The document provides answers and explanations for 10 multiple choice questions regarding USPTO procedures and guidelines from the MPEP.
The summaries are:
1. The most correct answer is that a rejection of claims can be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, while an objection requiring deletion of new matter is subject to supervisory review by petition.
2. All answers were credited for a question.
3. The most correct answer is that an interview should only be held when it could serve to develop and clarify specific issues and lead to mutual understanding between the examiner and applicant to advance prosecution.
Patent bar practice questions october 2003Bradley Sands
This document is the Questions and Answers from the October 2003 Exam. You'll notice I put in key knowledge points for the multiple choice sections and also tried to identify the question's topic. I didn't pay for an expensive test prep to study for the patent bar. Instead, I went through the freely available test questions from 2002 and 2003, found all of the answers in the MPEP, and put the Q&As into manageable slides. Thus, the day before the exam, I was able to easily go through 200+ questions in only a few hours and go through my entire outline in about an hour. Then, the day of the exam, I went through the outline in the morning. I took and "preliminarily" passed the patent bar on August 11, 2016. Hopefully this content will help you study for and confidently take the patent bar.
Patent bar practice questions april 2003Bradley Sands
The document contains a 15 question multiple choice exam from the USPTO regarding patent law procedures and rules. The questions cover topics such as proper Markush groups, responses to office actions, fees and deadlines, common ownership under 103, and when a final rejection is proper. The exam tests knowledge of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).
This document is the outline I generated from the online tests available from the USPTO Patent Bar. I didn't pay for an expensive test prep to study for the patent bar. Instead, I went through the freely available test questions from 2002 and 2003, found all of the answers in the MPEP, and put the Q&As into manageable slides. Thus, the day before the exam, I was able to easily go through 200+ questions in only a few hours and go through this entire Outline in about an hour. Then, the day of the exam, I went through this outline in the morning. I took and "preliminarily" passed the patent bar on August 11, 2016. Hopefully this content will help you study for and confidently take the patent bar.
The document contains the morning exam session from April 2003 with multiple choice questions and answers regarding patent law and procedures. Question 1 discusses requirements for actual reduction to practice. Question 2 addresses consequences for failing to notify the office of a foreign filing after submitting a non-publication request. Question 3 regards providing a reply stating that required information is unknown or not readily available.
The document contains questions and multiple choice answers regarding USPTO rules and procedures for reissue patents, as outlined in the MPEP. It addresses topics like what can be corrected with a Certificate of Correction, what constitutes impermissible recapture in a reissue application, and the requirements for filing reissue applications to broaden claims within two years of the original patent grant.
Carl Client has filed a lawsuit against Indiana Skydiving Center related to injuries sustained during a skydiving accident. He is requesting the production of documents from Indiana Skydiving Center related to parachute inspection procedures, communications regarding parachutes and deployment devices, and reports regarding the condition of the skydiving center. Carl Client is also requesting interrogatories to identify employees involved in his training and the investigation of his parachute, as well as entities involved in providing and installing his parachute. Finally, Carl Client has requested admissions from Robert Dougherty regarding aircraft deployment procedures, business registrations, and trainer expectations.
The document discusses several recent patent law cases:
1. The Supreme Court may review whether clear and convincing evidence is the proper standard of proof for patent invalidity challenges, as some judges argue factual findings in claim construction should be given deference.
2. Design patent cases were impacted by rulings on separating functional from ornamental elements and applying the ordinary observer test.
3. The written description requirement and what is needed to show possession of generic invention claims was addressed in an en banc Federal Circuit decision.
4. Inducement of infringement and liability for method patent violations under section 271(f) were also topics of recent case law developments.
Claim construction from the perspective of a trial lawyer jerrypattersonsheridan
This document discusses various principles of claim construction from the perspective of a trial lawyer. It summarizes guidelines from key cases like Phillips v. AWH Corp. that instruct courts to primarily rely on intrinsic evidence like the claims, specification, and prosecution history to determine the meaning of claim terms to one of ordinary skill in the art. It also discusses debates around how much weight to give the specification in limiting claim scope versus taking the plain meaning.
Patent bar practice questions october 2003Bradley Sands
This document is the Questions and Answers from the October 2003 Exam. You'll notice I put in key knowledge points for the multiple choice sections and also tried to identify the question's topic. I didn't pay for an expensive test prep to study for the patent bar. Instead, I went through the freely available test questions from 2002 and 2003, found all of the answers in the MPEP, and put the Q&As into manageable slides. Thus, the day before the exam, I was able to easily go through 200+ questions in only a few hours and go through my entire outline in about an hour. Then, the day of the exam, I went through the outline in the morning. I took and "preliminarily" passed the patent bar on August 11, 2016. Hopefully this content will help you study for and confidently take the patent bar.
Patent bar practice questions april 2003Bradley Sands
The document contains a 15 question multiple choice exam from the USPTO regarding patent law procedures and rules. The questions cover topics such as proper Markush groups, responses to office actions, fees and deadlines, common ownership under 103, and when a final rejection is proper. The exam tests knowledge of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).
This document is the outline I generated from the online tests available from the USPTO Patent Bar. I didn't pay for an expensive test prep to study for the patent bar. Instead, I went through the freely available test questions from 2002 and 2003, found all of the answers in the MPEP, and put the Q&As into manageable slides. Thus, the day before the exam, I was able to easily go through 200+ questions in only a few hours and go through this entire Outline in about an hour. Then, the day of the exam, I went through this outline in the morning. I took and "preliminarily" passed the patent bar on August 11, 2016. Hopefully this content will help you study for and confidently take the patent bar.
The document contains the morning exam session from April 2003 with multiple choice questions and answers regarding patent law and procedures. Question 1 discusses requirements for actual reduction to practice. Question 2 addresses consequences for failing to notify the office of a foreign filing after submitting a non-publication request. Question 3 regards providing a reply stating that required information is unknown or not readily available.
The document contains questions and multiple choice answers regarding USPTO rules and procedures for reissue patents, as outlined in the MPEP. It addresses topics like what can be corrected with a Certificate of Correction, what constitutes impermissible recapture in a reissue application, and the requirements for filing reissue applications to broaden claims within two years of the original patent grant.
Carl Client has filed a lawsuit against Indiana Skydiving Center related to injuries sustained during a skydiving accident. He is requesting the production of documents from Indiana Skydiving Center related to parachute inspection procedures, communications regarding parachutes and deployment devices, and reports regarding the condition of the skydiving center. Carl Client is also requesting interrogatories to identify employees involved in his training and the investigation of his parachute, as well as entities involved in providing and installing his parachute. Finally, Carl Client has requested admissions from Robert Dougherty regarding aircraft deployment procedures, business registrations, and trainer expectations.
The document discusses several recent patent law cases:
1. The Supreme Court may review whether clear and convincing evidence is the proper standard of proof for patent invalidity challenges, as some judges argue factual findings in claim construction should be given deference.
2. Design patent cases were impacted by rulings on separating functional from ornamental elements and applying the ordinary observer test.
3. The written description requirement and what is needed to show possession of generic invention claims was addressed in an en banc Federal Circuit decision.
4. Inducement of infringement and liability for method patent violations under section 271(f) were also topics of recent case law developments.
Claim construction from the perspective of a trial lawyer jerrypattersonsheridan
This document discusses various principles of claim construction from the perspective of a trial lawyer. It summarizes guidelines from key cases like Phillips v. AWH Corp. that instruct courts to primarily rely on intrinsic evidence like the claims, specification, and prosecution history to determine the meaning of claim terms to one of ordinary skill in the art. It also discusses debates around how much weight to give the specification in limiting claim scope versus taking the plain meaning.
The document provides information on intellectual property (IP) practice, including:
1) HDP is the 10th largest US IP firm with over 110 attorneys across four offices. In 2018 it obtained the 6th highest number of utility patents.
2) It discusses strategies for freedom to operate (FTO) analyses such as patent searches, monitoring risks of infringement, and obtaining opinions of counsel. Litigation costs and risks are also reviewed.
3) Guidelines are presented for patent preparation and prosecution best practices, including ownership issues, duty of candor, claim drafting, means-plus-function language, and obviousness arguments.
State Bar Advanced CLE Presentation August 2012 (selinger)pattersonsheridan
This document provides an overview of key considerations for trial lawyers regarding claim construction. It discusses starting claim construction with the goal of avoiding infringement or creating invalidity defenses. It also discusses that claim construction is often outcome determinative, citing the Markman ruling. The document reviews guidelines from court cases like Phillips and Thorner on interpreting claim terms based on intrinsic evidence and the specification. It also discusses narrowing claims during prosecution and the role of trial counsel in the claim construction process.
Anatomy of a Civil Appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme CourtNicole Benjamin
This document outlines the anatomy and process of a civil appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. It details the key steps including filing a notice of appeal within 20 days of judgment, requesting transcripts within 20 days, transmitting the record within 60 days, submitting Rule 12A statements, participating in a pre-briefing conference, submitting briefs or supplemental statements depending on the calendar assignment, participating in oral arguments ranging from 10-30 minutes depending on the calendar, and awaiting a decision which is typically released by July 1 each year. The process involves pre-docketing and post-docketing requirements and procedures.
The document discusses two methods for expediting patent rights: (1) early publication of provisional applications to obtain provisional rights, and (2) filing a petition to make an application special to receive early examination. It provides details on the requirements and procedures for both approaches, including how to request early publication, the conditions that warrant special status, and the accelerated examination process.
Case studies presentation_Patent Research AESAN PATEL
Infringement: A term which is very common in patent research and law forms. i.e. the action of breaking the terms of a law, agreement, etc.; violation.
The document discusses patentability requirements in the US, including utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. It provides details on the types of subject matter that can be patented, conditions for novelty like anticipation and statutory bars, and considerations for non-obviousness. It also discusses the European patent regime and takes questions.
European & us patent law module3 2013 updatedIP Dome
This document provides an overview of patentability requirements in the US and Europe. It discusses the US patent regime, including patentability, novelty, non-obviousness, and specific cases related to anticipation. It also touches on plant patents, hybrids, and the differences between filing dates and priority dates. Overall, the document outlines key concepts regarding patent eligibility and examines the standards for obtaining a patent in different jurisdictions.
The webinar covered several orthopedic IP litigation topics:
1. ConforMIS has settled multiple patent infringement suits against competitors, deriving over $40 million in licensing revenue from their patents on patient-specific orthopedic implants and instruments.
2. Smith & Nephew challenged many of ConforMIS's patents through inter partes review proceedings, successfully invalidating key patents. This led to an eventual $10.5 million settlement between the companies.
3. Recent cases also involve prolific doctor-inventors aggressively asserting their orthopedic patent portfolios against numerous competitors. Enforcement of patents is occurring not just in the US but also in other countries like France.
60 Minutes and New England Compounding Pharmacymzamoralaw
This order grants plaintiff Chad Green's motion to conduct an expedited inspection of defendant New England Compounding Pharmacy's (NECC) facility in Framingham, Massachusetts, subject to certain parameters. The court found good cause for early discovery through an inspection, as time is of the essence and further delay could make it difficult for Green to obtain scientifically valid information. The court also found that the proposed inspection and testing are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The inspection will be allowed to proceed within four days according to specified restrictions to avoid interfering with ongoing government investigations.
Chad Green adv. New England Compounding Pharmacymzamoralaw
This order grants plaintiff Chad Green's motion to conduct an expedited inspection of defendant New England Compounding Pharmacy's (NECC) facility in Framingham, Massachusetts, subject to certain parameters. The court found good cause for early discovery through an inspection, as time is of the essence and further delay could make it difficult for Green to obtain scientifically valid information. The court also found that the proposed inspection and testing are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The inspection will be allowed to proceed within four days according to specified restrictions to avoid interfering with ongoing government investigations.
This document summarizes the key statutory requirements for patentability in the United States, including novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure requirements. It discusses how prior art references can anticipate claimed inventions either expressly or inherently, and how multiple references may render a claimed invention obvious. The level of ordinary skill in the art and secondary considerations must be considered for obviousness. Later Supreme Court cases further refined how obviousness is determined.
The document summarizes highlights from the second year of post-issuance proceedings administered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). It discusses several notable cases from 2014 related to inter partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant review. Specifically, it discusses how the Federal Circuit addressed the appealability of PTAB decisions on petitions and clarified that only final written decisions can be appealed. It also summarizes trends in petitions filed and issues considered in the second year of these new proceedings introduced by the America Invents Act.
Partners Dan Altman and David Schmidt, Ph.D., gave an informative presentation focused on strategic considerations for drafting and prosecuting patent claims directed to life sciences-related inventions, before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The presentation was summarized in Japanese by IP Strategist, Kenny Masaki.
The document discusses the disclosure requirements for biotechnology patents under 35 USC § 112. It covers topics like enablement, written description, and the statutory disclosure requirements. It summarizes several relevant court cases, including In re Wright, UC v. Eli Lilly, Enzo v. Gen-Probe, Chiron v. Genentech, and U. of Rochester v. Searle. The cases discuss how broad claims require broad disclosure, and that the specification must demonstrate possession of the full scope of the claims, including after-arising technologies. Undue experimentation and claims of undue breadth can result in lack of enablement.
SCOTUS Amicus Brief filed in Alice Corp. v CLS Bank case.Patrick Delaney
This amicus brief supports endorsing the analytical framework laid out in Chief Judge Rader's concurring opinion in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., which included a "claim as a whole" test consistent with Diehr. The brief argues this would be an incremental clarification of the law for evaluating computer-implemented inventions under 35 U.S.C. 101 that embraces the machine-or-transformation test endorsed in Bilski while achieving consensus with Judge Lourie's CLS Bank opinion. The framework is also fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent and clarifies that a claim must meaningfully limit an abstract idea to a specific application or machine to be patent eligible.
The document announces an upcoming seminar on navigating the risks and rewards of the America Invents Act for start-ups and entrepreneurs. The seminar will be held on October 27th, 2011 from 11:30 AM to 1:00 PM PST at Hantel Technologies in Hayward, CA. It will feature speaker Brian Eller from NC State who will provide an overview of the immediate and long term impacts of the America Invents Act on innovation and technology development, with relevance for medical devices. Registration is requested on EventBrite.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that the federal Animal Welfare Act does not preempt a claim brought under North Carolina law alleging animal cruelty at a zoo. The federal law does not expressly preempt state law, implies no intent to exclusively regulate animal welfare nationwide, and does not conflict with the state law. Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims and its dismissal was reversed and remanded.
An expert at HGF Limited presented on developing effective patent strategies for personalized medical devices in Europe and the US. The presentation covered:
1) Considerations for patenting personalized medical devices in Europe, including allowable claim types and restrictions on methods of treatment.
2) A hypothetical case study of a company developing a customized implantable medical device, and strategies for patenting it in Europe and the US.
3) Lessons learned from litigation involving Conformis, a pioneer in personalized orthopedic implants, highlighting the complexities of prosecuting patents for such technologies.
The document summarizes two key patent cases in India - Novartis AG's plea seeking patent protection for its cancer drug Glivec, which was dismissed, and Natco Pharma's compulsory license application for the cancer drug Nexavar, which was granted. The Novartis ruling confirmed that slight modifications alone do not warrant patents under Indian law. The Nexavar ruling allowed Natco to sell cheaper copies of Nexavar, requiring it to pay Bayer royalties and supply some free doses annually. These rulings make life-saving drugs more affordable in India by allowing generics, though multinational companies argue they could reduce pharmaceutical investment and innovation.
ITC Markman Ruling in Patent Case Against Samsung, QualcommNVIDIA
A U.S. International Trade Commission judge has returned a pretrial claim construction ruling that favors NVIDIA on nearly all of the claims that were disputed in our patent case against Samsung and Qualcomm.
The document describes a patent application that was filed on May 1, 2001 naming inventor H as the sole inventor. A primary examiner rejected all the claims under 35 USC 102(e) as being anticipated by a patent granted to inventors H and S that was filed on December 7, 2000. The patent application and patent define the same patentable invention. Filing a terminal disclaimer in accordance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or filing a declaration stating the application and patent are commonly owned and the named inventor is the prior inventor under 35 USC 104 would overcome the rejection according to the patent laws and procedures in the MPEP.
The document provides information on intellectual property (IP) practice, including:
1) HDP is the 10th largest US IP firm with over 110 attorneys across four offices. In 2018 it obtained the 6th highest number of utility patents.
2) It discusses strategies for freedom to operate (FTO) analyses such as patent searches, monitoring risks of infringement, and obtaining opinions of counsel. Litigation costs and risks are also reviewed.
3) Guidelines are presented for patent preparation and prosecution best practices, including ownership issues, duty of candor, claim drafting, means-plus-function language, and obviousness arguments.
State Bar Advanced CLE Presentation August 2012 (selinger)pattersonsheridan
This document provides an overview of key considerations for trial lawyers regarding claim construction. It discusses starting claim construction with the goal of avoiding infringement or creating invalidity defenses. It also discusses that claim construction is often outcome determinative, citing the Markman ruling. The document reviews guidelines from court cases like Phillips and Thorner on interpreting claim terms based on intrinsic evidence and the specification. It also discusses narrowing claims during prosecution and the role of trial counsel in the claim construction process.
Anatomy of a Civil Appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme CourtNicole Benjamin
This document outlines the anatomy and process of a civil appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. It details the key steps including filing a notice of appeal within 20 days of judgment, requesting transcripts within 20 days, transmitting the record within 60 days, submitting Rule 12A statements, participating in a pre-briefing conference, submitting briefs or supplemental statements depending on the calendar assignment, participating in oral arguments ranging from 10-30 minutes depending on the calendar, and awaiting a decision which is typically released by July 1 each year. The process involves pre-docketing and post-docketing requirements and procedures.
