Binnenwerk mobiel banditisme_2009

Itinerant groups
target stores in
European Union
An urgent cross-border problem

www.dedetailhandel.nl

Detailhandel Nederland is the umbrella organisation for all retail trade
in the Netherlands. Its purpose is to optimise and strengthen the pro-
motion of retailers’ interests in The Hague and Brussels.
Detailhandel Nederland is the joint venture of the Netherlands Retail
Trade Council (RND) and the National Retail Council of the Dutch
Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MKB-Nederland).

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Detailhandel Nederland
Hendrik Jan van Oostrum, Head of Brussels office
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info@dedetailhandel.nl
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T: 070 – 320 23 45

Researcher:
Robert van Geffen, Radboud University Nijmegen

All rights reserved. The information in this research pamphlet
can only be used with proper citation and written permission of
Detailhandel Nederland.

Graphic design:
Studio Steenbergen BNO, Gouda

Printing:
Joh. Enschedé Amsterdam

November, 2009

Itinerant groups
target stores in
European Union
An urgent cross-border problem

Contents

Preface 5

Summary 6

Chapter 1: Itinerant crime groups as a form of criminality 9

Chapter 2: Extent of the problem 13

Chapter 3: Approach to itinerant crime groups in the Netherlands 25

Chapter 4: International approach to itinerant crime groups 31

Chapter 5: The Treaty of Lisbon and the changing role of the European Union 37

Conclusions 41

Recommendations 43

Research justification 45

Preface
Itinerant crime groups constitute a serious problem for retailers, both
in the Netherlands and in Europe as a whole. With the abolition of
border controls in the European Union, it has not only become easier
for citizens to travel freely to other Member States, but also for
criminals. Retailers are confronted with this fact every day. In recent
years, they have been increasingly targeted by organised, itinerant
crime groups, also known as mobile groups, mainly from (South)
Eastern Europe. Worryingly, the European Union has failed to tackle
this cross-border problem.

The retail trade plays a prominent role in the European economy.
The retail trade is a very important socio-economic player and
employer in the EU. However, retail crime is putting profit margins
under increasing pressure and affecting retailers and employees. Retail
crime is bad for the economy and bad for society. Unfortunately, the
sector has noted that the approach to itinerant crime groups
is inadequate in most of the Member States. At the European level,
this form of crime is falling between two stools. The European police
and justice organisations, Europol and Eurojust, are concentrating on
terrorism, drug smuggling and human trafficking. With this research,
Detailhandel Nederland wants to initiate change. Detailhandel
Nederland is striving to put the subject high on the European agenda
and thus force an effective approach to itinerant crime groups.

This report describes the current approach to itinerant crime groups
and makes recommendations. From Brussels research was performed
and practical examples and experiences were collected. Detailhandel
Nederland thus hopes to contribute to a joint solution. It should be
emphasised here that a retail trade with less crime is not only good for
retailers and their employees. Less crime is also good for the consumer,
who is ultimately the one who largely pays for everything stolen from
stores.

Mr. Patricia E.H. Hoogstraaten

5
Chair of the Europe Committee of Detailhandel Nederland

Summary

The retail trade in North West Europe is increasingly being plagued by itinerant crime groups, a
trend also known as mobile banditry. These are mainly (South) Eastern European groups, which
conduct series of crimes in a short space of time, mainly involving shoplifting, ram raids, hold-
ups, payment card fraud and burglaries.

Generally speaking, there are two types of itinerant crime groups. One type works on the basis
of the ‘hit and run’ principle. This group travels to and from Western Europe to conduct its raids
and returns within a day. The other itinerant crime groups are more organised and spend at least
several days in another country on their crime sprees. In this second category, there is a fairly
new trend whereby criminals stay with family or friends rather than in hotels or on camp sites.

All the groups use more or less the same method. Distracting employees and inconspicuous
behaviour are central to both. The perpetrators usually avoid violence, although violence seems
to have been on the rise recently.

In the Netherlands, the retail trade loses around € 250 million every year as a result of shop
thefts and burglaries by these groups.

In general, there has been a rise in the number of crimes and groups in recent years. The main
targets of these crimes are cosmetics, clothing and DIY articles. Having started in the east of the
Netherlands, the itinerant groups now operate throughout the Netherlands. Most of the perpe-
trators in the Netherlands come from Poland, the Baltic States and Romania.

The losses of the retail sector in the countries
investigated amount to € 7.6 billion a year

Itinerant crime groups are active in almost all the countries included in this report: the
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark,
Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Associations of
retailers in these countries are seriously concerned about the damage these crime groups cause.
Countries in Central Europe and the Baltic states are also targeted by itinerant crime groups,
although the problem is less serious than in North West Europe. Almost everywhere, the trend
seems to be an increase in the number of reports of mobile banditry. Annual losses resulting

6 Summary

from shop thefts carried out by itinerant crime groups in the
countries under review total nearly € 7.6 billion.

In the Netherlands, tackling itinerant crime groups is not a priority
for the government and police. In some cases, a temporary police
team may be created. However, such a team does not operate for
long enough to get a real grip on the problem. It only deals a tempo-
rary blow. There is no structural approach. Information made availa-
ble about offenders from abroad is often ignored. Furthermore,
public prosecutors are rarely prepared to bring criminal charges
against offenders.

The situation is similar in most European countries. Itinerant offen-
ders are only identified incidentally when a project is started. Only
Belgium seems to have been successful in prioritising the subject and
initiating collaboration between the government, police and retail
trade. The result has been the stabilisation and sometimes even a
decline in retail crime by groups.

At the European level, virtually no attention is currently devoted to
itinerant crime groups. The only known research was a study carried
out by Europol into payment card fraud. The European Commission
will start statistical research into criminality against business in
2010.

A European approach towards cross-border retail crime has failed to
get off the ground. The reasons for this can be found in legislation,
prioritisation, organisation structure and culture and a lack of mutu-
al trust and capacity. Nevertheless, the Member States should easily
be able to focus on mobile banditry at the European level. For exam-
ple, Europol could start research involving the collection and exchan-
ge of information about the problem. A Joint Investigation Team
could also be set up to facilitate operational cooperation. It is possi-
ble to call on Europol and found a Joint Investigation Team on the ini-
tiative of just two Member States.

Summary 7

European cooperation is set to change soon due to the Treaty of
Lisbon, whereby the European Commission and European Parliament
will gain more control. In many areas relating to police and legal coo-
peration, unanimous decision-making will be abolished in the Council
of Member States. However, it cannot be expected that the Treaty of
Lisbon can be of much practical use in tackling itinerant crime groups.
The European Union will still be unable to take decisions about the
operational deployment of police officers. The types of cross-border
crime to be tackled will still be decided on the basis of unanimity.

All in all, there does not seem to be a permanent approach towards
itinerant offenders by police and the judiciary and the approach
towards mobile groups in the Netherlands and Europe fails – despite
the availability of technical resources. Based on this research, several
recommendations can be made. For example, the retail trade
must continue to invest in prevention and there must be more
investment in cooperation with regional, national and supranational
governments.

