Distinguishes Humean (statistics-based) notions of causation and Kantian (deterministic, structure-based) notions of causation, arguing that intelligent robots and animals need both, but each requires a combination of competences, and various kinds of partial competence of both kinds are possible.
Ontologies for baby animals and robots From "baby stuff" to the world of adul...Aaron Sloman
In contrast with ontology developers concerned with a symbolic or digital environment (e.g. the internet), I draw attention to some features of our 3-D spatio-temporal environment that challenge young humans and other intelligent animals and will also challenge future robots. Evolution provides most animals with an ontology that suffices for life, whereas some animals, including humans, also have mechanisms for substantive ontology extension based on results of interacting with the environment. Future human-like robots will also need this. Since pre-verbal human children and many intelligent non-human animals, including hunting mammals, nest-building birds and primates can interact, often creatively, with complex structures and processes in a 3-D environment, that suggests (a) that they use ontologies that include kinds of material (stuff), kinds of structure, kinds of relationship, kinds of process (some of which are process-fragments composed of bits of stuff changing their properties, structures or relationships), and kinds of causal interaction and (b) since they don't use a human communicative language they must use information encoded in some form that existed prior to human communicative languages both in our evolutionary history and in individual development. Since evolution could not have anticipated the ontologies required for all human cultures, including advanced scientific cultures, individuals must have ways of achieving substantive ontology extension. The research reported here aims mainly to develop requirements for explanatory designs. The attempt to develop forms of representation, mechanisms and architectures that meet those requirements will be a long term research project.
Kantian Philosophy of Mathematics and Young Robots: Could a baby robot grow u...Aaron Sloman
There is a sequel to this, with more emphasis on 'toddler theorems' and kinds of child science here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#toddler
It is not yet stable enough to be uploaded to slideshare.
Why symbol-grounding is both impossible and unnecessary, and why theory-tethe...Aaron Sloman
Introduction to key ideas of semantic models,
implicit definitions and symbol tethering, using ideas from philosophy of science and model theoretic semantics to explain why symbol ground theory is misguided: there is no need for all symbols used by an intelligent agent to be 'grounded' in terms of experience, or sensory-motor patterns. Rather, most of the meaning of a symbol may come from its role in a powerful explanatory theory, though the theory should have some connection with experiments and observations in order to be applicable to the world. That is not the same as requiring every symbol to be linked to experiences, experiments or measurements.
Symbol grounding theory is a modern version of the philosophical theory of 'concept empiricism', which was refuted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century.
Possibilities between form and function (Or between shape and affordances)Aaron Sloman
I discuss the need for an intelligent system, whether it is a robot, or some sort of digital companion equipped with a vision system, to include in its ontology a range of concepts that appear not to have been noticed by most researchers in robotics, vision, and human psychology. These are concepts that lie between (a) concepts of "form", concerned with spatially located objects, object parts, features, and relationships and (b) concepts of affordances and functions, concerned with how things in the environment make possible or constrain actions that are possible for a perceiver and which can support or hinder the goals of the perceiver.
Those intermediate concepts are concerned with processes that *are* occurring and processes that *can* occur, and the causal relationships between physical structures/forms/configurations and the possibilities for and constraints on such processes, independently of whether they are processes involving anyone's actions or goals.
These intermediate concepts relate motions and constraints on motion to both geometric and topological structures in the environment and the kinds of 'stuff' of which things are composed, since, for example, rigid, flexible, and fluid stuffs support and constrain different sorts of motions.
They underlie affordance concepts. Attempts to study affordances without taking account of the intermediate concepts are bound to prove shallow and inadequate.
Notes for invited talk at Dagstuhl Seminar: ``From Form to Function'' Oct 18-23, 2009 http://www.dagstuhl.de/en/program/calendar/semhp/?semnr=09431
Helping Darwin: How to think about evolution of consciousness (Biosciences ta...Aaron Sloman
ABSTRACT
Many of Darwin's opponents, and some of those who accepted the theory of evolution as regards physical forms, objected to the claim that human mental functions, and
consciousness in particular, could be products of evolution. There were several reasons for this opposition, including unanswered questions as to how physical mechanisms could produce mental states and processes an old, and still surviving, philosophical problem.
A new answer is now available. Evolution could have produced the "mysterious" aspects of consciousness if, like engineers developing computing systems in the last six or seven decades, evolution encountered and "solved" increasingly complex problems of representation and control (including self-monitoring and self-control) by using systems with increasingly abstract mechanisms based on virtual machines, including most
recently self-monitoring virtual machines.
These capabilities are, like many capabilities of computer-based systems, implemented in non-physical virtual machinery which, in turn, are implemented in lower level physical mechanisms.
This would require far more complex virtual machines than human engineers have so far created. Noone knows whether the biological virtual machines could have been
implemented in the discrete-switch technology used in current computers.
These ideas were not available to Darwin and his contemporaries: most of the concepts, and the technology, involved in creation and use of sophisticated virtual machines were developed only in the last half century, as a by-product of a large number of design decisions by hardware and software engineers solving different problems.
Virtuality, causation and the mind-body relationshipAaron Sloman
Extends my previous introductions to virtual machines and their role both in artefacts and products of biological evolution. This attempts to correct various erroneous assumptions about computation, functionalism, supervenience, life, information, and causation. See also http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/vm-functionalism.html
Why the "hard" problem of consciousness is easy and the "easy" problem hard....Aaron Sloman
The "hard" problem of concsiousness can be shown to be a non-problem because it is formulated using a seriously defective concept (the concept of "phenomenal consciousness" defined so as to rule out cognitive functionality and causal powers).
So the hard problem is an example of a well known type of philosophical problem that needs to be dissolved (fairly easily) rather than solved. For other examples, and a brief introduction to conceptual analysis, see http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/varieties-of-atheism.html
In contrast, the so-called "easy" problem requires detailed analysis of very complex and subtle features of perceptual processes, introspective processes and other mental processes, sometimes labelled "access consciousness": these have cognitive functions, but their complexity (especially the way details change as the environment changes or the perceiver moves) is considerable and very hard to characterise.
"Access consciousness" is complex also because it takes many different forms, since what individuals are conscious of and what uses being conscious of things can be put to, can vary hugely, from simple life forms, through many other animals and human infants, to sophisticated adult humans,
Finding ways of modelling these aspects of consciousness, and explaining how they arise out of physical mechanisms, requires major advances in the science of information processing systems -- including computer science and neuroscience.
There are empirical facts about introspection that have generated theories of consciousness but some of the empirical facts go unnoticed by philosophers.
