2023 Leonen bar materials in all subjects

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Constitutional Law 2
Public International Law 28
Labor Law 30
Taxation Law 47
Criminal Law 67
Civil Law 96
Commercial Law 157
Remedial Law 174
Ethics 251
Practical Exercises 266
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Basic Principles of Political Law
Sovereignty
State Immunity
Delegation of Powers
Fundamental Powers of the State
2. Bill of Rights
Due Process
Equal Protection
Freedom of Expression
Rights During Expropriation
Searches and Seizure
3. Composition and Powers of the Government Organs
4. Judicial Review
5. Supervision of Courts
6. Powers of the Supreme Court
7. Quali ications, Disquali ications, and Selection
8. Immunity and Privileges
9. Structure of Government
Composition
Functions
Powers and Privileges
Separation of Powers
System of Checks and Balances
10. Process of Legislation
11. Nationalization Principle
12. Amendments and Revisions
1. Basic Principles of Political Law
Sovereignty
The people can directly exercise their sovereign authority through the
following modes, namely:
1) Elections. — the people choose the representatives to whom
they will entrust the exercise of powers of government.
2) Plebiscite. — the people ratify any amendment to or revision
of the Constitution and may introduce amendments to the
constitution.
3) Initiative. — legal process whereby the registered voters of an
LGU may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance
through an election called for the purpose.
4) Recall. — a method of removing a local of icial from of ice
before the expiration of his term because of loss of con idence.
5) Referendum. — the people can approve or reject a law or an
issue of national importance.
Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Arroyo, supra
While Art. II, §1 of the Constitution says that "sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from
them," it also says that "the Philippines is a democratic and
republican state."
This means that ours is a representative democracy — as
distinguished from a direct democracy — in which the sovereign
will of the people is expressed through the ballot, whether in an
election, referendum, initiative, recall or plebiscite. Any exercise of
the powers of sovereignty in any other way is unconstitutional.
What took place at EDSA from January 16 to 20, 2001 was not a
revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative
fact which enabled VP Arroyo to assume the presidency was the fact
that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the executive leadership
which made the government rife for seizure by lawless elements. The
presidency was up for grabs, and it was imperative that the rule of
succession in the Constitution be enforced.
Based on the Pre-Week Notes and Shortened Bar Syllabus By RGL 2 of 268

State Immunity
1) Where a suit is iled NOT against the government itself or its
of icials but against one of its entities, it must be ascertained
whether or not the State has given its consent to be sued.
2) This ascertainment will depend in the irst instance on WON
the agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated.
3) An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it
with a separate juridical personality. The test of suability lies
in its charter — It is suable if its charter says so; regardless of
the nature of the functions it is performing.
4) Unincorporated agencies have no separate juridical
personality as they are merged in the general machinery of the
government.
a) A suit against it is necessarily against the State.
b) Suability then depends on the nature of the function it
is performing either governmental or proprietary.
5) Suability vs. Liability. — Waiver of immunity by the State
does not mean concession of its liability.
a) Suability is the result of the express or implied
consent of the State to be sued.
b) Liability is determined after hearing on the basis of
relevant laws and established facts.
Arigo v. Swift 2014 En Banc
The rule is that if the judgment against such of icials will require the
state itself to perform an af irmative act to satisfy the same, such
as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
Under the restrictive rule of state immunity, state immunity
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public of icial is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their of icial capacity as
commanding of icers of the US Navy. The suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity thus applies.
Philippine Textile Research Institute v. CA 2019
The State may be sued with its consent. The State's consent to be
sued may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be made through a general law or a special law. The general law
waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
where the Philippine government 'consents and submits to be sued
upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.
PTRI entered into a Contract of Works with B.A. Ramirez. PTRI is
being sued upon a claim involving liability arising from a contract.
Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from suit
inds application.
Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be
subjected to suit when the State enters into a contract. However,
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity.
Delegation of Powers
1) The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or
as expressed in a Latin maxim—potestas delegata non
delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are
delegation:
a) Of tariff powers to the President under Sec 28(2) Art VI;
b) Of emergency powers to the President under Sec 23(2)
Art VI;
c) To the people at large;
d) To local governments; and
e) To administrative bodies.
2) In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the
law
a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and
b) ixes a standard — the limits of which are suf iciently
determinate and determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
3) A suf icient standard is one which de ines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and speci ies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected.
⭐Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III 2019 En Banc Leonen, J
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate
legislation is that
1) the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; and
2) that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
The Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to ix the
contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts for the
monthly salary credits. It is within the scope of the Social Security
Commission's power to ix them, as clearly laid out in the law.
Fundamental Powers of the State
Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation
Regulates Both liberty
and property
Only property rights
Exercised by Government Government and
private entities
Government
Property taken Destroyed
because it is
noxious
Intended for public use or
purpose and is therefore
wholesome
Compensation Intangible
altruistic
feeling that he
has
A full and fair equivalent of the
property expropriated or
protection and public
improvements for the taxes paid

