SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 7
Download to read offline
Credit FAQ:
How Will The Recent Presidential
Election Affect Standard & Poor's
Ratings On Argentina?
Primary Credit Analyst:
Daniela D Brandazza, Mexico City (52) 55-5081-4441; daniela.brandazza@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contacts:
Julia L Smith, Buenos Aires (54) 114-891- 2186; julia.smith@standardandpoors.com
Joydeep Mukherji, New York (1) 212-438-7351; joydeep.mukherji@standardandpoors.com
Table Of Contents
Frequently Asked Questions
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 1
1486694 | 302429798
Credit FAQ:
How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect
Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
The opposition leader Mauricio Macri won the Argentine presidential elections on Nov. 22, 2015. Macri won in the
second round of the national elections, with just over 51% of the vote against his opponent Daniel Scioli. Voter turnout
was a high 81%. Below, Standard & Poor's addresses some frequently asked questions about the creditworthiness of
Argentina and its local and regional governments (LRGs) in light of this recent development.
Frequently Asked Questions
What are Standard & Poor's current ratings on the Republic of Argentina based on?
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' unsolicited foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Argentina
are 'SD/SD' (selective default), and the unsolicited local currency sovereign credit ratings are 'CCC+/C'. The outlook
on the long-term local currency rating is negative. Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment on the sovereign is
'CCC-', and our national scale rating is 'raB+' with a negative outlook.
Our selective default foreign currency ratings on Argentina stem from its nonpayment of part of its external debt. On
July 30, 2014, Argentina failed to make a $539 million interest payment on its discount bonds due in December 2033.
Since then, Argentina has not been able to service any of its external bonds under foreign law, which has limited the
sovereign's access to the international bond market.
Argentina previously defaulted on its debt in November 2001. Subsequently, after a debt exchange in 2005, we
assigned a new rating of 'B-' in June of that year.
When will Standard & Poor's change the 'SD' rating on the Republic of Argentina, and what rating will
the sovereign receive?
The recent election has no effect on our ratings. The foreign currency ratings will remain at 'SD' until Argentina cures
the default, through payment, exchange, or other settlement. If and when that happens, we will reassess the
sovereign's general credit standing, most likely raising the foreign currency rating to the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories.
We would reassess the economic conditions of the country while analyzing the details of any agreement with holdout
creditors in a broader political and economic context under a new government.
What economic issues will the new president face in his first few months in office?
When Macri assumes the presidency on Dec. 10, 2015, he will have to cope with very low foreign-exchange reserves
in the central bank. Gross reserves were only around US$26 billion as of Nov. 12, 2015, and could fall to around US$24
billion in December. However, we estimate that net reserves are likely to be negative in December, considering the
reserve requirements, a currency swap with the People's Bank of China, as well as unpaid imports and unpaid
corporation dividends.
The new administration will have to manage changes to Argentina's current set of foreign-exchange controls in order
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 2
1486694 | 302429798
to avoid a possible disorganized devaluation of the currency that could have negative economic and political effects.
The success of the government's economic policies, as well as its credibility, will depend on the timing and the nature
of changes to foreign-exchange restrictions. It is clear that any structural solution to the issue of the depleting level of
international reserves and foreign exchange restrictions will have to be tied to the negotiations with the holdout
creditors.
The government also faces fiscal difficulties. We expect the general government deficit to exceed 4.5% of GDP in
2015. Also, the government is currently partially funding its fiscal deficit through lending from the central bank, which
in turn weakens monetary policy. The administration will face salary negotiations with employees at the federal and
provincial level at the beginning of 2016 in a context of high inflation, and it is likely to get requests for financial
support from provincial governments. This salary negotiation will be the initial challenge to test the new government's
deal-making skills against the highly organized unions and social movements, which strongly supported the departing
administration. The new administration will need to have very sophisticated negotiation skills in order to implement its
economic policy agenda.
We believe that Macri's government may move slower than some observers anticipate because of the complexity of
the economic issues, the political challenge of managing a Congress when the government lacks a majority, and the
