This deck presents an introduction and overview of the so-called Benefit Corporation (a.k.a. the Public Benefit Corporation). It contrasts benefit corporations to related entities such as B Corps, flexible purpose corporations, non-profit corporations, and traditional business corporations.
Becoming a certified B Corp is a great opportunity to "walk the talk" in terms of social enterprise and your business' commitment to the triple bottom line, where companies prioritize people and the environment alongside profits to make a measurable difference in society. This presentation covers the basics on B Corps, what it takes to become one, and how for-profit organizations can use this designation to build community while they build business.
B Corps are businesses for a new generation of entrepreneurs who desire to see business used as a force for good. By following triple bottom principles and a desire for societal impact, B Corps are changing the way success in business is defined.
Maintaining Mission: Meeting the Legal Requirement for B Corp Certification.pptxB Lab
Still working on the legal requirement for B Corp Certification? Join B Lab's resident mission alignment experts Rick Alexander and Holly Ensign-Barstow and Standards Analyst Matt Nabhan to learn about the legal component of B Corp Certification. This webinar will cover the reasons behind this component of B Corp Certification, how and when to meet the legal requirement depending on your form of incorporation, and tools for moving through the process. Then we'll dive into benefit corporations with the team that has been instrumental in passing benefit corporation legislation in over 30 states.
This presentation was given by Rick Alexander, Holly Ensign-Barstow, Matt Nabhan, and Jessica Friesen on March 1st, 2016.
Revitalizing Rule 14a-8's ordinary business exclusion for shareholder proposalsStephen Bainbridge
Who decides what products a company should sell, what prices it should charge, and so on? Is it the board of directors, the top management team, or the shareholders? In large corporations, of course, the answer is the top management team operating under the supervision of the board. As for the shareholders, they traditionally have had no role in these sort of operational decisions. In recent years, however, shareholders have increasingly used SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (the so-called shareholder proposal rule), to not just manage but even micromanage corporate decisions.
The rule permits a qualifying shareholder of a public corporation registered with the SEC to force the company to include a resolution and supporting statement in the company’s proxy materials for its annual meeting. In theory, Rule 14a-8 contains limits on shareholder micro-management. The rule permits management to exclude proposals on a number of both technical and substantive bases, of which the exclusion in Rule 14a-8(i)(7) of proposals relating to ordinary business operations is the most pertinent for present purposes. Rule 14a-8(i)(7) is intended to permit exclusion of a proposal that “seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”
Unfortunately, court decisions have largely eviscerated the ordinary business operations exclusion. Corporate decisions involving “matters which have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in them” may not be excluded as ordinary business matters, for example, which creates a gap through which countless proposals have made it onto corporate proxy statements.
Becoming a certified B Corp is a great opportunity to "walk the talk" in terms of social enterprise and your business' commitment to the triple bottom line, where companies prioritize people and the environment alongside profits to make a measurable difference in society. This presentation covers the basics on B Corps, what it takes to become one, and how for-profit organizations can use this designation to build community while they build business.
B Corps are businesses for a new generation of entrepreneurs who desire to see business used as a force for good. By following triple bottom principles and a desire for societal impact, B Corps are changing the way success in business is defined.
Maintaining Mission: Meeting the Legal Requirement for B Corp Certification.pptxB Lab
Still working on the legal requirement for B Corp Certification? Join B Lab's resident mission alignment experts Rick Alexander and Holly Ensign-Barstow and Standards Analyst Matt Nabhan to learn about the legal component of B Corp Certification. This webinar will cover the reasons behind this component of B Corp Certification, how and when to meet the legal requirement depending on your form of incorporation, and tools for moving through the process. Then we'll dive into benefit corporations with the team that has been instrumental in passing benefit corporation legislation in over 30 states.
This presentation was given by Rick Alexander, Holly Ensign-Barstow, Matt Nabhan, and Jessica Friesen on March 1st, 2016.
Revitalizing Rule 14a-8's ordinary business exclusion for shareholder proposalsStephen Bainbridge
Who decides what products a company should sell, what prices it should charge, and so on? Is it the board of directors, the top management team, or the shareholders? In large corporations, of course, the answer is the top management team operating under the supervision of the board. As for the shareholders, they traditionally have had no role in these sort of operational decisions. In recent years, however, shareholders have increasingly used SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (the so-called shareholder proposal rule), to not just manage but even micromanage corporate decisions.
