This document discusses the implications of advances in neuroscience for the practice of law. It argues that as neuroscience develops a more mechanistic understanding of the brain and mind, traditional notions of free will and responsibility based on those concepts will become scientifically invalid. A consequentialist rather than retributive model of corrections would be better aligned with this emerging scientific understanding, focusing on public safety and rehabilitation rather than "just deserts". The document provides an example of how neuroscience evidence was used in a court case where a man's criminal urges were found to be caused by a brain tumor, and argues this illustrates both the relevance of neuroscience but also the need to move away from notions of absolute responsibility or blame.
Through the keyhole: why do we need research on research?Emma Kirkpatrick
Research on Research (RoR) is an internal NIHR program that conducts research to improve the management of NIHR research programs and the projects they fund. RoR is a small team of about 4 researchers within NETSCC that identifies areas to reduce research waste and add value. Examples of RoR projects include assessing the clinical relevance of funded research, evaluating processes like topic identification and decision making, and estimating the effect size of pilot and feasibility studies. The goals of RoR are to inform research questions, improve efficient delivery and regulation of research, and ensure accessible reporting of unbiased results.
This document discusses the importance of research for guidance and counseling programs. It notes that research is a service-oriented activity used to discover new knowledge and advance current understanding. Research provides concrete evidence that counseling programs are worthwhile, and helps counselors grow professionally. The document recommends specific topics that counselors could research, such as factors affecting academic achievement, teacher responses to misbehavior, and the effectiveness of counseling approaches and training programs. Overall, the document emphasizes that research is essential for demonstrating the value of counseling, improving services, and stimulating professional development.
This document presents the National Ethical Guidelines for Health Research in Nepal and Standard Operating Procedures. It acknowledges the members of the taskforce that revised the guidelines and expresses gratitude to supporting partners. The guidelines are divided into three sections. Section A discusses guiding principles for research involving human participants, including informed consent and risk-benefit assessment. Section B outlines basic principles such as voluntary participation, protecting vulnerable groups, and ensuring benefits outweigh risks. Section C presents standard operating procedures for Nepal Health Research Council's Ethical Review Board, covering functions, membership, application processes, and decision making.
Neuroscience and genetics are challenging the concept of free will by providing evidence that brain abnormalities and genes can impair a person's ability to make rational choices. Studies such as the case of Phineas Gage, who had personality changes after brain damage, showed the link between brain structure and behavior. Neuroscience has also been used in court, with defendants presenting brain scans to argue they are not culpable due to brain abnormalities, though the reliability of these scans is debated. While brain factors may influence behavior, courts recognize other environmental and circumstantial factors must also be considered when assessing individual responsibility and free will.
This document provides an overview of a symposium on criminal behavior and the brain that explored the intersection between neuroscience evidence and different aspects of criminal law. It summarizes two articles from the symposium. The first article discusses the historical relationship between neuroscience and law, examining four moments from the 19th century to the 1990s. The second article focuses on how neuroscience could impact theories of criminal responsibility and the criminal justice system. It notes neuroscience may expand excuses or change thinking on the system. The document then summarizes a third article about how neuroscience could aid the development of a more informed approach to sentencing.
E D I T O R I A LWhat Neuroscience Can andCannot Answer.docxbrownliecarmella
E D I T O R I A L
What Neuroscience Can and
Cannot Answer
Octavio S. Choi, MD, PhD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 45:278 – 85, 2017
We truly live in the golden age of neuroscience. Ad-
vances in technology over the past 20 years have
given modern neuro-researchers tools of unprece-
dented power to probe the workings of the most
complex machine in the universe (as far as we know).
Neuroscience as a field is driven by our natural fasci-
nation with understanding how a physical organ,
weighing three pounds and running on 20 watts of
power, can give rise to the mind, and with it, our
thoughts, feelings, soul, and identity. Brain activity is
presumably the source of all these things, but how,
exactly? Culturally, neuroscience is a currency that
enjoys very high capital, and public fascination with
neuroscience is evident in the news and popular cul-
ture.1 Neuroscience is cool: prestigious, high-tech,
complex, philosophically rich, and beautiful.
It is of increasing interest in the courtroom as well,
and each year the number of cases using neuroscience-
based evidence rises.2 The reasons for this are clear
enough. Many legal decisions depend on accurate
assessment of mental states and mental capacities
(such as capacity for rationality or control over one’s
behaviors), and the hope is that neuroscience can
shed light on these matters.
I have participated in several of these cases in my
early career and have seen enough to report that there
is trouble afoot. I have witnessed neuroscience re-
peatedly misrepresented and misused. Certain pat-
terns have emerged: speculations clothed as facts, er-
rors of logical reasoning, and hasty conclusions
unsupported by evidence and unrestrained by cau-
tion. I have found too much weight placed on iso-
lated neurofindings and too little weight on good
clinical observation and other kinds of behavioral
evidence.
Forensic psychiatrists will be increasingly asked to
opine on neuroevidence, and thus we must be able to
distinguish neuroscience from neuro-nonsense. To do
this, we should understand what kinds of questions
neuroscience currently can and cannot answer. Fur-
thermore, we must understand the kinds of questions
neuroscience will never be able to answer. Finally, in
the interests of justice, when we recognize that neu-
roscience is being misused or misrepresented, we
must be forthright in communicating this informa-
tion to finders of fact.
Presciently, in 2006 Morse identified signs of a
cognitive pathology he labeled brain overclaim syn-
drome (BOS). This devastating illness “afflicts those
inflamed by the fascinating new discoveries in the
neurosciences,” leading to a “rationality-unhinging
effect . . . the final pathway, in all cases . . . is that
more legal implications are claimed for the brain sci-
ence than can be justified” (Ref. 3, p 403).
Part of the problem is that neuroscience evidence
is genuinely mind boggling. A bar chart can be gen-
erated by a grade schooler on her smartphone, but a
fu.
