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Aggression and Unfairness in an Uncertain Transitory Environment “ From Here and From There:   New and Old Members’ Perception on EU Enlargement” A Joint Workshop of the Dutch- and Hungarian Networks of Institutional Economics  25-26 September 2003, Groningen ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 Balazs Hamori  Professor of Economics,  BUESPA, Budapest, Hungary   [email_address]
Take television. Cops chase robbers, victims   are stalked by hit men (or should I say hit  persons?),   posses cut off rustlers at the pass,  plaintiffs sue   defendants, exorcists cast spells  against vampires .  What is all this but muscular  economics? Robbers,   rustlers, hit persons, litigants--they're all trying to   make a living. Even vampires are making economic   choices: sucking blood is presumably the cost-effective   way of meeting their unusual nutritional needs."   -- Jack Hirshleifer   ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 ,[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 ( Denzau - North  [1994]  revisited)
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 T he outcome depends on which party is  more aggressive.  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],To make a "take it or leave it" threat  credible, a   participant must be prepared  to sacrifice a potentially good deal.
Aggression and Capitulation in a  Customer-Vendor Transaction Assume that the regular price for the apples was $6,  the closing-time offer is $5, and the customer's  counter offer is $1. As shown in:  ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 0 , 0 5 , 1 holds offer 1 , 5 3 , 3 backs down CUSTOMER holds offer backs down VENDOR
Aggression and Capitulation in a    Customer-Vendor Transaction ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
The  maximum gain for an individual player depends on *   T aking a dominant, aggressive position ,   *   R efusing to back down--even at the risk of   losing the deal entirely. Once one player has established a  d ominant   position, *  B oth are wise to maintain the status quo.  When an aggressive vendor is challenged by an  equally aggressive customer,  *  B oth will lose; an unrealized deal is the worst    outcome for both.   ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Although market economy historically emerged   *   from the struggle against feudal      aggression   and injustice,  C ame into being with     *   principles of equity and     *   a respect for the law,  Th e example  before  proves that    *   aggression resides not only in the      background of the actions of market    actors, but    *   can also be a manifest aspect of their      behavioral patterns. ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Off-listing, „cut-rate prices” and other effective methods of blackmail in commerce ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
*   Retailers with a European presence  often  place financial demands on their suppliers that are akin to feudal rent from a theoretical viewpoint.  * If global companies producing well   known brand- names   wish to see their products on the shelves of the  hyper-markets of large retail chains, they must yield to  vehement demands of price reduction from time to time  and resign themselves to the fact that 1-2-% of the  retail value of their commodities might - even  retroactively – be claimed by retailers as a special  discount *  R ebel s,  refusing the   „requests” for a rebate,  have   to count with severe retorsions; the retailer will not order from the company in the future Off-listing and rent seeking ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
‘ Tricky’ actions of retailers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Beware the Small Type!--Contractual Aggression   ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Uncertainty and criminal behavior ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Definition of mafia ,[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Mafia as a geographic phenomenon ,[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
The particular characteristics of Eastern mafias  in comparison with their Western counterpart Eastern   Western Field of   more diversified   concentrate on some   activity   as a consequence of   selected area: protection ,      economic   uncertainty   drug, prostitution   Aggression     drastic, unlimited,   sophisticated a nd   terror   bloody Origin   from the top,    from the bottom   from the former    nomenclature Relationship     intertwining,    separated,  w ith   the state   close   contacts   hostile Infiltration   whole branches,     limited segments of   regions,     the economy     even countries   ©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
The Four “A”s  for Businesses :  Anytime, Anywhere, Anything For Anybody   ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Other illegal practices of „normal” businesses ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Self-healing market mechanism ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
Janus-facedness of market ,[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
The balance of two sides of market turn out positively for Eastern Europe too ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],©   Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26

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Aggression Unfairness

  • 1. Aggression and Unfairness in an Uncertain Transitory Environment “ From Here and From There: New and Old Members’ Perception on EU Enlargement” A Joint Workshop of the Dutch- and Hungarian Networks of Institutional Economics 25-26 September 2003, Groningen © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 Balazs Hamori Professor of Economics, BUESPA, Budapest, Hungary [email_address]
  • 2. Take television. Cops chase robbers, victims are stalked by hit men (or should I say hit persons?), posses cut off rustlers at the pass, plaintiffs sue defendants, exorcists cast spells against vampires . What is all this but muscular economics? Robbers, rustlers, hit persons, litigants--they're all trying to make a living. Even vampires are making economic choices: sucking blood is presumably the cost-effective way of meeting their unusual nutritional needs." -- Jack Hirshleifer © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6. Aggression and Capitulation in a Customer-Vendor Transaction Assume that the regular price for the apples was $6, the closing-time offer is $5, and the customer's counter offer is $1. As shown in: © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26 0 , 0 5 , 1 holds offer 1 , 5 3 , 3 backs down CUSTOMER holds offer backs down VENDOR
  • 7.
  • 8. The maximum gain for an individual player depends on * T aking a dominant, aggressive position , * R efusing to back down--even at the risk of losing the deal entirely. Once one player has established a d ominant position, * B oth are wise to maintain the status quo. When an aggressive vendor is challenged by an equally aggressive customer, * B oth will lose; an unrealized deal is the worst outcome for both. © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
  • 9. Although market economy historically emerged * from the struggle against feudal aggression and injustice, C ame into being with * principles of equity and * a respect for the law, Th e example before proves that * aggression resides not only in the background of the actions of market actors, but * can also be a manifest aspect of their behavioral patterns. © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
  • 10.
  • 11. * Retailers with a European presence often place financial demands on their suppliers that are akin to feudal rent from a theoretical viewpoint. * If global companies producing well known brand- names wish to see their products on the shelves of the hyper-markets of large retail chains, they must yield to vehement demands of price reduction from time to time and resign themselves to the fact that 1-2-% of the retail value of their commodities might - even retroactively – be claimed by retailers as a special discount * R ebel s, refusing the „requests” for a rebate, have to count with severe retorsions; the retailer will not order from the company in the future Off-listing and rent seeking © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17. The particular characteristics of Eastern mafias in comparison with their Western counterpart Eastern Western Field of more diversified concentrate on some activity as a consequence of selected area: protection , economic uncertainty drug, prostitution Aggression drastic, unlimited, sophisticated a nd terror bloody Origin from the top, from the bottom from the former nomenclature Relationship intertwining, separated, w ith the state close contacts hostile Infiltration whole branches, limited segments of regions, the economy even countries © Hamori, 2003 Sept. 25-26
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21.
  • 22.