judged to be sufficiently clear and/or the estimated collateral casualties are acceptable (Phase 2), a Scalable/Tailorable Effects Weapon (STEW) is released (Phase 3). Note that Phase 3 may overlap with Phase 2 provided the weapon can be countermanded or is capable of autonomous decision-making during terminal engagement stage (Phase 4).
During the end-game (Phase 4), targeting, discrimination and weapon effects decisions will be controlled by the weapon/munition onboard processor. Examples of weapon effects decisions include mission abort, target redirection, self-destruct, self-inert or selectable application of effects.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical scenario or use case.
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3. Dr. Gabriel Pei October 14, 2014
GP&A
A multi-story residential building in an urban zone is under surveillance. Enemy presence in the building has been detected and the building has been selected for the candidate target list. Intelligence reports and tactical data indicate high probability of civilian presence including families with children. One possibility is that the civilians are mostly confined to the lower levels and basement while the enemy conducts operations from the rooftop and upper level vantage points. Surveillance indicates temporal patterns to the enemy operations. Collateral casualty modeled estimates are judged acceptable if a strike is launched when enemy forces are concentrated at levels and rooftop. The selected mission assets include:
• (1) Airborne strike platform carrying
– Precision guided (PG)/discrimination sensor cluster (DSC) packages
– Precision strike weapon with autonomous control
• (1) Ground-based indirect fire support battery with
– Kinetic impact penetrator (KIP)/ (DSC) packages
• Supporting ISR, C2 and fire direction assets
At T=XXXX hours, airborne video indicates the beginning of enemy movement as the standing watch is relieved. A call for fire is issued and at T+x (seconds), multiple KIP/DSC arrivals penetrate the building walls and upper floors. Clusters of sensors are dispersed through the upper levels but no structural damage is caused. The KIP/DSC sensors collect acoustic and motion detection data and form an ad-hoc network. Simultaneously, a PG/DSC package is launched from the airborne asset to arrive at the target within y seconds of the initial KIP impact. The PG/DSC package deploys over the building rooftop suspended by an altitude-position controlled balloon. The PG/DSC package includes video sensors and a datalink relay to the KIP/DSC sensors. The STEW weapon is launched at T+x+y+z, with time of impact estimated at T+x+y+z+l. The STEW command processor assumes autonomous control at T+x+y+z+l-δ However prior to the estimated impact time, at T+x+y+z+s (where l-δ < s < l), the uplinked acoustic data reveals signatures correlating to an infant and a woman. The weapon command processor safes the arming circuit and redirects the weapon to a nearby secondary target. The command processor requests any available discrimination information for the secondary target but is unable to achieve a high confidence estimate of collateral casualties. The processor issues a self-destruct command.
Figure 1. Notional Operational Scenario and Timelines
T=XXXX T+xT+x+yT+x+y+zT+x+y+z+sT+x+y+z+l•ISR video•Call for fire•Estimated impact time•Weapon launch•PG/DSC package deployed •Data links established•KIP/DSC packages deployed at target location•Civilian presence confirmed•Weapon redirectedT+x+y+z+l-δ•Autonomous control
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4. Dr. Gabriel Pei October 14, 2014
GP&A
The above scenario can be elaborated in many dimensions, depending on the available discrimination sensing technologies; the degree of weapon autonomy; and the scalability of weapon effects. Ultimately, the goal should be to refine these capabilities to selectively attack or incapacitate adversaries anywhere in the battlespace without unacceptable collateral casualties.
Technical Challenges / State-of-Art
A discussion of technical challenges and relevant technologies is presented.
Discrimination Sensor Technologies
Discrimination of civilian presences, activity patterns and signatures typically requires placing sensors in fairly close proximity to the area of interest. Line-of-sight occlusions and multipath can degrade sensor performance. The urban sensing environment is highly cluttered, generating high false alarm rates which may translate into missed tactical opportunities if a conservative decision logic is applied. Finally, as discussed earlier, compressed timelines limit data collection time windows, which also reduces discrimination performance. To ameliorate these difficulties, emphasis is focused on leveraging the proximity sensors to provide confirmation or elimination of existing discrimination hypotheses or states that are generated a priori from other data sources, e.g. ISR or intelligence reports.
As discussed in the example, acoustic signatures and voice recognition can provide good discriminatory information. Imaging sensors provide strong discrimination but may be limited by occluded fields-of- view. Multi-spectral cameras can distinguish the presence of military gear and uniforms. Body controller gaming technologies are also a relevant area of investigation. For example, Nintendo Wii and Xbox Kinect motion detection and depth sensor algorithms can be adapted to interpret body movements, gestures and other activities. Through-the-wall (TTW) technologies, using high frequency RF waveforms for 3D localization and tracking of human hand movements, can achieve an accuracy of several centimeters. 3D imaging technologies, e.g. MMW or backscatter, pose significant packaging and delivery difficulties. Biometric signatures are an unproven area, however gas/aerosol sensors that detect levels of CO2 and water vapor, and infrared body heat sensors can provide indicators of human presence and activities.
