Case Study 3.1: White Collar Crime: The Gap Between Perpetrators and Victims When a prominent business leader ends up in prison, we often ask: “Why would a successful person with so much to lose risk it all by engaging in criminal activity?” Harvard professor Eugene Soltes sets out to answer this question in his book Why Do They Do It? In addition to reviewing what experts have to say on the subject, he interviews executives serving jail time for insider trading, manipulating interest rates, backdating stock options, falsifying financial statements, and stealing from investors. Soltes points out that while he analyzes the failures of prominent executives, we can learn from their example to avoid a similar fate. Soltes reports that two common explanations for white collar crime—personality weaknesses and judging that the benefits outweigh the costs—don’t explain the actions of his subjects. For the most part, the convicted executives didn’t have poor self-control or lack empathy. (One exception was Bernie Madoff, who seemed to lack feeling even for his own family.) And they didn’t carefully weigh the costs and benefits of their actions. Scott London, a KPMG senior partner who provided inside trading information to a friend, noted, “At the time this [securities fraud] was going on, I just never really thought about the consequences” (p. 99). London made little money from providing the information to his friend but had to pay a high cost. In addition to going to jail, he lost his CPA license and his job (which paid $650,000 to $900,000 a year) and had to resign from three charitable boards. Professor Soltes puts much of the blame for corporate crime on the disconnect between the action and the harm. In large companies, perpetrators are separated physically and psychologically from their victims. Their misbehavior is eased by the fact that they are distanced from the harm caused by their crimes. The CFO of ProQuest, for example, illegally boosted earnings, which cost shareholders $437 million when the scam was discovered. However, he didn’t think he did much damage because he carried out his crime on a computer and didn’t target a particular individual or group. In addition, perpetrators are often rewarded for misbehavior (get promoted or honored for making the numbers) before they are caught. According to Soltes: Each kind of corporate misconduct has facets that make it resonate less intuitively. With financial reporting fraud, the effects are not felt until long into the future and the victims are often applauding the perpetrator’s behavior until the deception is revealed. With insider trading, it’s difficult to identify precisely which investors are harmed. And with tax evasion, the reduction to government coffers make the harm to specific individuals so diffuse that it no longer feels salient to say it harmed any individual person. (pp. 128–129) Many of the disgraced executives didn’t consider the moral implications of their actions. They saw ...

1. Case Study 3.1: White Collar Crime: The Gap Between
Perpetrators and Victims
When a prominent business leader ends up in prison, we often
ask: “Why would a successful person with so much to lose risk
it all by engaging in criminal activity?” Harvard professor
Eugene Soltes sets out to answer this question in his book Why
Do They Do It? In addition to reviewing what experts have to
say on the subject, he interviews executives serving jail time for
insider trading, manipulating interest rates, backdating stock
options, falsifying financial statements, and stealing from
investors. Soltes points out that while he analyzes the failures
of prominent executives, we can learn from their example to
avoid a similar fate.
Soltes reports that two common explanations for white collar
crime—personality weaknesses and judging that the benefits
outweigh the costs—don’t explain the actions of his subjects.
For the most part, the convicted executives didn’t have poor
self-control or lack empathy. (One exception was Bernie
Madoff, who seemed to lack feeling even for his own family.)
And they didn’t carefully weigh the costs and benefits of their
actions. Scott London, a KPMG senior partner who provided
inside trading information to a friend, noted, “At the time this
[securities fraud] was going on, I just never really thought
about the consequences” (p. 99). London made little money
from providing the information to his friend but had to pay a
high cost. In addition to going to jail, he lost his CPA license
and his job (which paid $650,000 to $900,000 a year) and had to
resign from three charitable boards.
Professor Soltes puts much of the blame for corporate crime on
the disconnect between the action and the harm. In large
companies, perpetrators are separated physically and
psychologically from their victims. Their misbehavior is eased
by the fact that they are distanced from the harm caused by their
crimes. The CFO of ProQuest, for example, illegally boosted