The document discusses two methods for expediting patent rights: (1) early publication of provisional applications to obtain provisional rights, and (2) filing a petition to make an application special to receive early examination. It provides details on the requirements and procedures for both approaches, including how to request early publication, the conditions that warrant special status, and the accelerated examination process.
Case studies presentation_Patent Research AESAN PATEL
Infringement: A term which is very common in patent research and law forms. i.e. the action of breaking the terms of a law, agreement, etc.; violation.
The document discusses patentability requirements in the US, including utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. It provides details on the types of subject matter that can be patented, conditions for novelty like anticipation and statutory bars, and considerations for non-obviousness. It also discusses the European patent regime and takes questions.
European & us patent law module3 2013 updatedIP Dome
This document provides an overview of patentability requirements in the US and Europe. It discusses the US patent regime, including patentability, novelty, non-obviousness, and specific cases related to anticipation. It also touches on plant patents, hybrids, and the differences between filing dates and priority dates. Overall, the document outlines key concepts regarding patent eligibility and examines the standards for obtaining a patent in different jurisdictions.
The webinar covered several orthopedic IP litigation topics:
1. ConforMIS has settled multiple patent infringement suits against competitors, deriving over $40 million in licensing revenue from their patents on patient-specific orthopedic implants and instruments.
2. Smith & Nephew challenged many of ConforMIS's patents through inter partes review proceedings, successfully invalidating key patents. This led to an eventual $10.5 million settlement between the companies.
3. Recent cases also involve prolific doctor-inventors aggressively asserting their orthopedic patent portfolios against numerous competitors. Enforcement of patents is occurring not just in the US but also in other countries like France.
60 Minutes and New England Compounding Pharmacymzamoralaw
This order grants plaintiff Chad Green's motion to conduct an expedited inspection of defendant New England Compounding Pharmacy's (NECC) facility in Framingham, Massachusetts, subject to certain parameters. The court found good cause for early discovery through an inspection, as time is of the essence and further delay could make it difficult for Green to obtain scientifically valid information. The court also found that the proposed inspection and testing are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The inspection will be allowed to proceed within four days according to specified restrictions to avoid interfering with ongoing government investigations.
Chad Green adv. New England Compounding Pharmacymzamoralaw
This order grants plaintiff Chad Green's motion to conduct an expedited inspection of defendant New England Compounding Pharmacy's (NECC) facility in Framingham, Massachusetts, subject to certain parameters. The court found good cause for early discovery through an inspection, as time is of the essence and further delay could make it difficult for Green to obtain scientifically valid information. The court also found that the proposed inspection and testing are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The inspection will be allowed to proceed within four days according to specified restrictions to avoid interfering with ongoing government investigations.
This document summarizes the key statutory requirements for patentability in the United States, including novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure requirements. It discusses how prior art references can anticipate claimed inventions either expressly or inherently, and how multiple references may render a claimed invention obvious. The level of ordinary skill in the art and secondary considerations must be considered for obviousness. Later Supreme Court cases further refined how obviousness is determined.
The document summarizes highlights from the second year of post-issuance proceedings administered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). It discusses several notable cases from 2014 related to inter partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant review. Specifically, it discusses how the Federal Circuit addressed the appealability of PTAB decisions on petitions and clarified that only final written decisions can be appealed. It also summarizes trends in petitions filed and issues considered in the second year of these new proceedings introduced by the America Invents Act.
Partners Dan Altman and David Schmidt, Ph.D., gave an informative presentation focused on strategic considerations for drafting and prosecuting patent claims directed to life sciences-related inventions, before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The presentation was summarized in Japanese by IP Strategist, Kenny Masaki.
The document discusses the disclosure requirements for biotechnology patents under 35 USC § 112. It covers topics like enablement, written description, and the statutory disclosure requirements. It summarizes several relevant court cases, including In re Wright, UC v. Eli Lilly, Enzo v. Gen-Probe, Chiron v. Genentech, and U. of Rochester v. Searle. The cases discuss how broad claims require broad disclosure, and that the specification must demonstrate possession of the full scope of the claims, including after-arising technologies. Undue experimentation and claims of undue breadth can result in lack of enablement.
SCOTUS Amicus Brief filed in Alice Corp. v CLS Bank case.Patrick Delaney
This amicus brief supports endorsing the analytical framework laid out in Chief Judge Rader's concurring opinion in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., which included a "claim as a whole" test consistent with Diehr. The brief argues this would be an incremental clarification of the law for evaluating computer-implemented inventions under 35 U.S.C. 101 that embraces the machine-or-transformation test endorsed in Bilski while achieving consensus with Judge Lourie's CLS Bank opinion. The framework is also fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent and clarifies that a claim must meaningfully limit an abstract idea to a specific application or machine to be patent eligible.
The document announces an upcoming seminar on navigating the risks and rewards of the America Invents Act for start-ups and entrepreneurs. The seminar will be held on October 27th, 2011 from 11:30 AM to 1:00 PM PST at Hantel Technologies in Hayward, CA. It will feature speaker Brian Eller from NC State who will provide an overview of the immediate and long term impacts of the America Invents Act on innovation and technology development, with relevance for medical devices. Registration is requested on EventBrite.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that the federal Animal Welfare Act does not preempt a claim brought under North Carolina law alleging animal cruelty at a zoo. The federal law does not expressly preempt state law, implies no intent to exclusively regulate animal welfare nationwide, and does not conflict with the state law. Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims and its dismissal was reversed and remanded.
An expert at HGF Limited presented on developing effective patent strategies for personalized medical devices in Europe and the US. The presentation covered:
1) Considerations for patenting personalized medical devices in Europe, including allowable claim types and restrictions on methods of treatment.
2) A hypothetical case study of a company developing a customized implantable medical device, and strategies for patenting it in Europe and the US.
3) Lessons learned from litigation involving Conformis, a pioneer in personalized orthopedic implants, highlighting the complexities of prosecuting patents for such technologies.
The document summarizes two key patent cases in India - Novartis AG's plea seeking patent protection for its cancer drug Glivec, which was dismissed, and Natco Pharma's compulsory license application for the cancer drug Nexavar, which was granted. The Novartis ruling confirmed that slight modifications alone do not warrant patents under Indian law. The Nexavar ruling allowed Natco to sell cheaper copies of Nexavar, requiring it to pay Bayer royalties and supply some free doses annually. These rulings make life-saving drugs more affordable in India by allowing generics, though multinational companies argue they could reduce pharmaceutical investment and innovation.
ITC Markman Ruling in Patent Case Against Samsung, QualcommNVIDIA
A U.S. International Trade Commission judge has returned a pretrial claim construction ruling that favors NVIDIA on nearly all of the claims that were disputed in our patent case against Samsung and Qualcomm.
The document describes a patent application that was filed on May 1, 2001 naming inventor H as the sole inventor. A primary examiner rejected all the claims under 35 USC 102(e) as being anticipated by a patent granted to inventors H and S that was filed on December 7, 2000. The patent application and patent define the same patentable invention. Filing a terminal disclaimer in accordance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or filing a declaration stating the application and patent are commonly owned and the named inventor is the prior inventor under 35 USC 104 would overcome the rejection according to the patent laws and procedures in the MPEP.
Are United States' Courts Adopting an Essential Elements Test for Patent Vali...David Thibodeau
A review of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit relating to the description requirement of 35 USC 112. Recent cases such as ICU Medical and Automotive Technologies v. BMW are discussed.
This document is a summary of the Supreme Court case Bilski v. Kappos regarding the patent eligibility of business methods and processes. The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's judgment that the patent application in question claimed an unpatentable abstract idea, but rejected the Federal Circuit's view that the machine-or-transformation test is the sole test for determining patent eligibility of a process under Section 101 of the Patent Act. The Court held that while the machine-or-transformation test is a useful clue for determining patent eligibility, it is not the sole test. The Court also rejected a categorical exclusion of business methods from Section 101's definition of patentable processes.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's ruling that the claimed invention in the patent application is not patent eligible. The Court rejected two approaches advocated by the Federal Circuit and respondents: 1) that the machine-or-transformation test is the sole test for determining patent eligibility of a process, and 2) that business methods are categorically excluded from patentability. However, the Court found that the claimed invention in this case was attempting to patent the abstract idea of hedging risk, which is not patent eligible subject matter.
This document provides a summary of an opposition proceeding between Campari America LLC (Opposer) and Skyyguard, Corp. (Applicant) regarding Applicant's application to register the mark "SKYYGUARD" for roofing services. The Opposition Board dismissed all of Opposer's claims, including Opposer's claim that Applicant was not using the mark in interstate commerce as of the application filing date, as required for a Section 1(a) use-based application. The Board found that although Applicant's roofing projects to date had been confined to Colorado, Applicant's activities were sufficient to constitute "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act. As a result, Applicant's application was
This document is a Supreme Court syllabus for the case Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. regarding the proper interpretation of the definiteness requirement in patent claims under 35 U.S.C. 112. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit's decision, concluding that the lower court's standard of "amenable to construction" and not "insolubly ambiguous" does not satisfy the statute's requirement that a patent claim must clearly define the scope of the invention. The Supreme Court held that a patent is invalid if the claims, in light of the specification and prosecution history, fail to inform those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. Without expressing an
The Supreme Court considered the standard for determining whether a patent claim is sufficiently definite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). The Court held that a patent claim is invalid for indefiniteness if the claim, read in light of the specification and prosecution history, fails to inform a person skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. The Court vacated the Federal Circuit's standard that a claim is definite unless it is "insolubly ambiguous" and remanded for the Federal Circuit to reconsider the definiteness of the claims at issue under the new standard.
SKGF_Advisory_Real World Impacts of Reexamination Practice and Procedure_2008SterneKessler
This document discusses issues related to patent reexamination procedures and their impact on patent owners. It provides background on ex parte and inter partes reexamination procedures. It then discusses concerns about the low standard for instituting reexaminations, the impact of reexaminations on capital markets, and identifying the real party in interest in inter partes reexaminations. It proposes solutions such as increasing the standard for reexaminations involving previously litigated patents or previous reexams and keeping reexamination proceedings confidential until a final office action.
This document discusses several appeals cases and answers regarding patent application appeal procedures and regulations.
The document provides detailed answers and explanations for multiple choice questions regarding when an appellant can receive separate consideration for certain claims, when a prior art reference must be included in a statement of rejection, how to address an examiner's answer that contains an alleged new ground of rejection, and other appeal procedures based on 37 CFR and MPEP regulations.
Several answers cite specific sections of the MPEP to explain why certain options are correct or incorrect regarding issues like claim grouping, examiner participation, non-compliant briefs, and other appeal procedures and requirements.
1. Prosecution history estoppel prevents patent holders from claiming infringement on patent claims that were amended during the patent application process.
2. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., the Supreme Court ruled that while amendments create a presumption that the patent holder surrendered access to equivalents, this presumption can be overcome under certain conditions.
3. The Court placed the burden on the patent holder to show what equivalents were not surrendered during amendments, but left room for equivalents that were unforeseeable or bore a tangential relationship to the amendment.
Stem OPT Extension Judge Decision - Jan 23, 2016happyschools
This document is a memorandum opinion from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia regarding a motion from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeking to extend a stay of vacatur for an interim final rule. The court had previously vacated the rule for lack of notice and comment procedures but stayed the vacatur for 6 months to allow DHS time to issue a new rule. DHS now seeks a 90 day extension of the stay, arguing it needs more time to avoid a regulatory gap. The plaintiff opposes, arguing the court lacks jurisdiction during the pending appeal and DHS fails to show extraordinary circumstances for relief. The court grants DHS's motion, finding it has jurisdiction and DHS has shown circumstances warrant
1) The Ex parte Bilski decision established a "machine-or-transformation" test that the USPTO and courts must use to determine if an invention is patent-eligible.
2) Under this test, a process is patent-eligible if it is tied to a particular machine, or if it transforms an article into a different state or thing.
3) The decision affects business method and software patents in particular, and raises questions about how the test applies to processes involving computers, data manipulation, and abstract ideas.
The document discusses the evolution of the legal doctrine of inherent anticipation in U.S. patent law from the late 1800s to present day. It covers key cases that helped define the doctrine. The doctrine holds that a claim may be invalid for lacking novelty if an inherent feature is inherently present in a prior art reference, even if the reference does not explicitly disclose that feature. The document analyzes how the doctrine has been applied to questions of both anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102 and obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103. It concludes by considering whether the doctrine of inherent anticipation will remain relevant after revisions to patent law under the America Invents Act.
The handout for the third of my modules on English patent law. This one deals with patentability or the conditions for the grant of a patent, namely novelty, an inventive step, utility and no exclusion from patentability. On novelty, readers are introduced to the concept of the "state of the art" and the test of novelty in General Tire and Rubber v Firestone. As to inventiveness, they are introduced to the concepts of the skilled addressee and common general knowledge and the Supreme Court's decision in Actavis v ICOS. Finally, on excluded matter there is a very close look at the Aerotel and Macrpssan tests.
Genentech's BPCIA case against Amgen dismissed without prejudice.Sherry Roberg-Perez
1) Amgen submitted a letter brief arguing that Genentech's complaint against Amgen is procedurally improper according to controlling Federal Circuit precedent in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.
2) That precedent held that the sole remedy for any alleged non-compliance with the statutory disclosure requirements for biosimilar applicants is a patent infringement action, not an action to compel compliance.
3) Genentech cannot distinguish the present case from this precedent by arguing Amgen "purported to opt in" to statutory procedures, as the Federal Circuit's reasoning did not depend on whether the applicant opted in or out, but rather on its interpretation of the statutes.
This document contains summaries of several patent reissue applications. It discusses the timing requirements for filing broadening reissue applications under 35 U.S.C. § 251, and exceptions allowing a reissue application to be filed without an oath/declaration or fees. For example, a broadening reissue application must be filed within two years of the original patent grant to avoid statutory bars, but the oath/declaration and fees can be filed later under the provisions of 37 CFR § 1.53(f) and MPEP § 1410.01.
In this talk from Balisage 2017, I present my paper, "Automatically Denormalizing Document Relationships." Abstract: "Native XML databases provide no exception to the problem that data may not be easily contained by any single data storage idiom. Many-to-many relationships, in particular, present a unique problem for documents, as strategies for joining across documents are a potential minefield of software maintenance and performance problems. Automatic denormalization shifts the responsibilty for managing relationships to write-time, making an explicit trade-off for simplicity and speed at runtime. This paper discusses existing strategies for managing relationships across documents and explores design patterns and use cases for performing automatic denormalization and their trade-offs."
The USPTO announced new rules to speed up the patent appeals process by streamlining procedural requirements. The new rules eliminate documents previously required in appeal briefs and examiner answers. They also allow the Board of Patent Appeals to assume jurisdiction earlier and presume certain information if not specified. The goal is to reduce delays and backlog by focusing on substantive issues and limiting new grounds of rejection examiners can introduce during an appeal.
Matthew Professional CV experienced Government LiaisonMattGardner52
As an experienced Government Liaison, I have demonstrated expertise in Corporate Governance. My skill set includes senior-level management in Contract Management, Legal Support, and Diplomatic Relations. I have also gained proficiency as a Corporate Liaison, utilizing my strong background in accounting, finance, and legal, with a Bachelor's degree (B.A.) from California State University. My Administrative Skills further strengthen my ability to contribute to the growth and success of any organization.
Guide on the use of Artificial Intelligence-based tools by lawyers and law fi...Massimo Talia
This guide aims to provide information on how lawyers will be able to use the opportunities provided by AI tools and how such tools could help the business processes of small firms. Its objective is to provide lawyers with some background to understand what they can and cannot realistically expect from these products. This guide aims to give a reference point for small law practices in the EU
against which they can evaluate those classes of AI applications that are probably the most relevant for them.
Sangyun Lee, 'Why Korea's Merger Control Occasionally Fails: A Public Choice ...Sangyun Lee
Presentation slides for a session held on June 4, 2024, at Kyoto University. This presentation is based on the presenter’s recent paper, coauthored with Hwang Lee, Professor, Korea University, with the same title, published in the Journal of Business Administration & Law, Volume 34, No. 2 (April 2024). The paper, written in Korean, is available at <https://shorturl.at/GCWcI>.
The Future of Criminal Defense Lawyer in India.pdfveteranlegal
https://veteranlegal.in/defense-lawyer-in-india/ | Criminal defense Lawyer in India has always been a vital aspect of the country's legal system. As defenders of justice, criminal Defense Lawyer play a critical role in ensuring that individuals accused of crimes receive a fair trial and that their constitutional rights are protected. As India evolves socially, economically, and technologically, the role and future of criminal Defense Lawyer are also undergoing significant changes. This comprehensive blog explores the current landscape, challenges, technological advancements, and prospects for criminal Defense Lawyer in India.
Business law for the students of undergraduate level. The presentation contains the summary of all the chapters under the syllabus of State University, Contract Act, Sale of Goods Act, Negotiable Instrument Act, Partnership Act, Limited Liability Act, Consumer Protection Act.
What are the common challenges faced by women lawyers working in the legal pr...lawyersonia
The legal profession, which has historically been male-dominated, has experienced a significant increase in the number of women entering the field over the past few decades. Despite this progress, women lawyers continue to encounter various challenges as they strive for top positions.
Receivership and liquidation Accounts
Being a Paper Presented at Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners Association of Nigeria (BRIPAN) on Friday, August 18, 2023.
सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने यह भी माना था कि मजिस्ट्रेट का यह कर्तव्य है कि वह सुनिश्चित करे कि अधिकारी पीएमएलए के तहत निर्धारित प्रक्रिया के साथ-साथ संवैधानिक सुरक्षा उपायों का भी उचित रूप से पालन करें।
Lifting the Corporate Veil. Power Point Presentationseri bangash
"Lifting the Corporate Veil" is a legal concept that refers to the judicial act of disregarding the separate legal personality of a corporation or limited liability company (LLC). Normally, a corporation is considered a legal entity separate from its shareholders or members, meaning that the personal assets of shareholders or members are protected from the liabilities of the corporation. However, there are certain situations where courts may decide to "pierce" or "lift" the corporate veil, holding shareholders or members personally liable for the debts or actions of the corporation.
Here are some common scenarios in which courts might lift the corporate veil:
Fraud or Illegality: If shareholders or members use the corporate structure to perpetrate fraud, evade legal obligations, or engage in illegal activities, courts may disregard the corporate entity and hold those individuals personally liable.
Undercapitalization: If a corporation is formed with insufficient capital to conduct its intended business and meet its foreseeable liabilities, and this lack of capitalization results in harm to creditors or other parties, courts may lift the corporate veil to hold shareholders or members liable.
Failure to Observe Corporate Formalities: Corporations and LLCs are required to observe certain formalities, such as holding regular meetings, maintaining separate financial records, and avoiding commingling of personal and corporate assets. If these formalities are not observed and the corporate structure is used as a mere façade, courts may disregard the corporate entity.
Alter Ego: If there is such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its shareholders or members that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer exist, courts may treat the corporation as the alter ego of its owners and hold them personally liable.
Group Enterprises: In some cases, where multiple corporations are closely related or form part of a single economic unit, courts may pierce the corporate veil to achieve equity, particularly if one corporation's actions harm creditors or other stakeholders and the corporate structure is being used to shield culpable parties from liability.
Synopsis On Annual General Meeting/Extra Ordinary General Meeting With Ordinary And Special Businesses And Ordinary And Special Resolutions with Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations, 2018
Genocide in International Criminal Law.pptxMasoudZamani13
Excited to share insights from my recent presentation on genocide! 💡 In light of ongoing debates, it's crucial to delve into the nuances of this grave crime.
Defending Weapons Offence Charges: Role of Mississauga Criminal Defence LawyersHarpreetSaini48
Discover how Mississauga criminal defence lawyers defend clients facing weapon offence charges with expert legal guidance and courtroom representation.
To know more visit: https://www.saini-law.com/
4. 3. ANSWER: (B) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 713.01, underthe heading“SchedulingAndConductingAn Interview,”states“[a]ninterview
shouldbe hadonlywhenthe nature of the case is suchthat the interviewcouldserve todevelopandclarifyspecificissues andleadtoa mutual
understandingbetweenthe examinerandthe applicant,andtherebyadvance the prosecutionof the application.”(A)isincorrect.37 CFR §
1.133(a)(2); MPEP § 713.02. Section713.02 statesthat although“[a] requestforan interviewpriortothe firstOffice actionisordinarilygranted
incontinuingorsubstitute applications[,][a] requestforaninterviewinall otherapplicationsbefore the firstactionisuntimelyandwill notbe
acknowledgedif written,orgrantedif oral.37 CFR 1.133(a).” (C) isincorrect.MPEP § 713.03. Larry isonlysoundingoutthe examinerandhasno
authoritytocommitJoe to any agreementreachedwiththe examiner.(D) isincorrect.MPEP§ 713.09. Jane hasno rightto an interview
followingthe final rejection.Althoughsuchaninterviewmaybe grantedif the examinerisconvincedthatdisposal orclarificationforappeal may
be accomplishedwithonlynominal furtherconsideration,interviewsmerelytorestate argumentsof recordor to discussnewlimitationswhich
wouldrequire more thannominal reconsiderationornewsearchshouldbe denied.(E) isincorrectbecause (D) isincorrect
5. 4. ANSWER: (C) isthe most correct answer.Whenthe specificationexpresslyprovidesaspecial definitionforatermusedin the claims,the term
mustbe giventhatspecial meaning.SeeMPEP§ 2111.01. (A) is incorrectbecause aterm isgivenitsplainmeaningonlywhenthe specification
doesnotprovide a definitionforthe term.Id.(B) isincorrectbecause the specificationdefinesthe termasbeinginclusive of elemental copper.
See MPEP § 2111.01. (D) isincorrectbecause itdoesnot take intoaccount the definitionof copperfoundinthe specification.See MPEP§
2111.01.
6. 5. ANSWER: (B) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 2141.01. QuotingfromPanduitCorp.v. DennisonMfg.Co.,810 F.2d 1561, 1568, 1 USPQ2d
1593, 1597 (Fed.Cir.),cert.denied,481 U.S. 1052 (1987), MPEP 2141.01, underthe heading“PriorArtAvailable Under35U.S.C. 102 Is Available
Under 35 U.S.C.103,” states“‘[b]eforeansweringGraham's'content'inquiry,itmustbe knownwhetherapatentor publicationisinthe priorart
under35 U.S.C.§ 102.’ Subjectmatterthat ispriorart under35 U.S.C.§ 102 can be usedto supporta rejectionundersection103. Ex parte
Andresen,212 USPQ 100, 102 (Bd.Pat.App.& Inter.1981) (‘itappearstous that the commentator[of 35 U.S.C.A.] andthe [congressional]
committee viewedsection103 as includingall of the variousbarstoa patentas setforthin section102.’).”Because the printedpublicationin(B)
was notpublisheduntilafterthe filingdate of the patentapplication,itdoesnotconstitute priorart.(A) isincorrectbecause the patentpre-
datesthe application,therefore qualifyingaspriorart, and comesfromthe same fieldasthe application,thereforequalifyingasanalogous.(C) is
incorrectbecause the printedpublicationpre-datesthe application,therefore qualifyingaspriorart,and concernsthe same particularproblem
soughtto be solvedinthe patentapplication,therefore qualifyingasanalogous.(D) isincorrectbecause the printedpublicationpre-datesthe
application,thereforequalifyingaspriorart, andcomesfrom the same fieldasthe application,thereforequalifyingasanalogous.(E) isincorrect
because the patentissuedbeforethe application,therefore qualifyingaspriorart, and concernsthe same particularproblemsoughttobe
solvedinthe patentapplication,therefore qualifyingasanalogous.The USPTOclassificationinadifferentclassdoesnotrenderthe patent
nonanalogous.See MPEP§ 2141.01(a) (“While PatentOffice classificationof references.. . are some evidence of ‘nonanalogy’or‘analogy’
respectively,the courthasfound‘the similaritiesanddifferencesinstructure andfunctionof the inventionstocarryfar greaterweight.’”).
7. 6. ANSWER: (B) isthe most correct answer.37 CFR § 1.137; andMPEP § 2268. The patentownerwill needtofile apetitionforentryof late
papersinorder to have theirresponse entered,consideredandactedupon.AccordingtoMPEP 2268, “[p]ursuantto37 CFR 1.550(d), an ex
parte reexaminationproceedingisterminatedif the patentownerfailstofile atimelyandappropriateresponsetoanyOffice ... An ex parte
reexaminationproceedingterminatedunder37 CFR 1.550(d) can be revivedif the delayinresponse bythe patent... was unavoidable in
accordance with37 CFR1.137(a), or unintentional inaccordance with37 CFR 1.137(b).” (A) isnot the mostcorrect answer.In a reexamination
proceeding,requestsforextensionsof time mustbe filedonorbefore the dayon whichaction by the patentownerisdue pursuantto37 CFR§
1.550(c). See MPEP§ 2265. (C) isincorrect.(C) isinconsistentwithMPEP§ 2266, whichstatesthatif the patentownerfailstofile atimely
response toanyOffice action,the reexaminationproceedingwill be terminated,andafterthe proceedingisterminated,the Commissionerwill
proceedtoissue a reexaminationcertificate.There isnoprovisionforissuinganotice of allowance inareexaminationproceeding.Further,(C) is
incorrectinasmuchas the examinershouldnotmail aNotice of Allowance andgranta newpatent.(D) isnot the mostcorrect answer.Ina
reexaminationproceedingwhere patentownerfailstofile atimelyandappropriate response toanyOffice action,the reexaminationproceeding
will be terminatedviaissuance of the Notice of IntenttoIssue ReexaminationCertificate.See MPEP§ 2266. (E) isnot the mostcorrect answer.
In a reexaminationproceeding,requestsforextensionsof time mustbe filedonorbefore the dayon whichactionbythe patentownerisdue
pursuantto 37 C.F.R.§ 1.550(c).
8. 7. ANSWER: (C) isthe bestanswer.MPEP §§ 2107.01 and 2107.02. MPEP § 2107.01, underthe heading“TherapeuticorPharmacological Utility,”
citesIn re Chilowsky,229F.2d 457, 461-2, 108 USPQ321, 325 (CCPA 1956); In re Gazave,379 F.2d 973, 978, 154 USPQ92, 96 (CCPA 1967); and
Nelsonv.Bowler,626 F.2d 853, 856, 206 USPQ 881, 883 (CCPA 1980) as takingthe positionthat“[i]nventionsassertedtohave utilityinthe
treatmentof humanor animal disordersare subjecttothe same legal requirementsforutilityasinventionsinanyotherfieldof technology.”
MPEP § 2107.02, underthe heading“The ClaimedInventionIsThe FocusOf The UtilityRequirement,”states“.. . regardlessof the categoryof
inventionthatisclaimed(e.g.,productorprocess),anapplicantneedonlymake one credible assertionof specificutility forthe claimed
inventiontosatisfy35U.S.C. 101 and 35 U.S.C. 112; additional statementsof utility,evenif not"credible,"do notrenderthe claimedinvention
lackinginutility.See,e.g.,... In re Gottlieb,328 F.2d 1016, 1019, 140 USPQ 665, 668 (CCPA 1964) (‘Havingfoundthatthe antibioticisuseful for
some purpose,itbecomesunnecessarytodecide whetheritisinfact useful forthe otherpurposes'indicated'inthe specificationaspossibly
useful.’).”The issue iswhetherMr.Bloc hasdisclosedaspecificutilityforthe claimedcompoundYsufficienttosatisfythe practical utility
requirementof 35 U.S.C § 101. Accordingto the setof facts,we knowthat compoundY isan intermediate inthe chemical manufactureof
syntheticZ.We are giventwoutilitiesforsyntheticZ:1) alleviatingpain,autilityitshareswiththe natural formof Z; and,2) curingcancer. The
examinerfocusesonthe disclosure thatsyntheticZisa cure for cancer.Evenif one were toagree that syntheticZ’sability tocure cancer
amountsto an incredibleutility,aclaimtothe intermediatecompoundYwouldnotrunafoul of the utilityrequirementof 35 U.S.C. § 101 where
anothersubstantial,credibleandspecificutilityisalternativelydemonstrated.Here,the specificationdisclosesthatsyntheticZ,like the natural
formof Z, alleviatespain.The alleviationof painisanothersubstantial, credible andspecificutilityandservestogive compoundYanalternative
utilitytothatof beingusedtomake a cancer-curingsubstance.Anapplicantneednotshowthatall disclosedutilitiesare credible.Anapplicant
needonlyshowthatone of the disclosedutilitiesisinfactcredible.Inre Gottlieb,supra.The establishmentof acredible,substantial andspecific
utilityrendersthe disclosureof anadditional incredible utilitysuperfluous,andtherefore ultimatelyirrelevant.Accordingly,Mr.Bloc’sbest
course of actionisto make the argumentthathe hasdisclosedanothersubstantial,credible,andspecificutility,notwithstandingthe disclosure
of curingcancer.(A) is notthe mostcorrect answer.The advice couldpreventhimfromgettingapatenttowhichhe may be entitled.(B) isnot
the most correct answer.A cure for cancer isostensiblyincredible.Itishardlya response tothe examiner’srejectiontoaskfor the chance to
prove one can cure cancer.(D) isnot the mostcorrect answer.While itistrue that the utilityrequirementisaddressedtothe claimedinvention,
whichhere iscompoundY not syntheticZ,itisnot enoughtorespondbyrepeatingwhatthe inventionisbut,rather,toshow thatthe invention
has indeedasubstantial,credible,andspecificutility.Whateverisclaimedasthe invention,itmustcomplywiththe utilityrequirementof 35
U.S.C.§ 101. Here the examinerstatesthatthe claimdoesnotcomply,asevidencedbythe incredible utilityof the finalproduct.Itis Mr. Bloc’s
responsibilitytothenshowthatcompoundY doescomplywith35 U.S.C. § 101 by showingthatitsendproducthas a substantial,credible,and
specificutility.(E) isnotthe mostcorrect answer.NotingthatsyntheticZismodeledonnatural Z doesnotgo far enoughinestablishinga
substantial,credible andspecificutilityforcompoundY.ItissyntheticZ’stherapeuticabilitytoalleviate painwhichestablishesthe necessary
alternative utility.
9. 8. ANSWER: (D) isthe mostcorrect answer. Assetforthin MPEP § 2135, underthe heading“General Requirementsof 35 U.S.C.102(d),” states
“(C) The foreignpatentorinventor’scertificatemustbe actuallygranted(e.g.,bysealingof the papersinGreatBritain) before the U.S.filing
date.It neednotbe published.”Answer(A) isincorrectbecause itisone of the four conditionsestablishedby35 U.S.C.§ 102(d). MPEP § 2135,
underthe heading“General Requirementsof 35 U.S.C.102(d),” states“(A) The foreignapplicationmustbe filedmore than12 monthsbefore
the effective U.S.filingdate….”Answer(B) isincorrectbecause itisone of the fourconditionsestablishedby35 U.S.C.§ 102(d). MPEP § 2135,
underthe heading“General Requirementsof 35 U.S.C.102(d),” states“(B) The foreignapplicationmusthave beenfiledbythe same applicantas
inthe UnitedStatesor byhisor her legal representativesorassigns.”Answer(C) isincorrectbecause itisone of the fourconditionsestablished
by 35 U.S.C.§ 102(d). MPEP § 2135, underthe heading“General Requirementsof 35 U.S.C.102(d),” states“(C) The foreignpatentorinventor’s
certificate mustbe actuallygranted(e.g.,bysealingof the papersinGreatBritain) before the U.S.filingdate.Itneednotbe published.”Answer
(E) is incorrectbecause itisone of the fourconditionsestablishedby35 U.S.C.§ 102(d). MPEP § 2135, underthe heading“General Requirement
of 35 U.S.C.102(d)” states“(D) The same inventionmustbe involved.”See alsoMPEP§ 2135.01(IV).
10. 9. ANSWER: The most correctansweris (E).See MPEP§ 201.11, underthe heading“VI.WhenNotEntitledToBenefitEarlierOf FilingDate,”
states“[a]nyclaimina continuation-in-partapplicationwhichisdirectedsolelytosubjectmatteradequatelydisclosedunder35 U.S.C.112 inthe
parentnonprovisional applicationisentitledtothe benefitof the filingdate of the parentnonprovisional application.However,if aclaimina
continuation-in-partapplicationrecitesafeature whichwasnotdisclosedoradequatelysupportedbyaproperdisclosure under35 U.S.C.112 in
the parentnonprovisionalapplication,butwhichwasfirstintroducedoradequatelysupportedinthe continuation-in-partapplicationsucha
claimisentitledonlytothe filingdate of the continuation-in-partapplication.See Inre Chu,66. F.3d292, 36 USPQ2d 1089 (Fed.Cir.1995) and
Transco Products,Inc.v. Performance ContractingInc.,38 F.3d 551, 32 USPQ2d 1077 (Fed.Cir.1994).” Accordingly,claims1-10are entitledto
the benefitof the filingdate of the firstapplication,butclaims11-20 are not entitledtothe benefitof the filingdate of the firstapplication
because claims11-20 recite animprovedcapacitor,whichwasnotdisclosedinthe firstapplication.Claims1-10 have aneffective filingdate
earlierthanthe publicationdate of the article.Claims11-20have a filingdate laterthanthe publicationdate of the article.For35 U.S.C.102(a)
to apply,the reference musthave apublicationdate earlierintime thanthe effective filingdate of the application.See MPEP706.02(a),
paragraph “III.35 U.S.C. 102(a).” Thus,answers(A)-(D) are incorrect.
11. 10. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.Asset forthinMPEP § 2173.02, “[d]efinitenessof claimlanguage mustbe analyzed,notina
vacuum, but inlightof:(A) The contentof the particularapplicationdisclosure;(B) The teachingsof the priorart; and(C) The claim
interpretationthatwouldbe givenbyone possessingthe ordinarylevelof skill inthe pertinentartat the time the inventionwasmade.”Answers
(A),(B) and(C) each identifycriteriatobe analyzedinconsideringwhetherclaimlanguageisdefinite,thereforeanswer(E) whichincludeseach
of these answersisthe mostcorrectanswer.Answer(D) isincorrectsince itdoesnotinclude criteria(C).
12. 11. ANSWER:The correctansweris (C).See MPEP§ 706.02(l) et seq.Inaccordance withproperUSPTO policyandprocedure,the priorart
exclusionof 35 U.S.C.§ 103(c) can onlybe invokedwhenthe reference onlyqualifiesaspriorart under35 U.S.C.§ 102(f),35 U.S.C.§ 102(g), or
35 USC 102(e) for applicationsfiledonorafterNovember29,1999, the applicationandthe reference were commonlyowned,or subjecttoan
assignmenttothe same person,atthe time the inventionwasmade,andthe reference wasusedinanobviousnessrejectionunder35 U.S.C.§
103(a). Answer(A) isincorrect.The priorart exclusionin35 U.S.C.§ 103(c) cannotobviate rejectionsmade under35U.S.C. § 102(e). See MPEP
706.02(l)(1). Answer(B) isincorrect.The priorart exclusionin35 U.S.C.§ 103(c) cannot obviate double patentingrejections.See MPEP§§
706.02(l)(1) and (l)(3).
