The document provides an overview of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). It discusses the history and evolution of FMEA from its origins in the aerospace industry in the 1960s to the current AIAG VDA FMEA Handbook published in 2019. The document outlines the seven step approach of the new handbook, including planning, structure analysis, function analysis, optimization, risk analysis, failure analysis, and documentation of results. It also summarizes some of the major changes between the previous AIAG 4th edition and new handbook, such as replacing RPN with action priority and revising the rating tables.

1. 1
Phone - +91 8383050287,
Email – guptaankit0860@gmail.com

2. 2
• History of FMEA
• Overview(Whatis FMEAand What it cando for you?)
• Scope/whentouse?
• ObjectiveofFMEA
• FMEAterminology
• AIAGFMEA4th edition(Oldedition)
• Introductionof AIAGVDA FMEA(New edition)
• Why new AIAGVDA FMEA?
• Majorchanges
• Steps of FMEA
• Severity rating
• Occurrencerating
• Detectionrating
• AP Table
• Casestudy
Contents:
CONTENT

3. 3
• This “type” of thinkinghas been aroundfor hundreds of years.It was first formalized
in the aerospaceindustryduring the Apolloprograminthe 1960s by NASA.
• Ford wasthe first North AmericanautomotivesectorcompanyusingFMEAin the
1970s. Incorporatedby the “BigThree”(Ford,GM & ChryslerLLC)
• Automotive Industry actiongroup(AIAG)and American societyofqualitycontrol
copyright standardsin 1993 , 2nd edition1995, 3rd edition2001.
• After that, adoptedby manyother industries.
• PublishedAIAG4th edition2008.
• PublishedAIAG-VDA1st editionJune 2019.
History of FMEA:

4. 4
• IdentifiesDesignor Process related failuremodes
beforetheyhappen.
• Determinethe Effectsand Severityof thesefailure
modes.
• Identifiesthe causesand probabilityofoccurrenceof
the failuremodes.
• Identifiesthe controland their effectiveness.
• Quantifiesand prioritizestheRisk associatedwiththe
failuremodes.
• Developand documentsactionplans that willoccurto
reducerisk.
What is FMEA?.....What it can do for you?:

5. 5
Whereto use?:
• New productdevelopment(NPD).
• Modificationinthe existingproduct/process(ECN,PCN)
• Manufacturingof productat New location,environmentorapplication.
• Existingeditionchange(asper customer).
• Supplierchange.
ObjectiveofFMEA:
• Increasethequality,reliability,manufacturing,serviceabilityand safetyof
automotiveproducts.
• Reducewarranty
• Increasedcustomersatisfaction.
• Maintaindefectfreeproducts.
• Reduceprocessvariation
Scope….Where to use ? & Objective:

6. 6
• Failuremodes:(Specificlossof a function)is a concisedescriptionofhow a part,
system,or manufacturingprocessmaypotentiallyfailto performits function.
• Failuremode “Effect”: A descriptionof the consequenceorramificationof a system
or part failure.A typicalfailure modemayhaveseveral“effects”dependinguponwhich
customeryouconsider.
• Severityrating/Ranking:(Seriousnessof the effect)Severityis the numericalrating
of the impactoncustomer. Whenmultipleeffectsexistsfora givenfailuremodeenter
the worst caseseverityonthe worksheettocalculaterisk.
• Failuremode “Causes”:Adescriptionof the designor processdeficiency(globalcause
or rootlevelcause)thatresultsin the failuremode.
• Occurrencerating:It is an estimateno.of frequenciesorcumulativeno.of failure
(based onexperience) thatwilloccur(inour designconcept)fora givencauseoverthe
intended“lifeof the design”.
• Failuremode “Controls”:Themechanism,methods,tests,procedures,orcontrolsthat
we haveinplacetoPREVENT the causeof the failuremodeor DETECTthe failure
mode or causeto occur.
FMEA terminology:

7. 7
• Detectionrating: A numericalratingofthe probabilitythat a givenset of controls
WILL DISCOVERaspecificcauseof failuremodeto preventbad parts leavingthe
facilityor gettingto the ultimatecustomer.
• Riskprioritynumber(RPN):It is the product of Severity,occurrence&detection.
Risk=Severity*Occurrence*Detection
• Actionplanning: A thoroughlythoughtout and welldevelopedFMEAwithhighrisk
patternsthat is not followedwithcorrectiveactionshas littleorno value,otherthan
havinga chart for anaudit.
✓ Actionplans shouldbe takenveryseriously.
✓ If ignored,youhaveprobablywastedmuchof your valuabletime.
✓ Basedon the FMEAanalysis,strategiestoreduceriskare focussedon:
✓ Reducingtheseverityrating.
✓ Reducingtheoccurrencerating.
✓ Reducingthedetectionrating.
FMEA terminology:

8. 8
FMEA AIAG 4th edition (Old format):
Process
Step
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential S
Effects of e
Failure v
C
l
a
s
Potential
Causes/
of Failure
s Mechanisms c
Current
Process
Control
(Detection)
D R.
e P.
t N.
Recommended
Actions
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
Action Results
Actions
Taken
S O D R.
e c e P.
v c t N.
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(Process FMEA)
FMEA Number
Page of
Prepared by
FMEA Date (Orig.) (Rev.)
Core Team
Model Year(s) Program(s)
Item
Process Responsibility
Key Date
O Current
c Process
Control
(Prevention)
Function
Insufficien
t friction
delivered
by
handbrake
Hand brake
Manager Name
H-09
Names ofteammembers including theirphone numbers
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between
brake pad
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Bicycle
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potential
resulting in
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b)Cable
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c) External
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04-01-2019 03-03-2019

9. New AIAG VDA FMEA Handbook
• AIAG FMEA-4from the Automotive Industry ActionGroup
• VDA Volume 4from the VDA (VerbanderAutomobilindustrie)
Latest :
• AIAG VDA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Handbook.: June 2019
+ =
+
9

10. Suppliers providingproducts to both German and North
America OEM's wererequiredto assess their products'
failuremodes and effectsdifferently,based on differences
betweenthe Severity,Occurrence,and Detection rating tables
in the VDA and AIAG FMEA Manuals.
This caused confusion and added complexity to the product
development andproduct improvementactivities of the
suppliers.
Why New AIAG VDA FMEA?
10

11. MAJOR CHANGES IN NEW AIAG
VDA FMEA
11

12. Major changes in New AIAG VDA FMEA
1. New 7 Steps
approach
defined
2.RPN is replaced by
Action Priority (AP)
– Low, Medium &
High
3. Rating Chart
revision for global use
by automotive OEM &
Suppliers
4. Use of 5 T approach
(InTent, Timing,
Team, Task, Tool)
12
7. Structure analysis
for System, Sub-
System & Component
level
6. Scope & Results
of FMEA needs to
be summarized and
communicated
5. PFMEA : Failure cause
in 4 M-1 E (Man,
Machine, Method,
Material, Environment)

13. 7 Step Approach in AIAG VDA
FMEA
13

14. 14
New 7 Steps Approach
Step:1
Step:2
Step:3
Step:4
Step:5
Step:6
Step:7
Planning and Preparation
Structure Analysis
Functional Analysis
Optimization
Risk Analysis
Failure Analysis
Result Documentation

15. 15
1st Step: ProjectPlanning & Preparation
Importantpoints in the this steps is
1.- Define what to include and exclude from the FMEA.
2.- FMEA project plan, such as important dates, FMEA responsible persons, potential team members,
project timelines, etc.
3.- Define the boundaries of the analysis.
New 7 Steps Approach_ 1st Step

16. 16
Explanation of 5T’s Methodology:
New 7 Steps Approach_ 1st Step Continue…….
ST’s Methodology in AIAG VDA FMEA
FMEA Team – Who needs to be on the team?
FMEA Timing – When is this due?
FMEA In Tent – Why are we here?
FMEA Tool – How do we conduct the analysis?
FMEA Task – What work needs to be done?