The rule permits a qualifying shareholder of a public corporation registered with the SEC to force the company to include a resolution and supporting statement in the company’s proxy materials for its annual meeting. In theory, Rule 14a-8 contains limits on shareholder micro-management. The rule permits management to exclude proposals on a number of both technical and substantive bases, of which the exclusion in Rule 14a-8(i)(7) of proposals relating to ordinary business operations is the most pertinent for present purposes. Rule 14a-8(i)(7) is intended to permit exclusion of a proposal that “seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”
Unfortunately, court decisions have largely eviscerated the ordinary business operations exclusion. Corporate decisions involving “matters which have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in them” may not be excluded as ordinary business matters, for example, which creates a gap through which countless proposals have made it onto corporate proxy statements.
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On the first day, attendees learned about ownership and governance structures being used in the wake of the Great Recession to create a more inclusive economy, including land trusts and housing cooperatives, as well as new financing vehicles that leverage community capital.
The second day focused on worker cooperatives and freelancer-owned cooperatives, including entity structure, bylaws and operating agreements, ownership transitions to worker cooperatives, nonprofit incubation of worker cooperatives, employment law, tax structures and more.
Lawyers were offered 1 Ethics Credit and 5.5 Professional Practice Credits on Day 1 and 7 Professional Practice credits on Day 2 for the State of New York.
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Ted De Barbieri, Assistant Professor of Clinical Law at Brooklyn Law School
Camille Kerr, Director of Field Building at the Democracy at Work Institute (DAWI)
Ricardo Nunez, Cooperatives Program Director at SELC
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What Every Founder/Entrepeneur Must Know (Series: The Start-Up/Small Business...Financial Poise
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To view the accompanying webinar, go to:https://www.financialpoise.com/financial-poise-webinars/what-every-founder-entrepreneur-must-know-2021/
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This is about the Business firms which are the entities that employ factors of production (resources) and produces goods and services to be sold to the consumers, other firms of government.
Corporate Social Responsibility is a new and untouched phinomina for Indian Companies and introduction of it from Financial Year 2014-15 as compliance for selective categories of companies, there is going to be a far reaching impact of it into the society and economy
Although the prohibition on taking of organizational opportunities is well established, the standards applied to this problem in corporate law disputes are vague and imprecise. Corporate directors and officers lack clear guidance as to when a business venture may be taken for themselves or must first be offered to the corporation. This article reviews the relevant Delaware case law, focusing on the ambiguities inherent therein. It then offers a proposed alternative regime, providing greater certainty and predictability.
The article then turns the question of why Delaware courts have resisted adopting a more determinate standard, such as the one offered here. It argues that — at least in this context — Delaware judges are concerned neither with maximizing the number of Delaware incorporations or promoting the interests of the Delaware bar. Instead, mandatory indeterminacy with respect to corporate opportunities is driven by the Delaware courts’ self-interest in maximizing their reputation.
In the Parable of the Talents, neither the master nor any of the servants make any appeal to legal standards, but it seems improbable that there was no background set of rules against which the story played out. To the legal mind, the Parable thus raises some interesting questions: What was the relationship between the master and the servant? What were the servants’ duties? How do the likely answers to those questions map to modern relations, such as those of principal and agent? Curiously, however, there are almost no detailed analyses of these questions in Anglo-American legal scholarship.
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Legal professionals, accountants, and community development organizations were invited to a two-day workshop on legal structures and strategies for cooperative development and sustainable local economies. This workshop had a special emphasis on worker cooperatives, freelancer-owned cooperatives, land trusts, and alternative capital structures.
On the first day, attendees learned about ownership and governance structures being used in the wake of the Great Recession to create a more inclusive economy, including land trusts and housing cooperatives, as well as new financing vehicles that leverage community capital.
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Presenters included:
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Corporate Social Responsibility is a new and untouched phinomina for Indian Companies and introduction of it from Financial Year 2014-15 as compliance for selective categories of companies, there is going to be a far reaching impact of it into the society and economy
Although the prohibition on taking of organizational opportunities is well established, the standards applied to this problem in corporate law disputes are vague and imprecise. Corporate directors and officers lack clear guidance as to when a business venture may be taken for themselves or must first be offered to the corporation. This article reviews the relevant Delaware case law, focusing on the ambiguities inherent therein. It then offers a proposed alternative regime, providing greater certainty and predictability.