contributed to
the general
welfare
Police Power
1) Power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
2) In a positive sense, it is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.
In negative terms, it is that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Agustin v. Edu)
3) The most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does “to all the great public needs.”
4) May not be bargained away through the medium of contract or
even a treaty. The impairment clause must yield to the police
power whenever the contract deals with a subject affecting the
public welfare.
5) May sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for
the attainment of a legitimate police objective.
6) Power of eminent domain could also be used as an implement.
7) When the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare. (Carlos Superdrug v.
DSWD)
8) Both ends and means must be legitimate. Otherwise, the
police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights.
9) There should be reasonable relation between the means
and the end.
10) The SC has invariably applied certain standards for judicial
review:
Strict scrutiny
Laws dealing with the freedom of the mind
or restricting the political process.
Rational basis
standard
Review of economic legislation
Heightened or
immediate scrutiny
Evaluating classi ications based on gender
and legitimacy
Overbreadth
doctrine
A statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights
Void-for-vagueness
doctrine
A penal statute encroaches upon the freedom
of speech.
11) In ine, the means employed for the accomplishment of the
police objective must pass the test of reasonableness and,
speci ically, conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of
Rights for the protection of private rights.
Evasco, Jr. v. Montañez 2018
Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and
installation of building and other structures such as billboards
within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. This direct and
speci ic grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in
another law of general application, in this case the National Building
Code.
Even if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements
as to the construction and regulation of billboards, the city
government may impose stricter limitations because its police
power to do so originates from its charter and not from the
National Building Code.
City of Cagayan De Oro v. Cagayan Electric Power & Light 2018
The purpose of an imposition will determine its nature as either a tax
or a fee. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least
one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly
classi ied as an exercise of the power to tax. On the other hand, if the
purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed an exercise of
police power in the form of a fee, even though revenue is
incidentally generated. In other words, if generation of revenue is
the primary purpose, the imposition is a tax but, if regulation is
the primary purpose, the imposition is properly categorized as
a regulatory fee.
Eminent Domain
1) De inition, Nature and Function. — Also called the power of
expropriation, it is described as “the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the government” that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method “in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State.”
2) Essential requisites for the exercise by an LGU
a) Enactment of an ordinance, not just a resolution;
b) Must be for a public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
bene it of the poor and the landless;
c) Payment of just compensation; and
d) Exercise must be preceded by a valid and de inite offer
made to the owner, who rejects the same.
3) Conditions precedent to the issuance of a writ of
possession
a) Complaint for expropriation suf icient in form and
substance is iled in the proper court; and
b) Deposit with said court at least 15% of the property’s fair
market value based on its current tax declaration.
City of Manila v. Prieto 2019
Sec 19 of the LGC states that the exercise of such delegated power
should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent laws. R.A. No.
7279 is such pertinent law in this case as it governs the local
expropriation of properties for purposes of urban land reform
and housing.
The case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v.
City of Manila emphatically ruled that the provisions are strict
limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units, especially with respect to:
1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized
housing; and
2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means of
acquiring it.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory.
4) Stages

a) Determination of the validity of the expropriation.
Necessity of an expropriation is a justiciable question.
b) Determination of just compensation.
5) Private Property. — Anything that can come under the
dominion of man, including: (1) real and personal, (2) tangible
and intangible properties. Except money and choses in action.
a) Property already devoted to public use is still subject to
expropriation, provided this is done (1) directly by the
legislature, or (2) under a speci ic grant of authority to
the delegate.
b) Services are considered embraced in the concept of
property.
PNOC Alternative Fuels v. NGCP 2019
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp. held that
when the subject property is classi ied by the government as an
industrial zone, the subject property therein had been declared
patrimonial. Further, it is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR
that the industrial estate is being owned, managed, and operated by
the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in its private
capacity. It is apparent from P.D. No. 949, as amended by R.A. No.
10516, that the Petrochemical Industrial Park is intended and
accordingly devoted by law as a commercial and business venture.
Thus, NGCP has the authority under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511
to expropriate the subject property.
6) Taking. — May include trespass without actual eviction of the
owner, material impairment of the value of the property or
prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was
intended.
a) In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, the imposition of an
easement over a 3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property
could not be legally done without payment of just
compensation.
b) In People v. Fajardo, a municipal ordinance prohibiting
construction of any building that would destroy the view
of the plaza from the highway was considered a taking
under the power of eminent domain.
c) The right-of-way easement, resulting in the restriction or
limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines is also an exercise of expropriation, as
in NPC v. Aguirre-Paderanga.
d) In NPC v. Ileto, the prohibition imposed by the
transmission lines, i.e. construction of any improvements
or planting of any trees that exceed 3 meters within the
aerial right of way, clearly interferes with the
landowners’ right to possess and enjoy their properties.
7) Requisites of Taking in Eminent Domain
a) The expropriator must enter a private property;
b) The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
c) The entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
d) The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
e) The utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
bene icial enjoyment of the property.
National Transmission Corp. v. Sps Taglao 2020
True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of
the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is
not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an
inde inite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof.
NPC v. Sps Aoque citing NPC v. Tiangco held that if the easement is
intended to perpetually or inde initely deprive the owner of his
proprietary rights, then the owner should be compensated for the
monetary equivalent of the land.
In this case, considering that the installation of the power lines
would de initely deprive Spouses Taglao of the normal use of their
property, they are entitled to the payment of a just compensation.
8) Public Use. — Any use directly available to the general public
as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or
accommodation.
MCIAA v. Lozada, et al. 2010 En Banc
We now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be
devoted to the speci ic public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or
not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual
justi ication.
9) Just Compensation. — The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed
or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.
(LBP v. Manzano 2018 Leonen, J)
a) According to De Knecht v. CA, owner refers to all those
who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned,
including a mortgagee, a lessee, and a vendee in
possession under an executory contract.
b) The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's
loss.
c) The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the
time of the taking until just compensation is actually
paid to him. To be just, the compensation must not only be
the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a
reasonable time from the time the land is taken from the
owner. (Apo Fruits v. LBP 2010 En Banc)
City Government of Valenzuela v. Sps Abacan 2019
In Meralco v. Pineda, the Court held that where the issue is
determining the amount of just compensation in an expropriation
suit, a trial before the commissioners is indispensable. However,
while the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in resolving
the issue of just compensation, courts are not bound by their
indings. Courts may substitute their estimate of the value, as long
as it is supported by the evidence on record.
Republic v. Dela Cruz 2019
Interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and
follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the

