Challenges of implementation of new technology in governments for developing countries

1. Challenges of implementation of new technology in
governments of developing countries
A look at Implementation of HRMIS in Afghanistan
By: Ahmad Wais Popalyar
HISTORY OF COMPUTING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
SC/STS3561
Professor Dov Lungu
October 26, 14

2.
1
Acronyms:
GIRoA Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service
Commission
USAID United States Agency for International Development
HRMIS Human Resource Management Information System
HRD Human Resource Directorate
ACSS Afghanistan Civil Service Support
CSMD Civil Service Management Department
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoHE Ministry of Higher Education
MoE Ministry of Education
MoEC Ministry of Economy
MAIL Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock
MoLSAMD Ministry of Labour Social Affairs, Martyr and Disabled
PRR Priority Reform and Restructuring
P&G Pay and Grade
BPS Business Process Simplification
RIMU Reform Implementation Management Unit
PMO Project Management Office
PMU Project Management Unit
UID Unique Identification Document
NGO Non Governmental Organization
RFP Request for Proposal
ICT Information and Communication Technology

3.
2
This paper broadly deals with the common challenges involved in the use of
new technology in Afghanistan (Appendix 1)
and by extension in the developing countries
where often a perpetual dependence on foreign aid exists. It aims to tackle questions
like how new advanced technologies should be embraced by developing countries to
alleviate cost and business process complexities in governments. The focus of the
paper is the process of implementation of HRMIS by the Independent Administrative
Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)1
of Afghanistan where I worked in
the capacity of the Project Manager for Afghanistan Civil Service Support (ACSS)2
project for Civil Service Management Department (CSMD)3
of IARCSC and Advisor
to Director General of CMSD, for a period of four years (2009 – 2013). During my
tenure at CSMD, one of the areas I was involved in was program development and
implementation of HRMIS project which is embodied under the over arching reform
mandate for the IARCSC and is also reiterated through Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS)4
document. This paper is heavily dependent on my
personal work experience with HRMIS directorate over the years. Some overall project
information is available through the stakeholder websites whose web links are provided
in the bibliography section of the paper.
The HRMIS was designed in response to the need of the civil services of the
country. Status quo before the advent of HRMIS was such that the government policy-
making agencies were finding it exceedingly difficult to design strategies and policies
that would anticipate or answer the growing needs of the country. Since the civil
servant personnel files were stacked in closets which rarely saw day-light with bizarre
inaccuracies and varying degrees of completeness, it was difficult for the planning

4.
3
agencies to differentiate and devise their strategic plans and outline their long term
goals. This was due to lack of knowledge on how many civil servants the government
has at any particular time, the number of males versus females, old versus young,
educational level and training, the graph of growing need of the country and predicting
the future needs. This problem was compounded with the widespread administrative
corruption resulting in what is called as existence of ghost employees. Ghost employee
is a name given to an individual who is employed by several ministries or the same
ministry in different provinces simultaneously and is reaping more than one salary
without presence on the job. This phenomenon has not only had its share of impact on
the budget of the government for the civil services, but on the quality and quantity of
service delivery to the public as well. On the other hand, the filing system of the civil
servants made it cumbersome for the staff to transfer from one department to another
department within the ministry or from one ministry to the other.
The design of the HRMIS project per-se was done in an ad hoc fashion by
stakeholders which included some government civil service ministries and independent
agencies, the international donor community (USAID specifically), civil society
organizations that are interested in reforms in government institutions and IARCSC.
Notable organizations that were involved in the design and implementation of the
project were CSMD, Deloitte LLP and USAID. Since the project was mainly donor
funded, there was a sense of urgency to initiate the project and consume the allocated
fund. This sense of urgency for the implementation of the project from the donor side
resulted in increased costs and little due diligence on project planning.