The article then turns the question of why Delaware courts have resisted adopting a more determinate standard, such as the one offered here. It argues that — at least in this context — Delaware judges are concerned neither with maximizing the number of Delaware incorporations or promoting the interests of the Delaware bar. Instead, mandatory indeterminacy with respect to corporate opportunities is driven by the Delaware courts’ self-interest in maximizing their reputation.
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2. Traditional Conception of Entrepreneurship Social Entrepreneurship
Process of creating value by
bringing together a unique
package of resources to exploit
an opportunity, in pursuit of
high returns to the owners of
the business
Process of creating value by
bringing together a unique
package of resources to exploit
an opportunity, in pursuit of
high social returns
Social Entrepreneurship
2
3. The Spectrum of Social Enterprises
• Pure profit.Business.
• Good profit.Ethical Business
• Extra profit put to good use.Corporate Social
Responsibility
• Make profit and do good.Social
Entrepreneurship
• Profit but no dividend.Social Business
• Charity. No Profit, No Dividend.Non-Profit
• Public Services, incentives and
regulations.Government
Source
4. Contested Definitions In any case, it means:
Some have advocated
restricting the term to
founders of organizations
that primarily rely on earned
income–meaning income
earned directly from paying
consumers.
• Others prefer to call this
socio-economic
entrepreneurship
Creating business solutions
to address the needs,
challenges, inefficiencies
and inequalities in society
actively engaging
stakeholders with a
profitable, wealth-generation
and sustainable long term
approach measured by a
double-bottom line of
financial return and social
impact.
Social Entrepreneurship
6. Conventional legislation recognizes and regulates charity and
for-profit business but not social entrepreneurship.
It also provides incentives for both, but very little for social enterprises.
Core Legal Problem
6
7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co, a 1919 decision by the Michigan
Supreme Court, held that "a business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”
• That case also established that "it is not within the lawful powers of a
board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation
for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary
purpose of benefiting others."
Despite contrary claims by some academics and anti-
corporate partisans, this remains the law today.
• The 2010 Delaware Chancery Court decision in eBay Domestic
Holdings Inc. v. Newmark, held that corporate directors are bound by
"fiduciary duties and standards" which include "acting to promote the
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”
The Corporate Purpose
8. Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law § 1715
(a) General rule.--In discharging the duties of their respective
positions, the board of directors ... may in considering the best
interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they deem
appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such
action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and
creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation,
including benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term
plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of
any person seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
(4) All other pertinent factors.
The Emergence of Constituency Statutes
8
9. Thirty three states have adopted some form of constituency
statute:
• Not Delaware
Constituencies covered:
• 32 states: customers, employees, and communities
• 31: suppliers
• 24: “long- term interests” of the corporation
• 22: creditors
• 19: the continued independence of the company
• 16: interests relating to society or the economy, or both
Decisions covered:
• 24: All decisions
• 9: Only decisions related to corporate takeovers
Permissive or mandatory?
• All: Permissive
Constituency Statutes Today
9
Source: Geczy, Christopher and Jeffers, Jessica S and Musto, David K. and Tucker, Anne M., Institutional
Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme (March 24, 2015). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584674
11. William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, The Need And Rationale For The
Benefit Corporation:
• “the lack of case law interpreting constituency statutes … makes it
difficult for directors to know exactly how, when and to what extent they
can consider those interests”
– “neither the constituency statutes themselves nor state case law address questions
such as how directors should decide which parties fall within a protected
constituency category, what weight the directors should assign to shareholder and
non-shareholder interests and what standards a court should use in reviewing
directors’ decisions to consider (or not to consider) non-shareholder interests”
– “courts seem reluctant to wade into these issues and often fall back on shareholder
primacy”
• “many constituency provisions in state corporate statutes were enacted
in response to takeover activity in the 1980s as a way to protect local
businesses,” which meant that their breadth was suspect
• “permissive constituency statutes only create the option (and not the
requirement) for directors to consider interests of constituencies other
than shareholders. Thus, directors have the permission not to consider
interests other than shareholder maximization of value”
Objections to Constituency Statutes as a Vehicle for Social
Entrepreneurship
11
12. B Lab
B Lab is a nonprofit corporation
designed to promote so-called
“B Corps” (source)
• Develop a program to certify “Certified
B Corporations” actively engaged in
CSR not just for marketing
• Accelerating the growth of
investments in C Corps through use of
B Lab’s GIIRS Ratings & Analytics by
institutional investors
• Promoting legislation creating a new
corporate form that facilitates being a
B Corp
– The so-called “benefit corporation”
Today:
• Certification:
– Assessment of the company in
areas of governance, workers,
community, the environment, as
well as the product or service the
company provides
– Integration of stakeholder
commitment into corporate organic
documents
• 1,257 Certified B Corps
– 38 countries
– 121 industry sectors
B Corp Video
13. Benefit Corporation Laws
B Lab Model Benefit Corporation
Statute
• Directors and officers of a benefit
corporation in discharging their duties
must consider the effects of any
action on the ability of the benefit
corporation to achieve its general
public benefit and any specific public
benefit for which it was organized, as
well as on its shareholders,
employees, customers, community,
the environment and the short-term
and long-term interests of the benefit
corporation.
