Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS

Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi
InMind and OutMindInMind and OutMind
Societal OrderSocietal Order
Cognition & Self-Organization:
The role of MAS
_____________________
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Institute for Cognitive Sciences and Technologies - Roma

Premise and Issues
““Socio-(Cognitive-)Technical Systems”Socio-(Cognitive-)Technical Systems”
What we are unavoidably building with computer networks, AI,
and Ag technologies are Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems:
Socio-Technical System in fact means that any new technology
implies/requires/introduces not only new skills and competences,
but new expectations, goals, beliefs; new "scripts", with their
roles, norms; new form of interaction and conventions among the
social actors.
So we have to specify the "cognitive" and interactive side of the
new system.
You are Social EngineersSocial Engineers; are you aware of that?

Premise and Issues
““Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”
BUT….. this new complex Socio-Technical (and mental) System
cannot be just planned and designedcannot be just planned and designed.
It is dynamically emerging and self-organizing: it is a
spontaneous Social Orderspontaneous Social Order (von Hayek); a dynamic equilibrium
not necessarily "good" for the goals of the actors.
What we need is not just a top-down organization and control.

Premise and Issues
in order
to support and mediate human interaction and organization
and
to emulate them in efficient open MAS systems,
we have to (partially) "understand" and to reproduce features of
human social mind (like commitments, norms, mind reading,
power, trust, "institutional" effects, ...) and of social macro-
phenomena.
In particular we have to model "immergence""immergence" and "cognitivecognitive
emergence"emergence"; the mental "mediators" of societal phenomena and
the partial understanding and awareness in the actors

Our general PERSPECTIVE - 1
The “Cognitive Mediators”“Cognitive Mediators” of Social Phenomena
Social and cultural phenomena cannot be deeply accounted for without
explaining how they work through the individual agents’ minds (mental
“counterparts” or “mediators”).
This requires a richer cognitive model (architecture) for “Agents,”
moving from formal and computational AI and ALife models, closer to those
developed in psychology, cognitive science, and in cognitive approaches in
economics, sociology, organization studies.
“The most important fact concerning human interactions is that these events are
psychologically represented in each of the participants”
(Kurt Lewin, 1935)

““COGNITIVIZING”COGNITIVIZING”
Cooperation, Conflict, PowerPower,, Social
‘Values’, Commitments, Norms,
Rights, Social Order,Rights, Social Order, Trust,, …
- AIJ paper- AIJ paper
- Social Commitment paper- Social Commitment paper
____________________________________________________________
Von Hayek, Pareto, Garfinkel, … the aim of founding theVon Hayek, Pareto, Garfinkel, … the aim of founding the
Social Sciences as Autonomous from PsychologySocial Sciences as Autonomous from Psychology

Social phenomena are due to the agents’ behaviors, but…but…
the agents’ behaviors are due the the mental mechanisms
controlling and (re)producing them. (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, Falcone,…)
For example:
My Social PowerSocial Power lies in, consists of, the others’ Goals & Beliefs!!!!
That’s why we need Mind Reading! Not for adjusting ourself,
but for manipulating and exploiting the others or for helping or
punishing them.

Social phenomena are due to the agents’ behaviors, but…but…
the agents’ behaviors are due the the mental mechanisms
controlling and (re)producing them. (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, Falcone,…)
For example:
• How the normnorm should work through the minds of the agents? How
is it “represented”?
? Which are the proximate mechanisms
underlying the normative behavior?

Our general PERSPECTIVE – 2
However,
Mind is not enoughMind is not enough!!
the “individualistic + cognitive” approach is not sufficient
for the social theory and processes (even when modeling
joint and collective attitudes and actions).
The social actors dosocial actors do notnot understand, negotiate,understand, negotiate,
and planand plan for all their collective behavior and
cooperative activity.

Premise and Issues
We have to "understand" and to reproduce also
hhow humans do socially construct somethingow humans do socially construct something
without understandingwithout understanding itit!!
How is it possible that intentional agents do not intend the
functions of their collective behavior?
Which the relationship between emergent functions and intended
goals?
CAN WE SUPPORT HUMAN ORGANIZATIONS &
BUILD EFFECTIVE SOCIAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT
UNDERSTANDING AND GOVERNING THAT!?

Mind is not enoughMind is not enough
Emergence, Self-Organization
Functions and Cognitions
1

INDIVIDUAL MIND
COLLECTIVE
STRUCTURES
& BEHAVIOURS
Bel --> G --> action
Mind is not enough
emergenceemergence & immergenceimmergence
not only knowledge,
mutual beliefs,
reasoning,
shared goals
and
deliberately
constructed
social structures
and
cooperation

Agents in
a common world (INTERFERENCE)
r
or
q
q
p
q
and
p
G
objective
DEPENDENCE
network
CognitiveCognitive
emergenceemergence:
awareness
Levels of
emergence...