17. 17
PFMEAHeader:
New 7 Steps Approach_ 1st Step Continue…….
Process FailureMode and Effect Analysis (PFMEA)
SCOPE DEFINITION STEP 1
CompanyName:XYZ Subject:Name of PFMEA project
PlantLocation:Geographical Location
PFMEA StartDate: Date of PFMEA Project
Started
PFMEA ID Number:Determinedbythe company
CustomerName:Name of Customer(s) or(Process
Family)
PFMEA RevisionDate:Date of mostrecent
change
ProcessResponsibility: Name of PFMEA Owner
Model Year/Platform:Customerapplicationor
CompanyModel/style
CrossFunctional Team: Teamroasterneeded ConfidentialityLevel: ( BusinessUse Confidentiality)

18. 2nd Step: Structure Analysis
The Structure Analysis transfers the information gatheredin the
scoping step to visualizethe relationships and interactions
betweenthe design or processelements.
The structure analysisis the basis for the next step (function analysis)
New 7 Steps Approach_ 2nd Step

19. New 7 Steps Approach_ 2nd Step
CONTINUOUS
IMPROVEMENT
STRUCTURE ANALYSISSTEP 2
History/ Change
Authorization
(As Applicable)
1. Process Item
System, Subsystem, Part
Element orName of Process
2. Process Step
Station No. andName
of Focus Element
3. Process Work Element
(Man, Machine, Material
(indirect), Milieu
(Environment), etc.
HandbookExample - this
row can be hiddenor
deleted
Electrical Motor (OP 30) Sintered
Bearing Press-In
Process
Operator
Electrical Motor (OP 30) Sintered
Bearing Press-In
Process
Press machine
NewAIAG-VDA FMEA
Process
steps
Function
AIAG 4th edition
Comparison in the Format of old v/s new FMEA:
19

20. 3rd Step: Function Analysis
In this step the functionality of the product or processes are ensured by
allocating a description of the activities, purposes or tasks intended for
the product performance.
A function describes what the process item or process step is intended
to do. There may be more than one function for each process item or
process step.
Visualizationof product or process functions
Function tree/net or equivalent process flow diagram
Basis for the FailureAnalysis step
New 7 Steps Approach_ 3rd Step
20

21. 21
New 7 Steps Approach_ 3rd Step
NewAIAG-VDA FMEA
Process
steps
Function
AIAG 4th edition
Comparison in the Format of old v/s new FMEA:
CONTINUOUS
IMPROVEMENT
STRUCTURE ANALYSISSTEP2 FUNCTION ANALYSISSTEP3
History/ Change
Authorization
(As Applicable)
1. Process Item
System,
Subsystem,Part
Element or Name
ofProcess
2. Process Step
Station No.and
Name ofFocus
Element
3. Process Work
Element
(Man, Machine,
Material (indirect),
Milieu
(Environment), etc.
1. Functionofthe
Process Item
(In-Plant, Ship-to
plant, Process
item, Vehicle End
user, When
known)
2. Functionof
Process Step and
Product
Characteristics
(Quantitative Value
is Optional)
3. Functionof
Process Work
Element and
Process
Characteristics
Handbook Example -this
row can be hidden or
deleted
ElectricalMotor (OP 30) Sintered
Bearing Press-In
Process
Operator Product: Convert
electricalenergy
into mechanical
energy (acc.
Control signal)In
Plant: Assembly of
components
within cycletime,
Press insintered
bearing toachieve
axial position in
pole housing to
max gap perprint
Operator takes
clean sintered
bearing fromchute
and push itonto the
press-inshaft until
the upper stop

22. 4th Step: FailureAnalysis
• Step # 4 is to identify failurecauses, modes, and effects, and show
their relationshipsto enable risk assessment.
New 7 Steps Approach_ 4th Step
▪ The Failure Chain
For a specific failure, there are three aspects to be considered:
▪ FailureEffect (FE)
▪ FailureMode (FM)
▪ FailureCause (FC)
22

23. 23
New 7 Steps Approach_ 4th Step
NewAIAG-VDA FMEA
AIAG 4th edition
Comparison in the Format of old v/s new FMEA:
FUNCTION ANALYSIS STEP 3 FAILURE ANALYSIS STEP 4
1. Functionofthe
Process Item
(In-Plant, Ship-to
plant, Process
item, Vehicle End
user, When
known)
2. Functionof
Process Step and
Product
Characteristics
(Quantitative
Value is Optional)
3. Functionof
Process Work
Element and
Process
Characteristics
1. FailureEffect
(FE) (In-plant,
Ship-to plant,
Process Item,
Vehicle End User,
When known)
Severity
(S)
of
FE
2. FailureMode
(FM) ofthe
Process Step
3. FailureCause
(FC) ofthe work
Element
Product: Convert
electricalenergy
into mechanical
energy (acc.
Control signal) In
Plant: Assembly
ofcomponents
within cycletime,
Press insintered
bearing toachieve
axial position in
pole housing to
max gap perprint
Operator takes
clean sintered
bearing fromchute
and push itonto
the press-inshaft
until the upper stop
Product: Loss of
mechanical
energy because
oftoo much
friction between
bearing and shaft.
Inner diameter of
the bearing
deformed
because oftoo
much
8 Axial Positionof
sintered bearing
is not reached,
gap too small
Operator inserts a
sintered bearing
which was
dropped to the
ground floor
before
(contaminated
with dirt)
Potentialfailure
mode
Potentialeffects
of failure
Severity
(S)
of
FE
Classification
Potential
causes of
failure

