In Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) canonical "Protection for Sale" (PFS) model political competition between industry lobbies is purely driven by their interests as consumers. This paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into PFS framework to address the rivalry among lobbies due to product substitutability. It shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups’ incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions. This may explain why empirical tests of PFS find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government trade policy decision. The paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation, suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect industry decision to get organized.
by Elena Paltseva, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics
Leszek Balcerowicz, Professor of Economics and Architect of Poland´s economic reforms, on June 11, 2018 in Bratislava. Video is available at www.institute.sk
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate harsher times after defections as leniency reduces recidivism and lowers post-conviction prices. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal law enforcement.
Leniency policies and asymmetric punishment are regarded as potentially powerful anticorruption
tools, also in the light of their success in busting price-fixing cartels. It has been
argued, however, that the introduction of these policies in China in 1997 has not helped
fighting corruption. Following up on this view, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party passed, in November 2015, a reform introducing heavier penalties, but also
restrictions to leniency. Properly designing and correctly evaluating these policies is difficult.
Corruption is only observed if detected, and an increase in convictions is consistent
with both reduced deterrence or improved detection. We map the evolution of the Chinese
anti-corruption legislation, collect data on corruption cases for the period 1986-2010, and
apply a new method to identify deterrence effects from changes in detected cases developed
for cartels by Miller (2009). We document a large and stable fall in corruption cases
starting immediately after the 1997 reform, consistent with a negative effect of the reform
on corruption detection, but under specific assumptions also with increased deterrence. To
resolve this ambiguity, we collect and analyze a random sample of case files from corruption
trials. Results point to a negative effect of the 1997 reform, linked to the increased leniency
also for bribe-takers cooperating after being denounced. This likely enhanced their ability
to retaliate against reporting bribe-givers – chilling detection through whistleblowing – as
predicted by theories on how these programs should (not) be designed.
We examine the effects of bank deregulation on the spatial dynamics of retail-bank branching, exploiting, much like a quasi-natural experiment, the context of intense liberalization
reforms in Belgium in the late nineties. Using fine-grained data on branch network dynamics within the metropolitan area of Antwerp and advancing novel spatial econometric techniques, we show that these liberalization reforms radically shifted and accelerated branch network dynamics. Entry and exit dynamics substantially intensified, the level change in financial void grew significantly, and bank choice markedly declined. Moreover, all these changes consistently extended (even with greater intensity) after the liberalization peak. However, the immediate and longer-term spatial ramifications of the financial sector liberalization were very distinct. All immediate changes systematically, differentially impacted the poorer and wealthier neighborhoods, disenfranchising the poorer neighbourhoods and favoring their wealthier counterparts. The longer-term e¤ects on spatial patterns of change no longer exhibited this systematic relationship with neighborhood income. We draw out the policy implications of our findings.
In Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) canonical "Protection for Sale" (PFS) model political competition between industry lobbies is purely driven by their interests as consumers. This paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into PFS framework to address the rivalry among lobbies due to product substitutability. It shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups’ incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions. This may explain why empirical tests of PFS find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government trade policy decision. The paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation, suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect industry decision to get organized.
by Elena Paltseva, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics
Leszek Balcerowicz, Professor of Economics and Architect of Poland´s economic reforms, on June 11, 2018 in Bratislava. Video is available at www.institute.sk
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate harsher times after defections as leniency reduces recidivism and lowers post-conviction prices. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal law enforcement.
Leniency policies and asymmetric punishment are regarded as potentially powerful anticorruption
tools, also in the light of their success in busting price-fixing cartels. It has been
argued, however, that the introduction of these policies in China in 1997 has not helped
fighting corruption. Following up on this view, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party passed, in November 2015, a reform introducing heavier penalties, but also
restrictions to leniency. Properly designing and correctly evaluating these policies is difficult.
Corruption is only observed if detected, and an increase in convictions is consistent
with both reduced deterrence or improved detection. We map the evolution of the Chinese
anti-corruption legislation, collect data on corruption cases for the period 1986-2010, and
apply a new method to identify deterrence effects from changes in detected cases developed
for cartels by Miller (2009). We document a large and stable fall in corruption cases
starting immediately after the 1997 reform, consistent with a negative effect of the reform
on corruption detection, but under specific assumptions also with increased deterrence. To
resolve this ambiguity, we collect and analyze a random sample of case files from corruption
trials. Results point to a negative effect of the 1997 reform, linked to the increased leniency
also for bribe-takers cooperating after being denounced. This likely enhanced their ability
to retaliate against reporting bribe-givers – chilling detection through whistleblowing – as
predicted by theories on how these programs should (not) be designed.
We examine the effects of bank deregulation on the spatial dynamics of retail-bank branching, exploiting, much like a quasi-natural experiment, the context of intense liberalization
reforms in Belgium in the late nineties. Using fine-grained data on branch network dynamics within the metropolitan area of Antwerp and advancing novel spatial econometric techniques, we show that these liberalization reforms radically shifted and accelerated branch network dynamics. Entry and exit dynamics substantially intensified, the level change in financial void grew significantly, and bank choice markedly declined. Moreover, all these changes consistently extended (even with greater intensity) after the liberalization peak. However, the immediate and longer-term spatial ramifications of the financial sector liberalization were very distinct. All immediate changes systematically, differentially impacted the poorer and wealthier neighborhoods, disenfranchising the poorer neighbourhoods and favoring their wealthier counterparts. The longer-term e¤ects on spatial patterns of change no longer exhibited this systematic relationship with neighborhood income. We draw out the policy implications of our findings.
O. andriychuk, competition and consumer welfare in antitrusMichal
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the conceptual relationship between two central
elements of the theory of antitrust: competition and consumer welfare. These
two notions are analysed in their mutual dependency. In terms of methodology,
the paper proposes to structurally separate competition from consumer welfare.