Table 1. Proximity Discrimination Signatures2
2 A Survey of Human Sensing Methods for Detecting Presence, Count, Location, Track and Identity, T. Teixeira, G. Dublon, A. Savvides, ACM Computing Surveys, 2012.
Disrimination ModalitySignature(s)ConfidenceProximitySensingCountBiophysical, thermal, chemicalHigh3 - 5 metersInfrared, bolometric, CO2, humidityLocalizationMotion, range/depthModerate3 - 5 metersRFActivitiesMotion, gesture, acoustic, vibration featuresModerate3 - 5 metersRF, Acoustic/VLFAgeVoice/speech featuresModerate3 - 5 metersAcousticGenderVoice/speech featuresModerate3 - 5 metersAcousticNon-combatant objectsImage/spectral features, range/depthModerate5 - 8 metersOptical, RFCombatant objectsImage/spectral features range/depthModerate5 - 8 metersOptical, RFNon-combatant presenceImage/spectral featuresLow5 - 8 metersOpticalCombatant presenceImage/spectral featuresLow5 - 8 metersOpticalBiometricsVery Low< 1 meterMMW, ultrasound
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5. Dr. Gabriel Pei October 14, 2014
GP&A
All discrimination signatures will be geo-referenced with a common time base through an ad-hoc self- organizing network. The key engineering focus will be on survivability and cost. The sensor packages will be designed to be expendable and to function for a limited duration.
Penetration and dispersal of the sensor clusters throughout an urban structure will be a key requirement. Several types of kinetic impact penetrators (metal alloy or liquid metal) are available but must be customized for sensor payloads and delivery systems. Two variants will be considered – light structural penetrators/single DSC package; and multi-stage/multi-DSC package delivery systems.
Autonomous Weapon Behaviors
The CONOPS will be significantly shaped by the weapon intelligence and decision making capabilities. A major mission consideration is that tactical opportunities may be fleeting, i.e. a strike with acceptable collateral casualties may only be available for a few minutes. Ideally the weapon behaviors can extend the battlespace and timelines by deferring actions or dynamically adapting to discrimination information. Some novel operational concepts are:
• Terminal tracking and impact adjustment – assuming precise navigation, guidance and control the weapon impact point may be adjusted in the terminal phase based on discrimination data
• Delayed action fuzing – weapon effects are delayed after impact, and triggered when discrimination information indicates effects zone is sufficiently clear of civilians
• Coordinated attacks – two (or more) weapons are launched, separated in time. The second (follower) weapon performs battle damage assessment (BDA) on the results from the first (leader) weapon to determine its subsequent course of action (COA).
• Weapon effects control – scalable or focused weapon effects (see section below)
Scalable and Tailorable Weapon Effects
This technology area includes lethal and non-lethal effects. A partial list of potentially relevant technologies is provided. Newer technologies will require customization and integration with the STEW effects controller, triggering and detonation mechanisms.
• Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) – shaping and timing of multi-phase explosives
• Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME) – tuned focused energy release
• MAgneto Hydrodynamic Explosive Munition (MAHEM) – controlled and timed explosive jets
• Reactive Material Structures (RMS) – release of blast energy from high-strength materials on demand
• Controllable anti-personnel dispersal patterns
• Incapacitating agents –temporary immobilization of targets, allows extended discrimination times for follow-up attack
• Neuromuscular blocking paralytics via atomized inhalant/gas or skin absorption, e.g.
- Vercuronium (Norcuron) - 60 seconds to onset, 30-40 minutes duration
- Succinylcholine (Suxamethonium) - 30 seconds onset, 5-10 minutes duration,
- Kolokol-1 (Moscow 2002 theater siege, opioid-based agent containing carfentanil) - few seconds onset, several hours duration
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6. Dr. Gabriel Pei October 14, 2014
GP&A
Program Roadmap
A notional program roadmap is provided.
Phase 1 – Demonstration Program
1) Objectives
Define CONOPS
Define system concepts and requirements
Design / Integrate / Test prototype technologies
• Discrimination Technologies
• Structure Penetration Systems
• Scalable and Tailorable Effects Weapon (STEW)
Demonstration of Prototypes
2) Outcomes
Assess measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
Down-select/prioritize technologies for further development
Finalize CONOPS and SoS architecture
Build DoD partnering relationships
Phase 2 – Advanced Concept Development
1) Objectives
Complete (2) or more system concepts
Operational testing of system concepts at DoD facility
Finalize DoD MOU/MOA for further development and operational testing
2) Outcomes
Validate operational effectiveness and suitability of system concepts
Transition system concepts and technologies to DoD partners
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