The notion of a virtual machine is introduced briefly and illustrated using Conway's "Game of life" and other examples of virtual machinery that explain how contents of consciousness can have causal powers and can have intentionality (be able to refer to other things).
The beginnings of a research program are presented, showing how more examples can be collected and how notions of virtual machinery may need to be developed to cope with all the phenomena.
Ontologies for baby animals and robots From "baby stuff" to the world of adul...Aaron Sloman
In contrast with ontology developers concerned with a symbolic or digital environment (e.g. the internet), I draw attention to some features of our 3-D spatio-temporal environment that challenge young humans and other intelligent animals and will also challenge future robots. Evolution provides most animals with an ontology that suffices for life, whereas some animals, including humans, also have mechanisms for substantive ontology extension based on results of interacting with the environment. Future human-like robots will also need this. Since pre-verbal human children and many intelligent non-human animals, including hunting mammals, nest-building birds and primates can interact, often creatively, with complex structures and processes in a 3-D environment, that suggests (a) that they use ontologies that include kinds of material (stuff), kinds of structure, kinds of relationship, kinds of process (some of which are process-fragments composed of bits of stuff changing their properties, structures or relationships), and kinds of causal interaction and (b) since they don't use a human communicative language they must use information encoded in some form that existed prior to human communicative languages both in our evolutionary history and in individual development. Since evolution could not have anticipated the ontologies required for all human cultures, including advanced scientific cultures, individuals must have ways of achieving substantive ontology extension. The research reported here aims mainly to develop requirements for explanatory designs. The attempt to develop forms of representation, mechanisms and architectures that meet those requirements will be a long term research project.
Kantian Philosophy of Mathematics and Young Robots: Could a baby robot grow u...Aaron Sloman
There is a sequel to this, with more emphasis on 'toddler theorems' and kinds of child science here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#toddler
It is not yet stable enough to be uploaded to slideshare.
Why symbol-grounding is both impossible and unnecessary, and why theory-tethe...Aaron Sloman
Introduction to key ideas of semantic models,
implicit definitions and symbol tethering, using ideas from philosophy of science and model theoretic semantics to explain why symbol ground theory is misguided: there is no need for all symbols used by an intelligent agent to be 'grounded' in terms of experience, or sensory-motor patterns. Rather, most of the meaning of a symbol may come from its role in a powerful explanatory theory, though the theory should have some connection with experiments and observations in order to be applicable to the world. That is not the same as requiring every symbol to be linked to experiences, experiments or measurements.
Symbol grounding theory is a modern version of the philosophical theory of 'concept empiricism', which was refuted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century.
Possibilities between form and function (Or between shape and affordances)Aaron Sloman
I discuss the need for an intelligent system, whether it is a robot, or some sort of digital companion equipped with a vision system, to include in its ontology a range of concepts that appear not to have been noticed by most researchers in robotics, vision, and human psychology. These are concepts that lie between (a) concepts of "form", concerned with spatially located objects, object parts, features, and relationships and (b) concepts of affordances and functions, concerned with how things in the environment make possible or constrain actions that are possible for a perceiver and which can support or hinder the goals of the perceiver.
Those intermediate concepts are concerned with processes that *are* occurring and processes that *can* occur, and the causal relationships between physical structures/forms/configurations and the possibilities for and constraints on such processes, independently of whether they are processes involving anyone's actions or goals.
These intermediate concepts relate motions and constraints on motion to both geometric and topological structures in the environment and the kinds of 'stuff' of which things are composed, since, for example, rigid, flexible, and fluid stuffs support and constrain different sorts of motions.
They underlie affordance concepts. Attempts to study affordances without taking account of the intermediate concepts are bound to prove shallow and inadequate.
Notes for invited talk at Dagstuhl Seminar: ``From Form to Function'' Oct 18-23, 2009 http://www.dagstuhl.de/en/program/calendar/semhp/?semnr=09431
Helping Darwin: How to think about evolution of consciousness (Biosciences ta...Aaron Sloman
ABSTRACT
Many of Darwin's opponents, and some of those who accepted the theory of evolution as regards physical forms, objected to the claim that human mental functions, and
consciousness in particular, could be products of evolution. There were several reasons for this opposition, including unanswered questions as to how physical mechanisms could produce mental states and processes an old, and still surviving, philosophical problem.
A new answer is now available. Evolution could have produced the "mysterious" aspects of consciousness if, like engineers developing computing systems in the last six or seven decades, evolution encountered and "solved" increasingly complex problems of representation and control (including self-monitoring and self-control) by using systems with increasingly abstract mechanisms based on virtual machines, including most
recently self-monitoring virtual machines.
These capabilities are, like many capabilities of computer-based systems, implemented in non-physical virtual machinery which, in turn, are implemented in lower level physical mechanisms.
This would require far more complex virtual machines than human engineers have so far created. Noone knows whether the biological virtual machines could have been
implemented in the discrete-switch technology used in current computers.
These ideas were not available to Darwin and his contemporaries: most of the concepts, and the technology, involved in creation and use of sophisticated virtual machines were developed only in the last half century, as a by-product of a large number of design decisions by hardware and software engineers solving different problems.
Virtuality, causation and the mind-body relationshipAaron Sloman
Extends my previous introductions to virtual machines and their role both in artefacts and products of biological evolution. This attempts to correct various erroneous assumptions about computation, functionalism, supervenience, life, information, and causation. See also http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/vm-functionalism.html
Why the "hard" problem of consciousness is easy and the "easy" problem hard....Aaron Sloman
The "hard" problem of concsiousness can be shown to be a non-problem because it is formulated using a seriously defective concept (the concept of "phenomenal consciousness" defined so as to rule out cognitive functionality and causal powers).
So the hard problem is an example of a well known type of philosophical problem that needs to be dissolved (fairly easily) rather than solved. For other examples, and a brief introduction to conceptual analysis, see http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/varieties-of-atheism.html
In contrast, the so-called "easy" problem requires detailed analysis of very complex and subtle features of perceptual processes, introspective processes and other mental processes, sometimes labelled "access consciousness": these have cognitive functions, but their complexity (especially the way details change as the environment changes or the perceiver moves) is considerable and very hard to characterise.
"Access consciousness" is complex also because it takes many different forms, since what individuals are conscious of and what uses being conscious of things can be put to, can vary hugely, from simple life forms, through many other animals and human infants, to sophisticated adult humans,
Finding ways of modelling these aspects of consciousness, and explaining how they arise out of physical mechanisms, requires major advances in the science of information processing systems -- including computer science and neuroscience.