2. earnings, which cost shareholders $437 million when the scam
was discovered. However, he didn’t think he did much damage
because he carried out his crime on a computer and didn’t target
a particular individual or group. In addition, perpetrators are
often rewarded for misbehavior (get promoted or honored for
making the numbers) before they are caught. According to
Soltes:
Each kind of corporate misconduct has facets that make it
resonate less intuitively. With financial reporting fraud, the
effects are not felt until long into the future and the victims are
often applauding the perpetrator’s behavior until the deception
is revealed. With insider trading, it’s difficult to identify
precisely which investors are harmed. And with tax evasion, the
reduction to government coffers make the harm to specific
individuals so diffuse that it no longer feels salient to say it
harmed any individual person. (pp. 128–129)
Many of the disgraced executives didn’t consider the moral
implications of their actions. They saw themselves as solving
immediate business problems under time pressures in order to
further their careers. They relied on their intuitions, which
lacked a moral component. No one then challenged their
choices. Executives at Symbol Technologies, for example, were
convicted of booking sales for equipment that wasn’t shipped in
order to continue to reach earning projections. Said one
executive engaged in the scheme: “We always came up with
solutions . . . Whatever it took, you did it and you got success
from it.” (p. 189)
Soltes concludes by offering suggestions to reduce corporate
misbehavior in ourselves and others. (Financial fraud costs the
United States nearly $400 billion a year.) He argues that we
need “uncomfortable dissonance” if we are to avoid falling
victim to faulty intuition. To engage in deliberate reasoning, we
need to hear more dissenting opinions when making choices,
something that his leaders failed to do. Along with dissonance
we need to be humble, to appreciate “our lack of invincibility—
our inherent weakness and frailty” (p. 329). Doing so will

3. encourage us to stop and reflect. However, moving toward
greater humility may not be easy. The former executives
interviewed by Soltes didn’t appear all that humbled by their
experiences. Instead, they believed that what they did wasn’t so
bad and that others were more at fault. According to Soltes:
“Virtually every one of the former executives I spoke with
pointed out, even complained, that it was not he who was the
true villain—it was always someone else” (p. 329).
Discussion Probes
1. What steps can organizations take to reduce the physical and
psychological distance between financial crimes and the harms
they cause?
2. What might be other reasons that executives commit white-
collar crimes?
3. How can we help ensure that moral considerations are
factored into important organizational decisions?
4. How open are you to “uncomfortable dissonance?” How can
you ensure that you will hear from those with different
opinions?
5. Why do so many disgraced executives excuse their behavior?
6. What are some strategies for recognizing our “inherent
weakness and frailty?”
A malware protection procedure guide
2

4. A malware protection procedure guide
A malware protection procedure guide
User access websites and download files from unknown sources
which could compromise user system such file or application
know as malware or malicious software. Which can Record
keystroke, leak personal information, get user credential or
credit card or bank detail of user, Malware can also use to
control user machines remotely.
Common Malware type is Virus, Trojan, Worm, spyware,
Backdoor, Rootkit. Every day new malware and viruses are
detected. Best practices for the defending system from malware
is an update and implement antivirus scanning and patching
regularly. On updating the antivirus program, we download new
definitions, then start looking for new viruses listed in the
definition.

5. a. List of approved anti-malware software
a. AVG Business Edition
b. Windows defender
c. Bitdefender Gravity Zone Advance Business security
Anti-Spyware
A. Total AV
B. Norton by Symantec
Antivirus software is running and identifying any malware
before it causes trouble. Symptoms of malware infection are
Slow response opening application, abnormal application
behavior, OS not functioning correctly, Numerous windows pop
up on the screen. We will use AVG, an antivirus program, to
identify malware or spyware on the system. Manual scan good
temporary measure but in real-time scan should perform regular
intervals that minimizes impact to users.
Ensuring anti-malware software and data is up to date. Always
ensure that the system running on the latest security patch helps
to protect the system form other security risks or virus attacks.
All workstations have an antivirus with updated virus
definition, detection, and repair engine. Schedule a daily fast
scan to check for viruses such as activity we can conduct during
non-peak hours, such as during lunch break. Also, we can
schedule a complete scan on Sunday when the system is
performing minimal activities. Always scan removable disk and
files downloaded from the internet before using it. Also, backup
all programs and data regularly. Recovery from clean backup is
the best way to restore files. We can also review logs to find
any anomalies.
If any system is get attacked with malware, the IT administrator
should disconnect those systems from the network to prevent
further damage from the attacker.IT admin wants to know about
the infection to stop it spreading or compromising our person
file. Use a deep scan option and check for any possible malware
infection. If we found any malware, remove it. If we did not
find anything and we still feel something is not right boot
system in safe mode. In safe mode, minimum required services

6. and programs will load and prevent any malware is set to
startup when OS starts and if PC working fast in safe mode
means possible malware infection. “Before starting anything,
delete temporary files to accelerate the malware scan, while
clearing downloaded virus files.” (Elsie Otachi,2019)
Reference
1. Otachi, E. (2019, September 17). What To Do If You Think
Your Computer Or Server Has Been Infected With Malware.
Retrieved from https://helpdeskgeek.com/help-desk/what-to-do-
if-you-think-your-computer-or-server-has-been-infected-with-
malware/
2. Solomon, M. (2011). Security strategies in windows
platforms and applications. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett
Learning.(Chapter 5)