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A Comprehensive Program for Preventing
and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
June 2000
Reference Number: 2000-20-094
This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review
process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from
this document.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
INSPECTOR GENERAL
for TAX
ADMINISTRATION
June 14, 2000
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER ROSSOTTI
FROM: Pamela J. Gardiner
Deputy Inspector General for Audit
SUBJECT: Final Audit Report - A Comprehensive Program for Preventing
and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
This report presents the results of our review of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS)
program for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses. In summary, we
found that the IRS does not have an effective program for preventing and detecting
computer viruses. We recommended that the Chief Information Officer designate a
senior official to be responsible for managing the IRS virus prevention program and
overseeing its effective implementation. The responsible official needs to focus on
(1) developing effective procedures for keeping anti-virus software current,
(2) establishing controls for ensuring all updates have been successfully accomplished,
(3) creating a system for gathering information for evaluating the program, (4) ensuring
that virus incident reports are prepared, and (5) preparing plans for responding quickly
and effectively to major computer virus outbreaks.
IRS management agreed with our recommendations. Their written response discusses
several corrective actions that will improve the reported conditions. Management's
comments have been incorporated into the report where appropriate, and the full text of
their comments is included as an appendix.
Copies of this report are being sent to the IRS managers who are affected by the report
recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions, or your
staff may call Scott Wilson, Associate Inspector General for Audit (Information Systems
Programs), at (202) 622-8510.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Table of Contents
Executive Summary...................................................................................Page i
Objective and Scope..................................................................................Page 1
Background................................................................................................Page 2
Results.......................................................................................................Page 3
Anti-virus Software Was Not Current and Operating Properly on
Internal Revenue Service Computers .............................................Page 3
The Internal Revenue Service Lacks Data for Measuring the
Effectiveness of Its Virus Protection Activities.................................Page 6
The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have a Formal
Response Capability for Resolving Major Computer Virus
Outbreaks........................................................................................Page 7
Conclusion ............................................................................................…Page 9
Appendix I – Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology .......................Page 10
Appendix II – Major Contributors to This Report ........................................Page 13
Appendix III – Report Distribution List........................................................Page 14
Appendix IV – Management’s Response to the Draft Report.....................Page 15
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page i
Executive Summary
Computer viruses are malicious programs designed to spread unauthorized, visible, and
sometimes destructive functions throughout information systems and networks. The
likelihood of an organization experiencing a computer virus is increasing tremendously,
with newer viruses being more complex and difficult to detect. Statistics on the extent
and impact of viruses within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were not available
because the IRS did not have a system for tracking such data. However, we estimated the
possible annual cost to the IRS of responding to and cleaning up viruses, and the negative
impact on productivity caused by computer down time, could be at least $500,000, and
up to $11.5 million, based on data from industry sources.
The overall objective of this review was to determine if the IRS had an effective program
for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses.
Results
The IRS does not have an effective program for preventing and detecting computer
viruses. As a result, viruses have gone unchecked and undetected. The IRS continued to
spread the Melissa virus almost a year after it was first detected. The Melissa virus
propagates in the form of an e-mail message containing an infected Word document as an
attachment. The following deficiencies occurred as a result of inadequate virus
protection management.
Anti-virus Software Was Not Current and Operating Properly on
Internal Revenue Service Computers
Computers were inadequately protected against viruses. Anti-virus software was either
not operating properly or did not have recent updates on many computers we tested. The
IRS lacked effective procedures for keeping software current and ensuring that updates
were successfully installed. During our January through March 2000 testing, we found
many computers that had not received the updates necessary to detect the Melissa virus.
The Internal Revenue Service Lacks Data for Measuring the
Effectiveness of Its Virus Protection Activities
The IRS did not compile information needed for evaluating trends, problems, and the
overall effectiveness of its virus prevention activities. For example, the IRS did not have
statistics on how often computers became infected with viruses or detected viruses. The
IRS did not track the cost of infections, such as lost productivity and clean-up time, that
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page ii
would be useful in understanding the full magnitude of virus protection and the need for
additional resources. IRS management believed that required virus incident reports were
rarely prepared when infections occurred.
The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have a Formal Response
Capability for Resolving Major Computer Virus Outbreaks
The IRS was not adequately prepared to respond to major computer virus outbreaks. It
did not have a coordinated virus response plan setting forth the procedures and
mechanisms to be put in place, such as how to seek technical assistance or disseminate
alerts throughout the organization. A response team had not been formed.
Summary of Recommendations
We recommended that the Chief Information Officer designate a senior official to be
responsible for managing the IRS virus prevention program and overseeing its effective
implementation. The responsible official needs to focus on (1) developing effective
procedures for keeping anti-virus software current on both networked and portable
notebook computers, (2) establishing controls for ensuring all updates have been
successfully accomplished, (3) creating a system for gathering information for evaluating
the program, (4) ensuring that virus incident reports are prepared, and (5) preparing plans
for responding quickly and effectively to major computer virus outbreaks.
Management's Response: IRS management agreed with our findings and
recommendations and has assigned responsibility for directing and overseeing the
implementation and effectiveness of virus protection efforts to a senior level executive.
Their response details the responsibilities of that executive to include developing
procedures and controls for updating virus software, program evaluation, incident report
preparation, and the formation of an effective response capability to future virus attacks.
Management’s complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix IV.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 1
Objective and Scope
Our overall objective was to determine if the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) had an effective program for
preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses.
To accomplish this objective, we reviewed requirements,
procedures, and guidelines for (1) keeping anti-virus
software current on servers and workstations,
(2) formulating contingency plans for when virus
outbreaks occur, including disseminating warnings and
advice when new viruses are discovered, and
(3) overseeing the virus protection program.
Our work included:
1. Reviewing virus program requirements and guidance
in the Computer Security Act of 1987,1
the Internal
Revenue Manual (IRM), IRS’ Information Systems
Security Procedural Guide, and documents issued by
the Office of Management and Budget, Department
of the Treasury, and National Institute of Standards
and Technology.
2. Reviewing virus program guidance issued by private
sector industry sources.
3. Interviewing officials, management, and staff
responsible for managing and overseeing computer
security, and obtaining national and local virus
program procedures.
4. Reviewing IRS virus communications and computer
virus incident reports.
5. Testing a sample of servers and workstations to
determine whether anti-virus software was properly
operating and contained recent anti-virus software
updates.
Our audit work was performed at the IRS’ National
Office and two area offices belonging to IRS’
1
The Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235
Our objective was to
determine if the IRS had an
effective computer virus
prevention program.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 2
Information Systems (IS) organization between
December 1999 and March 2000, in accordance with
Government Auditing Standards. Details of our audit
objective, scope, and methodology are presented in
Appendix I. Major contributors to this report are listed
in Appendix II.
Background
Computer viruses, malicious programs designed to
spread unauthorized, visible, and sometimes destructive
functions throughout information systems and networks,
pose a serious and increasing threat to computer
systems. The probability of an organization
experiencing a computer virus has approximately
doubled in each of the last four years, according to
ICSA.net, an Internet security assurance services firm.
Along with this growth has been the creation of more
complex viruses that are increasingly difficult to detect.
Some viruses are capable of causing major damage such
as system crashes, corruption of file systems, and
extensive loss of data. However, the most costly aspect
of viruses is not the direct damage they may inflict but
the cost of responding to and cleaning up viruses and the
negative impact on productivity caused by computer
down time. Aside from the dollar impact, organizations
that spread viruses could have their credibility seriously
damaged.
ICSA.net recently reported that viruses were expected to
cost U.S. companies over $2 billion in 1999. It also
recently reported that the Melissa virus, one of the
fastest growing viruses ever detected, cost North
American businesses between an estimated $93 and
$385 million in actual damages during the 1 week
following its release and infected more than 1 million
personal computers in North America. The Melissa
virus propagates in the form of an e-mail message
containing an infected Word document as an attachment.
