The document discusses the results of local elections held in Colombia on October 28, 2007. It summarizes that the elections showed that paramilitary groups still exert political influence in many regions of Colombia. Several candidates who won elections had direct ties to politicians currently being investigated for links to paramilitary groups. The political parties that are part of the ruling coalition, some of which have members under investigation for paramilitary links, won a significant number of mayoralties across the country, demonstrating the ongoing political power of paramilitary networks. The elections highlighted the need for greater transparency and measures to dismantle ties between politicians and paramilitaries.

1. Con el apoyo de:
1
Gobierno de
Canadá
Bulletin No 21: Series on the rights of the victims and the application of Law 975
Recent local elections are evidence that paramilitarism is
alive and well in Colombia
On October 28 2007, elections for mayors, governors, deputies, councilmen and local
administrative councils were held. The realization and results of these elections awoke
special interest at both the national and international levels, as nearly 45 Congress
members from 16 departments of the country are being investigated by the Supreme
Court and by the Prosecutor General’s office for their presumed links with paramilitary
groups. This, added to the supposed demobilization of nearly 31,000 paramilitaries,
raised greater expectations about these elections than on any other previous occasion.
Perhaps the greatest expectation is whether, on the basis of the results, paramilitarism –
understood not only as a military structure but also as an economic and political structure
– has indeed been dismantled, as the government insists[1], or whether, on the contrary,
these structures continue to exert their power in the country.
27,000 candidates endorsed by political parties with links to the paramilitaries
The investigations against various politicians for their presumed links with paramilitary
groups, and revelations about alliances between national and local-level politicians with
these groups caused impact in public opinion. However, this impact was not reflected in
the implementation of mechanisms to overcome this situation; although the Supreme
Court and the Prosecutor’s Office have undertaken efforts to elucidate such links, these
efforts will dissolve if the government does not implement strategies to dismantle the
tight relations between important politicians and paramilitary groups.
The above became evident during the past elections, in which five of the political parties
whose members are being investigated for their links with paramilitary groups offered
their endorsement to approximately 27,000 candidates of the 86,000 that were registered.
[2] Likewise, the politicians investigated for presumed links with paramilitaries continue
to be involved in politics from prison, which demonstrates that many of them have
continued to exert great power in their regions of influence, and that the political
structures of paramilitarism remain intact.
Indeed, political parties presumably involved with paramilitary groups, such as Colombia
Viva, Colombia Democrática, Apertura Liberal, Convergencia Ciudadana and Alas-
Equipo Colombia, gave their backing to thousands of candidates and there were no
mechanisms in place to prevent it. For example, the political party Colombia Viva,
*The European Union supported the first phase of this project, between July and December of 2006, during which this
series of information bulletins was begun and the first twelve numbers published, available on the web page. The
present publication has been prepared under the auspices of the Canadian government, and its content is the sole
responsibility of the Colombian Commission of Jurists. In no way should it be thought to reflect the point of view of
the European Union or of the government of Canada.

2. 2
founded by Dieb Maloof, Congressman from Atlántico department and currently under
arrest for supposed links with the paramilitary leader “Jorge 40,” sought to win six
governorships, six mayoralties of capital cities, and 3,437 seats in local councils,
assemblies, and mayoralties, for a total of 3,551 endorsements. [3]
Likewise, the party Convergencia Ciudadana, founded by Congressman Luis Alberto Gil,
formally interrogated for his links with paramilitarism, sponsored four governorships, 11
mayoralties of capital cities, and 6,588 seats in the remaining bodies. For its part, the
party Colombia Democrática, founded by the President of Colombia, and also seriously
implicated in paramilitarism, gave 5,338 endorsements for the elections, among them
four governorships. Several of the members of this party are being investigated for links
with paramilitarism: Senator Mario Uribe, founding member and cousin of the President;
also Congressmen Miguel de la Espriella and Álvaro García Romero, who are currently
detained. [4]
For its part, Apertura Liberal, a political party whose member, Representative Jorge Luis
Caballero, is being investigated for the offenses of agreement to commit a crime
(concierto para delinquir) and procedural fraud, gave 4,682 endorsements for assemblies
and councils, 10 for governorships, and six for mayoralties of capital cities. Lastly, Alas-
Equipo Colombia, one of whose founding members, Senator Álvaro Araújo Castro, is in
prison, gave 6,356 endorsements for the October elections. [5]
The above figures speak for themselves and are sufficient to conclude that the authorities
did not take any steps to keep paramilitarism from seizing local political power again,
and are proof that paramilitarism continues its strategy of infiltrating local and regional
political power. In spite of the fact that these five political parties are being severely
questioned regarding the legitimacy of the election of their members in past elections,
they were able to endorse candidates freely for the October election and to continue
acting in politics without any consequences for the investigations of which many of their
members are object.