For a really effective approach, the national government must give
priority to itinerant crime groups. These groups not only affect the
retail trade, they also impact on other groups in society, including
citizens. This makes the issue even more urgent. In concrete terms,
there is a need for a permanent police team specialised in this type
of crime. Such teams should be set up in all Member States, creating
centralised units and improving coordination. The government
should also develop a long term vision, while information from home
and abroad should always be used by police and the judiciary. At the
European level, the Member States should commission Europol to
investigate itinerant crime groups and the relevant Member States
should then create a Joint Investigation Team.

8 Summary

Chapter 1:

Itinerant crime
groups as a form of
criminality

1. Types of itinerant crime groups 10

2. Composition and working methods 11

9

Before discussing the extent of the problem and the approach towards itinerant crime groups,
it is important to explain what we mean by this phenomenon. The term ‘itinerant crime groups’
is defined differently at home and abroad. For this research, the main elements are combined.

Itinerant crime groups are groups that:
• commit series of shop thefts, ram raids, hold-ups, payment card fraud and burglaries,
• mainly originating from (South) Eastern European countries,
• commit many offences in a short space of time.

The perpetrators are also responsible for house and car break-ins and thefts and plague other
parts of industry. The criminal bosses often appear to be involved in human trafficking and drug
smuggling besides retail crime.

1. Types of itinerant crime groups

Generally speaking, there are two types of itinerant crime groups. Firstly, there are the groups
which work on the basis of the ‘hit and run’ principle. These are roving groups which travel to
Western Europe to do their business and return within a day. They often involve young people
who commit a one-off offence. They use the proceeds to fund luxury articles or their studies.
These young people are recruited by organised criminals whom they often meet through friends.
These criminals are often known to the police in their homeland and are involved in mobile
banditry as well as other forms of organised crime, such as human trafficking and drug
smuggling. The young people usually travel by minibus to Western Europe in groups of three or
four and often return within a day. These groups initially came from Poland and the Baltic
states, but now also come from Romania and Bulgaria.

The second form of mobile banditry is more organised and professional. These are groups who
spend a short time (usually between a week and a month) in Western Europe, travelling long
distances from one place during this period to carry out their raids. These offenders stay in
motorway hotels, on camp sites or in bungalow parks. They are in regular contact with each
other by mobile phone. Many groups spend several periods a year in Western Europe. These
groups are often not independent, but are related to criminal organisations and a black market
at home where the stolen goods are sold. Interestingly, these groups often come from the same
town in the country of origin. For example, for a long time the Netherlands was targeted by

10 Itinerant crime groups as a form of criminality

itinerant crime groups from the Polish town of Wroclaw.

The groups are usually part of a wider criminal circuit. Within this
circuit there are several key figures that keep in contact with and
coordinate the various groups. Criminal organisations that have been
rounded up consisted of 15 to sometimes 75 members.

These criminal groups not only use their own transport, they also use
international bus and train connections and to a lesser extent
aeroplanes. There are indications that special buses are used to
transport the criminals from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. The
criminals are then picked up a week later by a new bus bringing a
new group. The criminals spend the week shoplifting, begging and
pickpocketing. Such activities have been reported by Belgium and
Denmark, among others.

Within this second category of more organised, professional mobile
banditry, a new trend can be observed. More reports are being
heard of actual migration from (South) Eastern Europe to other parts
of Europe, mainly families from Romania and Bulgaria. These
immigrants then offer short-term accommodation to family and
friends with criminal intentions.

2. Composition and working methods

Most groups consist of two to five people, mainly young men, but
women may also be involved in the theft of cosmetics. The members
of the group have clear roles. The offenders come into the stores
separately so that they are not recognised as a group. Some
members distract the personnel, while others fill their bags.
Sometimes criminals remove goods from the view of the security
camera after which they transfer them to another bag before leaving
the store. With respect to clothing theft, they may remove security
labels in the fitting rooms or use prepared bags which do not set off

Itinerant crime groups as a form of criminality 11

the alarm. If the offenders are noticed, they often respond very
aggressively. In recent years, retailers have noted an increase in
aggression by itinerant offenders.

Outside the store, one of the offenders keeps watch, sometimes in a
getaway car. The loot is then hidden in a prepared car or even buried
in woodland until they return to their homeland. The groups often
steal to order and have lists of cosmetics and designer clothing that
they need to take. The organised nature of the crimes meant that
last year the first offenders were convicted of belonging to a criminal
organisation. This is a step forward in the fight against itinerant
crime groups.

12 Itinerant crime groups as a form of criminality

Chapter 2:

Extent of the problem

1. The Netherlands 14

2. Belgium 17

3. Germany 18

4. Rest of Europe 19

???????????? 13

Besides causing losses to the retail trade, itinerant crime groups also cause social damage.
Criminality in the retail trade is often considered an economic crime without casualties. In recent
years, however, itinerant crime groups have been using more and more violence. Consequently,
employees who have been victim to this violence may be unable to work for shorter or longer
periods. Society partly pays for the consequences.

For some retailers, the costs of losses and security may be so high that they have to close their
store or departments. Store closures reduce the quality of life in a local community. The social
function of local stores disappears and jobs are lost.

The costs of prevention and losses suffered at the hand of itinerant crime groups must be met.
There are two options here. On the one hand, it is possible for the retailers to pay the costs
themselves. In view of the narrow margins in the retail trade, this may mean the difference
between profit and loss for the business. On the other hand, the costs can also be passed on to
the consumer. However, retailers do not usually choose to increase prices due to the fierce
competition and strong market forces in the retail sector.

This report focuses on the retail trade, but itinerant offenders are also involved in other forms of
crime. This is the case in all the countries surveyed. Groups tend to be involved in car break-ins
and thefts, house burglaries and pickpocketing. It is estimated that some 20% of all burglaries
can be attributed to itinerant crime groups. In the Netherlands alone, that would mean 30,000
burglaries a year. In some areas of the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, rounding up these
kinds of groups resulted in a decline in the number of burglaries by several tens of percent. The
rounding up of one group can often solve many crimes. Tackling these groups is therefore
worthwhile.

1. The Netherlands

1.1 Extent of the damage
Based on interviews with retailers in 2008, Detailhandel Nederland estimated the losses
suffered at the hands of itinerant groups at € 220 million per year. This sum related to the total
losses caused by itinerant groups, not just by shop thefts. This research indicates that this
estimate reflects a lower limit and that actual losses are likely even higher.

14 Extent of the problem

The Monitor Crime in the Business Sector (Monitor Criminaliteit Bedrijfsleven) provides an
estimate based on a survey conducted by TNS NIPO relating to the number of thefts in the
period 2004-2008. In recent years, an average of 1.4 million store thefts have been carried out
on a yearly basis. The National Police Corps (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD) assumes
that 35% of all store thefts are committed by itinerant, mobile groups. That means that 490,000
store thefts are carried out by mobile groups every year.