Statistics on the extent and cost impact of viruses within
the IRS were not available because the IRS did not have
Computer viruses are a
serious threat to computer
systems.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 3
a system in place for tracking such data. However,
based on data from a recent virus survey performed by
ICSA.net, the cost of virus infections to a large
organization similar to the IRS could possibly be at least
$500,000, and up to $11.5 million, annually.
Results
The IRS does not have an effective program for
preventing and detecting computer viruses. Anti-virus
software was not current or operating properly on IRS
computers. The IRS lacked data for monitoring virus
prevention activities. And, the IRS does not have a
formal plan to respond to virus outbreaks.
As a result, viruses can go unchecked and undetected.
For example, the IRS continued to spread the Melissa
virus almost a year after the virus was first discovered.
The deficiencies we found occurred because the IRS did
not centrally direct and oversee virus prevention efforts.
Accountability had not been assigned to an executive or
senior manager. We believe that our recommendations,
in conjunction with the centralization of information
system activities currently underway, should enable
management to more effectively administer virus
prevention and detection efforts.
Anti-virus Software Was Not Current and
Operating Properly on Internal Revenue Service
Computers
Our tests of computers at four major IRS locations found
a significant number of servers and workstations
inadequately protected against computer viruses. The
anti-virus protection on these computers was not
operating properly and not kept current with the latest
updates, making the computers vulnerable to becoming
infected with and spreading viruses. The IRM requires
that computers be properly protected with IRS approved
We found anti-virus protection
deficient on a significant
number of computers tested.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 4
anti-virus software and that the software be kept current
with the latest software updates.
We randomly tested a total of 183 computers consisting
of 52 servers and 131 workstations. Anti-virus
protection on 56 percent of them was inadequate to
guard against viruses. These deficiencies are listed
below. The total of these items represents more than
56 percent because some computers were deficient in
more than 1 category.
• There were 55 computers (30 percent) with outdated
virus scan engines; 87 percent of these 55 outdated
scan engines were incapable of detecting the Melissa
virus.2
The scan engine is the part of the software
application that searches for the presence of viruses.
• There were 49 computers (27 percent) that had not
received updates for detecting new viruses in at least
4 weeks. Industry sources commonly recommend
that updates for detecting new viruses be installed at
least that often. These files provide information to
the scan engine enabling it to detect specific viruses.
• There were 29 computers (16 percent) that did not
have the latest version of the anti-virus software
application.
• There were 19 computers (10 percent) that either did
not have anti-virus software installed or did not have
the software turned on.
• There were 16 computers (9 percent) not using the
virus warning capabilities of their word processing
software.
The IRM contains requirements for updating anti-virus
software. However, it does not specify how often
software should be updated and does not contain formal
procedures for implementing software updates. Without
updates, anti-virus software is not able to detect newly
2
The Melissa virus was discovered on March 26, 1999, and is
considered one of the fastest spreading viruses ever created.
The IRS lacked effective
procedures for ensuring the
successful updating of
anti-virus software.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 5
created viruses. The methods used to update anti-virus
software differed at the two IS area offices we reviewed,
but neither was successful at keeping the software
properly running and sufficiently updated to adequately
guard against viruses.
One IS area office used the automatic update feature of
the anti-virus software, which routinely loads updates
from a specified file location on a specified day and
time. However, we found that the automatic update
settings were incorrect in many of the exceptions we
cited above. The other IS area office updated servers by
using technicians to individually load updates to each of
the servers. That office also used a software program to
install updates simultaneously to large groups of
workstations from a remote computer. However,
problems with the settings and the operation of these
methods were present in many of the exceptions we
cited above.
The IRS also did not have a process for updating
anti-virus software on notebook computers. Such
computers may not be connected to a network and can
not be updated using the procedures described above.
We tested four notebook computers, all of which were
not being updated. Employees indicated that they
received new notebook computers without any
instructions on how to update the anti-virus software.
To properly manage risks, procedures need to be in
place for ensuring that virus protection is implemented
effectively and remains effective over time. The IRS did
not require that spot checks or other methods of
verification be performed to confirm that updates were
being achieved as intended.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 6
The Internal Revenue Service Lacks Data for
Measuring the Effectiveness of Its Virus
Protection Activities
The IRS does not compile information summarizing its
virus detection activity. For example, officials told us
they do not collect statistics on the number of times their
computers have become infected with viruses or have
detected viruses. Without the recording of such
information, the IRS does not have data for evaluating
trends, problems, resource needs, and the overall
effectiveness of its virus detection activities.
The IRM contains one virus-related reporting
requirement. It requires that a Virus Incident Report be
prepared when a virus incident occurs. Some of the key
information captured in this report includes (1) how the
virus was acquired, (2) whether safeguards in place were
adequate, and (3) whether additional safeguards were
needed. These reports could provide a basis for:
• Monitoring the volume of virus activity.
• Identifying weaknesses in IRS virus prevention
activities.
• Formulating corrective actions to strengthen virus
protection.
• Determining whether corrective actions to strengthen
virus protection have a positive effect in reducing
further infection.
For example, several Virus Incident Reports prepared
between April and November 1999 indicated that
workstations became infected because they were not
using the latest virus detection updates, an indication
that the updating process might not be performing
successfully. Outdated virus detection updates was the
second most common deficiency we found in our tests.
IS management told us that no analysis of Virus Incident
Reports was done and that they believed that these
reports were rarely prepared, thereby limiting the
usefulness of the data.
The IRS lacks data for
monitoring the effectiveness
of its virus activity.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 7
The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have a
Formal Response Capability for Resolving
Major Computer Virus Outbreaks
We found that the IRS was not adequately prepared to
respond to major computer virus outbreaks. While the
IRM contains procedures for isolating, identifying,
eradicating, and reporting viruses, it does not address
how other important virus response activities are to be
coordinated and carried out, such as how information on
newly reported viruses is to be disseminated to
management and users. Officials from the IRS National
Office and two IS area offices told us that an emergency
response plan to deal specifically with major virus
outbreaks did not exist. A planned response capability is
needed for reacting quickly when major computer virus
outbreaks occur. Without such formal response
capability, viruses can seriously affect operations and be
costly.
A planned and coordinated virus response capability
generally consists of a designated response team with
the particular skills and broad range of experience
needed to take control of a major virus outbreak. The
team takes responsibility for the overall management
and resolution of the outbreak by having procedures and
mechanisms in place to:
• Determine why the virus is spreading and formulate
the corrective actions needed to stop it.
• Disseminate virus alerts to management and users.
• Alert key agency directors and notify computer
security, information systems, data processing, legal,
public affairs, and law enforcement officials.
• Obtain technical assistance from vendors and
investigative agencies.
• Deal with media inquiries.
The IRS lacks a formal
response capacity for
responding to major
outbreaks of viruses.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 8
Recommendations
We recommend that:
1. The IRS Chief Information Officer formally assign
to a senior official the responsibility for directing
and overseeing the implementation and effectiveness
of the IRS’ virus prevention efforts.
2. The official responsible for the virus program should
develop and implement IRS-wide procedures
detailing the frequency and steps to be followed for
reliably updating anti-virus software on both
networked and portable notebook computers.
3. The official responsible for the virus program should
establish controls for ensuring all updates have been
successfully accomplished.
4. The official responsible for the virus program should
develop a system for gathering information to help
analyze and monitor the effectiveness of the
program’s virus detection and prevention activities.
5. The official responsible for the virus program should
strengthen procedures for ensuring that employees
comply with the IRM requirements for preparing
Virus Incident Reports.
6. The official responsible for the virus program should
form a virus response team and develop procedures
for the various activities that need to be quickly
coordinated and carried out when major virus
outbreaks occur.
Management's Response: Management assigned
responsibility for directing and overseeing the
implementation and effectiveness of the IRS' virus
prevention efforts to the Director, Telecommunications.
