Admiral Woodward

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JRCSP 11
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Admiral Woodward, an Effective Operational Level Commander
Introduction
Rear Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward’s steadfast adaptive operational-level
leadership was the underlying reason why the Royal Navy was able to gain localized
maritime superiority and execute successfully Operation Corporate. Admiral Woodward
used his manifestly competent and dynamic operational level leadership to achieve a
marked victory in the face of extreme difficulties in ratios of enemy power, distance,
technology, weather, media perceptions, home government concerns, and logistics.
Without Woodward’s adaptive leadership, the mission and the well being of the forces
employed would have been in stark jeopardy. The thesis of this paper is that Admiral
Woodward employed an adaptive leadership methodology that was highly appropriate for
leading an operational level campaign and was thereby able to prosecute optimally
Operation Corporate.
Methodology
After describing leadership at the operation level and several leadership
evaluation models, this paper will go through several key campaign events. Relative to
these events, this paper will then use three leadership evaluation models1
to shed light on
Woodward’s leadership techniques. Next, this paper will assemble these individual
situational based leadership techniques into an approximation of Woodward’s leadership
style or profile. Finally, this paper will use leadership evaluation models to interpret
Woodward’s profile and his overall effectiveness as a leader at the operational level.
1
One primary and two supplementary models.

3
Figure 1: Woodward and his Leadership Constituencies2
2
The above diagram delineates the various groups (“leadership constituencies”) that Woodward led in an
operational context during the conflict. This paper defines ‘leadership’ as “the art of influencing human
behaviour so as to accomplish a mission...” See Department of National Defence, CFP 131-002 The
Professional Officer (Ottawa: DND, 1973), 2-1. Many of the constituencies are not subordinate to
Woodward and some are not even in the chain of command at all. They are all, however, influenced by
Woodward in support of his operational mission accomplishment. This author gives thanks to Colonel
Randy Brooks, CF “Woodward’s War: A Lesson in Leadership at the Operational Level” (Toronto:
Canadian Forces College, 2000), for the reference.
Commander,
Amphibious Task Force
(CATF), Commodore
Clapp
Rear Admiral
Woodward,
Commander Task
Force (Seaborne)
Commander Land Forces
Falkland Islands (CLFFI),
MG Jeremy Moore, RM
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse,
CINC, Fleet (Based back in
Northwood, London)
Royal Air
Force
Royal Navy Ship
Captains
Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Support Ships Captains
Argentine
Military
British Government
The Press
Ship’s Crews
Woodward’s Staff
Royal Marines
and supporting
British Army

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Leadership at the Operational Level
Canadian doctrine defines leadership: “the art of influencing human behaviour so
as to accomplish a mission....”3
The key to effective leadership is knowing how to
influence optimally and thereby achieve the desired result most efficiently. As a leader
assumes higher levels of authority and matures from the tactical and unto the operational
level of command, the intricacies of leadership become exponentially more complex.
This increased complexity is due to the complications involving, but not limited to,
numbers, time, and space. Moreover, new leadership constituencies, possibly joint
services, the media, or the home government, emerge that make the demands at the
tactical level pale in comparison. At the operational level, more so than at the tactical
level, leadership is art fused with the science of management. Therefore, a successful
operational level commander must be both masterful artist and scientist and adroitly
adapt his techniques to the situation at hand.4
Dr. Ross Pigeau, Head of the Command Group of the Defence and Civil Institute
of Environmental Medicine advocates this concept with his thesis:
Leadership + Management = Commandership5
Dr. Pigeau states that the commander is a complex combination of
complementary and uniquely human capabilities that enable “the creative expression of
3
Department of National Defence, CFP 131-002 The Professional Officer (Ottawa: DND, 1973), 2-1. This
author gives thanks to Colonel Brooks, as noted above, for the reference.
4
Also as per Brooks, but elaborated.
5
Dr Ross Pigeau, “Command”, (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 26 September 2000).
Quoted in Brooks “Woodward’s War…”, 4. See also Dr Ross Pigeau, and Carol McCann, “What is a
Commander?” in Bernd Horn & Steven Harris (Eds.), Generalship and the Art of the Admiral, (St.
Catherines, ON: Vanwell Press, 2004), 79-104.

5
human will necessary to accomplish the mission.”6
A commander’s leadership skills
propel common human purpose, while his management skills optimize combat power via
optimal use of equipment, personnel, maintenance, and other support functions. A
consummately efficient commander, as both leader and manager, is therefore the ultimate
combat multiplier.
Leadership Model: FM 22-100
The US Army field manual, FM 22-100 Leadership, describes a series of leadership
techniques that range from the highly centralized autocratic to the highly decentralized
transformational. As per the manual, an individual should employ each of these different
styles in different situations. FM 22-100 states that "effective leaders are flexible enough
to adjust their leadership style and techniques to the people they lead. Some subordinates
respond best to coaxing, suggestions, or gentle prodding; others need, and even want at
times, the verbal equivalent of a kick in the pants."7
The key is to know what style to use
when with whom. This essay will use the model articulated in FM 22-100 as the primary
leadership evaluation tool.
6
Dr Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Clarifying the Concepts of Control and Command,” Proceedings of
the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (Newport: Naval War College, 29
June - 1 July 1999) 5. See http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999_CCRTS/pdf_files/track_3/019mccan.pdf
Accessed May 8, 2007.
7
United States, Department of Defense, FM 22-100 Leadership, (Washington: US Army, 1999) 3-65

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US Army Leadership Styles8
1. Directing leadership. A leader-centered approach; may be appropriate when
time is short and leaders do not have a chance to explain things or
subordinates are inexperienced.
2. Transactional leadership. A reward/consequence-centered approach that
includes such techniques as motivating subordinates to work by offering
rewards or threatening punishment. Typically evokes only short term
commitment and discourages risk-taking and innovation but can be entirely
appropriate for specific tasks.
3. Participating leadership. A both leader and team-centered approach; is
especially appropriate for leaders who have time for consultations and who
are dealing with experienced subordinates.
4. Delegating leadership. A subordinate-centered approach; appropriate for
leaders with mature and experienced subordinates or who want to create a
learning experience for subordinates. Often, a leader need only give the
authority to make decisions, the necessary resources, and a clear
understanding of the mission end-state.
5. Transformational leadership A vision-centered approach that educates and
inspires subordinates by challenging them to rise above their immediate needs
and self-interests; emphasizes subordinate growth and organizational
enhancement. Key features include empowering and mentally stimulating
subordinates. The leader motivates them first as individuals and then as a
group. Immediate benefits are often delayed until the mission is accomplished.
As per US Army Doctrine, a leader must have the situational awareness to know
when to apply which leadership technique. It is the accumulation of these different
techniques in different scenarios that make up a particular leader’s style or profile. The
master leader will know how to, without disingenuousness,9
adapt his leadership style to
a particular audience in order to accomplish a particular mission. Like a master artist, an
adaptive leader is flexible in the application of techniques and will use those that best
concentrate collective human will to effect optimal mission accomplishment. As will be
shown below, Admiral Woodward’s operational level leadership style was exceedingly
adaptable and, in all controllable instances, he had little difficulty in motivating his forces
and ensuring the scientific application of force, thereby optimizing his combat power.
Leadership Model: Situational Leadership Theory
8
FM 22-100 Leadership… 364 to 382.
9
Which would break trust and immediately discredit him.
Less
Centralized
Decision
Making
More
Centralized
Decision
Making

7
Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard's Situational Leadership Theory (SLT), its basic
principals unchanged since the 1960s, has long been used by the US military for leader
training and development.10
SLT emphasizes the effective leader as an amalgamation of
mission and human environment expert who employs active situational leadership while
also addressing leadership style and execution concerns. Therefore, SLT is an ideal
illustrative prism through which to evaluate leadership styles vis-à-vis the synthesis of the
science and art found in Dr. Pigeau’s Commandership.
In SLT, the leader’s analysis of the follower and their capabilities and understanding
(“maturity’) determines the leader’s appropriate style. Situational leadership attempts to
"improve the odds that managers will be able to become effective and successful
leaders."11
Further, the leader's effectiveness depends on the follower’s12
readiness
level.13
The leader then assesses the level of readiness, adopts the optimal leadership
style, and leads via that style to influence behaviors and achieve the desired result. The
leader enables the follower to grow in readiness by adjusting his leadership behavior
through the four styles along the leadership curve: Telling, Selling, Participating and
Delegating. See the below diagram.14
10
Major General George W. Yeakey, U.S. Army, “Situational Leadership”, Military Review Jan/Feb 2002.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/yeakey.htm. Accessed April 20, 2007.
11
Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human
Resources, 6th
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), 207.
12
SLT is designed for more than just followers. See Yeakey “Situational Leadership…”, 6: “In SLT,
leader/follower relationships are not necessarily hierarchical. Any reference to leader or follower implies
potential leader and potential follower. The concepts are intended to apply regardless of attempts to
influence a subordinate's behavior, the boss, an associate, a friend, or relative.”
13
A leader can get more out of experienced vice inexperienced personnel.
14
Diagram is copied from Yeakey, “Situational Leadership…”, 7-8.

