LEARNING LESSONS THE HARD WAY - THE BRITISH ARMY'S EXPERIENCE

1
Learning lessons – the British Army’s
experience
Rupert Lescott
The author worked as an analyst in the British
Army’s Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC) from
May 2009 to May 2012. He served as an infantry
officer for 10 years and, before returning to the
military environment, worked as an analyst in the
City of London. He now advises organisations on
how to manage knowledge and enhance their
capacity for learning.
Background
In June 2009, Patrick Little wrote an article for the
RUSI journal entitled, “Lessons Unlearned. A
Former Officer’s Perspective On The British Army
At War”1, in which he made some pointed
observations on the British Army’s cultural
unwillingness to embrace self-criticism. In May
2012, Frank Ledwidge’s book, “Losing Small Wars
– British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan”2,
another criticism of the British Army’s culture and
its failure to understand modern conflict, was
published in paperback.
These 2 works act as ‘book-ends’ to the 3 years I
spent as a lessons analyst in the British Army’s
Lessons Exploitation Centre in Warminster,
Wiltshire, UK.
1 Patrick Little, “Lessons Unlearned: A Former
Officer’s Perspective on the British Army at War”,
RUSI Journal (Vol. 154, No. 3, June 2009),
downloaded from
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Journal_Lit
tle.pdf on 31 May 2012.
2 Frank Ledwidge. (2011) “Losing Small Wars”, Yale
University Press, London.
Neither Little nor Ledwidge refer to its attempts to
identify and learn lessons3, indicating that such
efforts had yet to become embedded in either the
British Army or wider defence consciousness.
Consequently, this article seeks to demonstrate
that, during that 3 year period and since, much has
been done to develop and improve the British
Army’s capacity for learning.
However, whilst significant work is under way, more
is required and I offer some ideas on the changes
needed before the British Army can truly claim to
be a learning organisation4.
Expanding analytical capacity
In May 2009, I began work as a lessons analyst in
the Land Lessons Learned team, part of the Land
Warfare Development Group - expanded to include
civilian contractors following direction from the then
Director General Land Warfare, Maj Gen Andrew
Kennett CBE. The team’s traditional role was to
identify and manage enduring tactical lessons from
the land environment, otherwise known as the ‘long
lessons loop’.
Following a Business Process Review 4 months
later, the Lesson Exploitation Centre (LXC) was
3 “In simple terms, a lesson is an experience,
example, or observation, which imparts beneficial
new knowledge or wisdom…that can be analysed
to produce recommendations and/or actions and
as such can be positive or negative.” Defence-wide
Lessons Management Defence Information Note
(DIN). (2009) MOD, London.
4 Learning organisations, according to Peter Senge,
are “…where people continually expand their
capacity to create the results they truly desire,
where new and expansive patterns of thinking are
nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free,
and where people are continually learning how to
learn together.” Peter Senge. (2006) The Fifth
Discipline, Random House, London, p. 3.

2
formally established through the merger of the
Lessons Learned team with the former Mission
Support Group5. Additionally, the LXC was to be
merged with its equivalents from the Army’s
Service Inquiry branch and the overseers of
environmental issues and accidents to form the
Centre for Army Lessons and Safety6. At a higher
level, a new 3* command was formed under Lt Gen
Sir Paul Newton KBE CBE - Force Development
and Training (FDT), modelled on the US Army’s
TRADOC7 to combine doctrine, training, force
development and lessons under one command.
The LXC’s role is to receive information feeds from
theatre and elsewhere (including weekly reports,
post-incident reports8 and, as part of Mission
Exploitation, Post-Operational Reports and Post-
Operational Interviews) and make deductions from
the fused material which can support those
deployed in theatre or inform Force Development.
5 The Mission Support Group’s role was to provide
on-going support to a deployed force, focusing on
lessons immediately identified from incidents,
otherwise known as the ‘short lessons loop’.
6 These are the Directorate of Personal Services
(Army) (DPS (A)) and Chief Environmental Safety
Officer (Army) (CESO (A)), respectively. This
merger remains partial as the 3 elements are not
collocated but their governance and procedures
were partially aligned to enable synthesis of
multiple sources and facilitate understanding of
‘the bigger picture’.
7 TRADOC, the US Army’s Training and Doctrine
Command, was formed in 1973.
8 Incidents resulting in death or serious injury are
reported using an Operational Learning Account &
After Action Review (OLAAAR), to report the facts
as they are understood at the time and notify the
deployed force, its successor and the Army HQ of
any immediately identified lessons.
Example of LXC output 1
Within 30 days of returning from a deployment, a
brigade is required to identify and record lessons in
a Post-Operational Report which is ’sifted’ by the
LXC lessons team, who check its categories (i.e.
lesson, good practice, theatre issue etc), that the
lessons were allocated to the correct Defence Line
of Development (DLoD)9 for resolution and, where
appropriate, re-word them for the purposes of
brevity or clarity.
Following further analysis, we would ‘socialise’ the
report to a wider audience in order to validate our
judgement10. Once this second sift was complete
(following a little horse-trading to get DLoD staff to
agree on their lessons allocation), confirmed
lessons would be entered into the Defence
9 Lessons are managed within the DLoD
framework. The 8 DLoDs are: Training, Equipment,
Personnel, Information, Doctrine and Concepts,
Organisation, Interoperability and
Logistics/Infrastructure.
10 This includes staff from the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ) (now Joint Force Command
(JFC)), Army HQ and the capability directorates of
the Army (i.e. Combat, Combat Support etc).