The project teams Polaris 1 and 2 of the National Criminal Investigation Service (Dienst Nationale
Recherche), which have been occupied with mobile banditry for several years, registered the loot
of several groups. Based on hundreds of registrations, an average haul of around € 420 per theft
can be estimated. Based on this calculation, the losses suffered at the hands of itinerant crime
groups are around € 206 million per year, just from store thefts. Almost all the groups described
in tracking dossiers come from Eastern Europe, according to the KLPD.

An estimated 20 to 25% of all break-ins in the retail trade are committed by itinerant crime
groups. For the retail trade, that means losses of € 40 to € 50 million per year. In combination
with losses for thefts from stores, the total losses at the hands of itinerant crime groups for the
Dutch retail trade come to around € 250 million per year.

1.2 Increase or decrease
The idea that mobile groups play a big part in retail crime is confirmed by retailers, police offi-
cers and academics. Most retailers say that it has become a big problem particularly in recent
years. Cosmetics, clothing and DIY articles have been particularly targeted by mobile groups,
with electronics stores suffering to a lesser extent.

Since the accession of eight Eastern European Member States to the EU in 2004 and the
abolition of a visa requirement for residents from these new EU Member States, the number of
criminals, not necessarily store criminals, from Eastern Europe has risen significantly. This
concerned the accession of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. Another, more modest increase in the number of Eastern European criminals,
was the result of the accession of this group of eight countries to the Schengen Area at the end
of 2007, with which regular border controls were abolished. The accession of Romania and
Bulgaria in January 2007 to the European Union also resulted in an increase in the number of
criminals arrested from these countries, according to KLPD statistics.

Extent of the problem 15

The following table shows the origin of arrested suspects. Most Eastern European offenders
(70%) do not appear to reside in the Netherlands. According to the KLPD, they almost always
work in groups as an itinerant crime group. The Polaris project team confirms that offenders
from Eastern Europe very rarely operate alone, but in organised groups. Experts also indicate
that an increase in Eastern Europeans can be observed in the prison population.

Number of non-residents according to origin of suspected criminals

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Eastern Europe 3,397 3,746 3,733 3,798 4,827
Increase/decrease - + 10.3% -0.3% +1.7% + 27.1%

(source: KLPD Landelijke criminaliteitskaart 2007, p. 193)

1.3 Offenders
Store theft is by far the main form of property crime committed by Eastern Europeans. In recent
years, the offenders have spread across the Netherlands. While the first reports mainly came
from the east of the Netherlands, the problem has extended to other parts of the country in
recent years. Medium-sized towns and villages seem to be the most frequent target, but big
cities are now also being hit. This map shows where Eastern European groups suspected of store
theft were arrested in the period between July 2006 and December 2007. The groups are
mainly in the west, middle and south of the
Netherlands. Interestingly, many crimes are
committed near big thoroughfares. A typical
expression is that the A1 highway in the
Netherlands is the sewer of Europe.

The origin of the offenders appears to be
changing. Ten years ago, most Eastern
European offenders came from Poland,
Lithuania and the Balkans. A few suspects
came from the Caucasus, Bulgaria, Romania,
Russia and even Mongolia. In 2006, the vast
majority of Eastern European criminals came
from Poland, but there was also an increase


in the number of Romanians. Mobile banditry is still mainly attributed to Poland and the
residents of the Baltic states. Recently, the number of offenders from Romania and Bulgaria has
rocketed. These criminals are mainly involved in store thefts, skimming, muggings and pick-
pocketing. The criminals involved in payment card fraud (skimming) are almost all from Romania
and that is a growing problem, according to Europol.

Suspects (aged 12 and over) according to origin 2006

Number of Number of
Origin of suspects residents non-residents
Poland 787 1,939
Former Czechoslovakia 142 152
Hungary 171 72
Baltic states 47 319
Romania 118 348
Bulgaria 91 306

(Source: Rotterdam Institute for Social Policy Research, Risbo, Oost-Europeanen in Nederland, 2008)

2. Belgium

In Belgium, the extent of the problem of itinerant crime groups is similar to that in the
Netherlands. The total losses caused by mobile groups in the retail trade are also around € 250
million. According to the government, the percentage of business raids involving mobile groups
in Belgium is substantial at around 20-25%. The targets in Belgium are the same as in the
Netherlands: cosmetics, clothing and DIY articles.

The problem seems to have stabilised in Belgium in recent years. After a peak in 2005/2006,
the number of store thefts has remained the same in recent years and the number of ram
raids has even declined significantly, according to UNIZO, the Belgian lobby organisation for
independent businesses. This picture is confirmed by several retailers in Belgium. Some business
owners indicate a slight increase, but in general the number of reports of itinerant offenders
remains constant.


Nationality of itinerant groups in 2005

Ex-Yugoslavs (23%)

Romanians (22%)

Albanians (21%)

Others (8%)

Poles (6%)

Georgians (5%)

Moldavians (4%)

Lithuanians (3%)

Croatians (2%)

Russians (1%)

Estonians (1%)

(Source: Trimestrial report DJB)

2.3 Offenders
There are some prominent differences between Belgium and the Netherlands with respect to the
origin of the offenders. In Belgium, the groups tend to be from former Yugoslavia, Romania and
Albania (together 66%) and less from Poland than in the Netherlands. The offenders mainly
target big urban areas.

3. Germany

In 2007, 400,000 store thefts were reported to the Bundeskriminalamt in Germany with
330,000 different suspects registered with the police. Of these, 70,000 were not of German
origin. Of all the non-Germans, around 30% came from another EU member state. Suspects
from Poland, Italy and Romania were the most commonly registered. Every year, around
€ 4 billion is stolen from the retail trade in Germany.


On this basis, it can be concluded that at least € 250 million worth of goods are stolen from the
German retail trade by residents of other EU countries. However, this sum should be clarified. For
example, a large number of store thefts are not registered. In Germany, thefts only tend to be
reported when the offender is known. Due the flexibility and mobility of itinerant offenders,
relatively few thefts committed by them will be reported. The actual losses may therefore be
several times higher. Discussions with internationally operating retailers show that the KLPD
(Dutch Korps Landelijke Politiediensten) percentage of 35% of store thefts being committed by
crime groups is a realistic estimate for many European countries. This would mean losses in
Germany of nearly € 1.4 billion a year. In Germany, thefts of cosmetic articles are mainly repor-
ted. As in the Netherlands, these are mainly intended for the black market in the countries of origin.

Police studies show that the extent of the problem has remained stable. Reports about organi-
sed crime groups mention groups involved in store thefts. These show that the number of Polish
groups remains stable while the number of groups from Lithuania has declined significantly in
recent years. In contrast, groups from Romania show a strong increase and are heavily involved
in payment card fraud in Germany as well. Property crimes related to groups tend to be com-
mitted by groups from Eastern Europe.