• In considering these factors, the
directors and officers are not required
to give priority to one over another.
State by state analysis by B Lab
13
Source: B Lab
14. The certificate of incorporation and the name of the corporation must clearly indicate that
the corporation is a public benefit corporation.
• This may be satisfied by including the phrase “public benefit corporation” in the legal
name of the corporation, or including the abbreviation “P.B.C.” or “PBC” in the name.
Certificate of incorporation must identify the specific public benefit(s) the corporation will
promote. “Public benefit” means a positive effect on one or more categories of persons,
entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders, in their capacity as
stockholders)
Business Corporation to PBC: 90% affirmative vote of all classes of stock
PBC to Business Corporation: 2/3 vote of all classes of stock
Directors of public benefit corporations must manage the corporation in a manner that
balances (i) the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, (ii) the interests of those materially
affected by the corporation’s conduct, and (iii) the public benefit or public benefits
identified in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation
Biannual report to shareholders assessing progress in meeting public benefit
Organizational
documents
Stated public benefit
Conversions
Triple bottom line
Disclosure
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Statute: Key Provisions
14
15. Common Features of Benefit Corporation Statutes: Purpose
California law requires that:
• “A benefit corporation shall have the
purpose of creating general public
benefit.”
• “ ‘General public benefit’ means a
material positive impact on society
and the environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed against a third-
party standard, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation.”
– Third-party standard as metric of
success, such as B Lab’s Impact
Assessment
California law also allows benefit
corporations to elect a “specific
public benefit,” including the
following:
• Providing low-income or underserved
individuals or communities with benefit
products or services
• Promoting economic opportunity for
individuals or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the ordinary course of
business
• Preserving the environment
• Improving human health
• Promoting the arts, sciences, or
advancement of knowledge
• Increasing the flow of capital to entities
with a public benefit purpose
• The accomplishment of any other
particular benefit for society or the
environment
15
16. Common Features of Benefit Corporation Statutes: Personnel
Some states provide for the
election of a “benefit director”
• Must be independent
• Must prepare an annual evaluation of
the corporation’s performance, which
must be included in the annual benefit
report
Some states provide for
appointment by the board of
directors of a “benefit officer”
• Responsible for preparing the annual
benefit report
• And other duties assigned by the
board
16
17. Most statutes create some form of a benefit enforcement
proceeding:
• Shareholders and directors have standing
• Relief under the statute is typically equitable rather than monetary
No personal liability for directors for monetary damages for
failure to create general public benefit
No duty owed by directors to beneficiary of general public
benefit
• Other constituencies may not sue or bring claims
Common Features of Benefit Corporation Statutes: Liabilities
17
18. Most statutes require annual (some biannual) annual
benefit report
• Delivered to shareholders and posted on corporate website
• Must disclose:
– The ways in which the company pursued general public benefit and the
extent to which it was created
– Any circumstances that hindered the creation of general or specific public
benefit
– The process and rationale for selecting the third party standard used to
prepare the report
• Must measure corporate performance on public benefits using a third
party metric, such as B Impact Assessment
Common Features of Benefit Corporation Statutes: Disclosure
18
19. Most statutes provide that the provisions of the state’s
general corporate code apply, except where the benefit
corporation statute provides a different rule.
