1. THE VIEWS IN THIS BROCHURE ARE THE VIEWS OF THE AUTHOR AND DON’T BIND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE. CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: .OFPR MARIUS - EUGEN OPRAN / GR. I - RO
A STRATEGY FOR A STRONGER
AND MORE COMPETITIVE
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
- Position Document -
European Economic and Social Committee
MARIUS.OPRAN@EESC.EUROPA.EU

2. 2
POSITION DOCUMENT
ON :
A STRATEGY FOR A
STRONGER AND MORE COMPETITIVE
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
AUTHOR: P FOR . MARIUS – EUGEN OPRAN
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BUREAU/GROUP I - RO/REX&TEN
TABLE 1: R&D ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMMES DUPLICATION IN THE EU MEMBER STATES
TYPE OF DEVELOPED SYSTEM EUROPE USA
LAND SYSTEMS 23 5
MAIN BATTLE TANK 4 1
ARMOURED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE 16 3
155 MM HOWITZER 3 1
AIR SYSTEMS 37 18
JET FIGHTER / STRIKE / INTERCEPTOR 7 5
GROUND ATTACK / TRAINER 6 1
ATTACK HELICOPTER 7 5
ANTI-SHIP MISSILE 9 3
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE 8 4
NAVAL SYSTEMS 29 4
FRIGATE 11 1
ANTI-SUBMARINE TORPEDO 9 2
DIESEL SUBMARINE 7 0
NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE 2 1
T O T A L : 89 27
[1]
THE TOTAL R&T INVESTMENT IN THE THREE FIGHTER‐STRIKE OR COMBAT AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS THAT ARE IN COMPETITION INSI‐
DE EUROPE HAS BEEN 10.5 BN HIGHER ‐ 54.7% FOR 66% LESS PRODUCED OUTPUT AND AT THE SAME TIME – WHICH IS WORSE ‐ LESS
TECHNOLOGY OUTPUT, SINCE THE EUROFIGHTER, THE RAFALE AND THE GRIPEN ARE ALL EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT, BUT THEIR
TECHNOLOGIES ARE AGEING COMPARED TO THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US.

3. 3
1.1. EU Member States are currently
developing a number of national military
projects (89 for the main categories of
armaments, compared with only 27 major
projects by the US DoD / DARPA) (see also
Tables 1 & 2); these projects are often
motivated by regional economic needs rather
than solid commitment to either serious
military capability or economic efficiency. This
is leading to:
(1) EUROPEAN MARKET FRAGMENTATION;
(2) UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION;
(3) OFTEN POOR INTEROPERABILITY.
1. GENERAL INFORMATION
EU - US DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
– GENERAL (FY 2007)
Europe [2]
U S A [3]
Total Defence
Expenditure
€ 204 Bn € 454 Bn
Defence Expenditure
as % of GDP
1.69% 4.5%
Defence Expenditure
Per Capita
€ 417 € 1 504
TABLE 3: Comparison between EU and US
Defence expenditure / General ‐ FY 2007
(Source: EDA Press release / 11.12.2008)
Euro/USD exchange rate (average for 2007): 1.370
NOTE: The EU Member States Armed Forces
are currently using 11 different models of
Main Battle Tank, more than 20 different
Armoured Vehicle models, two types of Jet
Fighters produced in the same country ‐ one
of them under simultaneous production in all
four countries of origin of the joint
developers. We have 16 different Armoured
Vehicles models under development, and at
the same time – by contrast– the activities
regarding the development of a new 5th
Generation Jet Fighter (Fig. 1), Ground ‐ to ‐
Air Laser Weapons (Fig. 2 ‐ 4) or Reactive
Protection of the Army Combat Vehicles (Fig.
5 ‐ 6) are totally absent!
EU - US DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
– REFORM (FY 2007)
Europe U S A
Military Personnel [4]
1 836 882 1 379 551
Civil Personnel 457 392 696 101
Defence Spent per Soldier € 103602 € 329 201
Investment (Equipment
R&D + Procurement) per
Soldier
€ 22 795 € 111 604
1.2. A continuous decline of the European
Armed Forces, aggravated by reduced
capacity and readiness to deal with current
asymmetric conflicts, is eroding the Defence
Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB),
enabling foreign competitors to gain ground
on us almost every year. The situation is
further complicated by DEFENCE INFLATION
and LOW LEVELS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE,
particularly in the small and medium‐sized
MS, as well as some larger ones, which spend
less than 2% of their GDP on defence.
1.3. In the present circumstances, Europeans
are less and less able to contribute anything
of real substance to the transatlantic
partnership, thereby reducing the efficiency
of NATO and producing an environment that
is more conductive to American unilateralism.
In fact, the so ‐ called competition with the
US is an asymmetric one, because of the GAP
BETWEEN THE LEVELS OF THE BUDGETARY
ALLOCATIONS and the LACK OF RECIPROCITY
REGARDING MARKET ACCESS (see also Tables
3 & 4).
TABLE 4: Comparison between EU and US
Defence expenditure / Reform ‐ FY 2007
(Source: EDA Press release / 11.12.2008
www.eda.europa.eu/reference.aspx
(2)
EUROPE MEANS THE 26 EDA PARTICIPATING MEMBER STATES (DENMARK IS NOT AN EDA MEMBER).
(3)
THE EURO/US DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE IS BASED ON AN AVERAGE RATE FOR 2007 OF USD 1.370 TO THE EURO.
(4)
AUTHORISED STRENGTH OF ALL ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL; INCLUDES NON‐MOD/DOD PERSONNEL IN UNIFORM
WHO CAN OPERATE UNDER MILITARY COMMAND AND CAN BE DEPLOYED OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY.