3.3 Offenders
The offenders mainly seem to come from Poland and Romania. Relatively few store thefts are
committed in the east of Germany and in the Ruhr conurbation.

4. Rest of Europe

This research shows that mobile banditry mainly occurs in (North) Western Europe, but also
occurs in many other countries. Over the last five years, the problem has become increasingly
prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. Besides the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, this
research also investigated the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark,
Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

4.1 United Kingdom
There has been a large increase in the number of immigrants from Eastern European Member
States here. At the moment, there are almost one million immigrants from Eastern European


origin. Around 10% of all suspects in the United Kingdom (UK) are now of Eastern European
origin. These are mainly involved in store theft, pickpocketing and human trafficking. The
number of cases of payment card fraud has also rocketed. Over 80% of these are thought to
have been committed by Romanian groups. Retailers are increasingly hiring private security per-
sonnel in order to keep Eastern European criminals at bay and are less inclined to call in the
police. In addition, the UK is one of the few EU Member States which does not belong to
the Schengen area and where border controls are still performed. These border controls could
explain why there are no reports about the mass export of stolen goods as is the case in the
Netherlands and Belgium.

4.2 France
Research in the Netherlands into itinerant crime groups also found various offenders who were
also active in France. Furthermore, stolen vehicles from France were sometimes used in the
Netherlands. France itself reports a strong increase in criminality by itinerant crime groups.

4.3 Italy
In Italy, active groups tend to come from Romania and Albania. The extent of the problem has
not been assessed, but there are many reports of groups that stay in Italy either temporarily or
for a longer term. As has been mentioned, these groups are mainly from Romania and Albania,
but have links with Moldavia, Russia and the Ukraine. The groups are less known in Italy for their
wide scale store thefts and more for their car thefts and house burglaries. Italy seems to be an
attractive country due to the large population of Romanians who live there. It is estimated that
the number of Romanians living here doubled in 2008 to nearly one million.

4.4 Spain
No specific figures are known from Spain about the phenomenon of itinerant crime groups.
However, there are reports of raids and robberies carried out by groups from Romania and
Albania. These not only target stores and businesses, but also villas. The wave of very violent
villa burglaries that plagued the Spanish coast in recent years is the best known example of
these. Most of the arrested EU citizens in Spain come from Romania.

4.5 Sweden
In Sweden, mobile banditry is a well-known phenomenon. There are no figures relating to
total losses, but many organised groups track through the country. The problem has increased
in recent years. Offenders tend to come from Poland and the Baltic states. Here too, the


phenomenon of Romanian skimmers appears. There are also reports of Russians who are flown
in for one day to carry out various raids. This last phenomenon occurs in several countries. Mobile
banditry is not well registered in Sweden, due to the sensitive nature of registering nationality
in the country.

4.6 Denmark
Mobile banditry also occurs in Denmark. In the past, groups tended to spend the summer months
in Denmark, but groups are currently active all year round. Last year, the Danish police was aware
of twenty of such groups. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of
itinerant crime groups. This is confirmed by the Danish national police. In the past two years,
the total number of store thefts in Denmark has risen by 20% (this is probably not totally
attributable to the itinerant groups). Romanians have been particularly well represented in the
past year. The police also arrested people from Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic
states. As in the Netherlands, most criminals stay on camp sites, in hostels or sleep in their car.

4.7 Switzerland
Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it was included in this research because it is
part of the Schengen area. Switzerland is aware of the phenomenon of itinerant crime groups
and has noted an increase in the problem in recent years. In particular, groups from South
Eastern Europe (Albania and Macedonia) are active here. Thefts and break-ins are also regularly
committed by groups from the Caucasus. Nearly half of all thefts are committed by non-Swiss
nationals, not always in a group context.

4.8 Austria
In Austria, the phenomenon has become well known in recent years and there are many reports
of groups. An increase in the problem has been observed. The country is mainly targeted by
groups from Romania, the Ukraine and Georgia.

4.9 Greece
The Greek government is not aware of a widespread problem. It is only aware of groups guilty of
skimming, which have become much more active in recent years.

4.10 Estonia
The Estonian government is not familiar with the phenomenon of itinerant crime groups.
However, retailers have observed a strong upsurge in this form of crime in recent years. The main


perpetrators are Ukrainian groups who operate quite blatantly. Apparently, organised raids are
carried out through the Baltic states whereby as many as 10 stores a day are targeted.

4.11 Czech Republic and Slovakia
As with the Baltic states, there are varying reports from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The
Slovakian government is apparently unfamiliar with the trend of itinerant crime groups. There
would even seem to be a decline in retail crime since the accession to the European Union.
However, the retail trade itself reports differently. The sector indicates an increase of criminals
mainly from Romania. The phenomenon of itinerant Romanian families involved in store
criminality in these countries has been well known for some time. In recent years, however,
this phenomenon has changed and now involves Romanian gypsy groups who have no family
relations, but a more organised character.

4.12 Poland
There are no reports in Poland of itinerant crime groups. Retailers do not report any problems
with this phenomenon. However, the retailers do experience fierce competition with the black
markets where stolen goods from other countries are traded.


Itenerant crime groups;
the development of the problem

Increasing problem in last ten years
Increasing problem in last five years
Stabilising problem in last five years


4.13 General trends
Research highlights some general trends. Mobile banditry occurs in almost all the countries
studied. The phenomenon is strongly present in North West Europe. Southern countries are also
affected. In the last five years, this form of crime has also appeared in Central and Eastern
Europe. In the countries in North West Europe, the offenders tend to come from Poland, the Baltic
states and to a lesser extent from Romania. This last group has started to grow significantly.
In the southern countries, criminals from the Balkans and increasingly Romania are active. In
Central and Eastern Europe, the offenders tend to come from the former Soviet Union and
Romania.

Every year, the Centre for Retail Research publishes a barometer in which the total losses from
retail crime in countries all over the world are calculated. Based on this barometer, the
losses in the countries studied in this report in 2008 amounted to € 21.8 billion.

The Dutch Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (KLPD) indicates that itinerant crime groups are
responsible for around 35% of the total losses resulting from thefts in the retail trade. Retailers
operating in several EU Member States consider this to be a realistic estimate for the countries
in which they are active.

Based on this 35%, the losses for the retail trade in 2008 caused by itinerant crime groups in
countries studied in this report total € 7.6 billion. This concerns losses caused by itinerant crime
groups in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark,
Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

For comparison: according to Eurostat, the total turnover of the retail trade in the countries
studied was € 2,117 billion in 2008. Against this background, losses resulting from itinerant
crime groups of over € 7.6 billion (or 0.36% of the total turnover) do not seem particularly
big. However, it must be remembered that profit margins in the retail trade tend to be very
low. Therefore, losses caused by itinerant crime groups are quite a substantial cost item. In an
important number of cases, these costs will mean the difference between profit and loss for the
individual retailer.