There are empirical facts about introspection that have generated theories of consciousness but some of the empirical facts go unnoticed by philosophers.
The notion of a virtual machine is introduced briefly and illustrated using Conway's "Game of life" and other examples of virtual machinery that explain how contents of consciousness can have causal powers and can have intentionality (be able to refer to other things).
The beginnings of a research program are presented, showing how more examples can be collected and how notions of virtual machinery may need to be developed to cope with all the phenomena.
Presentation to the J. Craig Venter Institute, Dec. 2014Mark Wilkinson
This is largely a compilation of various other talks that I have posted here - a summary of the past 3+ years of work on SADI/SHARE. It includes the (now well-worn!!) slides about SHARE, as well as some of the more contemporary stuff about how we extended GALEN clinical classes with richer semantic descriptions, and then used them to do automated clinical phenotype analysis. Also includes the slide-deck related to automated Measurement Unit conversion (related to our work on semantically representing Framingham clinical risk assessment rules)
So... for anyone who regularly follows my uploads, there isn't much "new" in here, but at least it's all in one place now! :-)
How to Build a Research Roadmap (avoiding tempting dead-ends)Aaron Sloman
What's a Research Roadmap For?
Why do we need one?
How can we avoid the usual trap of making bold promises to do X, Y and Z,
then hope that our previous promises will not be remembered the next time we apply for funds to do X, Y and Z?
How can we produce a sensible, well informed roadmap?
Originally presented at the euCognition Research Roadmap discussion in Munich on 12 Jan 2007
This suggests a way to avoid tempting dead ends (repeating old promises that proved unrealistic) by examining many long term goals, including describing existing human and animal competences not yet achieved by robots, then working backwards systematically by investigating requirements for those competences, and requirements for meeting those requirements, etc. Insread of generating a single linear roadmap this should produce a partially ordered network of intermediate targets, leading back, to short term goals that may be achievable starting from where we are.
Such a roadmap will inevitably have mistakes: over-optimistic goals, missing preconditions, unrecognised opportunities. But if the work is done in many teams in a fully open manner with as much collaboration as possible, it should be possible to make faster, deeper, progress than can be achieved by brain-storming discussions of where we can get in a few years.
Environmental Science Essay
Scientific Method Step Essay
Science Essay
Scientific Theory Essay
Essay on Forensic Science
Forensic Science Essay example
scientific literacy Essay
Scientific Method
Is Psychology a Science? Essay
The Scientific Method Essay
My Passion For Science
Essay On College Education. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples RedlineSPMelissa Otero
College Essay Examples - 9 in PDF Examples. College and Education - Free Essay Example PapersOwl.com. Essay websites: Essay on the importance of college education. College Education: Should Education be Free Essay. St Joseph Hospital: College Application Essay. Importance of college education essay. Free importance of education .... 004 Essay Example Why Is College Important On Importance Of Education .... College Essay Format: Simple Steps to Be Followed. FREE 11 Sample College Essay Templates in MS Word PDF. Argumentative essay on college education. Sample College Application Essay 5. 021 10067 Thumb College Education Essay Thatsnotus. How to Write In College Essay Format OCC NJ. College Admissions Essay Workshop - 9 Types of Supplemental Essays .... Admission essay: Being a college student essay. This is How You Write a College Essay College application essay .... College Essay: Graduate school essay sample. Why College Should Be Cheaper Essay. Essay On The Importance Of College Education. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples RedlineSP. Why Do You Think College Education Is Important Essay. Impressive Essay On Education Thatsnotus. Essay for education - College Homework Help and Online Tutoring.. College education essay - 24/7 Homework Help.. Education in College - Free Essay Example PapersOwl.com. Everyone Should Enjoy a Free College Education - Free Essay Example .... 26 Outstanding College Essay Examples / - Example of a college essay .... Writing An Essay To Get Into College - Writing a strong college .... College essay: Importance of college education essay. Essay on why college education is important Essay On College Education Essay On College Education. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples RedlineSP
What designers of artificial companions need to understand about biological onesAaron Sloman
Discusses some of the requirements for artificial companions (ACs), contrasting relatively easy (Type 1) goals and much harder, but more important, (Type 2) goals for designers of ACs. Current techniques will not lead to achieving Type 2 goals, but progress can be made towards those goals, by looking more closely at how the relevant competences develop in humans, and their architectural and representational requirements. A human child develops a lot of knowledge about space, time, causation, and many varieties of 3-D structures and processes. This knowledge provides the background and foundation for many kinds of learning, and will be required for development of ACs that act sensibly and give sensible advice. No AI systems are anywhere near the competences of young children. Trying to go directly to systems with adult competences, especially statistics based systems, will produce systems that are either very restricted, or very brittle and unreliable (or both).
Construction kits for evolving life -- Including evolving minds and mathemati...Aaron Sloman
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection does not adequately explain the generative power of biological evolution. For that we need to understand the mechanisms involved in producing new options for natural selection, without which there would always be the same set of possibilities available. This applies also to the construction kits: evolution can produce new construction kits, "Derived" construction kits, based on the Fundamental construction kit provided by the physical universe and its originally lifeless physical and chemical mechanisms. It turns out that life needs both concrete and abstract construction kits, of ever increasing complexity. This paper introduces some basic ideas, though far more empirical and theoretical research is required, combining multiple disciplines. Slideshare no longer allows presentations to be updated, so I no longer use it. For a later version search for: Sloman "Construction kits for evolving life" cogaff. Most of my slideshare presentations have newer versions in the CogAff web site at the University of Birmingham, UK. (Not Alabama)
The Turing Inspired Meta-Morphogenesis Project -- The self-informing universe...Aaron Sloman
This replaces an earlier version. The latest version with clickable links is available at Versions with clickable links available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
Presentation to the J. Craig Venter Institute, Dec. 2014Mark Wilkinson
This is largely a compilation of various other talks that I have posted here - a summary of the past 3+ years of work on SADI/SHARE. It includes the (now well-worn!!) slides about SHARE, as well as some of the more contemporary stuff about how we extended GALEN clinical classes with richer semantic descriptions, and then used them to do automated clinical phenotype analysis. Also includes the slide-deck related to automated Measurement Unit conversion (related to our work on semantically representing Framingham clinical risk assessment rules)
So... for anyone who regularly follows my uploads, there isn't much "new" in here, but at least it's all in one place now! :-)
How to Build a Research Roadmap (avoiding tempting dead-ends)Aaron Sloman
What's a Research Roadmap For?
Why do we need one?
How can we avoid the usual trap of making bold promises to do X, Y and Z,
then hope that our previous promises will not be remembered the next time we apply for funds to do X, Y and Z?