4. 4
2. MILITARY & POLITICAL ASPECTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SECTOR
2.1. The basis of the current critical situation
goes back a long way, starting during the Gulf
War in 1991, resurfacing after the subsequent
Bosnian and Kosovo wars and culminating in
the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan,
where many EUROPEAN SOLDIERS HAVE
FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO MOUNT JOINT
OPERATIONS WITH AMERICAN TROOPS ‐ OR
EVEN WITH CONTINGENTS FROM OTHER EU
COUNTRIES.
2.2. Faced with the ongoing rise of China,
India and Russia, and a myriad of regional
powers such as Brazil and Iran, the need for a
strong and militarily capable European Union
has never been greater, owing to the fact that
the power of the individual Member States –
even UK and France ‐ is in a steady, albeit
relative, decline. In addition, EUROPE'S
INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN
REDUCED, due to the growing Asian‐Pacific
orientation of the US, and the widening
power gap between the two sides of Atlantic;
2.3. The drive to enhance Europe's
military capabilities was partly
responsible for the St. Malo
Agreement between the UK and
France in 1998, the aim of which was
to provide for A GREATER LEVEL OF
EUROPEAN MILITARY COOPERATION WITH
NATO. The conditions may now be right for
the UK and France to take
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INTEGRATION
onto a new plane, opening the door
for all MS to fulfil the requirements
imposed on the EU Defence Forces
members.
2.4. During its term of office the
French EU Presidency already pushed
forward the ESDP, first of all by
redrafting the 2003 document which
is still in force. Also, the proficient
President of the EP Sub‐Commission for
Defence and Security, Karl von Wogau, MEP,
recently finalised its own ESDP version.
2.5. Referring to Community Military
Capabilities, during the informal
meeting of EU Defence Ministers in
Deauville on 1
October 2008, the EU
High Representative for the
Common Foreign & Security Policy, Mr.
Javier Solana remarks that : “The EU needs
decisions of the MS if we want to reduce the
actual gaps efficiently. This target can be
reached only by taking decisions in
knowledge of reason by the MS on concrete
projects. Need to bolster Europe's military
capabilities to match our aspirations is more
urgent than ever. And so, too, is the need for
us to respond better to challenges facing our
defence industries. EDA can make a huge
difference”. Interesting proposals have been
already made by MS during last months,
with EDA ACTIVE SUPPORT, mainly on
SPACE, HELICOPTERS, STRATEGIC
T R A N S P O R T A T I O N , A I R ‐ T O ‐ S E A
COOPERATION, SEA MINE CLEARANCE,
MILITARY AND NAVAL OBSERVATION.
2.6. In his speech at the High‐Level Seminar
on relations between the Eu‐
ropean Union and NATO (Paris, 7
July 2008), the NATO Secretary
General JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER
mentioned that many EU mem‐
bers accept the need for A CLOSER
EU ‐ NATO RELATIONSHIP and the
fact that from a transatlantic perspective, a
strong ESDP is more and more necessary.
During his intervention, the NATO Secretary
General launched the proposal for A
CONCRETE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
TWO INSTITUTIONS ‐ A JOINT STRATEGIC
AIRLIFT PROJECT «A400M& C17».
2.7. Some politicians have already expressed
their support for the solution that
the way forward is for we
Europeans to band together in
the European Union, which
should then BECOME A MEMBER
OF NATO IN ITS OWN RIGHT,
replacing the current twenty ‐ old EU
Members of NATO.
2.8. Granting status of "ASSOCIATE
MEMBERS" to Norway (see[6]
) and maybe to
Switzerland (in the near future) with EDEM
& EDTIB STRUCTURES can represent the
correct political option in order to strength
and to increase the competitiveness of
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY.