5.
4
HRMIS along with some other HR reform initiatives, such as Priority Reform
and Restructuring (PRR), Pay and Grade (P&G), Reform Implementation Management
Units (RIMU), Gender directorate and Business Process Simplification (BPS), were
devised to provide a fundamental solution to the status quo described above. The
approach was addressed as a reform package to address the service delivery issues at
the civil services of Afghanistan.
HRMIS was an integral part of this reform package. To rollout HRMIS, the
software had to be developed and localized based on the ground realities and in sync
with the varying needs of the government ministries and independent agencies. The
directorate of HRMIS at CSMD had about eleven civil service staff members who were
not only deficient in number to achieve the desired results for the reform plan but also
did not possess the expertise needed to forward the reform agenda. The ACSS project
allocated funds for the recruitment of staff in all fronts; be it the technologically savvy
national and international experts to local data analysts and service staff. As the project
manager for ACSS at CSMD, I personally was involved in recruitment of close to 70
national and international staff for HRMIS directorate. The ACSS project staff were
contract project staff that was meant to support the implementation of the HRMIS. The
phases of implementation of HRMIS included software development, procurement of
necessary ICT equipment and their installation, data gathering, data entry, data
normalization, filing, transportation of physical files and computer terminals with
access to database to respective ministry or agency and training of HR directorate of
respective ministry in utilization from the HRMIS interface. The data gathering for

6.
5
HRMIS required a certain prior processes that was made possible only after the rollout
of the P&G.
Although the development of software for the HRMIS was not included in the
mandate of IARCSC, this task was embarked upon. The data gathering plan for the
HRMIS started almost simultaneously with the recruitment of the Junior Analysts
whose main task was to go to different ministries, present HRMIS utility to the
ministry staff and collect data through distribution of forms which had a unique ID
called a UID with a digitized employee picture.
The process of HRMIS project rollout was pushing boundaries on five fronts,
which are pointed and discussed below:
1. Needs Analysis of ministries and design of HRMIS software to answer those needs
2. Software development
3. Data gathering, data entry and data normalization
4. Working closely with Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
(MoCIT) to devise solutions to connect line ministries in provinces with the center.
5. Capacity Development
1. From the get-go, the project was too ambitious with an imprecise scope and
plan. The analysis of needs of the ministries and independent government agencies
revealed that although there’s a need for a standard HRMIS system, the functions
necessary for each government organ varied. To reach a one-design fit all solution was
a formidable and time-consuming task that required major shifts into how some
government agencies functioned. It was not only a nightmare of a mission, but it was a
political one too. For example, a medical doctor besides being a professor at the public
university is also the dean of a faculty with administrative tasks and an occasional

7.
6
surgeon at a public hospital. This poses problems as this individual has three
designations under two ministries. To come to a common term between the ministries
and government agencies needed political will that was beyond the control of the
implementing agency i.e. IARCSC and required an overall stakeholder leadership.
2. The development of software for HRMIS was a cumbersome and expensive
task too. After two years of software development and millions of dollars in resource
expenditure, it was finaly decided to change the software engine into an open source
off the shelf software called OrangeHRM5
. The reason being that the older software
used the Microsoft SQL for which the government had to pay exorbitant amounts of
money per year in royalties. This was not a sustainable option for a new and poor
government that required international aid money to survive.
3. The activity of data collection, entry and normalization needed large numbers
of people to do tedious tasks just like the human-computers of olden times. The activity
required a group of “Analysts” to visit ministries where they would hold presentations
to the staff of different departments within the ministry about how to fill in the forms
for the HRMIS. The forms would be distributed and the data would be collected. At the
end of the session each civil servant would stand before a camera and his or her picture
would be collected for later input into the database. At the same time, the personnel
documents pertaining to the individuals who input data into the forms would be
collected for further data retrieval / check. The personnel documents would be later on
placed into a new filing system with the UID as the retrieval key. A copy of these
documents with the new filing system would be transferred back to the ministry for
their perusal should a need arise. Although the data collection part of the project was