For a (Pessimistic) Theory of
Spontaneous Social OrderSpontaneous Social Order
A critical homage to F. von Hayek

I will examine:
• the crucial relationships between the intentional nature of the agents'
actions and their explicit goals and preferences, and the possibly
unintended 'finality' or 'function' of their behavior.
• in favor of 'cognitive architectures' in computer simulations.
• propose some solutions about the theoretical and functional relationships
between agents' intentions and non-intentional 'purposes' of their
actions.
• 'Social order' is not necessarily a real 'order' or something good and
desirable for the involved agents; nor necessarily the best possible solution.
• It can be bad for the social actors against their intentions and welfare
although emerging from their choices and being stable and self-maintaining.
How to TRUST it?
• Hayek's theory of spontaneous social 'order' and Elster's opposition
between intentional explanation and functional one will be criticized.

Agent-based Modeling & Social Simulation will be
crucial for the solution of one of the most hard
theoreticaltheoretical problems of economic and social sciences:
the spontaneous organization of a “dynamic socialthe spontaneous organization of a “dynamic social
order” that cannot be planned, but emerges out oforder” that cannot be planned, but emerges out of
intentional planning agentsintentional planning agents guided by their ownguided by their own
choices.choices.
This is the problem that Hayek assumes to be
the real reason for the existence of the Social
Sciences.

SOCIAL
SCIENCES
A
B
MULTI-AGENT
SYSTEMS
B: Not only an ‘experimental method’ and experimental
platforms
CONCEPTS, MODELS, THEORIES
The new COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCES

Agents & MASAgents & MAS paradigm
Just a Technology?
I stress those aspects still needing a theory (that we cannot just buy
and import from the cognitive and social sciences) also because it
is important not reducing “Agents” (and MAS) to a technology.
This is not only an impoverishing move but even a risky move
(remember the serious mistake that AI did with the “expert
systems”).
““Agents”Agents” are an intellectual (and formal-computational)
framework; a way of thinkinga way of thinking and of analyzing dynamic and
complex phenomena that involve active, partially independent,
distributed but interfering and interactive entities, producing
common (either planned or unplanned) collective results, for
individual or collective advantages.

Only MAS can fully deal with this problemOnly MAS can fully deal with this problem
>> Up & Down>> Up & Down

“THE core theoretical problem
of the whole social science”
(Hayek )

“THE core theoretical problem
of the whole social science” (Hayek )
"This problem (the spontaneous emergence of an unintentional"This problem (the spontaneous emergence of an unintentional
social order and institutions) is in no way specific of thesocial order and institutions) is in no way specific of the
economic science.... it doubtless iseconomic science.... it doubtless is THE core theoreticalTHE core theoretical
problem of the whole social scienceproblem of the whole social science"" (von Hayek, Knowledge,
Market, Planning)
the problem is not simply how a given equilibrium or
coherence is achieved and some stablesome stable orderorder emergesemerges
To have a "social order" or an "institution", spontaneous emergence and
equilibrium are not enough. They must be "functional".

Adam Smith’s "invisible hand"
Adam Smith’s original formulation of “THE problem” is much deeper
and clearer
The great question is how:
"(the individual) - that does neither, in general"(the individual) - that does neither, in general, intend to, intend to
pursuepursue thethe public interestpublic interest,, nor is awarenor is aware of the fact that he isof the fact that he is
pursuing it,...pursuing it,... is conduced by an invisible hand tois conduced by an invisible hand to pursue anpursue an
endend that is not among histhat is not among his intentionsintentions"" (Smith, ).(Smith, ).
Hayek like Smith in acknowledging the teleological nature of the invisible
hand and of spontaneous order, cannot avoid attributing to it
a (positive) value judgment, a providential, benevolent,a (positive) value judgment, a providential, benevolent,
optimistic visionoptimistic vision of this process of self-organizationof this process of self-organization
((ideologismideologism).).

In the “Invisible Hand”:
1) there are intentions and intentional behavior
2) some unintended and unaware (long term or complex) effect emerges
from this behavior
3) but it is not just an effect, it is an end we “pursue”, i.e. its orients and
controls -in some way- our behavior: we "necessarily operate for" that
result (Smith).
- how is it possible that we pursuepursue something that is not an
intention of ours; that the behavior of an intentional and
planning agent be goal-oriented, finalistic (‘end’‘end’), without
being intentional;
- in which sense the unintentional effect of our behavior is
an "endend”??

Theory of “Function”Theory of “Function”
This problem appeared in other social sciences as the
problem of the notion of "functions" (social and
biological) impinging on the behavior of anticipatory
and intentional agents, and of their relations with their
"intentions".