Chapter 3:

Approach to itinerant
crime groups in the
Netherlands

1. The retail trade 26

2. The government 27

3. The police and judiciary 28

4. Conclusion 30

???????????? 25

The problem of itinerant crime groups in the Netherlands is not currently a government priority.
It is important to list which measures have been taken in the past and which could still be taken.
The role of the retail trade, the government and the police will hereby be addressed.

1. The retail trade

The retail trade is the victim of itinerant crime groups and suffers losses at their hands. The
sector is therefore investing substantially in prevention: nearly € 300 million every year. In
the countries studied, this amounts to € 6.5 billion (source: Retail Theft Barometer). These
investments are aimed at tackling all forms of retail crime, not just mobile banditry. For a sector
with small margins like the retail trade, this is a huge burden. Businesses invest differently in
security and theft prevention. The approach to itinerant crime groups is generally part of a wider
approach to retail crime.

Various measures are taken. For example, retailers invest in training their personnel. Employees
thus become more aware of store theft and can anticipate it. This is noted by (potential)
thieves. This training also helps trace the offenders. Because employees are prepared for
threatening situations, they are better able to remember characteristics of the offenders.

A lot of money is also invested in technological prevention. Camera systems, security gates and
burglar alarm installations are examples of these. In addition, products themselves are secured
with labels and chips. Depending on the size of the company, businesses often have a
department with one or more personnel responsible for assessing the risks for stores and
making recommendations. These security managers focus on procedures relating to cash
registers and safes in the stores and amend them where necessary to optimise security. Some
retailers even have their own security centre, which constantly monitors all stores.

Stores make architectural adjustments to prevent burglaries and ram raids. Stores also adjust
their stocks. Fewer in-store stocks mean less loot in big thefts by mobile groups. Retailers
indicate a reduction in the haul of these groups in recent years. In contrast, the number of thefts
is rising, meaning that the total losses have increased. Many retailers also feel the need to install
physical security in their stores. Millions of euros are spent every year on hiring professional
security personnel. Sometimes mobile intervention teams are used. These are teams that
travel all over the country so that they can support stores quickly in the event of problems.

26 Approach to itinerant crime groups in the Netherlands

The retail trade realises that this battle cannot be won alone. It therefore regularly cooperates
with the government and police. The results of this cooperation are mixed.

2. The government

The Dutch government does not undertake structural action against itinerant crime groups,
despite repeated urging by the House of Representatives. In response, the minister of Justice and
the minister of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs have emphasised that they do not under-
estimate the problem of itinerant crime groups and that there is good cooperation within the
Dutch police. It is claimed that cooperation can be achieved by starting up supra-regional
criminal investigation teams. In reality, however, this is more difficult to do. Starting up such a
team is so time consuming and difficult that it is often not attempted. Furthermore, one
wonders whether a project approach can be effective. The projects relating to itinerant crime
groups that have been launched so far may have produced good results, but they only deliver
one blow. A long term approach is needed. This is confirmed by staff at the KLPD. The problem
associated with past projects was their short duration. This meant they were forced to stop after
around a year, just when they were starting to get a good picture of itinerant crime groups.

The government feels that the retail trade sector should address the problem itself. Here,
ignorance about the extent of the problem will play a role. The measures undertaken by retailers
are limited and more rigorous action by police and judiciary is required. Retailers want to do this
together with the government. The capacity of police and judiciary seems to be the biggest
obstacle to tracing itinerant crime groups. Police and the Public Prosecution service have
sufficient authorisation. Property offences like retail crime are given little or no priority. Politics
and government should ask themselves whether the capacity of the police is currently sufficient
and whether it should be extended. Extra policy has no added value at the moment. More public-
private ventures and the use of existing resources are valuable, however. Public-
private collaboration is also considered important by the Netherlands Centre for Crime
Prevention and Community Safety. This collaboration should produce a risk analysis about
the future of mobile banditry in the Netherlands.

Approach to itinerant crime groups in the Netherlands 27

Problems in prosecuting itinerant offenders
Besides the fact that the chance of arresting them is very small and the number of convictions
few, it is almost impossible to extradite EU residents from the country. As many group members
come from EU Member States, this is a problem. According to a letter from the State Secretary of
Justice in 2007, among others, it is only possible to extradite people who “form a current, real
and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society”. In view of the fact that this
involves very serious crimes and terrorism, it cannot be expected that multiple, wide scale store
thieves will soon be extradited from the Netherlands on this basis. The state secretary does
mention a few options that would make it less easy for foreigners who are difficult to extradite
to reoffend. The accumulation of criminal facts and sentences whereby they can be locked away
for longer is central to this. This could contribute to the reduction in the number of itinerant
offenders (letter from state secretary of Justice to the House of Representatives, 13 August
2007). In Italy, a start was made with the extradition of groups of criminal Romanians in 2007.
In response to this, the European Commission indicated that this was within the rules if the
criminals disturbed public order.

3. The police and judiciary

The police have limited capacity and are thus not able to give attention to all forms of crime.
However, a preventive approach by the retail trade must be followed by a repressive approach
by police and judiciary. Criminality can only partly be tackled by prevention, but itinerant crime
groups are not always frightened off by cameras or security gates.

At the moment, the police tend to handle retail crime committed by Eastern European offenders
as incidents. This means that the offenders may be back on the street within several hours and
subsequently disappear into anonymity. In cases where the police do conduct
investigations and organised links are found, the Public Prosecution service is often unwilling to
instigate proceedings. This happened in the case of Polaris 2. In police circles, it was indicated
that the Public Prosecution service saw little in the case and let various matters drop. The fact
that proceedings by the Public Prosecution service can produce results was proved in 2008 when
a legal judgement was made about a criminal group in Soest. At the arrest of a Polish shoplifter,
it appeared that she was part of a group. Arrests were made and the loot was also found. The
court judged that this group was not only guilty of group theft but also part of a criminal
organisation. The sentence could thus be extended and the offenders put behind bars for longer.


Bureau Beke, an independent research company, reports that itinerant crime groups in the
Netherlands have low priority and that the police indicate that it is a problem for the retailers.
The crimes committed by the groups are property offences with limited consequences in the eyes
of the police and Public Prosecution service on account of the lack of violence in most cases. In
view of the lack of priority given to such offences and the lack of capacity, the matter is not
investigated further. This also resulted in the abolition of the Polaris teams. Between 2003-2005
and 2006-2007, two project teams - Polaris 1 and 2 - operated in the supra-regional criminal
investigation Noordoost Nederland and the KLPD, which focused on itinerant crime groups.
Although the Polaris 2 staff recommended restarting the project, tackling itinerant crime groups
was stopped. These project staff even indicated that such a team should become a standard part
of the KLPD. Yet the Supra-regional Investigation Forum (Bovenregionaal Recherche Overleg)
decided not to give further priority to this form of crime, despite the fact that no decline in store
thefts or groups was observed. Pressure from the House of Representatives was to no avail
either.