8.
7
very expensive in terms of use of resources and time, it was a rather straightforward
task with not much difficulty. However, the process seemed excessive with room for
human error.
4. Access to the stored data from the HR Directorates at ministries, required
dedicated and secured connection to the central database. Initially this was a big
challenge as the Internet access was very limited and there were no infrastructure in
place to connect ministries physically in an intranet. The whole project relied on the
use of Internet that was received through the use of satellite from Hong Kong. This
method of having access to the Internet was both expensive and exclusive. The
provinces did not enjoy connectivity to the World Wide Web as much as the capital
city. It was understood that soon the fiber optic cable would connect all the provinces
and to the world through the neighboring countries. The buy-in and political support
from the ministries for the implementation of HRMIS project at their ministry was not
unequivocal due to this reason.
To resolve the internet problem, the Commission worked closely with MoCIT6
.
Since the data was considered confidential and the Internet security was questionable,
MoCIT assisted the IARCSC to encrypt the transfer of data. In addition, the MoCIT
worked towards development of a switch for the access of Internet to the country
through the new fiber optic cable. This meant that the data from the country would no
longer have to travel through the international Internet cloud before getting from point
A to B within the country which will have a great impact in keeping the security of the
data intact. Although the work towards this project had started long time before this
demand arose, it is yet to be completely achieved in all provinces.

9.
8
5. The introduction of HRMIS to HR Directorates of ministries and independent
government agencies had to be coupled with capacity development work
simultaneously. The HR directorates did not possess the required resources, both
physical and human, to not only put to use the facility of HRMIS but also contribute to
its content and institutionalize it within their organization. To this end, the HRMIS
Directorate through the assistance from the ACSS project helped train and send
temporary staff along with computer terminals and other necessary resources to each
partner ministry. These temporary staff would shadow the HR employees who would
eventually be leading the new development at the ministry.
The advent of HRMIS at ministries meant a fundamental change in terms of
how things worked not only at the HR directorates but the entire institution as the civil
servants now have a transparent record which could be accessed by the authorized
personnel with the click of a few buttons. The strive towards more training and
updating education, attendance, awards and hard work by civil servants, who once
never thought important, guaranteed recognition through promotions and raise in pay
scale.
Change in the HR practices was not welcome by all. The bulk of management
of the change was something that was left to the leadership within the organizations
where HRMIS was implemented. Although IARCSC created the political-will and sold
the agenda of reform to the ministries and agencies, the real owners of the reform had
to be the ministries and agencies themselves. Some ministries managed change much
better than others and the result of the implementation of HRMIS is more vividly

10.
9
noticeable in their day-to-day work. However, those organizations that lagged behind
in the change management feat are still struggling (See Appendix 3).
The lessons from the challenges (See Appendix 2 for a detailed list of Challenges)
, design and
implementation of HRMIS shine a light on how a large project, such as HRMIS, can be
implemented in a developing country that is reliant on donor aid. The multiplicity in
stakeholders and beneficiaries, with vested interests, in such large projects overshadow
the project design scope and resource allocation. It is only natural for the projects to
become a little more than a political instrument and used as leverage for stakeholders to
achieve their desired, most often than not, political results. The donor agency uses the
project to demonstrate work done to those they are answerable to in their own
constituencies; while the implementing agencies may have their latent political and
economic vested interests. All of these can translate into large amounts of wasted
resources and poor quality/quantity of end result.
My contention is that the developing countries should use the new technologies
in unison with the rate of development in other sectors within their country. A vertical
approach in development and/or adapting to new technologies poses many bottlenecks
in both implementation and utilization. The push for the design and implementation of
HRMIS by the donor agency 7
prior to establishment of the fiber-optics cable
throughout the country is a prime example of a vertical approach and capitulating to
donor agency pressure. Based on the experience attained from the implementation of
HRMIS in Afghanistan, it can be argued that the efficiency and effectiveness of such
large scale projects can only manifest, as initially desired, if the design and
implementation of the projects are outsourced to locally available and experienced

11.
10
private sector companies. If local capacity is nonexistent then perhaps a wider capacity
building initiative should precede such projects and initiatives. Should this be the case,
cost of the projects would not outweigh the utility of the projects for the country and
neither would stakeholders be able to use the projects as tools for political leverage.
The coordination and leadership aspects of the projects are the two areas where the
responsible authorized agencies i.e. IARCSC in the case of HRMIS, along with the
reform owners i.e. ministries and government agencies, can undertake with success as
per their mandates.