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In an iterative process, the leader makes determinations of the appropriate leadership
style. The first determination is what the objective (mission) is; the second, what
activities to influence; the third, determining the group's maturity;15
and the fourth is the
appropriate leadership style. The leader then assesses his results with his desired results
and deduces if further leadership is required. If a gap exists between expected and actual
performance, then additional leadership is required and the cycle is repeated until the
objective is met.16
A Situational Leadership Model
15
Or readiness level or competence to achieve this objective.
16
Drawn from Yeakey, “Situational Leadership…”, 8.

9
The US Air War College (AWC) Model, as described by Colonel Donald
Waddell,17
illustrates levels of leadership, varying points on the peace-war continuum,
and joint and combined situations where varying different leadership styles can be
valuable.
Figure 3. AWC Leadership Model
17
Donald Waddell, “A Situational Leadership Model for Military Leaders” Airpower Journal (Fall 1994):
5. See http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/waddell.html Accessed 12 April 2007.
Situation
Leader Follower Mission
Active
communication
1. Levels
2. Combat/Peace
3. Joint/Combined
4. Staff/Operational

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Figure 4. AWC Levels of Leadership18
Levels Leader Followers Mission
National Generalist Indirect Many Broad
Strategic
Operational
Tactical Technician Direct Few Specific
Figure 5. The AWC Model War or Peace19
18
Ibid., 6, 9, 12.
19
Ibid.
Situation
Leader Follower Mission
Peace
Crisis
War
Democratic Easier Relaxed Flexible
Authoritarian Difficult Afraid Imperative
(perhaps)
Levels
Interaction

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Waddell states that higher level commanders must be more generalist, as they
have many more followers20
who, firstly, are there to provide technical skills and,
secondly, are best influenced indirectly in the accomplishment of much broader missions.
If commanders tried to master the intricacies of the skill sets abounding in their
commands, they would be ineffectual. Moreover, in the attempt, they would undermine
the human empowerment of their subordinates and, thereby, suboptimize aggregate
combat power. Per Waddell, higher level commanders must become practiced experts in
“climate control” and remain well above the “lower and more direct leadership levels” to
not become micromanagers.21
Per the AWC Model in peacetime, commanders may be more democratic in their
approach, when followers are more relaxed and easier to lead in more flexible, less
dangerous, and less exigent operations. During wartime, however, Waddell argues that
commanders often will have to be more authoritarian if their charges, out of fear, anxiety,
stress, fatigue, time constraints and the like, are more difficult to lead in the
accomplishment of more imperative missions. Waddell notes, though, that this shift to
authoritarianism should not be axiomatic; rather, it is dependent on the situation, the
subordinates, and the leader.22
Figure 6. AWC Joint and Combined Leadership23
Levels Leader Followers Mission
Combined National sensitivities
Historical & Doctrinal
Differences
Joint Service sensitivities
Doctrinal Differences
Service More Collegial Misunderstanding
Perceived prejudice
&bias, doctrinal & cultural differences
20
And influence groups, what this paper calls “leadership constituents” and who can be superiors or even
foes.
21
Waddell, “A Situational Leadership Model…”, 6.
22
Ibid., 9.
23
Ibid., 10.

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In joint and combined situations,24
the AWC model propounds that operational
commanders must be more collegial and sensitive to issues of misunderstanding,
perceived bias, and doctrinal difference. Service and national sensitivities must be
catered to in order to maintain unity of purpose, lest joint operations devolve to dis-joint.
Operational commanders lead with greater time, space, and complexity issues and
with much greater possibilities for unintended consequences than do leaders at the
tactical level. Operational leader’s actions must be much more deliberate, lest they throw
their staffs, technical experts, and subordinate commanders into chaos mixed with inertia.
Moreover, these leaders must synergistically harness the collective human energy of their
charges, focus them on the goal, stimulate them intellectually to harvest their ingenuity,
and motivate, hector, or otherwise impel them to accomplish the mission. By the AWC
model, proven tactical commanders will make more effective operational leaders if they
can adapt their leadership style to complex operational situations.
Leadership Evaluation
During the next section, this essay will use the above leadership evaluation tools to
deduce Woodward’s efficacy as a leader at the operational level. The primary evaluation
model will be from FM 22-100. This essay will also use the SLT and AWC models as
supplementary evaluation tools. Next, this paper will examine the results of the FM 22-
100 model, augmented where appropriate by the AWC and SLT methods, and compare
them with Pigeau’s Commandership to produce an evaluation of Woodward’s leadership
style and capability. As this paper will demonstrate, Woodward displays remarkable
ability to adapt his leadership in all but one incident wherein, as this paper will show, no
matter what actions he had taken, he would have been badly received.
Woodward as a Leader at the Operational Level
Woodward, as Flag Officer, First Fleet (FOF1), was aboard the destroyer HMS
Antrim near Gibraltar conducting the exercise Springtrain in late March of 1982. In
response to increasing Argentine-British tensions, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, CINC
24
And implicitly more so in combined situations.

13
Fleet, ordered Woodward to be ready to sail south on 1 April. At 0300 2nd April,
Woodward and his accompanying fleet set sail. Operation Corporate had begun. At
2130 that evening, Fieldhouse signaled that Argentina had invaded the Falklands.
En route Woodward, now Battle Group Commander25
for the coming campaign,
and his staff started their campaign plan.26
Starting 7 April, Woodward went from ship to
ship meeting with the various crews. He told them all that they might be going to war
and that they should prepare themselves for it physically and mentally. He also apprised
them of the very real danger that they might loose ships and men. Characteristically,
Woodward thought there was no point in trying to be soft about the danger message and
conveyed the truth resolutely to dozens of ships and thousands of men. He also pointed
out that in naval terms, the British surface fleet would outnumber the Argentine surface
by roughly four to one. Woodward told them that the “best route to survival was to
buckle to, learn fast, and try harder.” He cites that these talks represented his first
attempts to build up his sailors psychologically whom he believes “are, and have been for
centuries, realists.”27
Here Woodward demonstrates that he understands his subordinates,
does not take them for naïve fools, provides them an honest assessment of the situation,
and demonstrates his confidence in them and their ability to execute the mission.28
He is
engaging in active communication with his charges, is communicating the broad mission
openly without getting into the details best left to specialists, and is engendering
confidence through his demonstration of trust in his subordinates.
Using US Army leadership parlance, Woodward used elements from both
Delegating and Transformational leadership techniques. He delegated by preparing his
forces for the mission while not telling them how to execute it. He transformed in that he
asked each sailor to look into himself and do what it takes to survive and get the mission
done. As is appropriate, Woodward used a highly decentralized leadership style. Per
SLT, Woodward, as an introduction, sold (Block S2) the war situation and, of much
25
The exact chain of command and Woodward’s title remained muddled in some of the subordinate’s
minds. See below.
26
Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days; The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group
Commander, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 78.
27
Ibid., 80
28
Note that no matter how well articulated a message, some subordinates aways will grumble. See Max
Hastings and Simon Jenkins The Battle for the Falklands ( Norton and Company, New York, 1983), 120-
121. Remember that Napoleon’s Old Guard were habitual called “Les Grognards” (“The Grumblers”).

14
greater emphasis, delegated (Block S-4) the execution of duties. Once again, Woodward
used a highly decentralized leadership style. Per the AWC Model, Woodward used non-
authoritarian active communication to convey generalist messages to his subordinates.
All three theories indicate that Woodward empowered his subordinates by giving them
independence. At the same time, by actively engaging in communication and
demonstrating his concern and support by generalist means, Woodward evoked their
human energy commitment to the fight. Thereby, Woodward demonstrated a robust
synthesis of Pigeau’s Commandership theory.
On 21 April, some 1500 miles out from Ascension Island and still outside of the
Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), Hermes’29
radar picked up an unknown aircraft
approaching. Woodward launched a Harrier and discovered a fleeing Boeing 707 in
Argentine Air Force regalia. Due to current Rules of Engagement (ROE), Woodward did
not permit the Harrier to engage. However, Woodward now faced a dilemma: Surely the
707 -- dubbed ‘the Burglar’ -- would return and seek to report his position. Moreover,
the Argentines now knew that a carrier based plane, and therefore at least one carrier, was
in theater. But under the current ROE he could not shoot it down.
The next day the Burglar returned, only to be intercepted and driven away again.
Characteristically, Woodward asked Fleet HQ to leak both word to the media that he now
had permission to shoot down the Burglar and for that actual permission. Here
Woodward demonstrated a keen understanding of what will later be known as
Information Operations (IO) as he used (or led) the press to convey his message to the
enemy in order to defeat the enemy without recourse to violence. Further, in response to
his second request, Woodward received permission to down the Burglar given positive
identification and within a certain range.
After several more appearances and disappearances, on 23 April the Burglar
appeared, this time from the SE.30
Woodward locked weapons on as the aircraft
continued its approach. Upon his inquiry, Woodward’s staff confirmed that no civilian
airlines were scheduled to be in theater. He then, in the manner of a Perisher31
expert,
29
One of Woodward’s two light carriers
30
Previous approaches were from the SW or were not specified. See Woodward, “One Hundred Days…”
101-103
31
See Appendices for a description of Perisher. In short, a highly trained submarine commander.