administration's own desire to avoid unexpected volatility. Macri won the popular vote in only nine out of Argentina's
24 provinces but did well in the country's large urban centers. Macri may face difficulty balancing, on the one hand,
moving fast enough with reforms to satisfy his supporters and, on the other hand, avoiding alienating the nearly 49% of
the voters who did not support him.
Finally, the main macroeconomic challenge for the new administration will be how to decrease inflation to a single
digit. We also expect the government to take a gradualist approach in this regard. As long as inflation remains high, it
will continue to cause imbalances in the external sector of the economy, as well as cause the real exchange rate to
appreciate. Reducing inflation gradually will require a comprehensive political agreement--a significant challenge given
the political considerations--but remains essential for restoring macroeconomic sustainability.
Many market observers have questioned the reliability of official government data on inflation. Hence, steps to
strengthen the integrity of government institutions and provide more transparency on data would help restore public
confidence. The publication of more reliable economic data would help the administration better address the country's
economic imbalances.
Does the government have large debt servicing needs in the coming year?
We project Argentina's general government debt to be 43% of GDP at the end of 2015. Debt service in 2016 consists
mainly of local bonds (US$1 billion in BONAD 2016 and US$2.6 billion in two series of BONAR 2016). The debt
burden could spike in the coming years since around 65% of Argentina's debt is in foreign currency, according to
available data published by the Ministry of Economy. As a result, any significant devaluation can hurt the country's
debt service.
The country's largest provinces do not face any important external debt service next year. At the same time, both the
provinces and the private sector have been reducing their debt burden in recent years. However, the limited access to
external liquidity has been a problem for both public and private issuers.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 3
1486694 | 302429798
Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
Why is it important for Argentina to reach an agreement with holdout creditors?
Because Argentina has low foreign exchange reserves, as well as expected current account and fiscal deficits, access to
the capital markets is especially important. Reaching an agreement with holdout external creditors is the most
important step in restoring the sovereign's standing in the international capital markets. Absent an agreement, the
government will not be able to borrow from global capital markets, while subsovereign and private issuers will have
only limited access and at relatively high interest rates. Given the complexity of the issues, we are uncertain about the
timeframe for reaching an agreement with holdout creditors.
We estimate that gross external financing needs (including amortization requirements of debt currently in default) will
remain close to 100% of current account receipts (CARs) and usable reserves over 2015-2017, while external debt net
of public- and financial-sector external assets will average 63% of CARs in the same period.
How will the composition of the Argentine Congress affect the Macri Administration?
Macri's Propuesta Republicana, or PRO party, will govern the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires,
which, together, account for 40% of Argentina's population. However, Macri will have to work with a Congress in
which the Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), Argentina's traditionally dominant Peronist party, holds an absolute majority
in the Senate and has the largest share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, though not an absolute majority.
Chart 1
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 4
1486694 | 302429798
Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
Chart 2
Macri will enjoy the support of 91 deputies from PRO and the radical party, Coalición Cívica, which are allied with
him, in the Chamber of Deputies.
Macri would need to quickly establish a good working relationship with the Congress since it will be dominated by the
FPV, which could block or dilute his initiatives. The Congress may, for example, delay approval of an agreement with
Argentina's holdout creditors, potentially extending the process of regularizing relationships with international
investors.
Have Argentine LRGs defaulted on their foreign currency debt while the sovereign has been in
default?
No. Contrary to what we have seen in the past, Argentine provinces and the City of Buenos Aires have been able to
repay their obligations in foreign currency since Argentina defaulted in 2014.
Do the provincial governments have any large debts coming due in 2016?
Not really. After the 2015 high debt repayments--mostly of the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos
Aires--many large external debt service payments aren't due until 2017. The City of Buenos Aires repaid a $475 million
bond in April 2015, and the Province of Buenos Aires repaid $675 million in October 2015 (after exchanging $375