13. 12. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.MPEP § 106 states“[t]he assignee of recordof the entire interestinanapplicationmayintervene in
the prosecutionof the application,appointinganattorneyoragentof hisor her ownchoice.See 37 CFR § 3.71. Suchintervention,however,
doesnotexclude the applicantfromaccesstothe applicationtosee thatit isbeingprosecutedproperly,unlessthe assigneemakesspecific
requesttothat effect.”(A),(B),(D),and(E) are incorrect.MPEP § 409.03(i) isdirectlycontraryto answer(A),andprovidesthatanonsigning
inventorcannotrevoke orgive a powerof attorneywithoutagreementof all namedinventorsorthe 37 CFR § 1.47(b) applicant.(B) isincorrect.
MPEP § 106 doesnot empoweraninventorwhohasassignedhisorherrightsto exclude anon-signingjointinventorfromaccessingan
applicationinwhichthe latterparty isnamedas a jointinventor.(E) isincorrect.MPEP§ 106. CorporationD,as an assignee of apart interest,
cannot exclude the non-signingjointinventorfromaccesstothe application.See also,MPEP§ 106.01, whichstates“While itisonlythe assignee
of recordof the entire interestwhocanintervene inthe prosecutionof anapplicationorinterference tothe exclusionof the applicant,an
assignee of apart interestora licenseeof exclusive rightisentitledtoinspectthe application.”(D) isincorrectbecause MPEP§ 409.03(i) states
that a nonsigninginventorisentitledtoinspectanypapersinthe application,andordercopiesatthe price setforthin 37 C FR § 1.19.
14. 13. ANSWER:(D) is the mostcorrect answer.35 U.S.C.§ 41(h); MPEP §§ 302.06; 509.02. 35 U.S.C.§ 41(h) specifiesthatthe fees“chargedunder
subsection(a) or(b) shall be reducedby50 percentwithrespecttotheirapplicationtoanysmall businessconcernasdefinedundersection3of
the Small BusinessAct,andto anyindependentinventorornonprofitorganizationasdefinedinregulationsissuedbythe Director.”Since the fee
for a documentaffectingtitleischargedpursuantto35 U.S.C.§ 41(d)(1),itnot subsection(a) or(b),andit isnot entitledtoasmall entity
discount.See alsoMPEP509.02, whichstates,“[o]therfees,establishedundersection41(c) or (d) of Title 35, UnitedStates Code,are not
reducedforsmall entitiessince suchareductionisnotpermittedorauthorizedbyPublicLaw97-247. Feeswhichare not reducedinclude ...
miscellaneousfeesandcharges,37 CFR 1.21.” Feesforrecordingdocumentsaffectingtitleare setunder37 CFR § 1.21(h).See MPEP § 302.06.
(A) isentitledtoasmall entitydiscountbecause itisafee chargedpursuantto 35 U.S.C.41(a)(3)(A).(B) isentitledtoasmall entitydiscount
because itischarged pursuantto 35 U.S.C.41(a)(5).(C) is entitledtoasmall entitydiscountbecauseitischargedpursuantto35 U.S.C. 41(a)(8).
(E) is entitledtoasmall entitydiscount becauseitischargedpursuantto 35 U.S.C.41(b)(1).
15. 14. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.35 U.S.C. § 112, firstparagraph;MPEP §§ 2164.01 and 2164.06(b). MPEP § 2164.01 states“[t]he
standardfor determiningwhetherthe specificationmeetsthe enablementrequirementwascastin the Supreme Courtdecisionof Mineral
Separationv.Hyde,242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) whichposturedthe question:isthe experimentationneededtopractice the inventionundue or
unreasonable?Thatstandardisstill the one to be applied.Inre Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed.Cir.1988). Accordingly,
eventhoughthe statute doesnotuse the term ‘undue experimentation,’ithasbeeninterpretedtorequire thatthe claimedinventionbe
enabledsothatany personskilledinthe artcan make anduse the inventionwithoutundue experimentation.”See alsothe discussionof Enzo
Biochem,Inc.v.Calgene,Inc.,52 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed.Cir.1999) in MPEP § 2164.06(b). (B) isincorrect.MPEP § 2107.01, under the heading“III.
TherapeuticOrPharmacological Utility,”states“[t]he Federal Circuithasreiteratedthattherapeuticutilitysufficientunderthe patentlawsisnot
to be confusedwiththe requirementsof the FDA withregardtosafetyandefficacyof drugsto marketedinthe UnitedStates... In re Brana,51
F.3d 1560, 34 USPQ2d 1436 (Fed.Cir.1995). Accordingly,Office personnel shouldnotconstrue 35 U.S.C.101, underthe logic of ‘practical’utility
or otherwise,torequire thatanapplicantdemonstrate thatatherapeuticagentbasedonaclaimedinventionisasafe or fullyeffective drugfor
humans.”(C) isincorrect.35 U.S.C. § 112, firstparagraph; MPEP § 2107.02. MPEP § 2107.02, underthe heading“WhenIsAn AssertedUtilityNot
Credible,”states“Rejectionsunder35 U.S.C.101 have beenrarelysustainedbyfederal courts.Generallyspeaking,inthese rare cases,the 35
U.S.C.101 rejectionwassustained... because .. .[applicant] assertedautilitythat.. . was whollyinconsistentwith contemporaryknowledgein
the art. In re Gazave,379 F.2d 973, 978, 154 USPQ92, 96 (CCPA 1967).” The disclosure in(C) isinconsistentwithpublished information.(D) is
incorrect.MPEP § 2107.01 underthe heading“RelationshipBetween35U.S.C. 112, FirstParagraph,and 35 U.S.C. 101,” quotesInre Ziegler,992
F.2d 1197, 1200- 1201, 26 USPQ2d 1600, 1603 (Fed.Cir.1993) as stating"The how to use prongof section112 incorporatesasa matterof law
the requirementof 35 U.S.C.101 thatthe specificationdisclose asamatterof fact a practical utilityforthe invention....If the applicationfailsas
a matter of fact to satisfy35 U.S.C.§ 101, thenthe applicationalsofailsasamatter of lawto enable one of ordinaryskill inthe artto use the
inventionunder35 U.S.C.§ 112." Enablementforthe claimsina utilityapplicationisfoundinthe specificationprecedingthe claims,asopposed
to beinginthe claims.The claimsdonot provide theirownenablement.35U.S.C. § 112, firstparagraph.(E) is incorrect. MPEP2107.01 states
that the examiner“musttreatas true a statementof fact made byan applicantinrelationtoan assertedutility,unlesscountervailingevidence
can be providedthatshowsthatone of ordinaryskill inthe art wouldhave a legitimate basistodoubtthe credibilityof sucha statement.”
Inasmuchas countervailingevidence hasbeenproduced,the lackof necessitytotheorize orexplainthe failuresdoesnotalleviatethe inventor
fromcomplyingwith35 U.S.C.§ 112, firstparagraph to provide anenablingdisclosure thatiscommensurateinscope withthe claims.
16. 15. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.The filingof anamendmentcomplyingwith37CFR § 1.116 is a properreplyunder 37 CFR § 1.113
to a final rejection.SeeMPEP§ 714.13, underthe heading“EntryNot A Matter of Right,”whichstates,inpertinentpart,“A replyunder37 CFR
1.113 islimitedto:(A) anamendmentcomplyingwith37CFR 1.116.” (B) isnot the mostcorrect answerbecause the Notice of Appeal mustbe
accompaniedbythe appeal fee requiredby37 CFR § 1.17(b).(C) is not the mostcorrect answerbecause the RCE mustbe accompaniedby a
submission(i.e.,anamendmentthatmeetsthe replyrequirementof 37 CFR § 1.111). (D) isnot the correct answerbecause CPA practice does
not applytoutilityorplantapplicationsif the priorapplicationhasafilingdate onor afterMay 29, 2000. See MPEP§ 706.07(h), paragraphs I
and IV.(E) is notthe correctanswersince (A) isa properreply.
17. 16. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.35 U.S.C. § 251, MPEP § 1402 (fifthparagraph).MPEP§ 1402 statesthatone of the “most common
basesforfilingareissue application[is] (A) the claimsare toonarrow or toobroad.” The claimsmay be broadenedinareissue applicationfiled
by the inventorwithintwoyearsfromthe patentissue date.(B) isincorrectsince the 4thparagraphof 35 U.S.C. § 251 statesthat no reissued
patentshall be grantedenlargingthe scope of the clamsof the original patentunlessappliedforwithintwoyearsfromthe grantof the original
patent.(C) and(E) are incorrect.MPEP§ 1402, sixteenthparagraph.Anapplicant’sfailure totimelyfileadivisional applicationwhile the original
applicationisstill pendingisnotconsideredtobe anerror correctable viareissue.See Inre Orita,550 F.2d 1277, 1280, 193 USPQ145, 148 (CCPA
1977). (D) is incorrect.MPEP § 201.06. In orderto claimbenefitunder35U.S.C. § 120 to a parent application,adivisional applicationmustbe
filedwhile the parentpatentapplicationisstillpending.
18. 17. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 2144.03 providesthatwhenanapplicantseasonablytraversesanofficially noticedfact,the
examinermaycite areference teachingthe noticedfactandmake the nextactionfinal.Here,applicantdidseasonablytraverse the noticedfact
by demandingproof inresponsetothe rejection.IIistherefore anappropriate actionbythe examiner.Iisalsoan appropriate actionbecause
the examinershouldvacate arejectionbased onofficial noticeif nosupportforthe noticedfactcan be foundinresponse toa challenge bythe
applicant.See Inre Ahlert,424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A.1970) (“[a]ssertionsof technical factsinareasof esoterictechnologymustalwaysbe
supportedbycitationtosome reference work”and“[a]llegationsconcerningspecific“knowledge”of the priorart,whichmightbe peculiartoa
particularart shouldalsobe supported”).(B) isincorrectbecause (A) iscorrect.(C),(D),and(E) are incorrectbecause actionIIIisimproper.An
applicantisentitledtorespondtoarejectionbyrequestingreconsideration,withorwithoutamendingthe application.37CFR § 1.111(a)(1).
Applicantisalsorequiredtotimelychallenge anoticedfactinorderto preserve the issue forappeal.MPEP§ 2144.03.
19. 18. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 2121, underthe heading“WhatConstitutesAn‘EnablingDisclosure’DoesNotDependOn
The Type Of PriorArt The Disclosure IsContainedIn,”states,inreliance uponInre Moreton,288 F.2d 708, 711, 129 USPQ 227, 230 (CCPA 1961):
“The level of disclosure requiredwithinareference tomake itan‘enablingdisclosure’isthe same nomatterwhat type of priorart isat issue....
There isno basisinthe statute (35 U.S.C. 102 or 103) for discriminatingeitherinfavorof or againstpriorart referencesonthe basisof
nationality.”Answer(B) isincorrect.MPEP§ 2121, underthe heading“PriorArtIs PresumedToBe Operable/Enabling,”states that“[w]henthe
reference reliedonexpresslyanticipatesormakesobviousall of the elementsof the claimedinvention,the reference ispresumedtobe
operable.”Answer(C) isincorrect.MPEP§ 2121.01, underthe heading“35 U.S.C. 103 RejectionsAndUse Of InoperativePrior Art,”quotes
Symbol TechnologiesInc.v.OpticonInc.,935 F.2d 1569, 1578, 19 USPQ2d 1241, 1247 (Fed.Cir.1991) as statingthat “a non-enablingreference
may qualifyaspriorart for the purpose of determiningobviousnessunder35 U.S.C.103.” Answer(D) is incorrect.MPEP§ 2121.01 statesthat
“[a] reference containsan‘enablingdisclosure’if the publicwasinpossessionof the claimedinventionbefore the date of invention.”Answer(E)
isincorrectbecause answers(B),(C) and(D) are incorrect.
20. 19. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.Asset forthinMPEP § 2131.05, “‘Argumentsthatthe allegedanticipatorypriorartis‘nonanalogous
art’ or ‘teachesawayfromthe invention’orisnotrecognizedassolvingthe problemsolvedbythe claimedinvention, [are]not‘germane’toa
rejectionundersection102.’TwinDisc,Inc. v.UnitedStates,231 USPQ 417, 424 (Cl.Ct.1986) (quotingInre Self,671 F.2d 1344, 213 USPQ 1, 7
(CCPA 1982)). A reference isnolessanticipatoryif,afterdisclosingthe invention, the reference thendisparagesit.The questionwhethera
reference ‘teachesaway’fromthe inventionisinapplicabletoan anticipationanalysis.CeleritasTechnologiesLtd.v.Rockwell International
Corp.,150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 USPQ2d 1516, 1522-23 (Fed.Cir.1999).”Therefore,answers(A) through(D) are incorrect.See alsoMPEP§
706.02(b) as to waysto overcome arejectionunder35 U.S.C.§ 102.
21. 20. ANSWER:(D) is the mostcorrect answer.MPEP § 201.06(c), underthe heading“INCORPORATION BYREFERENCE”,subheading“B.
ApplicationEntitledtoaFilingDate,”statesthat“[i]f the applicationasoriginallyfiledincludesaproperincorporation byreference of the prior
application(s),anomittedspecificationpage(s) and/ordrawingfigure(s) identifiedina“Notice of OmittedItem(s)”maybe addedbyamendment
providedthe omitteditem(s) containsonlysubjectmatterincommonwithsuchpriorapplication(s).Insuchcase applicantneednotrespondto
the “Notice of OmittedItem(s).”Applicantshouldsubmitthe amendmentaddingthe omittedmaterial priortothe firstOffice actiontoavoid
delaysinthe prosecutionof the application.”(A) and(B) are incorrectbecause the applicationfilingdate will be the date of the filingof the
missingdrawingfigure. See MPEP§ 601.01(g). Furthermore,apriorityclaimunder35 U.S.C.§ 120 in a continuationordivisional applicationdoes
not amountto an incorporationbyreferenceof the applicationtowhichpriorityisclaimed.See MPEP§201.06(c). (C) isincorrect. The
continuationapplicationwill notbe accordedwithafilingdate of January3, 2003 withthe missingdrawingfigure.(E) isincorrectbecausea
petitionunder37CFR § 1.53(e) will notbe grantedif the missingdrawingfigureisinadvertentlyomitted bythe applicantandnotinfact
depositedwiththe USPTOwiththe applicationpapers.
23. 22. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.MPEP § 103, underthe heading“PublishedU.S.PatentApplications”statesthat“If a patent
applicationhasbeen publishedpursuantto35 U.S.C. 122(b), thena copy of the specification,drawings,andall papersrelatingtothe file of that
publishedapplication(whetherabandonedorpending) maybe providedtoanypersonuponwrittenrequestandpaymentof the fee.”(A),and
(B) are not correct.37 CFR § 1.14(c)(2).Once an applicationhasbeenpublished,acopyisavailable tothe publicuponwrittenrequestand
paymentof a fee.(C) and(D) are not correct.As statedinMPEP § 103, underthe heading“PublishedU.S.PatentApplications,”if the published
patentapplicationispending,the applicationfile itself will notbe availabletothe publicforinspection.”
24. 23. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.Pursuantto35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph6, In re Donaldson Co.,16 F.3d1189, 1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845,
1849 (Fed.Cir.1994) (inbanc),and MPEP § 2181, underthe heading“WrittenDescriptionNecessaryToSupportA ClaimLimitationWhich
Invokes35 U.S.C.112, SixthParagraph,”"step"plusfunctionlimitationsshall be construedtocoverthe correspondingactsdisclosedinthe
specificationandtheirequivalents.Accordingly,the stepplusfunctionimitationcorrespondinglyincludesacts(1)-(5) andtheirequivalents.Thus,
inorder to anticipate,apriorart reference mustdiscloseeachandeveryact,or its equivalent,forthe stepplusfunction.If the reference is
shownto notdisclose one of the acts, or itsequivalents,thenthe reference failstoanticipate,whichisthe answersetforthin(C).Thus,(C) is
the most complete answer.(A)isnotthe mostcomplete answerbecause acts(1)-(4) are disclosedinthe reference andthe equivalentof act(5)
has to be dealtwith,i.e.,the equivalentof continuingtowalkmaystill be metbythe reference unlessthe applicantshowsthroughargument
that the reference alsofailstocontainanyequivalentforact(5).Thus, the mostcomplete answeris(C) ascomparedto (A).(B) isnotthe most
correct answerbecause once act (5) is removedfromthe specification,the prior artreference clearlyanticipates(since itotherwise expressly
has acts (1)-(4) andthe other claimlimitations) underthe above recitedfactsabsentact(5) in the specification.SeeDonaldson,16F.3d at 1193,
29 USPQ2d at 1849; MPEP § 2181. (D) is not the mostcomplete answerthe priorartstill anticipatesthe claim.(E) isnotthe mostcorrect answer
because itincludestwoincorrectanswerchoices,(B) and(D).
25. 24. ANSWER:(D) is the mostcorrect answer.MPEP § 2181 underthe heading“ProceduresForDeterminingWhetherThe WrittenDescription
AdequatelyDescribesThe CorrespondingStructure,Material,OrActsNecessaryToSupportA ClaimLimitationWhichInvokes35 U.S.C.112,
SixthParagraph.”35 U.S.C.112, sixthparagraphstatesthat a claimlimitationexpressedinmeansplusfunctionlanguage“shall be construedto
coverthe correspondingstructure,materials,oracts describedinthe specificationand‘equivalentsthereof.’”See alsoB. BraunMedical,Inc.v.