15
made a last minute, experienced-based intuitive decision to figure out the exact azimuth
of the Burglar’s course and deduce its potential origin and destination. The azimuth,
when drawn on a chart twenty seconds from the time the airliner would have been
engaged, indicated a straight line from Durban to Rio de Janeiro. Woodward
immediately stood the weapons down and sent a Harrier up to investigate. The Harrier
reported that the “Burglar” was, in fact, a Brazilian Airliner. Here Woodward
demonstrates his thoroughness, prudence, and foresight. If Woodward had downed the
airliner, world sympathies for the British cause would have suffered grievously.32
Woodward demonstrated that, although he used his staff, when appropriate he
relied on his own perceptions to verify facts. Woodward was, therefore, a decentralized
leader who still knew when to insert himself into a dynamic battlefield when tactical
decisions could have operational33
consequences. Moreover, he also demonstrated that
he had the savvy to use the channels available to him (the media) to influence the enemy.
As per the US Army leadership model, Woodward knew instantly when to move
from a Delegating and Participating (Decentralized) style to a Directing (Centralized)
style of leadership. He realized that his staff was not prepared, in the time allowed, to
make the optimal decision. Moreover, as the situation dictated speed, there was no
potential educational or confidence building benefit to be gained from Delegating or
Participating. As FM 22-100 puts it “The directing style may be appropriate when time is
short and leaders don’t have a chance to explain things.”34
This airliner incident was
clearly such an occasion. Per SLT, Woodward quickly deduced that his subordinates
lacked the requisite maturity (competencies) to make the decision on their own. He then
deftly moved from a follower-directed mostly Delegating (S4) and somewhat
Participating (S3) technique to a leader-directed Telling (S1) technique. Per the AWC
model, Woodward knew when to move from Generalist to Technician and from
Democratic to Authoritarian to achieve not only the optimal result, but also the only
result that would have allowed the campaign to proceed with vigor, as support for the
32
As they did to the Soviets the next year in their shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. See
Woodward ,“One Hundred Days…” 103. See also Lawrence Freedman , The Official History of the
Falklands Campaign Volume II. (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, UK, 2005; simultaneously published in the
US and Canada by Tailor and Francis, New York), 218
33
And Strategic level, too.
34
FM 22-100, 3-70

16
British cause would have been significantly undermined had he shot down the airliner.
Once again, we see an optimal synthesis of Pigeau’s Commandership. This incident,
combined with his skillful use of IO to lead the Argentines, proved that Woodward
himself is a powerful force multiplier.
Woodward later discussed his Staff Organization and noted how he entitled his
two Group Warfare Officers (GWOs) Royal Navy captain deputies to manage real-time
decisions for the Battle Group on his behalf.35
Clearly, Woodward empowered his staff.
Further demonstrating Woodward’s keen understanding of the complexities of a
multifaceted battlefield, he selected a naval aviator as one of his two deputies. His trust
in and empowerment of his staff was further demonstrated in asking his Operations
Officer to screen all of his daily messages and deliver to him only those he thought
Woodward needed to see. Woodward commented thereon: “No Commander in the field
can operate in the field without such a person. Great trust is placed in him.”36
Throughout his text Woodward described his ship’s captains, their roles, and his
relationships with them. As an example, of the captain of the Hermes, Woodward said
“His responsibilities were entirely separate from mine… we followed essentially different
paths of responsibility aboard the ship.”37
Clearly Woodward is no micromanager and
did not thrust his presence into areas not warranted.38
When Woodward’s actions are compared to the styles listed in the US Army
leadership model, it is evident that he adopted a highly decentralized delegating approach
towards his captains and staff officers. He effectively used a combination of delegating
and transformational leadership techniques to empower his key subordinates which
enabled him to focus on those duties that required his specific attention. By doing so,
Woodward achieved organizational enhancement. Using the SLT model, Woodward
judges his subordinates to be exceptionally proficient (mature) and relies on the S4
follower-made decisions inherent in the delegating approach. In AWC parlance, he
exercised active communication and employed indirect means to impart generalist and
35
Woodward, “One Hundred Days…”, 117.
36
Ibid., 120.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., 350. Non-interference worked well, for by 1989, nine of his frigate and destroyer captains had been
promoted to admiral and his minesweeper captain rose to command the British squadron in the 1990 Gulf
war.

17
democratic guidance to his subordinates. Again, Woodward demonstrates the level of
acumen that Pigeau believes is required in an effective commander.
On May 2nd
, Woodward was exceedingly concerned that the he old but well-
armed and armored Argentine Heavy Cruiser Belgrano was positioning itself to strike his
carrier group. Woodward’s dilemma was that currently the Belgrano was outside of the
Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) and was, therefore, not an engageable target under current
ROE. To solve this dilemma, Woodward, via a satellite circuit monitored back in
London, ordered the commander of the submarine Conqueror -- not under Woodward’s
command -- to sink Belgrano outside of the TEZ.39
Woodward did so knowing that his
order, though it certainly would not be obeyed by Conqueror, would likely prompt
London to amend speedily the ROE40
and then empower HMS Conqueror to fire on the
Belgrano. London did as Woodward expected and, subsequently, Conqueror sank the
Belgrano. Woodward removed the threat to his Carrier Group and, therefore, the British
war effort by his artful use of an unorthodox but highly apposite leadership technique.41
Here was an example of Woodward influencing (leading) not only his higher
headquarter, but also the highest levels of government in a tactful, resourceful, and
efficacious fashion. Once again we observe the exceptional quality of Woodward’s
adaptable leadership ability.
Further, his simultaneous aggressive use of firepower on Argentine shore
positions convinced the Argentines to send their carrier 25 de Mayo back to port.
Woodward42
had won another signal victory, this time without recourse to physical
engagement. Woodward ‘led’ the Argentines by his aggressive attacks and convinced
them that they had too much to loose in a naval engagement. Thereby Woodward greatly
increased his chances of gaining localized maritime superiority and enabling the landing
force to win a campaign.
Though Woodward was not leading subordinates in these examples, he influenced
and, in effect, led his superiors and the enemy. Using US Army leadership doctrine,
39
Woodward, “One Hundred Days…” 154-6.
40
And thereby avoid the usual drawn out processes for such changes.
41
For an exemplary account of how Woodward did this and how he ensured that all British actions were in
strict accord with ROE and their potential political consequences if broken see Lieutenant-Commander Guy
R. Phillips, CF article “Rules of Engagement: A Primer”, 15-16 in The Army Lawyer, Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet, 27-50-248, July, 1993.
42
Though he did not know this fact for some time.

18
Woodward used a decentralized delegating43
leadership style in that he has conveyed the
mission to his higher headquarters and to the enemy without getting involved in its
execution. Woodward demonstrated tremendous ingenuity and adaptability. Using the
SLT model to evaluate the Belgrano incident, Woodward instantly recognized the
intricacies of the chain of command and the best way to get his desired intent executed.
He had a high certitude that his highly competent “follower” would know how to execute
the mission. Therefore, he used a follower directed delegating (S4) methodology. In the
AWC model, he deftly used a faux-authoritarian approach with Conqueror to convey via
a democratic leadership method to his higher headquarters the exigent need for attack.
Woodward used tactful and diplomatic, yet exceptionally rapid, means to achieve his
desired result. Viewed through Pigeau’s Commandership prism, Woodward was a
combat power multiplier.
Woodward’s leadership style was highly decentralized, except when exigent
circumstances demanded his intercession. His style was highly appropriate for the
conduct of war at the operational level. What is more, he showed remarkable creativity
at ‘leading’ non-traditional leadership constituents by getting both his superiors and his
enemy to take distinct actions based on his deliberate actions. Woodward demonstrated
considerable leadership acumen in other key campaign events44
but discussions of these
incidents that support the central thesis of this paper are omitted for brevity.
Criticisms of Woodward and their Rejoinders
43
In that his higher command is, in this instance, a follower.
44
Notably his design of the simple but effective air space box for the routing of flights to prevent blue on
blue attacks and to effectively deal with increasingly more deadly Argentine air assaults and, second, his
by-the-rules opposition to the Bluff Cove amphibious move. Woodward “One Hundred Days…” 240-241.
Here he used a more authoritarian approach to quickly cut through bureaucracy with his statement of one of
his commanders “I don’t give a damn about your bloody rules, this is how it is going to be done’. Another
illustration of Woodward as a capable operational commander is demonstrated when Woodward advised
Gen Moore and Commodore Clapp not to go by sea to transport troops from the west side of East Falkland
to the east side. Because Woodward was not senior during the land phase of the campaign he,
appropriately for a Joint Operation, did not insist on an alternative landward course of action. The Bluff
Cove maneuver became known as the Bluff Cove Disaster due to heavy casualties. See Woodward “One
Hundred Days…” 321-2. Also see Robert S. Bolia, “The Falklands War: The Bluff Cove Disaster”
Military Review , November -December 2004. This is an excellent secondary source for putting some of the
difficulties that Woodward had with the RMs and the BA in perspective as herein Commodore Clapp
essentially derides the land component for gross lethargy. Woodward shares similar thoughts in his
narrative. See Woodward, “One Hundred Days…” 325