That individual's responsibilities will include:
1. Coordinating with the Program Manager for Tier 3
Operations (personal computers and networks) to
develop and implement procedures for updating anti-
virus software on both networked and portable
notebook computers.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 9
2. Establishing controls for ensuring all updates have
been successfully accomplished.
3. Developing a monitoring system to ensure the
effectiveness of the program’s virus detection and
prevention activities.
4. Strengthening procedures to ensure compliance with
requirements for preparing Virus Incident Reports.
5. Forming a virus response team to effectively respond
to virus attacks.
Conclusion
Effective virus prevention efforts are needed to guard
computer systems against the serious and rapidly
growing threats posed by viruses. The IRS has likely
spent large amounts in responding to virus outbreaks and
can expect to spend much more, unless accountability
for virus prevention and detection is established and
more emphasis is placed on this program.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 10
Appendix I
Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The overall objective was to determine if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had an
effective program for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses. To
accomplish this objective, we:
I. Determined whether the IRS had effective requirements, procedures, and
guidelines for keeping anti-virus software current on its servers and workstations
and for making sure that updates were successfully installed.
A. Reviewed the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), Information Systems Security
Procedural Guide, and the Department of the Treasury Security Manual for
sections related to keeping anti-virus software current and ensuring that such
updates are successfully installed.
B. Reviewed computer security reference material issued by the U.S. General
Accounting Office, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), ICSA.net, and others
to determine their recommended virus prevention policies and practices.
C. Interviewed Information Systems (IS) security management and staff from
two IS area offices, and a security oversight official in the IRS National Office
to determine their procedures for updating anti-virus software on networked,
non-networked, and notebook computers. Obtained copies of their written
instructions and guidelines.
D. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a
security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine how
management ensures that anti-virus updates have been successfully installed
on all workstations and servers. Obtained copies of their written instructions
and guidelines.
E. Determined whether operational reviews found instances in which anti-virus
software was not updated.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 11
F. Tested anti-virus software updating procedures by checking the software on a
sample of servers and workstations at four major sites within two IS area
offices between January and March 2000. We reviewed a total of 183
computers at these four locations by randomly selecting servers and
workstations throughout the office building. We considered a computer to
have inadequate virus protection if (1) it did not have the latest software
version that the IRS was using, (2) its virus detection files had not been
updated in at least four weeks, (3) it did not have anti-virus software installed
or it was not turned on, or (4) the virus warning built into word processing
software was not turned on.
II. Determined whether the IRS had adequate contingency plans for responding to
virus outbreaks/infections, including procedures for disseminating warnings when
new viruses are discovered.
A. Reviewed the IRM, Information Systems Security Procedural Guide, and
Department of the Treasury Security Manual for sections pertaining to virus
contingency plans and the reporting/dissemination of information on newly
discovered viruses.
B. Reviewed OMB and NIST reference materials to determine recommended
practices for virus contingency planning and the reporting/dissemination of
information on new viruses.
C. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a
security oversight official in the IRS National Office about their virus
contingency plans and procedures for reporting/disseminating information on
newly discovered viruses.
D. Obtained copies of communications that had been issued on newly discovered
viruses.
III. Determined how virus prevention activities were managed and overseen.
A. Reviewed the IRM, Information Systems Security Procedural Guide, and
Department of the Treasury Security Manual for sections covering how virus
activities should be managed and monitored, such as those pertaining to
management information, reporting, and operational reviews.
B. Reviewed OMB and NIST reference materials to determine recommended
ways to manage and evaluate virus prevention programs, such as the
collection of data and reports.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 12
C. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a
security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine their roles
and responsibilities in managing and overseeing virus prevention activities
and the organizational chain of command over virus protection activities.
D. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a
security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine how they
manage and oversee virus prevention activities and if they have reports, data,
tables, reviews, or other documentation that were used to oversee and track
virus prevention activities.
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 13
Appendix II
Major Contributors to This Report
Scott Wilson, Associate Inspector General for Audit (Information Systems Programs)
Stephen Mullins, Director
Gerald Horn, Audit Manager
Richard Borst, Senior Auditor
Charles Ekholm, Auditor
Midori Ohno, Auditor
A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and
Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed
Page 14
Appendix III
Report Distribution List
Chief Information Officer IS
Director, Office of Security and Privacy Oversight IS:SPO
Director, Security, Evaluation and Oversight IS:SPO:S
A Comprehensive Program.for Preventingand
DetectingComputerViruses'Is Needed
Appendix IV
Management's Response tothe Draft Report
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Page 15
A Comprehensive Progl'amfor Preventingand
Detecting'computerViruses Is Needed
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Page 16
A Comprehensive Programfor Preventing and
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.....
. .
The responslbilltyfor directingand overseeingIhe implementatiinand i?ffectiiess of
$9 IRS' vlrus preventipne m has e n assigned.tq,the,Director. Tele~mmunications.
will designatethis to a Senior mawierwho wiIl'h2iviiib'it:Sshislherpri'mary
.... ...~ : ~ p ~ ~ i b i Wby Jub 1. m::,, ..... .................. .... . . . . . . . . .
I Ro~ponslbleOfficialsfor Comctlvo..... AcUonn#l........ ...... . . . ....... ....... ...... . . . .
. . . . .... ..... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ... ... . . . . . .
1. Director. Telecommunications
. . . . . .
I ISwllltrack the prosre& of this &+&live actionthrou* a series of weekly meetings.
A ComprehensiveProgramfor Preventingand
Detecting ComputerViruses Is Needed
MANMEMEW RESPONSETO.,D.MFTAUDIT REPORT-A CQMPREHENSIVE
PROGRAMFOR PREVENTINGmepi3ECTINO COMPUTERVIRU3E9 IS NEEDED , ,....... .
The otficlalwspot#&le for th9Vlrus programshoutd devel4:kndi&ent IRS-wide
procedures detailingi.thefreqwcy and steps to befallowed.6rreliably::ypdatlnganti-
. . . .vlrus softwaw on both networjied and portablenotebookcomputers. ::::.: . . . . . . .. . . . . . ."'
... . . . . . . . ._._... . . . .. . , ....... . . . ...... . ..... . .Assesmmentof Cause: . .
. . . . . .. . ..............
The IRSlacksstandah'servi&ide proceduresdetalingthefrii6uency and steps to b6 ....
.::...............,Lblkwedfw rellabfyupdatlnganti-vlrus software on botti:networked and portable............... ......:..:not9Wk.-titers. ..: . .
. . .
. . . . .
.CorrectiveActlon #2 . .
. . . .. . . . . . .
The Program Managerfor ~ i e r3 O@#iitione will, by 31 December2000, develop and
ImplementIRS-wide proceduresdetailirigthe freqency ahd:stepstorb@:followedfor
mllablyupdatlnganti-virus softwareon:M..netwo&edand.p&rtablen'btebwk
computers. fhese procedureswlll be WOrdi&Hed dth the ohaal resp~.nsiblefor the
. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .vlrus,program. :,.,,. ........... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
ImplomentationDateof Co'rrective;Ad[&ri"#Z " ' . . . . .. . . . . . . ....... ......... .... . .. .
Completed .
ResponsibleOfficialsfor CorrectiveActlon#2 . ' .: . I
Chlef Information Officer IS
DeputyChlef InformationOfficer(Operations) IS
' Director. IS Field Operations
. .. . , . . . ....
".(=;MrectiveActlon #2 M5iiitorinijiClm
. . . .. . . . . .
Sameas recommendatiohtn
Page 18 .
A Comprehensive Programfor Preventingand
. DetectingComputerViruses Is Needed
MANA&MENT RESPONSE T Q : ~ ~ T TAUDIT REPORT-A COMPREHENSIV.Ej,.:. . . . .
I: j , , m o ~ ~ e i i i q. . . .. . . . . .P ~ ; ~ M G*ND D ~ E C T W Gm n ~ m. n ~ u s n. IS NEEIXD.....
. 3 . . .