This technique is successfully applied in the domain of legal philosophy when the
correlation between law and morality is debated. The main purpose of this paper
is to show that both competition and consumer welfare are economic values of
fundamental importance with no ex ante hierarchical dominance of consumer
welfare over competition. In case of conflict, priority might be given to either of
these values depending on the context of the assessment. This paper has a discursive
character, it constitutes a response to Dawid Miąsik’s article entitled: ‘Controlled
Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study of the Goals of Polish Antitrust Law’ which was published in the ‘Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory
Studies’ 2008 vol. 1.
Nudging Legally on the Checks and Balances of Behavioural Regulation - Albert...OECD Governance
"Nudging Legally on the Checks and Balances of Behavioural Regulation" by Alberto Alemanno, HEC Paris, NYU School of Law & Alessandro Spina, University of Milan. This report was made available at the Behavioural Economics Workshop, OECD, Paris - 31 March 2014. For more information see www.oecd.org/gov/behavioural-economics.htm
Write 3-4 sentences for each question below.1. Examine the s.docxambersalomon88660
Write 3-4 sentences for each question below.
1. Examine the similarities and differences between learning organizations and learning communities. Create a scenario where it would be optimal for a learning organization and a learning community to collaborate and join forces.
2. Imagine that you are a teacher leader in a learning community. Describe the size and environment of your imaginary learning community. Propose at least three reasons why you could be considered a problem solver and an innovator.
3. Determine how the event “No Child Left Behind” has impacted today’s learning environments. Predict how this event will affect learning environments in the future.
4. Create a short (one paragraph) speech to deliver to the Gary, Indiana school board members that convinces them that a learning organization provides the most stimulating student learning environment. Predict at least two major issues that the school board will foresee encountering and provide solutions for their concerns.
InsightsEconomic
Firm,” published in Economica (1937). In
“The Nature of the Firm,” Coase ex-
plained that firms exist because they re-
duce the transaction costs that emerge
during production and exchange, cap-
turing efficiencies that individuals cannot.
Coase was heavily influenced by
Frank Knight’s monumental Risk, Uncer-
tainty, and Profit and Philip Wick-
steed’s The Common Sense of Political
Economy. The former inspired his in-
terest in institutions and the structure of
productive process. The latter led him
to study constrained optimization prob-
lems, that is, choices that are con-
strained by costs, information, market
prices and uncertainty.1
In his article about the Federal Com-
munications Commission, Coase showed
economists the crucial importance of in-
stitutional property rights and how their
presence or absence influences the effi-
cient allocation of scarce resources. In
that paper, Coase first put forward what
has come to be known as the Coase
Ronald Harry Coase was born in a
London suburb in 1910. He was edu-
cated at the London School of Eco-
nomics from 1929 through 1932, study-
ing industrial law with the intention of
becoming a lawyer. But that changed
after his exposure to Professor of Com-
merce Arnold Plant, who came to the
London School of Economics from a
position in Cape Town, South Africa, in
1930. Plant’s influence put Coase firmly
on the road to becoming an economist
and also shaped his attitude that eco-
nomic theory is fine as long as it’s
grounded in reality.
During 1931 – 32, Coase traveled to
the United States on a scholarship to
study the structure of American indus-
try. This study became the basis for
Coase’s lifetime fascination with indus-
trial organization and his later work on
the nature of firms and their costs.
After leaving the London School of
Economics, Coase held a series of teach-
ing positions: at the Dundee School of
Economics and Commerce (1932 – 34),
the University of Liverpool (1934 – .
How did Neoclassical economists rationalize a policy of laissez fair.pdfamitseesldh
How did Neoclassical economists rationalize a policy of laissez faire with respect to the potential
intervention into a market economy by government? Why do modern economists, on the other
hand, acknowledge a role for government.
A well-structured answer will include:
Solution
Ans :
In broad terms, there are three kinds of economic policies. The first is government ownership, or
socialism, where the government directly owns the means of production. The second is
government regulation, or interventionism, where the government leaves production to the
private sector but tries to shape market outcomes with subsidies, taxes, licensing, price and
quantity restrictions, standards of quality, safety, and health, non-waivable worker and consumer
rights, and other measures. The third is the free market, or laissez-faire, where private property
rights and freedom of contract alone provide the framework for interaction between firms,
consumers, and workers. The relationship between libertarianism and laissez-faire is a simple
one: laissez-faire is the libertarian position on economic policy. While most who use the
libertarian label admit exceptions, even the most moderate use laissez-faire as a benchmark.
Different economic perspectives emphasize specific elements of capitalism in their preferred
definition. Laissez-faire and liberal economists emphasize the degree to which government does
not have control over markets and the importance of property rights.
Classical economics can trace its roots to Adam Smith in 1776. In The Wealth of Nations Adam
Smith presented a comprehensive analysis of economic phenomena based on the notions of free
markets and actions guided by individual self interests in a laissez faire environment. This work
by Smith was motivated in large part as a critique of the existing merchantilist system.
Under mercantilism the ruling aristocracy directed economic activity with the primary goal of
benefiting the ruling aristocracy. The merchantilist view was that the wealth of a nation was
based on the wealth of the ruling aristocracy. Smith argued, quite convincingly, that the wealth
of a nation was actually based on the productivity of resources, which was best achieved if the
producers, consumers, and resource owners were left to their own \"selfish\" actions.
Economists also applied this classical framework to macroeconomic issues, especially
unemployment, economic growth, and business-cycle stability. With this application a
comprehensive theory of macroeconomics was developed that offered an explanation for
macroeconomic phenomena and provided recommendations for government policies.
The classical study of macroeconomics emerged from a set of axioms and assumptions that were
used for all economic analysis, such as wants and needs are unlimited, resources are limited,
people are motivated by self interest, and more is preferred to less. However, three particular
assumptions proved most important to the study of macroeconomic phenom.
To regulate or not to regulate – economic approachMichal
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible
remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged
behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able
to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author
discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and
via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs
depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree,
the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network,
IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not
so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects
will probably fail.
