1) Colonel Gaddafi claimed that the protests in Libya were caused by al-Qaeda, and that he was merely fighting terrorism, but many see this as a way for Gaddafi to gain international support for staying in power. 2) While al-Qaeda does have a presence in North Africa, there is no evidence they are directly involved in the Libyan protests, which seem primarily focused on ending corruption. 3) However, if the protests drag on and the rebels grow desperate, they may turn to al-Qaeda for aid, undermining future security in the region. International intervention aims to replace Gaddafi quickly before this can happen.

1. Blame it on Al Qaeda: Gaddafi’s Final Hope<br />An Article written by Braden Johnson<br />For consideration in the BYU Political Review<br />Another head of state has jumped on the bandwagon. A newly emerging trend, since the tragic events of 9/11, seems to involve pursuing one’s own interest under the guise of fighting terrorism. Up until this point, the pursuance of these interests could be reasonably tied to some goal of enforcing national security, with such actions as the US led invasion of Iraq, the passing of “The Patriot Act,” and The TSA’s hijack of unobtrusive airport security. But when Libya’s infamous dictator, Mummar Gaddafi, penned a letter to President Obama this week, the limits of this trend were pushed beyond reasonable consideration. Colonel Gaddafi shocked the world by stating, “We are fighting nothing other than al-Qaida in what they call the Islamic Maghreb,” and then, “if you had found them taking over American cities by the force of arms, tell me what you would do?”<br />Colonel Gaddafi’s use of these words, in this order, seems as out of place as the French-backed attacks on Libya these past several days. Can Gaddafi really be arrogant enough to state that cutting off power to his own lands, and killing his own subjects is diminishing the role of terrorism? Yet his words may have some small pieces of truth in them. <br />The Maghreb is a North African region that has been relatively cohesive under several different historical empires, as far back as 1040 AD and as recently as 1989. Gaddafi has long dreamt that this area would become a Muslim super-state, but trade tensions and lack of development have derailed this vision. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a radical Islamic militia in this area, calling themselves, “The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb,” which carried out violent acts and ran a black market economy. Though their efforts are mainly focused on Algeria, their presence in the Maghreb is disruptive and deadly. <br />It is this ring of al-Qaeda cohorts that has allegedly given aid and support to those calling for new government in Libya, just like they did in Tunisia and Algeria; but this time it’s personal. <br />In the early 1990’s Gaddafi began taking steps to rid his country of the influence of al-Qaeda. In 1999, he handed over two of its citizens for trial at The Hague for their alleged role in the Pan Am 103 bombing. Libya later compensated victims of that flight, and admitted responsibility for the attack. Libya also stopped its WMD program, and took serious measures cut its ties with terrorist groups, including closing terrorist camps and extraditing terrorism suspects. These actions enraged al-Qaeda, and certainly stirred up a desire for regime change amongst its affiliates in the Maghreb. <br />But could it then be said that Libyan protestors, even violent ones, are affiliated with al-Qaeda? The answer is probably not. It has not been proven that al-Qaeda has any physical involvement in the revolt, and it is doubtful that their efforts could gain enough public support to be considered legitimate in the next regime. Although the opportunity for influence is present, Libyans are looking for an end to corruption in government, not just an exchange of corrupt leaders. Yet as the protestors grow evermore desperate for supplies, they may look to these terrorists for sustenance. This could create relationships that could undermine future security in North Africa, and undo some of the counterterrorism work that has been done there. <br />Gaddafi has much to gain by presenting to the World that those seeking regime change in his country are sponsored by al-Qaeda. By supporting this façade, he plays on the American sensitivity for terrorist infiltration. But if the 110 missiles fired on Libya in the last few days are any indication, the rest of the world isn’t buying his story. Gaddafi is clutching at straws, and seeking any possible way to stay in power. But the truth of the matter is, the people of Libya will not be placated, and the tenuous oil markets will not return to normal levels until a new regime takes the stage. <br />The role of the United States and its allies is to ensure that Gaddafi is taken out of power before the poorly outfitted rebels begin looking to al-Qaeda for support in their cause. Thus, the institution of a no-fly zone, and the partial occupation of the country is a necessary evil. If al-Qaeda is allowed back in to Libya, we can expect continued difficulty in the Islamic areas of Africa, and further attacks on Algeria and other nations. Thus, by securing a quick and effective regime change for Libya, we stop the goals of the terrorists, and secure a greater possibility for peace in North Africa. <br />