date of taking."
NTC v. Bermuda Development 2019
A case iled by a landowner for recovery of possession or
ejectment against a public utility corporation, which has occupied
the land belonging to the former without prior acquisition of title
thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not
prosper.
The proper recourse is for the ejectment court:
1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner iling
the proper action for recovery of just compensation and
consequential damages; or
2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation
to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and
consequential damages assessed therein; or
3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation
case and determine the just compensation and
consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67, if the ejectment
court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.
Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO
Sec 17 Art XII pertains to the right of the State in times of national
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take
over the operation of any business affected with public interest.
The term "national emergency" was de ined to include threat
from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but
not strikes "unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze
government service." The temporary takeover by the government
extends only to the operation of the business and not to the
ownership thereof. As such the government is not required to
compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there
is no transfer of ownership. The private entity-owner affected
cannot, likewise, claim just compensation as the temporary takeover
by the government is in exercise of its police power and not of its
power of eminent domain.
Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant
to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
Taxation
1) Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from
persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty, for the support of government and for all public
needs. Obligation to pay taxes is not based on contract.
2) Except only in the case of poll taxes, nonpayment of a tax may
be the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment.
3) Taxes are the nation’s lifeblood through which government
agencies continue to operate and with which the State
discharges its functions for the welfare of its constituents.
4) Taxes = levied to raise revenues; Licenses = imposed for
regulatory purpose.
5) In Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, SC held that
the payment of building permit fee is a regulatory imposition,
and not a charge on property, and is therefore not an imposition
from which petitioner is exempt.
2. Bill of Rights
Due Process
1) Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, xxxx.
2) Due process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part
of the government.
3) Protects all persons, natural as well as juridical, citizen or
alien.
4) Juridical persons are also covered but only insofar as their
property is concerned.
5) To deprive is to “take away forcibly, to prevent from
possessing, enjoying or using something.”
6) Deprivation is denial of the right to life, liberty or property. It
is per se not unconstitutional. What is prohibited is deprivation
without due process of law.
7) Due process is comprised of two (2) components —
a) substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and
b) procedural due process which consists of the two basic
rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal.
8) Judicial Due Process. —
a) There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
b) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
the defendant and over the property which is the subject
matter of the proceeding.
c) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.
d) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In re Abellana v. Paredes 2019
Jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also
be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence
sentence as to circumstance of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant:
1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person;
2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as such excess.
Even if it were true that petitioner or his counsel were not noti ied of
the scheduled hearing, it is still not enough to warrant a inding of
denial of due process. For in the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
9) Administrative Due Process. —
a) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.
b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
c) The decision must have something to support itself.

d) The evidence must be substantial.
e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing.
f) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
g) The board or body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered.
Ang v. Belaro, Jr. 2019
The right to be heard is the most basic principle of due process.
There is only denial of due process when there is total absence or
lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court.
Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
10) Levels of Scrutiny
Test Deals with How?
Strict
Scrutiny
Freedom of the mind;
restricting the political
process; regulation of
speech, gender, or race,
other fundamental
rights such as suffrage,
judicial access,
interstate travel
Focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than
substantial governmental
interest and on the absence
of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial
review of statutes or
ordinances:
Determines the quality and
the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify
the regulation of
fundamental freedoms.
Rational
Basis
Standard
Review for economic
legislation; equal
protection challenges
Rationally further a
legitimate governmental
interest
Heightened
or
Immediate
Scrutiny
Classi ication based on
gender and legitimacy
Governmental interest is
extensively examined and
the availability of less
restrictive measures
considered.
⭐Acosta v. Ochoa 2019 En Banc Leonen, J
There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the
ownership or possession of a irearm a property right. Persons
intending to use a irearm can only either accept or decline the
government's terms for its use. The grant of license, however, is
without prejudice to the inviolability of the home.
With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege granted by the
State, there could not have been a deprivation of petitioners'
right to due process in requiring a license for the possession of
irearms.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the right to possess a
irearm was considered a property right, it is doctrine that
property rights are always subject to the State's police power.
Equal Protection
Section 1. xxx nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
Requisites for Valid Classi ication
1) Based upon substantial distinctions.
2) Germane to the purpose of the law.
3) Not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) Apply equally to all members of the same class.
Philippine Plastics Industry Association v. San Pedro 2018
Resolution
The subject Ordinance did not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, as there is substantial distinction between the
primary and secondary plastic packaging materials, or even between
plastic packaging materials and plastic cutlery.
DPWH Region IV-A v. COA 2019 En Banc on Selective Prosecution
In People v. Dela Piedra, the Court declared that an erroneous
performance of statutory duty — such as an apparent selective
enforcement of the statute — could not be considered a
violation of the equal protection clause, unless the element of
intentional or purposeful discrimination is shown.
⭐Zomer Development v. CA 2020 En Banc Leonen, J
In Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, this Court
summarized the three (3) tests to determine the reasonableness
of a classi ication:
The strict scrutiny test applies when a classi ication either
1. interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or
2. burdens suspect classes.
The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classi ication
does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classi ications based on gender and
legitimacy.
Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not
covered by the irst two tests.
A "suspect class" is "a class saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process. "
Juridical entities cannot be considered a "suspect class."
The rational basis test may be applied to determine the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8971, Section 47. The rational
basis test requires only that
a) there be a legitimate government interest and that