5. 5
3. CONCLUSIONS (I)
technology developments which might lead
to Dual ‐ Use (DU) applications, mutually
increasing knowledge of and innovation in
civil and military technologies;
3.3. MORE AND BETTER JOBS: The
development of NEW DEFENCE
TECHNOLOGIES, especially the increasing
complexity of defence systems, will require
EXCELLENT TECHNOLOGICAL SKILLS and A
WELL ‐ TRAINED WORKFORCE. A EUROPEAN
DEFENCE INDUSTRY able to respond to all
future military needs will require an
ambitious policy of Human Resources
Management based on the principles of the
proper management of jobs and skills,
including major investments in Continuous
Vocational Training for its own personnel.
3.4. PUBLIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENT (PDP)
activities should be carried out in accordance
with a COMMON SET OF RULES, accepted by
all Member States in order to achieve a better
utilisation of allocated funds and strengthen
the DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BASE (DTIB) – by, inter alia:
 Defining a EUROPEAN COMMON MODEL
for PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE FIELD OF
DEFENCE AND SECURITY, accepted by all MS;
 Introducing & increasing the role of
SECURITY OF INFORMATION (SOI) and
SECURITY OF SUPLY (SOS) ‐ as SELECTION
CRITERIA proportionate to the sensitivity and
scale of the DEFENCE AND SECURITY PUBLIC
CONTRACTS under awarding procedures – in
order to reach a higher level of transparency.
3.5. The process of DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BASE (DTIB) reinforcement
can also be supported by setting up:
 An increased awareness of the importance
of MONITORING NON ‐ EU INVESTMENTS IN
THE EU DEFENCE INDUSTRY, in order to avoid
illegal access to the latest technologies
developed by the EU Defence companies.
 A harmonisation effort in the EU Defence
Business sector in order to tackle the
problems arising from the CO‐EXISTENCE of
PUBLIC & PRIVATE COMPANIES in a sector
with a CLEAR POLITICAL & STRATEGIC
PROFILE.
3.1.RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LISBON STRATEGY
represents the actual major task conditioning
the SURVIVABILITY & GLOBAL FUTURE OF THE
EU DEFENCE INDUSTRY. This requires ‐ inter
alia:
 In order to provide for the necessary
capabilities supporting the EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP), the
Union needs a strong and dynamic
EUROPEAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT MARKET
(EDEM), in accordance with the full set of
specific requirements unique for this domain:
 Strict and coherent RULES FRAMING THE
PRODUCTION AND THE SALES – this sensitive
matter being entirely subject to the decision
of the MS, and outside the scope of the
Community competence (referring first to the
Third ‐ Countries Export Operations).
 Methods that take account of the SECRET
NATURE OF SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES, which
imposes severe constraints as regards access
to technical information.
 A level of TECHNOLOGICAL EXCELLENCE for
products requested by military users, so that
they can successfully carry out their missions.
3.2. The future industrial policy for the EU
DEFENCE INDUSTRY should also be fully in
line with the following aspects emphasised by
the LISBON STRATEGY FOR GROWTH AND
JOBS:
 Sustaining the INTERNAL MARKET by
IMPROVING EU & NATIONAL REGULATIONS;
 Encourage KNOWLEDGE and INNOVATION
by promoting MORE INVESTMENT IN R&D :
 In line with the Lisbon goal, the DEFENCE
INDUSTRY SHOULD INCREASE RESEARCH
INVESTMENT with the aim of approaching 3%
OF TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (TDE) ;
 EU Member States could increase the
EFFICIENCY OF RESEARCH spending through
more co‐operative research activities, by
more efficient co‐operation – WORKING
WITH THE COMMISSION AND THE EDA, and
INCREASING THEIR R&D SPENDING towards
the Lisbon goals;
 Furthermore, SYNERGIES between Civil and
Military Research could still be better
exploited and actively looked for
(5)
WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES SPENDS 3.3% OF TDE ON DEFENCE R&T, THE EU MS TOGETHER SPEND ONLY 1.1%.