12.
11
Bibliography8
Civil service management department. 2012 [cited 10/20 2014]. Available from
http://csmd.gov.af/index.php/human-resource-management-information-system-hrmis-
directorate.
This is the HRMIS Directorate page at CSMD, which outlines work progress.
Source is credible because it is an official website of the organization. It does not
mention the name of the Author for the information provided on the site.
Lungu, Dov. “Early computing: Lecture 2,” SC/STS3561 A - History of Computing and
Information Technology, (Toronto, York University, September 17, 2014)
The discussion on “Human Computers” doing tedious tasks is similar to the data
processing task done at HRMIS.
HRMIS, IARCSC. OrangeHRM customization and localization of the database software.
20132014]. Available from https://www.devex.com/projects/tenders/consultancy-
services-for-customizing-the-orange-hrm-according-to-afghanistan-human-resource-
standards-policies-and-procedures--2/135709.
This is the announcement of outsourcing the customization and localization of
OrangeHRM for HRMIS. Source announces RFP’s from across the world. It does not
mention the name of the Author for the information provided on the site.
MoF, Afghanistan. Afghanistan national develpment strategy. 2008 [cited 10/20 2014].
Available from http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/page/afghanistan-national-
development-strategy.
The national strategy that includes reform agendas of the country. The civil
service reform package contains HRMIS as one of the reform initiatives. Source is
credible because it is an official website of the organization. It does not mention the
name of the Author for the information provided on the site.
USAID, Afghanistan. Afghanistan civil service support project (ACSS). in USAID
Afghanistan [database online]. June 2011 [cited 10/20 2014]. Available from
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Fact%20Sheet%20ACSS%20
FINAL%20June%202011.pdf
ACSS described by USAID in their website. Source is credible because it is an
official website of the organization. It does not mention the name of the Author for the
information provided on the site.
World Bank, Afghanistan. Governance and public sector. February 2011 [cited 10/20 2014].
Available from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EX
TSAREGTOPPRISECDEV/0,,contentMDK:20584869~menuPK:496677~pagePK:340
04173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:496671,00.html
World Bank runs the Capacity Building for Results program for the civil
services and spells out the reform progress in the Afghan Government. Source is

13.
12
credible because it is an official website of the organization. It does not mention the
name of the Author for the information provided on the site.
Appendices:
1. Background:
Afghanistan had been through a USSR invasion from the years 1979 to 1989 which gave
way to later civil war where different political factions struggled to gain power until 1995-6.
To bring the chaotic situation to some sort of normalcy, the Taliban rose to power only to
establish a harsh and intolerable government, which suppressed almost all necessary and
otherwise normal life matters. The Taliban government collapsed in 2001 after the retaliatory
action by the United States and its allies in response to the terrorist act of 9/11 2001 in New
York and Washington cities.
All in all, the Afghan people had suffered numerous imposed wars for a period of 23
years before entrance of the international community into the political scene. The
governments were all short lived and did not have the means and the will to bring necessary
reforms to its public administration.
Afghanistan established its new government with the help from the international
community in the latter part of 2001 and started its efforts towards rebuilding of the
institutions of the government. The assistance from the international community paved the
way for a democratic Afghanistan with an opportunity to use the new tested and accepted
governance methods and technologies.
2. Challenges:
Challenges of Implementation of HRMIS Project
Challenge Detail
1 HRMIS Project
Design
Initially the design of the HRMIS project
was too ambitious with little detailed research
conducted. The scope, cost and time factors for
the project were set unrealistically.
2 Needs assessment
for HRMIS program
The initial needs assessment showed an
urgent need for HRMIS; however, the needs of