Social FunctionsSocial Functions and CognitionCognition
a) no theory of social functions is possible and tenable
without clearly solving this problem;
b)without a theory of emerging functions among cognitive
agents social behavior cannot be fully explained.
Moreover: we have towe have to buildbuild social functionssocial functions andand
spontaneous ordersspontaneous orders (conventions, conformity,(conventions, conformity,
…) in Agent supported human organizations and…) in Agent supported human organizations and
in open MASin open MAS
not only goodnot only good
intentionallyintentionally cooperating/competing systemscooperating/competing systems

Functions install and maintain themselvesFunctions install and maintain themselves parasitical toto
cognition:cognition:
functions install and maintain themselves
thanks to and through agents' mental representations
but not as mental representations:
i.e. without being known or at least intended.

While Social NormsSocial Norms emergence and functioning require also a
(partial) "cognitive emergencecognitive emergence",
Social FunctionsSocial Functions require an extra-cognitiveextra-cognitive emergence and
working
For a Social Norm to work as a Social Norm and be fully
effective, agents should recognize and treat it as a Social Norm.
On the contrary the effectiveness of a Social Function is
independent of agents' understandingindependent of agents' understanding of this function of
their own behavior:
a) the function can rise and maintain itself without the awareness of the
agents;
b) if the agents intend the results of their behavior, these would no more
be mere "social functions" of their behavior, but just "intentions".

The problem:
Emergence and Functions should not be
what the
likes or notices,
(“just in the eye of the beholder”)
but should be indeed observer-independent,
based on self-organizing and self-reproducing phenomena,
>>> "positive”, “good” can just consists in this.
We cannot exclude "negative functions" (Merton) (kako-
functions) from the theory: perhaps the same mechanisms are
responsible for both positive and negative functions.
>> Two kinds of finalistic notionsfinalistic notions:
- evolutionary finalities, adaptive goals; and
- mental ends (motives, purposes, intentions).

IntentionalIntentional behavior Vs. functionalfunctional behavior
Finalistic systems:
There are twotwo basic types of system having a finalistic (teleonomic)
behaviour:
Goal-oriented systems - (Mc Farland, 1983),
Goal-governed systems
a specific type of Goal-oriented system based on representationsrepresentations
that anticipate the results

MAIN PROBLEMSMAIN PROBLEMS
• If a behavior is reproduced thanks to its good effects, that
are good relatively to the goals of the agent (individual or
collective) who reproduces them by acting intentionally, there
is no room for "functions” (Elster).
If the agent appreciates the goodness of these effects and the
action is replied in order to reproduce these effects, they are
simply "intended".
• How is it possible that a system which act
intentionally and on the basis of the evaluation of
the effects relative to its internal goals reproduces
bad habits thanks to their bad effects?

>> ?? a behavioristic reinforcement layer (van Parijs)
together with
>> a deliberative layer (controlled by beliefs and goals) ???
the deliberative layer accounting for intentional actions and effects,
the behavioristic layer (exploiting conditioned or unconditioned reflexes)
accounting for merely "functional" behaviors??
Are “functions” and “roles” just impinging on ‘habitus’ ???
(Bourdieu), while
intentions would just be for personal purposes??
Our problem is indeed that:
 intentional actionsintentional actions have functionsfunctions!
Goals and beliefs of the agents have functions.

The fundamental problem is
how to graft teleological but unintentional behaviours
precisely on intention-driven behaviours.
[WE HAVE TO BUILD THIS KIND OF MAS-BASEDTHIS KIND OF MAS-BASED
SYSTEMSSYSTEMS]
What answer can be given to Elster according to whom the idea
of intention makes that of the function of behaviour
impracticable and superfluous.
How can intentional acts also be functional,How can intentional acts also be functional, that is,that is,
unwitting butunwitting but
reproducedreproduced precisely as a result of theirprecisely as a result of their unintentionalunintentional
effectseffects.

Why also
Kako-functions?Kako-functions?
How is it possible?

Why also kako-functionskako-functions?
- thethe mechanism that install a bad function can be exactlymechanism that install a bad function can be exactly
the same installing a good onethe same installing a good one
- to definitely separate a functional view of behavior and
society from any teleological, providential view (functions
can be very bad and persist although bad)
- kako-functions cannot be explained in a strictly
behavioristic framework of reinforcement learning: the
result of the behavior can be disagreeable or useless, but the
behavior will be "reinforced", consolidated and reproduced.