The European Commission published a White Paper on 2 April 2008 on damages
actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. The content of the White Paper is since
then being prepared to be converted into EU legislation on private antitrust
enforcement. This paper presents the developments in private antitrust enforcement
in Poland after 2 April 2008. It commences with an outline of EU actions in
this field which act as an introduction to the more detailed analysis of recent
jurisprudential and legislative developments in Poland. The latter part of the paper
covers, in particular, the 2009 Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings
and the 2011 Act Amending the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts which
abolishes all specific elements of commercial proceedings, including the statutory ‘non-admission of evidence’ principle. These two legal acts are assessed in order
to establish whether their introduction is likely to help facilitate private antitrust
enforcement in Poland and to consider to what an extent are these developments
responding to the challenges outlined by the European Commission.
More Related Content
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O. andriychuk, competition and consumer welfare in antitrusMichal
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the conceptual relationship between two central
elements of the theory of antitrust: competition and consumer welfare. These
two notions are analysed in their mutual dependency. In terms of methodology,
the paper proposes to structurally separate competition from consumer welfare.
This technique is successfully applied in the domain of legal philosophy when the
correlation between law and morality is debated. The main purpose of this paper
is to show that both competition and consumer welfare are economic values of
fundamental importance with no ex ante hierarchical dominance of consumer
welfare over competition. In case of conflict, priority might be given to either of
these values depending on the context of the assessment. This paper has a discursive
character, it constitutes a response to Dawid Miąsik’s article entitled: ‘Controlled
Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study of the Goals of Polish Antitrust Law’ which was published in the ‘Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory
Studies’ 2008 vol. 1.
Nudging Legally on the Checks and Balances of Behavioural Regulation - Albert...OECD Governance
"Nudging Legally on the Checks and Balances of Behavioural Regulation" by Alberto Alemanno, HEC Paris, NYU School of Law & Alessandro Spina, University of Milan. This report was made available at the Behavioural Economics Workshop, OECD, Paris - 31 March 2014. For more information see www.oecd.org/gov/behavioural-economics.htm
Write 3-4 sentences for each question below.1. Examine the s.docxambersalomon88660
Write 3-4 sentences for each question below.
1. Examine the similarities and differences between learning organizations and learning communities. Create a scenario where it would be optimal for a learning organization and a learning community to collaborate and join forces.
2. Imagine that you are a teacher leader in a learning community. Describe the size and environment of your imaginary learning community. Propose at least three reasons why you could be considered a problem solver and an innovator.
3. Determine how the event “No Child Left Behind” has impacted today’s learning environments. Predict how this event will affect learning environments in the future.
4. Create a short (one paragraph) speech to deliver to the Gary, Indiana school board members that convinces them that a learning organization provides the most stimulating student learning environment. Predict at least two major issues that the school board will foresee encountering and provide solutions for their concerns.
InsightsEconomic
Firm,” published in Economica (1937). In
“The Nature of the Firm,” Coase ex-
plained that firms exist because they re-
duce the transaction costs that emerge
during production and exchange, cap-
turing efficiencies that individuals cannot.
Coase was heavily influenced by
Frank Knight’s monumental Risk, Uncer-
tainty, and Profit and Philip Wick-
steed’s The Common Sense of Political
Economy. The former inspired his in-
terest in institutions and the structure of
productive process. The latter led him
to study constrained optimization prob-
lems, that is, choices that are con-
strained by costs, information, market
prices and uncertainty.1
In his article about the Federal Com-
munications Commission, Coase showed
economists the crucial importance of in-
stitutional property rights and how their
presence or absence influences the effi-
cient allocation of scarce resources. In
that paper, Coase first put forward what
has come to be known as the Coase
Ronald Harry Coase was born in a
London suburb in 1910. He was edu-
cated at the London School of Eco-
nomics from 1929 through 1932, study-
ing industrial law with the intention of
becoming a lawyer. But that changed
after his exposure to Professor of Com-
merce Arnold Plant, who came to the
London School of Economics from a
position in Cape Town, South Africa, in
1930. Plant’s influence put Coase firmly
on the road to becoming an economist
and also shaped his attitude that eco-
nomic theory is fine as long as it’s
grounded in reality.
During 1931 – 32, Coase traveled to
the United States on a scholarship to
study the structure of American indus-
try. This study became the basis for
Coase’s lifetime fascination with indus-
trial organization and his later work on
the nature of firms and their costs.
After leaving the London School of
Economics, Coase held a series of teach-
ing positions: at the Dundee School of
Economics and Commerce (1932 – 34),
the University of Liverpool (1934 – .
How did Neoclassical economists rationalize a policy of laissez fair.pdfamitseesldh
How did Neoclassical economists rationalize a policy of laissez faire with respect to the potential
intervention into a market economy by government? Why do modern economists, on the other
hand, acknowledge a role for government.
A well-structured answer will include:
Solution
Ans :
In broad terms, there are three kinds of economic policies. The first is government ownership, or
socialism, where the government directly owns the means of production. The second is
government regulation, or interventionism, where the government leaves production to the
private sector but tries to shape market outcomes with subsidies, taxes, licensing, price and
quantity restrictions, standards of quality, safety, and health, non-waivable worker and consumer
rights, and other measures. The third is the free market, or laissez-faire, where private property
rights and freedom of contract alone provide the framework for interaction between firms,
consumers, and workers. The relationship between libertarianism and laissez-faire is a simple
one: laissez-faire is the libertarian position on economic policy. While most who use the
libertarian label admit exceptions, even the most moderate use laissez-faire as a benchmark.
Different economic perspectives emphasize specific elements of capitalism in their preferred
definition. Laissez-faire and liberal economists emphasize the degree to which government does
not have control over markets and the importance of property rights.
Classical economics can trace its roots to Adam Smith in 1776. In The Wealth of Nations Adam
Smith presented a comprehensive analysis of economic phenomena based on the notions of free
markets and actions guided by individual self interests in a laissez faire environment. This work
by Smith was motivated in large part as a critique of the existing merchantilist system.