.. . . . .
The offlcbtresponslbleibrthe virus pmgmmshocltd::establishcontmlg.fqrensuring all ...............................updateshave been~ y ~ s f u ! l y. . . . . . . . . accomplished.. . . ...... . . .
. . . .
I . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .Amsesament of Cause ....
. . . ......a . . . . . . .. ....
IRS h& standard servldewide'controlsfor ...$*uring:$lli&pdates. . . . . . to virus protection
. . . . ..... . . . . . .softw@t:trave been accomplish##, . ... . ........ . . . . . . . . ....... . . . ...... . . . . . . .. .
. . . . .corrective Action#3 . . .... .
. .
The o R i l responsiblefor the virus programwiil, by 33 Mardh 2001. establishmntrois .
for ensuring........all,,updateshave beensu,ccessfullyaccomplished.
. . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ........ ............ . . . . . . . . . . .. . .ImplementationDate of Corrective Action #3
. . . . .. . . . . . . .....
......i:::.::'i.';; :' Completed
31 March 200'l
I ResponsibleOfticlals for Corrective Actlon#3
chief I n m t i o n ~ i i j e r 'is
.DepulyChief InformationOfficer(Operations) IS
Director. Telecornmunlcations
Comotlve Action #3.ManlbdiiqPlan ...................... . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . .. .
@rn.*recommendation*I...::........
Page 19
A Comprehensive P.rograrnfor .Preventingand
DetectingComputerViruses Is Needed
I MANAGEMENT RESPONSETODRAFTAUDIT REPORT-A COMPREHENSIVE
PROGRAM FOR PREVENTINGAND DETECTING COMPUTERV1RUSES IS NEEDED I
megfRd@tresponglblefor the virus programshoulddevelopa system for gathering
Intarmrttlonto helpanalyze and monitor the effeCbivenessof the program's virus
.........
IRS lacksa standardservlce-widesystem for gathering infomktionto analyzeand : ...
monitor the'affsciivene~.of:viy,s,pe,e@onand peention....... activities.
.... . . . . ... I. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................
The official responsible for the viniii' pi&jfa'm wilt, by.1'~une20ilil,'d~velopa system for.'::'
gathering Informationto help analyzeand.manitorthe effectivenessof the program's , .,. ........... .
vkw detection and preventionactivities.
. . . .
, iiiipkmentatlori.iQate. . of CorrectiveAction'+ ' "
ICompleted Proposed
1June 2001
. .
. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .Cortsctive AGtlon#4 ~onltorl'n~:i~l#: ,, . . . ........ .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . .. .
. . . . . . . . . . . ..... . ., . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .Same as raGmkndation#1' ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .. . . .
Page 20
A Comprehensive.Program for Preventingand
DetectlngComputerVlruses Is Needed
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO DRAFTAUDIT REPORT-A COMPREHENSIVE
PROORAMFOR PREVENTINGAND DETECnNGCOMPUTER VIRUSES IS NEEDED
. . . . . .
. .... ......... R.commendatlon #5 ": . . . . . . .
.............. . . . . . . . .....................The oYl#9ri,f.'' "
esm;ible k r the virus programshould strengthen procedures for ensuring. . . . . .that
qomply with the IRM requirementsfor prepari"'Vir,m IncidentReports......... . . ..... . . ...............................
"' ::Assmsmentof Cause. .. . . . .. . ..
. . . ....
. . . . .
...:IRS needsto strengthenproceduresfor e n i 8 i g that employees,cg~plywlh'the IRM . '
requirements for prepermgVirus -l!eident Reports. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. .
.......
. CorreetlveActlon .':
...
m.offldatresponsible fat the v i r ~ s ' . : ~ r a r nwill. 6y 31 D w m b e r 201)01,Strengthen
pmctdunsfor ensuringthat employ~~..mmply....... with the IRM'requirementsfor preparing
' ' Wrus Incident Reports. . .
. .
. . . .............. ......... . .
. . . . . .:. : irn$i&iiita~.c~n!Dateof CorrecttveActlon +5....... . . . . .
........ . . . . . ..... ............. .......................... .......... . . .. . . . . . . .
Chlef Information0ffiWr;lS :.: i:': . . .. . . . . . . .
Deputy Chid Informatbt$iOfficer~6perations)'jS.' '
, h d w .Telecornmunt~tins , ,, , . . . . . . ................
Corrective Actlon #S Monkorjnq.pi&
...........
Page 21
A.ComprehensiveProgramfor Preventingand
DetectingComputer Viruses IsNeeded
.......
... ....
MANAeEMENTRESPONSETO DRAFT'AUDIT REPORT-A C~PREHENSIVE
PROGRAM FOR P-NTING AND DETECTINGCOMPUTERVIRUSES IS NEEDED
he offk&l.responslbletor the virus p r & ~ . a ~ ~ t iform a . $ ~wpanse teakAia. ...
:::.:,-rried out when 'maj@:vlrusoutbre~&soccur.
.... . . . .
I
.... . . .... . . . ......~iseiomentof Cause " " ... ................. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . .......... . . . .
IRS Idcke.;a.:r;sntratvirus res&nse team with service-wlde responsiblll~and authority,,,,,,
alongwfth prWdUWs requiredfor'thevartou.s,,adlvltlesthat'need to be W l n a t e d aria:.:: .:
carriedout when majorvjk~s.outbreaks occur. . :............ ..:..... ........... . . . . . . . ...... ...... ....
The responsible for thd.hiusprogramwill, by.31'December2000, form a v l w
responseteamwith seiyice-wkle:authority &:develop procedurestor fheva~ous
acttvttles:that.needtobe wordhat@ and carrledout when majorvirus outbreaks occur....... . .... . . . . .
Completed
I. ~i&orsed
31 December2000
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .............. . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . lnrormatjonOffi&::j$ .. . .. ............
. . . .......... ...DeputyChief Informaitii5n.~1cer(Operations)IS ' " ' y...... . . . . . . ........
' . .&-or. T'eeommunicatibmS. . .
.....,. . . . .. . .. . . .
Corrq@v~.Action#8 ~ o n l t o ~ ~ ~Ptan .: .,
....................... .... . . . . .
...
.Same asternmendation #l.I:...
Page 22

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A comprehensive program for preventing and detecting computer viruses is needed

  • 1. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed June 2000 Reference Number: 2000-20-094 This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.
  • 2. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 INSPECTOR GENERAL for TAX ADMINISTRATION June 14, 2000 MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER ROSSOTTI FROM: Pamela J. Gardiner Deputy Inspector General for Audit SUBJECT: Final Audit Report - A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed This report presents the results of our review of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) program for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses. In summary, we found that the IRS does not have an effective program for preventing and detecting computer viruses. We recommended that the Chief Information Officer designate a senior official to be responsible for managing the IRS virus prevention program and overseeing its effective implementation. The responsible official needs to focus on (1) developing effective procedures for keeping anti-virus software current, (2) establishing controls for ensuring all updates have been successfully accomplished, (3) creating a system for gathering information for evaluating the program, (4) ensuring that virus incident reports are prepared, and (5) preparing plans for responding quickly and effectively to major computer virus outbreaks. IRS management agreed with our recommendations. Their written response discusses several corrective actions that will improve the reported conditions. Management's comments have been incorporated into the report where appropriate, and the full text of their comments is included as an appendix. Copies of this report are being sent to the IRS managers who are affected by the report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions, or your staff may call Scott Wilson, Associate Inspector General for Audit (Information Systems Programs), at (202) 622-8510.