AbbottLab.,124 F.3d 1419, 1424, 43 USPQ2d 1896, 1899 (Fed.Cir.1997).” The examinerhasmade aprima facie case of equivalentinthe Office
actionto supportthe rejectionbasedon35 U.S.C.§ 102. By amendingthe claimtono longerinclude the meanslimitationin question,the claim
becomesnarrowerinasmuchasitno longerincludesequivalentsunder35 U.S.C.§ 112, paragraph 6 forexaminationpurposes.Thus,(D)
overcomesthe lackof noveltyrejectionunderthesecircumstances.(A) isnotthe mostcorrect answerbecause suchanamended claimwould
continue tolack novelty,sincebothitandthe prior art wouldhave the attachedbar expressly.Furthermore,suchanamendmentwould
introduce newmatterlackingsupportinthe applicationasoriginallyfiled.35U.S.C. § 112, firstparagraph.(B) is notthe most correctanswer
because the “notfoundinthe priorart” argumentdoesnotrebutthe primafacie case of equivalentsraisedbythe examiner. (C) isnotthe most
correct answerbecause itdoesnotaddressthe rejection.(E) isnotthe mostcorrect answerbecause the amendmentwouldraise anewmatter
issue.
26. 25. ANSWER:The mostcorrect answeris(D).See 35 U.S.C.§ 154(b); 37 CFR § 1.702(f); MPEP § 2730 (quotingsection1.702(f)).The application
was filedpriortoMay 29, 2000 and is ineligibleforthe provisionsof PatentTermAdjustment(PTA).Moreover,the filingof aRequestfor
ContinuedExamination(RCE) under35 U.S.C.§ 132(b) and 37 CFR § 1.114 doesnot cause an applicationfiledbefore May29, 2000 to be entitled
to the benefitsPTA underthe provisionsof 35 U.S.C.§ 154(b) and 37 CFR §§ 1.702-1.705. See MPEP § 2730. (A) and(B) are not correct answers
because the applicationwasfiledpriortoMay 29, 2000, the eligibilitydate forapplicationstoreceivethe benefitof PTA provisionsof 35U.S.C. §
154(b) and 37 CFR §§ 1.702 through705. Answerchoice (C) isnotcorrect because utilityapplications,notdesignapplicationsare subjecttothe
PTA provisionsandthe answersuggeststhatdesignapplicationsare eligible forPTA.Answerchoice (E) isnota correct answerbecause the
applicationisnoteligible forPTA andfilinganRCEdoesnot make an ineligible applicationeligible forPTA.Designpatentsare grantedfor
fourteenyeartermsfromthe grant of the patent.35 U.S.C. § 171. Utilitypatentsare subjecttopatenttermadjustment.35U.S.C. § 154(b)
27. 26. ANSWER:(D) is the mostcorrect answer.MPEP § 714.16, third paragraph,states“a supplemental reissue oathordeclarationistreatedasan
amendmentunder37CFR 1.312 because the correctionof the patentwhichitprovidesisan amendmentof the patent,eventhoughno
amendmentisphysicallyenteredintothe specificationorclaim(s).”Answer(A) isincorrectbecause asupplemental oathordeclarationisnot
treatedas an amendmentunder37CFR 1.312 exceptwhensubmittedinareissue.See MPEP§603.01. Answer(B) isincorrectbecause a
supplemental oathordeclarationinareissue will be treatedasanamendmentunder37CFR § 1.312 onlyif filedafterallowance.Answer(C) is
incorrectbecause amendmentsfiledafterthe date the issue fee hasbeenpaidare nolongerpermittedunder37CFR § 1.312. (E) is wrong
because (A) iscorrect.
28. 27. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.35 U.S.C.§ 101; MPEP 2106, underthe heading“A.IdentifyandUnderstandAnyPractical
ApplicationAssertedforthe Invention.”Withregardtocomputer-relatedinventions,MPEP§ 2106 statesthat “[a]lthoughthe courtshave yetto
define the termsuseful,concrete,andtangible inthe contextof the practical applicationrequirementforsuchinventions,the followingexample
illustratesclaimedinventionsthathave a practical applicationbecause theyproduceuseful,concrete,andtangibleresults: ‘Claimsdrawntoa
long-distance telephone billingprocesscontainingmathematicalalgorithmswere heldtobe directedtopatentablesubjectmatterbecause the
claimedprocessappliesthe Booleanprinciple toproduce auseful,concrete,tangible resultwithoutpre-emptingotherusesof the mathematical
principle.’ AT&TCorp.v.Excel Communications,Inc.,172 F.3d 1352, 1358, 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1452 (Fed.Cir.1999).” See also, State StreetBank&
Trust Co. v.Signature Financial GroupInc.,149 F. 3d 1368, 1374, 47 USPQ2d 1596, 1601-02 (Fed.Cir.1998). Answers(A),(B) and(D) are
incorrect.MPEP § 2105 statesthatabstract ideas,lawsof nature and physical phenomenahave beenheldbythe SupremeCourt tobe
unpatentable subjectmatterunder35U.S.C. § 101. Answer(E) isincorrectbecause answers(A),(B) and(C) are incorrect.
29. 28. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 2144, underthe heading“Rationale DifferentFromApplicant’sIsPermissible.”PatentA
suggestsaninsertwithreceptaclesthatare circularand whichcan be shapedto complementthe shape of the objecttobe received.The
purpose forthisinPatentA isto keepthe cart organized,notasinthe claimto preventthe objectfromfallingandbreaking.The differencein
objectivesdoesnotdefeatthe case forobviousnessbecause,asMPEP§ 2144 states,the “reasonor motivationtomodifythe reference may
oftensuggestwhatthe inventorhasdone,butfora differentpurposeorto solve adifferentproblem.Itisnotnecessarythatthe prior art
suggestthe combinationtoachieve the same advantage orresultdiscoveredbyapplicant.Inre Linter,458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA
1972) …; In re Dillon,919 F.2d688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert.denied,500 U.S. 904 (1991) … .” In otherwords, itdoesnotmatter
that PatentA doesnot appreciate the claimedpurpose of preventingbreakage.Itsuggestsaninsertwithreceptaclestoholdbottles.Thatis
enoughtorenderthe claimedsubjectmatterprimafacie obvious.The primafacie case isnotrebuttedbyarguingthatthe purpose forthe
claimedinsertisdifferentformthatspecifiedforthe insertdescribedinPatentA.Thatiswhy answer(C) iswrong.To rebutthe primafacie case,
the practitionermustshowa difference instructure instead.Answer(B) iswrongbecause the primafacie case isnotrebuttedbyshowingthat
PatentA doesnotteach wine bottles.Thisisnotan anticipationrejectionwhere identityof subjectmattermightbe anissue.Thisisaquestion
of obviousness.Therefore,itissufficienttopoint outthat PatentA is a genericteachingof shoppingcartinsertsthatholdobjectsof anysize and
shape.(D) isnot the most correctanswerbecause whatPatentA is interestedindoingisirrelevanttothe questionof obviousness.(E) isnotthe
mostcorrect answerinasmuchas itwas notthe practitioner’sargument.However,the questioninquiresaboutthe meritsof the argumentthat
the practitionermade assetforth inthe penultimate sentence of the question,notthe meritsof some hypothetical replythe examinermay
communicate.
30. 29. ANSWER:(B) is the mostproperanswer.MPEP § 2128.02, underthe heading“Date of AccessibilityCanBe ShownThroughEvidence of
Routine BusinessPractices,”states,inreliance uponConstantv.AdvancedMicro-Devices,Inc.,848 F.2d 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed.Cir.),cert.
denied,988 U.S. 892 (1988), and Inre Hall,781 F.2d897, 228 USPQ 453 (Fed.Cir.1986), “Evidence showingroutinebusiness practicescanbe
usedto establishthe date onwhichpublicationbecame accessible tothe public.Specificevidence showingwhenthe specificdocumentactually
became available isnotalwaysnecessary.”Answer(A) isincorrect.MPEP§ 2128.01, underthe heading“A ThesisPlacedInA UniversityLibrary
May Be PriorArt If Sufficiently Accessible ToThe Public,”states“[a] doctoral thesisindexedandshelvedinalibraryissufficientlyaccessibleto
the publicto constitute priorartas a ‘printedpublication.’Inre Hall,781 F.2d 897, 228 USPQ 453 (Fed.Cir.1986). Even if access tothe libraryis
restricted,areference will constitute a‘printedpublication’aslongasa presumptionisraisedthatthe portionof the publicconcernedwiththe
art wouldknowof the invention.Inre Bayer,568 F.2d 1357, 196 USPQ 670 (CCPA 1978).” Answer(C) isincorrect.MPEP§ 2128.01, underthe
heading“OrallyPresentedPaperCanConstitute A ‘PrintedPublication’If WrittenCopiesAre AvailableWithoutRestriction,” states,inreliance
uponMassachusettsInstitute of Technologyv.ABFortia,774 F.2d 1104, 1109, 227 USPQ 428, 432 (Fed.Cir.1985): “[a] paperwhichisorally
presentedinaforumopento all interestedpersonsconstitutesa‘printedpublication’if writtencopiesare disseminatedwithoutrestriction.”
Answer(D) isincorrect.MPEP § 2128.01, underthe heading“Internal DocumentsIntendedToBe ConfidentialAre NotPrintedPublications,”
states,inreliance uponInre George,2 USPQ2d 1880 (Bd.Pat. App.& Int.1987), Garret Corp. v.UnitedStates,422 F.2d 874, 878, 164 USPQ 521,
524 (Ct.Cl.1970), and NorthernTelecomInc.v.DatapointCorp.,908 F.2d 931, 15 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed.Cir.1990). “[d]ocumentsanditemsonly
distributedinternallywithinanorganizationwhichare intendedtoremainconfidential are not‘printedpublications’no matterhowmanycopies
are distributed.”Answer(E) isincorrect.MPEP§ 2128.02, underthe heading“A Journal Article orOtherPublicationBecomes Available AsPrior
Art on Date of It IsReceivedbya Memberof the Public,”states,inreliance uponInre Schlittler,234F.2d 882, 110 USPQ 304 (CCPA 1956): “[a]
publicationdisseminatedbymail isnotpriorart until itis receivedbyatleastone memberof the public.”
31. 30. ANSWER:(B) or (D) isacceptedas the correct answer.Asto (B) and (D),see MPEP § 706.02(l)(2), underthe heading“II.Evidence RequiredTo
EstablishCommonOwnership.”(B) isacceptedbecause applicants,e.g.,inventors,have the bestknowledge of the ownershipof their
applications,andbecause theirstatementof suchissufficient evidence because of theirparamountobligationof candorandgoodfaithto the
USPTO. (D) reproducesthe examplesetforthunderthe foregoingheading.(A) isincorrectbecause applicantsorthe representativesof record
have the bestknowledge of the ownershipof theirapplications,andbecause theirstatementof suchissufficientevidence becauseof their
paramountobligationof candorandgood faithtothe USPTO.(C) is incorrectbecause the statementdoesnotestablishcommon ownershipat
the time the laterinventionwasmade.35U.S.C. § 103(c). (E) is incorrectbecause itdoesnotestablishthatthe priorart inventionand the
claimedinventionare entirelyorwhollyownedbythe same person.MPEP§ 706.02(l)(2).
32. 31. ANSWER:(C).35 U.S.C.§ 305; MPEP §§ 2258 and 1412.03. MPEP § 2258, underthe heading“ClaimsInProceedingMustNotEnlarge Scope
Of The ClaimsOf The Patent,”states“[w]here neworamendedclaimsare presented... the claimsof the reexaminationproceedingshouldbe
examinedunder35 U.S.C.305, to determinewhethertheyenlarge the scope of the original claims.35 U.S.C.305 statesthat‘no proposed
amendedornewclaimenlargingthe scope of the claimsof the patentwill be permittedinareexaminationproceeding...’."Underthe further
subheading“CriteriaforEnlargementof the Scope of the Claims,”MPEP§ 2258 states“A claimpresentedinareexaminationproceeding
‘enlargesthe scope’of the claimsof the patentbeingreexaminedwherethe claimisbroaderthaneachand everyclaimof the patent.See MPEP
§ 1412.03 for guidance asto whenthe presentedclaimisconsideredtobe abroadeningclaimascomparedwiththe claimsof the patent,i.e.,
whatis broadeningandwhatisnot. If a claimis consideredtobe a broadeningclaim forpurposesof reissue,itislikewiseconsideredtobe a
broadeningclaiminreexamination.”MPEP§ 1412.03, underthe heading“NewCategoryof InventionAddedInReissue –Broadening,”states
“[t]he additionof processclaimsasa newcategoryof inventiontobe claimedinthe patent(i.e.,where therewere nomethodclaimspresentin
the original patent) isgenerallyconsideredasbeingabroadeningof the invention.SeeEx parte Wikdahl,10 USPQ2d 1546, 1549 (Bd.Pat. App.&
Inter.1989).” MPEP 2258, underthe furthersubheading“Rejectionof ClaimsWhere There IsEnlargement,”states“[a]nyclaimina
reexaminationproceedingwhichenlargesthe scope of the claimsof the patentshouldbe rejectedunder35 U.S.C.305.” Since no claimsdrawn
to a methodwere everpresentedduringprosecutionof PatentX(claims1 through4 “are the onlyclaimsthatwere everpresentedduring
prosecutionof the applicationthatmaturedintoPatentX”),the claimrecitedin(C) isnotdirectedto“the inventionasclaimed.”(A),(B),and(D)
are all incorrectbecause eachof theirclaimsare directedtoa hydrocyclone separatorapparatus,i.e.,“the inventionasclaimed,”andtheydo
not enlarge the scope of the claimsinPatentX.(E) isan incorrectanswerbecause (C) isthe correct answer.
33. 32. ANSWER:(B) is the mostcorrect, as onlystatement(2) istrue.The examinerhasthe initial burdentoestablishareasonable basistoquestion
the enablementprovided.MPEP§ 2164.04 states“[i]norderto make a rejection,the examinerhasthe initial burdentoestablishareasonable
basisto questionthe enablementprovidedforthe claimedinvention.Inre Wright,999 F.2d 1557, 1562, 27 USPQ2d1510, 1513 (Fed.Cir.1993)
(examinermustprovide areasonable explanationastowhythe scope of protectionprovidedbyaclaimisnot adequatelyenabledbythe
disclosure).”Answer(A) isincorrect,because statement(1) isnottrue. The examinermaynotanalyze enablementbefore construingthe claims.
MPEP § 2164.04. Answer(C) isincorrect,because statement(3) isnottrue.The examinermustgive reasonsforthe uncertaintyof the
enablement,evenwhenthereisnoevidence of operabilitywithoutundueexperimentationotherthanthe disclosedembodiments. Inre Brana,
51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 USPQ2d 1436, 1441 (Fed.Cir.1995). MPEP § 2164.04 states“[a]ccordingtoIn re Bowen,492 F.2d 859, 862-63, 181 USPQ
48, 51 (CCPA 1974), the minimal requirementisforthe examinertogive reasonsforthe uncertaintyof the enablement.”Answer(D) isincorrect
because itincludesfalse statement(1).Answer(E) isincorrectbecause itincludesfalsestatements(1) and(3).
34. 33. ANSWER:(D) is correct."Inherentcomponentsof elementsrecitedhave antecedentbasisinthe recitationof the componentsthemselves."
MPEP § 2173.05(e). The MPEP providesananalogousexample:"the limitation'the outersurface of saidsphere'would notrequire an
antecedentrecitationthatthe sphere have anoutersurface."Id.(A),(B),(C),and(E) are all examplesof thingswhichinherentlyhave the
claimedcharacteristicanddonot have an antecedentbasisproblem;thatis,all circleshave acenter,all ellipseshaveamajordiameter,all
sphereshave anoutersurface,andall rectangleshave anarea, and these characteristicsneednotbe providedwithexpressantecedentbasis.
The ellipse example isfromBose Corp.v.JBL Inc.,61 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (Fed.Cir.2001) ("There canbe no dispute thatmathematicallyan
inherentcharacteristicof an ellipse isamajordiameter.").The leverrecitedin(D) isnotan inherentcomponentof amachine andtherefore
requiresexpressantecedentbasis.
35. 34. ANSWER:(A),describingaprocedure thatisnotin accordance withthe USPTO rulesand the proceduressetforthinthe MPEP , the most
correct answer.MPEP § 609, underthe heading“MinimumRequirementsforanInformationDisclosure Statement,”underthe subheading“B(3).
InformationDisclosure StatementFiledAfterB(2),butPriorto Paymentof Issue Fee 37 CFR 1.97 (d)”,andsubheading“B(5) StatementUnder37
CFR 1.97(e).”(A) The statementspecifiedin37CFR § 1.97(e) requiresthatthe practitionercertify,afterreasonableinquiry,thatnoitemof
informationcontainedinthe IDSwasknownto any individual designatedin37CFR § 1.56(c) more than three monthspriorto the filingof the
informationdisclosure statement.The practitionercannotcertifythisbecause the reference wasknowntothe clientbeforeFebruary11,2002,
the time of filingof the utilityapplication,whichwasmore thanthree monthspriorto the filingof the informationdisclosure statement.See(B),
statinga procedure thatconformswiththe USPTO rulesandthe proceduressetforthinthe MPEP, isan incorrectanswer.Under37 CFR §
1.313(a), a petitiontowithdrawthe applicationfromissueisnotrequiredif aproperRCE isfiledbefore paymentof the issue fee.(C),statinga
procedure thatconformswiththe USPTO rulesandthe proceduressetforthinthe MPEP,is an incorrectanswer.A practitionercanfile a
continuingapplicationonorbefore the date thatthe issue fee isdue andpermitthe parentapplicationtobecome abandonedforfailure topay
the issue fee.(D),statingaprocedure thatconformswiththe USPTO rulesandthe proceduressetforthinthe MPEP, isan incorrectanswer.