3
Lessons Identified Management System (DLIMS)
and staff action to ‘learn’ the lesson would begin.
We received 7 Brigade reports during my time at
the LXC and our analysis developed with each one.
We moved from receiving lessons in word
documents to using formatted spread-sheets that
filtered specific types of issue and enabled a
statistical breakdown of each report’s lessons. We
developed a taxonomy to show which types of
lesson were most prevalent and used keywords to
identify themes and trends.
In time, these results will enable root-cause
analysis and the identification of some of the
underlying issues of which individual lessons are
but a symptom. However, beyond the LXC itself,
there seemed little appetite for this approach - the
dominant view being that lessons are just more
work, rather than evidence of any sort of deeper
malaise. Perhaps it was just a matter of resources,
time and effort – there appearing never to be
enough of any of these.11
11 For a more thorough, broadly accurate account
of the structural and procedural changes
summarised here, I recommend reading,
Socialising knowledge
A significant development in the British Army’s
efforts to learn from operations is the 2-day
‘Mission Exploitation Symposium’ (MXS). The main
purpose of this is to gather as many people as
possible from those that deployed to theatre and
those that trained, equipped and administered them
from the UK, to examine what worked and what
didn’t. Historically, units returning from an
operation had grown tired and frustrated with ad
hoc requests for visits and briefs from defence
contractors, academics and other interested
parties. Covering the same ground repeatedly
several months after the deployment meant there
was no ‘break-clean’ point and, because each
briefing was discrete and isolated, information was
repeated many times, albeit to different audiences.
MXSs address this problem by offering all
interested parties an opportunity to interrogate
recently-returned personnel in a series of syndicate
discussions, each focused on a specific area (e.g.
clothing and equipment, operational welfare,
targeting and influence etc). Each syndicate has a
dedicated page on the MXS intranet web-site on
which attendees post their intended questions
beforehand, achieving economy of effort for the
troops and cross-pollination of questions and ideas
for the audience, who benefit from other attendees’
questions as well as their own.
Following these discussions is a series of ‘deep
dives’, attended on an invitation-only basis,
enabling more detailed exploration of issues.
MXS is a new way of socialising knowledge and
has been adopted with vigour by the British Army,
“Transformation in contact: learning the lessons of
modern war” by Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin and
Helen McCartney, (2011) International Affairs, Vol.
82 No.2, pp253-270.