Unlike nonprofit corporations, benefit corporations
• Can raise money in more diverse ways, including issuing stock
– Most grant and donation-based money available in the marketplace is
available only to non-profit, tax-exempt entities
• Have shareholders who elect directors
• Shares may be freely bought and sold
– Some benefit corporations seeking public status
• May earn profits
• Pay dividends to shareholders
• Get no special federal tax benefits
– A few states offer some tax credits, but not full tax exemption
Common Features of Benefit Corporation Statutes: Other Issues
19
21. Directors elected by shareholders
• What happens if shareholders seek to elect directors who would
increase profit?
Open questions
21
22. General public benefit is defined uniformly to mean “a material positive
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as assessed
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a
benefit corporation.”
1. The definition is ambiguous:
a) Material is not defined
b) society and environment are so nebulous and extensive that it is difficult to know their
actual or intended limits
c) As assessed against is vague because it does not specify whether the benefit
corporation must accomplish its general public benefit purpose as assessed against the
third-party standard
2. Is consideration of the statutorily defined stakeholders would be both necessary
and sufficient to evidence pursuit of this purpose?
3. It is not clear how this purpose will relate to the traditional shareholder primacy
norm—the de facto shareholder wealth maximization purpose of a traditional
corporation
a) Nor is it clear how the general public benefit purpose would relate to any of the other
specific public benefit purposes if the enterprise chose to articulate them
Open questions
22
23. If there is disagreement about how the company should
balance general and specific purposes versus profits, who
decides?
• Judicial review?
– E.g., preserving the local environment. One group may wish to see a local
stream restored; another may wish to see a park built.
Open questions
23
24. Accountability: Directors of both are required to
consider the effect of decisions not only on
shareholders, but also on other stakeholders, such
as workers, community, and the environment.
Transparency: Both are required to publish
publically a report assessing their overall social
and environmental performance against a third
party standard.
Performance: Each Certified B Corporation has
achieved a verified minimum score on the B Impact
Assessment (80 points out 200). While benefit
corporations are required to publish an annual
report assessing their overall social and
environmental performance against a third party
standard, that report is not required to be verified,
certified, or audited by a third party standard
organization.
Certified B Corporation is a certification conferred by the nonprofit B Lab. Benefit
corporation is a legal status administered by the state. Benefit corporations do NOT
need to be certified.
Certified B Corporations have been certified as having met a high standard of overall
social and environmental performance, and as a result have access to a portfolio of
services and support that benefit corporations do not.
Comparison
Commonalities Differences
Comparing B Corps and Benefit Corporations
24
26. Process:
• Approval by board of directors
• Approval by a supermajority of shareholders
– Delaware: Holders of 90% of the shares
– California: Holders of 2/3 of the shares
Litigation risks:
• Shareholders may sue to block, relying on Dodge v Ford Motor Co
Could an existing public corporation convert into a benefit
corporation?
27. According to a 2011 study prepared by the IPO Task Force for the U.S.
Treasury Department, it costs approximately $2.5 million for a company
to achieve regulatory compliance for an initial public offering, and
another $1.5 million per year for ongoing compliance.
• These costs include underwriting commissions; filing fees; and fees for lawyers,
accountants, and transfer agents.
The SEC’s disclosure regime focuses on financial and economic
analysis; it does not elicit the type of social benefit assessment that
benefit corporations must provide under state law.
• Potential duplication of disclosure and increase of disclosure litigation risk from
having to comply with federal rules and state assessment disclosures
Lose the ability to control shareholder community:
• If a benefit corporation’s business model has substantial earnings potential
absent the “public benefit” mission, there is nothing to stop frustrated investors
from campaigning to amend the company’s charter. Even if activists cannot
attain the supermajority vote that benefit corporation statutes require, defending
the company’s mission would be a significant distraction and expense for
management.
(Source)
Could (Should) a Benefit Corporation Go Public?
27
28. Etsy IPO: Certified B Corp but not a Benefit Corporation
Risk factors disclosure from IPO prospectus:
Our values are integral to everything we do, and
accordingly, we intend to focus on the long-term
sustainability of our business and our ecosystem. We may
take actions that we believe will benefit our business and
our ecosystem and, therefore, our stockholders over a
period of time, even if those actions do not maximize
short- or medium-term financial results. However, these
longer-term benefits may not materialize within the
timeframe we expect or at all. For example:
we may choose to prohibit the sale of items in our
marketplace that we believe are inconsistent with our
values even though we could benefit financially from
the sale of those items;
we may choose to revise our policies in ways that we
believe will be beneficial to our members and our
ecosystem in the long term even though the changes
are perceived unfavorably among our existing
members; or
we may take actions, such as investing in alternative
forms of shipping or locating our servers in low-impact
data centers, that reduce our environmental footprint
even though these actions may be more costly than
other alternatives.