Under mercantilism the ruling aristocracy directed economic activity with the primary goal of
benefiting the ruling aristocracy. The merchantilist view was that the wealth of a nation was
based on the wealth of the ruling aristocracy. Smith argued, quite convincingly, that the wealth
of a nation was actually based on the productivity of resources, which was best achieved if the
producers, consumers, and resource owners were left to their own \"selfish\" actions.
Economists also applied this classical framework to macroeconomic issues, especially
unemployment, economic growth, and business-cycle stability. With this application a
comprehensive theory of macroeconomics was developed that offered an explanation for
macroeconomic phenomena and provided recommendations for government policies.
The classical study of macroeconomics emerged from a set of axioms and assumptions that were
used for all economic analysis, such as wants and needs are unlimited, resources are limited,
people are motivated by self interest, and more is preferred to less. However, three particular
assumptions proved most important to the study of macroeconomic phenom.
To regulate or not to regulate – economic approachMichal
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible
remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged
behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able
to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author
discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and
via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs
depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree,
the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network,
IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not
so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects
will probably fail.
The European Commission published a White Paper on 2 April 2008 on damages
actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. The content of the White Paper is since
then being prepared to be converted into EU legislation on private antitrust
enforcement. This paper presents the developments in private antitrust enforcement
in Poland after 2 April 2008. It commences with an outline of EU actions in
this field which act as an introduction to the more detailed analysis of recent
jurisprudential and legislative developments in Poland. The latter part of the paper
covers, in particular, the 2009 Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings
and the 2011 Act Amending the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts which
abolishes all specific elements of commercial proceedings, including the statutory ‘non-admission of evidence’ principle. These two legal acts are assessed in order
to establish whether their introduction is likely to help facilitate private antitrust
enforcement in Poland and to consider to what an extent are these developments
responding to the challenges outlined by the European Commission.
Sieci szerokopasmowe w polityce telekomunikacyjnej a book reviewMichal
A new book from Professor Stanisław Piątek, an established authority on
telecommunications law, brings the reader closer to the inner workings of broadband
technology in its legal environment. The title reflects the focus of telecoms policy
on access whereby the only access that matters is to the broadband network in its
many variations. The subject matter itself makes the book worth reading, particularly
in the absence of other major Polish works on this topic. Even if some authors
regarded broadband technologies as obsolete years ago1, in reality it still represents
a lion’s share of the telecoms business. Professor Piątek himself is well aware of the
historical and transitory nature of the subject matter when he defines broadband not
by association with any particular technology but as the ability of whatever technology
available at any given moment to provide a certain minimum transmission speed.
Thus the central notion is open to absorb technologies nonexistent as of yet. This in
turn may pose serious regulatory issues as to what future industries will be subject to
regulation, particularly since the distinction between content and carrier regulation
is becoming increasingly blurred.
Media audiovizualne. konflikt regulacyjny w dobie cyfryzacji a book reviewMichal
The book under review here is entitled Audiovisual Media: regulatory conflict in
the digitalisation era by Katarzyna Chalubinska- Jentkiewicz. As the title suggests,
I expected it to be a monograph on new regulatory problems in the increasingly
digital audiovisual field. The sector itself is well known to cause competence conflicts
between the as many as three different regulatory bodies overseeing it in Poland: the
national telecoms regulator (the UKE President), the audiovisual media supervisory
body (the KRRiT) and the competition authority (the UOKiK President). The impact
of the European Commission can also not be overlooked. The book does indeed
deal in great detail with what is seen as the ‘regulatory conflict’ in the audiovisual
field but the approach applied therein is that of the theory of administration and
administrative/constitutional law rather than that of market regulation. As a result,
the analysis focuses primarily on the perceived ‘conflict’ between Poland’s interests
and regulatory competences and the impact exercised by the European Union as
a whole, rather than on any existing or potential internal conflicts. Key to the entire
analysis is the contraposition of the notion of ‘public interest of a nation’ (State) and
the ‘general interest of the EU’ whereby the special characteristics of ‘national’ public
interest are associated with the notion of ‘public morality’ and also, ‘public mission’.
Legislative developments in the aviation sector in 2011 in polandMichal
The Polish Aviation Law Act of 3 July 2002 was amended six times in
2011. The only major change introduced in this period resulted from the
Amendment Act to the Aviation Law Act of 30 June 2011, most of which
entered into force 30 days after its publication1. In fact, changes introduced
thereby were so widespread and crucial to the entire aviation sector that it
can easily be referred to as a completely new law. Considerable effort went
into the preparation of this Act – its first draft was presented as early as 2009
followed by long consultations and the ultimate introduction of a number of
further changes.
Legislative developments in rail transport in 2011 in polandMichal
Most amendments of the Polish rail transport law in 2011 concerned the
organisation of rail transport including: improvements in timetable changing
procedures; mechanisms to ensure the observance and early publication of
timetables; interoperability of the rail system and; certification of train drivers.
Introduced were also some changes meant to restructure the incumbent state
rail operator (in Polish: Polskie Koleje Państwowe; hereafter PKP).
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the telecommunications sector...Michal
The Telecommunications Law Act1 (in Polish: Prawo Telekomunikacyjne,
hereafter: PT) was subject to a number of amendments in 2011 introduced by
the Amendment Act of 14 April 2011 and the Amendment Act of 16 September
2011 as well as by the separate Act of 30 June 2011 on the implementation of
digital terrestrial television.
In response to the reservations expressed by the European Commission
regarding the compatibility of the way in which regulatory obligations
concerning the setting of wholesale prices are imposed in Poland, the
Amendment Act of 14 April 2011 changed Articles 39 and 40 PT2. The direct
reason for this amendment was set out in a reasoned opinion prepared by the
Commission in October 2010 under Article 258 TFEU3. It was stated therein
that Polish rules regarding the establishment of wholesale prices may give
rise to legal uncertainty and may be discriminatory towards certain telecoms
operators.