4
with attendance for each first day sometimes
exceeding 1000 people. Indeed, some commercial
organisations, hearing of this process through
exploratory meetings with the LXC, have shown
interest in using it to socialise the knowledge
captured at the end of projects.
However, MXS is not without flaws. It has a
weakness in that the Chair and scribe for each
syndicate are usually a senior officer and
subordinate from the Army HQ department
responsible for resolving the issues raised. Whilst
this might sound like common sense (i.e. they have
a direct, daily involvement with the topics under
discussion), the reality is that the Chair often holds
the most senior rank in the room and is culturally
more attuned to ‘batting away’ certain topics for
being ‘minor’ or having been ‘overtaken by events’.
Also, for those issues that do make it through to the
typed-up notes, how likely is it that the scribe
(usually the Chair’s subordinate, on whom he or
she depends for their annual performance
appraisal) types up a frank and accurate record
that does not sit easy with the Chair’s intentions?
This problem is compounded by the room layout -
unconducive to an honest and constructive enquiry
into challenging issues - with Chair and scribe sat
at a table directly facing rows of attendees. A more
explicitly antagonistic framework would be hard to
design and the Chair and scribe would not be
human if they did not sometimes feel, as
shortcomings in current policy are raised, that they
are being ‘got at’ and react accordingly.
Interestingly, in an experiment at a recent MXS,
several sessions were successfully facilitated in a
highly interactive way, enabled by collaborative
technology.12 Shortened presentations prompted
12 This was facilitated with the support of
TEAMWIN practitioners from Beechwood
conversations in small groups, captured directly
from participants anonymously, via wirelessly
connected laptops, and subsequently produced as
a transcript. This is welcome, as the Army is at
least acknowledging the above cultural problem but
is perhaps only side-stepping it, rather than
addressing it directly.
Risk management
Earlier, I mentioned the lack of appetite for root
cause analysis or anything indicating much more
than the work associated with each lesson.
Nevertheless, in the area of risk management, the
LXC has begun to show that lessons can be used
to reinforce or clarify messages that the Army is
receiving from other sources.
In December 2011, I was tasked with reviewing all
lessons that had been closed but for which no
resolution had been identified.13 I considered
International – www.beechwood.net,
www.teamwin.com.
13 In DLIMS, lessons are closed ‘green’ or ‘black’.
‘Green’ means that a solution to the issue has
been identified and successfully implemented.

5
whether each lesson was now genuinely out of
date or whether there was a possibility, however
small, that the issue identified might recur at some
point - in other words, was there any latent risk
associated with it? My guiding principle was that of
caution and I imagined a rabidly anti-Army
journalist looking over my shoulder – if he or she
might think there was an opportunity for a story
about potential negligence, then I presumed there
was a risk that needed to be captured, measured
and managed. Following this initial sift, my findings
were reviewed by LXC colleagues and elevated to
British Army HQ, to marry up the risks we had
identified with the various capability areas to which
they corresponded.
Whilst the detail remains classified, this
nevertheless provides an example of forward and
lateral thinking on the part of the LXC and those
that direct its work. Lessons are slowly being
viewed as evidence of more fundamental and
enduring issues rather than just bald statements of
problems isolated in time and space.
The Army Inspectorate
It should be clear that the British Army is trying to
learn from operations; whether these efforts are
having the desired effect is less so. Nevertheless,
one encouraging sign is the 2011 decision by the
Army Inspectorate to conduct a review on whether
the Army is a learning organisation. This work was
not complete when this paper was written but it is
worth noting that the original remit – to review the
British Army’s lessons process and the LXC – was
expanded to look at learning capabilities across the
wider Army. Whilst this broader examination is
However, closing a lesson ‘black’ indicates
disagreement with the lesson per se, there is
insufficient funding for the proposed solution, the
lesson has since been overtaken by events or “it’s
all a little bit too difficult”.
welcome, one should not conflate the LXC’s
capabilities with the wider question of the Army’s
claim to be a learning organisation because many
of the changes needed to achieve this are beyond
the scope of the LXC’s role as presently conceived,
learning lessons being but one feature of a learning
organisation.
Again, the details of the interim Army Inspectorate
report are classified but 2 points stick out. Firstly,
their team was sufficiently impressed with the
LXC’s method for capturing and managing lessons
to resolution that they are adopting this very
process to track the progress of their own reports’
recommendations. Secondly, the position and
purpose of the Army Inspectorate, described by
some as the ‘conscience for the Army,’ strikes me
as entirely appropriate for the LXC itself. It is
answerable only to the (4*) Chief of the General
Staff and, commanded by a 1* Brigadier in his or
her final appointment, is unencumbered by the
political considerations that plague younger,
ambitious colleagues.
Small signs of progress
A significant oversight in the current set-up of the
LXC is the lack of any basic measure of
effectiveness. Instead, there is the commonplace
appetite for measures of ‘effort’ and a mistaken
belief that these are one and the same. When
senior officers seek an overview of the LXC, they
are shown long lists of the work underway or of
projects completed, statistical breakdowns of
lessons closed over a specific period and perhaps,
if they are lucky, a comparison of closure rates
across DLoDs. However, none of these metrics
give even the remotest hint as to whether learning
is actually taking place.
So I can only offer up some small anecdotal
examples of what I consider to be progress and