This document discusses the relationship between claims of alien abduction and the neurological phenomenon of sleep paralysis. It argues that sleep paralysis serves as the basis for purported alien abduction experiences, as the sensations caused by sleep paralysis are often misinterpreted. Many characteristics of claimed alien abductions match the effects of hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences during sleep paralysis. The document also notes commonalities in sleep paralysis experiences across cultures and argues this demonstrates alien abduction claims have physiological rather than otherworldly explanations.
Biotechnology and science probing the mindKarlos Svoboda
This document discusses issues around the use of neuroscience evidence in legal cases. It describes two main types of neuroscience evidence - brain scans used for lie detection and determining cognitive ability. While this technology is promising, there are still many challenges around reliability and getting such evidence admitted in court. A key open question is whether brain scans should be considered a search of physical brain cells under the 4th Amendment or a statement of information from the individual under the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. This characterization could have significant legal implications as laws have not kept pace with advancing neuroscience technology.
Through the keyhole: why do we need research on research?Emma Kirkpatrick
Research on Research (RoR) is an internal NIHR program that conducts research to improve the management of NIHR research programs and the projects they fund. RoR is a small team of about 4 researchers within NETSCC that identifies areas to reduce research waste and add value. Examples of RoR projects include assessing the clinical relevance of funded research, evaluating processes like topic identification and decision making, and estimating the effect size of pilot and feasibility studies. The goals of RoR are to inform research questions, improve efficient delivery and regulation of research, and ensure accessible reporting of unbiased results.
This document discusses the importance of research for guidance and counseling programs. It notes that research is a service-oriented activity used to discover new knowledge and advance current understanding. Research provides concrete evidence that counseling programs are worthwhile, and helps counselors grow professionally. The document recommends specific topics that counselors could research, such as factors affecting academic achievement, teacher responses to misbehavior, and the effectiveness of counseling approaches and training programs. Overall, the document emphasizes that research is essential for demonstrating the value of counseling, improving services, and stimulating professional development.
This document presents the National Ethical Guidelines for Health Research in Nepal and Standard Operating Procedures. It acknowledges the members of the taskforce that revised the guidelines and expresses gratitude to supporting partners. The guidelines are divided into three sections. Section A discusses guiding principles for research involving human participants, including informed consent and risk-benefit assessment. Section B outlines basic principles such as voluntary participation, protecting vulnerable groups, and ensuring benefits outweigh risks. Section C presents standard operating procedures for Nepal Health Research Council's Ethical Review Board, covering functions, membership, application processes, and decision making.
Neuroscience and genetics are challenging the concept of free will by providing evidence that brain abnormalities and genes can impair a person's ability to make rational choices. Studies such as the case of Phineas Gage, who had personality changes after brain damage, showed the link between brain structure and behavior. Neuroscience has also been used in court, with defendants presenting brain scans to argue they are not culpable due to brain abnormalities, though the reliability of these scans is debated. While brain factors may influence behavior, courts recognize other environmental and circumstantial factors must also be considered when assessing individual responsibility and free will.
This document provides an overview of a symposium on criminal behavior and the brain that explored the intersection between neuroscience evidence and different aspects of criminal law. It summarizes two articles from the symposium. The first article discusses the historical relationship between neuroscience and law, examining four moments from the 19th century to the 1990s. The second article focuses on how neuroscience could impact theories of criminal responsibility and the criminal justice system. It notes neuroscience may expand excuses or change thinking on the system. The document then summarizes a third article about how neuroscience could aid the development of a more informed approach to sentencing.
E D I T O R I A LWhat Neuroscience Can andCannot Answer.docxbrownliecarmella
E D I T O R I A L
What Neuroscience Can and
Cannot Answer
Octavio S. Choi, MD, PhD
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 45:278 – 85, 2017
We truly live in the golden age of neuroscience. Ad-
vances in technology over the past 20 years have
given modern neuro-researchers tools of unprece-
dented power to probe the workings of the most
complex machine in the universe (as far as we know).
Neuroscience as a field is driven by our natural fasci-
nation with understanding how a physical organ,
weighing three pounds and running on 20 watts of
power, can give rise to the mind, and with it, our
thoughts, feelings, soul, and identity. Brain activity is
presumably the source of all these things, but how,
exactly? Culturally, neuroscience is a currency that
enjoys very high capital, and public fascination with
neuroscience is evident in the news and popular cul-
ture.1 Neuroscience is cool: prestigious, high-tech,
complex, philosophically rich, and beautiful.
It is of increasing interest in the courtroom as well,
and each year the number of cases using neuroscience-
based evidence rises.2 The reasons for this are clear
enough. Many legal decisions depend on accurate
assessment of mental states and mental capacities
(such as capacity for rationality or control over one’s
behaviors), and the hope is that neuroscience can
shed light on these matters.
I have participated in several of these cases in my
early career and have seen enough to report that there
is trouble afoot. I have witnessed neuroscience re-
peatedly misrepresented and misused. Certain pat-
terns have emerged: speculations clothed as facts, er-
rors of logical reasoning, and hasty conclusions
unsupported by evidence and unrestrained by cau-
tion. I have found too much weight placed on iso-
lated neurofindings and too little weight on good
clinical observation and other kinds of behavioral
evidence.
Forensic psychiatrists will be increasingly asked to
opine on neuroevidence, and thus we must be able to
distinguish neuroscience from neuro-nonsense. To do
this, we should understand what kinds of questions
neuroscience currently can and cannot answer. Fur-
thermore, we must understand the kinds of questions
neuroscience will never be able to answer. Finally, in
the interests of justice, when we recognize that neu-
roscience is being misused or misrepresented, we
must be forthright in communicating this informa-
tion to finders of fact.
Presciently, in 2006 Morse identified signs of a
cognitive pathology he labeled brain overclaim syn-
drome (BOS). This devastating illness “afflicts those
inflamed by the fascinating new discoveries in the
neurosciences,” leading to a “rationality-unhinging
effect . . . the final pathway, in all cases . . . is that
more legal implications are claimed for the brain sci-
ence than can be justified” (Ref. 3, p 403).