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the postal sector in 2011 in ...Michal
Postal services in Poland are governed by the Postal Law Act of 2003 (in
Polish: Prawo Pocztowe)1 which maintains the monopoly of the public operator
Poczta Polska with respect of letters weighing up to 50 grams. However, Poland
will have to fully liberalize its postal services market by 31 December 2012.
For this reason, the Government adopted on 5 October 2010 Assumptions
for the Draft Postal Law Act as proposed by the Minister of Infrastructure2.
However, the Draft was not placed on the Government’s legislative agenda
for 2011. Thus, the majority of legislative work will have to be completed in
2012, a fact that jeopardizes the implementation of Directive 2008/6/EC. The
latter indicates 31 December 2012 as the deadline beyond which Member
States must not maintain a privileged position of operators providing universal
postal services
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the energy sector in 2011 in ...Michal
The year 2011 brought about fundamental changes to the legal framework
affecting energy markets in Poland. The most important of these changes
concerned rules on obligatory public trading of electric energy (so-called,
exchange obligation) and the implementation of Nuclear Facilities Projects
and Obligatory Natural Gas Reserve System Projects.
Key legislative and jurisprudential developments of Polish Antitrust Law in 2011Michal
The article presents key developments in Polish antitrust legislation and jurisprudence
of 2011. Its legislative part focuses on the renewal of Polish Group Exemption
Regulations for vertical agreements, specialization and R&D agreements as well as
cooperation agreements in the insurance sector. Noted is also the sole amendment
of the Competition Act introduced in 2011 which concerns the financial liability of
the Polish competition authority. The article covers also the new Guidelines of the
UOKiK President on the criteria and procedures of merger notifications. Presented
in its jurisprudential part is a number of 2011 rulings, mainly those rendered by
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, divided according to their subject
matter with respect to particular types of restrictive practices and other problems
related to the decision-making process of the UOKiK President.
Is the parallel competence set out in regulation 12003 totally clear. case co...Michal
With a motion dated 28th of April 2005 submitted to the President of the Office of
Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji
i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK President), Tele2 Polska Sp. z o.o. (currently:
Netia S.A., hereafter, Applicant) requested the initiation of antitrust proceedings
against Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (hereafter, TP). The Polish incumbent, TP, was
alleged to have engaged in practices restricting competition covered by Article 8(1)
and 8(2)(5) of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection of 15th December
2000 (hereafter, Competition Act 2000) and in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing
European Community (hereafter, TEC), presently, Article 102 of the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union (hereafter, TFEU).
How to facilitate damage claims private enforcement in croatiaMichal
Ever since the Croatian Competition Agency started functioning in 1997, public
enforcement of competition law has been the norm. Civil actions for breaches of
competition law have been the exception in Croatia. The existing legislation in the
area of competition law makes no effort to incentivise private enforcement. There
are no specific rules in the Competition Act 2009 dedicated to civil actions, except a
single provision that assigns jurisdiction over damages claims to commercial courts.
General tort law is applicable in order to prove damages. A number of issues arise
here mostly due to the complexity of competition cases. These issues were described
in the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of
EC Antitrust Rules (2008). The level of uncertainty as regards the outcome of the
claim is high. It seems that special rules need to be adopted in Croatia in order
to improve the position of the injured side. The paper deals with a number of
procedural and substantive law issues relevant to the facilitation of civil proceedings
for antitrust damages. A domestic law perspective is applied taking into account
recent developments in EU competition law and policy.
European audiovisual sector – where business meets society’s needs a book r...Michal
The Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (CARS), responsible for this
yearbook, also prepares the publication of textbooks and monographs. An Englishlanguage
textbook European Audiovisual Sector: Where business meets society’s needs
written by Dr. Ewelina D. Sage is one of the latest publication in this series
Differentiation between entrepreneurs and its legal consequences. case commentMichal
The discussed judgment was rendered in relation to the dispute between the
President of the Polish Competition Authority (hereafter, UOKiK President) on the
one hand and the Polish Football Association and the broadcaster Canal+ on the
other hand. These two undertakings were party to an agreement on exercising media
rights to football games of the two highest classes of the Polish league. The core of
the dispute consisted of the possibility of deeming the pre-emption right reserved
for Canal+ as a contractual provision restricting competition. The Courts involved
were also forced to answer the question whether performing tasks of a public service
character justified a decrease in the fine imposed by the competition authority
Development of the judicial review of the decisions in slovakiaMichal
The article provides an analysis of the most important judgments rendered by
Slovak courts at the end of 2010, in the course of 2011 and at the beginning of 2012.
The article focuses solely on judicial review of decisions issued by the National
Competition Authority of the Slovak Republic.
Slovak courts dealt with several key issues concerning public enforcement
of competition law such as: the application of the so-called ‘general clause’;
competences of the Slovak competition authority in regulated sectors; and the
application of the economic continuity test. Some of the conclusions resulting from
these judgments may be considered disputable. It may be argued, in particular, that
they may jeopardize the effective enforcement of competition law in the Slovak Republic. At the same time, the discussed jurisprudence has managed to clarify
a number of key issues which had been subject to debate for a number of years. The
article presents a review of these judgments, summarizes their key conclusions and
considers their possible impact on the system of public enforcement of competition
law in the Slovak Republic. The article is divided into a number of parts, each of
which covers an individual case, the titles of which refers to the main topic that was
under discussion in the presented judgment.
Commission guidelines on assessment of significant market power. case commentMichal
The ruling of the Court of Justice (hereafter, CJ) in the PTC case concerns the
interpretation of Article 58 of the Treaty of Accession1 establishing an obligation
to publish EU legal acts in the languages of Member States which accessed the EU
on 1 May 2004. A controversy emerged in this context whether the said obligation
also applied to European Commission Guidelines on relevant market analysis and
the assessment of significant market power in the field of electronic communication
(hereafter, 2002 Guidelines)2. In general, guidelines issued by the Commission are
regarded as acts of soft law, also called innominate acts or sui generis acts.