6
urge others to consider how best to judge whether
these efforts are succeeding.
An organisation has a ‘learning culture’ when
everything it does is infused with the desire to
improve and for evidence of such progress to be
shared as widely as possible. Some commercial
organisations (notably some of the international Oil
Majors) embed learning into standard project
activity14, expecting every project manager to
produce a ‘learning plan’ at the initiation stage,
whereby he or she identifies what knowledge is
required, where it is held and how to get it.
Unfortunately, in the British Army to date, this
would still be considered ‘good initiative’ rather than
an instinctive response to direction from above.
For example, in the weeks before OP
DEFERENCE (a non-combatant evacuation
operation conducted in Libya in February 2011), I
retrieved the Post-Operational Interviews from
Commanding Officers (CO) that had conducted or
prepared for similar operations in recent years and
sent them to the lessons team at PJHQ. An initially
cool response was followed up days later with
gratitude as planners were able to anticipate some
of the pitfalls that had beset previous deployments.
My point is that it should not have been as a result
of good initiative that such knowledge was passed -
such flows need to become embedded15.
14 Based on conversations between the author
and the organisational learning (OL) teams at BP,
Royal Dutch Shell and Knoco Ltd (August 2011-May
2012).
15 There needs to be an instinctive presumption
that someone somewhere has undertaken any
given activity before and will have knowledge from
which the latest participants will benefit. Similarly,
anyone undertaking a new activity should seek to
tell others what they have learned from it – for
good or bad.
Nevertheless, there was pleasant surprise in my
final months at Warminster, when a 1* Brigadier,
due to command Task Force Helmand, approached
the LXC in person and asked for some interview
synopses to help him prepare. Up until now, the
effort had been on ‘pushing’ the knowledge
captured from operations with relatively time spent
encouraging the wider British Army to ‘pull’ it for
itself. But when this happens (and the 1* example
was an encouraging sign), then a learning culture
might be growing.
The Fifth Discipline by Peter Senge
I first read Peter Senge’s “Fifth Discipline” in early
2010 and began, with the zeal of the convert, to
urge it upon my LXC colleagues, none of whom
had ever heard of it. However, change is obviously
afoot as I proof-read 3 Masters degree
dissertations in my final 12 months at LXC, all of
which used Senge as a reference. I was further
encouraged in my final week at the LXC when I
saw Senge’s book on the desk of a new staff officer
who had “read it at Staff College and thought I’d
better re-acquaint myself with it”16. Given that one
of his predecessors spent his final week in the job
recovering all emails and documents that he had
16 Conversation with LXC staff officer, May 2012.

7
worked on whilst at the LXC and saving them to
disk (apparently in order to defend himself in the
event of any potential investigations), this was
progress indeed.
Suggestions for the future
So how can the British Army develop a learning
culture?
At the LXC, we would occasionally discuss what
changes we thought might improve the Army’s
ability to learn. I would ask my uniformed
colleagues to think beyond their military confines
and not rule out ‘obviously civilian’ options as a
matter of course. In return, they would try to rein in
my utopian enthusiasm and remind me of the limits
on their freedom of action. I still believe that, when
looking for examples of good practice in
organisational learning, the British Army should
consider all options but have, begrudgingly,
restricted my suggestions to those not too far from
its comfort zone.17
Learning about learning
The British Army should embrace the ideas of
Peter Senge and his books should be read at
Sandhurst, Shrivenham and beyond. Furthermore,
‘systems-thinking’ would enable the British Army to
move from its current stove-piped view of lessons
and adopt a more holistic approach. In Senge’s
words, the current methods demonstrate a
“reinforcing reliance on quick fixes…and an
unwillingness to take the time to work out
integrative solutions.”18
17 I would love to recommend that each MXS be
held in civilian clothing, without rank and for all to
be on first name terms but I know this would be
unthinkable to many, if not most.
18 Senge, p344.
Furthermore, whilst Senge should ideally be for
everyone, those with specific responsibility for
organisational learning should also acquaint
themselves with the works of Chris Argyris, Arie De
Geus and Nick Milton.19
Lessons Learned Handbook by Nick Milton
A lessons cadre
As with many staff posts across the British Army,
those in the field of learning are normally filled on a
“best-fit” basis, without interviews. Consequently,
some people fill roles for which they are unsuited.
Given the potential impact of such roles, the criteria
should be amended to facilitate the selection of
those with the requisite qualities of complete
integrity (about their own limitations and failings),
moral courage (so as to challenge the chain of
command robustly to uncover the truth) and
19 Chris Argyris’s work on organisational defence
mechanisms and ‘mental models’ greatly
influenced Senge’s 5th Discipline; Arie De Geus’s
1997 work, “The Living Company” ((1999) Nicholas
Brealey, London) is also a source. De Geus worked
at Royal Dutch Shell for 4 decades and pioneered
their use of ‘scenario planning’. Nick Milton was a
core member of BP’s Knowledge Management
team in the 1990s and recently wrote the very
practical guide to learning, “The Lessons Learned
Handbook” (2010) Chandos, Oxford.