Unexpected evil effects exist, or evil effects combined with good individual
intentions (Boudon, 1977) in which
the intended good effects reproducedthe intended good effects reproduced
in spite ofin spite of the negative consequencesthe negative consequences.
This is true,
- both in the case in which the evil effects are not perceived or are not
attributed correctly,
- and in the case in which they are perceived
(in the second case the good effects must be subjectively more important and in any
case preferred (for instance, be closer in time), or else are more conditioning/reinforcing
than the evil effects)
action
negative
unexpected effects
negative
expected effects
positive
expected and
intended
effects
positive
unexpected effects
reproduce
Perceived effects

But there are also
harmful effects capable of self-reproductionharmful effects capable of self-reproduction (through the action)
precisely because of their negative naturebecause of their negative nature (Castelfranchi, 1997; 1998b;
1998d).
a long line of automobiles and the slowing down due to the simple individual intention
of rapidly glancing at an accident that has occurred in the other lane
azione
effetti negativi
inattesi
effetti negativi
attesi
effetti positivi
attesi ed intesi
effetti
positivi inattesi
riproduce
riproduce

The notion of ‘function'
as
an effect selecting and reproducingan effect selecting and reproducing
its own causeits own cause
How is it possible for a system that acts intentionally on the basis
of an evaluation of the effects vis-à-vis its own goals, to reproduce
bad habits precisely as a result of their bad effects?
And even more crucially - if a behaviour is instead reproduced
thanks to its good effects with respect to the (individual or
collective) goals of the agent who reproduces them by acting
intentionally, then there is no room for the "functions".

It is necessary to have complex reinforcement learning forms not
merely based on classifiers, rules, associations, motor sequences,
etc. but operating on the cognitive representationsoperating on the cognitive representations governing the
action, that is, on beliefsbeliefs and goalsgoals.
In this view "the consequences of the action, which may be more or
less consciously anticipated, nevertheless modify the probability of
the action being repeated the next time in similar stimulus
conditions " (Macy, 1998). More exactly:
the functions are simply effects of behaviour whichthe functions are simply effects of behaviour which
gogo beyond thebeyond the intended effectsintended effects but which canbut which can
successfully be reproduced because they reinforcesuccessfully be reproduced because they reinforce
the agent's beliefs and goals that give rise to thisthe agent's beliefs and goals that give rise to this
behaviour.behaviour.

How Social Functions are
implemented through
cognitive representations
The basic model
Act
Bel
Goals
+
+
Intended
effects
Unintended
effects
Functional
unintended
effects

There are two Cognitive "reinforcement" principles:
1. Belief Reinforcement:
two different mechanisms can be postulated:
association (accessibility) :
the association between the belief and that context or scenario is
strengthened: the believe will have more probability to be retrieved next
time in similar situations; it will be more activated, more available and
accessible (accessibility bias);
confirmation (reliability) :
some of the action's effects are perceived by the agent (even if not
necessarily understood and causally connected to its actions) and they
confirm the beliefs supporting the action: they give new evidence for that
belief, increase its "credibility", and reliability: they augment its “truth” or
the subjective probability of the event.

2. Goal Reinforcement
two different mechanisms can be postulated (analogous to the beliefs
reinforcement mechanisms):
association (accessibility) :
the success of the chosen goal, plan, action is memorized in the sense that the association
between the goal-plan and that problematic context or scenario is strengthened: the
goal/plan (solution) will have more probability to be retrieved next time in similar
situations; it will be more activated, more available and accessible;
confirmation (reliability) :
the success of the chosen goal, plan, action is memorized; it increments a "successfulness
index" relative to that choice; or better some meta-cognitive evaluation of the value of the
action. This memorized behavioral choice is "confirmed": next time the probability to
choose the same way (goal, plan, strategy, action) will be greater: it will be more preferable
and reliable (we will trust more it).
The reinforcement of both the belief and the goal/plan
will determine a reinforcement of that behavior

An example: dirty and clean streets
A social (kako)function based on social conformity and imitation.
The agent assumes (B1) that this is a bad behavior or even a forbidden one; he assumes (B2) that a lot of other
people behave this way; that (B3) this can be quite practical and easy sometimes; he assumes that (B4) his
contribution to the garbage is quite marginal and small (that its true). He has the goal (G1) to do as others do and
until others do so (Bicchieri, 1989); or at least, to do as others do and until others do so if this is useful and
practical for his goals. Goal G1 on the bases of beliefs B2, B3, B4 will generate a goal (G2) to leave small garbage
in the street, which overcomes the possible goal (G3) -based on B1- of not dirtying the city. Now the result of such
a behavior is that streets are dirtier; this is perceived and then it will confirm the supporting beliefs (B2, B4) and
the goal G2.
Everybody reinforces the behavior of the others.
The global effect is not wanted and intended by anybody; the
reinforcement effect is also unattended and unintended.
The behavior is (reciprocally) reinforced by its effects. These effects
are self-maintaining and reproducing through the reinforcement of
their own causes. This passes through the mind of the agents (their
beliefs and goals) but not through their consciousness and intention.
It is quite interesting to observe that exactly the same kind of beliefs, and an identical
goal (G1) can generate in this case an eu-function: to maintain the city clean.