One result was that criminals themselves advertised that they could operate easily in countries
like the Netherlands and Germany. Nor were they deterred by the prisons or the lenient senten-
ces currently imposed. Interviews with the Latvian police showed that they have a great deal of
information about criminal bosses and potential couriers. The police send this information to the
Netherlands, which subsequently fails to use it. It is not clear why this is the case. Perhaps the
Dutch police lack faith in Eastern European police. However, any reason for scepticism appears
unfounded from previous experiences in cooperation. Polaris 2 experienced good information
exchange with government departments from other European countries when required.

Conversations with police and other experts indicate that the Netherlands has the technical
resources to effectively trace itinerant crime groups. For example, there is the computer program
BlueView, which can search for the background of offenders in all computer systems of the
various police regions. This shows whether an offender from Eastern Europe has also committed
a crime in another part of the Netherlands. It can also be investigated whether many offenders
come from a single place. This could point to activities of an itinerant crime group. Retailers can
also assist the police. Many retailers register crimes committed in their store. Good cooperation
between the retail trade and the police can achieve better results. Furthermore, readouts of the
telephones of suspects can be very effective in charting the networks. In this way, activities of
various criminals can be linked.

Approach to itinerant crime groups in the Netherlands 29

4. Conclusion

After studying the actions of the Dutch government, police and
judiciary against mobile banditry, it can be concluded that the
problem does not have priority. Information provided from abroad is
not used and even when the police or retailers submit cut-and-dried
cases to the judiciary, prosecutions seldom take place. In view of
the extent of the losses and the relative ease with which such crimes
can be tackled, this is remarkable. The technical resources exist
and the capacity required is fairly modest. On average, the Polaris 2
team operated with five staff members and was able to chart many
itinerant crime groups in the Netherlands. The results in tracing and
prosecution are impressive. In many cases, retail crime declines sig-
nificantly.


Chapter 4:

International
approach to itinerant
crime groups

1. Attention within the Member States 32

2. Attention at the European level 33

3. Problems with European cooperation 33

4. Possibilities for a European approach 35

???????????? 31

Europe virtually ignores the phenomenon of mobile banditry. It is
seen as a form of national criminality with which the EU does not
get involved. However, there is a clear cross-border component to
the problem and European Union involvement would therefore be
more than justified. The national organisations of retailers should
therefore urge their governments to lobby for a European approach.

1. Attention within the Member States

In this research, various countries in Europe were studied, including
the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Estonia,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In almost all the countries
studied, there are examples of local and regional initiatives to tackle
itinerant offenders. These concern temporary projects which usually
produce good results. However, this is not a structural approach.
Belgium is an exception here. At the end of the 1990s, Belgium was
the first country to concern itself with mobile banditry. The existen-
ce of this phenomenon was then established, also in studies into
criminality on the Belgian-French border. This was the incentive
to study the phenomenon further. The Belgian government
subsequently drew up a policy and gave priority to the problem. The
policy mainly focuses on preventing crime related to private proper-
ty such as house burglaries and car thefts, but there is also good
cooperation between the Belgian government, the police and the
Belgian retail trade. Since 2008, there has been someone responsible
for dealing with itinerant crime groups at all levels in the police and
justice system. Everyone knows who that person is and this
phenomenon is tackled at all levels. At the local level, meetings are
organised so that government authorities, police and entrepreneurs
can get to know each other better. In addition, entrepreneurs can
request visits from police advisors to recommend technological
means of crime prevention. More neighbourhood information
networks are also set up whereby entrepreneurs and the police tell
each other about the activities of itinerant crime groups. This is also

32 International approach to itinerant crime groups

supported by local authorities. Together, threats are charted, where-
by the entrepreneurs play an important role.

2. Attention at the European level

Nearly all the retailers involved in this study see a role for Europe
in tackling mobile banditry. This mainly concerns setting up an
information exchange between Member States and in some cases
properly joining forces in operations. At the European level, there are
two developments in the field of mobile banditry. Firstly, a study is
currently being conducted on behalf of the European Commission.
This study charts how the European Commission can collect
comparable statistics about cross-border crime targeting business.
The European Commission hopes to start actual data collection about
this form of crime in 2010.

Europol is currently also conducting research into payment card
fraud, i.e. ‘skimming.’ This form of crime occurs throughout the
European Union, mainly by Romanian groups. This research thus
concentrates on one activity of mobile banditry.

3. Problems with European cooperation

There are still barriers to achieving cooperation between Member
States. In recent years, attempts have been made to change this. One
example is the Treaty of Prüm. This Treaty provides for better
information exchange and operational cooperation between the
countries involved. This will facilitate the exchange of car registration
data, for example, and enable police officers to cross the border in
the fight against criminals.

In the coming years, more such steps should be taken. But the
Member States are not always prepared to do their utmost to tackle
mobile banditry. Member States are strongly inclined to protect their
sovereignty with regard to police and judiciary. They feel that their

International approach to itinerant crime groups 33

sovereignty could be affected by cross-border cooperation. If the
Member States fail to act together, it is the criminals who will benefit.
Without a good national approach to mobile banditry in the Member
States, there can be no high expectations at the European level. The
European Union can promote cooperation, but it remains the
jurisdiction of the Member States. It is not possible to force the
Member States to devote attention to the subject.

Besides legal barriers, there are also other issues preventing
cross-border, European cooperation. An important problem is the
difference in priorities between Member States. This often appears to
be one of the major issues in practice. Because police services in the
various Member States all have different priorities when tackling
crime, cooperation may not get off the ground. Furthermore, trust
between Member States can be an issue in cooperation, particularly
lack of trust between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Member States,
although there is no reason for this. In cases where cooperation
between Member States is sought, it often appears to work well.
Countries like Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania are happy to contribute
to research studies. In some cases, requests for information via
Europol were honoured within an hour. In many cases, the police
in Eastern European countries already have some ideas about the
bosses and criminals involved in mobile banditry. This information is
often forwarded, but usually not used by Dutch police. This also
damages trust in each other. The Eastern European police tend not to
consider the Dutch police as good partners.

Besides trust, the Member States also have differences in organisation
and culture. This forms a greater problem than jurisdictions and
options. Cooperation also concerns capacity. It is sometimes
necessary to invest time in a case from abroad that has no immediate
benefit. The realisation of the importance of this seems to be
growing. This would be a positive development in the fight against
itinerant crime groups.


4. Possibilities for a European approach

4.1 Europol
An enhanced role for Europol is often mentioned as a means to
tackle mobile banditry. At the moment, the smallest common
denominator in this organisation determines the policy, Europol
confirms. Member States must make use of this organisation, also
with respect to itinerant crime groups. This does not happen at the
moment. Europol is only involved in 5% of all cases of cross-border
contacts due to police collaboration.