million of the $1.05 billion bond in June for a longer-term bond). Both the City of Buenos Aires and the Province of
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 5
1486694 | 302429798
Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
Cordoba have external bullet maturities in 2017, for a total of over $800 million, while the Province of Buenos Aires
doesn't face any large external debt maturities until 2018, on its $475 million bond.
Is Standard & Poor's assessment of the institutional framework of Argentine LRGs likely to change as
a result of the new administration?
No. We base our assessment of the LRGs' institutional framework on the analyses of three main factors: overall
predictability of the intergovernmental system, revenue and expenditure balance, and the transparency of the financial
information. We will assess the Argentine LRGs' institutional framework during 2016 as we did in 2015 to evaluate
these factors. In our view, the predictability measure is the most likely of the three to improve because the Macri
Administration could create an opportunity to have clearer plans for the provinces. A stronger institutional framework
assessment at the LRG level may eventually contribute to higher sovereign ratings.
Newly elected governors in Argentina have stated their intention to make modifications to some aspects of the LRGs'
institutional framework in order to balance the resources that the federal government manages versus the provincial
governments. For example, the elected governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Maria Eugenia Vidal, announced
that one of the first steps she will take as the new governor will be to request that the national government return
coparticipation income to the province, which currently has an outdated mechanism of distribution. In our opinion, the
fact that Vidal and Macri come from the same party makes it more likely that the modifications to the institutional
structure will favor provinces such as Buenos Aires. However, such a modification will likely require the national
government to cede its own resources, given that it will be difficult to convince other provinces to accept smaller
coparticipation transfers and then vote unanimously for such a modification. Therefore, we still view such changes as
politically difficult during the next year.
Beyond the economy, what are other relevant issues on the public agenda in Argentina?
For the first time, security issues are taking the spotlight in the public debate in Argentina. Fighting organized crime
became a major part of the candidates' campaign promises, with some of them offering a stronger involvement of the
armed forces. As the experiences in other Latin American countries show, organized crime has a corrupting effect on
state institutions, particularly the justice system. The new government will have to strengthen institutions to preserve
their independence and functionality to meet public demands for more security.
We have determined, based solely on the developments described herein, that no rating actions are currently warranted. Only a rating
committee may determine a rating action and, as these developments were not viewed as material to the ratings, neither they nor this report
were reviewed by a rating committee.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 6
1486694 | 302429798
Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P
reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites,
www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription) and www.spcapitaliq.com
(subscription) and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information
about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective
activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established
policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain
regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P
Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any
damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and
not statements of fact. S&P's opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase,
hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to
update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment
and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does
not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be
reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives.
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part
thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval
system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be
used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or
agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not
responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for
the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING
WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no
event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential
damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by
negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Copyright © 2015 Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC, a part of McGraw Hill Financial. All rights reserved.
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 7
1486694 | 302429798