Interpersonal and collective level: vicious circlesvicious circles
Hubbub in a restaurant or at a party
(The example given is merely -on a small scale- the model followed by the arms
race).
Hostility leads to hostility

Institutional level: vicious circlesvicious circles
Prisons <==><==> Delinquency
>
<
>
<
>
<
>
<
D E L I N Q U E N Z A
P O L I Z I A / T R I B U N A L I C A R C E R I

What distinguishes function from non function is notnot that the
unintentional (collective) effect is good but that it is self-
organizing and self-producing by means of positive feedback,
that is, by reinforcing, selecting, and reproducing the
behaviour that generated it:
unintended effects that select their own causesunintended effects that select their own causes.
>> functionality must be kept distinct from goodness (and that is from
the subjective goals of the agents),
>> good and bad functions (exactly like unintended good and bad effects)
are on the same plane: both may be self-organizing.
>> the function is not reproduced or maintained or repeated by virtue of
its good effects (a risky approach owing to the boundary with intention)

GoalsGoals vs. “Functions”“Functions”
An example:
The ADOPTION of a NORMADOPTION of a NORM
without the UNDERSTANDINGUNDERSTANDING (sharing)
of its END

Delegation, Proactivity,Delegation, Proactivity,
Order, Norms, ViolationOrder, Norms, Violation
3

“We have to maintain the control”
We can delegate “how” to achieve a given goal, but
not “what”: goal decision and choice should remains
our power (a general worry; ex. Müller-Schloer)
However…. There are different kinds and level of
“delegation” useful for cooperation, and autonomy, and
iniciative or pro-activity.
Over-helpOver-help
Not always our objective is the right one (ex. expert
systems’ advices).
Not always we understand our own interest.

Goal
action
subGoalsubGoal
PLAN
Des.
action action
Levels ofLevels of DelegationDelegation
Closed-Delegation:
mere execution
A plan-based approach

Goal
action
subGoalsubGoal
PLAN
Des.
action action
Goal
action
subGoal
?
Open-DelegationOpen-Delegation:
• Delegation of meta-tasks (searching,
planning, deciding, monitoring, ...)
• Intelligence, autonomy (agent modelling)
Levels ofLevels of DelegationDelegation

Social-AgentSocial-Agent’’s Architectures Architecture
and Multiple Goal-SourcesMultiple Goal-Sources
ACTIVE
GOALS
ACTIONS
INTENTIONS
ADOPTEDADOPTED
GOALSGOALS
EMOTIONS
BODILY
NEEDS
DESIRESDESIRES
PRACTICAL
REASONING
EXOGENOUS GOALS

non shared plannon shared plan Goal
action
subGoal subGoal
action action
subGoal
Goal
PLAN
action
subGoal
PLAN Goal
action
subGoal subGoal
action
Unaware CooperationUnaware Cooperation
•Reconciling EmergenceEmergence and CognitionCognition

Goal
action actionaction
subGoalsubGoal
PLAN
Des.
Goal-DelegationGoal-Delegation Vs
Goal-AdoptionGoal-Adoption
• Over- HelpOver- Help
• Critical-HelpCritical-Help
Levels of collaboration

Degrees of AutonomyDegrees of Autonomy
There are degrees of Autonomy, but also
domains of Autonomy;
And we also need ““adjustableadjustable”” autonomyautonomy
Possibly based on “negotiation”: both sides
(delegator and delegated) might ask for a
broader or more limited autonomy and initiative;
and for more or less control.

Monitoring PeopleMonitoring People
(and Autonomous Agents)?
We cannot monitor and control people
without understandingwithout understanding “what” they are doing
(goal) and “why”,
and why sometime they have to violatehave to violate
norms or roles
? the possible danger of a computer-based
formalization and enforcement of rules in
organizations

Functional violations
of norms and commitments
For "functional disregard" I mean
The violation of a norm/rule/prescription/commitment
finalized to make the required/expected work (also) more
functional to the organisation's aims (over- and critical-
help). (“functional” here means “good for ..“functional” here means “good for ..”!)
“Finalized” can mean either “intentional”(goal-governed)
or “functional” (goal-oriented)

Two different forms of “functional disregard or violation”:
(“functional” here means “good for ..“functional” here means “good for ..”!)
Deliberated functional violationsDeliberated functional violations
In order to be deliberated this behaviour has to be free
(one could have done differently), and aware of its consequences
and on purpose, thus the agent cannot be merely self-interested.
• Deliberated is not only the violation but also its functionality
to the organisation
I focus on felicitous deliberateddeliberated violations (first kind)

The Sociological Description and Definition of the
Phenomenon
"The repeated and systematic violation of criteria, prescriptions and
dispositions included in the normative apparatus that defines and regulates
(through "norms", in a broad sense) a collective organised activity. This
violation favours an acceptable level of functioning of the organisation itself,
while the literal and punctual application of the normative will produce levels
of functioning either unacceptable or less efficacious" (Manciulli et al., 1986,
p. XI).
"grève du zéle" - "forms of sabotage consisting just in a rigorous
application of rulements" (Mottez, 1971).