Part of the problem is that neuroscience evidence
is genuinely mind boggling. A bar chart can be gen-
erated by a grade schooler on her smartphone, but a
fu.
This document discusses the relationship between claims of alien abduction and the neurological phenomenon of sleep paralysis. It argues that sleep paralysis serves as the basis for purported alien abduction experiences, as the sensations caused by sleep paralysis are often misinterpreted. Many characteristics of claimed alien abductions match the effects of hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences during sleep paralysis. The document also notes commonalities in sleep paralysis experiences across cultures and argues this demonstrates alien abduction claims have physiological rather than otherworldly explanations.
Biotechnology and science probing the mindKarlos Svoboda
This document discusses issues around the use of neuroscience evidence in legal cases. It describes two main types of neuroscience evidence - brain scans used for lie detection and determining cognitive ability. While this technology is promising, there are still many challenges around reliability and getting such evidence admitted in court. A key open question is whether brain scans should be considered a search of physical brain cells under the 4th Amendment or a statement of information from the individual under the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. This characterization could have significant legal implications as laws have not kept pace with advancing neuroscience technology.
1) Gallese's research into mirror neurons found that observing another person's actions activates the same areas of the observer's brain that are involved in performing those actions. This suggests humans simulate others' intentional actions unconsciously through an "embodied simulation" mechanism.
2) Gallese argues this embodied simulation allows for direct, non-conceptual understanding of others' intentions. More cognitive elaboration is needed to understand complex social stimuli.
3) Sterelny argues folk psychology is an automated skill acquired through perceptual priming and a carefully engineered social learning environment, not innate conceptual knowledge. This challenges claims of a specialized "theory of mind module."
1) The document discusses how quantitative methods involving biochemistry, toxicology, and imaging could help evaluate amygdala and limbic system activation in legal settings to better understand criminal behavior and mental states.
2) Literature on the topic suggests pathological amygdala and limbic system activation could be objectively diagnosed and potentially treated similarly to other physiological conditions if validated assessment methods were established.
3) Studies have found abnormal metabolism and neurochemistry in the amygdala of individuals with conditions like borderline personality disorder that could relate to symptoms like impulsivity and emotional dysregulation.
This document discusses the philosophical foundations of criminology. It begins with an overview of criminology as the scientific study of crime, criminals, and criminal punishment. It then discusses early non-scientific theories that emphasized moral weakness and evil spirits as causes of criminality. Modern theories recognize multiple interacting variables and are based on scientific inquiry. Classical and neoclassical theories view crime as a matter of free will and choice. Positive theories examine biological, psychological, and sociological factors as causes of criminality. Important theorists discussed include Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, Cesare Lombroso, and Emile Durkheim.
This document discusses the complex relationship between law and medicine regarding mental health and legal culpability. It notes that while law and medicine both consider mental state, they have different definitions and approaches. Law focuses on attaching responsibility and considers insanity as a possible defense, while medicine views mental abnormalities as treatable diseases. The document explores how courts and medical experts sometimes disagree in their assessments of a defendant's mental state and responsibility. It examines relevant laws and cases regarding insanity defenses and mental abnormality. Overall, the relationship between law and medicine in this area is antagonistic yet interdependent, and improving collaboration between the two fields could lead to better outcomes.
Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology a new theory with respect to m...Elsa von Licy
This document discusses a new model for understanding the relationship between mind and brain based on principles of quantum physics. It proposes that classical physics, which views the brain as entirely material, cannot fully explain phenomena like self-directed neuroplasticity where mental processes like attention and effort are able to systematically alter brain function. Quantum physics provides a framework to causally relate mental and physical properties and allow psychological concepts to be included as causal factors in models of brain function. The authors argue this provides a more coherent understanding of how directed attention and cognitive strategies can produce changes in the brain.
The document discusses prosecuting juveniles as adults and whether it constitutes justice or retribution. While juvenile courts traditionally focused on rehabilitation, there is a trend toward waiving more juveniles to adult courts which emphasize punishment. However, evidence suggests this "get tough" approach has not reduced crime rates. Adolescents' brains, especially the prefrontal cortex responsible for reasoning and judgment, are still developing into adulthood. Therefore, a system that does not consider this may be a failure. The research aims to examine whether juveniles should be prosecuted as adults for serious crimes like assault, murder, or crimes involving weapons. It will consider arguments on both sides and the impact on society and the criminal justice system.
Personality and the brain; Can brain damage change personality?Ivona Vukotic
Brain damage can change personality in several ways:
1) Studies have found links between certain personality disorders like antisocial personality disorder and abnormalities in areas of the brain like the prefrontal cortex and amygdala.
2) Brain imaging research on criminals with antisocial personality disorder has revealed structural and functional damage in regions involved in decision making, emotions, and social behavior.
3) Brain damage may contribute to personality changes by impairing functions like impulse control, empathy, and the ability to learn from punishment or fear. However, the relationship between brain abnormalities and personality is complex with many open questions.
Reduced punishment in Israel in the case of murder: Bridging the medico-legal...Ya'ir Ronen
This document summarizes the historical development of diminished responsibility laws in Israel. It discusses how Israeli law has evolved to bridge the gap between legal and psychiatric understandings of mental illness and criminal responsibility. Specifically, it notes that Israeli law has moved from a purely cognitive test for insanity to incorporating a test of will as well. Most recently, in 1997 clause 300a was added permitting more lenient punishment for murder in cases of severe mental disorder or significantly restricted mental capacity. This represented recognition in law that mental disorders exist on a spectrum rather than a simple sane/insane dichotomy.
The Insanity Defence ~ An Analysis with Specific Reference to Section 84 of t...inventionjournals
The M’Naghten Rules and the test suggested therein came to be known as the “Right – Wrong” test.
Prior to this, a person who committed a crime and pleaded insanity was said to be possessed by evil sprits or
“wild beasts”. Confusion rules the roost when one attempts to analyse what exactly insanity is.