Politicians elected with the support of members of parliament being investigated for
paramilitarism
Some of the candidates are being severely questioned not only for being endorsed by
political parties involved in investigations for links with paramilitarism, but also because
there are direct accusations against them of having links with paramilitaries or, at least,
with politicians who are at present being investigated for links with such groups.
There are several candidates about whom it was said that they enjoyed direct support
from politicians being investigated for their presumed links with paramilitary groups. For
example, Senators Álvaro García and Jairo Merlano, both detained in the investigation on
“parapolitics,” supported the candidacy for the mayoralty of Sincelejo (Sucre) of Jesús
Paternina Namur, and the candidacy for the governorship of the same department of
Jorge Carlos Barraza Farak. [6] For its part, the candidacy of Martha Sáenz to the

3. 3
governorship of the department of Córdoba had the backing of Congressmen Juan
Manuel López Cabrales y Reginaldo Montes, also detained. [7]
Also, the candidacy for the governorship of the department of Cesar of Arturo Rafael
Calderón Rivadeneira, former secretary of health during the administration as governor of
Hernando Molina, was questioned because of the support he received from La Picota
prison. On the one hand, the detained senator Álvaro Araújo Castro, from prison and
through radio station Radio Guatapurí, owned by his family, “invited” the electors to vote
for Calderón. [8] The candidate, for his part, had the backing of Hernando Molina,
former governor of the department of Magdalena, currently detained for alleged links
with the paramilitary leader alias “Jorge 40,” who supposedly led Hernando Molina to a
victory for the governorship in 2003 after threatening and forcing Cristian Hernando
Moreno to give up his candidacy. [9] Álvaro Araújo, too, is allegedly supporting the
candidacy of David Andrade to the mayoralty of Bosconia (Cesar), and the candidate
himself visited the senator in prison to ask for his political support. [10]
The candidacy of Omar Díazgranados for the governorship of Magdalena too was
questioned. This candidate was the secretary of Trino Luna, former governor of
Magdalena, who is currently detained for his alleged links with paramilitaries. The
candidate enjoyed the support of the former governor and, also, had the endorsement of
former representative Alfonso Campo and Senator Luis Eduardo Vives. These two are
also detained at La Picota prison for their alleged links with paramilitary groups. [11]
For his part, Senator Dieb Maloof, detained for his alleged links with paramilitarism,
endorsed the candidacy to the Bogotá City Council of Liliana Támara, who was his aide
in Congress. The name of Liliana Támara has been involved in a bribe of three thousand
million pesos that the senator offered so that a health insurance company would not be
shut down.[12]
Beyond the political backing that some of the congress people under investigation gave to
many of the candidates postulated for the October elections, some paramilitaries under
the special treatment accorded them by Law 975 of 2005, who are currently giving free-
version testimonies, have singled out some of the candidates of the past elections as
members of the paramilitary structure. This happened on October 29, 2007, when the
paramilitary leader Ever Veloza, alias “HH,” said at a free-version hearing held one day
after the elections, when the results were already known, that Arnulfo Peñuela, elected
for mayor of Carepa (Antioquia) directed the paramilitary organization (Convivir)
“Papagayo,” created by Raúl Hazbún, a well-known paramilitary from Urabá, through
whom the banana companies of the region made their “contributions” to
paramilitarism.[13]
The far from negligible victories of candidates linked with paramilitaries
The preceding are only a few examples of the political grip that the paramilitaries and
their political structure have on many regions of the country, as the electoral contest of
October past demonstrated that electoral campaigns still function in the traditional way,

4. 4
and that, when it comes to politics, little has changed. The mere postulation of candidates
endorsed by political parties whose members are being investigated is a sign that
paramilitarism is not finished, in spite of what the government announces; since, as was
mentioned before, paramilitary structures are much more than armed structures. Unless
the power that various politicians forged together with paramilitary bosses to take hold of
the resources of the regions for their own particular interests is dismantled, it will be
difficult to maintain that paramilitarism has ceased to exist; and it will be equally difficult
to think that the country will have transparent elections, removed from paramilitary
influence, in the near future.