This may improve. The Stockholm Programme, in which the European
Union approach to police and judicial cooperation for the next five
years is documented, will - if the European Commission has its way -
strengthen the role of Europol. The European Commission’s proposal
wants information received through cross-border contacts to be
automatically passed on to Europol.

If research is started at Europol, the main condition is that the
Member States supply sufficient information. Dutch police officers
with experience in exchanging information via Europol also
emphasise the importance of this organisation. At the moment,
Europol is mainly engaged in exchanging information and compiling
information dossiers. It is not expected that Europol will be given its
own operational service in the short term. Such a move is opposed
by the Member States because a European criminal investigation
agency of this kind could get in the way of national police and
judicial organisations.

It is also debatable to what extent a Europol operational agency
could actually supply the custom work required. Europol, and
incidentally also Eurojust, are facilitating organisations and
Member States often fail to use them. As Eurojust does not have
its own facilities for independently prosecuting internationally
operating criminals, this organisation cannot be expected to make

International approach to itinerant crime groups 35

any real contribution to the fight against itinerant crime groups.

In the struggle against mobile banditry, research could be started at
Europol. This is possible on the initiative of two Member States.
Consent and involvement of all Member States is not required for
this.

4.2 Joint Investigation Teams
At the moment, Joint Investigation Teams can be set up to tackle
cross-border crime problems. In these teams, different countries can
work together to deal with a cross-border form of crime. Europol can
also be involved in this form of collaboration. However, working in
these teams has its problems. Sharing information often tends to be
difficult. The people who actually work with the dossiers generally
prefer to work through a trusted network with whom they have
already built up a working relationship. Exchanging information
with an unknown foreign colleague is unusual.

However, when there is good cooperation within the Teams and
where Europol is involved, the teams regularly prove to be an
effective means of tackling cross-border problems. This is a second
resource which can be used in the fight against itinerant crime
groups.


Chapter 5:

The Treaty of Lisbon
and the changing
role of the European
Union

???????????? 37

On the 2nd of October 2009 Ireland by referendum accepted the
Treaty of Lisbon, after having first rejected it in 2008. Assuming that
Poland and the Czech Republic will now as last of the group of 27
Member States ratify the Treaty in the months to come, the Treaty
could entry into force early 2010. This would result in an important
institutional change in the European Union with respect to police and
judicial cooperation. This could have important consequences for the
fight against mobile banditry. For this reason, we look ahead.

The main change is that everything related to police and judicial
cooperation will in principle be decided by means of the co-decision
procedure. This means that the European Parliament becomes the
co-legislator. The Commission will be the prime initiator (Member
States can only make proposals jointly) and decisions in the Council
are generally adopted with majority vote. The right of veto thus
disappears in most cases and that can speed up decision-making.

Yet some obstacles have been built into the Treaty of Lisbon aimed
at preventing Member States from losing too much influence. For
example, at the European level no decisions can be made about the
deployment of police officers and Member States are not obliged to
deploy capacity to prevent certain forms of crime. Furthermore,
decisions must always be unanimous with regard to what forms of
cross-border crime must be tackled. Finally, the Member States have
an ‘emergency brake’ which can be used if they feel that their
country’s legal system is being hit too hard by the measures.

The changes, and particularly the reservations relating to a number
of areas in the Treaty of Lisbon, are not expected to alter much at the
European level in the fight against mobile banditry. The modifications
in the Treaty concern changes to the decision-making process. Issues
which are crucial for a joint approach to mobile banditry, such as a
joint operational approach to the problem, are not included in the
Treaty.

38 The Treaty of Lisbon and the changing role of the European Union

With respect to the Commission's right of initiative, little will change
in practice. The possibility for an individual Member State to submit
its own initiative bill will be abolished. In practice, however, very
little use is made of this option. At the moment, nearly all the
initiatives are taken by the European Commission. The European
Parliament is involved in the legislation as co-legislator. Not having
been involved as co-legislator in recent years, it is important that
they develop their competences in this field in the coming years.
Unanimity will be abolished in the Council in many cases. In practice,
however, consensus is still often sought. Big countries in particular
seem to oppose far-reaching police and judicial cooperation. There
are also great differences with respect to priority and culture
between Member States which hinders cooperation at an
operational level. The Treaty will not change this. Neither will the
Treaty of Lisbon affect the lack of trust between police and justice
departments. Furthermore, it is debatable whether decision-making
in the European Union will become faster as a result of the Treaty.
The question is more whether the shared legislative authority bet-
ween the Council and the Parliament will slow down legislation. In
the coming years, no specific legislation at the European level is to be
expected in the field of mobile banditry. The Treaty of Lisbon should
be seen as the next step in growing cooperation between Member
States in the field of police and judiciary.

The Treaty of Lisbon and the changing role of the European Union 39

Conclusions

This research shows that itinerant crime groups constitute a major, cross-border problem for
the retail trade. It is a phenomenon that occurs in almost all European countries and therefore
deserves attention at both national and European levels. Throughout the European Union,
nearly 31 million people work in the retail trade in 6.2 million businesses with a total turnover
of around € 1,274 billion. The losses suffered by the European retail trade at the hands of
itinerant crime groups are substantial. On a yearly basis, losses amount to over € 7.6 billion in
the countries studied. In these countries, this is around 35% of the total losses incurred through
store theft, which totals € 21.8 billion. The retail trade is aware of its own responsibility and with
investments in security totalling over € 6.5 billion in 2008 in the countries studied, the sector
accepts this responsibility too.

However, this situation cannot continue. The governments, police and judiciary in particular
must also accept their responsibility and reach agreements with the retail trade about how this
form of crime can be tackled. At the moment, the subject does not seem to have priority in most
Member States in the European Union. Where priority is given to mobile banditry, the parties
involved are generally happy with the cooperation. A local and national approach is vital,
whereby knowledge about the size and working methods of the groups is important.

At the European level too, attention can be devoted to the problem. Information exchange and
a joint operational approach are among the possibilities. No new legislation is required for this.
Neither will the Treaty of Lisbon have much impact on the fight against itinerant crime groups.
It is important that the Member States mainly deploy the resources which currently exist.
Agreeing on priorities, capacity deployment and improving mutual trust are essential to achieve
good results in cross-border cooperation.

Mobile banditry is a form of crime that affects all parts of society, not just the retail trade. It is
therefore vital that itinerant crime groups are tackled in order to offer both citizens and
business owners a safer living and working environment.

41

Recommendations

Recommendations are given at three levels: local, national and European. The recommendations
for national level primarily focus on the Netherlands, but some can also be applied in other
European countries.

Local

• The retail trade must continue to invest in preventive measures. Training store personnel,
introducing technological aids and in some cases recruiting professional security personnel to
keep thieves at bay are still necessary to tackle retail crime in general and itinerant
groups in particular.
• The local government, police and the retail trade must cooperate better in tackling mobile
banditry. Information must be passed on sooner. Also, permits for improved security, such as
installing ram pillars, should be issued faster. This can prevent crime by mobile groups.
• The police and the Public Prosecutions service should always handle reports of large-scale
store thefts and be aware of the presence of mobile groups. They must also use all available
(technical) means to tackle mobile groups. Reading out mobile phones is an example of this.