24. 5th Step: Risk Analysis
In this step preventionand detectioncontrols areassigned, as wellas the
rankingsfor severity,occurrenceand detection.
A new approach for "actionprioritization"is introduced.
Note:RPN has disappeared
New 7 Steps Approach_ 5th Step
24
The main objectivesof the Process RiskAnalysis are:
▪ Assignment of existing and/or planned controlsand rating of failures
▪ Assignment of PreventionControls to the FailureCauses
▪ Assignment of Detection Controls to the Failure Causes and/or Failure Modes
▪ Rating of Severity, Occurrenceand Detectionfor each failure chain
▪ Collaborationbetweencustomer and supplier (Severity)
▪ Basis for the product or processOptimizationstep

25. New 7 Steps Approach_ 5th Step
25
▪ Evaluations
Each FailureMode, Cause and Effect relationship (failurechain or net) is
assessed for its independent risk. There are three rating criteriafor the
evaluationof risk:
Severity(S): stands for the Severityof the Failure Effect Occurrence(O):
stands for the Occurrenceof the Failure Cause
Detection(D): stands for the Detection of the occurredFailureCause
and/or Failure Mode
Evaluation numbers from 1 to 10 are used for S, O, and D respectively,in
which 10 stands for the highest risk contribution.

26. (Risk analysis-Severity ranking table)
26
Process general Evaluation Criteria Severity (S)
PotentialFailure Effect rated according to the criteriabelow
Blankuntil
filled in by
User
S
Effe
ct
Impact to YourPlant Impact to ship-to Plant (When Known)
Impact to End User
(When Known)
Corporate
or Product
Line
Example
10
High
Failure mayresultinanacute health
and/orsafetyriskforthe
manufacturingorassembly worker
Failure mayresultinanacute healthand/or
safetyriskforthe manufacturingorassembly
worker
Affectssafe operationof
the vehicle and/orother
vehicles,the healthof
driverorpassenger(s) or
roaduseror pedestrians.
Failure mayresultinin-plant
regulatorynoncompliance
Failure mayresultinin-plantregulatory
noncompliance
NonCompliancewith
regulations.
9
8
Mo
dera
tely
High
100% of production runaffectedmay
have to be scrapped.Failure may
resultinin-plantregulatory
noncomplianceormayhave chronic
healthand/orsafety riskforthe
manufacturingorassembly worker.
Line shutdowngreaterthanfull shift;stop
shipmentpossible;fieldrepairorreplacement
required(Assembly toenduser) Otherthanfor
regulatorynoncompliance.Failure mayresultin
in-plantregulatorynoncomplianceormayhave
chronichealthand/orsafetyrisk forthe
manufacturingorassembly worker.
Loss of primary vehicle
function necessary for
normal driving during
expectedservice life.

27. (Risk analysis-Severity ranking table)
27
S Effect Impact to YourPlant
Impact to ship-to Plant (When
Known)
Impact to End User (When
Known)
Corporate or
Product Line
Example
6
Moder
ately
Low
100% of production runmayhave
to be reworkedoff lineand
accepted
Line shutdownuptoone hour
Lossof Secondary vehicle
function
5
A portionof the productionrun
mayhave to be reworkedoff line
andaccepted
Lessthan 100% of productaffected;
strongpossibility foradditional defective
product;sortrequired,notline shut
down
Degradationof Secondaryvehicle
function
4
100% of productionrun mayhave
to be reworkedinstationbefore it
isprocessed
Defective producttriggerssignificant
reactionplan;additionaldefective
productnotlikely;sortnotrequired
VeryObjectionableappearance,
soundvibration,harshness, or
haptics.
3
Low
A portionof the productionrun
may have tobe reworked in-station
before itisprocessed
Defectiveproducttriggersminorreaction
plan;additional defectiveproductnot
likely;sortnotrequired
Moderately Objectionable
appearance, soundvibration,
harshness,orhaptics.
Slightinconveniencetothe process,
operationoroperator
Defectiveproducttriggersnoreaction
plan;additional defectiveproductnot
likely;sortnotrequired;requires
feedback tosupplier
SlightlyObjectionable
appearance, soundvibration,
harshness,orhaptics.
2
1
Very
Low
NoDiscernibleEffect NoDiscernible EffectorNoeffect NoDiscernibleEffect