6. 6
3. CONCLUSIONS (II)
(6)
ON 26 MAY 2008, THE EU DEFENCE MINISTERS AGREED TO ALLOW NON‐EU MEMBER NORWAY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REGIME
ON DEFENCE PROCUREMENT, UNDER WHICH GOVERNMENTS AND INDUSTRY VOLUNTARILY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO MORE
OPEN CROSS‐BORDER COMPETITION FOR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT CONTRACTS. NORWAY, ALTHOUGH NOT A MEMBER OF THE
EU, PARTICIPATES IN ITS EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) IN MANY WAYS, CONTRIBUTING TROOPS TO ESDP
OPERATIONS AND FORMING PART OF THE EU NORDIC BATTLE GROUP.
ALTHOUGH THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IS "YES",
SECTOR STILL FACES A LARGE NUMBER OF CONSTRAINTS:
 The European Market remains fragmented, with each MS trying to
preserve its status of "CONTRACTING AUTHORITY" and "PROTECTOR" of
its own National Defence Industry;
 The EU does not compete on a level playing field with the US in the area
of Defence Industry due to the LACK OF COORDINATION and to the LOW
FUNDS ALLOCATION at the level of MS.
3.6. Any industrial policy for the
defence sector should emphasise the
need for Member States and industry
to better coordinate national
programmes, work together more and
ensure that all capabilities needed for
ESDP IMPLEMENTATION are available.
Such EU COOPERATION, which would
also include Norway(6)
too, would
ensure the best use of available
resources and the identification of new
technologies and products.
3.7. In order to facilitate the under‐
taking of R&D joint programmes, the
MS and the EDA should bridge the
current gap existing between various
national R&D policies of the MS by
SETTING UP A NEW « LIST OF EURO ‐
ARMAMENTS PROJECTS» to be
developed with an emphasis on joint
R&D programmes considered to be of
general common interest for the
Community's members. Of course, EDA
should start working on this issue only
after being officially mandated by its
Steering Board in Ministerial Format.
3.8. Subject to the unanimous approval
of the new "EURO‐ARMAMENTS LIST"
by the assembly of the MS, it will be
the role of the EDA to define the technical
and tactical requirements for the FUTURE
GENERATION OF EURO‐ARMAMENTS to be
designed & manufactured under the brand
"MADE IN EU" – with the support of a team of
27 INDEPENDENT EXPERTS – one from each
MS, minus Denmark, plus Norway.
3.9. To have a successful "EU MILITARY R&D
PROGRAMME", international RULES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS have to be
established, that also satisfy those parties that
generate such information, in particular
industry.
3.10. The EDA R&D BUDGET SHOULD BE
INCREASED AS APPROPRIATE by decision of
European Defence Agency – Steering Board in
Ministerial Format (EDA‐SBMF), in order to
fully support the approved thematic plan.
 Often POOR INTEROPERABILITY between
different national contingents, members of
the EUROPEAN JOINT TASK FORCE (or similar);
 At the same time, improving at the level of
all Member States:
 DEFENCE Capabilities;
 ARMAMENT Manufacturing Capacities;
 HUMAN RESOURCES through continuous
professional training and permanent
improvement of their working conditions.
IS THE EU'S DEFENCE INDUSTRY STILL COMPETITIVE??