How can we produce a sensible, well informed roadmap?
Originally presented at the euCognition Research Roadmap discussion in Munich on 12 Jan 2007
This suggests a way to avoid tempting dead ends (repeating old promises that proved unrealistic) by examining many long term goals, including describing existing human and animal competences not yet achieved by robots, then working backwards systematically by investigating requirements for those competences, and requirements for meeting those requirements, etc. Insread of generating a single linear roadmap this should produce a partially ordered network of intermediate targets, leading back, to short term goals that may be achievable starting from where we are.
Such a roadmap will inevitably have mistakes: over-optimistic goals, missing preconditions, unrecognised opportunities. But if the work is done in many teams in a fully open manner with as much collaboration as possible, it should be possible to make faster, deeper, progress than can be achieved by brain-storming discussions of where we can get in a few years.
Environmental Science Essay
Scientific Method Step Essay
Science Essay
Scientific Theory Essay
Essay on Forensic Science
Forensic Science Essay example
scientific literacy Essay
Scientific Method
Is Psychology a Science? Essay
The Scientific Method Essay
My Passion For Science
Essay On College Education. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples RedlineSPMelissa Otero
College Essay Examples - 9 in PDF Examples. College and Education - Free Essay Example PapersOwl.com. Essay websites: Essay on the importance of college education. College Education: Should Education be Free Essay. St Joseph Hospital: College Application Essay. Importance of college education essay. Free importance of education .... 004 Essay Example Why Is College Important On Importance Of Education .... College Essay Format: Simple Steps to Be Followed. FREE 11 Sample College Essay Templates in MS Word PDF. Argumentative essay on college education. Sample College Application Essay 5. 021 10067 Thumb College Education Essay Thatsnotus. How to Write In College Essay Format OCC NJ. College Admissions Essay Workshop - 9 Types of Supplemental Essays .... Admission essay: Being a college student essay. This is How You Write a College Essay College application essay .... College Essay: Graduate school essay sample. Why College Should Be Cheaper Essay. Essay On The Importance Of College Education. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples RedlineSP. Why Do You Think College Education Is Important Essay. Impressive Essay On Education Thatsnotus. Essay for education - College Homework Help and Online Tutoring.. College education essay - 24/7 Homework Help.. Education in College - Free Essay Example PapersOwl.com. Everyone Should Enjoy a Free College Education - Free Essay Example .... 26 Outstanding College Essay Examples / - Example of a college essay .... Writing An Essay To Get Into College - Writing a strong college .... College essay: Importance of college education essay. Essay on why college education is important Essay On College Education Essay On College Education. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples RedlineSP
What designers of artificial companions need to understand about biological onesAaron Sloman
Discusses some of the requirements for artificial companions (ACs), contrasting relatively easy (Type 1) goals and much harder, but more important, (Type 2) goals for designers of ACs. Current techniques will not lead to achieving Type 2 goals, but progress can be made towards those goals, by looking more closely at how the relevant competences develop in humans, and their architectural and representational requirements. A human child develops a lot of knowledge about space, time, causation, and many varieties of 3-D structures and processes. This knowledge provides the background and foundation for many kinds of learning, and will be required for development of ACs that act sensibly and give sensible advice. No AI systems are anywhere near the competences of young children. Trying to go directly to systems with adult competences, especially statistics based systems, will produce systems that are either very restricted, or very brittle and unreliable (or both).
Construction kits for evolving life -- Including evolving minds and mathemati...Aaron Sloman
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection does not adequately explain the generative power of biological evolution. For that we need to understand the mechanisms involved in producing new options for natural selection, without which there would always be the same set of possibilities available. This applies also to the construction kits: evolution can produce new construction kits, "Derived" construction kits, based on the Fundamental construction kit provided by the physical universe and its originally lifeless physical and chemical mechanisms. It turns out that life needs both concrete and abstract construction kits, of ever increasing complexity. This paper introduces some basic ideas, though far more empirical and theoretical research is required, combining multiple disciplines. Slideshare no longer allows presentations to be updated, so I no longer use it. For a later version search for: Sloman "Construction kits for evolving life" cogaff. Most of my slideshare presentations have newer versions in the CogAff web site at the University of Birmingham, UK. (Not Alabama)
The Turing Inspired Meta-Morphogenesis Project -- The self-informing universe...Aaron Sloman
This replaces an earlier version. The latest version with clickable links is available at Versions with clickable links available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
Reorganised several times since first uploaded: most recently 25 Jan 2016
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Slides include link to video of lecture (158MB) http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/movies/#ailect2-2015
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Two questions are shown to have deep connections: What are the functions of vision in animals? and How did human languages evolve? The answer given here is that the functions of vision need to be supported by richly structured internal languages (forms of representation used for acquiring, storing, manipulating, deriving and using information), from which it follows that internal languages must have evolved before languages for communication.
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The account of the functions of vision mentions early AI vision, the impact of Marr and the even greater impact of Gibson, but argues that they did not recognize all the functions of vision, e.g. the uses of vision in making mathematical discoveries leading to Euclid's elements.
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Many questions are left unanswered by this research, which is part of the Meta-Morphogenesis project, introduced here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
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A slideshare presentation on "origins of language" by Jasmine Wong, adds some useful additional evidence, but presents a simpler theory:
http://www.slideshare.net/JasmineWong6/origins-of-language
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Minor corrections+ additions 30-Mar-2015, 1-Apr-2015, 15-Apr-2015 12-Nov-2015
If learning maths requires a teacher, where did the first teachers come from?
or
Why (and how) did biological evolution produce mathematicians?
Presentation at Symposium on Mathematical Cognition AISB2010
Part of the Meta-Morphogenesis Project. See also this discussion of toddler theorems:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/toddler-theorems.html
Evolution of human mathematics from earlier abilities to perceived, use and reason about affordances, spatial possibilities and constraints.
The necessity of mathematical truth does not imply infallibility of mathematical reasoning. (Lakatos).
Toddlers discover theorems without knowing it. Later they may learn to reflect on and talk about what they have learnt. Compare Annette Karmiloff-Smith on "Representational re-description".
Why is it still so hard to give robots and AI systems the ability to reason spatially as mathematicians do (except for simple special cases, e.g. where space is discretised.)
A multi-picture challenge for theories of visionAaron Sloman
(Modified 7th June 2013 to include some droodles.)
Some informal experiments are presented whose results help to challenge most theories of vision and proposed mechanisms of vision.