28. (Risk analysis-Occurrence ranking table)
28
Occurrence Potential(O) forthe process
Potentialfailure cause ratedaccordingtothe criteriabelow.ConsiderPreventionControlswhendeterminingthe best
occurrence estimate.Occurrence isthe predictive qualitative ratingmethodat the time of evaluationsandmay not
reflectthe actual Occurrence. The Occurrence ratingnumber is a relative ratingwithinthe scope of FMEA(Process
being evaluated).Forpreventioncontrolswithmultiple occurrence Ratings,use the rating that bestreflectsthe
robustnessof the control.
Blankuntil filled
inby User
O Predictionof failure Cause
Occurring
Type of
Control
PreventionControls
Corporate or
ProductLine
Examples
3 Low
BestPractices:
Behavioralor
Technical
Preventioncontrol are highlyeffectivein
preventingfailurecause
2 VeryLow
1 ExtremelyLow Technical
Preventioncontrolare extremely effective in
preventingfailurecause fromoccurringdue to
design(ie;partgeometry) orprocess(ie;fixture
or toolingdesign) Intentof prevention controls-
Failure cannotbe physically produceddue tothe
failure cause

29. (Risk analysis-Occurrence ranking table)
29
Occurrence Potential(O) forthe process
Potentialfailure cause ratedaccordingtothe criteria below.ConsiderPreventionControlswhen determiningthe best
occurrence estimate.Occurrence isthe predictive qualitative ratingmethodatthe time of evaluationsandmay not
reflectthe actual Occurrence.The Occurrence rating numberis a relative ratingwithinthe scope of FMEA(Processbeing
evaluated).Forpreventioncontrolswithmultiple occurrence Ratings,use the rating that bestreflectsthe robustnessof
the control.
Blankuntil filled
inby User
O Predictionof failure Cause
Occurring
Type of
Control
PreventionControls
Corporate or
ProductLine
Examples
10 Extremely High None NoPreventive Controls
9
Very High Behavioral
Preventioncontrol willhave little effectin
preventing failure cause
8
7
High
Behavioral or
Technical
Preventioncontrol somewhateffectivein
preventingfailure cause
6
5
Moderate
Prevention controlare effective inpreventing
failurecause
4

30. (Risk analysis-Detection ranking table)
30
DetectionPotential(D) for the validationof the Processdesign
Detection control ratedaccording tothe detectionmethod MaturityandOpportunityfor detection
Blank until
filled inby
User
D
Ability to
Detect
DetectionMethodMaturity Opportunityfor Detection
Corporate or
Product Line
Example
10
Very Low
Notestingorinspectionmethodhasbeen
established orisknown.
The failure mode willnotorcannotbe detected.
Itis unlikelythatthe testingorinspection
methodwilldetectthe failuremode
The failure mode isnoteasilydetected through
randomorsporadicaudits.
9
8
Low
Testor inspection methodhasnotbeen
proventobe effective andreliable (ie,
planthaslittle ornoexperiencewith
method, gauge R&Rresultmarginalon
comparable processonthisapplication,
etc.)
HumanInspection(Visual, tactile, Audible), oruse
of manual gauging(attribute orvariable)that
shoulddetectthe failuremode orfailure cause.
Machine-baseddetection(automated orsemi
automatedwithnotificationbylight,buzzeretc.),
or use of a inspectionequipmentsuchasa
coordinate measuringmachine thatshoulddetect
failure modeorfailure cause
7