19
Much of the criticism of Woodward as a leader stems from a single day.
Although this paper will not evaluate this particular incident using the leadership models
introduced above, it is critical to go over this incident and its background in some detail
lest a critic of Woodward reach an incorrect conclusion of Woodward’s leadership.45
On 16 April Woodward went over to meet with Commodore Amphibious Warfare
Mike Clapp and Brigadier Julian Thompson, of the 3 Commando Brigade. This meeting
was Woodward’s attempt to conduct a joint planning operation for the coming
amphibious assault. Woodward thought that the meeting went well and that they amiably
discussed potential landing sites.46
However, to Commodore Clapp and, per Clapp,
Brigadier Thompson, the whole meeting was a disaster where Woodward carried himself
like an overbearing martinet. Clapp’s account of the incident is worth quoting in detail:
“We were one day from Ascension when Sandy landed on board Fearless during the
forenoon of 16 April. I met him on the flight deck and went straight to my cabin. There had been
no warning of this visit, just a radio call saying two helicopters were on their way and out he
stepped with a few members of his staff. Julian and I had cleared our minds for CTF’s
(Fieldhouse) arrival at Ascension the following day and were more than happy to have the chance
to discuss with Sandy both the agenda and the options, as we saw them…”
“We were not, however, prepared for what was to take place. Although he was the senior, we had
not expected Sandy to want to take the lead at this meeting in such a forceful and tactless way.
We believed that we were the best people to discuss amphibious problems and expected him to
want to hear our views. Instead he gave us a number of instructions which we considered to be
complete red herrings. Unfortunately, since he was the senior, we would be obliged to waste our
staffs’ time exploring them.”
Summarized, Woodward had three ideas (1) Stone frigate for basing landward supplies on a west
Falkland off-shore island (2) Construct and airstrip on West Falkland (3) Amphibious Deception
Plan
“All of this was seen on board the Fearless as an unnecessary attempt to dominate and it acutely
embarrassed the naval members of my staff, while infuriating the Royal Marines, and, more
particularly, the Army members who were new to the Royal Navy and its quirks. Trust was
broken and it took a long time to repair”.47
Other sources agree with Clapp48
in that Woodward made a significantly bad
impression on the Royal Marines in particular, which resonates well with the AWC
leadership model that talks of the increased difficulties of .joint level leadership. Per
45
Which has been the case with more than one otherwise highly capable critic in the past. See Brooks,
“Woodward’s War…” for one such example.
46
Ibid. 90. Note that Woodward is senior in rank to both Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson.
47
Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos
Water, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD 1996, 56.
48
Though their source may be Clapp himself.

20
Hastings and Jenkins “he (Woodward) left behind an enraged commando brigade staff.
‘He made us feel like a bunch of small boys under the scrutiny of the headmaster’ one of
them said. He introduced himself to Ewen Southby-Tailyour49
with the words ‘and what
do you know about the Falklands, boy?’50
This 16 April event appears to not be Woodward’s best leadership moment. It is
for this incident that others51
have viewed Woodward as an inflexible and inadaptable to
circumstances commander. However, he was indeed the senior naval officer afloat and
had the responsibility to ensure the success of the missions, both naval and amphibious.
Moreover, two of his three ideas (numbers (2) and (3)) had real merit and one, the
deception plan, was enacted multiple times in differing iterations. But the real-want-of a-
nail-that-lost-the-kingdom52
was Woodward’s surprise visit. Most senior officers would
grant their subordinates the courtesy of an advanced notice that they were inbound. Both
Clapp and, presumably, Thompson perceived that they were not afforded such courtesy.
Research for this paper indicates that they let their staff’s know that Woodward granted
no courtesy, thereby souring the command relationship dynamic.
Such carelessness and lack of courtesy was atypical of the exact and perfunctory
Woodward. It is only a careful reading of Clapp’s full text that reveals that well after the
shooting stopped Clapp received “two bags of mail and low-priority signals that had not
been able to come by radio. Amongst them were signals telling me that Sandy
(Woodward) intended to visit us off Ascension.”53
It is certainly likely that if that signal
had been routed correctly, Clapp and Thompson would have been prepared for
Woodward’s arrival, would not have felt ambushed, would not have allowed their staff’s
49
Southby-Tailyour, a senior but not career-minded major, was the son of a former Commandant of the
Royal Marines, and had spent a good deal of time boating in and out of the Falklands coves during his
previous vacations. He is also the coauthor of Clapp’s book.
50
See Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falkland, 122. Note that there is a very different meaning
from ‘boy’, a remarkably uncharacteristic statement for Woodward and the very similar words ‘old boy’
which is typical Woodward. Given that Southby-Tailyour had grey hair and was obviously not a boy,
Woodward may have been trying to be funny but it was not taken well.
51
See Brooks, “Woodward’s War…” 11-12 for the best and most concise of these arguments.
52
Something of great importance may depend on an apparently trivial detail. The saying comes from a
longer proverb about a battle during which the loss of a nail in a horseshoe leads to the loss of a horse,
which leads to the loss of the rider, which leads to the loss of the battle, which in turn leads to the loss of a
whole kingdom.
53
Clapp and Southby-Tailyor, Amphibious Assault Falklands… 275.

21
to sour on working with Woodward, and the whole incident would have been a non-
incident.
Moreover, this misrouted message does not explain the whole picture and why
Woodward was perceived as a ruffian. As Clapp demonstrates in his work, Clapp,
Thompson, and their staffs did not believe that Woodward was their superior in the chain
of command.
Figure 7: Commodore Clapp’s understanding of the Chain of
Command at the beginning of Operation Corporate54
Clapp expounds on his concerns well prior to the 16 April incident:
“Central to Julian’s (Thompson) and my thoughts was the command structure which placed us
directly under Sandy Woodward along with his Springtrain forces. We wondered how it would
work out in practice but for the moment were reasonably content. It was a command structure
based on Rank rather than role, and if that is really what the Commander-in-Chief wanted then we
54
Ibid., 32.
CTU 317.8.3
(Commodore Michael Clapp)
(COMAW-CATF)
(The Amphibious Task Group)
CTF 317
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse
(CINC Fleet)
CTG 317.8
(Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward)
(FOF 1)
CTG 324.3
(Vice Admiral Sir Peter Herbert
(FOSM)
CTU 317.8.1
(FOF 1)
CTU 317.8.1
(Brigadier Julian Thompson)
(Cdr 3 Cdo Bde – CLF)
(The Landing Force)

22
would do our best to make it work. It was not in strict accordance with the American dominated
ATP (Allied Tactical Publication) 8 which requires the Commander Amphibious Task Force
(CATF-me) to answer directly to an Admiral in overall command of the forces at sea, who, in this
case, would be the Commander-in-Chief ashore at Northwood.”
55
Clapp continues:
“On 9 April the Commander-in-Chief issued the new command and control directive to come into effect at
midday on the 10th
…“The three of us at sea were now nominated as equal Task Group Commanders with
Sandy taking all the carriers and Springtrain ships in one group and leaving me ... with whatever
amphibious ships were with us or about to join. Julian’s command… stayed the same but was elevated to
the status of a Task Group. …“…This organization was to remain essentially the same throughout the
campaign””
Figure 8: Commodore Clapp’s understanding of the Chain of Command after the
first few days of Operation Corporate
“
In order to help clarify matters we were told by Northwood (HQ) that the CTG 317.18 was the
‘senior CTG’ purely to co-ordinate assets ‘when necessary’ but not to command. Thus, in effect,
Woodward was to be ‘primus inter pares’ on the spot but with us all having equal access to Northwood.
This seemed a little strange to us since it is obvious that the Senior Officer would have such a task but it
was, at least, clear.”56
55
Ibid., 38-39; Timeframe is “beginning of April.’ Clapp is suggesting that he should by pass the at-sea
senior officer and report back to the London-based Admiral Fieldhouse. This suggestion is not prudent as
it, given difficulties in communication, defies the military precept of unity of command and will render a
very disjointed task force.
56
Ibid., 50-51.
CTF 317
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse
(CINC Fleet)
CTG 317.8
(Commander Carrier/Battle Group)
CTG 324.3
(Vice Admiral Sir Peter Herbert
(FOSM)
CTU 317.1
(Brigadier Julian Thompson)
(Commander Landing Force)
CTU 317.9
(Captain Brian Young, RN)
(Commander Op. Paraquet Group
CTU 317.0
(Commodore Michael Clapp)
(Commander Amphibious Task
Group)