7. 7
4.2. PROPOSAL 2: In this respect, the
Commission and the EDA mandated by
SBMF should define in the next period a
NEW EU JOINT R&D DEFENCE
PROGRAMME: "EURO‐DEFENDING OUR
FUTURE”, approved by the highest ‐ level
EU political organs: the Council, the
Commission, the HR‐CFSP and by the EDA
‐ SBMF.
 To identify CHALLENGES & to define COM‐
MON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES;
 To establish the investment needs in order
to reach all the planned TARGETS AT
NATIONAL AND EU (EDA) LEVEL for R&D,
production and training activities – in order
to upgrade the COMBAT LEVEL OF OUR
ARMED FORCES;
 To issue the full sets of regulations and
concrete actions accepted by all MS for an
EFFICIENT COOPERATION, including joint
common facilities for repairing and
maintenance in the battlefield conditions.
4. PROPOSALS (I)
4.1. PROPOSAL 1: According with their
competencies, the Commission and the
EDA ‐ SBMF should promote A NEW FULL
SET OF POLITICAL, FINANCIAL &
ECONOMIC MEASURES ENHANCING EU
DEFENCE CAPABILITIES in order to
eliminate the distressing factors
discontinuing its healthy growth –
mainly:
4.4. PROPOSAL 4: The 2009 CZECH &
SWEDISH EU PRESIDENCIES SHOULD
EMPOWER THE COUNCIL represented by
the EDA & the COMMISSION to prepare A
NEW STRATEGIC DOCUMENT making
public their official position regarding the
concept on “EU COMMON POLICY ON
EURO‐ARMAMENTS”, including:
4.5. PROPOSAL 5: The EDA Steering
Committee in Ministerial Format should
establish & approve the proper level of the
OBLIGATORY ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION OF
THE MS – as a percentage of the National
Defence R&D Budget allocation ‐ to the EDA
COMMON FUND FOR THE R&D ACTIVITIES 8
.
4.6. In the event of the APPROVAL OF THE
EURO‐ARMAMENTS CONCEPT by the EDA ‐
SBMF, it will be the task of the Agency to
evaluate as a possible ROUTE MAP FOR THE
E U R O ‐ A R M A M E N T S R & D A N D
MANUFACTURING PROGRAMME the
attached PROPOSED FLOWCHART (Tables 5A
and 5B ‐ Concept and Stages Postulation).
 MARKET FRAGMENTATION between
different European producers of the same
categories of Armaments;
 UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION of R&D
activities within the EU Member States;
 Often POOR INTEROPERABILITY
between different national contingents,
members of the European Joint Task Force
(or similar);
 At the same time, IMPROVING AT THE
LEVEL OF ALL MEMBER STATES:
 DEFENCE Capabilities;
 ARMAMENT Manufacturing Capacities 7
HUMAN RESOURCES continuous
learning & better working conditions .
4.7. According to the global trends, the future
common law package to be set by the EDA
and the Commission and approved by the
European Parliament and the Council should
be OPEN ENOUGH TO ADAPT TO FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS and allow for consultation
with the main players from outside the
European Community, mainly with NATO.
4.3. PROPOSAL 3: The main task of the
new Programme should be to set up the
LIST OF MILITARY PRODUCTS considered
by all the MS as representing the highest
priorities – "THE EURO ‐ ARMAMENTS
LIST". The main task of the programme
will be to establish the minimal require‐
ments in the fields of standardisation and
inter ‐ operability.
(7)
THE EUROPEAN NATIONS – WITH ALMOST 2 MILLION MEN AND WOMEN UNDER ARMS – WERE ABLE TO DEPLOY ONLY AROUND 100 THOUSAND
AT ANY ONE TIME. THE MS HAVE AROUND 1 200 TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, YET ONLY ABOUT 35 ARE DEPLOYED IN AFGHANISTAN.
(8)
THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE OF THE MS ALREADY APPROVED IN 2007, AS A SHORT‐TERM OBJECTIVE, AN ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION OF EACH COUN‐
TRY REPRESENTING 20% OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE R&D ALLOCATED BUDGET, THE FINANCIAL ESTIMATION BEING CLOSE TO EUR 500M.

8. 8
6. EDA: selecting priorities
for Euro ‐ Armaments
development according
with the existing budget
5. IEG: modifying initial
TOR in accordance with
the amendments received
from the Member States
7. EDA: establishing the
optional share of national
financial contributions for
each Euro ‐ Armaments
project in accordance with
MS expressions of interest
1.EDA: using EDA CAPTECH
database, selecting &
appointing IEG ‐ the EDA
Independent Experts Group of
27 people (27 EU MS –
Denmark + Norway) – one
expert from each country
2. IEG: setting up the list of
armaments included in the
category of "Euro‐Armaments"
to be developed jointly and to
become operational within all
EU MS Armed Forces; defining
the Technical and Operational
Requirements (TOR)
3. EDA: sending the proposed
list of Euro‐Armaments and
the TOR to the military joint
staffs of all MS for evaluation
and comments
4. EDA: receiving comments
and firm orders from each
Member States, including
their participation interest
for a specific Euro‐Armament
project, preparing the future
standard contract, including
price and delivery terms
estimation on the new Euro
‐Armaments categories
8. IEG: Preparing
Tender Documents
STEP 9
TABLE 5A: ROAD MAP FOR THE EURO-ARMAMENTS R&D AND MANUFACTURING PROGRAMME
(CONCEPT AND STAGE POSTULATION – I)
4. PROPOSALS (II)

9. 9
13. EDA: as proprietor of
the intellectual rights of
project & demonstrator,
EDA should proceed to
the selection of system
manufacturer/integrator
by a tender procedure
12. IEG:
Preparing
Tender
Documents
14. IEG: technical and
operational evaluation
of bids in order to
nominate the general
integrator for mass
production of each
Euro‐Armament type
9. EDA: launching the tender
procedure to select the inte‐
grator – company / JV ‐ in
charge of drawing up techni‐
cal documentation & devel‐
oping demonstrators for
each Euro‐armament project
10. IEG: technical
and operational
evaluation of the
bidding offers
11. IEG: demonstrator
field test & evaluation,
before taking any final
decision on starting
industrial production
to meet firm orders by
Member States
TABLE 5B: ROAD MAP FOR THE EURO-ARMAMENTS R&D AND MANUFACTURING PROGRAMME
(CONCEPT AND STAGE POSTULATION – II)
4. PROPOSALS (III)