  • 3. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Table of Contents Executive Summary...................................................................................Page i Objective and Scope..................................................................................Page 1 Background................................................................................................Page 2 Results.......................................................................................................Page 3 Anti-virus Software Was Not Current and Operating Properly on Internal Revenue Service Computers .............................................Page 3 The Internal Revenue Service Lacks Data for Measuring the Effectiveness of Its Virus Protection Activities.................................Page 6 The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have a Formal Response Capability for Resolving Major Computer Virus Outbreaks........................................................................................Page 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................…Page 9 Appendix I – Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology .......................Page 10 Appendix II – Major Contributors to This Report ........................................Page 13 Appendix III – Report Distribution List........................................................Page 14 Appendix IV – Management’s Response to the Draft Report.....................Page 15
  • 4. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page i Executive Summary Computer viruses are malicious programs designed to spread unauthorized, visible, and sometimes destructive functions throughout information systems and networks. The likelihood of an organization experiencing a computer virus is increasing tremendously, with newer viruses being more complex and difficult to detect. Statistics on the extent and impact of viruses within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were not available because the IRS did not have a system for tracking such data. However, we estimated the possible annual cost to the IRS of responding to and cleaning up viruses, and the negative impact on productivity caused by computer down time, could be at least $500,000, and up to $11.5 million, based on data from industry sources. The overall objective of this review was to determine if the IRS had an effective program for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses. Results The IRS does not have an effective program for preventing and detecting computer viruses. As a result, viruses have gone unchecked and undetected. The IRS continued to spread the Melissa virus almost a year after it was first detected. The Melissa virus propagates in the form of an e-mail message containing an infected Word document as an attachment. The following deficiencies occurred as a result of inadequate virus protection management. Anti-virus Software Was Not Current and Operating Properly on Internal Revenue Service Computers Computers were inadequately protected against viruses. Anti-virus software was either not operating properly or did not have recent updates on many computers we tested. The IRS lacked effective procedures for keeping software current and ensuring that updates were successfully installed. During our January through March 2000 testing, we found many computers that had not received the updates necessary to detect the Melissa virus. The Internal Revenue Service Lacks Data for Measuring the Effectiveness of Its Virus Protection Activities The IRS did not compile information needed for evaluating trends, problems, and the overall effectiveness of its virus prevention activities. For example, the IRS did not have statistics on how often computers became infected with viruses or detected viruses. The IRS did not track the cost of infections, such as lost productivity and clean-up time, that
  • 5. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page ii would be useful in understanding the full magnitude of virus protection and the need for additional resources. IRS management believed that required virus incident reports were rarely prepared when infections occurred. The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have a Formal Response Capability for Resolving Major Computer Virus Outbreaks The IRS was not adequately prepared to respond to major computer virus outbreaks. It did not have a coordinated virus response plan setting forth the procedures and mechanisms to be put in place, such as how to seek technical assistance or disseminate alerts throughout the organization. A response team had not been formed. Summary of Recommendations We recommended that the Chief Information Officer designate a senior official to be responsible for managing the IRS virus prevention program and overseeing its effective implementation. The responsible official needs to focus on (1) developing effective procedures for keeping anti-virus software current on both networked and portable notebook computers, (2) establishing controls for ensuring all updates have been successfully accomplished, (3) creating a system for gathering information for evaluating the program, (4) ensuring that virus incident reports are prepared, and (5) preparing plans for responding quickly and effectively to major computer virus outbreaks. Management's Response: IRS management agreed with our findings and recommendations and has assigned responsibility for directing and overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of virus protection efforts to a senior level executive. Their response details the responsibilities of that executive to include developing procedures and controls for updating virus software, program evaluation, incident report preparation, and the formation of an effective response capability to future virus attacks. Management’s complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix IV.
  • 6. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 1 Objective and Scope Our overall objective was to determine if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had an effective program for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses. To accomplish this objective, we reviewed requirements, procedures, and guidelines for (1) keeping anti-virus software current on servers and workstations, (2) formulating contingency plans for when virus outbreaks occur, including disseminating warnings and advice when new viruses are discovered, and (3) overseeing the virus protection program. Our work included: 1. Reviewing virus program requirements and guidance in the Computer Security Act of 1987,1 the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), IRS’ Information Systems Security Procedural Guide, and documents issued by the Office of Management and Budget, Department of the Treasury, and National Institute of Standards and Technology. 2. Reviewing virus program guidance issued by private sector industry sources. 3. Interviewing officials, management, and staff responsible for managing and overseeing computer security, and obtaining national and local virus program procedures. 4. Reviewing IRS virus communications and computer virus incident reports. 5. Testing a sample of servers and workstations to determine whether anti-virus software was properly operating and contained recent anti-virus software updates. Our audit work was performed at the IRS’ National Office and two area offices belonging to IRS’ 1 The Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235 Our objective was to determine if the IRS had an effective computer virus prevention program.
  • 7. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 2 Information Systems (IS) organization between December 1999 and March 2000, in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. Details of our audit objective, scope, and methodology are presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to this report are listed in Appendix II. Background Computer viruses, malicious programs designed to spread unauthorized, visible, and sometimes destructive functions throughout information systems and networks, pose a serious and increasing threat to computer systems. The probability of an organization experiencing a computer virus has approximately doubled in each of the last four years, according to ICSA.net, an Internet security assurance services firm. Along with this growth has been the creation of more complex viruses that are increasingly difficult to detect. Some viruses are capable of causing major damage such as system crashes, corruption of file systems, and extensive loss of data. However, the most costly aspect of viruses is not the direct damage they may inflict but the cost of responding to and cleaning up viruses and the negative impact on productivity caused by computer down time. Aside from the dollar impact, organizations that spread viruses could have their credibility seriously damaged. ICSA.net recently reported that viruses were expected to cost U.S. companies over $2 billion in 1999. It also recently reported that the Melissa virus, one of the fastest growing viruses ever detected, cost North American businesses between an estimated $93 and $385 million in actual damages during the 1 week following its release and infected more than 1 million personal computers in North America. The Melissa virus propagates in the form of an e-mail message containing an infected Word document as an attachment. Statistics on the extent and cost impact of viruses within the IRS were not available because the IRS did not have Computer viruses are a serious threat to computer systems.
  • 8. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 3 a system in place for tracking such data. However, based on data from a recent virus survey performed by ICSA.net, the cost of virus infections to a large organization similar to the IRS could possibly be at least $500,000, and up to $11.5 million, annually. Results The IRS does not have an effective program for preventing and detecting computer viruses. Anti-virus software was not current or operating properly on IRS computers. The IRS lacked data for monitoring virus prevention activities. And, the IRS does not have a formal plan to respond to virus outbreaks. As a result, viruses can go unchecked and undetected. For example, the IRS continued to spread the Melissa virus almost a year after the virus was first discovered. The deficiencies we found occurred because the IRS did not centrally direct and oversee virus prevention efforts. Accountability had not been assigned to an executive or senior manager. We believe that our recommendations, in conjunction with the centralization of information system activities currently underway, should enable management to more effectively administer virus prevention and detection efforts. Anti-virus Software Was Not Current and Operating Properly on Internal Revenue Service Computers Our tests of computers at four major IRS locations found a significant number of servers and workstations inadequately protected against computer viruses. The anti-virus protection on these computers was not operating properly and not kept current with the latest updates, making the computers vulnerable to becoming infected with and spreading viruses. The IRM requires that computers be properly protected with IRS approved We found anti-virus protection deficient on a significant number of computers tested.
  • 9. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 4 anti-virus software and that the software be kept current with the latest software updates. We randomly tested a total of 183 computers consisting of 52 servers and 131 workstations. Anti-virus protection on 56 percent of them was inadequate to guard against viruses. These deficiencies are listed below. The total of these items represents more than 56 percent because some computers were deficient in more than 1 category. • There were 55 computers (30 percent) with outdated virus scan engines; 87 percent of these 55 outdated scan engines were incapable of detecting the Melissa virus.2 The scan engine is the part of the software application that searches for the presence of viruses. • There were 49 computers (27 percent) that had not received updates for detecting new viruses in at least 4 weeks. Industry sources commonly recommend that updates for detecting new viruses be installed at least that often. These files provide information to the scan engine enabling it to detect specific viruses. • There were 29 computers (16 percent) that did not have the latest version of the anti-virus software application. • There were 19 computers (10 percent) that either did not have anti-virus software installed or did not have the software turned on. • There were 16 computers (9 percent) not using the virus warning capabilities of their word processing software. The IRM contains requirements for updating anti-virus software. However, it does not specify how often software should be updated and does not contain formal procedures for implementing software updates. Without updates, anti-virus software is not able to detect newly 2 The Melissa virus was discovered on March 26, 1999, and is considered one of the fastest spreading viruses ever created. The IRS lacked effective procedures for ensuring the successful updating of anti-virus software.