23
So to Clapp, Thompson, and their staffs, Woodward was simply an unannounced
interloper, whereas Woodward clearly thought he was in command. No leadership
technique can succeed in such an environment.
Outside of Clapp’s commentary, all documents that this author has viewed
indicate that Woodward was in a command role.57
Moreover, even Clapp indicates that
he was getting mixed messages from Headquarters. On 25 April, Clapp cites a draft copy
of the invasion order:
Parts of the Command and Control paragraph also bear repeating:
‘Operational Command of TF 317 is retained by CINCFLEET. Operational Control of TF 317.8
is delegated to FOF 1 (Admiral Woodward) as the Commander Combined Task Force.”
It was this last puzzling phrase ‘Commander Combined Task Force’ that did not accord with the
latest signal, nor with what I had been told personally by CTF who, by his title, had to be that
man…. It implied that the task organization was to be changed back to the original one under
which we sailed in which Julian and I were Task Units operating under Sandy as a Task Group
Commander, but it was worrying. This was not what the CTF had told me at the meeting and nor
did it accord with the present command structure where we three were co-equal CTGs.”58
With such confusion as to who had what role in the chain of command, it is
doubtful that any leadership style would have succeeded on the 16 of April. Any
assertive commander would be a meddling martinet and any unassertive commander an
inconsequential wallflower.
On 18 April, after Woodward had ordered the Carrier Group and escorts to sail
precipitously, Commodore Clapp made the following observation:
“Sandy was to sail his Carrier Battle Group the next day with and aim of establishing the Maritime
Exclusion Zone as early as 29 April. ( (sic) The reason for the swift sailing of the Carrier Battle
Group was understood but unfortunately it occurred without consultation with all those who had
an interest and so the ships took with them much special military equipment that needed many
longer and longer Sea King helicopter sorties to recover to the Island (Ascension) from the ships
as they steamed south. A prime example of a single-service requirement taking precedence in a
joint operation. A wait of two hours or so would have made trans-shipment, mostly of SAS
equipment, easy. Army tempers would have to be eased. Was history repeating itself so soon?
(referring to Woodward’s apparent ambush two days earlier.)”59
Once again, Clapp has made a very serious indictment of Woodward’s leadership
and has characterized Woodward as demanding and inconsiderate, single service minded
autocrat. On the surface, this indictment appears to be valid, but a careful reading of
57
Including notes from PM Thatcher. See Woodward, “One Hundred Days…”, xii.
58
Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands… , 74-75.
59
Clapp and Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands… 68-69.

24
further facts – readily available to Clapp at the time he was writing his book60
– reveals
why Woodward ordered the premature sailing and why Woodward was correct to act
peremptorily:
“The morning of 18 April was a prize example of the confusion he (a whale) can cause. At 0900
our newly arrived tanker Olmeda reported the sighting of a ‘feather’, the wash of a periscope. It
did not require a great stretch of imagination to work out that the Argentinians could easily have
put a submarine into the Ascension area in a bold attempt to finish the war before it started.
“All ships were ordered to weigh anchor. Hermes was underway by 1000 – two hours earlier than
planned. Within thirty minutes, all ships had been ordered to form up – and the Battle Group was
quickly into formation, with no hitches”
So it is clear that Woodward’s ordering of the movement of the Carrier Group and
Clapp’s noted loss of the two hours of unloading time were due to a perceived threat to
the capital ships. Clapp should have known this. If he did not then he was negligent and,
if he did, he was remiss, first, in not informing others why Woodward departed and,
second, in not recording the reason overtly in his version of events. This omission
indicates that Clapp may have a jaundiced view of Woodward and his actions and,
therefore, all comments by Clapp about Woodward should be taken with a dose of
perspicacity.
Therefore, this author concludes that the problems that arose with Clapp and the
landing force were due to an inconsistent understanding of roles and responsibilities and,
therefore, their unwillingness to listen to Woodward as a commander. Coupled with their
perception that Woodward was trying to ambush them by an unannounced visit, there is
little Woodward could have done not to have been badly received. Therefore, criticisms
of Woodward as being inflexible on 16 April are unfounded. Further, due to factors that
rendered an appropriate leadership style impossible, one cannot adjudge Woodward’s
leadership through the 16 April incident. Therefore, this paper considers that incident
non-contributory to an assessment of Woodward’s leadership.
There are other criticisms of Woodward’s leadership ability not relating to any
particular incident that need to be addressed in order to demonstrate clearly his expertise
in leading an operational level campaign. Dr David Schrady, Distinguished Professor at
the Department of Operations Research at the US Naval Postgraduate School, is highly
60
Clapp and Tailyour’s Amphibious Assault Falklands was published in 1996, five years after
Woodward’s book.

25
critical of Woodward’s leadership and notes that “in his book written ten years later, the
Falklands battle group commander, RADM Woodward, wrote 351 pages without ever
using the word logistics.”61
Schrady’s criticism is unwarranted. He may be completely correct in that the
word logistics is not used in the text, but logistics is comprised of a variety of
components that Woodward does indeed mention in depth, notably fuels, missiles,
support facilities, spare parts, stores, food, airbases and strips, satellite communication
facilities and ‘all of the paraphernalia of war.”62
Woodward also puts a considerable
effort and commentary into ensuring that his ships and planes are operational.
Further, in a lecture given by Woodward and MG Moore on 20 October 1982,63
Woodward issues a definitive riposte:
“Logistics—Aladdin’s cave opened—items which would normally take 10 years to get,
took as many days. Ascension rapidly became the centre of a colossal stores network,
which must be one of the major, if unglamorous, achievements of the entire campaign…
Very rapidly I became aware of a feeling of complete accord and mutual confidence
between myself and my Commander-in-Chief and I believe that it is true that this feeling
of accord and trust spread downwards, amongst my colleagues and subordinates, too. We
were all part of a joint national group, working to one national authority”
Clearly, Schrady’s argument is ill-founded. Moreover, his criticism, when
revealed as not condign, advances the counter argument. For if Woodward would have
been remiss in not attending to logistics, then he must be that much more competent for
having attended to them. Beyond a deflection of Schrady’s criticism, Woodward’s
lecture gives manifest evidence of Woodward’s concern for engendering “trust and
accord amongst his colleagues and subordinates” in support of a joint operation. Clearly,
his grasp of the importance of logistics, trust, and accord in support of a joint national
effort further indicate that Woodward was indeed a capable operational level leader.
Further, that he did not dedicate excessive passages in his work to the intricacies
of logistics indicate that he took, seen using US Army doctrine, a delegating,
61
Dr. David Schrady, “Sea-based Logistics and Lessons from the Falklands” May 2000 in a paper given to
The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 20. This author
thanks Col Brooks for the reference.
62
See Woodward, “One Hundred Days…”, 86, 126, 296, 317-318.
63
See MG Sir Jeremy Moore and RA Sir John Woodward, “The Falklands Experience”, RUSI, The
Journal of the United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Volume 128 No. 1, March 1983, 27-28.

26
decentralized approach completely in accord with leadership at the operational level.
Through this approach, he enabled the emergence of the “trust and accord amongst his
colleagues and subordinates.” Using the SLT model, Woodward is firmly in the
delegating box (S4) of follower-directed actions, as his subordinates are able, willing, and
confident. Seen from the AWC model, Woodward employs a collegial, democratic, and
generalist leadership approach.
All three of these analytical methodologies indicate that Woodward was leaving
the details of the logistics mission execution to subordinates. He was therefore able to
free up his personal attention to other issues that demand his attention. Viewed via
Pigeau’s Commandership lens, Woodward was increasing his combat power through an
adroit synthesis of the science of management with the art of leadership.
In Conclusion: A Lesson in Leadership at the Operational Level
Woodward was a highly effective operational level leader. Although some have
viewed his leadership style as arrogant, a careful analysis indicates that he was judicious
and tactful in his conduct of command and only entered into direct handling of events
when he deemed it necessary to control a critical situation. In all endeavors, save those
exceptional instances that he determined required his personal intercession, Woodward
used a decentralized and empowering approach to lead his subordinates and manage his
resources. This methodology aligns with Pigeau’s concept of Commandership and
demonstrates that Woodward served as a combat multiplier for the British forces.
The exponential increase in complexities of information flows since Woodward’s
days militate for an increasingly decentralized approach. A successful operational level
leader must know his staff and subordinates, train and empower them to excel, and
entrust them with incrementally increasing responsibilities via mission type orders.
Further, he must engage in continuous active communication with them to address
iteratively the results of individual tasks to prepare for the following tasks. However, a
commander is still responsible for all a command does and fails to do and must therefore
always be ready to reenter the direct authoritarian decision mode if that is what the
situation merits.

27
Key to these endeavors is adaptive leadership. The operational level commander
must be the well-attuned to his surroundings and his subordinates in order to deduce how
to manage best all the simultaneously process flows. He must use a decentralized
approach to effectively manage the myriad of processes around him. Yet, he must also
have an instant cognizance of which process flows are of exceptional importance and be
ready to adapt his leadership to a directive technique to meet any emergent exigent
circumstance arising on those critical paths.
Woodward was consistently able to keep a multitude of maneuver units actively
engaged in the fight through a judicious use of decentralized, delegating leadership.
Woodward used his exceptional leadership skills to inspire his sailors, sustain his force
logistically, sink or drive away the enemy’s capital ships, deceive the enemy as to where
the landing was coming, and preserve his carriers to establish localized air parity and
maritime superiority. Moreover, he personally interceded during the Brazilian airliner
incident, thereby preserving the moral strength of and, with that, the popular support for
the British war effort. Woodward was, indeed, an exceptionally competent operational
commander.