8
intellectual curiosity (the “personal mastery” sought
by Senge).20 Better a post is gapped than someone
lacking integrity or intellectual ambition fills it. A
learning cadre should be created, attracting the
very best in each recruitment pool.
Moving LXC up the chain
The LXC should be removed from its current
position within the Directorate of Land Warfare and
should report directly to the Chief of the General
Staff, in the same manner as the Army
Inspectorate, in order for it to be able properly to
‘speak truth unto power’. The messages and
warnings from lessons have lacked impact due to
the dilution from the ‘value’ added by each level of
the chain of command21. The response to a 2010
British Army Review22 article by Captain John
Bethell (Intelligence Officer to the Welsh Guards
Battle Group on their 2009 Helmand tour) entitled,
“Accidental Counterinsurgents” is a case in point.
The article criticised the British Army’s approach to,
training for and understanding of the campaign in
Afghanistan. Its publication was permitted in the
Review only with a LXC ‘response’ to the article
20 “People with high levels of personal mastery are
more committed. They take more initiative. They
have a broader and deeper sense of responsibility
in their work. They learn faster.” Senge, p133.
21 “Language in briefing becomes more bland and
insipid, and in particular, relies on extensive
euphemism, leading to great difficulty in
communicating the undesirable….[This} has led to
a command climate in which bad news is routinely
camouflaged.…” Little, p. 14.
22 BAR is classified at ‘Restricted’ (akin to ‘For
Official Use Only’ (FOUO)) and is therefore
unfortunately unavailable as a reference – a
debatable point in its own right. A summary of
Bethell’s criticisms can be found in “Dead Men
Risen” by Toby Harnden (2011) Quercus, London,
p540.
printed below it – a response drafted with the
understanding that it had to be seen to nullify the
criticisms and demonstrate that they were useful,
gratefully received but now very much out of date.
Performance appraisals
Supporting, enabling and encouraging
organisational learning should be criteria against
which all military personnel should be judged. The
British Army should reward and promote those that
demonstrate honesty, modesty, curiosity and an
incessant desire to understand why things happen
as they do. If someone is formally assessed in a
particular aspect of their work, they are more likely
to view it as important. London’s Metropolitan
Police Service has already introduced such criteria
for the performance appraisals of senior officers.23
The British Army should investigate this initiative
and do the same, from recruitment onwards.
Dialogue, not discussion
The structural tensions within MXS should be
removed through the use of independent dialogue
facilitation for each syndicate discussion.24 Whilst
the ‘gold-plated’ solution would involve external
civilian facilitators running each session, a half-way
house addressing the key flaws within the current
model would be for uniformed officers outside the
direct chain of command to run and write up for
each meeting. Regardless of which option is
23 Based on email exchange between the author
and an OL analyst at the Metropolitan Police (April
2012)).
24 Peter Senge differentiates between discussion
and dialogue thus, “In a discussion, different views
are presented and defended….In dialogue, different
views are presented as a means toward
discovering a new view. In a discussion, decisions
are made. In a dialogue, complex issues are
explored.” Senge, p. 230.