  • 10. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 5 created viruses. The methods used to update anti-virus software differed at the two IS area offices we reviewed, but neither was successful at keeping the software properly running and sufficiently updated to adequately guard against viruses. One IS area office used the automatic update feature of the anti-virus software, which routinely loads updates from a specified file location on a specified day and time. However, we found that the automatic update settings were incorrect in many of the exceptions we cited above. The other IS area office updated servers by using technicians to individually load updates to each of the servers. That office also used a software program to install updates simultaneously to large groups of workstations from a remote computer. However, problems with the settings and the operation of these methods were present in many of the exceptions we cited above. The IRS also did not have a process for updating anti-virus software on notebook computers. Such computers may not be connected to a network and can not be updated using the procedures described above. We tested four notebook computers, all of which were not being updated. Employees indicated that they received new notebook computers without any instructions on how to update the anti-virus software. To properly manage risks, procedures need to be in place for ensuring that virus protection is implemented effectively and remains effective over time. The IRS did not require that spot checks or other methods of verification be performed to confirm that updates were being achieved as intended.
  • 11. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 6 The Internal Revenue Service Lacks Data for Measuring the Effectiveness of Its Virus Protection Activities The IRS does not compile information summarizing its virus detection activity. For example, officials told us they do not collect statistics on the number of times their computers have become infected with viruses or have detected viruses. Without the recording of such information, the IRS does not have data for evaluating trends, problems, resource needs, and the overall effectiveness of its virus detection activities. The IRM contains one virus-related reporting requirement. It requires that a Virus Incident Report be prepared when a virus incident occurs. Some of the key information captured in this report includes (1) how the virus was acquired, (2) whether safeguards in place were adequate, and (3) whether additional safeguards were needed. These reports could provide a basis for: • Monitoring the volume of virus activity. • Identifying weaknesses in IRS virus prevention activities. • Formulating corrective actions to strengthen virus protection. • Determining whether corrective actions to strengthen virus protection have a positive effect in reducing further infection. For example, several Virus Incident Reports prepared between April and November 1999 indicated that workstations became infected because they were not using the latest virus detection updates, an indication that the updating process might not be performing successfully. Outdated virus detection updates was the second most common deficiency we found in our tests. IS management told us that no analysis of Virus Incident Reports was done and that they believed that these reports were rarely prepared, thereby limiting the usefulness of the data. The IRS lacks data for monitoring the effectiveness of its virus activity.
  • 12. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 7 The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Have a Formal Response Capability for Resolving Major Computer Virus Outbreaks We found that the IRS was not adequately prepared to respond to major computer virus outbreaks. While the IRM contains procedures for isolating, identifying, eradicating, and reporting viruses, it does not address how other important virus response activities are to be coordinated and carried out, such as how information on newly reported viruses is to be disseminated to management and users. Officials from the IRS National Office and two IS area offices told us that an emergency response plan to deal specifically with major virus outbreaks did not exist. A planned response capability is needed for reacting quickly when major computer virus outbreaks occur. Without such formal response capability, viruses can seriously affect operations and be costly. A planned and coordinated virus response capability generally consists of a designated response team with the particular skills and broad range of experience needed to take control of a major virus outbreak. The team takes responsibility for the overall management and resolution of the outbreak by having procedures and mechanisms in place to: • Determine why the virus is spreading and formulate the corrective actions needed to stop it. • Disseminate virus alerts to management and users. • Alert key agency directors and notify computer security, information systems, data processing, legal, public affairs, and law enforcement officials. • Obtain technical assistance from vendors and investigative agencies. • Deal with media inquiries. The IRS lacks a formal response capacity for responding to major outbreaks of viruses.
  • 13. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 8 Recommendations We recommend that: 1. The IRS Chief Information Officer formally assign to a senior official the responsibility for directing and overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the IRS’ virus prevention efforts. 2. The official responsible for the virus program should develop and implement IRS-wide procedures detailing the frequency and steps to be followed for reliably updating anti-virus software on both networked and portable notebook computers. 3. The official responsible for the virus program should establish controls for ensuring all updates have been successfully accomplished. 4. The official responsible for the virus program should develop a system for gathering information to help analyze and monitor the effectiveness of the program’s virus detection and prevention activities. 5. The official responsible for the virus program should strengthen procedures for ensuring that employees comply with the IRM requirements for preparing Virus Incident Reports. 6. The official responsible for the virus program should form a virus response team and develop procedures for the various activities that need to be quickly coordinated and carried out when major virus outbreaks occur. Management's Response: Management assigned responsibility for directing and overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the IRS' virus prevention efforts to the Director, Telecommunications. That individual's responsibilities will include: 1. Coordinating with the Program Manager for Tier 3 Operations (personal computers and networks) to develop and implement procedures for updating anti- virus software on both networked and portable notebook computers.
  • 14. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 9 2. Establishing controls for ensuring all updates have been successfully accomplished. 3. Developing a monitoring system to ensure the effectiveness of the program’s virus detection and prevention activities. 4. Strengthening procedures to ensure compliance with requirements for preparing Virus Incident Reports. 5. Forming a virus response team to effectively respond to virus attacks. Conclusion Effective virus prevention efforts are needed to guard computer systems against the serious and rapidly growing threats posed by viruses. The IRS has likely spent large amounts in responding to virus outbreaks and can expect to spend much more, unless accountability for virus prevention and detection is established and more emphasis is placed on this program.
  • 15. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 10 Appendix I Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology The overall objective was to determine if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had an effective program for preventing and detecting the spread of computer viruses. To accomplish this objective, we: I. Determined whether the IRS had effective requirements, procedures, and guidelines for keeping anti-virus software current on its servers and workstations and for making sure that updates were successfully installed. A. Reviewed the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), Information Systems Security Procedural Guide, and the Department of the Treasury Security Manual for sections related to keeping anti-virus software current and ensuring that such updates are successfully installed. B. Reviewed computer security reference material issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), ICSA.net, and others to determine their recommended virus prevention policies and practices. C. Interviewed Information Systems (IS) security management and staff from two IS area offices, and a security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine their procedures for updating anti-virus software on networked, non-networked, and notebook computers. Obtained copies of their written instructions and guidelines. D. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine how management ensures that anti-virus updates have been successfully installed on all workstations and servers. Obtained copies of their written instructions and guidelines. E. Determined whether operational reviews found instances in which anti-virus software was not updated.
  • 16. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 11 F. Tested anti-virus software updating procedures by checking the software on a sample of servers and workstations at four major sites within two IS area offices between January and March 2000. We reviewed a total of 183 computers at these four locations by randomly selecting servers and workstations throughout the office building. We considered a computer to have inadequate virus protection if (1) it did not have the latest software version that the IRS was using, (2) its virus detection files had not been updated in at least four weeks, (3) it did not have anti-virus software installed or it was not turned on, or (4) the virus warning built into word processing software was not turned on. II. Determined whether the IRS had adequate contingency plans for responding to virus outbreaks/infections, including procedures for disseminating warnings when new viruses are discovered. A. Reviewed the IRM, Information Systems Security Procedural Guide, and Department of the Treasury Security Manual for sections pertaining to virus contingency plans and the reporting/dissemination of information on newly discovered viruses. B. Reviewed OMB and NIST reference materials to determine recommended practices for virus contingency planning and the reporting/dissemination of information on new viruses. C. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a security oversight official in the IRS National Office about their virus contingency plans and procedures for reporting/disseminating information on newly discovered viruses. D. Obtained copies of communications that had been issued on newly discovered viruses. III. Determined how virus prevention activities were managed and overseen. A. Reviewed the IRM, Information Systems Security Procedural Guide, and Department of the Treasury Security Manual for sections covering how virus activities should be managed and monitored, such as those pertaining to management information, reporting, and operational reviews. B. Reviewed OMB and NIST reference materials to determine recommended ways to manage and evaluate virus prevention programs, such as the collection of data and reports.