What are its borders? When can a person be called insane? What degree of loss of sanity is required, what is
the threshold between sanity and insanity are all questions that clamour for a clear answer which has been
evasive for a few centuries now and this evasiveness, the lack of answers to these pivotal questions, for a judge
or a jury, nay for the psychiatrist himself will remain.
A jury or a judge is called upon to declare guilt or pronounce innocence. A psychiatrist has a thankless job in
this context, which is certainly not going to cause any inconvenience to the judge or jury – it is by what the
psychiatrist says and how of it is comprehended in the correct sense by the jury and the judges – upon which the
fate of the accused hangs. He has to, through the evidence of the expert, the psychiatrist, prove that he was
insane or of unsound mind when the act in question was committed. An attempt is made here to understand the
medical and the legal aspects of the insanity defence.
Running head: CAUSES OF CRIME Thomas 1
Causes of crime 2
Causes of crime
Jonathan Thomas
CRJ 475
Mount Olive College
Causes of crime
Crime is generally referred to as the commissioning of an act that violates the law causing injuries to the society. Contemporary scholars from all over the world have debated this subject for ages with the aim of trying to unearth the causes of crime but many have gone ahead to conclude that it is a motivation of various factors. The factors are nevertheless numerous and there is no single study that accurately proves the current theories. All in all these theories have been used by scholars and researchers across the globe and have been widely accepted as the most probable sources of criminology. This study will indulge explicitly into some of these theories that form the basis of criminology together with some of the most profound programs and policies that would reduce the rising rates of crimes around the world.
These theories can be classified into three major theories; theories that attribute the act of crime to some congenital or biological defects by the defender, theories that may emanate out of a mental or a psychological disorder and theories that emanate from social or environmental factors. This study will begin by looking into the biological theories of crime.
There are two or more theories that currently exist in the biosocial world today and one or two set of these theories lays more emphasis on the genetic factors basically the traits that are transmitted to the child from the parents (Perez, 2011). Other studies assert that a criminal behavior may be triggered by defects in the neurology set up which may inhibit the factors that aid in self control which limit the probability of indulging in a criminal behavior. The irregularities may result out of defects in the structure and the chemical composition of the brain.
Genetic factors
This study shows that the effect of biological inheritance tending towards criminality is high in conjunction with the social environment of an individual. Studies in the interrelationship of criminal inheritance between parents and children proves that children whose parents had a background of crime or who are criminals themselves were more likely to engage in criminal activities compared to parents who abided by the law.
Finally there is a research that has been carried out between parents and their adopted children and parents and their real children. The research proved that the children with their biological parents had a higher risk of indulging in criminal activities if their parents were criminals than the adopted children (Ramdhan, 2011). However, there is little genetic predisposition to prove this and hence more study is needed to reaffir ...
Classics in the History of Psychology Aninternet resource .docxbartholomeocoombs
Classics in the History of Psychology
An
internet resource developed by
Christopher D.
Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario
ISSN 1492-3713
(Return to index)
The Myth of Mental Illness
By
Thomas S. Szasz (1960)
First published in American Psychologist, 15,
113-118.
Posted
January 2002
My aim in this essay is to raise the question "Is there such a thing as mental
illness?" and to argue that there is not. Since the notion of mental
illness is extremely widely used nowadays, inquiry into the ways in which this
term is employed would seem to be especially indicated. Mental illness, of course, is not literally a
"thing" -- or physical object -- and hence it can "exist"
only in the same sort of way in which other theoretical concepts exist. Yet,
familiar theories are in the habit of posing, sooner or later -- at least to
those who come to believe in them -- as "objective truths" (or
"facts"). During certain
historical periods, explanatory conceptions such as deities, witches, and
microorganisms appeared not only as theories but as self-evident causes of
a vast number of events. I submit that
today mental illness is widely regarded in a somewhat similar fashion, that is,
as the cause of innumerable diverse happenings.
As an antidote to the complacent use of the notion of mental illness --
whether as a self-evident phenomenon, theory, or cause--let us ask this
question: What is meant when it is asserted that someone is mentally ill?
In what follows I shall describe briefly the main uses to
which the concept of mental illness has been put. I shall argue that this notion has outlived
whatever usefulness it might have had and that it now functions merely as a
convenient myth.
MENTAL ILLNESS AS A SIGN OF BRAIN DISEASE
The notion of mental illness derives it
main sup- port from such phenomena as syphilis of the brain or delirious
conditions-intoxications, for instance -- in which persons are known to
manifest various peculiarities or disorders of thinking and behavior. Correctly
speaking, however, these are diseases of the brain, not of the mind. According to one school of thought, all
so-called mental illness is of this type.
The assumption is made that some neurological defect, perhaps a very
subtle one, will ultimately be found for all the disorders of thinking and
behavior. Many contemporary psychiatrists, physicians, and other
scientists hold this view. This position
implies that people cannot have troubles -- expressed in what are now
called "mental illnesses" -- because of differences in personal
needs, opinions, social aspirations, values, and so on. All problems in living are attributed
to physicochemical processes which in due time will be discovered by medical research.
"Mental illnesses" are thus regarded as basically no different than all other diseases (that is,
of the body). The only difference, in
this view, between mental and bodily diseases is that the former, affecting the
brain, manifest themselves by means of me.
This document summarizes Thomas Szasz's 1960 essay "The Myth of Mental Illness", which argues that the concept of mental illness is a myth. The summary is as follows:
1) Szasz argues that mental illness is not a real disease like a physical illness, but rather a theoretical concept used to describe problems in living or undesirable behavior.
2) He examines different ways mental illness has been conceptualized, such as a sign of brain disease or a problem in personality, but finds these definitions problematic and misleading.