10. 10
4. PROPOSALS (IV)
4.7. PROPOSAL 5: The Council and the
Committee should set up during 2009 a
special EU INTER‐AGENCY COMMITTEE FOR
THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IN THE AREA OF EUROPEAN AEROSPACE
AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY – a EU adapted
version of CFIUS (9)
. Its task will be TO
REVIEW THE COMMUNITY SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS
OF EU COMPANIES OR OPERATIONS.
4.8. PROPOSAL 6: Considering the
ORGANISATION FOR JOINT ARMAMENTS
CO‐OPERATION (OCCAR) created by France,
Germany, Italy and the UK as a precursor of
a real common Armaments Agency /
Programme Management Agency, the
Committee recommends to the Council to
start consultations with all Member States
regarding their position on a possible
OFFICIAL FUSION / JOINT COOPERATION
TEAM BETWEEN OCCAR AND THE EDA as
foreseen in the joint action that created it.
This would allow the start of new
programmes targeting the development of
A NEW GENERATION OF MAJOR EUROPEAN
ARMAMENT SYSTEMS TO BE COMMONLY
USED BY ALL ARMED FORCES AND THE
SECURITY FORCES OF THE EU MS. The
author is drawing up this proposal in good
faith and trust, respecting that finally the
implementation of this proposal is purely a
national responsibility.
4.9. Regarding the position expressed by some
international politicians supporting the EU
becoming a member of NATO in its own right
and replacing the current twenty‐odd European
Members of NATO ‐ because:
 Given the aggregated size of the Union, the
Europeans will be able to express themselves
as an Equal to Washington in NATO;
 Of course, this requires many POLITICAL
SOLUTIONS, not least a decision by the so‐called
“Neutral Member States” like Austria and
Ireland to take a firm position, we
considers that this solution will also necessitate
considerable institutional changes in Brussels
and a certain transfer of powers between
Member State Capitals and the EU Capital …
 … but can be considered as a goal the New
Generation of Young Politicians and Military
Experts can work towards!
For all these aspects, we believes that THIS
OPTION IS NOT OF INTEREST FOR THE
MOMENT!
4.10. PROPOSAL 7: The Commission and
EDA should set up a concrete ACTION
PLAN IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE
EUROPEAN ABILITY TO RESPOND TO A
CRISIS in a more comprehensive way –
taking into account that:
4.11. Finally, a highly appreciation should be
granted to the OFFICIAL PUBLIC POSITION OF
THE COUNCIL OF THE COUNCIL of 30 May
2008 on actual and future problems of the
EU DEI ‐ promoting a number of major
concepts:
PROPOSAL 8: THE COUNCIL DOCUMENT
TO BE FULLY INCLUDED WITHIN THE
STRATEGY SET UP BY THE COMMISSION, as
a hub/focal point of the key guidelines:
SECURITY WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT will
soon alienate the Local Population
– based
on Military Intelligence Field Data;
 In the same time, DEVELOPMENT
WITHOUT SECURITY is impossible – Axiom
based on Contemporary Practice;
 LOGICAL CONCLUSION: THEY ARE
INTERDEPENDENT, like the two sides of the
same coin.
Practical case: DEPLOYING MILITARY FORCES
ON PEACE ‐ KEEPING DUTIES WITH CIVILIAN
CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERTS AS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF OPERATION.
Improving the competitiveness of the EDI
by ensuring a dynamic and strong EDTIB;
Promoting and supporting the fair
competition for EDI goods without
prejudice to Article 296 of the Treaty;
Emphasising the importance of the
European Code of Conduct for Arms
E x p o r t s t o T h i r d C o u n t r i e s .

11. 11
Advanced fly ‐ by ‐
wire controls
New high ‐ power
16 T‐thrust engines
Thrust ‐ vectoring
Nozzles
Super cruise ability
Advanced radars
and sensors
In‐flight refueling
Capability
Large combat
radius
High endurance
ROLE : Stealth Air Superiority
Fighter
ORIGIN : United States
MANUFACTURER : Lockheed
Martin Aeronautics
Boeing Defense Systems
DEVELOPED: FROM LOCKHEED MARTIN X‐35
RECEIVED ORDERS: 3’198 UNITS FROM 10
COUNTRIES
JOINT TEAM COUNTRIES: US (LM, GE), UK
(BAE, RR), ITALY, NETHERLANDS, TURKEY,
AUSTRALIA, NORWAY, DENMARK, CANADA,
ISRAEL, SINGAPORE
UNIT COST: US$ 49.5M (F‐35A) / 69.3M (F
‐35B) / 64.5M (F‐35C)
ROLE : STEALTH MULTI‐ROLE FIGHTER
FIRST FLIGHT : 15 DECEMBER 2006
5. WEAPONS - NEW TRENDS (I)
Fig. 1: WORLD JET FIGHTERS ‐ 5th
GENERATION