More Related Content

What's hot

LBS Economic Research and Strategy
LBS   Economic Research and StrategyLBS   Economic Research and Strategy
LBS Economic Research and StrategyMark MacIsaac
 
State tourism us - august 2013
State tourism   us - august 2013State tourism   us - august 2013
State tourism us - august 2013QYResearchReports
 
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Mr. Trump’s Economic Policies
The Macroeconomic Consequences  of Mr. Trump’s Economic PoliciesThe Macroeconomic Consequences  of Mr. Trump’s Economic Policies
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Mr. Trump’s Economic PoliciesSusana Gallardo
 
Turkey - Uncertainty Arising from June Elections
Turkey - Uncertainty Arising from June ElectionsTurkey - Uncertainty Arising from June Elections
Turkey - Uncertainty Arising from June ElectionsThe PRS Group, Inc.
 
Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike Starr
Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike StarrBloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike Starr
Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike StarrMarissa Adamo
 
Nuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda española
Nuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda españolaNuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda española
Nuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda españolaManfredNolte
 
February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?
February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?
February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?FGV Brazil
 
March 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be recharged
March 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be rechargedMarch 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be recharged
March 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be rechargedFGV Brazil
 
MONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLE
MONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLEMONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLE
MONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLEIan Salisbury
 
Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009
Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009
Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009Breaking news
 
Italian municipal election analysis
Italian municipal election analysisItalian municipal election analysis
Italian municipal election analysisBrunswick Group
 
Western Union Q3Y16 Earnings Presentation
Western Union Q3Y16 Earnings PresentationWestern Union Q3Y16 Earnings Presentation
Western Union Q3Y16 Earnings Presentationwuir
 
The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?
The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?
The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?MSL
 

What's hot (20)

2014 10-31 mfa slide deck
2014 10-31 mfa slide deck2014 10-31 mfa slide deck
2014 10-31 mfa slide deck
 
Financial Synergies | Q2 2020 Newsletter
Financial Synergies | Q2 2020 NewsletterFinancial Synergies | Q2 2020 Newsletter
Financial Synergies | Q2 2020 Newsletter
 
LBS Economic Research and Strategy
LBS   Economic Research and StrategyLBS   Economic Research and Strategy
LBS Economic Research and Strategy
 
Coming Soon June 2015
Coming Soon June 2015Coming Soon June 2015
Coming Soon June 2015
 
March 2015 Coming Soon
March 2015 Coming SoonMarch 2015 Coming Soon
March 2015 Coming Soon
 
State tourism us - august 2013
State tourism   us - august 2013State tourism   us - august 2013
State tourism us - august 2013
 
September 2015 Coming Soon
September 2015 Coming SoonSeptember 2015 Coming Soon
September 2015 Coming Soon
 
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Mr. Trump’s Economic Policies
The Macroeconomic Consequences  of Mr. Trump’s Economic PoliciesThe Macroeconomic Consequences  of Mr. Trump’s Economic Policies
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Mr. Trump’s Economic Policies
 
Turkey - Uncertainty Arising from June Elections
Turkey - Uncertainty Arising from June ElectionsTurkey - Uncertainty Arising from June Elections
Turkey - Uncertainty Arising from June Elections
 
Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike Starr
Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike StarrBloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike Starr
Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Report_Mike Starr
 
Argentina final
Argentina finalArgentina final
Argentina final
 
Trendlines: Summer 2013
Trendlines: Summer 2013Trendlines: Summer 2013
Trendlines: Summer 2013
 
Nuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda española
Nuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda españolaNuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda española
Nuevo rating (BBB-) de la deuda española
 
February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?
February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?
February 2014 - 20 years after the Real Plan, why does growth remain elusive?
 
March 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be recharged
March 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be rechargedMarch 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be recharged
March 2011 - Electricity regulation needs to be recharged
 
MONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLE
MONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLEMONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLE
MONY_20161101_78_1286637_ARTICLE
 
Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009
Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009
Venture Capital Investment Report Q2 2009
 
Italian municipal election analysis
Italian municipal election analysisItalian municipal election analysis
Italian municipal election analysis
 
Western Union Q3Y16 Earnings Presentation
Western Union Q3Y16 Earnings PresentationWestern Union Q3Y16 Earnings Presentation
Western Union Q3Y16 Earnings Presentation
 
The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?
The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?
The Disenchantment of Latin America: What to expect from the region in 2020?
 

Viewers also liked

Snapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-Brochure
Snapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-BrochureSnapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-Brochure
Snapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-BrochureRob Neill
 
Revista científica
Revista científica Revista científica
Revista científica darryson99
 
Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...
Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...
Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...Alejandro Escalera-Briceño
 
Expresión oral secundaria
Expresión oral secundariaExpresión oral secundaria
Expresión oral secundariaKatherinGrecia
 
Indjija град који волим
Indjija град који волимIndjija град који волим
Indjija град који волимjelenavesna
 
Transcript three pages
Transcript three pagesTranscript three pages
Transcript three pagesRod Wise
 
ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2
ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2
ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2Samuel Brissett
 
Impossible Sale
Impossible SaleImpossible Sale
Impossible SaleAmy Wilbur
 

Viewers also liked (12)

Snapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-Brochure
Snapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-BrochureSnapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-Brochure
Snapshots-Banks-Empowering-Customers-and-Fighting-Exploitation-Brochure
 
Revista científica
Revista científica Revista científica
Revista científica
 
SAKSHI C.V
SAKSHI C.VSAKSHI C.V
SAKSHI C.V
 
Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...
Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...
Una propuesta para el análisis del turismo desde la perspectiva de la geopolí...
 