3) Szasz asserts that judgments of mental illness rely on social and ethical norms rather than medical pathology, making it a myth to view it as an objective medical condition
The document summarizes and evaluates the type-identity thesis, which claims that mental states are identical to physical brain states. It discusses the motivations for the type-identity thesis in response to behaviorism. It examines the arguments of philosophers J.J.C. Smart and D. Lewis in support of the type-identity thesis, including Smart's analogy to lightning and Lewis' argument based on causal roles and transitivity of identity. It also considers criticisms of the type-identity thesis, such as the "dual property" objection and the argument from multiple realizability, and how defenders of the thesis have responded to these criticisms. Overall, the document argues that the type-identity thesis as formulated by D. Lewis withstands
The document discusses research conducted by Professor Adrian Raine on the relationship between childhood experiences, brain development, and criminal behavior later in life. The research found that children aged 3-5 years old who received better nutrition, exercise, and education as part of an "enrichment program" were less likely to develop antisocial behaviors as teenagers or engage in criminal activities as adults compared to children who did not receive the program. The results suggest that environmental factors like diet and exercise during critical early childhood years can influence brain development in ways that reduce criminal risk.
This document summarizes recent advances in understanding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). It discusses how studying changes in consciousness during sleep, anesthesia, and seizures has provided insights. It also examines paradigms used to study the NCC for specific percepts and the role of different brain regions. Finally, it discusses dynamic neural activity patterns like sustained vs phasic activity and their relation to the NCC.
The document discusses the brain and memory from multiple perspectives. It begins by exploring how the brain is viewed differently by everyday people, neurosurgeons, and cognitive neuroscientists. It then summarizes the current understanding of memory storage in the brain as being distributed across interconnected regions rather than in single locations, though some recent studies challenge this view. The document also discusses how understanding the brain-memory relationship could help address memory loss issues and provides background on neurons, the basic functional units of the brain.
1) Gallese's research into mirror neurons found that observing another person's actions activates the same areas of the observer's brain that are involved in performing those actions. This suggests humans simulate others' intentional actions unconsciously through an "embodied simulation" mechanism.
2) Gallese argues this embodied simulation allows for direct, non-conceptual understanding of others' intentions. More cognitive elaboration is needed to understand complex social stimuli.
3) Sterelny argues folk psychology is an automated skill acquired through perceptual priming and a carefully engineered social learning environment, not innate conceptual knowledge. This challenges claims of a specialized "theory of mind module."
1) The document discusses how quantitative methods involving biochemistry, toxicology, and imaging could help evaluate amygdala and limbic system activation in legal settings to better understand criminal behavior and mental states.
2) Literature on the topic suggests pathological amygdala and limbic system activation could be objectively diagnosed and potentially treated similarly to other physiological conditions if validated assessment methods were established.
3) Studies have found abnormal metabolism and neurochemistry in the amygdala of individuals with conditions like borderline personality disorder that could relate to symptoms like impulsivity and emotional dysregulation.
This document discusses the philosophical foundations of criminology. It begins with an overview of criminology as the scientific study of crime, criminals, and criminal punishment. It then discusses early non-scientific theories that emphasized moral weakness and evil spirits as causes of criminality. Modern theories recognize multiple interacting variables and are based on scientific inquiry. Classical and neoclassical theories view crime as a matter of free will and choice. Positive theories examine biological, psychological, and sociological factors as causes of criminality. Important theorists discussed include Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, Cesare Lombroso, and Emile Durkheim.
This document discusses the complex relationship between law and medicine regarding mental health and legal culpability. It notes that while law and medicine both consider mental state, they have different definitions and approaches. Law focuses on attaching responsibility and considers insanity as a possible defense, while medicine views mental abnormalities as treatable diseases. The document explores how courts and medical experts sometimes disagree in their assessments of a defendant's mental state and responsibility. It examines relevant laws and cases regarding insanity defenses and mental abnormality. Overall, the relationship between law and medicine in this area is antagonistic yet interdependent, and improving collaboration between the two fields could lead to better outcomes.
Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology a new theory with respect to m...Elsa von Licy
This document discusses a new model for understanding the relationship between mind and brain based on principles of quantum physics. It proposes that classical physics, which views the brain as entirely material, cannot fully explain phenomena like self-directed neuroplasticity where mental processes like attention and effort are able to systematically alter brain function. Quantum physics provides a framework to causally relate mental and physical properties and allow psychological concepts to be included as causal factors in models of brain function. The authors argue this provides a more coherent understanding of how directed attention and cognitive strategies can produce changes in the brain.
The document discusses prosecuting juveniles as adults and whether it constitutes justice or retribution. While juvenile courts traditionally focused on rehabilitation, there is a trend toward waiving more juveniles to adult courts which emphasize punishment. However, evidence suggests this "get tough" approach has not reduced crime rates. Adolescents' brains, especially the prefrontal cortex responsible for reasoning and judgment, are still developing into adulthood. Therefore, a system that does not consider this may be a failure. The research aims to examine whether juveniles should be prosecuted as adults for serious crimes like assault, murder, or crimes involving weapons. It will consider arguments on both sides and the impact on society and the criminal justice system.
Personality and the brain; Can brain damage change personality?Ivona Vukotic
Brain damage can change personality in several ways:
1) Studies have found links between certain personality disorders like antisocial personality disorder and abnormalities in areas of the brain like the prefrontal cortex and amygdala.
2) Brain imaging research on criminals with antisocial personality disorder has revealed structural and functional damage in regions involved in decision making, emotions, and social behavior.
3) Brain damage may contribute to personality changes by impairing functions like impulse control, empathy, and the ability to learn from punishment or fear. However, the relationship between brain abnormalities and personality is complex with many open questions.
Reduced punishment in Israel in the case of murder: Bridging the medico-legal...Ya'ir Ronen
This document summarizes the historical development of diminished responsibility laws in Israel. It discusses how Israeli law has evolved to bridge the gap between legal and psychiatric understandings of mental illness and criminal responsibility. Specifically, it notes that Israeli law has moved from a purely cognitive test for insanity to incorporating a test of will as well. Most recently, in 1997 clause 300a was added permitting more lenient punishment for murder in cases of severe mental disorder or significantly restricted mental capacity. This represented recognition in law that mental disorders exist on a spectrum rather than a simple sane/insane dichotomy.