What happened then with the results of the October 28 elections? The results indicate
that, although some politicians supported by paramilitarism did not gain seats, others did;
and, also, that the political parties whose members are being investigated for links with
paramilitarism did not lose their power but “realigned” themselves throughout the
country. [15]
Some candidatures supported by the political parties questioned for links with
paramilitaries obtained victories. Such is the case of the candidate for the governorship
of Magdalena, Omar Díazgranados, supported from La Picota prison, or of Martha del
Socorro Sáenz, who won the governorship of Córdoba thanks to the support of detained
Congressman Juan Manuel López Cabrales. Elections to the governorship of the
department of Sucre were also severely questioned for possible electoral fraud, after the
liberal candidate Julio César Guerra Tulena was declared winner, in principle, and then
later the candidate of the “U” Party, Jorge Carlos Barraza Farak, with the support of
imprisoned Congress members Álvaro García and Jairo Merlano, won by a difference of
889 votes. [16]
The results of the elections for mayors are another source of concern. Once again Álvaro
García showed that he is still the boss in the department of Sucre, not only by the victory
of his candidate to the governorship but also by the victory of Jesús Antonio Paternina to
the mayoralty of Sincelejo, backed by García’s movement Colombia Viva. Particularly
worrisome are the results of the mayoralty elections in municipalities such as San Onofre
(Sucre), where Edgar Benito Rebollo, candidate presumably supported by the
paramilitaries, won[17]; Yalí (Antioquia), where the winner was Óscar Alonso Mira,
“demobilized” paramilitary of the Héroes de Granada Block, who had been mayor of the
same municipality between 2001 and 2003[18]; Sabanalarga (Casanare), where the
mayor’s office went to Juan Antonio Bernal Ramírez, who is in prison since October 15,
2007, for the offense of agreement to commit a crime, due to his alleged links with
paramilitary groups[19]; Campo de la Cruz (Atlántico), where the winner was Carlos
Gutiérrez Cotes, who is also detained presumably for being a member of the paramilitary
group “Los 40”[20]; and Carepa (Antioquia), where, as was mentioned before, the winner
was Arnulfo Peñuela, singled out by alias “HH” as leader of a paramilitary group.
The results, and who won in several departments and municipalities, illustrate how
paramilitarism has taken over an important part of local political power in the country

5. 5
once again. However, this situation can be viewed in a broader scale if the results of the
elections are analyzed keeping in mind the political parties that won.
The political parties that make up the coalition now in government, most of which are
involved in the investigations that the judicial authorities are carrying out against some of
their members are, overall, the winners of the electoral contest. Of these, the most
affected by the investigations, although losing the regional capital cities, won a good
number of municipal mayoralties, taking over a good portion of the national territory.
Indeed, the movement Alas-Equipo Colombia gained one governorship and 83
mayoralties; Apertura Liberal won 37 mayoralties; the movement Colombia Viva gained
13 mayoralties; for its part, Colombia Democrática obtained victory in 34 mayoralties;
and Convergencia Ciudadana won 72 mayoralties and one governorship[21].
If the results are analyzed in comparison with those of the 2003 elections, it will be seen
that some of these parties have been growing and are consolidating. For example, the
movement Convergencia Ciudadana went from 21 mayors in 2003 to 72 in these
elections and kept one governorship in both periods. The movement Apertura Liberal, for
its part, went from 24 to 37 mayoralties; Alas-Equipo Colombia increased its presence by
15 mayoralties, progressing from 68 to 83; the movement Colombia Viva went from 27
mayoralties to 13, still a hardly negligible number[22].
The figures show, as a whole, that there is a tendency toward the nation-wide
consolidation of the political parties that have been questioned for their links with the
paramilitaries, rather than a decrease in their presence; and even that a territorial
expansion is underway through the high number of municipal mayoralties they won.