National

• Mobile banditry must be made a priority by the Supra-regional Investigation Forum. This will
promote a national approach to the phenomenon.
• A permanent, national team should be set up to tackle itinerant groups. This team should
primarily be engaged in collecting information about mobile groups and charting networks.
These teams should also be set up in other Member States. These teams can then liaise with
other Member States, improving coordination.
• The permanent national team should not only deal with offenders from Lithuania and Poland,
as was the case with Polaris, but include many more (South) Eastern European nationalities
in their investigations.
• The government must commission a risk analysis into the future of mobile banditry in the
Netherlands and on that basis develop a long-term vision for tackling the problem.
• Punishments for taking part in mobile banditry must be increased and more effort must be
made in criminal proceedings to convict the offenders for all offences. At the moment, cases
are too often dropped, whereby punishments are lower.

43

• Cases passed on by police and the retail trade to the judiciary must always lead to a trial.
Failure to prosecute in cases where the guilty party is clear is unacceptable.
• The Dutch police must always seriously consider information from abroad about criminal
activities. This can prevent retail crime and speed up conviction of offenders.

European

• Member States should lobby for research (Analytical Work File) at Europol. This could be
initiated by two Member States and improve information exchange about mobile banditry
between Member States. It also helps chart the extent of the problem.
• A Joint Investigation Team about mobile banditry should be started by various Member
States. This will facilitate an operational approach to the problem.
• The Member States should jointly formulate mobile banditry as a priority in the struggle
against cross-border crime.
• The Member States should more often exchange ‘best practices’ about tackling itinerant
groups.
• Member States should introduce a European criminal record. This will make it easier for
employers to see if job applicants have been convicted of cross-border crime, for example.
This will scare off potential store thieves because they will later be restricted on the labour
market.
• On the accession of new Member States, the European Union must be aware of the
consequences this can have for cross-border (store) crime. The open borders with new
Member States not only allow citizens to travel freely to other Member States, but also
criminals.

44 Recommendations

Research justification

Due to the lack of research into the phenomenon of mobile groups, only limited material is
available to assess the extent of the problem. After analysing earlier studies, requesting relevant
data and contacts with experts, a reliable assessment was made of the problem in the
Netherlands. Assessments were also made for other countries. The study confirmed that it is a
sizeable and increasing problem that deserves international attention.

The countries included in this study were chosen because they give a representative picture of
their region and thus of Europe as a whole. Countries from Northern, Central, Eastern, Southern
and particularly Western Europe were used. However, the emphasis lies on Western Europe, as
this is where the problem appears to be greatest. All of the big countries are therefore included
in the study.

This report is the result of four months of intensive research. For this research, on the request
of Detailhandel Nederland, Robert van Geffen of the Radboud University Nijmegen contacted
many experts and people involved. Besides the cooperation of sister organisations in other
European Member States, he contacted retailers, politicians, civil servants, police organisations
and academics. We would like to thank everyone who cooperated in this study. Due to this wide
range of experts and people involved, the problem could be viewed from various angles. Relevant
documents and policy reports were also studied. An overview of people and organisations
involved in interviews and conversations is given below. Some of them – for example the
national and international retailers which cooperated on this project – would like to remain
anonymous. For those which agreed on publicizing their names, we explicitly state that this does
not necessarily mean that they support the conclusions of this report.

Retail trade organisations:
• FEDIS (Belgium) • Confcommercio (Italy)
• UNIZO (Belgium) • Detailhandel Nederland (Netherlands)
• Danskerhverv (Denmark) • CEC (Spain)
• EuroCommerce (Europe) • Svensk Dagligvaruhandel (Sweden)
• FCD (France) • BRC (UK)
• HDE (Germany)

45

Security companies:
T.M.C. Asser Institute
Bureau Beke
Transcrime
Dutch Association of Insurers
Centre for Crime Prevention and Community Safety
WODC
National Platform for Crime Control
KLPD
International Police Cooperation Service (Dienst IPOL), Polaris 2 team
Ministry of Justice (Netherlands and Belgium)
Judicial Federal Police (Belgium)
ZNW Prevention & Safety (Belgium)
European Crime Prevention Network
Europol
Eurojust
European Police Chiefs Task Force
CEPOL / Police Academy
European Criminal Bar Association
European Commission
Netherlands Permanent Representation in Brussels
Baden-Württembergse Permanent Representation in Brussels
Jeanine Hennis Plasschaert, VVD MEP
Sophie in ’t Veld, D66 MEP
Professor at University of Tilburg
Researcher Vrije Universiteit
Monica den Boer, extraordinary professor Vrije Universiteit, vice president of Clingendael
Institute, dean of Police Academy
Gert Vermeulen, professor at University of Ghent
Dina Siegel, researcher Willem Pompe Instituut Utrecht
Stijn van Daele, researcher University of Ghent
Tom vander Beken, professor at University of Ghent

46 Research justification

Many relevant documents and policy documents were involved in this research, including:

• Detailhandel Nederland (2008). Nationaal onderzoek winkelcriminaliteit 2007.
Leidschendam: Detailhandel Nederland
• WODC. (2008/2009). Monitor Criminaliteit Bedrijfsleven 2007/2008.
Amsterdam: TNS NIPO/WODC
• KLPD - Dienst IPOL (2008). Georganiseerde Bovenregionale Vermogenscriminaliteit 2008.
Rotterdam: Thieme MediaCenter
• KLPD - Dienst IPOL (2008). Landelijke criminaliteitskaart 2007.
Rotterdam: Thieme MediaCenter
• Risbo (2008). Oost Europeanen in Nederland.
Rotterdam: EUR/Risbo
• Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie/Dienst IPOL (2004-2008).
Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld 2004/2008.
Zoetermeer: Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie
• Retail Theft Barometer
• Eurostat (2009). Share of motor, wholesale and retail trades in total distributive trades
in terms of turnover.
• Federale Politie België (2007). De aanpak van rondtrekkende offendergroeperingen:
een actualisatie.
Brussels: Federale Politie
• Vermeulen, G. e.a. (2003). Criminaliteit in de Frans-Belgische grensregio.
Antwerp: Maklu
• Ruyver, B. de (2005). Presentation itinerant groups.
• Bundeskriminalamt (2008). Polizeiliche kriminalstatistik 2007.
Wiesenbaden: Bundeskriminalamt
• Bundeskriminalamt (2006, 2008). Bundeslagebild organisierte kriminalität 2005/2007.
Wiesenbaden: Bundeskriminalamt
• Hessisches Landeskriminalamt (2005). Polizeiliche kriminalstatistik Hessen 2004.
Wiesbaden: Hessischen Landeskriminalamt

Research justification 47

Binnenwerk mobiel banditisme_2009

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