b) there is a reasonable connection between it and the means
employed to achieve it.
A longer period of redemption is given to natural persons whose
mortgaged properties are more often used for residential purposes. A
shorter period of redemption is given to juridical persons whose
properties are more often used for commercial purposes. Goldenway
Merchandising explains that the shorter period is aimed to ensure
the solvency and liquidity of banks.
Freedom of Expression
1) Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances.
2) Sec 18. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations. xxxx
3) Sec 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
4) Continuum of thought, speech, expression, and speech acts
⭐The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec 2015 En Banc Leonen, J
The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and
even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
declares that:
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. The salute
is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its
message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid
form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can
be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those
raised in this petition.
The form of expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in
point. Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected under
Art III, Section 4.
Free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. This
provides that “nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the
likelihood of violence.”
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so “when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.”
5) Prior restraint and subsequent punishment
Tordesillas v. Puno 2018
WON the Advisory issued by the respondents is not content-neutral
and thus constitutes prior restraint, censorship, and is
content-restrictive, which resulted to a "chilling effect" in violation of
the freedom of the press.
Our jurisprudence has recognized four aspects of freedom of
the press, to wit:
1) freedom from prior restraint;
2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication;
3) freedom of access to information; and
4) freedom of circulation.
Prior restraint refers to of icial governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint precludes
governmental acts that required
a) approval of a proposal to publish;
b) licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication
including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to
publish; and
c) even injunctions against publication.
There is prior restraint when the government totally prohibits and/or
in some way, restricts the expression of one's view or the manner of
expressing oneself. There is none in this case. No other interpretation
can be had of respondents' pronouncements except that for being a
reminder of prevailing provisions of the law and jurisprudence,
applicable to all and not only to media personalities, that resistance
or disobedience to lawful orders of authorities may result to
criminal, and even administrative, liabilities.
6) Content-based and Content-neutral
⭐The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec 2015 En Banc Leonen, J
Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of
the speaker or the subject of the expression. Content-based restraint
or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of
the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure.
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned
acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating
such restraints on freedom of speech. “When the speech restraints
take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity,” and it is subject
only to the intermediate approach.
A content-neutral government regulation is suf iciently
justi ied:
1. if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and
4. if the incident restriction is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
In this case, limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render
ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression. The restriction in the present case does not
pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral
regulations.
7) Speci icity of regulation and overbreadth doctrine. —
Under this doctrine, the statute must be carefully drawn or be
authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech
and not be susceptible to application to protected expression.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism
Council 2010 En Banc on Facial Challenge
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech
cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. (Imbong v. Ochoa)
The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do
NOT operate on the same plane. — A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge. — Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
laws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. The allowance of a
facial challenge in free speech cases is justi ied by the aim to avert
the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to
plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in
deterring socially harmful conduct.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation. The most distinctive feature of the
overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way.
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under
the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes.
8) Speech regulation in relation to election
Adiong v. Comelec
National Press Club v. Comelec ruled that regulation of election
activity has its limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the
limits of free speech. Regulation of election campaign activity may
NOT pass the test of validity
1) if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and
scope in its application,
2) if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or
one's opinion of his or her quali ications,
3) if it cuts off the low of media reporting, and
4) if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable
nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
9) Judicial analysis, presumptions and levels and types of
scrutiny
Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec 2019 En Banc
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a
combination of the following theoretical tests, to wit:
a) the dangerous tendency doctrine;
b) the clear and present danger rule; and
c) the balancing of interests test.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required
for its validity. They are not subject to the strictest form of judicial
scrutiny but an intermediate approach — somewhere between
the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the
compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.
As explained in Chavez,
1) a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear
and present danger rule,
2) while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to
intermediate scrutiny.
By banning partisan political activities or campaigning even during
the campaign period within embassies, consulates, and other foreign
service establishments, regardless of whether it applies only to
candidates or whether the prohibition extends to private persons, it
goes beyond the objective of maintaining order during the voting
period and ensuring a credible election.
10) Obscenity/pornography
⭐Madrilejos v. Gatdula 2019 En Banc
SC dismissed the petition on the ground that Ordinance No. 7780, an
anti-obscenity law, cannot be facially attacked on the ground of
overbreadth because obscenity is unprotected speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of
penal statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases.
It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected
speech or low-value expression refers to
1) libelous statements,
2) obscenity or pornography,
3) false or misleading advertisement,
4) insulting or " ighting words," i.e., those which by their very
utterance in lict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of peace and
5) expression endangering national security.
A litigant who stands charged under a law that regulates unprotected
speech can still mount a challenge that a statute is unconstitutional
as it is applied to him or her. If the litigant prevails, the courts carve
away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis.