In the fifth year of its activities CARS focused on the pursuit of a number of
goals set in its founding documents. It was a particularly busy year for its Publishing
Programme which saw the issue of 6 separate titles: two monographs, an Englishlanguage
textbook, a collective works and two volumes of the ‘Yearbook of Antitrust
and Regulatory Studies’ [a special edition vol. 4(4) and the yearly vol. 4(5)]. 2011 was
also a very active period for the CARS Open PhD Seminar series with four meetings
taking place throughout the year. Several CARS members engaged also in the second
edition of a research project dedicated to regulatory and antitrust aspects of airport
activities (first phase of the project completed in 2010).
What do limitation periods for sanctions in antitrustMichal
Limitation periods represent a legal safeguard for a person who has once
broken the law in order not to be put at risk of sanctions and other legal liabilities
for an indefinite amount of time. By contrast, public interest can sometimes require
that a person who has committed a serious breach of law cannot benefit from
limitation periods and that it is necessary to declare that the law had indeed been
infringed and that legal liability shall be expected irrespective of the passage of
time.
Universal service obligation and loyalty effectsMichal
In network industries, a Universal Service Obligation (USO) is often seen as a burden
on an incumbent, which requires compensation for the net cost of such service
provision. This paper estimates the effects of consumer loyalty as an intangible
benefit of USO in the postal sector. In doing so, the agent-based modelling (ABM)
approach is applied, which makes it possible to model the behaviour of boundedly
rational consumers and is thus particularly appropriate for taking into account
intangibles considerations. The analysis shows that loyalty is crucial to whether
the USO uniform pricing constraint results in loss-making or profitability. Under
certain conditions and in the presence of a loyalty parameter, uniform pricing gives
a USO provider an advantage, when the size of the rural area is sufficiently big
and a disadvantage, if its size is too small. This finding is counterintuitive as USO
providers in countries with sparsely populated areas are typically expected to incur
a significant net cost of USO.
2010 and 2011 eu competition law and case law developments with a nexus to po...Michal
This third overview of EU competition and sector-specific regulatory jurisprudential
and case law developments with a nexus to Poland covers the years 2010 and 2011.
This period of time is worth noting for several reasons. First, EU courts delivered
a significant number of judgments in ‘Polish’ cases including an increased number of
preliminary rulings. Second, 2010-2011 developments were dominated by judgments
and decisions concerning telecoms. Finally, the Commission adopted only a handful
of Polish State aid decisions following a formal investigation procedure under
Article 108(2) TFEU.
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA ConnectKari Kakkonen
My and Rik Marselis slides at 30.5.2024 DASA Connect conference. We discuss about what is testing, then what is agile testing and finally what is Testing in DevOps. Finally we had lovely workshop with the participants trying to find out different ways to think about quality and testing in different parts of the DevOps infinity loop.
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Albert Hoitingh
In this session I delve into the encryption technology used in Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Purview. Including the concepts of Customer Key and Double Key Encryption.
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024Tobias Schneck
As AI technology is pushing into IT I was wondering myself, as an “infrastructure container kubernetes guy”, how get this fancy AI technology get managed from an infrastructure operational view? Is it possible to apply our lovely cloud native principals as well? What benefit’s both technologies could bring to each other?
Let me take this questions and provide you a short journey through existing deployment models and use cases for AI software. On practical examples, we discuss what cloud/on-premise strategy we may need for applying it to our own infrastructure to get it to work from an enterprise perspective. I want to give an overview about infrastructure requirements and technologies, what could be beneficial or limiting your AI use cases in an enterprise environment. An interactive Demo will give you some insides, what approaches I got already working for real.
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object CalisthenicsDorra BARTAGUIZ
After immersing yourself in the blue book and its red counterpart, attending DDD-focused conferences, and applying tactical patterns, you're left with a crucial question: How do I ensure my design is effective? Tactical patterns within Domain-Driven Design (DDD) serve as guiding principles for creating clear and manageable domain models. However, achieving success with these patterns requires additional guidance. Interestingly, we've observed that a set of constraints initially designed for training purposes remarkably aligns with effective pattern implementation, offering a more ‘mechanical’ approach. Let's explore together how Object Calisthenics can elevate the design of your tactical DDD patterns, offering concrete help for those venturing into DDD for the first time!
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesLaura Byrne
Clients don’t know what they don’t know. What web solutions are right for them? How does WordPress come into the picture? How do you make sure you understand scope and timeline? What do you do if sometime changes?
All these questions and more will be explored as we talk about matching clients’ needs with what your agency offers without pulling teeth or pulling your hair out. Practical tips, and strategies for successful relationship building that leads to closing the deal.
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...BookNet Canada
The publishing industry has been selling digital audiobooks and ebooks for over a decade and has found its groove. What’s changed? What has stayed the same? Where do we go from here? Join a group of leading sales peers from across the industry for a conversation about the lessons learned since the popularization of digital books, best practices, digital book supply chain management, and more.
Link to video recording: https://bnctechforum.ca/sessions/selling-digital-books-in-2024-insights-from-industry-leaders/
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Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportAlan Dix
Paper presented at SYNERGY workshop at AVI 2024, Genoa, Italy. 3rd June 2024
https://alandix.com/academic/papers/synergy2024-epistemic/
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GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGuy Korland
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Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualityInflectra
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• Inflectra's AI Solutions: See demonstrations of Inflectra's cutting-edge AI tools like the ChatGPT plugin and Azure Open AI platform, designed to streamline your testing process.
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GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
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Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
1. BAEARBOOK
Y
of
O
NTITRUST
O K legal and periodical,
R economic
Peer-reviewed scientific
focusing on E V I E W
and REGULATORY issues of antitrust and regulation.