Cercado de lima franco farfán
Cercado de lima  franco farfánCercado de lima  franco farfán
Cercado de lima franco farfán
 
Expresión oral secundaria
Expresión oral secundariaExpresión oral secundaria
Expresión oral secundaria
 
Indjija град који волим
Indjija град који волимIndjija град који волим
Indjija град који волим
 
Transcript three pages
Transcript three pagesTranscript three pages
Transcript three pages
 
Alexandra
AlexandraAlexandra
Alexandra
 
ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2
ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2
ARCH-4341-Brissett-Sam_Digital-Portfolio_Final-2
 
MASTER RAD
MASTER RADMASTER RAD
MASTER RAD
 
Impossible Sale
Impossible SaleImpossible Sale
Impossible Sale
 

Similar to How the Election of Mauricio Macri May Impact Argentina's Credit Ratings

Country reports south_america_2016_crsa1601en
Country reports south_america_2016_crsa1601enCountry reports south_america_2016_crsa1601en
Country reports south_america_2016_crsa1601enEthos Media S.A.
 
Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.
Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.
Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.Nuricumbo + Partners
 
Argentina Paper Final Paper PDF
Argentina Paper Final Paper PDFArgentina Paper Final Paper PDF
Argentina Paper Final Paper PDFCody Etlin
 
What North America’s top finance executives are thinking - and doing
What North America’s top finance  executives are thinking - and doingWhat North America’s top finance  executives are thinking - and doing
What North America’s top finance executives are thinking - and doingΔρ. Γιώργος K. Κασάπης
 
Navigating COVID-19 - May 26
Navigating COVID-19 - May 26Navigating COVID-19 - May 26
Navigating COVID-19 - May 26GloverParkGroup
 
Report: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID World
Report: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID WorldReport: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID World
Report: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID WorldGloverParkGroup
 
Mid Term Elections & Commercial Real Estate
Mid Term Elections & Commercial Real EstateMid Term Elections & Commercial Real Estate
Mid Term Elections & Commercial Real Estatekottmeier
 
Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017
Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017
Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017UKinBrazilNetwork
 
Digitalization and taxation
Digitalization and taxationDigitalization and taxation
Digitalization and taxationKan Yuenyong
 
Country report South America - march 2015
Country report South America -  march 2015Country report South America -  march 2015
Country report South America - march 2015Ignacio Jimenez
 
Country report South America - march 2015
Country report South America - march 2015Country report South America - march 2015
Country report South America - march 2015Ignacio Jimenez
 
BBVA Bancomer
BBVA BancomerBBVA Bancomer
BBVA BancomerBBVA
 

Similar to How the Election of Mauricio Macri May Impact Argentina's Credit Ratings (20)

Country reports south_america_2016_crsa1601en
Country reports south_america_2016_crsa1601enCountry reports south_america_2016_crsa1601en
Country reports south_america_2016_crsa1601en
 
Coming Soon April 2016
Coming Soon April 2016Coming Soon April 2016
Coming Soon April 2016
 
Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.
Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.
Our Newsletter. Mexico & Latin America. January 2020.
 