11) Commercial speech
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association v. Duque III
The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly
falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech—that is,
speech that proposes an economic transaction.
Central Hudson provides a four-part analysis for evaluating the
validity of regulations of commercial speech.
1. To begin with, the commercial speech must "concern lawful
activity and not be misleading."
2. Next, the asserted governmental interest must be
substantial.
If both of these requirements are met, it must next be
determined
3. Whether the state regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and
4. Whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
See also Disini v. SOJ 2014 En Banc
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person
the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this
right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
12) Freedom of information. — Sec 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to of icial records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to of icial acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative
Legal Services v. PSALM 2012 En Banc
Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the
Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a
demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of
the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow
access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only
transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in
of icial communications and public documents of the government
agency.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary 2013 En Banc
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to
information is to ile a petition for mandamus.
Records of Police Drug Operations Almora v. Dela Rosa 2018 En Banc
The Court is mandated to protect and enforce the people's right to
information. The undeniable fact that thousands of ordinary citizens
have been killed, and continue to be killed, during police drug
operations certainly is a matter of grave public concern.
Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the requested
information and documents do not obviously involve state secrets
affecting national security.
Right to Information and Con identiality of Disbarment Proceedings in
Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of Staff 2017 Leonen, J
Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the
con identiality rule. The con identiality rule is intended, in part, to
prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage a
lawyer's reputation in the public sphere.
As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are con idential in nature
until their inal resolution and the inal decision of this Court. The
con identiality rule requires only that "proceedings against
attorneys" be kept private and con idential. It is the proceedings
against attorneys that must be kept private and con idential. This
would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment
complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far
that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary
actions.
Vitangcol III v. Comelec 2016 En Banc Separate Opinion of Leonen, J
When the subject of the petition for mandamus relates to a public
right such as the right to information on matters of public concern,
and when the object of the petition is to compel the performance of a
public duty, the petitioner need not show that its interest on the
result is exclusive. It may be shared by the public in general.
Rights During Expropriation
1) Owner’s failure to question for a long period of time the
government’s failure to institute expropriation proceedings
constitutes a waiver of his right to regain possession of his
property. His only remedy is an action for payment of just
compensation and may not sue for ejectment.
2) Amount to be Deposited
a) Rule 67 — an amount equivalent to the full assessed
value of the property in order for the court to issue a writ
of possession;
b) If the expropriator is an LGU, the amount to be deposited is
only 15% of the assessed value of the property.
c) In RA 8974, if the purpose of the expropriation is to
implement a national government infrastructure project,
what needs to be done is not a deposit but payment of
BIR Zonal valuation of the property. This amount
deposited or paid is NOT the just compensation.
3) In NPC v. Pobre, the expropriator is not allowed to unilaterally
withdraw because damages may have already been caused to
the property.
Searches and Seizure
Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except
1. upon probable cause
2. to be determined personally by the judge
3. after examination under oath or af irmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

4. particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
1) Probable Cause. —
Estrada v. Of ice of the Ombudsman 2015 En Banc
Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as
long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not inally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.
People v. Ramon 2019
The quantum of proof to establish probable cause and a prima
facie case for purposes of issuance of an arrest warrant and for
preliminary investigation are one and the same.
If the evidence on record does not clearly establish probable cause
then the imperative is for the prosecutor or the judge to relieve the
accused from the pain of going through trial. Conversely, if the inding
by the prosecutor or the judge is that the evidence on record
suf iciently establishes a prima facie case or probable cause against
the accused, the accused should be indicted and held for trial.
2) Personal Determination by the Judge. —
People v. Gabiosa, Sr. 2020
There is no need to examine both the applicant and the witnesses if
either one of them is suf icient to establish probable cause.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. It is
axiomatic that
1) the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or
pro-forma;
2) the judge must not simply rehash the contents of the
af idavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justi ication of the application;
3) the questions should not merely be repetitious of the
averments stated in the af idavits or depositions of the
applicant and the witnesses.
Fenix v. CA 2016
We uphold the power of judges to dismiss a criminal case when the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The judge is not compelled to follow the prosecutor's certi ication of
the existence of probable cause. As stated in People v. Inting, "it is
the report, the af idavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all
other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certi ication
which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination."
3) Examination of Applicant. — Evidence must be based on
the personal knowledge of those who offered same and not
on mere information or belief. Hearsay is not allowed.
4) Particularity of Description. — A warrant would be valid:
a) When it enables the police of icers to readily identify the
properties to be seized;
b) It leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles
to be seized;
c) When the things described are limited to those that bear a
direct relation to the offense charged.
Dimal v. People 2018
A description of a place to be searched is suf icient if the of icer with
the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the
place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the
community.
In Vallejo v. CA, the Court clari ied that technical precision of
description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not
be a mere roving commission.
An otherwise overbroad warrant will comply with the particularity
requirement when the af idavit iled in support of the warrant is
physically attached to it, and the warrant expressly refers to the
af idavit and incorporates it with suitable words of reference.
5) Exclusionary Rule. —
Polangcos v. People 2019
Polangcos' violations were punishable only by a city ordinance that
prescribes as penalty certain ines. SPO2 Juntanilla thus conducted an
illegal search when he frisked Polangcos for the foregoing violations
which were punishable only by ine.
Ultimately, Polangcos must be acquitted, as the corpus delicti of the
crime, i.e. the seized drug, is excluded evidence, inadmissible in any
proceeding, including this one, against him. This is in accordance
with the exclusionary rule in Section 3(2), Article III.
NB: Topics on Warrantless Searches Discussed in Criminal
Procedure
3. Composition and Powers of the Government
Organs
Note: The compiler assumes this meant the Constitutional Commissions
1) Sec 1 Art IX-A. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are
a) the Civil Service Commission,
b) the Commission on Elections, and
c) the Commission on Audit.
2) Sec 5. The Commission shall enjoy iscal autonomy. Their
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
3) Sec 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members, any case or matter brought before it within 60
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
4) How appointed and term of of ice. — All chairpersons and
commissioners are appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of 7
years without reappointment.
5) Staggering of terms. — Of those irst appointed, the
Chairman shall hold of ice for seven years, a Commissioner for