31. (Risk analysis-Detection ranking table)
31
6
Moderate
Test or inspection method has
been proven to be effective and
reliable(i.e planthas experience
with method; gauge R&R results
are acceptableon comparable
process or this application etc.)
Human Inspection (Visual, tactile,Audible),or useof manual
gauging (attribute or variable) thatwill detect the failuremode or
failurecause(including productsamplechecks)
5
Machine-based detection (semi automated with notification by
light,buzzer etc.), or use of inspection equipmentsuch as a
coordinatemeasuring machine thatwill detect failuremodeor
failurecause(including productsamplechecks)
4
High
System has been proven to be
effective and reliable(ie;planthas
experience with method on
identical process or this
application),gauge R&R results
are acceptable, etc.
Machine-based automated detection method that will detect
failuremodedownstream, prevent further processing or system
will identify the productas discrepantand allowitmove forward
in the process until the designated reject unload area.Discrepant
productwill becontrolled by a robustsystem that will prevent
outflow of the productfrom the facility.
3
Machine-based automated detection method that will detect
failuremodein-station,preventfurther processing or systemwill
identify the product as discrepantand allowitmove forward in
the process until the designated reject unload area.Discrepant
productwill becontrolled by a robustsystem that will prevent
outflow of the productfrom the facility.
2
Detection method has been
proven to be effective and
reliable(ie;planthas experience
with method, error- proofing,
verification etc.)
Machine-based detection method that will detect the causeand
prevent failuremode(discrepantpart) frombeing produced.
1 Very High Failuremode can not be physically producedas designed or processed,or detection methods proven to
always detect the failuremode and failurecause.

32. Risk analysis-Action priority
32
▪ Action Priority(AP)
The Action Priority (AP) method accounts for all 1000 possible combinations
of S, O, and D. It is createdto givemore emphasis on severity first, then
occurrence,then detection. This logicfollows the failure-preventionintent of
FMEA.
RPN alone is not an adequate method to determine the need for more
actions since RPN gives equal weight to S, O, and D.
Risk matrices can represent combinations of S and O, S and D, and O and D.

33. Risk analysis-Action priority
33
Action Priority(AP) forDFMEA & PFMEAc
Action Priorityis basedon combinationof Severity,Occurrence andDetectionratinginordertoprioritize actionsforrisk
reduction.
Blankuntil fill in
by User
Effect S
Prediction of
failure Cause
Occurring
O Ability to Detect D
Action Priority
(AP)
Comments
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
VeryHigh 8-10
Moderate 5-6 H
High 2-4 H
VeryHigh 1 H
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
High 6-7
Moderate 5-6 H
High 2-4 H
Product or
Plan Effect
Very High
9-
10
VeryHigh 1 H
Moderate 5-4
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
Moderate 5-6 H
High 2-4 H
VeryHigh 1 M
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
Low 3-2
Moderate 5-6 M
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
VeryLow 1 VeryHigh – VeryLow 1-10 L

34. Risk analysis-Action priority
34
Action Priority(AP) forDFMEA & PFMEA
Action Priorityis basedon combinationof Severity,Occurrence andDetectionratinginordertoprioritize actionsforrisk
reduction.
Blankuntil fill in
by User
Effect S
Predictionof
failure Cause
Occurring
O Abilityto Detect D Action Priority
(AP)
Comments
Productor
Plan Effect
High
7-8
VeryHigh 8-10
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
Moderate 5-6 H
High 2-4 H
VeryHigh 1 H
High 6-7
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
Moderate 5-6 H
High 2-4 H
VeryHigh 1 M
Moderate 4-5
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
Moderate 5-6 M
High 2-4 M
VeryHigh 1 M
Low 2-3
Low – VeryLow 7-10 M
Moderate 5-6 M
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
VeryLow 1 VeryHigh – VeryLow 1-10 L

35. Risk analysis-Action priority
35
Action Priority(AP) forDFMEA & PFMEA
Action Priorityis basedon combinationof Severity,Occurrence andDetectionratinginordertoprioritize actionsforrisk
reduction.
Blankuntil fill in
by User
Effect S
Predictionof
failure Cause
Occurring
O Abilityto Detect D
Action Priority
(AP)
Comments
Product or
Plan Effect
Moderate
4-6
VeryHigh 8-10
Low – VeryLow 7-10 H
Moderate 5-6 H
High 2-4 M
VeryHigh 1 M
High 6-7
Low – VeryLow 7-10 M
Moderate 5-6 M
High 2-4 M
VeryHigh 1 L
Moderate 4-5
Low – VeryLow 7-10 M
Moderate 5-6 L
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
Low 2-3
Low – VeryLow 7-10 L
Moderate 5-6 L
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
VeryLow 1 VeryHigh – VeryLow 1-10 L