Argentina Paper Final Paper PDF
Argentina Paper Final Paper PDFArgentina Paper Final Paper PDF
Argentina Paper Final Paper PDF
 
CCCQ1
CCCQ1CCCQ1
CCCQ1
 
Coming Soon February 2016
Coming Soon February 2016Coming Soon February 2016
Coming Soon February 2016
 
Review of Mexico - June 2018
Review of Mexico  -  June 2018Review of Mexico  -  June 2018
Review of Mexico - June 2018
 
What North America’s top finance executives are thinking - and doing
What North America’s top finance  executives are thinking - and doingWhat North America’s top finance  executives are thinking - and doing
What North America’s top finance executives are thinking - and doing
 
US Economic Stimulus, Q3
US Economic Stimulus, Q3US Economic Stimulus, Q3
US Economic Stimulus, Q3
 
Navigating COVID-19 - May 26
Navigating COVID-19 - May 26Navigating COVID-19 - May 26
Navigating COVID-19 - May 26
 
Report: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID World
Report: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID WorldReport: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID World
Report: Understanding Policy Influencers’ Priorities in a Post-COVID World
 
US Economic Stimulus
US Economic StimulusUS Economic Stimulus
US Economic Stimulus
 
Mid Term Elections & Commercial Real Estate
Mid Term Elections & Commercial Real EstateMid Term Elections & Commercial Real Estate
Mid Term Elections & Commercial Real Estate
 
Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017
Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017
Brazil Economic Focus | June 2017
 
TPL Dec 12 17
TPL Dec 12 17TPL Dec 12 17
TPL Dec 12 17
 
Digitalization and taxation
Digitalization and taxationDigitalization and taxation
Digitalization and taxation
 
Coming Soon May 2015
Coming Soon May 2015Coming Soon May 2015
Coming Soon May 2015
 
Country report South America - march 2015
Country report South America -  march 2015Country report South America -  march 2015
Country report South America - march 2015
 
Country report South America - march 2015
Country report South America - march 2015Country report South America - march 2015
Country report South America - march 2015
 