STUDIES Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies,
Creative Commons Attribution-No University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management
www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl Derivative Works 3.0 Poland License. www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl
Bożena Borkowska, Regulacja monopolu naturalnego w teorii i praktyce
[Regulation of a natural monopoly in theory and practice],
Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiego Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego,
[Publishing House of the Wroclaw University of Economics],
Wroclaw 2009, pp. 229.
Monopolization of the economy may result from a company’s market strategy
consisting in winning over its competitors and reinforcing its position on the market.
Achieving such a position may be the consequence of effective rent seeking leading
to State protection of businesses against competition and collecting monopoly rent.
Monopolization of the market may also be the end-result of economic calculation
which may show that increasing benefits of scale justify the operation of just one
business in a given sector. The latter case, called a natural monopoly, is the subject
of Bożena Borkowska’s considerations when discussing various types of regulation.
The author also presents case studies of three natural monopoly markets in the US:
the transportation, cable telephony, and electricity supply sectors.
The first chapter interestingly and chronologically analyzes the understanding
of a natural monopoly, starting from its classical concept up to the contemporary
understanding of the essence of such a market structure. The theory of monopoly itself
was the subject of considerations and theoretical generalization by A. Cournot in the
first half of the 19th century. The classical concept seeks to justify the existence of a
monopoly by increasing economies of scale and by optimized allocation of resources
resulting from the operations of one company on the market.
Borkowska presents the views of economists who theoretically contributed to
the development of monopoly theory, including natural monopoly (J. Dupuit,
F.Y. Edgeworth. J. S. Mill, T.H. Farrer, H.C. Adams, R.T. Ely, A.M. Henderson,
R.A. Posner, A.E. Kahn). Their common feature is that of highlighting the assumption
of the economies of scale and resulting optimization of allocation of resources as
justifications for operations of one entrepreneur, i.e., a natural monopoly. Economic and
technological premises indicated market monopolization, but the monopolist’s behaviour
could go against customers and consumers’ interests as he could take advantage of his
market position to maximize monopolistic profit. The views differ, as their authors point
out other premises of a natural monopoly. For instance, T.H. Ferrer stresses political
reasons while R.T. Ely speaks of competition possibilities in natural monopoly markets,
although he calls them destructive.
Vol. 2011, 4(4)
2. 240 BOOK REVIEWS
Contemporary concepts of a natural monopoly represented mainly by: W.J. Baumol,
E.E. Bailey, R.D. Willig, J.C. Panzar assume that this market structure does not
necessarily require the administrative interference of the State. Representatives of
this line of thinking also propose we understand a natural monopoly as an outcome
of increasing economies of scale but, at the same time, they accept it is linked
with subadditivity of the cost function. They also draw attention to the issue of
sustainability of a natural monopoly assuming that when certain conditions are met
a monopolist may not abuse his position without provoking potential competitors to
enter the market controlled by the incumbent. The above laid the foundations for the
theory of contestable markets, which was a reaction to regulatory ideas concerning
natural monopolies. Classical natural monopoly concepts led to the conclusion that
an economically justified monopoly in some markets and possible conflict of interest
between a monopolist and his customers and consumers call for State-originated
regulations imposed in the public interest and with a view to maximize social welfare.
The second chapter of the book is devoted to views on regulating a natural monopoly
in the public interest. The starting point is an assumption of market weakness under
optimum allocation of resources in monopolized markets. The theory of welfare
economics recognizes Pareto optimum conditions and reasons why the reality diverges
from the optimum. In accordance with the concept of regulations adopted in the
public interest, the State is expected to eliminate market weaknesses and to regulate
the market to arrive at optimal allocation of resources and, by the same stroke, to
prevent negative external effects resulting from market monopolization.
Consistently with the theory of institutional economics, the starting point for these
views is the assumption that the State acts in the public interest, its interference is cost-
free, and weaknesses are characteristic of the market – not of the State. Regulation
of a natural monopoly by specifying an optimal price of goods or services of a given
monopolist is of key importance to these ideas. When these theories emerged, a
natural monopoly was true of markets of goods having primary importance to both the
consumers and the economy (power generation, railway transport, telecommunication)
and limiting the increase in monopolists’ prices was the main objective in order for
it not to translate into higher costs of manufacturing, higher prices, and the reduced
welfare of society. In a slightly more moderate form, the problem remains up to date,
hence the search for effective and efficient ways of regulating natural monopolies of
local and regional scope.
Searches for optimal price led to the following concepts: marginal cost pricing
(A. Marshall, A.C. Pigou, R.F. Khan, A.P. Lerner, H. Hotelling, J. Dupuit, R.H. Coase),
average cost prices (R.D. Willig, J.M. Clark), two-part tariff (J. Hopkinson,
M.S. Feldstein, S.C. Littlechild, R.D. Willig), multipart tariff (S.J. Brown, D.S. Sibley,
J.A. Ordover, J.C. Panzar, R.A. Meyer, D. Dimopoulos), peak load pricing (J.M. Clark,
O.E. Williamson, M. Boitex, J. Hirshleifer, A. E. Khan) and finally price differentiation
in accordance with Ramsey’s principle (F. Ramsey, W.J. Baumol, D.F. Bradford,
M. Boiteux, S.V. Berg). All these concepts form a part of the traditional theory of
natural monopoly regulation, have their roots in the theory of social welfare, and
assume the need to regulate natural monopoly because of market weaknesses and
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
3. Regulation of a natural monopoly in theory and practice 241
negative external effects of market monopolization resulting from them. Various
concepts of price regulation came into being in attempts to find a solution bringing
outcomes as close to optimum Pareto as possible.
Three types of potential State interference feature in the views of the advocates
of classical theory: by means of taxes and subsidies, by regulating private monopolies,
or by nationalizing a natural monopoly and subjecting it to direct supervision of the
State. The author outlines these views highlighting the diversity between them that
exists despite their common starting point. She asks many questions to which theory
not always can find an unambiguous answer, but which inspire us to further theoretical
and empirical studies. The problem cumulates especially in subsequent chapters where
Borkowska refers to practice. The critics of market failure theory, State reliability,
and cost-free State regulation of natural monopolies (K.J. Arrow, R.B. Horowitz,
R.H. Coase) was the starting point for models of economic regulation based on
interest groups.