36. Risk analysis-Action priority
36
Effect S
Prediction of
failure Cause
Occurring
O Ability to Detect D
Action Priority
(AP)
Comments
Productor
Plan Effect
Low
2-3
VeryHigh 8-10
Low – VeryLow 7-10 M
Moderate 5-6 M
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
High 6-7
Low – VeryLow 7-10 L
Moderate 5-6 L
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
Moderate 4-5
Low – VeryLow 7-10 L
Moderate 5-6 L
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
Low 2-3
Low – VeryLow 7-10 L
Moderate 5-6 L
High 2-4 L
VeryHigh 1 L
VeryLow 1 VeryHigh – VeryLow 1-10 L
No
Discernible
Effect
1 VeryLow – VeryHig 1-10 VeryHigh – VeryLow 1-10 L

37. 37
New 7 Steps Approach_ 5th Step
NewAIAG-VDA FMEA
AIAG 4th edition
Comparison in the Format of old v/s new FMEA:
S
E
V
E
R
I
T
Y
C
L
A
S
S
Potential
Cause(s) /
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
O
C
C
U
R
E
N
C
E
Current
Controls
Preventi
on
Current
Controls
Detection
D
E
T
E
C
T
I
O
N
R
P
N
FAILURE ANALYSIS STEP 4 RISK ANALYSIS STEP 5
1. FailureEffect
(FE) (In-plant,
Ship-to plant,
Process Item,
Vehicle End User,
When known)
Severity
(S)
of
FE
2. FailureMode
(FM) ofthe
Process Step
3. FailureCause
(FC) ofthe work
Element
Current
Prevention
Control (PC)
ofFC
Occurrence
(O)
of
FC
Current
Detection
Control (DC)
ofFC or FM
Detection
(D)
of
FC/FM
PFMEA
AP
Sp Prod
Charac
Filter Code
(Optional)
Product: Loss of
mechanical
energy because
oftoo much
friction between
bearing and
shaft. Inner
diameter ofthe
bearing
deformed
because oftoo
much
8 Axial Positionof
sintered bearing
is not reached,
gap too small
Operator inserts
a sintered
bearing which
was dropped to
the ground floor
before
(contaminated
with dirt)
No
Prevention
Control
10 Lot release
protocol
objective
(Effectively;
100%)
Visual
Gauge
2 H

38. 6th Step:Optimization
Visualization of the failure analysis
The primary objectiveof optimizationis to develop actions that reduce
riskand increasecustomersatisfactionby improvingthedesignor
process.
The FMEA can be usedas the basis forcontinuousimprovementfor
designor process.
New 7 Steps Approach_ 6th Step
38

39. 39
New 7 Steps Approach_ 6th Step
NewAIAG-VDA FMEA
AIAG 4th edition
Comparison in the Format of old v/s new FMEA:
Recommende
d actions
Responsibilityand
target completion
date
Actions Result
Actions
taken
severity
Occurrence
Detection
RPN
OPTIMIZATIONSTEP 6
Preventi
on
Action
Detectio
n Action
Responsi
ble
Person's
Name
Target
Complet
ionDate
Status
Action
Taken
with
pointer
to
Evidenc
e
Complet
ionDate
Severity
(S)
Occurrence
(O)
Detection
(D)
PFMEA
AP
Remarks
Selected
press
w ith
positio
n
control
sensor
Selected
Press
w ith
force
moni
torin
g
Process
Engineer
Mr. Paul
Duncan
DD.MM.YY
YY
Open DD.MM.YY
YY
3 2 L
Newly
added

40. 7th Step: Result Communication
Documentationand communicationof implementedmeasures to reduce
risks, assessmentof the effectiveness of the action taken
New 7 Steps Approach_ 7th Step
40

41. NEW AIAG VDA FMEA FORMAT
41

42. Summary
❑ Major changes in AIAG-VDA FMEA:
✓ 7 step approach (PS 2F RO R)
✓ Totally revised severity, occurrence and detection rating.
✓ RPN is now replaced by AP
✓ New form sheet in colour with linkage.
✓ PFD is integral part.
✓ 4M approach.
✓ Recommendedaction replaced by Prevention and detection action.
✓ Added status of action.
✓ Added special characteristicsto replace classification
42

43. 43
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