BBVA Bancomer
BBVA BancomerBBVA Bancomer
BBVA Bancomer
 

How the Election of Mauricio Macri May Impact Argentina's Credit Ratings

  • 1. Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina? Primary Credit Analyst: Daniela D Brandazza, Mexico City (52) 55-5081-4441; daniela.brandazza@standardandpoors.com Secondary Contacts: Julia L Smith, Buenos Aires (54) 114-891- 2186; julia.smith@standardandpoors.com Joydeep Mukherji, New York (1) 212-438-7351; joydeep.mukherji@standardandpoors.com Table Of Contents Frequently Asked Questions WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 1 1486694 | 302429798
  • 2. Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina? The opposition leader Mauricio Macri won the Argentine presidential elections on Nov. 22, 2015. Macri won in the second round of the national elections, with just over 51% of the vote against his opponent Daniel Scioli. Voter turnout was a high 81%. Below, Standard & Poor's addresses some frequently asked questions about the creditworthiness of Argentina and its local and regional governments (LRGs) in light of this recent development. Frequently Asked Questions What are Standard & Poor's current ratings on the Republic of Argentina based on? Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' unsolicited foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Argentina are 'SD/SD' (selective default), and the unsolicited local currency sovereign credit ratings are 'CCC+/C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency rating is negative. Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment on the sovereign is 'CCC-', and our national scale rating is 'raB+' with a negative outlook. Our selective default foreign currency ratings on Argentina stem from its nonpayment of part of its external debt. On July 30, 2014, Argentina failed to make a $539 million interest payment on its discount bonds due in December 2033. Since then, Argentina has not been able to service any of its external bonds under foreign law, which has limited the sovereign's access to the international bond market. Argentina previously defaulted on its debt in November 2001. Subsequently, after a debt exchange in 2005, we assigned a new rating of 'B-' in June of that year. When will Standard & Poor's change the 'SD' rating on the Republic of Argentina, and what rating will the sovereign receive? The recent election has no effect on our ratings. The foreign currency ratings will remain at 'SD' until Argentina cures the default, through payment, exchange, or other settlement. If and when that happens, we will reassess the sovereign's general credit standing, most likely raising the foreign currency rating to the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories. We would reassess the economic conditions of the country while analyzing the details of any agreement with holdout creditors in a broader political and economic context under a new government. What economic issues will the new president face in his first few months in office? When Macri assumes the presidency on Dec. 10, 2015, he will have to cope with very low foreign-exchange reserves in the central bank. Gross reserves were only around US$26 billion as of Nov. 12, 2015, and could fall to around US$24 billion in December. However, we estimate that net reserves are likely to be negative in December, considering the reserve requirements, a currency swap with the People's Bank of China, as well as unpaid imports and unpaid corporation dividends. The new administration will have to manage changes to Argentina's current set of foreign-exchange controls in order WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 2 1486694 | 302429798
  • 3. to avoid a possible disorganized devaluation of the currency that could have negative economic and political effects. The success of the government's economic policies, as well as its credibility, will depend on the timing and the nature of changes to foreign-exchange restrictions. It is clear that any structural solution to the issue of the depleting level of international reserves and foreign exchange restrictions will have to be tied to the negotiations with the holdout creditors. The government also faces fiscal difficulties. We expect the general government deficit to exceed 4.5% of GDP in 2015. Also, the government is currently partially funding its fiscal deficit through lending from the central bank, which in turn weakens monetary policy. The administration will face salary negotiations with employees at the federal and provincial level at the beginning of 2016 in a context of high inflation, and it is likely to get requests for financial support from provincial governments. This salary negotiation will be the initial challenge to test the new government's deal-making skills against the highly organized unions and social movements, which strongly supported the departing administration. The new administration will need to have very sophisticated negotiation skills in order to implement its economic policy agenda. We believe that Macri's government may move slower than some observers anticipate because of the complexity of the economic issues, the political challenge of managing a Congress when the government lacks a majority, and the administration's own desire to avoid unexpected volatility. Macri won the popular vote in only nine out of Argentina's 24 provinces but did well in the country's large urban centers. Macri may face difficulty balancing, on the one hand, moving fast enough with reforms to satisfy his supporters and, on the other hand, avoiding alienating the nearly 49% of the voters who did not support him. Finally, the main macroeconomic challenge for the new administration will be how to decrease inflation to a single digit. We also expect the government to take a gradualist approach in this regard. As long as inflation remains high, it will continue to cause imbalances in the external sector of the economy, as well as cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. Reducing inflation gradually will require a comprehensive political agreement--a significant challenge given the political considerations--but remains essential for restoring macroeconomic sustainability. Many market observers have questioned the reliability of official government data on inflation. Hence, steps to strengthen the integrity of government institutions and provide more transparency on data would help restore public confidence. The publication of more reliable economic data would help the administration better address the country's economic imbalances. Does the government have large debt servicing needs in the coming year? We project Argentina's general government debt to be 43% of GDP at the end of 2015. Debt service in 2016 consists mainly of local bonds (US$1 billion in BONAD 2016 and US$2.6 billion in two series of BONAR 2016). The debt burden could spike in the coming years since around 65% of Argentina's debt is in foreign currency, according to available data published by the Ministry of Economy. As a result, any significant devaluation can hurt the country's debt service. The country's largest provinces do not face any important external debt service next year. At the same time, both the provinces and the private sector have been reducing their debt burden in recent years. However, the limited access to external liquidity has been a problem for both public and private issuers. WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 3 1486694 | 302429798 Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