The third chapter of the book reviews concepts of interest group behaviour in
the context of State regulation of natural monopolies (G.S. Becker, A.F. Bentley,
M. Olson, S. Peltzman, G.J. Stigler, D.B. Truman). Ideas for regulation disregard
the thesis of a regulator acting in favour of optimal allocation of resources and care
for social welfare but with reference to practice, facts are quoted confirming that
operations by regulators are subject to political pressure and take account of not only
consumers’ interest as the weaker side of market transactions, but also producers’,
especially natural monopolists as influential players in the market of political services.
This chapter provides interesting descriptions of the behaviour of regulators and
businesses subjected to regulations using examples from the US and resulting in the
operations of pressure groups, lobbyists, and rent seeking. Differently from classical
theory, regulation (as operating models for pressure groups) considers economic
benefits equal to political ones, e.g., winning political popularity and votes by pressure
groups. Politics and economics intertwined together is a more reliable reflection of
reality. The theory of pressure groups also draws attention to the asymmetry of
information between a regulator and a regulated company (classical theory assumes
both sides of the regulatory process are perfectly well informed) and to the possibility
of regulation being taken over by a regulated entity. G.S. Becker, J.J. Laffont, and
Tirol construed an agency theory which says that conflict of interests between groups
may deepen regulation inefficiency.
The final part of chapter three includes case studies of regulation history in the
US in sectors like railway transport, cable telecommunication services, and electricity
markets. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the US it was decided that all of
the above sectors manufacture products and render services in the general economic
interest and for that reason they should be regulated by the State in the public interest.
Observations of regulatory activities in the market of railway transport show these
activities were outcomes of the pressure of many different groups of interest and
consumers, as the weakest and the least organized group were not represented in
the game. We cannot say that regulation was taken over by railway companies as
its content took account of business users of railways. The description of regulation
Vol. 2011, 4(4)
4. 242 BOOK REVIEWS
in the market of cable telephony tells a story of a natural monopolist, which Bell
Telephone Company (BTC) was at the end of the 19th century. That history starts with
BTC building monopolistic power with the support of the State, while in 1949–1982
they forced out the division of the company enjoying such a strong market position
that competition could not develop, whether real or potential. Telecommunication
and antitrust regulators had problems with information asymmetry and with the
involvement of a group of eminent economists and lawyers on the side of the operator
who fought for the company’s interests.
The author draws our attention to a very important element which weakens
the need for regulation and competition. That is technical progress which created
competition to cable telecommunication from the side of mobile telephony and
VOIP. The example of electricity market regulation is not as unambiguous as the
previous ones. The reason is the high share of sunk costs in capital investment
outlays to start and to continue operations in the market of electricity and power.
The description of American experiences include many aspects familiar to Poles from
their own experience: the dilemma of operations concentrated in huge multinationals,
unbundling of transmission and distribution from generation and sales, and stimulating
energy generation from renewable resources. In presenting historical American
experiences, the author asks numerous interesting questions but finding answers to
them would require deepened studies. These questions are also to the point for the
Polish regulatory experience of the last two decades.
The fourth chapter presents new regulations for natural monopolies based on the
theory of new institutional economics. Following R.H. Coase’s concept it is assumed
that information in the market (economic, political) is incomplete and asymmetric,
the rationality of market players is limited, they are inclined to display opportunistic
approaches and in the entire regulatory process we should compare the weaknesses
of market and public administration. The new approach to regulation consists in
proposing the following theoretical solutions applied in practice: auctioning as a form
of competing to enter the market (E. Chadwick, H. Demsetz, O.E. Williamson,
M. Armstrong, S. Cowan, J. Vickers), yardstick competition (A. Shleifer, J.J. Laffont,
J. Tirole, M. Armstrong, S. Cowan, J. Vickers), price-cup regulation (S.C. Littlechild),
essential facility access price (R. Willig, W.J. Baumol, J.G. Sidak, M. Armstrong,
S. Cowan, J. Vickers), and structural regulation of natural monopoly (S. Peltzman,
R.J. Gilbert, E.P. Kahn, O. Shy, O.E. Williamson, M. Armstrong, S. Cowan, J. Vickers,
P.G. Klein). All these concepts assume activated competition if not on the market, then
by relating regulation instruments to averaged economic reality. Proposed solutions
may be applied in regulating municipal monopolies where in practice it is usually
difficult to find solutions directly based on market competition.
By the end of the fourth chapter the author focuses upon the relation between
exercising political power and effective regulations, with efficiency here meaning the
smooth exploitation and development of natural monopolies. The studies quoted
in the book reveal a large scope of discretion in political decisions which does not
favour investments in infrastructure as the absence of regulatory stability contributes
to higher investment risk. The studies on regulatory contracts cited in the book show
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
5. Regulation of a natural monopoly in theory and practice 243
they offered poor protection to entrepreneurs against the opportunism of political
authority.
The theory of new regulation is a response to imperfect interference of the political
system with the economy, also in natural monopolies. Theoretical attempts to make
objective the criteria used in regulatory decisions proved to be little effective: hence
the new approach to economic regulation based on the principle of regulation for
competition. The author’s reference to experiences of countries with long-established
regulatory practice and a democratic state is very instructive for Polish readers and
the book can be recommended not only to theoreticians but also to practitioners
engaged in natural monopoly sectors as well as politicians with whom many regulatory
operations and decisions originate. The book is based on well selected, representative
publications, mostly American and British. The book allows us to follow the
development of economic and political views on regulating natural monopolies. The
developmental trends indicate a rather clear direction of changes: from normative
to positive concepts resulting from experiences accumulated in regulatory processes.
Prof. Dr. Anna Fornalczyk
Technical University of Łódź,
Chair for European Integration and International Marketing
Vol. 2011, 4(4)