  • 17. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 12 C. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine their roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing virus prevention activities and the organizational chain of command over virus protection activities. D. Interviewed IS security management and staff from two IS area offices and a security oversight official in the IRS National Office to determine how they manage and oversee virus prevention activities and if they have reports, data, tables, reviews, or other documentation that were used to oversee and track virus prevention activities.
  • 18. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 13 Appendix II Major Contributors to This Report Scott Wilson, Associate Inspector General for Audit (Information Systems Programs) Stephen Mullins, Director Gerald Horn, Audit Manager Richard Borst, Senior Auditor Charles Ekholm, Auditor Midori Ohno, Auditor
  • 19. A Comprehensive Program for Preventing and Detecting Computer Viruses Is Needed Page 14 Appendix III Report Distribution List Chief Information Officer IS Director, Office of Security and Privacy Oversight IS:SPO Director, Security, Evaluation and Oversight IS:SPO:S
  • 20. A Comprehensive Program.for Preventingand DetectingComputerViruses'Is Needed Appendix IV Management's Response tothe Draft Report . . . . . . . . .. . . . , : i , . . .:.DEPARTMENTOF T ~ ETR%SURY . . . I N T ~ R N A LREVENUE SliRVkek,........ WASHlNGTON. p:C. 20224 . . . . . . ~ a ~ ' 3 0 , 2 0 0 0....COMM<~SI~'NK?,, . . .. . .. . . . .. ..... ..... . ..,. . . . . .. . .... . . . ........ ... . . . . .. . MEMOWDUM FQR.TREASURY INSPE~R'&ENERAL 2.''FORTAX ADMINISTRATIUN- , ...... ..... :..:Charles0.RossottiO M : k, m w .... Commissionerof InttimalRevenue . . . .. . . .. . ...... . .,'SUBJECT: . . . . Responseto Draft~"ditReport:#,Comprehensive ........................................... . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . gramfor Pmvenlng:and Detectin.g~ornputerViruses' : ... . . isNgeded . . . . .. . . .......... . . ...... .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . ....... .. . . . '~h&tc. yap for tho opportunityto c@nrnenton +$!;draft reportrind recommerndations,mnceming,:@fuhqq:w:orkneedaP::bytheInternal Revenue.. , Setvice to establisha comp~F~eriii~~~~rarn &!:;@reventinganddetecting cornputerr'viruses. hreviewimymu~.:d~fi'~eport.W@,.generallyagree with its....... . .. . . . . .....findings and recornmendatlons. ' ' ' '"" ".' . . . .- ........ ............ . . Pmtectingzi$stems:w"rces and recard$from ha& by computer viruses Is a :.., . top priorityfor the IRS:'Wecontinueto Irnpyye our viys prevenllon. detection. '.; and reaction;sa;a(?abiiities. . . . . Since the Melissa virus a"year ago, the IRS ha?pade substantial progress. This "' was demonstratedon May:;!., :2000when we eriwunteredthe destructive LoveBugvirus that affe&Oimqputer systems'throughoutthe world. Even ' 'thoughthe IRS receivedover'8 miHim.virus-b'eannge-tfmiis.. our.staff minimized the &ti'''# on opiiimtionsby standing up a.nationwMecoordination'center; shutting;gqwn sy$temsto conlln the virus, Installingnew softwareto cleanse the virus, aRd'tellingIiI':usersto delete,infectedmessagesand not open " . . . . atlachments. Other factorsthat WziblW::aS to be siccessfulwere earlier iqfrastn+afe initiiti??.~to (1) cpnVert to a single e-mail systemwith a standad configurntion. (2) establishan automated~di.~t,tribution,~pability,and (3) centralize. . and reduce.q??re-al servers from 800 to ?80. . . ..... . . . . Attached are ourcomFfj&r!ts. This letter, attachment, and your draft report are ,<. .designated as oLiMIT@D'OFFICIALUSE"dgcvrnents becauseof the sensitive ..: weaknesses and vulnerebititiesaddressed. itj:#hi'sregar$, they should be. .. . . .. . Page 15
  • 21. A Comprehensive Progl'amfor Preventingand Detecting'computerViruses Is Needed . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . ...... . . . .. . . ....... . . . . . . . .. . 2.::. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ............ .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .... restrictedto cj~l$&Ylcialswith a'"needto know' and sho"fd:nor &,eleased I:::::...... .. . . . ......pkblldy. . . . ..... ..... . . . . . . If $ 6 ~have any q$&~oys, please contactToni~irnrnerman.~ e p u t y * ~ ~ (Operations),at 26842Et?260or have% member:ofyour staff contact Al Whitlay, Director, T d ~ r n u n i c a t b t 3 sat 202-2890990.. . . . .. . ............. ....... ........... Attaehmam ..................... ..... ........... .................... . . ........... . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. . ........... . . . . . .. . . . . ...... . . ......... . . . .. . .......... . . . .. . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . ..... . . . . . ., ,. ...... . . . . . . . . .. . . . Page 16
  • 22. A Comprehensive Programfor Preventing and DetectingComputerViruses Is.Needed .... . . .... ..... .. MANAQEMENT RESPONSETO D'MAUDW &PORT -A CO&~REHENS~E.......... .. HUOGRAM.FORPREVENTINGAND DETECTINGCOMPUTER VIRUSES IS NEWER....... ... .... . . . . . . . . . .. . . ...Rkommendation #l :: . . . . .. . . . . . T h s . 1 ~ ~Chlef lnfoiwtion 0fkr forrn+l~,.assign,to a &&*t:afficIal. tha:,esponsibility- for dlmctingand overseeing the implernt3ntationand effectivMW of the::IRS'virus .....' ' ,' p r e ~ & ~ l i o ~efforts. . ................ ............ . . . . . . ...... ......... .... . . . .......Assessment ofCause .......... . .. . . ............... . . .IS need; td make a sb&r offFiajilii IS ~ ~ & & ~ n sresponsiblefor d'licting and . ' overseeingthe implementationand:eQfectiieneeof the IRSvirus piif$yenti&.&Jfo*,, . . .. . . . . . .. . ..... . . The responslbilltyfor directingand overseeingIhe implementatiinand i?ffectiiess of $9 IRS' vlrus preventipne m has e n assigned.tq,the,Director. Tele~mmunications. will designatethis to a Senior mawierwho wiIl'h2iviiib'it:Sshislherpri'mary .... ...~ : ~ p ~ ~ i b i Wby Jub 1. m::,, ..... .................. .... . . . . . . . . . I Ro~ponslbleOfficialsfor Comctlvo..... AcUonn#l........ ...... . . . ....... ....... ...... . . . . . . . . .... ..... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . 1. Director. Telecommunications . . . . . . I ISwllltrack the prosre& of this &+&live actionthrou* a series of weekly meetings.