Under 37 CFR § 1.313(c)(3), a petitiontowithdrawthe applicationfromissuecanbe filedafterpaymentof the issuefee topermitthe express
abandonmentof the applicationinfavorof acontinuingapplication.(E),statingaprocedure thatconformswiththe USPTOrulesandthe
proceduressetforthinthe MPEP, isan incorrectanswer.Under37 CFR§ 1.313(c)(2), a petitiontowithdrawthe applicationfromissue canbe
filedafterpaymentof the issue feetopermitconsiderationof aRequestforContinuedExamination(RCE) under37CFR § 1.114. See alsoMPEP
§ 1308.
36. 35. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswerbecause (B) and(C) togetherare correct. Regarding(B),see MPEP§ 2163.02, whichstates,
“Wheneverthe [writtendescription] issuearises,the fundamental factual inquiryiswhetherthe specificationconveyswithreasonable clarityto
those skilledinthe artthat,as of the filingdate sought,applicantwasinpossessionof the inventionasnowclaimed.See,e.g.,Vas-Cath,Inc.v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1991). An applicantshowspossessionof the claimedinventionby
describingthe claimedinventionwithall of itslimitationsusingsuchdescriptive meansaswords,structures,figures,diagrams,andformulasthat
fullysetforththe claimedinvention.Lockwoodv.AmericanAirlines,Inc.,107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed.Cir.1997).”
Regarding(C),see MPEP§ 2163.02, whichstates,“The courts have describedthe essential questiontobe addressedinadescription
requirementissue inavarietyof ways.Anobjective standardfordeterminingcompliance withthe writtendescriptionrequirementis,‘doesthe
descriptionclearlyallowpersonsof ordinaryskillinthe artto recognize thathe or she inventedwhatisclaimed.’Inre Gosteli,872F.2d 1008,
1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed.Cir.1989). UnderVas-Cath,Inc.v.Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1991),
to satisfythe writtendescriptionrequirement,anapplicantmustconveywithreasonable claritytothose skilledinthe art that,as of the filing
date sought,he or she wasin possessionof the invention,andthatthe invention,inthatcontext,iswhateverisnowclaimed.”(B) alone and(C)
alone are incorrectinasmuchas theydonot addresseachof the examiner’srationalesforthe rejection.(A) is incorrect.MPEP§ 2161. The
writtendescriptionrequirementisseparate anddistinctfromthe enablementrequirementof 35 U.S.C. § 112, firstparagraph. The argument
doesnotaddressand otherwise traversethe rejectionthatwasmade.(D) isincorrect.MPEP § 2163.03, underthe headings“RELIANCEON
FILINGDATE OFPARENTAPPLICATION UNDER35 U.S.C. 120,” and “RELIANCEON PRIORITYUNDER 35 U.S.C. 119.” The relatedcase must be an
applicationhavingafilingdate towhichthe instantapplicationisentitled,e.g.,aparentor provisionalapplication.The argumentdoesnotshow
the instantapplicationisrelatedtothe “relatedapplication”under35 U.S.C.§§ 119 or 120. (B) alone isnotcorrect because (C) isalsocorrect.
(C) alone isnot correct because (B) isalsocorrect.
37. 36. ANSWER:(D) is the correct answer.See MPEP§§ 706.07(h), underthe heading“X.AfterAppeal ButBefore DecisionByBoard,”and1215.01.
As explainedinMPEP§ 1215.01, “The filingof anRCE will be treatedasa withdrawal of the appeal bythe applicant,regardlessof whetherthe
RCE includesthe appropriate feeora submission.”Thus,the filingof the RCE withoutthe fee resultsinthe withdrawal of the appeal inthis
applicationandpassage of the applicationtoissue withthe allowedclaims6-10 afterthe cancellationof bothrejectedclaims1-3and claims4
and 5 whichare allowable exceptfortheirdependencyfromrejectedclaim1(A) isincorrect.AsalsoexplainedinMPEP§ 1215.01, althoughan
applicationunderappeal having noallowedclaimswillbe consideredabandonedbythe filingof animproperRCE,anapplicationhavingallowed
claimswill be passedtoissue withthe allowedclaims.Uponwithdrawal of appeal,claimswhichare allowable exceptfortheirdependencyfrom
rejectedclaimswillbe treatedasif theywere rejected.See MPEP§ 1215.01. All rejectedclaims,suchasclaims1-3,and claimswhichare
allowable exceptfortheirdependencyfromrejectedclaims,suchasclaims4 and5, will be canceled.(B) isincorrect.AsexplainedinMPEP§
706.07(h), underthe heading“AfterAppealButBefore DecisionByThe Board,”proceedingsasto the rejectedclaimsare terminatedandthe
applicationispassedtoissue withthe allowedclaims.MPEP§ 1215.01 explainsthatthe filingof anRCE will be treatedasa withdrawal of the
appeal bythe applicant,regardlessof whetherthe RCEincludesthe appropriate fee ora submission.(C) isincorrectforthe reasonsexplainedfor
(A),andbecause claims4 and 5 will be canceled.(E) isincorrect.The RCE,whichwas filedwithoutthe fee,isimproper.Thus,asexplainedin
MPEP § 706.07(h),. underthe heading,“AfterAppealButBefore DecisionByThe Board,” proceedingsastothe rejectedclaims are terminated
and the applicationispassedtoissue withthe allowedclaims.MPEP§ 1215.01 explainsthatthe filingof anRCE will be treatedasa withdrawal
of the appeal bythe applicant,regardlessof whetherthe RCEincludesthe appropriatefee orasubmission.
38. 37. ANSWER:(E) is the correct answer.35 U.S.C.§ 102(b); 37 CFR § 1.111(b); MPEP §§ 706.02(b), 2131 and 2131.03. As statedinMPEP 2131,
underthe heading“To Anticipate A Claim,The ReferenceMustTeachEvery ElementOf The Claim,”“A claimisanticipatedonly if eachandevery
elementassetforthinthe claimis found,eitherexpresslyorinherentlydescribed,inasingle priorart reference.”Verdegaal Bros.v.UnionOil
Co. of California,814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1987). MPEP 2131.03, underthe heading,“PriorArtWhichTeachesA Range
Within,Overlapping,OrTouchingThe ClaimedRange AnticipatesIf The PriorArtRange DisclosesThe ClaimedRange With‘Sufficient
Specificity.’”states“Whenthe priorartdisclosesarange whichtouches,overlapsoris withinthe claimedrange,butnospecificexamplesfalling
withinthe claimedrange are disclosed,acase by case determinationmustbe made astoanticipation.Inordertoanticipate the claims,the
claimedsubjectmattermustbe disclosedinthe referencewith‘sufficientspecificitytoconstitute ananticipationunderthe statute.’”A claim
containingalimitationthatthe gritparticle size is5-7 micronswouldnotbe anticipatedbythe appliedreference,because the appliedreference
disclosesadifferentgritparticle size well outsidethatrange.(A) isincorrect.MPEP§ 2123(8th Ed.).Patentsare relevantaspriorart for all they
containand are notlimitedtotheirpreferredembodiments.See Inre Heck,699 F.2d 1331, 1332-33, 216 USPQ 1038, 1039 (Fed.Cir.1983) and
Merck & Co. v. BiocraftLaboratories,874 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert.denied,493 U.S. 975 (1989). (B) isincorrect.See MPEP
§ 2131.04. Evidence of secondaryconsiderationssuchasunexpectedresultsisirrelevant to35 U.S.C.§ 102 rejectionsandthuscannotovercome
a rejectionsobased.See Inre Wiggins,488 F.2d 538, 543,179 USPQ 421, 425 (CCPA 1973). (C) is incorrect.See MPEP§ 715, underthe heading
“SituationsWhere 37 CFR 1.131 AffidavitsorDeclarations Are Inappropriate.”Anaffidavitordeclarationunder37CFR § 1.131 is inappropriate
where the reference publicationdate ismore than1 yearprior to applicant’seffective filingdate.Suchareference isa“statutorybar” under35
U.S.C.§ 102(b) as referencedin37 CFR § 1.131(a)(2). (D) is alsoincorrect.See MPEP§ 2131.05. Argumentsthatthe allegedanticipatorypriorart
is“nonanalogousart” are not “germane”to a rejectionunder35 U.S.C.§ 102. TwinDisc,Inc. v. UnitedStates,231 USPQ 417, 424 (Cl.Ct.1986)
(quotingInre Self,671 F.2d 1344, 213 USPQ 1, 7 (CCPA 1982).
39. 38. ANSWER:(D) is the mostcorrect answer.37 CFR § 1.197(c); MPEP § 1214.06. This case is specificallysetforthinMPEP§ 1214.06 underthe
heading“ClaimsStandAllowed.”Answers(A),(B) and(C) applyonlyif noclaimsstandallowedinthe application.Theyare incorrectbecause the
facts state that claim3 wasallowed.See MPEP§ 1214.06, underthe heading“NoClaimsStandAllowed.”(B) isincorrect.See MPEP§ 1214.06
underthe heading“ClaimsStandAllowed.”Where one ormore otherclaimsstandallowed,the examinerisnotauthorizedtoconvertto
independentformadependentclaimthathasbeenobjectedto(butnotallowedorrejected) basedonitsdependencytoa rejectedclaim.(C) is
incorrect.See MPEP § 1214.06 underthe heading“ClaimsStandAllowed.”Where one ormore otherclaimsstandallowed,the examinerisnot
authorizedtoprovide appellantwithtimetorewrite adependentclaimintoindependentformwhere the dependentclaimwasobjectedto(but
not allowedorrejected)basedonitsdependencytoarejectedclaim.
41. 40. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.Asset forthinMPEP § 2111.03 states“[t]he transitionalterm‘comprising’[Answer(A)],whichis
synonymouswith‘including’[Answer(D)],‘containing’[Answer(B)],or‘characterizedby’[Answer(C)],isinclusive oropen-endedanddoesnot
exclude additional,unrecitedelementsormethodsteps.Since Answers(A),(B),(C) and(D) are all open-endedtransitional phrasestheyare
incorrectanswers.
42. 41. ANSWER:The correctansweris (E).MPEP § 608.01(n), underthe heading“B.Unacceptable Multiple DependentClaimWording.”Multiple
dependentclaimsinproperformdependonprecedingclaimsandrefertothe claimsfromwhichtheydependinthe alternative only.Answer(A)
isincorrect.See MPEP § 608.01(n), underthe heading“B.Unacceptable Multiple DependentClaimWording,”andsubheading“1. ClaimDoes
NotReferBack In the Alternative Only,”secondexample.A propermultipledependentclaimmustreferbackinthe alternativeonly.Answer (B)
isincorrect.See MPEP § 608.01(n), underthe heading“B.Unacceptable Multiple DependentClaimWording,”andsubheading“1. ClaimDoes
NotReferBack In the Alternative Only,”fifthexample.A propermultiple dependentclaimrefersbackinthe alternative only.Answer(C) is
incorrect.Answer(C) reproducesthe exampleinMPEP§ 608.01(n), underthe heading“B.Unacceptable Multiple DependentClaimWording,”
and subheading“3.ReferencestoTwoSetsof ClaimstoDifferentFeatures.”A propermultipledependentclaimrefersinthe alternative toonly
one setof claims.Answer(D) isincorrect.See MPEP§ 608.01(n), underthe heading“B.Unacceptable Multiple DependentClaimWording,”and
subheading“2.ClaimDoesNotRefertoa PrecedingClaim,”secondexample.A propermultiple dependentclaimdependsonlyfrompreceding
claims.
43. 42. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.MPEP § 1002.02(c) identifiesamongthe matterspetitionabletoanddecidedbythe Technology
CenterDirectors“Petitionsfromafinal decisionof examinerrequiringrestrictioninpatentapplications,37CFR 1.144, MPEP § 818.03(c).” Hence
(A),and(C),whichprovide forreviewbefore the Boardof PatentAppealsandInterferencesare clearlyerroneous.Since the restriction
requirementisnotyet“final”noreviewispossible atthisjuncture.Answers(A),(B),(C),and(D) are alsoincorrectbecause noclaimis under
rejectionhence noappeal ispossible.See MPEP§ 1205, whichprovidesthatunder37 CFR 1.191(a), an applicantfora patent dissatisfiedwith
the primaryexaminer’sdecisioninthe secondorfinal rejectionof hisorherclaimsmayappeal to the Board for reviewof the examiner’s
rejectionbyfilinganotice of appeal andthe requiredfee setforthin37 CFR 1.17(b) withinthe time periodprovidedunder 37 CFR 1.134.and
1.136. A notice of appeal may be filedafteranyof the claimshas beentwice rejected,regardlessof whetherthe claim(s)has/have beenfinally
rejected.The limitationof “twice orfinally...rejected”doesnothave tobe relatedtoa particularapplication.Forexample,if anyclaimwas
rejectedinaparent application,andthe claim isagainrejectedinacontinuingapplication,thenapplicantwill be entitledtofile anappeal inthe
continuingapplication,evenif the claimwasrejectedonlyonce inthe continuingapplication.
44. 43. ANSWER:The answeris(C).See 37 CFR § 1.75(c); MPEP 608.01(n). Rule 1.75(c) providesthat“[o]ne ormore claimsmaybe presentedin
dependentform,referringbacktoand furtherlimitinganotherclaimorclaimsinthe same application.”See alsoMPEP§ 608.01(n), underthe
heading“IIIInfringementTest,”secondparagraph,whereinitstates,“[t]he testforaproperdependentclaimunderthe fourthparagraphof 35
U.S.C.112 iswhetherthe dependentclaimincludeseverylimitationof the claimfromwhichitdepends.”Foranswer(A),see MPEP§ 608.01(n),
underthe heading“IIIInfringementTest,”secondparagraph,whereinitstates,“[t]hetestisnotone of whetherthe claims differinscope.”For
answer(B),see MPEP§ 608.01(n), underthe heading“IIIInfringementTest,”secondparagraph,whereinitstates,“[a] dependentclaimdoesnot
lack compliance with35U.S.C. 112, fourthparagraph,simplybecause there isaquestionasto(1) the significance of the furtherlimitationadded
by the dependentclaim.”Foranswers(D) and(E),see MPEP § 608.01 (n),underthe heading“IIIInfringementTest,”fifthparagraph,whereinit
states,“[t]he factthat a dependentclaimwhichisotherwise propermightrelatetoa separate inventionwhichwouldrequire aseparate search
or be separatelyclassifiedfromthe claimonwhichitdependswouldnotrenderitanimproperdependentclaim,althoughitmightresultina
requirementforrestriction.”
45. 44. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.See 35 U.S.C.122(b)(2)(B)(iii);37CFR § 1.213; MPEP § 901.03 for informationonnonpublication
requests.See 37CFR § 1.137(f); MPEP § 711.03(c), underthe heading“3.AbandonmentforFailure toNotifythe Office of aForeignFilingAfter
Submissionof aNon-PublicationRequest.”(B) isincorrect.The notice of foreignfilingcan be filedaslate as 45 daysafterthe foreignfilingbefore
the U.S. applicationbecomesabandoned.(C) isincorrect.See MPEP§ 608.04(a). The improvementswouldconstitutenewmatter andnew
mattercannot be addedto the disclosure of anapplicationafterthe filingdate of the application.(D) isnotcorrect.The applicantisrequiredto
provide notice of foreignfiling,notmerelyrescindthe nonpublicationrequestwithinthe appropriate time.(E) isnotcorrect.The applicantwas
requiredtoprovide notice of foreignfilingwithin45days of filinginJapan,andtwomonthshave passed.Asa result,apetitiontorevive under
37 CFR § 1.137(b) isrequiredforexaminationtocontinue.Alsosee37CFR § 1.137(f).
46. 45. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.Asset forthinMPEP § 2127, underthe heading“AbandonedApplications,IncludingProvisional
Applications,”andsubheading,“AbandonedApplicationsDisclosedtothe PublicCanBe Usedas Prior Art,”states“the subject matterof an
abandonedapplication,includingbothprovisional andnonprovisionalapplications,referredtoina priorart U.S. patentmay be reliedonina 35
U.S.C.102(e) rejectionbasedonthatpatentif the disclosure of the abandonedapplicationisactuallyincludedorincorporatedbyreference in
the patent.Compare Inre Lund,376 F.2d 982, 991, 153 USPQ 625, 633 (CCPA 1967) (The court reversedarejectionoverapatentwhichwasa
continuation-in-partof anabandonedapplication.Applicant’sfilingdate precededthe issue date of the patentreference.The abandoned
applicationcontainedsubjectmatterwhichwasessentialtothe rejectionbutwhichwasnotcarriedoverintothe continuation-in-part.The court
heldthatthe subjectmatterof the abandonedapplicationwasnotavailable tothe publicasof eitherthe parent’sorthe child’sfilingdatesand
thuscouldnot be reliedoninthe 102(e) rejection.).”(A) isincorrectsince anabandonedpatentapplicationmaybecomeevidence of priorart.
Answers(B),(C) and(D) are incorrectdue to the use of the word“only”.Answer(E) doesnotinclude the term“only”.Inaddition,Answer(C) and
(D) are alsoincorrectdue to the inclusionof the phrase “as of itsfilingdate”.Assetforthabove,“Anabandonedpatentapplicationbecomes
available aspriorart onlyas of the date the publicgainsaccessto it.See 37 CFR 1.14(e)(2).”
47. 46. ANSWER:The correctansweris (C).The internal reportwasintendedtobe confidential andtherefore isnota“printedpublication”under35
U.S.C.§ 102(b). See MPEP § 2128.01, underthe heading“Internal DocumentsIntendedToBe Confidential Are Not‘PrintedPublications,”citing
In re George,, 2 USPQ2d 1880 (Bd.Pat. App.& Int.1987) states“Researchreportsdisseminatedin-house toonlythose persons whounderstood
the policyof confidentialityregardingsuchreportsare notprintedpublicationseventhoughthe policywasnotspecifically statedinwriting.”