28
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November -December 2004.
Brooks, Colonel Randy, CF, “Woodward’s War: A Lesson in Leadership at the
Operational Level” Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2000.
Clapp, Commodore Michael and Southby-Tailyour, Major Ewen, Amphibious Assault
Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos Water, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.
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1973.
Dunn, R. C. Operation Corporate: Operational Artist’s View of the Falklands Islands
Conflict, Newport: Naval War College, 1993.
Eddy, P., Linklater, M., and Gillam, P. The Falklands War. London: Deutsch, 1982.
Finlan, Alastair. Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War : culture and
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New York, NY: Tailor and Francis, 2005.
Great Britain. Ministry of Defence. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons. London: HMSO,
1982.
Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon, The Battle for the Falklands. New York: Norton
and Company, 1983.
Hersey, Paul and Blanchard, Kenneth, Management of Organizational Behavior:
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Kehrli, L., Phillips, C., and Shamblin, R. Guide for Case Study: The Falklands Conflict
1982. Maxwell AFB: Air War College, 1982.
Layman, C. “Duty in Bomb Alley.” Proceedings, August 1983.
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March 1983
Phillips, Lieutenant-Commander Guy R., CF, “Rules of Engagement: A Primer”, in The
Army Lawyer, Headquarters, Department of the Army (US), Department of the Army
Pamphlet, 27-50-248, July, 1993

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Pigeau, Dr Ross and McCann, McCann, “What is a Commander?” in Bernd Horn &
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Command,” .Proceedings of the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology
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Http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999_CCRTS/pdf_files/track_3/019mccan.pdf
Accessed May 8, 2007.
Schrady, Dr. David “Seabased Logistics and Lessons from the Falklands” in a paper
given to The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, May 2000. See http://www.dcmt.cranfield.ac.uk/ismor/ISMOR/2000/schrady2.pdf
Accessed 8 May 2007.
Thompson, Brigadier Julian, RM, No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South
Atlantic. London: Leo Cooper, 1985.
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http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/waddell.html
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Accessed April 20, 2007.

30
Appendix A: Brief Summary of Woodward’s role in Campaign.
On 2 April 1982, in response to a deteriorating domestic situation, General Leopoldo
Galtieri, leader of the Argentine Junta, ordered the invasion of the Falkland Islands and
South Georgia Island. The Argentine forces quickly overcame the small Royal Marine
forces and, over the next few weeks, set about consolidating their military and diplomatic
positions.
On 27 March 1982, in response to the building political tensions, Sir John Fieldhouse,
Commander in Chief Fleet, ordered Rear Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward to be
prepared to sail his naval task group from the Mediterranean Sea where they were
participating in the training exercise Springtrain to the South Atlantic.64
On 1 April, the
day before the actual invasion, Admiral Woodward, on board the HMS Antrim, was
ordered to proceed south covertly towards Ascension Island with seven light surface
ships and two supply ships. Sailing south the next day, Admiral Woodward was now
Commander of both Operation Corporate forces at sea as Commander Task Group
(CTG) 317.8 and commander of the exercise Springtrain Task Unit (CTU) 317.865
.
North of Ascension CTG 317.8 met up with the light carriers Hermes and Invincible and
their escorts as well as supply ships and an amphibious assault group under Commodore
Michael Clapp. On 12 April, the UK government announced a Maritime Exclusion Zone
around the Falklands in order to demonstrate to the Argentineans the seriousness of the
current situation.
On 18 April Admiral Woodward, after revictualing at Ascension Island and sending some
light surface ships ahead, led the carriers and the majority of the escorts, now renamed
CTG 317.8 toward the Falklands Islands.66
Commodore Clapp, as Commander
64
Water Michael Clapp and Ewen-Southby Tailyour Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San
Carlos, 13
65
Ibid. 15, 31. HMSs Antrim, Glasmorgan, Glasgow, Sheffield, Brilliant, Arrow, Plymouth and the Royal
Fleet Auxiliaries (RFAs) Appleleaf and Tidespring. Note that shortly thereafter the Springtrain designation
was administratively removed.
66
A second smaller taker force, Paraquet Group CTU 317.9 under Captain Brian Young, RN was sent to
liberate South Georgia Island. They commenced landing operations on 21 April and achieved victory on
25 April.

31
Amphibious Task Group, was to follow several days later once the Amphibious Group
CTU 317.0 was ready to sail from Ascension and after Admiral Woodward had, to the
extent possible, provided maritime superiority in and around the Falkland Islands.
On 24 April, Admiral Woodward rendezvoused with his advanced surface ships and
proceeded to the Maritime Exclusion Zone, arriving on the 29th
of April. The next day,
the UK Government declared the Maritime Exclusion Zone to be a Total Exclusion Zone
(TEZ), applicable to vessels and aircraft providing support to the Argentine occupation.
En route to the TEZ on 27th
April, Admiral Woodward, as the Commander of the Carrier
Battle Group, received the simple directive from Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse,
Commander Task Force (CTF) setting his immediate planning priority of preventing
enemy operations in the TEZ. To execute this aim CTF told Admiral Woodward that the
UK Government required him to:
1. Cut off the supply of the Argentine Garrison
2. Discredit the Argentinean claim of sovereignty
3. Provoke Argentinean naval and air forces into action
4. Effect local sea and air control for the main landing67
On 1 May, British initiated hostilities commenced with a long range Vulcan bomber
bombing attack from Ascension Island on Port Stanley’s Airport and an aggressive (in
that Woodward attacked as soon as they came into range) strike by Woodward’s carrier
based Harriers on the Airport and Goose Green.68
Further on the same day, Woodward
facilitated the landings of the initial SAS and SBS special operations reconnaissance
teams.
The next day May 2, Belgrano is sunk by HMS Conqueror. See the preceding paper for
details.
67
Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands…, 75
68
The first three Argentine aircraft (a Mirage, a Canberra bomber, and one Dagger) were destroyed in these
Harrier attacks.

32
On the 3rd
of May, Woodward continues his aggressive push; Woodward sank one and
severely damaged a second Argentine patrol boat with his Lynx helicopters. Also on that
day, although unknown by Woodward for some time, the Argentines withdrew most of
their surface fleet – including their carrier 25 de Mayo – back into port for the remainder
of hostilities.
On the 4th
of May, the Argentine Air Force launched a Super-Etendard jet strike against
the Woodward’s advanced destroyer screen, hitting and eventually sinking the HMS
Sheffield with an Exocet missile. Woodward had made the decision to put the Sheffield
and other type 42 destroyers well ahead of his carrier group to serve as a screen.
Woodward had empowered (in that he gave them a mission order and did not
micromanage) his captains to execute their screening mission in order to ensure that his
most vital assets, his carriers, were able to support the landing mission. His decision,
though costly, was the correct one. He thereby shows that he can effectively delegate
authority in a crisis mission.
Also on that day Woodward lost a Harrier in another bombing raid on Goose Green and
continues to bomb Argentine positions around Port Stanley. On the 6th
of May two of
Woodward’s Harriers crash in the fog. On the 8th
of May the Amphibious Task Group
under Commodore Clapp and support vessels sails from Ascension Island with San
Carlos (west side of East Falkland Island) as the amphibious objective area. Over the
next few days Woodward continues to run bombing attacks and naval gun fire barrages
against Argentine positions, especially around Port Stanley and sinks several small
Argentine surface craft, including one by surface fire by the HMS Alacrity.69
On the 14th
of May Woodward launched an SAS raid on an Argentine Airstrip on Pebble
Island to both destroy the enemy aircraft and secure a forward operating strip for the
carrier based Harriers. The raid succeeds and accounts for 11 Argentine Puccara aircraft,
though the landing strip is not usable for some time. Also on that day the Argentine Air
69
Ibid. 205

33
Force launched aggressive A4 bombing raids on the forward destroyer screen. HMS
Glasgow is damaged with an unexploded bomb in her engine room. Three A-4s shot
down or crashed. A fourth A4 was shot down by Argentine friendly-fire over Goose
Green.
On the 18th
of May the Amphibious Task Group rendezvous with Admiral Woodward’s
carrier force. The next day the War Cabinet in London gives Woodward authority to
proceed with the San Carlos landing plan. Once the landing begins Admiral Woodward
becomes the supporting commander to Commodore Michael Clapp, Commander of the
Amphibious Task Force. Once the landing force is ashore, Clapp will turn over control
to Brigadier General Julian Thompson, RM who in turn turns over command to Major
General Jeremy Moore, RM on 30th
May.
Operational surprise of the Argentine Garrison was achieved on 21st May when the San
Carlos landings, Operation Sutton, commenced. Initial landings are unopposed by
ground or air forces. Several hours later, Argentine airpower made an appearance in
force, as HMS Ardent was sunk by A4 attack jets in San Carlos Water. Further, both
HMS Argonaut and HMS Antrim were hit by bombs which fail to explode. Additionally,
2 British helicopters and 15 Argentine aircraft were shot down. Argentine aerial attacks
picked back up on 23rd
May when the frigate HMS Antelope is hit and sinks the next day
sunk when an unexploded bomb goes off during a defusing operation. Twenty-five
Argentine aircraft (mostly A-4s and Puccaras) are shot down between the 23rd
and the
25th
. Three British Landing Craft are damaged, the destroyer HMS Coventry is sunk, and
the container ship Atlantic Conveyor, along with vital Chinook transport helicopters, is
sunk.
Commencing on the 25th
of May, Army and Royal Marine troops march overland to
attack key Argentine positions. With some naval support, they take Goose Green on the
29th
. On the 31st
of May, Royal Marines take Mt Kent and Mt Challenger on the key
approaches to Port Stanley. Army reinforcements continue to arrive in San Carlos Water.
On 4 June Para forces take Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, positions just south of Port Stanley.
On 8 June HMS Plymouth in Falkland Sound near San Carlos is hit by Argentine bombs