" it is well known that the best way for sabotaging an organisation is that of
literally obeying to all its rules and to refusing to use our own judgement
capacity. Beyond what is obtainable by commands, beyond what is
controllable by supervision, beyond what is inducible by incentives or
preventable by punishment, even in the execution of the more humble jobs
there is a bit of discretionality... This "discretion" can be used both to allowThis "discretion" can be used both to allow
or to subvert the aims of the organisation"or to subvert the aims of the organisation".. (Bendix, 1959/72).
WILL WEWILL WE “SABOTAGE” ORGANIZATIONs“SABOTAGE” ORGANIZATIONs
via our COMPUTATIONAL CONTROL?via our COMPUTATIONAL CONTROL?
During the Tayloristic period in the industrial organisation one of the main
points in the dominant paradigm of the "scientific management" was the
monito to the worker: "you are not paid for thinking, but just for executing
orders and instructions".

Social conventions to violateSocial conventions to violate
Fly controllers in an airport control tower should use the interphone , also in
communication among people within the same control room. There is a rule
on this. However, the interphone has some inconvenience (for ex. voices
overlaps, misunderstandings, ... ) and the controllers consider its use not only
less natural for them, but “potentially safety critical”. This is why they in fact
do not use interphone for messages within the same room, and communicate
“directly”.
In this real example we clearly have:
a systematic violation for functional, cooperative reasons

TrustingTrusting & Delegating& Delegating
withoutwithout
UnderstandingUnderstanding
4

The a-technical, non-rational nature of the
deontic “ought”deontic “ought”
The “alienated”“alienated” nature
of norm adoption
&

The a-technical, non-rational nature
of the deontic “ought”
In a sense the deontic “ought” “have to” is a de-
technicalized “ought”: no longer a necessary meansmeans
for....for.... something that you have to want, to chose.you have to want, to chose.
“If you like/want to ..., you should, have to.....”
(technical ought)
“You have to” for what? why? (deontic ought)
In the mind of the “issuer” the N is supposed to be a
means, a solution for some problem, a way of
achieving a higher goal.

M O T H E R C H I L D
G o a l :
c h i l d b r u s h e s
h i s th e e ts
G o a l :
c h i l d b r u s h e s
h i s th e e ts
G o a l :
t o p r e v e n t
d e c a y
G o a l :
to m a k e
m o m m y
h a p p y
Citizens like childrens
We are not supposed to ‘cooperate’ but to ‘obey’!

The a-technical, non-rational nature
of the deontic “ought”the deontic “ought”
Both the ‘ideal’ and the ‘sub-ideal’ (for avoiding sanctions)
obedience share a fundamental core, crucial for the real nature
of the deontic ‘norm’, ‘ought’.
A core that differentiate the mind of the normative ‘subject’ S from the
mind of the ‘issuer’ or legislator.
S is NOT supposed to (have to) adopt the N (to ‘adhere’ to the imperative)
because s/he understands or agrees about its funtion, aim.
On the contrary, S is supposed to have to obey even if s/heto obey even if s/he
does not understand the meaning of the N, or disagreesdoes not understand the meaning of the N, or disagrees
about it.about it.
A normative education is precisely an education to obey in any
case, and even to not wondering and worry about the validity of
the N. (That’s why Socrates takes the poison)

The “alienated”“alienated” nature
of norm adoption and on
institution and social powers
We do not intend the ends of
our intentional behavior!

Multi-Agent SystemsMulti-Agent Systems
&
Emergence, Self-Organization
Functions and Cognitions
5

Not only the MAS supported social order cannot justcannot just
be top-downbe top-down, but it must allow autonomy and flexibility,
and true delegations and commitments, and
"conventions" and "norms" (top-down & bottom-up)
with their intrinsic possible “violation”.
We need cooperation/support by “autonomous”“autonomous”, ““pro-pro-
activeactive””, really helping, really helping Agents.
Not stupid executors.