Answer(A) isincorrect.Anorallypresentedpapercanbe a “printedpublication”if copiesare availablewithoutrestriction.The paperisa
“printedpublication”under35 U.S.C.§ 102(b). See MPEP§ 2128.01. Answer(B) isincorrect.The thesisisa “printedpublication”under35U.S.C.
§ 102(b). See MPEP§ 2128.01. Answer(D) isincorrect.Anelectronicpublicationdisclosedonthe Internetisconsideredtobe publiclyavailable
as of the date the itemwas posted.The referenceisa“printedpublication”under35 U.S.C.§ 102(b). See MPEP § 2128. Answer(E) isincorrect.
There isno needtoprove that anyone actuallylookedata document.The manual isa “printedpublication”under35U.S.C.§ 102(b). See MPEP
§ 2128.
48. 47. ANSWER:(B) is the mostproperanswer.MPEP § 2111, underthe heading“ClaimsMustBe GivenTheirBroadestReasonable Interpretation,”
states,inreference toInre Prater,415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969): “The court explainedthat‘readingaclaimin
lightof the specification,[’] totherebyinterpretlimitationsexplicitlyrecitedinthe claim,isaquite differentthingfrom‘readinglimitationsof the
specificationintoaclaim,’totherebynarrowthe scope of the claimbyimplicitlyaddingdisclosed[sic,disclosed] limitationswhichhave no
expressbasisinthe claim.”Answer(A) isanimproperresponse tothe questionbecauseitisacorrect statementof claiminterpretationduring
patentprosecution.AspointedoutinMPEP § 2111.01, the court inIn re Marosi,710 F.2d 799, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed.Cir.1983) (quoting
In re Okuzawa,537 F.2d545, 548, 190 USPQ 464, 466 (CCPA 1976)), states:“It iswell settledthat‘claimsare notto be read ina vacuum and
limitationsthereinare tobe interpretedinlightof the specificationingivingthemtheir“broadestreasonable interpretation.”’”Answer(C) isan
improperresponse tothe questionbecause itisacorrect statementof claiminterpretationduringpatentprosecution.MPEP§ 2111.01, under
the heading“PlainMeaningRefersToThe MeaningGiventoThe TermBy Those Of OrdinarySkill InThe Art,” statesthat“[w]hennotdefinedby
applicantinthe specification,the wordsof aclaimmust be giventheirplainmeaning.”Answer(D) isanimproperresponse tothe question
because itisa correct statementof claiminterpretationduringpatentprosecution.MPEP§2111.01 statesthat itis onlywhenthe specification
providesadefinitionfortermsappearinginthe claimscanthe specificationbe usedtointerpretthe claimlanguage.Answer (E) isanimproper
response tothe questionbecause itisacorrect statementof claiminterpretationduringpatentprosecution.See MPEP§2111.01, underthe
heading“PlainMeaningRefersToThe MeaningGivento The Term By Those Of OrdinarySkill InThe Art,” states,inreliance uponInre
Donaldson,16 F.3d 1189, 1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (Fed.Cir.1994), that there is“one exception,andthatiswhenanelementisclaimed
usinglanguage fallingunderthe scope of 35 U.S.C. 112, 6th paragraph (oftenbroadlyreferredtoas meansor stepplusfunctionlanguage).In
that case,the specificationmustbe consultedtodetermine the structure,material,oractscorrespondingtothe functionrecitedinthe claim.”
49. 48. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.35 U.S.C.§ 102(b); MPEP § 2133.03(b). MPEP § 2133.03(b), underthe heading“I.The MeaningOf
“Sale,”andsubheading“D.A Sale of RightsIs Nota Sale of the InventionandWill NotinItself Bara Patent,”states“‘[a]nassignmentorsale of
the rights,such as patentrights,inthe inventionisnotasale of ‘the invention’withinthe meaningof section102(b).’”The sale mustinvolve the
deliveryof the physical inventionitself.MoleculonResearchCorp.v.CBS,Inc.,793 F.2d 1261, 1265, 229 USPQ 805, 809 (Fed.Cir.1986).” (A) is
incorrect.Althoughreexaminations are limitedtopriorart patentsandprintedpublications,thatlimitationisnotpresentinoriginal prosecution.
MPEP § 2133.03(b) states“An impermissible salehasoccurredif there wasa definite sale,oroffertosell,more than1 year before the effective
filingdate of the U.S.applicationandthe subjectmatterof the sale,or offertosell,fullyanticipatedthe claimedinventionorwouldhave
renderedthe claimedinventionobviousbyitsadditiontothe priorart. FeragAG v.Quipp,Inc.,45 F.3d 1562, 1565, 33 USPQ2d 1512, 1514 (Fed.
Cir.1995).” (B) and (D) are incorrect.There isnorequirementthaton-sale activitybe public.See MPEP§ 2133.03(b), underthe heading“III.Sale
By Inventor,Assignee OrOthersAssociatedWithThe InventorInThe Course Of Business,”andsubheading“A.Sale ActivityNeedNotBe Public.”
(E) is wrongat leastbecause anon-sale bardoesnot require anactual sale.A bar can alsobe basedonan offerto sell.MPEP§ 2133.03(b), under
the heading“II.OffersForSale.”
50. 49. ANSWER:(D) is the correct answer.See MPEP§ 2173.05(c), underthe heading“Open-EndedNumerical Ranges.”Paraphrasingthe
explanationtherein,whenanindependentclaimrecitesacompositioncomprising“atleast20% iron”and a dependentclaimsetsforthspecific
amountsof non-ironingredientswhichaddupto100%, apparentlytothe exclusionof iron,anambiguityiscreatedwithregardtothe “at least”
limitationunlessthe percentagesof the non-ironingredientsare basedonthe weightof the non-ironingredients.Onthe otherhand,a
compositionclaimedtohave a theoretical contentgreaterthan100% (i.e.,20-80% of iron,20-80% of gallium,and1-25% of copper) isnot
necessarilyindefinitesimplybecause the claimsmaybe readintheoryto include compositionsthatare impossibleinfactto formulate.Here,
because the inventionisanon-theoretical alloy,the sumof the claimedconstituentscannotexceed100%unlessthe percentage isbasedon
weight.In(D),the sumof elements(B) and(C) is 81% by volume,leavingonly19%foriron.Claim1, however,requires“atleast20% iron,”
renderingClaim2ambiguousasto the percentage of elementA.(A) isincorrect.The sumof galliumandcoppercomponentsis 80%,leavinga
possible 20%of the compositionforelementiron.Claim1requires“atleast20% iron,”whichincludes20%iron.Therefore,the sumof iron,
galliumandcoppercomponentsinClaim2is 100%. (B) isincorrect.“At least20% iron”includes21% iron,“at least10% galliumincludes11%
gallium,and“at least10% copperincludes10.01% copper.(C) isincorrect.“At least20% iron”includes20%iron,“at least 10% galliumincludes
10% gallium,and“atleast10% copper”includes10%copper.(E) is incorrectbecause Claim1usesthe opentransitionphrase “comprising,”
whichpermitsadditionalelementstobe addedtothe composition.Nothinginthe problemindicatesthatanadditionalcomponent,silver,
cannot be addedto the composition.
51. 50. ANSWER:(D) is the mostcorrect answer.37 CFR § 1.75; MPEP § 608.01(n). As explainedinMPEP§ 608.01(n), underthe heading“Multiple
DependentClaims,”subheading“Acceptable Multiple DependentClaimWording”the multipledependentclaimwordingof newclaims16-27 is
proper.See,forexample,“any one of the precedingclaims,”and“inanyof claims1-3 or 7-9.” 37 CFR § 1.75(c) states“For fee calculation
purposesunder§ 1.16, a multiple dependentclaimwillbe consideredtobe thatnumberof claimsto whichdirectreferenceis made therein.”
Therefore,claims16-27wouldeachhave a claimvalue of elevenandthe total numberof claimsforfee calculationisone hundredforty-seven
(12 x 11 = 132 + 15 = 147). Answers(A) and(B) are incorrectbecause theyare not the correct total.Answer(C) isincorrectbecause the multiple
dependentclaimshave notbeencalculatedinaccordance with37 CFR§ 1.75. Answer(E) isincorrectbecause the questionasks forthe total
afterthe amendmentaddingclaims16-27 has beenentered.
53. 1. ANSWER: (A) isthe mostcorrect answer.35 U.S.C.§ 111; 37 CFR § 1.53; MPEP § 601.01. As providedinMPEP§ 601.01(a), the filingfee foran
applicationfiledunder37 CFR 1.53(b) can be submittedafterthe filingdate.(B),(C),(D) and(E) are incorrect.37 CFR § 53(b); MPEP § 601.01. 37
CFR § 1.53(b) providesthata filingdate isgrantedonthe date on whicha specificationasprescribedby35 U.S.C.§ 112 containingadescription
pursuantto 37 CFR § 1.71 and at leastone claimpursuantto 37 CFR § 1.75, and any drawingrequiredby37 CFR § 1.81(a) are filedinthe Office.
Thus,(B),(C),(D) and (E) are neededtoobtainafilingdate.
54. 2. ANSWER: (D) isthe mostcorrect answer.MPEP§§ 1403 and 1412.03, underthe heading“WhenA BroadenedClaimCanBe Presented.”A
broadeningreissueclaimmustbe filedwithinthe twoyearsfromthe grant of the original patent.(D) isthe mostcorrectand the examiner
shouldexaminethe case asany otherapplicationandaddressappropriate issuesconcerningreissue examination.SeeSwitzerv.Sockman,333
F.2d 935, 142 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1964) (a similarrule ininterferences).Since applicantfiledthe amendmentbyExpressMail,the amendmentis
treatedas beingfiledwiththe USPTOonthe date of depositwiththe US Postal Service.Therefore,(A),(B) and(C) are incorrectanswers.A
reissue applicationcanbe granteda filingdate withoutanoathor declaration,orwithoutthe filingfee beingpresent.See 37CFR § 1.53(f).
Applicantwill be givenaperiodof time toprovide the missingpartsandto paythe surcharge under37 CFR § 1.16(e).See MPEP § 1410.01.
Choice (E) isnot correct since the mere deletionof anelementof aclaimdoesnotautomaticallyraise agroundof rejection basedonthe
recapture doctrine.See MPEP§ 1412.02.
55. 3. ANSWER: (C) iscorrect. MPEP § 2113, underthe heading“Once A ProductAppearingToBe SubstantiallyIdentical IsFoundAndA 35 U.S.C.
102/103 RejectionMade,The BurdenShiftsToThe ApplicantToShowAnUnobviousDifference,”states“[o]nce the examinerprovidesa
rationale tendingtoshowthatthe claimedproductappearstobe the same or similartothat of the priorart, althoughproducedbya different
process,the burdenshiftstoapplicanttocome forwardwithevidence establishinganunobviousdifference betweenthe claimedproductand
the prior art product.In re Marosi,710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed.Cir.1983).” (A) isincorrectbecause the patentabilityof product-
by-processclaimsisbasedonthe productitself.See Inre Thorpe,227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed.Cir.1985). Where the endproductsare the same,the
processof makinglimitationsdonothave tobe givenweightinex parte examination.SeeAtlanticThermoplasticsCo.v.Faytex Corp.,23
USPQ2d 1481, 1490-91 (Fed.Cir.1992) (product-by-processclaimsare treateddifferentlyforpatentabilitypurposesduringex parte examination
inthe USPTO thanfor infringementandvaliditypurposesduringlitigation).(B) isincorrectbecause "[o]nce the Examinerprovidesarationale
tendingtoshow that the claimedproductappearstobe the same or similartothat of the priorart, althoughproducedbya differentprocess,
the burdenshiftstoapplicanttocome forwardwithevidence establishinganunobviousdifference betweenthe claimedproduct andthe prior
art product."MPEP § 2113. "To the extentthatthe processlimitationsdistinguishthe productsoverthe priorart,theymust be giventhe same
considerationastraditional productcharacteristics."Inre Hallman,210 USPQ 609, 611 (CCPA 1981). Thus,(C) is correctbecause applicantcan
showby factual argumentsand/ordeclarationsoraffidavitsunder37CFR § 1.132 thatthe methodof makingproducesadifferentproductand
that the differencesare unobvious.(D) isincorrectbecause itdoesnot tendtoshowthat the productsare different.(E) isincorrectbecause the
inventor'sawarenessof priorart isof no consequencetopatentability.
56. 4. ANSWER: (C) isthe correct answer.37 CFR §§ 1.6(d)(3) and1.8(a)(2)(i)(d);MPEP§ 502 (reproducingRule 1.6(d)(3));MPEP§ 512 (reproducing
Rule 1.8(a)(2)(i)(d));andMPEP§1817.01. Asstatedin MPEP § 1817.01, “[a]ll designationsmustbe made inthe international applicationonfiling;
none maybe addedlater.”The applicationwillnotbe accordedan internationalfilingdate since the practitionerhastriedtocure the failure to
designate atleastone contractingState byfilingapaperusingfacsimile whichisnotpermittedaccordingto37 CFR§§ 1.6(d)(3) and
1.8(a)(2)(i)(d).(A)iswrongbecause applicanthasfailedtocomplywithArticle 11(1)(iii)(b) onsuchdate.See MPEP§ 1810 (reproducingPCT
Article 11(1)(iii)(b).(B) iswrongbecause accordingto37 CFR1.6(d)(3) and 37 CFR 1.8 (a)(2)(i)(d),applicantcannotfile aninternational
applicationby facsimile.SeeMPEP§ 502 (reproducing37CFR § 1.6(d)(3));MPEP§ 512 (reproducing37CFR § 1.8(a)(2)(i)(d)).Since no
designationswere includedonfiling,the applicationpaperscannotbe accordedaninternational filingdate.See PCTArticle 11(1)(iii)(b).
Applicantcannotcorrectthisby filingthe designationsheetbyfacsimile.See MPEP§ 502 (reproducingRule 1.6(d)(3));MPEP § 512 (reproducing
Rule 1.8(a)(2)(i)(d)).(D) iswrongbecause accordingtoPCTRule 80.5, whena response isdue ona day where the receivingOffice isnotopenfor
business,applicanthasuntil the nextbusinessday.See AppendixTof the MPEP. (E) isincorrectbecause (C) iscorrect.
57. 5. ANSWER: (C) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 2163, underthe heading“GENERALPRINCIPLESGOVERNINGCOMPLIANCEWITHTHE
"WRITTEN DESCRIPTION"REQUIREMENT FOR APPLICATIONS,”andsubheading“NeworAmendedClaims,”states“A claimthatomitsan element
whichapplicantdescribesasanessential orcritical feature of the inventionoriginallydiscloseddoesnotcomplywiththe writtendescription
requirement.See GentryGallery,134 F.3d at 1480, 45 USPQ2d at 1503; In re Sus,306 F.2d494, 504, 134 USPQ 301, 309 (CCPA 1962) (‘[O]ne
skilledinthisartwouldnotbe taught bythe writtendescriptionof the inventioninthe specificationthatany'aryl orsubstitutedaryl radical'
wouldbe suitable forthe purposesof the inventionbutratherthatonlycertain aryl radicalsand certainspecificallysubstitutedaryl radicals[i.e.,
aryl azides] wouldbe suitableforsuchpurposes.’).”(A),(B),(D) and(E) are incorrect.Each listsa properwayto demonstrate satisfactionof the
writtendescriptionrequirement.MPEP§2163.02, underthe heading“STANDARDFORDETERMININGCOMPLIANCEWITH THE WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT,” providesthatthe writtendescriptionrequirementismet“whenthe specificationconveyswithreasonable clarity
to those skilledinthe artthat,as of the filingdate sought,applicantwasinpossessionof the inventionasnowclaimed.See,e.g.,Vas-Cath,Inc.
v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1991).” Possessionmaybe showninavarietyof ways“including
descriptionof anactual reductiontopractice,or by showingthatthe inventionwas‘readyforpatenting’suchasby the disclosure of drawingsor
structural chemical formulasthatshowthatthe inventionwascomplete,orbydescribingdistinguishingidentifyingcharacteristicssufficientto
showthat the applicantwasinpossessionof the claimedinvention.See,e.g.,Pfaff v.WellsElectronics,Inc.,525 U.S. 55, 68, 119 S.Ct.304, 312,
48 USPQ2d 1641, 1647 (1998); Regentsof the Universityof Californiav.Eli Lilly,119 F.3d 1559, 1568, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1405 (Fed.Cir.1997);
Amgen,Inc.v.Chugai Pharmaceutical,927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021 (Fed.Cir.1991).”
58. 6. ANSWER: (D) isthe mostcorrect answer.37 CFR § 1.56; MPEP § 2001.05. 37 CFR§ 1.56(a) setsforth a dutyto disclose informationthatis
material topatentability.MPEP§ 2001.05 statesthat“informationisnotmaterial unlessiscomeswithinthe definitionof 37 CFR 1.56(b)(1) or
(b)(2).If informationisnotmaterial,thereisnodutyto disclose the informationtothe Office.”The informationthatmoondustwasnever
actuallyusedisnotmaterial as definedunder37 CFR § 1.56(b)(1) or (2) whichstate that informationismaterial if “(b)(1) Itestablishes,byitself
or in combinationwithotherinformation,aprimafacie case of unpatentabilityof aclaim;or (2) It refutes,orisinconsistentwith,apositionthe
applicanttakesin:(i) Opposinganargumentof unpatentabilityreliedonbythe Office or,(ii) Assertinganargument of patentability.”Thatthe
use of the moondustas part of an erasure formulationwasonlytheorizedandnotactuallyusedisacceptable asisanexample formakingit.