34
that fail to explode. Attempting to use amphibious transport to make up for the lack of
helicopters, the Maj General Moore and Commodore Clapp attempt an amphibious
landing in the Bluff Cove area south of Port Stanley. Two British landing ships were hit
badly by A-4s in Bluff Cove, causing heavy British casualties. Three Argentine A-4s
were brought down.
Between the 11th
of June and the 14th
of June, British land forces, with naval gunfire and
air support, fight a series of victorious engagements with the Argentine garrison forces
forcing them back to Port Stanley, which surrenders on the afternoon of the 14th
. 9,800
Argentine prisoners are taken. Another 1,850 are taken in other parts of the islands over
the next few days. On the 20th
of June, three days after General Galtieri resigns, Britain
declares an end to hostilities.

35
Appendix B: Brief Biography of Woodward up to the Falklands Campaign
Rear Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward was a life-long sailor who was thoroughly
trained to make optimal decisions in suboptimal conditions and communicate his
commands in an efficient and authoritarian style. He joined the British Navy at the
tender age of thirteen, attending the Royal Naval College Dartmouth, from a relatively
obscure family with little military tradition other than his father’s three years in the
trenches of World War I. He portrays himself to have been reluctant to have been
ambitious and never really had exceedingly high hopes for himself. He attributes his rise
more to luck and “several rather unlikely events falling into place” than to skill.70
He
notably states that: “There were, for instance, two other sea-going admirals who could
certainly have commanded the Falkland Task Groups as well, probably better, than I…
but when Her Majesty’s Navy is told to move, it does so remarkably quickly, and I,
conducting at the time a fleet exercise off Gibraltar, was simply and solely the closest of
the sea-going commanders to the South Atlantic.”71
He does, however, put considerable emphasis on the concept of the traditions of centuries
of practice of the Royal Navy; specifically training, technical grounding, and the
principles of leadership. Therefore, this author concludes that it is not possible to
understand Admiral Woodward without some understanding of the Royal Navy culture,
which we will discuss hereafter.
Woodward, like most successful Royal Navy officers, immersed into the fighting
histories of Admirals Jervis, Hood, Hawke, Rodney, Howe, Nelson, Fisher, Jellicoe,
Pound and Cunningham. At Dartmouth his instructors said “These are the kinds of men
who have always commanded the Fleets of the Royal Navy, and the kind of men you
should try to emulate.”72
The example of Byng, shot for not being aggressive enough,
was no doubt also mentioned. Yet, interlaced in his unalloyed efforts to model himself
after these great naval leaders, he still evokes a measure of modesty, as shown in his
70
Woodward, One Hundred Days…, 24.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid., 26.

36
remarks about graduating in 1949 in the top fifth of his class: “I failed to win anything
that whole time – no academic prizes, no sporting colours, not even my house colours,
normally awarded for being public-spirited in one’s last term. Zero.”
Woodward then went on to serve first as a cadet under training and then as a midshipman
on a variety of surface ships. During this period Woodward learned many of the
technical intricacies of surface ship operation. He also, perceptively, learned to
appreciate the lasting effects of stress or shell-shock on his fellow sailors.73
He would
put this understanding to good use in Falklands Campaign in his handling of fatigue and
stress cases.
After receiving a commission as a sub-lieutenant at the age of 19, Woodward enrolled in
the Royal Naval College, Greenwich to take the Junior Officers War Course. After
passing out with moderately respectable marks in 1953, Woodward was enrolled (by
default as he had not made a preference known) to the Submariners Course. Woodward
states that even thirty-two years later, he still considered himself a “pressed man.” Such
a sense of irony demonstrates a capacity for humor, which can be an essential component
in most leadership endeavors.74
Woodward then reported to a shore-based submarine school for four months and then to
the submarine fleet where he served two years on board the HMS Sanguine in a variety of
junior officer positions. From late 1956, he then spent the next two years in the
dockyards helping oversee the construction of the first vessel of a new submarine class,
the HMS Porpoise. After the Porpoise was launched Woodward spent the next two years
as part of her officer rolls, learning and honing again the intricacies of a submarine at sea.
After marrying Mrs. Charlie Woodward in 1960, Woodward went on to the “Perisher”
Submarine Officers Qualifying Course. The Perisher course was rigorous course
designed to screen out those not fit to make quick and accurate decisions in a dynamic
73
Ibid., 34.
74
Ibid., 38.

37
submarine combat environment. Per Woodward, between twenty to twenty-five percent
of those tested failed their test and would not be promoted beyond the rank of Lieutenant
Commander.75
Woodward excelled and found the test none too difficult, despite being
mentored by an instructor – whom Woodward was exceedingly found of -- who called his
students his ‘useless officers’ and who felt entirely free to berate said officers in front of
the ships company and or complete strangers.76
In short, Woodward was extremely technically and tactically prepared to run a submarine
in a combat environment. As such an environment allows no room for failure or debate,
it has the, in Woodward’s words, “effect of converting one into a ‘pushy b—d’.”77
After Perisher, Woodward assumed command of the HMS Tireless, a modernized
wartime submarine. Characteristically, upon assuming command he chose the Gaelic
blessing of 1589, with its thrice repeated “we fear nothing” commencing his tour.78
After successfully completing his tour as commander of the HMS Tireless in 1962, he
transferred for six months to an anti submarine frigate, and then back to the Naval
College at Greenwich for a year long advanced course in Nuclear Reactors. Per
Woodward, this course was the most challenging work that he had yet faced. He finished
his course work in advanced mathematics, reactor design, Einstein’s physics, water
chemistry, and engineering, though not without some effort. Woodward then went to an
anti-submarine course for five months before assuming temporary command of the HMS
Grampus while a new submarine HMS Valiant, in which he would be executive officer,
was being built. Woodward completed both tours successfully and transferred out of
Valiant in 1967 upon his promotion to Commander.
75
Ibid., 41.
76
Ibid., 42. When reading the preceding analysis of Woodward’s leadership, it is helpful to understand
how he gained some of his more biting idiosyncrasies. By understanding where these idiosyncrasies came
from one can start to deduce what Woodward intended in their employment, which was, at times not how
these idiosyncrasies were received by those uninitiated and unused to his, at time, particularly caustic
commentary. See the 16 April incident above.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid., 43.

38
Woodward then returned to the Perisher school, this time as the instructor. He exhibited
extreme meticulousness in his instruction, taught his students the principles of
mathematical timing and the rigid rules of submarine safety, all the while emphasizing
mental agility and accuracy of observation.79
Per Woodward, “Kill or be killed – this is
no place for the careless.”80
Like his predecessors, Woodward failed about 20 percent of
his students.
Woodward went from Perisher instructor to a brief six month tour at the Joint Services
Staff Course which he seemed to take lightly as his only comment was about improving
his golf handicap.81
Then in December 1969 he took over command of HMS Warspite,
one of only three nuclear submarines (SSNs) in the Royal Navy.
Characteristically, soon after coming aboard Warspite, Woodward proceeded to ‘shake
down the crew’ by, initially, throwing in minor variations in the underwater transit depth.
Watching reactions in the Chiefs’ and Petty Officer’s mess, Woodward was taken aback
by his senior crew’s disquieted reaction to a slight unanticipated dive. As Woodward
found out later, his crew had yet to recover its nerve after a severe collision with an
iceberg the year before and had yet to have exercised vigorously since then. Woodward
knew full well that he would have to engage in far more sever dives in a wartime
situation and therefore considered his submarine non-operational until such time as he
had inured his crew to unshakable confidence in their ability to maneuver undersea at
violent inclinations, extreme depth, and at rapid speeds.82
So this is exactly what
Woodward did, running his crew through an exercise known as ‘Angles and Dangles’ day
and night for the rest of the week. The result was that one week later Woodward had a
solid crew who did not even look up when he ran them through unexpected steep, rapid
dives. Woodward remarked that this firming up of the crew was not without cost, as one
of the crew asked to leave that weekend. Nonetheless, Woodward was certain that he had
done the right thing as, in his belief, the other ninety-seven crew were much better off for
79
Ibid., 46.
80
Ibid., 47.
81
Ibid., 48.
82
Ibid., 49.