The Insanity Defence ~ An Analysis with Specific Reference to Section 84 of t...inventionjournals
The M’Naghten Rules and the test suggested therein came to be known as the “Right – Wrong” test.
Prior to this, a person who committed a crime and pleaded insanity was said to be possessed by evil sprits or
“wild beasts”. Confusion rules the roost when one attempts to analyse what exactly insanity is.
What are its borders? When can a person be called insane? What degree of loss of sanity is required, what is
the threshold between sanity and insanity are all questions that clamour for a clear answer which has been
evasive for a few centuries now and this evasiveness, the lack of answers to these pivotal questions, for a judge
or a jury, nay for the psychiatrist himself will remain.
A jury or a judge is called upon to declare guilt or pronounce innocence. A psychiatrist has a thankless job in
this context, which is certainly not going to cause any inconvenience to the judge or jury – it is by what the
psychiatrist says and how of it is comprehended in the correct sense by the jury and the judges – upon which the
fate of the accused hangs. He has to, through the evidence of the expert, the psychiatrist, prove that he was
insane or of unsound mind when the act in question was committed. An attempt is made here to understand the
medical and the legal aspects of the insanity defence.
Running head: CAUSES OF CRIME Thomas 1
Causes of crime 2
Causes of crime
Jonathan Thomas
CRJ 475
Mount Olive College
Causes of crime
Crime is generally referred to as the commissioning of an act that violates the law causing injuries to the society. Contemporary scholars from all over the world have debated this subject for ages with the aim of trying to unearth the causes of crime but many have gone ahead to conclude that it is a motivation of various factors. The factors are nevertheless numerous and there is no single study that accurately proves the current theories. All in all these theories have been used by scholars and researchers across the globe and have been widely accepted as the most probable sources of criminology. This study will indulge explicitly into some of these theories that form the basis of criminology together with some of the most profound programs and policies that would reduce the rising rates of crimes around the world.
These theories can be classified into three major theories; theories that attribute the act of crime to some congenital or biological defects by the defender, theories that may emanate out of a mental or a psychological disorder and theories that emanate from social or environmental factors. This study will begin by looking into the biological theories of crime.
There are two or more theories that currently exist in the biosocial world today and one or two set of these theories lays more emphasis on the genetic factors basically the traits that are transmitted to the child from the parents (Perez, 2011). Other studies assert that a criminal behavior may be triggered by defects in the neurology set up which may inhibit the factors that aid in self control which limit the probability of indulging in a criminal behavior. The irregularities may result out of defects in the structure and the chemical composition of the brain.
Genetic factors
This study shows that the effect of biological inheritance tending towards criminality is high in conjunction with the social environment of an individual. Studies in the interrelationship of criminal inheritance between parents and children proves that children whose parents had a background of crime or who are criminals themselves were more likely to engage in criminal activities compared to parents who abided by the law.
Finally there is a research that has been carried out between parents and their adopted children and parents and their real children. The research proved that the children with their biological parents had a higher risk of indulging in criminal activities if their parents were criminals than the adopted children (Ramdhan, 2011). However, there is little genetic predisposition to prove this and hence more study is needed to reaffir ...
Classics in the History of Psychology Aninternet resource .docxbartholomeocoombs
Classics in the History of Psychology
An
internet resource developed by
Christopher D.
Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario
ISSN 1492-3713
(Return to index)
The Myth of Mental Illness
By
Thomas S. Szasz (1960)
First published in American Psychologist, 15,
113-118.
Posted
January 2002
My aim in this essay is to raise the question "Is there such a thing as mental
illness?" and to argue that there is not. Since the notion of mental
illness is extremely widely used nowadays, inquiry into the ways in which this
term is employed would seem to be especially indicated. Mental illness, of course, is not literally a
"thing" -- or physical object -- and hence it can "exist"
only in the same sort of way in which other theoretical concepts exist. Yet,
familiar theories are in the habit of posing, sooner or later -- at least to
those who come to believe in them -- as "objective truths" (or
"facts"). During certain
historical periods, explanatory conceptions such as deities, witches, and
microorganisms appeared not only as theories but as self-evident causes of
a vast number of events. I submit that
today mental illness is widely regarded in a somewhat similar fashion, that is,
as the cause of innumerable diverse happenings.
As an antidote to the complacent use of the notion of mental illness --
whether as a self-evident phenomenon, theory, or cause--let us ask this
question: What is meant when it is asserted that someone is mentally ill?
In what follows I shall describe briefly the main uses to
which the concept of mental illness has been put. I shall argue that this notion has outlived
whatever usefulness it might have had and that it now functions merely as a
convenient myth.
MENTAL ILLNESS AS A SIGN OF BRAIN DISEASE
The notion of mental illness derives it
main sup- port from such phenomena as syphilis of the brain or delirious
conditions-intoxications, for instance -- in which persons are known to
manifest various peculiarities or disorders of thinking and behavior. Correctly
speaking, however, these are diseases of the brain, not of the mind. According to one school of thought, all
so-called mental illness is of this type.
The assumption is made that some neurological defect, perhaps a very
subtle one, will ultimately be found for all the disorders of thinking and
behavior. Many contemporary psychiatrists, physicians, and other
scientists hold this view. This position
implies that people cannot have troubles -- expressed in what are now
called "mental illnesses" -- because of differences in personal
needs, opinions, social aspirations, values, and so on. All problems in living are attributed
to physicochemical processes which in due time will be discovered by medical research.
"Mental illnesses" are thus regarded as basically no different than all other diseases (that is,
of the body). The only difference, in
this view, between mental and bodily diseases is that the former, affecting the
brain, manifest themselves by means of me.
This document summarizes Thomas Szasz's 1960 essay "The Myth of Mental Illness", which argues that the concept of mental illness is a myth. The summary is as follows:
1) Szasz argues that mental illness is not a real disease like a physical illness, but rather a theoretical concept used to describe problems in living or undesirable behavior.