A possible explanatory information-processing architecture is proposed, based on multiple dynamical systems, grown during an individual's life time, most of which are dormant most of the time, but which can be very rapidly activated and instantiated so as to build a multi-ontology interpretation of the currently, and recently, available visual information -- e.g. turning a corner into a busy street in an unfamiliar city. As far as I know, there is no working implementation of such a system, though a very early prototype called Popeye (implemented in Pop2) around 1976 is summarised. Many hard unsolved problems remain, though most of them are ignored by research on vision that makes narrow assumptions about the functions of biological vision.
Meta-Morphogenesis, Evolution, Cognitive Robotics and Developmental Cognitive...Aaron Sloman
How could a planet, condensed from a cloud of dust, produce minds -- and products of minds, along with microbes, mice, monkeys, mathematics, music, marmite, murder, megalomania, and all other forms and products of life on earth (and possibly elsewhere)?
This presentation introduces the ambitious, multi-disciplinary Meta-Morphogenesis project, partly inspired by Turing's 1952 paper on morphogenesis. It may lead to an answer, by identifying the many transitions between different types and mechanisms of biological information processing, including transitions that changed the mechanisms of change, altering forms of evolution, development, learning, culture and ecosystem dynamics. One of the questions raised is whether chemical information-processing is capable of supporting processes that would be infeasible or impossible on a Turing machine or conventional computer.
A 2hour 30 min recording of this tutorial was made by Adam Ford, available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNul52kFI74 (new version installed on 14 Jun 2013 with titles and audio problem fixed). Also available here
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/movies/#m-m-tut
"Information" here is used in Jane Austen's sense, not Claude Shannon's sense. See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/austen-info.html
More information about the project is available here: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/meta-morphogenesis.html
Adam Ford interviewed the author about some of these topics at the AGI conference in December 2012 in this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iuH8dC7Snno
Related PDF presentations can be found here http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks
What is computational thinking? Who needs it? Why? How can it be learnt? ...Aaron Sloman
What is computational thinking?
Who needs it? Why? How can it be learnt?
Can it be taught? How?
Slides for invited presentation at Conference of ALT (Association for Learning Technology) 11th Sept 2012, University of Manchester.
PDF available (easier for printing, selecting text, etc.):
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#talk105
A video of the actual presentation (using no slides because of a projector problem) is now available here
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXAFz3L2Qpo
It also has been made available as "slide 47" after the PDF presentation on this page.
I attempt to generalise Jeannette Wing's notion of "Computational thinking" (ACM 2006) to include attempting to understand much biological information processing, and try to show the necessity for educators to do deep computational thinking if they wish to facilitate processes of learning.
What's vision for, and how does it work? From Marr (and earlier)to Gibson and...Aaron Sloman
ABSTRACT
Very many researchers assume that it is obvious what vision (e.g. in humans) is for, i.e. what functions it has, leaving only the problem of explaining how those functions are fulfilled. So they postulate mechanisms and try to show how those mechanisms can produce the required effects, and also, in some cases, try to show that those postulated mechanisms exist in humans and other animals and perform the postulated functions. The main point of this presentation is that it is far from obvious what vision is for - and J.J. Gibson's main achievement is drawing attention to some of the functions that other researchers had ignored. I'll present some of the other work, show how Gibson extends and improves it, and then point out much more there is to the functions of vision and other forms of perception than even Gibson had noticed.
In particular, much vision research, unlike Gibson, ignores vision's function in on-line control and perception of continuous processes; and nearly all, including Gibson's work, ignores meta-cognitive perception, and perception of possibilities and constraints on possibilities and the associated role of vision in reasoning. If we don't understand that we cannot understand how biological mechanisms arising from requirements for being embodied in a rich, complex and changing 3-D environment underpin human mathematical capabilities, including the ability to reason about topology and Euclidean geometry.
Last updated: 1st March 2014, 10 June 2015 (additional links)
Slides prepared for a broadcast presentation to members of Computing at School http://www.computingatschool.org.uk/, about why computing education should be about more than the science and technology required for useful or entertaining applications. Instead, learning about forms of information processing systems can give us new, deeper ways of thinking about many old phenomena, e.g. the nature of mind and the evolution of minds of various kinds. This supports the claim that the study of computation is as much a science as physics or psychology, rather than just a branch of engineering -- as famously suggested by Fred Brooks.
Virtual Machines and the Metaphysics of Science Aaron Sloman
Philosophers regularly use complex (running) virtual machines (not virtual realities) composed of enduring interacting non-physical subsystems (e.g. operating systems, word-processors, email systems, web browsers, and many more). These VMs can be subdivided into different kinds with different types of functions, e.g. "specific-function VMs" and "platform VMs" (including language VMs, and operating system VMs) that provide support for a variety of different (possibly concurrent) "higher level" VMs, with different functions.
Yet, almost all ignore (or misdescribe) these VMs when discussing functionalism, supervenience, multiple realisation, reductionism, emergence, and causation.
Such VMs depend on many hardware and software designs that interact in very complex ways to maintain a network of causal relationships between physical and virtual entities and processes.
I'll try to explain this, and show how VMs are important for philosophy, in part because evolution long ago developed far more sophisticated systems of virtual machinery (e.g. running on brains and their surroundings) than human engineers so far. Most are still not understood.
This partly accounts for the apparent intractability of several philosophical problems.
E.g. running VM subsystems can be disconnected from input-output interactions for extended periods, and some can have more complexity than the available input/output bandwidth can reveal.
Moreover, despite the advantages of VMs for self-monitoring and self control, they can also lead to self-deception.
For a lot of related material see Steve Burbeck's web site http://evolutionofcomputing.org/Multicellular/Emergence.html
(A related presentation debunking the "hard problem" of consciousness is also in this collection.)
Do Intelligent Machines, Natural or Artificial, Really Need Emotions?Aaron Sloman
(Updated on 14 Jan 2014 -- with substantial revisions.)
Many people believe that emotions are required for intelligence. I argue that this is mostly based on (a) wishful thinking and (b) a failure adequately to analyse the variety of types of affective states and processes that can arise in different sorts of architectures produced by biological evolution or required for artificial systems. This work is a development of ideas presented by Herbert Simon in the 1960s in his 'Motivational and emotional controls of cognition'.
What is science? (Can There Be a Science of Mind?) (Updated August 2010)Aaron Sloman
This presentation gives an introduction to philosophy of science, though a rather idiosyncratic one, stressing science as the search for powerful new ontologies rather than merely laws. You can't express a law unless you have
an ontology including the items referred to in the law (e.g. pressure, volume, temperature). The talk raises a
number of questions about the aims and methods of science, about the differences between the physical sciences and
the science of information-processing systems (e.g. organisms, minds, computers), whether there is a unique truth
or final answers to be found by science, whether scientists ever prove anything (no -- at most they show that some
theory is better than any currently available rival theory), and why science does not require faith (though
obstinacy can be useful). The slides end with a section on whether a science of mind is possible, answering yes, and explaining how.