39
their new confidence. Here we see Woodward’s willingness to accept what he deems,
with reason, an acceptable price to achieve the mission. We will see this trait again
during the Falklands Campaign.
After a successful two years on HMS Warspite, in 1972 Woodward proceeded to the
Royal College of Defence Studies as an administrator and unofficial student. Here
Woodward had trouble being civil to army brigadiers who were being uncivil to him.
Here, too, Woodward had trouble as:
“This is not what I joined the Navy for. Nor did I take kindly to being taken down several pegs at
a go. My wife put me straight by firmly stating it as her opinion that a few months of humility
would be good for my soul, since I had become far too pleased with myself… I was unused to
being argued with or criticized. As a matter of fact, I was terribly unused even to being
interrupted!”83
Clearly Woodward had extreme autocratic tendencies after his recent submarine
command tour. However, just as clearly, between his own self awareness and his wife’s
commentary, he was conscious of this potential handicap in a less autocratic command
structure. Despite not enjoying his station, Woodward was successful enough as he
proceeded to be selected for the rank of Captain at the relatively junior age of 40.
Woodward’s first post as a Captain was in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in Whitehall
at the Directorate of Naval Plans. Woodward was not enthusiastic about this assignment
as he envisioned it to be a miasma of red tape, mumbling bureaucrats and dull offices
with none of the camaraderie of fleet service.84
Still, once again, Woodward executed his
duties in a capable fashion and prepared to return to the submarine service.
In the summer of 1974 Woodward was Captain of the Submarine Sea Training school
and oversaw a staff of approximately 100 personnel. His duties were to train all newly
83
Ibid., 50.
84
Ibid., 53. Ironically, one of his first assignments in 1973 was to analyze defensive options for the
Falklands.

40
launched or refitted submarine crews for sea. In 1976 he assumed command of his first
surface ship, the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield. The Sheffield was first in her class
and was replete with design and construction problems. Although Woodward intended to
get her worked up and out to the fleet in late 1977, Woodward was unable to overcome
problems with the new weapons guidance computers and software. Moreover, an eight
weeks dry dock maintenance stand turned into four months as the whole underside of the
hull had to be sanded and maintained. Significant mechanical and design problems
persisted so that by the time Woodward’s 406 day command tour ended, he had logged
only 96 days at sea, none of them operational.85
Considering Woodward’s engineering
expertise, his ability to proficiently operate and command numerous other vessels, and
his continuing accelerated promotions, it appears that he had done everything possible to
get the Sheffield operational but was simply confounded by a badly designed and built
vessel.
In January 1978 Woodward left Sheffield and went on to his next posting as the Director
of Naval Plans at the MOD. His new posting held considerable prestige as one fourth of
the holders of this office eventually became First Sea Lord.86
Woodward excelled in this
post and held it for a full three years, longer than any person in the previous fifty years.
During his tenure the Royal Navy underwent the 1981 Defence Review and was to be cut
considerably more than the other services. Gone were to be the aircraft carrier Hermes
and possibly Invincible, nine destroyers and frigates, the entire amphibious force and 8 to
10,000 men plus dockyard and refitting support. As fortune would have it, these cuts
had, only just, not yet been implemented and therefore did not have a catastrophic effect
on the outcome of the Falklands Campaign. These decisions were made at the
parliamentary level by Defence Secretary John Knott (a banker and barrister by training)
just after Woodward completed his tour as Director of Naval Plans and Woodward,
though gravely alarmed, could have done little to halt their passing.87
85
Ibid., 57-58.
86
Ibid., 59.
87
Ibid., 61. Navy Minister Keith Smith lost his post after his acrimonious resistance to the proposed
measures on 19 May, 1981.

41
After successfully completing his tour as the Director of Naval Plans and at the relatively
young age of 49, Woodward received his promotion to Rear Admiral, dated 7 July 1981
and his appointment to Flag Officer, Submarines. Within weeks and “In the very best
traditions of the service, or perhaps for good reasons not revealed to me… I was
reappointed to be Flag Officer, First Flotilla (FOF1).”88
Woodward was now one of only
three sea-going admirals in the Royal Navy.
Woodward’s new command consisted of twenty-two destroyers and frigates, with the
HMS Glasmorgan as his flagship. Woodward’s new duties included ensuring that his
command was ready for sail and potentially assuming command of flotillas comprised of
aircraft carriers, light surface combatants, and support ships. Of note, during an exercise
with the Americans in the Arabian Sea, Woodward, in Glasmorgan, managed to sneak up
on and “sink” the carrier USS Coral Sea via a deception plan and demonstrated
considerable flexibility and ingenuity in its execution.89
Although Woodward “lost” most
of his light surface ships in the attack, therefrom he learned that a determined enemy can
slip through most carrier screens and deliver a killing blow to a carrier. And with a
carrier goes maritime air power, which is the decider of most naval (and amphibious)
operations. This lesson would prove fundamental to his execution carrier strategies in the
Falkland Campaign.
88
Ibid., 62.
89
Ibid., 63-66.

42
Appendix C: Woodward and the Press
On 27 April Woodward had an encounter with an entity he was not certain how to
deal with, the press. He gave an interview and answered a few questions concerning the
likely outcome of the war with the intent of communicating to his own people in his
command more than to the Argentines, the British Government, the Americans or the
world. He chose his words, in his view carefully, to inspire confidence in his combatant
forces and their loved ones at home and said, though he himself thought the odds were
uncertain”
“20 to 1 on” as “Defeat must be unthinkable. This is my team we are talking about here,
and there is no way I can tell them we be on to a loser, any more than if I were a football
manager giving his team a last-minute lift before the Cup Final. I am going to tell them
the single biggest lie I can sensibly get away with, to encourage everyone. And maybe
frighten the Argentinians a bit at the same time. I added, safely enough I thought, ‘But
frankly, I’d rather be given a walkover.’”
From a leadership perspective, Woodward, true to character, makes a solid but sober
demonstration to engender confidence in his sailors. He really could not have taken any
other tack and not undermined the fighting ability of his forces. From an Information
Operations perspective, Woodward demonstrates a savvy understanding90
of how he can
use the Press to undermine the Argentine combat strength by eroding their confidence.
What Woodward failed to foresee is how the Press, once released, can run away with a
story in a way that leaves the actual words uttered irrelevant. The Press ran the story as:
“WALKOVER WOODWARD”… “This (the South Georgia occupation) is the run up to
the big match which in my view should be a walkover. I’d give odds of 20 to 1 on, to
win.”
While the message conveyed both to the Argentines and to his forces Woodward’s
intended message, he drew a rebuke from Fieldhouse to be ‘Less Jingoistic, more sober,
90
As Woodard did with the ‘Burglar’. See main essay above.

43
peace-loving, and quietly determined.’91
Thereby Woodward learned that he could not
afford to make press conferences “eighty-third” on his priority list.92
Yet Woodward’s Press battering did not end then, as he was asked shortly thereafter ‘Do
you think this could be a long war?’ and ‘Could a lot of people get killed?’ To which
Woodward answered “it could last a few months which could seem a long time” and
“Well, there is bloodshed in most wars. I doubt this will be any exception.” The Press ran
with the headline ‘WOODWARD FORECASTS A LONG AND BLOODY WAR’.
Needless to say, Woodward received another phone call from Fieldhouse enquiring why
he was sending contradictory messages. Three days later Woodward was pilloried by the
Press as “An Admiral out of his depth”93
Woodward was not concerned with any slur
upon him rather than, true to his overriding concern for his subordinates, the effect such
comments would have on his sailors. Thereby, Woodward reached the conclusion that the
Press was not on his side and he was much more circumspect in his interaction therewith
thereafter. 94
91
Woodward, One Hundred Days…, 110-111.
92
Ibid., 111-112. Woodward gives a comprehensive list of his current real world concerns trumping the
Press.
93
Ibid., 112.
94
Many Royal Army and Marine personnel would conclude that the BBC was not on their side in the lead
up to and aftermath of the fight at Goose Green. See Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins The Battle for the
Falkland, 240. See also Clapp, 240 for BBC leaks later in the conflict. Also, Woodward, One Hundred
Days…, 112.

44
Appendix D: Final Snapshot of Woodward as Humanist
During the final approaches to the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) in late April, Woodward
relieved two officers of front line duties due to evidence of stress. What makes this
incident remarkable and contributory to an analysis of Woodward’s leadership
methodology is how he went about doing it. Woodward remarks that such transfers are
of no main consequence if caught early on. The problem comes with “persuading such
people to face the facts.”95
Woodward, contrary to some criticisms, herein displays a
measure of humanity, compassion, and passion not in line with certain portrayals of him
as an uncaring authoritarian. Per Woodward: “Knowledge in the much-avoided subject
(combat stress) is a tremendous help in dealing with it, and a fundamental qualification of
modern management.”96
He clearly demands instant obedience in time-critical situations
like the Perisher training or in the handling of the ‘Burglar’ intrusion, but when time
permits, Woodward demonstrates considerable humanism and concern for the well being
of his subordinates.
95
Woodward, One Hundred Days…, 115.
96
Ibid., 116.

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