2) He examines different ways mental illness has been conceptualized, such as a sign of brain disease or a problem in personality, but finds these definitions problematic and misleading.
3) Szasz asserts that judgments of mental illness rely on social and ethical norms rather than medical pathology, making it a myth to view it as an objective medical condition
The document summarizes and evaluates the type-identity thesis, which claims that mental states are identical to physical brain states. It discusses the motivations for the type-identity thesis in response to behaviorism. It examines the arguments of philosophers J.J.C. Smart and D. Lewis in support of the type-identity thesis, including Smart's analogy to lightning and Lewis' argument based on causal roles and transitivity of identity. It also considers criticisms of the type-identity thesis, such as the "dual property" objection and the argument from multiple realizability, and how defenders of the thesis have responded to these criticisms. Overall, the document argues that the type-identity thesis as formulated by D. Lewis withstands
The document discusses research conducted by Professor Adrian Raine on the relationship between childhood experiences, brain development, and criminal behavior later in life. The research found that children aged 3-5 years old who received better nutrition, exercise, and education as part of an "enrichment program" were less likely to develop antisocial behaviors as teenagers or engage in criminal activities as adults compared to children who did not receive the program. The results suggest that environmental factors like diet and exercise during critical early childhood years can influence brain development in ways that reduce criminal risk.
This document summarizes recent advances in understanding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). It discusses how studying changes in consciousness during sleep, anesthesia, and seizures has provided insights. It also examines paradigms used to study the NCC for specific percepts and the role of different brain regions. Finally, it discusses dynamic neural activity patterns like sustained vs phasic activity and their relation to the NCC.
The document discusses the brain and memory from multiple perspectives. It begins by exploring how the brain is viewed differently by everyday people, neurosurgeons, and cognitive neuroscientists. It then summarizes the current understanding of memory storage in the brain as being distributed across interconnected regions rather than in single locations, though some recent studies challenge this view. The document also discusses how understanding the brain-memory relationship could help address memory loss issues and provides background on neurons, the basic functional units of the brain.
1. THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE AND CONSEQUENTIALISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRACTICE OF LAW
Shane Harrell
Masters of Criminal Justice Program
Auburn University at Montgomery
2. THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE AND CONSEQUENTIALISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRACTICE OF LAW
Abstract
Spurred by rapid advances in neuroimaging that allow for observation of the physical operations
of the brain, a functional account of the human mind based on folk psychological concepts of
“free will” and cognitive psychological concepts of “conscious control” are being replaced by a
mechanistic neuroscience that explicate the mind/brain as a deterministic system. This emerging
understanding could have implications for the exercise of law, rendering traditional notions of
responsibility based on free will scientifically and logically void. Theories of corrections based
on retributive precepts grounded in traditional notions of “free will” would similarly face serious
challenges, and be replaced by a scientifically grounded, consequentialist model of corrections.
3. 2 CONSEQUENTIALISM AND LAW
INTRODUCTION
Biological theories of criminality seek to explain criminal behavior and tendencies in
terms of genetic predispositions (Bohman, M., Cloninger, C. R., von Knorring, and Sigvardsson,
1984), body structure (Ellis, 2005) and abnormal hormone levels and deficiencies (Benton,
2007). Biological theories of criminality seek small-scale, mechanistic explanations of criminal
behavior, as compared to the traditional macroscopic explanations offered at the level of
sociology (Skogan, 1974; Tittle, Villemez, and Smith, 1978; Blau and Blau, 1982). The
individual is the focus, and the causative factors of criminal behavior are attributed within the
criminal offender, rather than outside environmental influences. The newest venture in biological
theories of criminality is a rapidly expanding and advancing neuroscience that seeks to explain
the operations of the mind by spelling out the physical functions of brain, and promises to gain a
prominent foothold in informing questions of biological determinants of criminality. However,
before the causal-mechanistic account of misbehavior becomes ascendant, vestiges of dualism
and other scientifically incoherent accounts of human volition must be relegated to the annals of
scientific history.
To what extent the new neuroscience will have bearing on questions of law is the subject
of much debate and discussion (Greene and Cohen, 2004; Morse, 2005; Snead, 2007). Morse
(2005) cautions against “brain overclaim syndrome”, deemed to be an overreliance on the
findings of neuroscience to inform or answer questions of law and criminal responsibility. The
law, Morse claims, is already written and structured in a manner to accommodate and all
discoveries that appear on the neuroscience horizon. Greene and Cohen (2004) admit that one
can make the concession that current legal doctrine is structured to accommodate neuroscientific
4. 3 CONSEQUENTIALISM AND LAW
findings, but that forthcoming neuroscience will ultimately lead to a paradigm shift in our
intuitions about responsibility. This article codifies the sentiments of Greene and Cohen, and
takes the position that the march towards an understanding of the mind as mechanistic brain
activity is inevitable, as captured by the “new neuroscience”. As such, a conceptual paradigm
shift in understanding the mind/brain as a causal, mechanistic system will be accompanied by a
shift in our intuitive conception of the causes of human behavior. This shift will entail that folk
psychological concepts of “free will” and similar cognitive psychological concepts of
“metacognition” or “metacognitive” control will fall by the wayside as logically and
scientifically incoherent accounts of human behavior, replaced by the understanding of humans
as determined systems. Moreover, there are no plausible accounts of free will or so-called
“metacognitive” control that cohere with our scientific or philosophical understanding of the
world around us.
While one can reach an agreement with Morse’s consternations concerning “brain
overclaim syndrome”, the criteria of criminal responsibility as currently written in law makes
ineliminable references to activity instantiated in the brain. Morse (2004) summarizes the
standard of criminal culpability as currently conceived in law: “Criminal law typically defines an
act as an intentional bodily movement performed by an agent whose consciousness is reasonably
intact” [emphasis added]. Morse cautions that it is difficult to imagine how neuroscientific
evidence would be culled from the exact time of the criminal act, (and it seems similarly difficult
to find academicians or philosophers that make such a claim), a nascent neuroscience of
consciousness shows promise in the future of illuminating the proverbial “black box” of the
mind, and this will undoubtedly inform ex ante or ex post evidentialist accounts of a criminal act.