9
adopted, greater openness and transparency will
most likely be achieved if those in authority really
want it to happen and are willing to make some
sacrifices to achieve it.25
Good old-fashioned leadership
To make such changes requires leadership. At its
heart, good leadership, as traditionally taught at
Sandhurst or West Point, enables learning to take
place. Good leaders are humble, self-effacing and
honest, recognising that their staff often know more
about a topic than they do. They admit to making
mistakes, are not weighed down by excessive pride
and understand the value in their own errors being
heard, understood and avoided.26 Failure to do so,
given the often unconscious ways in which people
lead by example, can seriously damage any
organisation’s ability to ask, and answer, difficult
questions about its own performance.27
25 “…everyone involved must truly want the
benefits of dialogue more than he wants to hold
onto the privileges of rank. If one person is used to
having his view prevail because he is the most
senior person, then that privilege must be
surrendered in dialogue. If one person is used to
withholding his views because he is more junior,
then that security of nondisclosure must also be
surrendered.” Senge, p. 228.
26 In 2011, one CO, briefing on his Afghan tour,
spoke of the lack of understanding and
misconceived ideas with which he had deployed.
One particular operation, involving 3 sub-units,
was undone “by 2 blokes with a moped and a
mobile phone”, forcing him to re-visit his
assumptions about his environment and his role
within it. This taught him much and his modesty
enabled those of us in the audience to benefit as
well. No-one thought any worse of him for this;
rather, we respected him all the more for it.
27 By contrast, another officer’s briefing offered
up some “enduring tactical imperatives” of which
Don’t be so defensive
Conversely, just as honest, self-critical leadership
should prosper, so should defensive behaviour be
discouraged – to consider the short-term cover-up
of mistakes or wrong-doing as evidence of ‘loyalty
to the team’ is misguided and anything but loyal to
those servicemen and women that may suffer
death or injury if the true causes of incidents and
accidents are not revealed, shared and rectified.
Other objections to revealing the truth include
‘maintaining morale’, ‘not thinking ill of the dead’,
‘operational security’ and ‘consideration for the
next-of-kin’. Whilst their intentions may be noble,
their effect is to obscure the facts and inhibit
learning.
One team - really?
Many organisations claim to possess and
encourage ‘team spirit’ but it was not until leaving
the Army that I realised how shallow and transient
this concept is in civilian life. I define team spirit as
‘sticking round late to help someone out, despite
not having any obligation to do so’. This happens
in the Army – especially so in its fighting units:
Regiments and Corps with long, proud histories.
The thing is, the bonds that join men and women
together to fight for one another on the battlefield
can, on occasion, turn them against other
colleagues of different cap-badges. Moreover,
the final one was, “Be a learning and adaptive
organisation.” When questions were invited, I
asked, “I notice that the tenth of your enduring
imperatives talks of “a learning and adaptive
organisation”. Bearing that in mind, what mistakes
did you make, personally, and what did you learn
from them?” The response was, “Hmm, good
question. I must admit I did not come prepared for
that one…. we always talk about the good points,
don’t we? Can I come back to you later on? Right,
next question…”

10
internal competition inhibits collective learning and
knowledge sharing28. Too often, people forced to
choose between ‘honesty’ and ‘loyalty’ will choose
the latter as the path of least resistance.
Furthermore, there is a pecking order of credibility
within the Army, along roughly the following lines:
Special Forces at the summit, then the Combat
Arms (i.e. infantry, armoured and aviation units);
next come the Combat Support Arms (i.e. artillery,
engineers, communications etc.), followed finally by
the Combat Service Support Arms (i.e. technical,
administrative and logistical support). There are
exceptions to every rule but, generally speaking,
those nearer the top of this pecking order are more
highly regarded than those lower down.
I alluded to ‘mental models’ in an earlier footnote.
These are deeply-held beliefs about the world,
which simplify our experience of it and without
which we would have to assemble and analyse
data in order to be able to perform the most basic
of mental deductions (i.e. since we can’t be forever
checking whether every single chair on which we
intend to sit will take our weight, we use a mental
model of a chair to simplify things).29 They are a
form of prejudice, for good or bad.
The Army’s regimental system and rank structures
are its most obvious mental models – requiring
loyalty between people where honesty is needed
28 A former LXC colleague, on reading a draft of
this paper, emailed thus: “…whilst we may share a
passing concern for those who wear the same
uniform as us and wouldn't want to see any real
harm come to them, we really like nothing better
than seeing other units/regiments or our career
competitors make mistakes and be embarrassed -
why? Because in the zero-sum game of regimental
bragging rights or career advancement, their loss is
your gain.”
29 Senge, p. 164.
for learning to take place; furthermore, the
credibility of any knowledge is tested many times
before it passes the filter of cap-badge (or rank)
prejudice. An audience of officers at Staff College
would happily listen to a Friday afternoon lecture on
pay and promotions policy if delivered by an officer
with a sandy beret and blue belt; however, a
fireside chat about a recent combat operation
would need to be very exciting indeed if delivered
by a logistician or technical officer, alas.
I don’t call for the Regimental system of rank
structure to be abolished; merely for their effect on
knowledge transfer and learning to be
acknowledged and options on how to mitigate them
should be considered.
Mission command – learning by doing
The British Army professes to use ‘mission
command’ to plan and conduct operations – the
decentralised execution of orders through the
maximising of trusted subordinates’ freedom of
action within clearly-defined constraints. However,
the increase in operational staff-work for a
combined arms operation nowadays appears
inversely proportionate to the extent to which a
belief in mission command is professed.
Commanders should be given greater continuity in
post to establish the relationships on which mission
command depends and the greater trust
established should enable more freedom of action,
more risk-taking and more learning.
Towards a just culture
In the world of air safety, the consequences of not
reporting accidents or ‘near-misses’ have led to the
development of a ‘just culture’, which
acknowledges mistakes can be made30. The
30 Taken from
http://flightsafety.org/files/just_culture.pdf,
accessed on 31 May 2012.