ive years (2 for Comelec), and another Commissioner for three
years (the remaining 4 for Comelec), without reappointment.
6) Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor.
7) In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
CSC As the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service.
Comelec Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
COA Shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including GOCCs with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis:
1. constitutional bodies, commissions and of ices
that have been granted iscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
2. autonomous state colleges and universities;
3. other GOCCs and their subsidiaries; and
4. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity.
4. Judicial Review
1) The power to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
2) Requisites
a) Ripeness. — An actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power;
b) Locus standi. — The person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge;
c) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and
d) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.
3) Ripeness
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III 2019 En Banc Leonen, J
Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an
⭐actual case or controversy. In every exercise of judicial
power, whether in the traditional or expanded sense, this is an
absolute necessity.
There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "con lict of legal
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial
resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must
establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable
right under the Constitution. There must be
1. a real and substantial controversy,
2. with de inite and concrete issues involving the legal
relations of the parties, and
3. admitting of speci ic relief that courts can grant.
Moreover, an actual case or controversy requires that the right must
be enforceable and legally demandable. A case is ripe for
adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed
action such that there is a direct, concrete, and adverse effect on the
petitioner. In connection with acts of administrative agencies,
ripeness is ensured under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. One other concept pertaining to judicial
review is intrinsically connected to it: the concept of a case being
moot and academic.
As for mootness, Courts cannot render judgment after the issue has
already been resolved by or through external developments.
However, Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Three (3) circumstances must be present before this Court may rule
on a moot issue. There must be an issue raising a grave violation
of the Constitution, involving an exceptional situation of
paramount public interest that is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
4) Locus Standi. — or legal standing has been de ined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
a) cases involve constitutional issues;
b) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
c) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question;
d) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
e) for legislators, there must be a claim that the of icial
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
⭐Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE
2018 En Banc Leonen, J
Another exception is the concept of third-party standing. Under
this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties
provided the following criteria are met:
1. irst, the party bringing suit must have suffered an
'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a suf iciently

concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
2. second, the party must have a close relation to the third
party; and
3. third, there must exist some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests.
In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third
parties represented by the petitioner would have special and
legitimate reasons why they may not bring the action themselves.
Understandably, the cost to patrons in the White Light case to
bring the action themselves—i.e., the amount they would pay
for the lease of the motels—will be too small compared with
the cost of the suit. This is the free rider problem in economics. It
is a negative externality which operates as a disincentive to sue and
assert a transcendental right.
As to actual controversy.
Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a
grounded level of urgency can be transcendent. This Court is not a
forum to appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive,
Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs.
5) Lis Mota. — It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an
issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible. Courts will not touch the
issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
6) Operative fact doctrine
League of Cities v. Comelec 2010 En Banc Resolution
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as
unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to
its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact
doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It
has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has
not been passed. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law.
7) Political Question
⭐Francisco v. House of Representatives
The term “political question” refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
There are two species of political questions:
1) "truly political questions" and
2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Sec 1 Art VIII, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question
from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
5. Supervision of Courts
Maceda v. Vasquez re supervision of lower courts and personnel
Article VIII, Section 6 exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof.
Thus, the Ombudsman should irst refer the matter of
petitioner's certi icates of service to this Court for determination
of whether said certi icates re lected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
6. Powers of the Supreme Court
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or af irm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, inal
judgments and orders of lower courts.
3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations
as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment
shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
6) Appoint all of icials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
7. Qualiﬁcations, Disqualiﬁcations, and Selection
Position Citizen Age Res Reg Term Limit
Pres
Natural-
Born
40 10 PH 6
Ineligible for any
election; Successor
who served at least
4 years.
VP Natural- 40 10 PH 6 2 consecutive