5. 4 CONSEQUENTIALISM AND LAW
Similar questions of the relation of rationality to responsibility will be arbitrated in a similar
manner, with future discoveries and detailed accounts of the neural substrates of rational action.
Morse claims that it is “patently obvious” that behavioral evidence settles questions of agents
acting rationally and consciously, and seems to employ an argumentum ad populum (“few
commentators disagree”) in defense of this assertion (see Morse, 2004, p. 400). However, what it
is in behavioral science that confers a unique status as the criteria for scientific proof of
conscious or rational acts is unclear.
Neuroscience has already made inroads in informing the practice of law. Seiden (2003)
recounts the case of a 40 year-old schoolteacher stricken by an apparently uncontrollable urge to
collect child pornography and make sexual advances towards his stepdaughter. Despite the threat
of incarceration and court ordered Sexaholics Anonymous, the man was unable to curb his
impulses. Before his sentencing, the man complained of severe headaches. Upon examination by
a doctor, he was found to have a tumor that displaced his orbitofrontal lobe, a region of the brain
associated with social decision making (Bechara, 2004). Upon removal of the tumor, the
pedophilic urges subsided, and the man was allowed to return home.
What this case demonstrates is that it is possible to draw a direct line between
neuroscientific evidence and the pronouncements of the legal system. Unfortunately, this very
same case illustrates a not entirely unfounded worry that the imposition of neuroscience in
questions of criminal culpability will result in the absolution of ultimate responsibility. The
concern may be phrased as such; if we are subject to the whims of dysfunctional brains, then we
are not truly the arbiter of our actions, and ultimately not responsible for them. Alternatively, the
concern may be phrased as a question: was it him, or his brain? However tempting this
6. 5 CONSEQUENTIALISM AND LAW
conclusion, it does not necessarily follow from the premise. There is no “I” or “self” that is
independent of the operations of the brain. Damage the brain, alter its chemistry, or allow
orbitofrontal tumors to proliferate unchecked, and anything that we may call the “self” changes
in response.
Those who exonerated the 40-year old man in the case above were correct to draw a
causal connection from the brain tumor to his criminal misbehavior. Where they erred was his
exculpation based on that same fact. He, as a person, was still the agent committing the acts in
question, and absolving this fact may amount to the “brain overclaim syndrome” that Morse
warns against. Still, there is an intuitive sense that criminal punishment for what ultimately
amounts to a medical condition is unfair.
It is at this juncture that a consequentialist model of corrections offers a distinct
advantage over retributivist principles. Consequentialism in correctional practice would justify
punishment based on future beneficial effects, rather than someone getting their “just deserts”. In
the current example, a consequentialist program would see that the 40-year old man be sent to a
forensic psychiatric center, with concerns and provisions for treating his brain tumor, should it
return. In this manner, he is contained or partitioned away from society and those that he may
potentially harm, and still receives the treatment for his tumor that initially was the cause of his
criminality. After treatment, his continued containment at the forensic center for the length of his
sentence would be necessary to ensure that the brain tumor does not return, thereby causing him
to return to criminal behavior once again. Indeed, this was the case; the tumor did return in this
patient, approximately one year later, and he began again his pattern of collecting child
pornography (Seiden, 2003).
7. 6 CONSEQUENTIALISM AND LAW
If the presence of a brain tumor is of some mitigating factor in exacting a retributivist
based punishment of an offender, what then is to be said of offenders absent of such apparently
extenuating circumstances? In the absence of a tumor or some other brain damage, could we then
say that an offender’s “free will” was intact? Pointing to an area of the brain, or some mechanism
within a person, that is free will seems like a hopeless exercise. A more scientifically palatable
case may be made that structures like the orbitofrontal cortex, limbic system, and
neurotransmitters such as vasopressin and oxytocin comprise our circuits that regulate moral and
social behavior (Churchland, 2009). Still, there appears to be no place in these systems for a
primary agent or locus of control that could be reliably called “free will”. The regulation of these
systems and the behavior that they produce are biologically determined, regardless of the
presence or non-presence of tumors or other mitigating factors. The criminal actions of a person
with a brain absent of lesions/tumors/damage are just as determined as a person with such
maladies.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The position taken here is that whatever operative principles are ultimately at work
(determinism, compatibilism, revisionism) in producing human behavior, there exists no
coherent account of free will that places such an agency as the primary mover, or first cause, of
human behavior. It is in this vein that folk and cognitive psychological intuitions about behavior
fail, and by extension, retributivist notions of punishment seem hopelessly incoherent.
Retributivism, as a program of punishment, is grounded in the intuition that the offender is
ultimately the author of any and all criminal action, without or despite duress or outside factors
8. 7 CONSEQUENTIALISM AND LAW
of influence. Neuroscience and accompanying behavioral science have shown that this is not a
coherent picture of human behavior that can be maintained.
The law has already shown a history of evolving in its treatment of offenders. Centuries
ago, misbehavior and criminal dispositions were regarded as the work of demons and
practitioners of black magic, and people were routinely burned at the stake for such imaginary
transgressions. As scientific, legal, and political progress gave way to modernity, systems of
corrections evolved away from torture, most notably with the passage of the Eighth Amendment
of the Bill of Rights in the United States that forbade cruel and unusual punishment. Correctional
practice has shifted in the modern era to one that contains elements of consequentialism, as
evidenced by the absolution of cruel corporal punishment and the presence of rehabilitation
programs present in many correctional systems. Still, the imposition of long prison sentences for
non-violent drug offenders, lack of adequate mental health care in prisons, and continued
practice of the death penalty are definitive markers of a correctional system that has not quite
completely progressed past retributivist urges. A rapidly advancing neuroscience is at the
forefront of overturning centuries-old intuitions about the nature of human behavior, and will
help serve to facilitate the continued paradigm shift in corrections from retribution to a focus on
the future beneficence of society.
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