  • 4. Why is it important for Argentina to reach an agreement with holdout creditors? Because Argentina has low foreign exchange reserves, as well as expected current account and fiscal deficits, access to the capital markets is especially important. Reaching an agreement with holdout external creditors is the most important step in restoring the sovereign's standing in the international capital markets. Absent an agreement, the government will not be able to borrow from global capital markets, while subsovereign and private issuers will have only limited access and at relatively high interest rates. Given the complexity of the issues, we are uncertain about the timeframe for reaching an agreement with holdout creditors. We estimate that gross external financing needs (including amortization requirements of debt currently in default) will remain close to 100% of current account receipts (CARs) and usable reserves over 2015-2017, while external debt net of public- and financial-sector external assets will average 63% of CARs in the same period. How will the composition of the Argentine Congress affect the Macri Administration? Macri's Propuesta Republicana, or PRO party, will govern the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires, which, together, account for 40% of Argentina's population. However, Macri will have to work with a Congress in which the Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), Argentina's traditionally dominant Peronist party, holds an absolute majority in the Senate and has the largest share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, though not an absolute majority. Chart 1 WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 4 1486694 | 302429798 Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
  • 5. Chart 2 Macri will enjoy the support of 91 deputies from PRO and the radical party, Coalición Cívica, which are allied with him, in the Chamber of Deputies. Macri would need to quickly establish a good working relationship with the Congress since it will be dominated by the FPV, which could block or dilute his initiatives. The Congress may, for example, delay approval of an agreement with Argentina's holdout creditors, potentially extending the process of regularizing relationships with international investors. Have Argentine LRGs defaulted on their foreign currency debt while the sovereign has been in default? No. Contrary to what we have seen in the past, Argentine provinces and the City of Buenos Aires have been able to repay their obligations in foreign currency since Argentina defaulted in 2014. Do the provincial governments have any large debts coming due in 2016? Not really. After the 2015 high debt repayments--mostly of the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of Buenos Aires--many large external debt service payments aren't due until 2017. The City of Buenos Aires repaid a $475 million bond in April 2015, and the Province of Buenos Aires repaid $675 million in October 2015 (after exchanging $375 million of the $1.05 billion bond in June for a longer-term bond). Both the City of Buenos Aires and the Province of WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 5 1486694 | 302429798 Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
  • 6. Cordoba have external bullet maturities in 2017, for a total of over $800 million, while the Province of Buenos Aires doesn't face any large external debt maturities until 2018, on its $475 million bond. Is Standard & Poor's assessment of the institutional framework of Argentine LRGs likely to change as a result of the new administration? No. We base our assessment of the LRGs' institutional framework on the analyses of three main factors: overall predictability of the intergovernmental system, revenue and expenditure balance, and the transparency of the financial information. We will assess the Argentine LRGs' institutional framework during 2016 as we did in 2015 to evaluate these factors. In our view, the predictability measure is the most likely of the three to improve because the Macri Administration could create an opportunity to have clearer plans for the provinces. A stronger institutional framework assessment at the LRG level may eventually contribute to higher sovereign ratings. Newly elected governors in Argentina have stated their intention to make modifications to some aspects of the LRGs' institutional framework in order to balance the resources that the federal government manages versus the provincial governments. For example, the elected governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Maria Eugenia Vidal, announced that one of the first steps she will take as the new governor will be to request that the national government return coparticipation income to the province, which currently has an outdated mechanism of distribution. In our opinion, the fact that Vidal and Macri come from the same party makes it more likely that the modifications to the institutional structure will favor provinces such as Buenos Aires. However, such a modification will likely require the national government to cede its own resources, given that it will be difficult to convince other provinces to accept smaller coparticipation transfers and then vote unanimously for such a modification. Therefore, we still view such changes as politically difficult during the next year. Beyond the economy, what are other relevant issues on the public agenda in Argentina? For the first time, security issues are taking the spotlight in the public debate in Argentina. Fighting organized crime became a major part of the candidates' campaign promises, with some of them offering a stronger involvement of the armed forces. As the experiences in other Latin American countries show, organized crime has a corrupting effect on state institutions, particularly the justice system. The new government will have to strengthen institutions to preserve their independence and functionality to meet public demands for more security. We have determined, based solely on the developments described herein, that no rating actions are currently warranted. Only a rating committee may determine a rating action and, as these developments were not viewed as material to the ratings, neither they nor this report were reviewed by a rating committee. WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 6 1486694 | 302429798 Credit FAQ: How Will The Recent Presidential Election Affect Standard & Poor's Ratings On Argentina?
  • 7. S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription) and www.spcapitaliq.com (subscription) and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees. S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process. To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof. Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P's opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages. Copyright © 2015 Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC, a part of McGraw Hill Financial. All rights reserved. WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT NOVEMBER 24, 2015 7 1486694 | 302429798