Evolution of minds and languages: What evolved first and develops first in ch...Aaron Sloman
SLIDESHARE NOW STUPIDLY DOES NOT ALLOW SLIDES TO BE UPDATED. To find the latest version of these slides go to http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff//talks/#talk111
The version posted here was last updated on 16 March 2015. There have been several changes since then on the alternative site. Why did Slideshare take such a stupid decision (after being bought by Linkedin?)
A theory is presented according to which "languages" with structural variability and compositional semantics evolved in several species for *internal* use (e.g. in perception, planning, learning, forming goals, deciding, etc.) before *external* languages evolved for communication. The theory implies that such internal languages develop in young humans before a language for communication.
It is is also noted that the standard notion of 'compositional semantics' has to allow for the propagation of semantic content from parts to wholes to be potentially context sensitive at every stage: i.e. current context, speaker intentions, user knowledge, shared goals, can all affect how semantics of larger parts are derived from semantics of smaller parts+syntactic structure. This applies as much to non-verbal languages as to verbal ones.
This theory of how human languages evolved from earlier 'internal languages' (GLs) is inconsistent with the best known published theories of evolution or development of language.
But that does not make it wrong. Moreover, this theory is supported by empirical evidence including the example of deaf children in Nicaragua: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language
This is a mixture of philosophy, artificial intelligence, Cognitive science, Software engineering and theoretical biology, presented at the Workshop on Philosophy and Engineering, London, 10-12 November 2008.
Introduction to AI for Nonprofits with Tapp NetworkTechSoup
Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Model Attribute Check Company Auto PropertyCeline George
In Odoo, the multi-company feature allows you to manage multiple companies within a single Odoo database instance. Each company can have its own configurations while still sharing common resources such as products, customers, and suppliers.
The Roman Empire A Historical Colossus.pdfkaushalkr1407
The Roman Empire, a vast and enduring power, stands as one of history's most remarkable civilizations, leaving an indelible imprint on the world. It emerged from the Roman Republic, transitioning into an imperial powerhouse under the leadership of Augustus Caesar in 27 BCE. This transformation marked the beginning of an era defined by unprecedented territorial expansion, architectural marvels, and profound cultural influence.
The empire's roots lie in the city of Rome, founded, according to legend, by Romulus in 753 BCE. Over centuries, Rome evolved from a small settlement to a formidable republic, characterized by a complex political system with elected officials and checks on power. However, internal strife, class conflicts, and military ambitions paved the way for the end of the Republic. Julius Caesar’s dictatorship and subsequent assassination in 44 BCE created a power vacuum, leading to a civil war. Octavian, later Augustus, emerged victorious, heralding the Roman Empire’s birth.
Under Augustus, the empire experienced the Pax Romana, a 200-year period of relative peace and stability. Augustus reformed the military, established efficient administrative systems, and initiated grand construction projects. The empire's borders expanded, encompassing territories from Britain to Egypt and from Spain to the Euphrates. Roman legions, renowned for their discipline and engineering prowess, secured and maintained these vast territories, building roads, fortifications, and cities that facilitated control and integration.
The Roman Empire’s society was hierarchical, with a rigid class system. At the top were the patricians, wealthy elites who held significant political power. Below them were the plebeians, free citizens with limited political influence, and the vast numbers of slaves who formed the backbone of the economy. The family unit was central, governed by the paterfamilias, the male head who held absolute authority.
Culturally, the Romans were eclectic, absorbing and adapting elements from the civilizations they encountered, particularly the Greeks. Roman art, literature, and philosophy reflected this synthesis, creating a rich cultural tapestry. Latin, the Roman language, became the lingua franca of the Western world, influencing numerous modern languages.
Roman architecture and engineering achievements were monumental. They perfected the arch, vault, and dome, constructing enduring structures like the Colosseum, Pantheon, and aqueducts. These engineering marvels not only showcased Roman ingenuity but also served practical purposes, from public entertainment to water supply.
June 3, 2024 Anti-Semitism Letter Sent to MIT President Kornbluth and MIT Cor...Levi Shapiro
Letter from the Congress of the United States regarding Anti-Semitism sent June 3rd to MIT President Sally Kornbluth, MIT Corp Chair, Mark Gorenberg
Dear Dr. Kornbluth and Mr. Gorenberg,
The US House of Representatives is deeply concerned by ongoing and pervasive acts of antisemitic
harassment and intimidation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Failing to act decisively to ensure a safe learning environment for all students would be a grave dereliction of your responsibilities as President of MIT and Chair of the MIT Corporation.
This Congress will not stand idly by and allow an environment hostile to Jewish students to persist. The House believes that your institution is in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the inability or
unwillingness to rectify this violation through action requires accountability.
Postsecondary education is a unique opportunity for students to learn and have their ideas and beliefs challenged. However, universities receiving hundreds of millions of federal funds annually have denied
students that opportunity and have been hijacked to become venues for the promotion of terrorism, antisemitic harassment and intimidation, unlawful encampments, and in some cases, assaults and riots.
The House of Representatives will not countenance the use of federal funds to indoctrinate students into hateful, antisemitic, anti-American supporters of terrorism. Investigations into campus antisemitism by the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Ways and Means have been expanded into a Congress-wide probe across all relevant jurisdictions to address this national crisis. The undersigned Committees will conduct oversight into the use of federal funds at MIT and its learning environment under authorities granted to each Committee.
• The Committee on Education and the Workforce has been investigating your institution since December 7, 2023. The Committee has broad jurisdiction over postsecondary education, including its compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, campus safety concerns over disruptions to the learning environment, and the awarding of federal student aid under the Higher Education Act.
• The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is investigating the sources of funding and other support flowing to groups espousing pro-Hamas propaganda and engaged in antisemitic harassment and intimidation of students. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is the principal oversight committee of the US House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X.
• The Committee on Ways and Means has been investigating several universities since November 15, 2023, when the Committee held a hearing entitled From Ivory Towers to Dark Corners: Investigating the Nexus Between Antisemitism, Tax-Exempt Universities, and Terror Financing. The Committee followed the hearing with letters to those institutions on January 10, 202
The French Revolution, which began in 1789, was a period of radical social and political upheaval in France. It marked the decline of absolute monarchies, the rise of secular and democratic republics, and the eventual rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. This revolutionary period is crucial in understanding the transition from feudalism to modernity in Europe.