These elements allow us to state that, without a doubt, paramilitarism remains an actor
involved in politics and exerting great pressure on elections, since the local political map
that will rule for the next four years will continue to be, in great part, influenced by actors
ignorant of democracy.
There is an urgent need to guarantee electoral transparency
From the beginning, the October 28 elections were characterized by a lack of
transparency, as innumerable risks threatened to upset the democratic order. Both civil
society and State institutions questioned severely the past polling day. These elections
were marked by warnings about electoral fraud and acts of violence taking place against
various candidates in different regions of the country. The Electoral Observation Mission
(Misión de Observación Electoral - MOE)[23] reported 151 acts of violence attributable
both to guerrilla and paramilitary groups, among them 29 homicides, eight kidnappings,
23 attacks, and 91 threats against the candidates.[24] Likewise, that organization warned
about the risks run by 576 municipalities through the influence of the armed actors[25]. If
to this one adds the warning about support to various candidates from the paramilitaries –
supposedly dismantled –, then we can see that the situation previous to Election Day was
not very encouraging at all.

6. 6
In the face of these threats, the government responded mostly by assigning a greater
number of state forces to watch over the elections. [26] However, greater presence of the
state forces does not mean greater freedom or security for the voters. Although polling
day went off in apparent calm and with few “alterations of law and order,” it is not less
true that, in order for state forces to be the guarantors of security on polling days, it
would be required, in the first place, that the links between paramilitary groups and
members of the state forces be broken. Furthermore, in what concerns paramilitary
groups, their strategy for exerting pressure on the voters is not limited to armed pressure,
as the October elections proved. In order to seize political power locally and nationally,
the paramilitaries have resorted to diverse strategies that span from campaign financing to
electoral fraud, none of which has a satisfactory solution in an increase in the number of
state forces to watch over the elections.
In conclusion, the elections of October 28 were not, as the government announced and
expected, “the most transparent in the history of Colombia.”[27] If there was anything
transparent about them, it is the influence of criminal interests seriously affecting the
validity of democracy in Colombia. What would happen, for instance, if the thousands of
fraudulent votes won by candidates backed and financed by the paramilitaries were
deducted from the total votes obtained in the elections for national and local public
office? Surely the political landscape would change considerably, since the threshold to
gain access to seats, in this case in Congress, would go down. Thus, as the results
changed, other legitimate political parties would now obtain the seats that they could not;
this would bring balance to the political forces in Congress and have a direct influence on
public policies and on the laws to be approved by Congress.
The way that the political map took shape through the elections, no change can be
expected in the management of power. For such a change to take place, guarantees are
needed of separation between politicians and paramilitary groups. Perhaps an electoral
reform that would set clear and transparent rules of the game would permit a purge of
public bodies, which, as the current judicial investigations show, are deeply penetrated by
paramilitarism.
For more information, please contact Gustavo Gallón-Giraldo, Director of the CCJ, at Tel. (571) 376 8200, Ext. 115.
Bogotá, December 27, 2007
*  The present publication has been produced with the support of the European Union and the Government of Canada. Its contents are
the sole responsibility of the Colombian Commission of Jurists. In no way should it be thought to reflect the point of view of the
European Union or of the government of Canada.
[1] See, among others, the words of the President, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, on July 20, 2007 at the ceremony of installation of Congress.
See: http://web.presidencia.gov.co.
[2] Claudia López, “¡Peligro! No escoja candidatos de alto riesgo para la democracia”, (Warning! Do not choose candidates who put
democracy at risk). October 26, 2007. Consulted at: : www.semana.com
[3] El Tiempo, “Partidos heridos por la parapolítica van en busca de 16 gobernaciones” (Parties wounded by parapolitics go in search
of 16 governorships). October 21, 2007, pages 14-15
[4]Ibíd.
[5] Ibíd.
[6] El Espectador, “Mapa electoral de la costa”, (Electoral Map of the Coast), September 2, 2007, page 4-A.
[7] Ibíd.

7. 7
[8] El Tiempo, “Desde prisión, ex senador Araújo impulsa campaña”, (From prison, former senator Araújo promotes campaign),
August 7, 2007, pages 1-4.