  • 23. A ComprehensiveProgramfor Preventingand Detecting ComputerViruses Is Needed MANMEMEW RESPONSETO.,D.MFTAUDIT REPORT-A CQMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMFOR PREVENTINGmepi3ECTINO COMPUTERVIRU3E9 IS NEEDED , ,....... . The otficlalwspot#&le for th9Vlrus programshoutd devel4:kndi&ent IRS-wide procedures detailingi.thefreqwcy and steps to befallowed.6rreliably::ypdatlnganti- . . . .vlrus softwaw on both networjied and portablenotebookcomputers. ::::.: . . . . . . .. . . . . . ."' ... . . . . . . . ._._... . . . .. . , ....... . . . ...... . ..... . .Assesmmentof Cause: . . . . . . . .. . .............. The IRSlacksstandah'servi&ide proceduresdetalingthefrii6uency and steps to b6 .... .::...............,Lblkwedfw rellabfyupdatlnganti-vlrus software on botti:networked and portable............... ......:..:not9Wk.-titers. ..: . . . . . . . . . . .CorrectiveActlon #2 . . . . . .. . . . . . . The Program Managerfor ~ i e r3 O@#iitione will, by 31 December2000, develop and ImplementIRS-wide proceduresdetailirigthe freqency ahd:stepstorb@:followedfor mllablyupdatlnganti-virus softwareon:M..netwo&edand.p&rtablen'btebwk computers. fhese procedureswlll be WOrdi&Hed dth the ohaal resp~.nsiblefor the . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .vlrus,program. :,.,,. ........... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ImplomentationDateof Co'rrective;Ad[&ri"#Z " ' . . . . .. . . . . . . ....... ......... .... . .. . Completed . ResponsibleOfficialsfor CorrectiveActlon#2 . ' .: . I Chlef Information Officer IS DeputyChlef InformationOfficer(Operations) IS ' Director. IS Field Operations . .. . , . . . .... ".(=;MrectiveActlon #2 M5iiitorinijiClm . . . .. . . . . . Sameas recommendatiohtn Page 18 .
  • 24. A Comprehensive Programfor Preventingand . DetectingComputerViruses Is Needed MANA&MENT RESPONSE T Q : ~ ~ T TAUDIT REPORT-A COMPREHENSIV.Ej,.:. . . . . I: j , , m o ~ ~ e i i i q. . . .. . . . . .P ~ ; ~ M G*ND D ~ E C T W Gm n ~ m. n ~ u s n. IS NEEIXD..... . 3 . . . .. . . . . The offlcbtresponslbleibrthe virus pmgmmshocltd::establishcontmlg.fqrensuring all ...............................updateshave been~ y ~ s f u ! l y. . . . . . . . . accomplished.. . . ...... . . . . . . . I . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .Amsesament of Cause .... . . . ......a . . . . . . .. .... IRS h& standard servldewide'controlsfor ...$*uring:$lli&pdates. . . . . . to virus protection . . . . ..... . . . . . .softw@t:trave been accomplish##, . ... . ........ . . . . . . . . ....... . . . ...... . . . . . . .. . . . . . .corrective Action#3 . . .... . . . The o R i l responsiblefor the virus programwiil, by 33 Mardh 2001. establishmntrois . for ensuring........all,,updateshave beensu,ccessfullyaccomplished. . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ........ ............ . . . . . . . . . . .. . .ImplementationDate of Corrective Action #3 . . . . .. . . . . . . ..... ......i:::.::'i.';; :' Completed 31 March 200'l I ResponsibleOfticlals for Corrective Actlon#3 chief I n m t i o n ~ i i j e r 'is .DepulyChief InformationOfficer(Operations) IS Director. Telecornmunlcations Comotlve Action #3.ManlbdiiqPlan ...................... . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . .. . @rn.*recommendation*I...::........ Page 19
  • 25. A Comprehensive P.rograrnfor .Preventingand DetectingComputerViruses Is Needed I MANAGEMENT RESPONSETODRAFTAUDIT REPORT-A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR PREVENTINGAND DETECTING COMPUTERV1RUSES IS NEEDED I megfRd@tresponglblefor the virus programshoulddevelopa system for gathering Intarmrttlonto helpanalyze and monitor the effeCbivenessof the program's virus ......... IRS lacksa standardservlce-widesystem for gathering infomktionto analyzeand : ... monitor the'affsciivene~.of:viy,s,pe,e@onand peention....... activities. .... . . . . ... I. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... The official responsible for the viniii' pi&jfa'm wilt, by.1'~une20ilil,'d~velopa system for.'::' gathering Informationto help analyzeand.manitorthe effectivenessof the program's , .,. ........... . vkw detection and preventionactivities. . . . . , iiiipkmentatlori.iQate. . of CorrectiveAction'+ ' " ICompleted Proposed 1June 2001 . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .Cortsctive AGtlon#4 ~onltorl'n~:i~l#: ,, . . . ........ .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . ., . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .Same as raGmkndation#1' ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . Page 20
  • 26. A Comprehensive.Program for Preventingand DetectlngComputerVlruses Is Needed MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO DRAFTAUDIT REPORT-A COMPREHENSIVE PROORAMFOR PREVENTINGAND DETECnNGCOMPUTER VIRUSES IS NEEDED . . . . . . . .... ......... R.commendatlon #5 ": . . . . . . . .............. . . . . . . . .....................The oYl#9ri,f.'' " esm;ible k r the virus programshould strengthen procedures for ensuring. . . . . .that qomply with the IRM requirementsfor prepari"'Vir,m IncidentReports......... . . ..... . . ............................... "' ::Assmsmentof Cause. .. . . . .. . .. . . . .... . . . . . ...:IRS needsto strengthenproceduresfor e n i 8 i g that employees,cg~plywlh'the IRM . ' requirements for prepermgVirus -l!eident Reports. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . ....... . CorreetlveActlon .': ... m.offldatresponsible fat the v i r ~ s ' . : ~ r a r nwill. 6y 31 D w m b e r 201)01,Strengthen pmctdunsfor ensuringthat employ~~..mmply....... with the IRM'requirementsfor preparing ' ' Wrus Incident Reports. . . . . . . . .............. ......... . . . . . . . .:. : irn$i&iiita~.c~n!Dateof CorrecttveActlon +5....... . . . . . ........ . . . . . ..... ............. .......................... .......... . . .. . . . . . . . Chlef Information0ffiWr;lS :.: i:': . . .. . . . . . . . Deputy Chid Informatbt$iOfficer~6perations)'jS.' ' , h d w .Telecornmunt~tins , ,, , . . . . . . ................ Corrective Actlon #S Monkorjnq.pi& ........... Page 21
  • 27. A.ComprehensiveProgramfor Preventingand DetectingComputer Viruses IsNeeded ....... ... .... MANAeEMENTRESPONSETO DRAFT'AUDIT REPORT-A C~PREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR P-NTING AND DETECTINGCOMPUTERVIRUSES IS NEEDED he offk&l.responslbletor the virus p r & ~ . a ~ ~ t iform a . $ ~wpanse teakAia. ... :::.:,-rried out when 'maj@:vlrusoutbre~&soccur. .... . . . . I .... . . .... . . . ......~iseiomentof Cause " " ... ................. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . .......... . . . . IRS Idcke.;a.:r;sntratvirus res&nse team with service-wlde responsiblll~and authority,,,,,, alongwfth prWdUWs requiredfor'thevartou.s,,adlvltlesthat'need to be W l n a t e d aria:.:: .: carriedout when majorvjk~s.outbreaks occur. . :............ ..:..... ........... . . . . . . . ...... ...... .... The responsible for thd.hiusprogramwill, by.31'December2000, form a v l w responseteamwith seiyice-wkle:authority &:develop procedurestor fheva~ous acttvttles:that.needtobe wordhat@ and carrledout when majorvirus outbreaks occur....... . .... . . . . . Completed I. ~i&orsed 31 December2000 . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .............. . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . lnrormatjonOffi&::j$ .. . .. ............ . . . .......... ...DeputyChief Informaitii5n.~1cer(Operations)IS ' " ' y...... . . . . . . ........ ' . .&-or. T'eeommunicatibmS. . . .....,. . . . .. . .. . . . Corrq@v~.Action#8 ~ o n l t o ~ ~ ~Ptan .: ., ....................... .... . . . . . ... .Same asternmendation #l.I:... Page 22