31. Flexible Purpose Corporations need only pursue
a specific purpose that has a positive effect on
any of the following: its employees, suppliers,
customers, creditors; the community and
society; or the environment.
Benefit Corporations are required to pursue a
General Public Benefit – a "material positive
impact on society and the environment, taken
as a whole”
No such standard is required for FPC
BC are required to gauge their success based
on an independent third party standard
Flexible Purpose Corporations need not use a
3rd party assessment tool
BC are required to disclose a comprehensive
assessment of its activities in support of its
purpose, as measured against a 3rd party
assessment tool
In some states (not CA), FPC directors and
officers need not consider benefit interests
Benefit Corporation directors and officers must
consider benefit interests
California Flexible Purpose Corporations (renamed Social
Purpose Corporation)
31
Editor's Notes
There are continuing arguments over precisely who counts as a social entrepreneur.
Groups focused on social entrepreneurship may be divided into several categories: community-based enterprises, socially responsible enterprises, social services industry professionals, and socio-economic enterprises.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_entrepreneurship
Social Entrepreneurship Is not running a non-profit. Nor is it running a so-called social business.
The “conventional” approach of “social business” as “a non-loss, non-dividend company designed to address a social objective” creates serious limitations to accountability, scaling, efficiency, motivation, attracting investors and competing in an aggressive business world
Social Entrepreneurship addresses those problems by bring about making profit and maximizing efficiency, while having a triple-bottom line: profit, stakeholder welfare, and social benefit.
We are concerned with socio-economic enterprises, which include corporations that balance earning profits and nonprofit social change for communities.
A.k.a. The Social Business Venture: These are set up as businesses designed to create change through social means. Social business ventures evolved through a lack of funding—social entrepreneurs in this situation were forced to become for-profit ventures. In places like the United States, this model is friendly to environmental entrepreneurs, due to the available market opportunities.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_entrepreneurship
Conventional legislation recognizes and regulates charity and for-profit business but not social entrepreneurship.
B Corp ‘s goal is to be to business firms what Fair Trade certification is to coffee or USDA Organic certification is to milk.
B Corps are certified by the nonprofit B Lab to meet rigorous standards of social and environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.
To be granted and to preserve certification, companies must receive a minimum score on an online assessment for "social and environmental performance”, satisfy the requirement that the company integrate B Lab commitments to stakeholders into company governing documents, and pay an annual fee ranging from $500 to $25,000
Advantages
Provides a benchmark of company environmental and social activities.
Academic institution student loan forgiveness.
Disadvantages
B-Lab certification has no legal status.
B-Lab evaluation is not public, the general public does not have access to documentation in support of scores, only to the purely numeric scores accorded by B Lab.
Some companies have found the assessment to be rigorous and difficult to complete and maintain. However more than 15,000 companies have taken the B Impact Assessment,[the first step in the certification process, receiving a median score of 80, a certifiable rating.
The ‘general public benefit’ purpose helps prevent abuse of this legislation by corporations interested in just one minor issue. Without the ‘general public benefit’ purpose, a corporation could name a single, narrow ‘specific public benefit’ purpose (e.g. keeping the river in back of the factory clean from toxic effluents) and then ‘consider’ and dismiss all other non-financial interests when making decisions, which would not meet the primary objective of this legislation to create a new corporate form whose corporate purpose requires it to create benefit for society generally.
Source: http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys
The purpose of the periodic assessment – as well as the benefit enforcement proceeding – is to prevent so-called “Greenwashing,” which occurs when a company or organization spends more time and money claiming to be “green” through advertising and marketing than actually implementing business practices that minimize environmental impact.
This information is adapted from Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-62/issue-4/thrower-symposium-articles/benefit-corporation-courts-boards-legislatures.html
This information is adapted from Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-62/issue-4/thrower-symposium-articles/benefit-corporation-courts-boards-legislatures.html
Availability: Benefit corporation is a corporate status legally recognized by 26 states and the District of Columbia. Certified B Corporation is a certification available to businesses in all 50 states and around the world.