[9] El Tiempo, “Sombra ‘parapolítica’ en campaña del Cesar” (The shadow of “parapolitics” in campaign in Cesar). October 22, 2007.
Electronic version.
[10] El Tiempo, “Blindar elecciones: ¿imposible?” (Shielding the elections: Impossible?), May 20, 2007, pages 1-5.,
[11] El Espectador, “Mapa electoral de la costa”, (Electoral Map of the Coast), September 2, 2007, page 4-A.
[12] El Tiempo, “Partidos heridos por la parapolítica van en busca de 16 gobernaciones”, (Parties wounded by parapolitics go in
search of 16 governorships). October 21, 2007, pages 14-15
[13] El Tiempo, “Trece elegidos con líos con la justicia” (Thirteen of those elected have problems with justice), October 30, 2007,
pages 1-4.
The “Convivir” groups, also known as “rural security cooperatives,” were associations authorized by Decree-Law 356 of 194 to use
weapons of war. The norm that permitted it (paragraph of Article 39), was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in
November 1997 (Sentence C-572/07). The “Convivir” were used intensively in the development of paramilitarism.
[14]It is the case of Rafael Arturo Calderón, candidate for the governorship of Cesar, supported from the la Picota jail, who lost the
elections to Cristian Moreno, candidate who had been rejected by the paramilitaries in the elections of 2003; or the case of Didier
Alberto Tavera Amado, who lost the governorship of the department of Santander to the liberal Horacio Serpa and had the support of
Luis Alberto Gil, senator being investigated for his alleged links with paramilitaries. However, Convergencia Ciudadana,political
party founded by that senador, won the governorship of Amazonas. See, in this respect, El Tiempo, “Varias regiones les pasaron
cuenta de cobro a los de la 'parapolítica'”, (Several regions got even with those linked with “parapolitics”), October 29, 2007, pages 1-
3.
[15] Claudia López, “Más violencia política en medio de mayor seguridad: otra paradoja de estas elecciones”, (More political violence
in the midst of greater security: another paradox of these elections), October 24, 2007, consulted in: www.semana.com
[16] “Los magos de Sucre”, (The magicians of Sucre), November 2, 2007, consulted in: www.votebien.com
[17] El Universal, “Campaña de Benitorevollo de San Onofre es ilegal”, (The campaign of Benito Revollo of San Onofre is illegal),
July 18, 2007, electronic version.
[18] El Colombiano, “Que me vean como Alcalde, no como paraco: Óscar Mira”, (They should view me as mayor, not as
paramilitary), consulted in: www.elcolombiano.com.co
[19] El Tiempo, “Varias regiones les pasaron cuenta de cobro a los de la 'parapolítica'” (Several regions got even with those linked
with “parapolitics”), October 29, 2007, pages 1-3.
[20] El Tiempo “Trece elegidos, con líos con la justicia”, (Thirteen of those elected have problems with justice), October 30, 2007,
pages 1-4.
[21] Consulted in: www.registraduría.gov.co
[22] Ver al respecto, Claudia López, “Más violencia política en medio de mayor seguridad: otra paradoja de estas elecciones”, (More
political violence in the midst of greater security: another paradox of these elections), October 24, 2007, consulted in:
www.semana.com
[23] The Electoral Observation Mission (MOE in Spanish) is an organization of civil society made up of non governmental
organizations, universities, social organizations, economic groups, and citizens whose aim is to oversee the electoral process is in
conformity with democratic principles. See: www.moe.org.co
[24] Claudia López, “Más violencia política en medio de mayor seguridad: otra paradoja de estas elecciones”, (More political violence
in the midst of greater security: another paradox of these elections), October 24, 2007, consulted in: www.semana.com
[25] See in this respect, Electoral Observation Mission, “Retos electorales, riesgos y recomendaciones: elecciones octubre 28 de 2007”
(Electoral challenges, risks and recommendations: elections of October 28, 2007), Bogotá, October 2007
[26] See, among others, Bulletin of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, “Para garantizar unas elecciones transparentes 77 mil
efectivos adicionales de la policía y 107 mil del Ejército reforzarán seguridad”, (To guarantee transparent elections, 77 thousand
additional members of the police and 107 thousand of the army will reinforce security), September 27, 2007, see:
http://www.mij.gov.co
[27] Ibíd.