12. 12
MTHEL uses directed energy (laser beam) to
intercept aerial targets such as rockets,
missiles, artillery shells and other aerial
threats. The target destruction is achieved
by projecting a highly focused, high‐power
laser beam, delivered by a chemical laser,
with enough energy to affect the target,
and explode it in midair. This operational
concept is offering the first "reusable"
interception element. Existing interceptors
use kinetic energy kill vehicles (such as
fragmentation warheads), which are not
reusable.
MTHEL represents a transformational
weapon system ‐ the first mobile directed
energy weapon that will be able to destroy
tactical airborne threats in midair. In order
to achieve a high rate of fire, designers are
looking into the use of high energy
Fig. 2: EXTERNAL VIEW OF MTHEL 9
chemicals used to fuel the laser, is
expected to be in the thousands of dollars ‐
far less expensive than the cost of kinetic
energy defence systems.
MTHEL is a development of the mobile
version of the Tactical High Energy Laser
(THEL) test‐bed weapon, under a US Army
contract. Since the year 2000, during field
test phase THEL has intercepted five
artillery projectiles and 28 rocket targets,
including the short range 122mm Katyusha ‐
type rockets fired singly and in salvos and
larger, long‐range 160mm rockets which
have twice the range of the standard
Katyusha. Most recently, the system
intercepted and destroyed mortar bombs,
fired both singly and in salvos. During the
most recent test, THEL destroyed a large
calibre rocket target, containing a live
warhead, which was intercepted by the
laser weapon.
The purpose of the MTHEL programme is to
develop and test the first mobile Directed
Energy weapon system detecting, tracking,
engaging and defeating Rockets/Artillery/
Mortars (RAM), cruise missiles, short‐range
ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles. MTHEL would have been the first
tactical and mobile, directed‐energy
weapon capable of shooting down in flight
airborne targets such as rockets, cruise
missiles and other weapons, protecting
expeditionary forces or deployed forces as
well as civilians areas targeted by such
threats. The alternative "relocated" system
will be optimised to protect critical and
5. WEAPONS - NEW TRENDS (II)
9
Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NfVJ622_hS0

13. 13
sensitive military sites at forward area
deployments. It could also provide limited
area protection for population centres
threatened from attack by RAM.
 The developer is proposing a derivative
of its high power chemical laser system to
be used as a ground‐based interceptor of
man‐portable anti‐aircraft missiles which
could be used by terrorists trying to hit pas‐
senger aircraft. The new system ‐ Skyguard
‐ will use the high‐energy Deuterium Fluo‐
ride chemical laser known as THEL, de‐
signed to protect against rocket, artillery
and mortar (RAM) threats. Benefiting from
significant technological advancements,
Skyguard has higher power than heritage
systems and a larger beam, making it a
more capable system.
 In fact, the researchers foresee the
system evolving into a "Laser‐based Air
Defence System” for U.S. Government
Agencies and Allies that require near‐term
defence against short‐range ballistic
missiles, short‐ and long‐range rockets,
artillery shells, mortars, UAVs and cruise
missiles". The company expects a single
Skyguard system will be able to defend
deployed forces, a large military
installation and/or a large civilian
population or industrial area. One Skyguard
system generates a protective shield of a 10
Km diameter.
 According to an Aviation Week report10
,
Skyguard could protect aircraft from man ‐
portable air defence system (MANPADS)
shoulder ‐ fired rockets out to a range of
roughly 20 km, while against harder RAM
targets, the effective range is 5 km.
Weather can degrade the system but not
nullify it. According to the same journal,
the cost could drop to US$ 25 … 30M a
piece, if the system is ordered in sufficient
quantities. Each shot costs about US$
1’000, the cost of chemicals.
 One concern raised about chemical lasers
was the toxic gases released during
operations. According to the developer, the
system's exhaust is not toxic, but mostly
helium and steam. Therefore, the system
requires a "keep out zone" of 30 metres,
smaller than conventional rocket systems
such as Stinger and Patriot. If users
want a system totally safe, a scrubber can
be added.
Fig.3: POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES OF THE SKY‐
GUARD TO DEFEAT TYPICAL MISSILE THREATS
TO PASSENGER AIRCRAFTS WITHIN THE
AIRPORT ZONES
Fig.4: THE CONCEPT OF AIR TRAFFIC SECURITY
USING LAND‐BASED, COUNTER ‐ MANPADS
SKYGUARD LASER SYSTEM
5. WEAPONS - NEW TRENDS (III)
 During an 18 month programme, the US
Dept. of Homeland Security have currently
under evaluation the capabilities of the
system to defeat typical missile threats to
passenger carriers. A formal Technology ‐
Readiness Level (TRL) assessment will be
made of ground‐based, non ‐ DIRCM
(Directional Infrared Counter‐Measures)
technologies using their potential appli‐
cation in the civil aviation environment.
10
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/