For more information, visit-www.vavaclasses.com
Biological screening of herbal drugs: Introduction and Need for
Phyto-Pharmacological Screening, New Strategies for evaluating
Natural Products, In vitro evaluation techniques for Antioxidants, Antimicrobial and Anticancer drugs. In vivo evaluation techniques
for Anti-inflammatory, Antiulcer, Anticancer, Wound healing, Antidiabetic, Hepatoprotective, Cardio protective, Diuretics and
Antifertility, Toxicity studies as per OECD guidelines
A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
Macroeconomics- Movie Location
This will be used as part of your Personal Professional Portfolio once graded.
Objective:
Prepare a presentation or a paper using research, basic comparative analysis, data organization and application of economic information. You will make an informed assessment of an economic climate outside of the United States to accomplish an entertainment industry objective.
Welcome to TechSoup New Member Orientation and Q&A (May 2024).pdfTechSoup
In this webinar you will learn how your organization can access TechSoup's wide variety of product discount and donation programs. From hardware to software, we'll give you a tour of the tools available to help your nonprofit with productivity, collaboration, financial management, donor tracking, security, and more.
Operation “Blue Star” is the only event in the history of Independent India where the state went into war with its own people. Even after about 40 years it is not clear if it was culmination of states anger over people of the region, a political game of power or start of dictatorial chapter in the democratic setup.
The people of Punjab felt alienated from main stream due to denial of their just demands during a long democratic struggle since independence. As it happen all over the word, it led to militant struggle with great loss of lives of military, police and civilian personnel. Killing of Indira Gandhi and massacre of innocent Sikhs in Delhi and other India cities was also associated with this movement.
1. WONAC: Workshop on Natural and Artificial Cognition – Oxford June 2007
http://tecolote.isi.edu/∼wkerr/wonac/
Causal Competences
Of Many Kinds
Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼axs/
Jackie Chappell
School of Biosciences, University of Birmingham
http://www.biosciences.bham.ac.uk/staff/staff.htm?ID=90
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 1 Last revised: December 21, 2008
2. Location of these slides
These slides are available here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/talks/wonac/#causal
They were originally part of this presentation at WONAC 2007
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/talks/wonac/#sloman
Jackie Chappell’s WONAC slides are at
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/wonac/#chappell
See also our papers at
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers
For details of WONAC 2007
International Workshop on Natural and Artificial Cognition – Oxford June 2007
See
http://tecolote.isi.edu/∼wkerr/wonac/
http://tecolote.isi.edu/∼wkerr/wonac/program.html
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 2 Last revised: December 21, 2008
3. Note on these slides
These slides were originally part of the Sloman/Chappell presentation for the
NSF/euCognition Workshop on Natural and Artificial Cognition (WONAC) – Oxford June
24-26 2007, namely
Evolution of two ways of understanding causation: Humean and Kantian
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/talks/sloman-wonac-slides.pdf
During the workshop a lot of time was spent discussing what it meant for an animal or
machine to understand causation, and various suggestions were made regarding the
sorts of tests that might reveal such understanding.
We had already prepared a first draft of the points made below, but there was not time for
us to include the analysis during the workshop presentation, so we are making this
available separately.
The summary of our presentation in the original set of slides is provided below.
The workshop slides include a brief explanation of the differences between Hume’s and Kant’s views on
causation. Hume’s view is much closer to current ideas about causation expressed in Bayesian causal
nets. Kant’s views suggest that understanding causation is very closely related to being able to do
geometrical, or more generally mathematical or logical reasoning regarding conclusions that follow
necessarily from premisses, especially premisses and conclusions involving spatial and temporal
relations. We take that for granted in what follows.
NOTE: these slides were produced using LaTex.
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 3 Last revised: December 21, 2008
4. Summary of our presentation at WONAC 2007
• Animals and robots need to grasp and use two types of causation:
1. Humean causation: evidence-based, correlational, often statistical
2. Kantian causation: structure-based, deterministic
• Most current theorising about causation in philosophy, psychology and AI is Humean
in a modern form: e.g. theories about Bayesian causal nets.
• This ignores deep features in Kantian causation connected with reasoning about
spatial and temporal structures and the role of properties of different kinds of stuff.
• Kantian understanding of causation, when available, also allows more creativity, and
recombination of different kinds of knowledge to deal with new problems
because of the way different structures and processes are embedded in the same spatial region.
• The growth of understanding of Kantian causation is linked to forms of learning and
development found only in animals usually classified as altricial, for reasons that are
only beginning to become clear.
• We need to revise and update some biological and computational ways of thinking
about animals and machines and their evolution and development.
• Close observation of play and exploration in children and animals, including their
failures as well as their successes, provide clues as to what is going on: including
development of ontologies and forms of representation, requiring abduction.
• Systematic biological and psychological research, along with design and
implementation of working models can add more clues and help to test the theories.
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 4 Last revised: December 21, 2008
5. Our main point here
There are (at least) three reasons why it is pointless trying to define
“understanding causation” in terms of some behavioural or experimental
test that will decide whether an animal does or does not understand.
• We do not have a precisely defined widely shared concept of such understanding that
is clear enough to be useful in specifying scientific research questions.
• Most of what is referred to by ‘understanding’ goes on in a virtual machine whose
operations are only loosely connected with behaviour, as explained in this
presentation:
Virtual machine functionalism: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/talks/#inf
• In any case the kind of competence we are investigating is not an all-or-nothing
competence:
instead there are several different sub-competences and different animals or machines may have
different subsets of those competences.
Arguing about which subset should be used to define the label “understands
causation” is completely pointless (like many debates about definitions).
If instead we try to identify all those subcompetences and treat them as all worthy of
scientific investigation we shall learn more than if we look for some dichotomy in nature.
That does not imply that there are only differences of degree.
SO...
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 5 Last revised: December 21, 2008
6. Don’t ask which animals or machines understand causation
There is no fixed, sharp, distinction between understanding and not understanding
causation.
Instead we can distinguish a fairly long list of types of competence related to causation
(below), and then ask:
– which animals have which subset,
– how they evolved
– at what age or in what order they typically develop,
– under what conditions they typically develop,
– how those competences are acquired or extended,
– which are necessary precursors for others,
– what forms of representation, mechanisms and architectures support them
– what the trade-offs are between alternative sets of competences and alternative implementations,
That way we can replace futile debates, about how to label phenomena, with productive
research, on what sorts of competences different animals have, what the implications of
those competences are, and what mechanisms can explain them.