Compliance to norms and commitments is assumed to be and to
have to be absolutely guaranteed in E-institutions. Why?
N-violation (commitments, rules, roles, ...) can be adaptive,
functional. But to really be adaptive should not be just accidental;
it should be based on some "understanding" and giving-priority to
the "goal" of that norm or task or request or prescription. It should
be based on some Over-help.
That’s why we need “Trust”That’s why we need “Trust”
However,
how to support "trust" within those self-organizing,
changing, and normatively not-rigid system?

Only MAS can solve this theoretical and technical
problems; by changing the Social Sciences methods,
data, and modeling tools.
By modeling EmergenceEmergence but also ImmergenceImmergence and CognitiveCognitive
EmergenceEmergence, and different levels and kinds of order; how minds
become coordination artifacts; different kinds and levels of
cooperation. And in particular the relation between mental
representations and learning and self-organizing autonomous
systems.
Can we Program with the "Invisible Hand"? Will the
"Invisible Hand" - governing human society - be
implemented in the emergent intelligence of Self-Self-
organizing open MA systemsorganizing open MA systems?
How to combine Control & Self-Organization?

MAS will play several crucial roles:
- Experimental methods and platforms for the Social and political sciences;
- New conceptual, theoretical and modeling tools;
- Infrastructure for Self-organizing but monitored and governed
organizations: MA implementation, Ag mediation and support;
- Participation, transparence, information; mediamorphosis of knowledge
institutions;
- Simulation for understanding, predicting and deciding about real social
dynamics;
- MA coordination/interpretation of feedbacks from intelligent sensors,
stakeholders, people, ... to authorities and control institutions.
Let me stress just one:
Artificial Social ImaginationImagination
“The best way to predict the future .. is to invent it” Allan McKay

Artificial Social “Imagination”
like human imagination/simulation guiding both human
executive actions and long-term decisions.
Anticipatory Simulation in action control: ex.
Comparison between purely stimulus-response systems (a) and those endowed
with anticipatory capabilities, which run an ‘internal looprun an ‘internal loop’ on-line with action
(b), or off-line (c) (Pezzulo).

Social Simulation, Social
Innovation, and
System Management
6

Governement and Simulation
Social Simulation will be Agent-basedAgent-based
and will be crucial for planning and governance of
complex systems.
The most serious problem of the Social “Sciences” is
that they cannot do real experiments.
This is even more dramatic for Social Policies!
Simulation provides this.

… in fact, learning (and adjustment) requires trials
and errorserrors! You cannot do this on purpose in real
context and people.
But we can systematically explore ““what wouldwhat would
happen if….happen if….”” in the computational model of the
given system.
Even more simple for/in those (future) systems and
organizations that will be fully networked and based on
agents. Their working not just they simulation!
Governement and Simulation

“Simulation” is so important and crucial because it finally
provides to the social sciences a truly “experimental” method,
for the validation and adjustment of the models (and of
working “architectures” not simply “formal”).
But:
“Simulation” is more than “experimental method”; it is a
modeling method (synthetic approach; proximate mechanisms
The challenge is much more serious: to develop a new forma new form
of collective intelligenceof collective intelligence; of imagination, prediction,
experimental design and planning, finally able to support
collective strategic decisions and policies.
76
The SimulationSimulation Revolution

77
political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
What will happen in a few decades is the systematic
use of Simulations as the basis for any big decision
about strategies and policies in any domain:
military, environmental, financial, economic, urban,
demographic, energetic, educational, logistic, sanitary,....
No political/managerial complex decision will be
taken without a grounded previsionprevision about possible
effects and trends; thanks to the modeling and
simulation of the phenomenon.

78
given the power of future computational scientific models
and platforms, and
given a society fully connected in real-time, on-line, reactive
and ‘virtualized’, with “smart environments and ambient
intelligence”,
 with continuous simulation and re-simulation of what is
happening,
there would be the cognitive collective powerthe cognitive collective power
and intelligenceand intelligence for better governing future and
complexity

79
A fundamental challenge for the future is - in my view - the
following one:
"How" to systematically integrate
-the simulationssimulations of social phenomena with
-the real-time feedbackreal-time feedback from the "playground”
dynamic processes?

80
A "cyclic" model
Planning/design may not just remainPlanning/design may not just remain top-downtop-down andand centralizedcentralized,
and be just "applied""applied" to the field.
One will need to combine:
- simulative models and their running and predictions
and the consequent decisions and choices, with possible timely
feedbacks from the territory, due to intelligent sensors or
witnesses; then
- run time readjusting the simulations and then the
policy or intervention; and
- so on, cyclically (Figure).