Born
Senator
Natural-
Born
35 2 PH 6 2 consecutive
Party-
List Rep
Natural-
Born
251
1 PH 3 3 consecutive
District
Rep
Natural-
Born
25 1
Dist
rict
3 3 consecutive
President and The Vice President
Sec 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold ANY other of ice or
employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
a) practice any other profession,
b) participate in any business, or
c) be inancially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or af inity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as
a) Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
b) the Of ice of the Ombudsman, or
c) as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or of ices, including GOCCs and their subsidiaries.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
The prohibition imposed on the President and his of icial
family is all-embracing and covers both public and private
of ice or employment.
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public of icials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself,
to wit:
1. the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par(2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and,
2. the Secretary of Justice being an ex-of icio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8(1), Article VIII.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,
remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien
to the primary function of a cabinet of icial, such additional
functions would fall under the purview of "any other of ice"
prohibited by the Constitution.
In order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress
the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution,
1. such additional duties or functions must be required by the
primary functions of the of icial concerned,
2. who is to perform the same in an ex-of icio capacity as
provided by law,
3. without receiving any additional compensation therefor.
Public Interest Center v. Elma Decision and Resolution
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two of ices was laid out in People v. Green — whether one
of ice is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one of ice has the
right to interfere with the other.
In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the
PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the
PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the
CPLC. However, Elma remains covered by the general prohibition
under Section 7, Article IX-B.
Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional, for being incompatible of ices. This ruling does not
render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of of ices, Elma had, in effect, vacated his irst
of ice as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second of ice as
CPLC.
Funa v. Executive Secretary 2010 En Banc
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of
DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section
13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another of ice is allowed by law or the primary functions of the
position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-of icio
capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
1) No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other of ice or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. (Incompatible of ice)
2) Neither shall he be appointed to any of ice which may have
been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected. (Forbidden of ice)
Liban v. Gordon
Not being a government of icial or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as
such, does not hold a government of ice or employment. We hold that
the of ice of the PNRC Chairman is not a government of ice or an
of ice in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Justices and Judges
Court Citizen Age Practice of Law
Supreme Court Natural-Born 40 15 years

Collegiate Courts Natural-Born 40 15 years
RTC Natural-Born 35 10 years
Municipal Courts Natural-Born 30 5 years
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.
De Castro v. JBC 2010 En Banc
Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC?
NO. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the
JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates
to ill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the
vacancy.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but
its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. For
mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
Aguinaldo v. Aquino III 2017 En Banc re
clustering of nominees by the JBC
The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the President's power to
appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of
the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Ombudsman
Art XI Sec 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
1) natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and
2) at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old,
3) of recognized probity and independence, and
4) members of the Philippine Bar, and
5) must not have been candidates for any elective of ice in the
immediately preceding election.
The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
Art XI Sec 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the
JBC, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
Such appointments shall require no con irmation. All vacancies
shall be illed within three months after they occur.
Gonzales III v. Of ice of the President 2014 En Banc
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the
President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of
the Of ice of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
The Of ice of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key of icials, all of them tasked to support the
Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. What is true for the
Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the
performance of their duties.
Members of Constitutional Commissions
1) Natural-born citizens;
2) at least 35 years old at the time of appointment and
3) must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their appointment.
CSC Comelec COA
Composition
1 Chair + 2
Comms
1 Chair + 6
Comms
1 Chair + 2 Comms
Term 7 years without reappointment
Special
quali ication
with proven
capacity for
public
administration
a majority
thereof,
including the
Chair, shall be
members of
CPAs with not less
than 10 years of
auditing
experience, OR
members of the
the Philippine
Bar who have
been engaged
in the practice
of law for at
least 10
years.
Philippine Bar who
have been engaged
in the practice of
law for at least 10
years.
At no time shall all
Members belong to
the same
profession.
Funa v. Villar 2012 En Banc
The Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of of ice of the irst set of commissioners,
shall always be for a ixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than
the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms.
3. Members who were appointed for a full term of seven years
and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

8. Immunity and Privileges
Presidential Immunity
⭐De Lima v. Duterte 2019 En Banc
The concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and
constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit
pertains to an of icial act of the President. Neither does immunity
hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions prevents us
from making any distinctions.
Privileges of Legislators
1) Freedom from Arrest. — Sect 11. A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session.
No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen 2018
The questioned statements in this case were admittedly made in
response to queries from the media during gaps in the Senate's
plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the purview of
privileged speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI.
Petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary
nonaccountability to insulate his statements, uttered outside the
"sphere of legislative activity," from judicial review.
2) Privilege of Speech and Debate. —
Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
of icers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classi ication from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
Pobre v. Santiago
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative loor
or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala ides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of
the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
9. Structure of Government
Composition
Legislative
1) Chambers of Congress
Sema v. Comelec
The of ice of a legislative district representative to Congress is a
national of ice, and its occupant, a Member of the House of
Representatives, is a national of icial. It would be incongruous
for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create a national of ice when its legislative powers extend only to its
regional territory.
2) District representatives and questions of apportionment
Aquino III v. Comelec 2010 En Banc
There is no speci ic provision in the Constitution that ixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. While
a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must irst meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district.
Aldaba v. Comelec 2010 En Banc Resolution
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial
question, and not a political one.
Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI on the
population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative
district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former 1st
District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the
geographic mass of that district. This contravenes the requirement
in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall
"comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory."
Bagabuyo v. Comelec
Legislative apportionment is de ined as the determination of the
number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision
may send to a legislative body.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change
in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X,
Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution
and the LGC expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of an LGU. In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment
or reapportionment provision.
A legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply,
a division of an LGU where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city,
municipality or barangay under the LGC should not apply to and be a
requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.
Equality of representation.
The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the