We can do that for many debates about cognition and development in humans, animals
and machines.
I.e. replace ill-defined and poorly motivated dichotomies with analysis of spaces of possible designs
and corresponding niches to be analysed, compared, explained, modelled, ...
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 6 Last revised: December 21, 2008
7. Varieties of Humean causal sophistication
Animals and robots may have more or less sophisticated Humean
causal knowledge used in the production of behaviour.
1. Abilities based on fixed, hard-wired predictive mechanisms and action-generating
mechanisms.
Essential for precocial organisms that don’t live long enough to learn much.
Even altricial organisms will need some hard-wiring for bootstrapping learning and for feeding, etc.
(eg. suckling). (That applies also to cognitive bootstrapping: a tabula rasa will achieve nothing.)
2. Hard-wired but ‘soft’ predictive mechanisms with a fixed structure but adjustable
parameters that can be modified by the statistics of experienced reality.
3. The inductive ability to generate new predictive rules as a result of learning:
• rules that are rigidly fixed once formulated.
E.g. things that are coloured red and black are noxious.
• rules that are modifiable though further experience (e.g. altering a bayesian net)
quantitatively, e.g. changing (conditional or prior) probabilities, or
qualitatively e.g. adding or removing nodes or arrows, (altering the structure).
4. Ability to deal with conflicts between predictive/causal rules
• Implicit conflict resolution, e.g. using competing activation weights
• Explicit representation of which rules are available and the ability to learn which to trust in which
situations, using conflict-resolution rules.
e.g. depending on current goals and constraints, such as time constraints.
5. Ability to notice evidence that is inconsistent with, or casts doubt on, stored rules and
to reduce trust in those rules as a result of making inferences from the evidence.
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 7 Last revised: December 21, 2008
8. Varieties of Humean causal sophistication (2)
6. Ability to notice an information gap when attempting to deploy a known rule.
E.g. noticing a need to look in a new place or a new direction to get some information to plug into a
condition that will allow a rule to be used to take a decision or make a prediction.
7. Ability to conduct experiments or observations to test or modify a doubtful
generalisation or theory.
We can distinguish
• experiments conducted automatically when failed or conflicting predictions directly trigger
behaviour modifications that test which variations produce which results
• experiments selected as a result of reasoning about consequences of alternative explanatory
theories and searching for good tests
• evidence seeking actions: without having specific expectations inspect things in an appropriate
spatial region, looking for previously unnoticed details that might give clues to distinguish one
situation from another.
• memory seeking actions: as before, but searching episodic memory for remembered details that
might be relevant to the problem.
8. Ability to use representations with hypothetical, or counter-factual content:
e.g. possible futures, possible histories, possible theories, questions to be answered, possible
strategies, etc.
I.e. there’s a distinction between what is represented and committed to, and what is represented as
part of a deliberative or other process (story telling, daydreaming, wondering about, doing thought
experiments, etc.)
Special architectural features are required to support this distinction in the processing of information,
whether factual information or control information
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 8 Last revised: December 21, 2008
9. Varieties of Humean causal sophistication (3)
9. Ability to generate new explanatory theories non-inductively (using abduction) and
then test them, including hypotheses explaining observations:
• single step explanations
• multi step explanations
• structured explanatory models (see Kantian causation)
For an incomplete discussion of the role of abduction in science and philosophy see
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/logical-geography.html#abduction
10. Ability to extend the ontology available for expressing causal hypotheses.
• definitional extensions (e.g. putting more tests into network nodes)
• substantive extensions – hypothesising new kinds of entities, events, processes, etc. not definable
in terms of currently known ones (which is how deep science proceeds).
See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#pr0604
‘Ontology extension’ in evolution and in development, in animals and machines.
11. Ability to record externally, or communicate to others, what causes what.
12. Ability to seek information from others about what causes what.
13. Philosophical ability to think about causation
what it is, whether it is rational to assume there are causal connections, whether determinism is true,
worries about free will, etc.
NB: that is not a complete list!
Some of these alternatives also apply to Kantian causation – but there are great differences in the details.
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 9 Last revised: December 21, 2008
10. Things still to be added
The above list is incomplete in various ways, especially insofar as it focuses only on the
abstract structures common to all sorts of causal models, as expressible in Bayesian nets.
We need to list ways in which the ability to do Kantian causal reasoning extends those
general causal competences.
The most basic cases will involve being able to represent complex structures and
processes embedded in a common region of space-time so that different parts of objects
and different ongoing sub-processes can interact with one another. (As in rotating
meshed gear wheels, or a steam engine with speed governor.)
We also need to list kinds of causal reasoning about things with semantic competences,
e.g. to reason about beliefs, desires, preferences, intentions, decisions, planning
processes, plan execution processes, etc. in oneself and others.
This requires meta-semantic competences combined with meta-management
competences for using meta-semantic information (information about information and
information-processing).
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 10 Last revised: December 21, 2008
11. Examples of Kantian causal competences
New Placeholder 28Jun
– ability to do various kinds of Kantian causal reasoning
o E.g. about different sorts of shapes, about distances and velocities, about kinds of stuff, about mental
states and processes, about effects of different sorts of actions ...
– ability to build a causal model of what’s going on in the current environment
(e.g. why only part of the toy train is visible: the rest is in the tunnel, and still moving)
– ability to work out what needs changing before some goal can be achieved.
– ability to plan actions using causal features of objects or situations.
o Can you lift a cup full of liquid using only one finger?
– ability to work out what to do to get new information
o where to look, what to try manipulating, what to test, etc.
See the original workshop slides from which these were extracted (and expanded)
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/wonac/#sloman
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 11 Last revised: December 21, 2008
12. Examples of meta-semantic causal competences
New Placeholder 28Jun
– ability to reason causally about mental processes in others
lots of literature to refer to in dev psych and animal behaviour studies
Also John Barnden’s ATT-META system (which supports recursively nested simulative reasoning)
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼jab/ATT-Meta/
– ability to do mathematics
– ability to do philosophical thinking
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 12 Last revised: December 21, 2008
13. Some limitations of current AI
Alas, current AI systems, including robots, have only a
small set of the previous types of causal competence:
e.g. they may be able to do things,
but, when doing something, don’t know
what they do, why they do it, how they do it,
what they did not do but could have done
why they did not do it differently,
what would have happened
if they had done it differently,
etc.
They also cannot tell whether someone else
is doing it the same way or a different way,
and if something goes wrong explain why it went wrong.
All this is related to lacking Humean and Kantian causal competences.
WONAC: Causal competences Slide 13 Last revised: December 21, 2008