81
A "cyclic" model
ENVIRONMENT

82
Information and computer technology gives us the tools and the cultural
conditions for those run time, decentralized, high qualified feedbacksrun time, decentralized, high qualified feedbacks.
Different kinds of "agents" might be exploited:
(i) local sensors and detectors, of various kinds (possibly learning and adjusting), even
interconnected and locally "cooperating" for a more reliable and global information;
(ii) local computational elaborations and intelligences, for primary elaboration and
reaction (additional data, additional "agents", alarm smart systems, ...);
(iii) active voluntary people communicating via sms, call centers, ...
(iv) local or domain "groups", “communities”, associations interested in
monitoring and giving advice on the phenomenon: bloggers, consumers unions, ..;
Elaboration of big-data, sentiment analysis, specific alert, ….
(v) local professionals in charge: policemen, bombers, medical staff, teachers,
social workers, specialized observatories (economic, demographic,
environmental,..), ......
(vi) local administrations, with their "research/documentation centers" or their
managers and administrators;...

83
Obviously, the solution (and the design) cannot be the same in
every domain.
For example, in traffic monitoring and planning (for instance, in view of a
transportation strike or of a big political demonstration) this is quite trivial: one
should design a fast interaction between the simulated intervention "plans" (with
their predictions) and the various feedbacks from the actual event: indications
from sensors; telephonic advices from people; advices from policemen and toll
booths; recommendations and requests from users' blogs, or consumers’
associations, or local authorities.
Rather different feedbacks are needed in case of an epidemic, or for the leakage of
toxic substances.

84
Much less simple is the case of social policies and interventions on
population welfare ..:
Who are the stakeholders to privilegestakeholders to privilege and which role/weight should
they be given? Which (objective or subjective) wellbeing indicators should be
chosen? And which conflicting “interests”? (Friedman’s talk)
Which instruments should be adopted for the surveys? (expert evaluations?
interviews? groups? ......).
The decision and re-planning is not technical; it is politicalThe decision and re-planning is not technical; it is political!
And requires the right subjects and participation and
negotiation.

To play such a role however computer Social
Simulation must become stronger and much more
reliable.
Not biased by internal arbitrary parameters, that might
produce whatever result we want, guided by the values of a
given group of interest.
And perhaps we even will need a
“participatory” simulation (like in scientific
work) with different stakeholders providing
and comparing their results.
85
The SimulationSimulation Revolution

86
The computer modeling and simulation is a
possible revolution of the
"collective" cognitio"collective" cognitionn:
its “anticipatory” and “imagination” power
… or such anan unbelievable cognitive powerunbelievable cognitive power should
be only at disposal of the army, of the “big brother”,
or of the word corporations??

Concluding RemarksConcluding Remarks

??

Can We……?
Can we engineering and manage our society
(in part) preserving
 self-organizationself-organization and
 individuality and (semi-)autonomy of(semi-)autonomy of
peoplepeople?

the new synthesisnew synthesis

• Reconciling EmergenceEmergence and CognitionCognition
1) Cognition as a level of emergence:
- from objective to subjective
- from implicit to explicit
ex. dependence
2) Beyond cognition:
emergent unaware, functional social phenomena
(ex. cooperation, problem solving)
among cognitive agents
the new synthesisnew synthesis

Social and cultural phenomena cannot be deeply accounted for
without explaining how they work through the individual agents’
minds (mental “counterparts” or “mediators”).
This requires a richer cognitive model (architecture) for “Agents,”a richer cognitive model (architecture) for “Agents,”
moving from formal and computational AI and ALife models,
closer to those developed in psychology, cognitive science, and in
cognitive approaches in economics, sociology, organization studies.

WILLWILL THIS “COGNITIVE MEDIATED” VIEWTHIS “COGNITIVE MEDIATED” VIEW of socialof social
phenomena ad dynamics, and of Agent-based modelingphenomena ad dynamics, and of Agent-based modeling WIN??WIN??
Not so sure at all: short cut of statistics, big data,
correlations, probability, … Ex. of current robust trend
PREDICTING WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING, withoutPREDICTING WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING, without
modeling themodeling the “proximate causes”“proximate causes”.

“AlienationAlienation”:
We are dominated by our own ‘delegated’
(emergent) (social and intellectual) powers, we are
not aware of;
we do not realize and we do not decide/intend to
create such collective or such institutional powers
impinging on us.

Can We Overcome our AlienationAlienation?
Will the Leviathan become
a giant connected and informedconnected and informed
community of agentscommunity of agents,
managing their collective Power?
1. I’m skeptical about that (also for cognitive
reasons)
2. I also worry about possible net-Demagogy

Engineering a new SocietyEngineering a new Society?
Are we aware that we are in fact building,
engineering a new SOCIETY?
A society where we shape H-H, C-C (Ag-Ag), H-C
& C-H interactions and organizations,
with their mental and behavioral counterparts.

ENDEND
Thank you for your attention!
And sorry for my “English”

Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS

Similar to Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS

Editor's Notes