number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the
number of registered voters therein. The Constitution does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation.
Aldaba v. Comelec 2010 En Banc Decision
Intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire
year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000
is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately
following election" after the attainment.
First, certi ications on demographic projections can be issued
only if such projections are declared of icial by the National
Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).
Second, certi ications based on demographic projections can be
issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying of icer.
Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle
of every year.
3) Party-list system. — Shall constitute 20% of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 2000 En Banc
RA No. 7941 mandates at least four inviolable parameters.
These are:
1. First, the twenty percent allocation — Section 5 (2),
Article VI is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
2. Second, the two percent threshold — as quali ied by
BANAT
3. Third, the three-seat limit;
4. Fourth, proportional representation.
The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which
the irst party is entitled is as follows:
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦−𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 1𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other quali ied parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑡'𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
× 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 1𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦
Bantay RA 7941 v. Comelec 2007 En Banc
Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names
of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein
petitions.
Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 2001 En Banc
1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identi ied in Section 5 of RA 7941. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
2. Disquali ications under Sec 6 of RA 7941:
a. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
b. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
c. It is a foreign party or organization;
d. It is receiving support from any foreign government,
political party, foundation, organization;
e. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
f. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
g. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
h. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
3. The party or organization must NOT be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government.
4. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the
law; its nominees must likewise do so.
5. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees.
6. While lacking a well-de ined political constituency, the nominee
must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene it the nation
as a whole.
BANAT v. Comelec 2009 En Banc Decision and Resolution
There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat
whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically
creates such additional party-list seats.
The illing-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory.
Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of
participants in the party-list election.
There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election
system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of
the House is the maximum number of seats available to
party-list organizations, such that there is automatically
one party-list seat for every four existing legislative
districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one
seat.
3. The additional seats shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that received less than two
percent of the total votes.

The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it
applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now
unconstitutional.
The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a
second round of seat allocation until all available
seats are completely distributed.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional.
Phil Guardians Brotherhood v. Comelec 2010 En Banc
The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon veri ied complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition if it:
a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or
b) fails to qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it registered.
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec 2013 En Banc
1. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
2. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not ield
candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party that ields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
3. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
a. “marginalized and underrepresented” — labor,
peasants, isherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers;
or
b. lacking in “well-de ined political constituencies.” —
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
4. A majority of the members of sectoral parties must belong
to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Same rule applies to sectors that lack “well-de ined
political constituencies.”
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations either
a. must belong to their respective sectors, or
b. must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona- ide members of such parties or organizations.
Executive
Sec 1 Art VII. THE executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines.
Judiciary
Sec 1 Art VIII. The judicial power shall be vested in ONE Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Sec 4. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, ive, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
illed within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. xxxx
Functions
Legislative
Legislative power has been de ined not only as the power to
pass laws but also the power to alter or modify them. It also covers
the amendment of existing legislations and that would still be
encompassed as legislative power.
General Plenary Powers. — The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Sec 1 Art
VI)
Executive
Marcos v. Manglapus Decision and Resolution
The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
speci ic powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words,
executive power is more than the sum of speci ic powers so
enumerated.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986—to limit the powers of the
President, for the result was a limitation of speci ic powers of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
Vinuya v. Romulo 2010 En Banc
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners'
cause would be inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the
Executive Department's determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to
which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
Judiciary
Sec 1 Art VIII. xxxx Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice
1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and
2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Powers and Privileges
Legislative
1) Legislative inquiries and oversight functions
a) Question Hour. — Sec 22. The heads of departments may,
upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules
of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
xxxx
⭐Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted
vis-á-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of
Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." A distinction
was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation.
In ine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive of icial may be exempted
from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment.
Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear
in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
b) Legislative Investigations. — Section 21. The Senate or
the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such
inquiries shall be respected.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. The investigation
must be
a) in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure and
b) that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in
aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to ind
out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa
had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the
courts rather than of the legislature.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon
When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on
respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with
its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the
AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
In the instant case, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the
matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment by the legislature
into the exclusive jurisdiction of another branch of the government.
Clearly, there was no basis for the respondent Judge to apply the
ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss
the petition for prohibition amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
In re Sabio
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just
of Congress, but also of "any of its committees." This is signi icant
because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power
upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the
Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
function are also available to the committees.
Gudani v. Senga
If the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the
AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive
branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and
control over the actions of the of icers concerned. The legislative
purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same
— whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or
similar concerns — would be accorded due judicial evaluation.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Of icers and
Investigation
Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and
received" by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
quali ied privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is
subject to balancing against other interest. In other words,
con identiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by
the Constitution.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks

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