11
British Army should examine such an approach.
This is nothing new - examples are already found in
the use of ammunition ‘amnesty boxes’ throughout
Army barracks and the ‘range declarations’ given at
the end of each live firing practice31. If the negative
consequences of coming forward to admit errors
outweigh the benefits, then soldiers and officers
alike will continue to keep the ‘truth’ under wraps.
Learning from others
The LXC has established links with both the US
Army’s Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
and the Marine Corps Centre for Lessons Learned
(MCCLL) and with its equivalents in other armies.
It has also shared ideas and issues with companies
such as Royal Dutch Shell and BP, as well as
organisations as diverse as the London Fire
Brigade and the OXFAM charity. Such
relationships offer valuable insights into how other
organisations learn and should not be neglected.
The LXC should be bolder still and approach
consultancies, IT companies and the nuclear
industry – anyone willing to share ideas, frankly –
to learn ‘what works’ and not just ‘what works for
the Army’. Furthermore, the British tradition of
over-classifying official documentation impedes
both the internal sharing of knowledge hard-won on
operations and its critical analysis by outsiders
who, however unwelcome, may nevertheless
provide valuable insights. To make the point, you
can buy the US Army/Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual online whereas
tracking down its British equivalent requires agility,
31 Amnesty boxes permit soldiers to hand in
discovered ammunition safely, without
consequences. After a range declaration that they
have no live rounds or empty cases in their
possession, soldiers are advised that if they do find
such items, they can hand them to a member of
staff and “nothing more will be said”.
cunning and tenacity. It’s certainly not the enemy’s
efforts that are most frustrated by such constraints.
Conclusion
The British Army has made many attempts to
identify “the lessons of failure in Iraq and
Afghanistan”32 and is trying to learn them. Its
allocation of extra resources, time and effort do it
credit but it will not reap the potential rewards
unless matched by a shift in culture33 – from one in
which very few own up to errors to one where
leaders are confident enough to admit their own
personal failings, safe in the knowledge that doing
so will win their soldiers’ respect, not diminish it.
The final words go to Major Giles Harris DSO, who
commanded the Prince of Wales’s Company of the
Welsh Guards on their bloody tour of Afghanistan
in 2009,
“The British are very good at whipping ourselves
into a sense of achievement….we almost have to,
to make it bearable. You can’t do something like
this and analyse it all the way through and think:
“Actually we got that wrong.” You just can’t. It
takes so much emotional investment. I’m not
saying we lie to ourselves but there’s an element of
telling yourself that it’s all right and it’s going well,
just to keep going.”34
Such honesty. We need more of it.
32 Ledwidge, p. 267.
33 “It is the organisational culture of the military
institution that determines whether innovation
succeeds or fails.” John A Nagel, “Learning to Eat
Soup with a Knife” (2005) University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, p. 215.
34 Harnden, p. 558.

LEARNING LESSONS THE HARD WAY - THE BRITISH ARMY'S EXPERIENCE

More Related Content

Viewers also liked

Similar to LEARNING LESSONS THE HARD WAY - THE BRITISH ARMY'S EXPERIENCE

Recently uploaded

LEARNING LESSONS THE HARD WAY - THE BRITISH ARMY'S EXPERIENCE