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considers an enhanced countermeasure unit
to be available in the future, and protect
against Kinetic Energy (KE) threats. Trophy
was designed to effectively operate in a dense
urban environment, where armoured vehicles
operate closely with integrated infantry
forces. Therefore, direction, formation and
energy of the fragments are designed to en‐
sure effective target kill with low collateral
damage, and low risk to nearby troops. While
not in use, the system is maintained in the
stowed position, protected by an armour
shield. The system has an automatic reload
mechanism to handle multiple attacks.
 The system can simultaneously engage
several threats, arriving from different
directions, is effective on stationary or moving
platforms, and is effective against short &
long range threats (such as RPGs and ATGM).
Trophy was designed to be effective in open/
closed terrain, including urban areas, operat‐
ing under all weather conditions.
 In September 2006, the US Army opted to
pursue a different system. Earlier in 2006, an
US company received a development contract
to demonstrate and develop the Quick Kill
APS, to be integrated into the future FCS
systems. The US decision was related to the
fact that the “Trophy” system right now has
no reloading capability. Once it fires, that side
of the vehicle is vulnerable. This brings up
another shortcoming: the Trophy can only be
mounted to protect one axis. This means
officials would have to mount multiple missile
systems on every vehicle. Both problems were
solved recently by the manufacturer. The
Quick Kill missile has a 360‐degree capability
and a reload capability.
 The Active Protection System creates a
hemispheric protected zone around the
vehicle where incoming threats are
intercepted and defeated. It has three
elements providing – Threat Detection and
Tracking, Launching and Intercept functions.
The Threat Detection and Warning subsystem
consists of several sensors, including flat‐
panel radars, placed at strategic locations
around the protected vehicle, to provide full
hemispherical coverage. Once an incoming
threat is detected, identified and verified, the
Countermeasure Assembly is opened, the
countermeasure device is positioned in the
direction where it can effectively intercept
the threat. Then, it is launched automatically
into a ballistic trajectory to intercept the
incoming threat at a relatively long distance.
 Specific details about the composition and
mechanism of this explosive interceptor
device are vague. From the briefing provided
by US sources, Defence Update understands
that Trophy is design to form a "beam" of
fragments, which will intercept any incoming
HEAT threat, including RPG rockets at a range
Fig. 6: A LAND FORCES 8X8 ARMOURED VE‐
HICLE EQUIPPED WITH “TROPHY” REACTIVE
PROTECTION SYSTEM.
Fig. 5: THE ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM IN
ACTION DURING THE OPERATIONAL TESTS IN
A DESERT POLYGON. (COURTESY: US ARMY)
5. WEAPONS - NEW TRENDS (IV)
However, an NBC report aired on 7 May 2007
claims that, in contrast to US Army officials,
Trophy was found to be “in an advanced state
of development” (with a TRL of 7 … 8), while
the new model Quick Kill was judged a 3 for
threshold capabilities (RPGs, ATGMs).

15. 15
6. A B B R E V I A T I O N S
No. ABBREVIATION E X T E N D E D
1. CDP CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN (of ESDP)
2. CFIUS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
3. DARPA US DEFENCE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
4. DIRCM DIRECTIONAL INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
5. DoD US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
6. DU DUAL ‐ USE
7. EDA EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY
8. EDA ‐ SBMF EDA STEERING BOARD IN MINISTERIAL FORMAT
9. EDEM EUROPEAN UNION DEFENCE AND EQUIPMENT MARKET
10. EDI EUROPEAN UNION DEFENCE INDUSTRY
11. EDTIB
EUROPEAN UNION DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BASE
12. ESDP EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
13. HR ‐ CFSP
EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECU‐
RITY POLICY
14. IEG INDEPENDENT EXPERTS GROUP (of EDA)
15. KE KINETIC ENERGY
16. LTV LONG ‐ TERM VISION (of EDA)
17. MANPADS MAN ‐ PORTABLE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM
18. MS MEMBER STATES
19. MTHEL MOBILE TACTICAL HIGH ‐ ENERGY LASER
20. PDP PUBLIC DEFENCE PROCUREMENTS
21. RAM ROCKETS / ARTILLERY / MORTAR
22. R & D RSEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
23. R & T RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
24. SoI SECURITY OF INFORMATION
25. SoS SECURITY OF SUPLY
26. TDE TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
27. TOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
28. TRL TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL
29. UAV UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

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