14.
13
development different organization varied. HRMIS had to be
designed as one solution for all. This was
achieved by the inclusion of capability to hide
and activate functions in the user interface.
3 Software
Development and
buy-in from
stakeholders
Software development, although not in the
mandate of IARCSC, was carried out. The
inclusion of stakeholders and their support has
been a key problem that took over two years
from the life of the project. Eventually the efforts
towards building of the HRMIS software were
discarded and a new off the shelf HRM software
was adopted.
4 Scope
Management for the
Project
The scope of the project increased with the
increase in the demand from HRMIS. For
example, the advent of biometric attendance and
its automatic feed to HRMIS database, changes
in the connectivity of the line ministries to
HRMIS, access levels to data retrieval etc. all
changed with the life of the project, which of
course is a nightmare for the project.
5 Data gathering
from across the
country
The cost determined at the design of the
project for the data gathering from provinces was
too meager. The travel costs of staff to provinces
and their stay for a period of time was a
challenge that required changes into the cost
budget of the project.
6 Creating a sense of
urgency for
implementation and
use of HRMIS at the
HR directorates of
ministries and
independent agencies
Both IARCSC and implementing agency had
to manage change at the organization level.
7 Connection of
central ministries
with line ministries at
the subnational
(provincial) level
Throughout the life of the project, there has
been parallel development in the internet
technology and country’s capacity which has had
its impact on how HRMIS was used
8 Outsourcing
challenges
The outsourcing of the HRMIS software
development would have cost much less than the

15.
14
embarkment to its in-house development by
IARCSC. The later outsourcing of the change of
software to OrangeHRM and its customization
and localization also proved difficult and costly
due to lack of local expertise.
9 Interference in
lines of action and
mandate by ministries
The problem of software development, possession
of central data center and HRMIS software
versus Afghanistan Financial Management
Information Systems (AFMIS) was a source of
problem among MoCIT, IARCSC and MoF
10 Ad hoc approaches
in adapting new
technology
The ministries that adopted HRMIS only had access
to files of central personnel and not the
subnational personal. The data gathering for
subnational personnel was carried out later on
during the project with much difficulty.
11 Remuneration
imbalance between
project staff versus
civil servants
There’s always been a lack of cooperation between
the project staff versus the civil servants due to
the pronounced imbalance in the remuneration.
12 Flow of aid money
and time bound
projects
Since HRMIS project depended on Aid money
heavily, the disturbances in the flow of aid as a
result of its use as political leverage have been a
major issue.
3. Difference of HRMIS success at ministries and agencies:
Reasons behind such difference in attitude and eventual success at the level of
ministries and agencies can be concluded in the following points:
1. The organizations that were pioneers in HRMIS implementation had the initial
version of the HRMIS database installed which did not meet all the organization needs. This
led to dissatisfaction and reversion to old ways of dealing with personnel files for resolving
problems.
2. The organizations whose structures were too complex and the new reform was
lagging behind i.e. PRR and the later P&G. Therefore the way was not paved for the
implementation of HRMIS.
3. The organizations which had devised an ad hoc MIS for themselves due to the
increasing need or as a result of the advanced leadership of the organ too found the advent of
the centralized HRMIS problematic since they could have resolved their HR problems in-
house. In addition, HRMIS, at times, lacked the functionality that their in-house MIS had.

16.
15
Endnotes:
1
Please
visit
this
website
for
further
detail
http://iarcsc.gov.af/english/
2
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Industries/US-­‐federal-­‐
government/f9fde8c6a4d87310VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm
3
Please
visit
this
website
for
further
info
http://csmd.gov.af/
4
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/page/afghanistan-­‐national-­‐development-­‐
strategy
5
http://www.orangehrm.com/
6
http://mcit.gov.af/en/page/7082
7
USAID
pushed
the
reform
agenda
through
allocating
exorbitant
amounts
of
money
to
the
government
of
Afghanistan.
This
was
problematic
as
the
infrastructure
for
a
country
wide
HRMIS
implementation
was
not
in
place
and
neither
were
there
local
capacity
available
to
tackle
it’s
needs.
8
The
bibliography
section
does
not
contain
books
because
the
material
used
for
this
essay
come
from
personal
experience,
working
as
the
project
manager
of
ACSS
for
CSMD,
and
project
stakeholder
websites.
The
websites
are
credible
to
the
most
part
as
they
are
official
websites
of
the
international
or
government
organizations.