MPEP § 608.01(p), II, underthe heading“SimulatedorPredictedTestResultsOrPropheticExamples,”statesthat“[s]imulatedorpredictedtest
resultsandprophetical examples(paperexamples) are permittedinpatentapplications....Paperexamplesdescribethe mannerandprocessof
makingan embodimentof the inventionwhichhasnotactuallybeenconducted.”Care,however,mustbe takennottostate that an experiment
was actuallyrunor conductedwhenitwasnot and that “[n]oresultsshouldbe presentedasactual resultsunlesstheyhave actuallybeen
achieved.”MPEP§ 2004, item8. (A) isincorrect.37 CFR § 1.56(a) requiresthatindividualsassociatedwiththe filingandprosecutionof apatent
applicationhave adutyto disclose informationtothe Office.37CFR § 1.56(c) defineswhichindividualsare associatedwith the filingand
prosecutionof apatentapplicationandthat“(c) Individualsassociatedwiththe filingorprosecutionof apatentapplication withinthe meaning
of thissectionare:(1) Each inventornamedinthe application;(2) Eachattorneyor agentwho preparesorprosecutesthe application;and(3)
Everyotherpersonwhois substantivelyinvolvedinthe preparationorprosecutionof the applicationandwhoisassociatedwiththe inventor,
withthe assignee orwithanyone towhomthere isan obligationtoassignthe application.”Pointispartof the Salesdepartmentandnofacts
were presentedthatsubstantivelyinvolvedhiminthe preparationorprosecutionof the application.Additionally,asnotedinthe explanation
relatinganswerto(D),the informationgiventoPointbyTipwas notmaterial information.(B) isincorrect.While Tipwouldbe anindividual
identifiedunder37 CFR§ 1.56(c), there isno material informationtobe disclosedasnotedinthe explanationto(D).(C) isincorrect.Asnotedin
the explanationrelatingto(D),the informationisnotmaterial.Additionally,asnotedinthe explanationtoanswer(A),Pointisnotan individual
definedby37 CFR 1.56(c) as owinga duty.(E) is incorrect.Asthere isno requirementthatitbe explicitlystatedthataninventionhasorhas not
beenactuallyconducted,asnotedinthe explanationof (D),the prosecutionneednotbe continuedforthe purpose of supplyinganinformation
disclosure statementregardingthe developmentof the moonrock erasure formulation.
59. 7. ANSWER: (A) isthe bestanswer.35 U.S.C.§ 102; MPEP § 2131.01, underthe heading“ExtraReference orEvidence CanBe UsedTo Showan
InherentCharacteristicof the ThingTaught bythe PrimaryReference,”states“thataslongas there isevidence of recordestablishinginherency,
failure of those skilledinthe artto contemporaneouslyrecognizeaninherentproperty,functionoringredientof apriorart reference doesnot
preclude afindingof anticipation.AtlasPowderCo.v.IRECO,Inc.,190 F.3d 1342, 1349, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1948 (Fed.Cir.1999) (Twopriorart
referencesdisclosedblastingcompositionscontainingwater-inoilemulsionswithidentical ingredientstothose claimed,inoverlappingranges
withthe claimedcomposition.The onlyelement of the claimsarguablynotpresentinthe priorart compositionswas"sufficientaeration...
entrappedtoenhance sensitivitytoasubstantial degree."The Federal Circuitfoundthatthe emulsionsdescribedinbothreferenceswould
inevitablyandinherentlyhave "sufficientaeration"tosensitize the compoundinthe claimedrangesbasedonthe evidence of record(including
testdata and experttestimony).(B) isincorrect.The priorart reference,toanticipate the claimedinvention,isnotrequiredtorecognizean
inherentproperty.SeeMPEP§ 2131.01. (C) isincorrect.The prior art reference,toanticipate the claimedinvention,isnot requiredtorecognize
an inherentfunctionof oxygen.See MPEP§2131.01. (D) isincorrect.The priorart reference, toanticipate the claimedinvention,isnotrequired
to recognize aninherentingredient,oxygen.See MPEP§ 2131.01. (E) is incorrectbecause (B),(C),and(D) are incorrect,as explainedabove.
62. 10. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.37 CFR § 1.99; MPEP § 610. Rule 1.99 providesthata thirdparty maysubmitina published
applicationaforeign-languagepublicationandanEnglishlanguage translationof pertinentportionsof the publication. The submissionmust
“identifythe applicationtowhichitisdirectedbyapplicationnumber,”.. “include the fee setforthin§ 1.17(p);” include “alistof the patentsor
publicationssubmittedforconsiderationbythe Office,includingthe date of publicationof eachpatentorpublication;”... a “ copy of eachlisted
patentor publicationinwrittenformorat leastthe pertinentportions;”andan“Englishlanguage translationof all the necessaryandpertinent
parts of any non-Englishlanguagepatentorpublicationinwrittenformreliedupon.”(A) isincorrect.37 CFR § 1.99 doesnot authorize athird-
party submissionof materialsorthingsotherthanpatentsorpublications.See 37CFR § 1.99; MPEP § 610. Thus,submissionof avideotape
under§1.99 isnot authorized.(B) isincorrect.A third-partysubmissionunder37 CFR 1.99 may not include explanations.See 37CFR § 1.99(d);
MPEP § 610. (C) is incorrect.A third-partysubmissionunder37 CFR 1.99 may not include markingsorhighlightsonthe publications.See 37CFR
§ 1.99(d);MPEP § 610. (D) isincorrectbecause a protestcannotbe filedinapublishedapplication.See37 CFR§ 1.291(a)(1); MPEP 1901.06.
63. 11. ANSWER:(E) is the most correctanswer.35 U.S.C.§ 251; 37 CFR § 1.53(f); MPEP § 1403. Filingabroadenedreissue applicationwithatleast
one broadeningclaimpriortothe expirationof the two-yeartime periodsetinthe statute satisfiesthe diligenceprovisionsof 35 U.S.C.§ 251.
The executedreissueoath/declarationandthe filingfee maybe filedatalatertime.AccordingtoMPEP § 1403, a reissue applicationcanbe
granteda filingdate withoutanoathor declaration,orwithoutthe filingfeebeingpresent.See 37CFR § 1.53(f).The reissue applicantwill be
givena periodof time toprovide the missingpartsandto paythe surcharge under37 CFR § 1.16(e).See MPEP § 1410.01. (A),(B) and(D) are
clearlyincorrectsince the inventorsandassignee wouldbe barredfroma broadeningreissue if filedafterthe twoyearperiodsetinthe statute.
(C) isincorrectsince the reissue applicationwasfiledwithoutatleastone broadeningclaimpriortothe expirationof the two-yeartime period
setin 35 U.S.C.§ 251.
64. 12. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(2)(b)(i),underthe heading“Safe Harbors,”subheading“IndependentPhysical
Acts (Post-ComputerProcessActivity),”statesthat“[e]xamplesof thistype of statutoryprocessinclude…[a] methodof controllingamechanical
robot whichreliesuponstoringdataina computerthatrepresentsvarioustypesof mechanical movementsof the robot,usingacomputer
processorto calculate positioningof the robotinrelationtogiventasksto be performedbythe robot,and controllingthe robot’smovement
and positionbased onthe calculatedposition.”(A) isatrue statement,andistherefore anincorrectanswer.AssetforthinMPEP§ 2105 a “ new
mineral discoveredinthe earthora newplantfoundinthe wildisnotpatentable subjectmatter.”(B) isan incorrectanswer.Assetforthin
MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(2)(b)(i),underthe heading“Safe Harbors,”subheading“Manipulationof DataRepresentingPhysical Objects orActivities
(Pre-ComputerProcessActivity),”statesthat“[e]xamplesof claimedprocessesthatdonot limitthe claimedinventiontopre-computingsafe
harbor include:... - selectingasetof arbitrarymeasurementpointvalues([Inre] Sarkar,588 F.2d [1330] at 1331, 200 USPQ [132] at 135).” (D)
isan incorrectanswer.MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(2)(b)(i) underthe heading“Safe Harbors,”subheading“IndependentPhysical Acts(Post-Computer
ProcessActivity),”statesthat“[e]xamplesof claimedprocessthatdonotachieve a practical applicationinclude:-stepof ‘updatingalarmlimits’
foundto constitute changingthe numbervalue of avariable torepresentthe resultof the calculation(Parkerv.Flook,437 U.S.584, 585, 198
USPQ 193, 195 (1978).” (E) isa true statement,andtherefore isanincorrectanswer.MPEP§ 2106(IV)(B)(1),underthe heading“Nonstatutory
SubjectMatter” states“[Inre]Warmerdam,33 F.3d [1354,] at 1361, 31 USPQ2d [1754,] at 1760 (claimtoa data structure perse held
nonstatutory).”
65. 13. ANSWER:(A) isthe most correct answer.MPEP§ 2113, underthe heading“ProductBy-ProcessClaimsAre NotLimitedToThe Manipulations
Of The RecitedSteps,OnlyThe Structure ImpliedByThe Steps,”states“’eventhoughproduct-by-processclaimsare limitedbyanddefinedby
the process,determinationof patentabilityisbasedonthe productitself.The patentabilityof aproduct doesnotdependonitsmethodof
production.If the productinthe product-by-processclaimisthe same asor obviousfroma productof the priorart, the claimis unpatentable
eventhoughthe priorproductwas made by a differentprocess.’Inre Thorpe,777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed.Cir.1985).” The issue
iswhetherthe claimedmixtureYisthe same as or obviousoverthe patentedmixture Y.MPEP§ 2113, underthe heading“Once A Product
AppearingToBe SubstantiallyIdentical IsFoundAndA 35 U.S.C.102/103 RejectionMade,The BurdenShiftsToThe ApplicantToShowAn
UnobviousDifference,”states“[o]nce the examinerprovidesarationale tendingtoshowthatthe claimedproductappearstobe the same or
similartothat of the priorart, althoughproducedbya differentprocess,the burdenshiftstoapplicanttocome forwardwithevidence
establishinganunobviousdifference betweenthe claimedproductandthe priorart product.In re Marosi,710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292
(Fed.Cir.1983).” Evidence thatthe twoprocessesproduce differentpropertiesisgermane tothe issue of patentabilityof the product-by-
processclaim.Accordingly,acomparisonof the resultsobtainedbyconductingthe processrecitedinthe claimversusthe processusedby
patentA andwhichshowsthat the claimedproductexhibitsanunexpectedlylowermeltingpointwouldbe apersuasivedemonstrationthat,
althoughthe productswouldappeartobe substantiallyidentical,infact,theyare patentablydifferent.Ex parte Gray,10 USPQ2d 1922 (Bd.Pat.
App.& Inter.1989). Therefore,the bestreplytothe outstandingrejectionwouldbe toargue thatthe claimedproducthasan unexpectedly
lowermeltingpointandtosupportthat argumentwithevidence showingthatthe resultof the patentA processisa mixture withhighermelting
pointas comparedto the claimedproduct.(B) isincorrect.The patentabilityof aproduct-by-processclaimisdeterminedonthe basisof product
characteristics,notprocesssteps.(C) isincorrect.The declarationisconclusory,asopposedtobeingfactual.Thus,the argumentisnot
supportedbyfacts.As statedinMPEP § 716.02(c), underthe heading“OpinionEvidence,”“Althoughanaffidavitordeclarationwhichstatesonly
conclusionsmayhave some probative value,suchanaffidavitordeclarationmayhave littleweightwhenconsideredinlightof all the evidence
of recordinthe application.Inre Brandstadter,484 F.2d 1395, 179 USPQ 286 (CCPA 1973).” Thus,the replyin(A) isthe most correct answervis-
à-vis(C).(D) like (B),isincorrectforthe same reasondiscussedfor(B).(E) isincorrect.Like (C),thisreplyrightlyfocusesonproductproperties.
But withoutthe comparative factual evidence tosupportit,thisreplyisweakerthanone describedin(A).
66. 14. ANSWER:The correctansweris answer(E).See MPEP§ 706.02(f)(1) ingeneral andExample 7 inparticular.(A) isnotcorrect as the
publicationunder35U.S.C. § 122(b) doeshave a priorart date under35 U.S.C.102(e). (B) and (D) are notcorrect because March 27, 2002 and
December1,2000 are not the earliestpriorartdate under35 U.S.C.§ 102(e).The publicationhasanearlierpriorartdate than March 27, 2002
and December1,2000 because of itsbenefit/priorityclaimstothe international applicationandthe provisional application.SeeMPEP§
706.02(f)(1). (C) isnot correct as itis nota filingdate foranyapplicationinthisquestion.
67. 15. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.37 §§ CFR1.6(d)(3); 1.8(a)(2)(i)(F);1.495(b);MPEP § 1893.01(a)(1), 2nd paragraph.The filingof the
copy of the international applicationandthe basicnational fee inordertoavoidabandonmentunder37 CFR§ 1.495(b), as appropriate,maynot
be transmittedbyfacsimile.See 37CFR § 1.6(d)(3) and37 CFR § 1.8(a)(2)(i)(F).(A)isnotthe mostcorrect answerbecause facsimile transmission
isnot permittedinthe situationssetforthin37 CFR § 1.6(d).(B) isnot the mostcorrect answerbecause eventhoughanoathor declarationmay
be submittedbyfacsimiletransmissionassetforthin MPEP § 602, the national stage submissionwasimproperforthe reasons discussedin(C).
(D) is notthe mostcorrect answerbecause (C) isthe mostcomplete answer.Facsimiletransmissionsmay notbe usedtofile acopy of the
international applicationnecessarytoenterthe national stage.(E) isnotthe mostcorrect answerbecause facsimile transmissionmaybe usedto
file certaincorrespondence inPCTapplications.See MPEP§1805.
68. 16. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.The principle inStatement3,that considerationof inherentpropertiesispartof proper
considerationof the inventionasa whole,isrecitedinMPEP§ 2141.02, underthe heading“DisclosedInherentPropertiesAre PartOf ‘AsA
Whole’Inquiry,”andinInre Antonie,559 F.2d 618, 620, 195 USPQ 6, 8 (CCPA 1977). (A) isincorrect,because the properquestioniswhetherthe
inventionasawhole,notjustthe differences,wouldhave beenobvious.See MPEP§2141.02, underthe heading“The ClaimedInventionAsA
Whole Must Be Considered,”(citingStratoflex,Inc.v.AeroquipCorp.,713 F.2d1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed.Cir.1983). (B) isincorrectbecause an
examinershouldconsidersuchassertionsbyaninventoraspart of the “subjectmatteras a whole.”See MPEP§ 2141.02 (citingInre Sponnoble,
405 F.2d 578, 585, 160 USPQ 237, 243 (CCPA 1969)). (D) and (E) are incorrectbecause theyinclude incorrectStatements1and/or2.
69. 17. ANSWER:The correctansweris answer(C).35 U.S.C. § 102(e); MPEP § 706.02(f). The applicationpublicationisaproperreference under35
U.S.C.102(e) because itwas filedbyanotherpriortothe filingdate of the invention.See MPEP§ 706.02(f) et seq.Answer (A) isincorrect.The
reference inanswer(A) isnotaproperreference under35 U.S.C.§ 102(e) because itsinternational filingdate waspriortoNovember29,2000
therebyfailingone of the three conditionsforaWIPOpublicationof aninternationalapplicationtobe appliedunder35U.S.C. § 102(e). See
MPEP § 706(f)(1),underthe heading“I.Determine The Appropriate 35U.S.C. 102(e) For Each Potential Reference ByFollowing The Guidelines,
ExamplesAndFlowChartsSetForthBelow,”subpart(C),whichstates“[I]f the potential reference resultedfrom,orclaimedthe benefitof,an
international application,the followingmustbe determined:(1) If the international applicationmeetsthe followingthreeconditions:(a) an
international filingdate onorafterNovember29, 2000 . . . thenthe international filingdate isaU.S. filingdate forpriorart purposesunder35
U.S.C.102(e).” The reference in(B) isnota properreference under35 U.S.C.§ 102(e) because the reference isnotbyanother.See MPEP§
706.02(f). The reference in(D) is nota properreference under35U.S.C. § 102(e) because 35 U.S.C.§ 102(e) referstopatentsand patent
applications,notjournal articles.See MPEP§ 706.02(f)(1).(E) isnot correct because (C) iscorrectand (A),(B) and(D) are incorrect.
70. 18. ANSWER:(C) isthe mostcorrect answer.See MPEP§ 605.04(b), whichstates“Exceptfor correctionof a typographical ortransliterationerror
inthe spellingof aninventor'sname,arequesttohave the name changedto the signedversionoranyothercorrections inthe name of the
inventor(s)willnotbe entertained...Whenatypographical ortransliterationerrorinthe spellingof aninventor'sname is discoveredduring
pendencyof anapplication,apetitionisnotrequired,norisa newoath or declarationunder 37 CFR1.63 needed.The U.S.[PTO] shouldsimply
be notifiedof the errorandreference tothe notificationpaperwill be made onthe previouslyfiledoathordeclarationby the Office.”(A),(B)
and (D) couldresultinthe spellingof Jon’sname beingcorrectedinUSPTOrecords,but woulddosoat a highercostto applicant,andtherefore
neitherone isthe mostcorrect answer.Furthermore,(A)isalsonotcorrect inthat if a requesttoadd JohnJonesas an inventorwastobe filed,
anotherrequest(andfee) todeleteJonJoneswouldbe required.(B) iswrongbecause apetitionunder37 CFR § 1.182 isnot requiredif the error
inthe name isa typographical error,andthe factsspecifythatthe error inthe spellingof “John”as“Jon” is a typographical error.(D) isnot
correct because notonlywouldfilingacontinuationcreate anadditional expensive,butfilinganewapplicationcouldalso delayexamination.(E)
isnot correct because pursuantto37 CFR § 1.2, businesswiththe Office istobe conducted inwriting,and,evenmore importantly,because“itis
improperforanyone,includingcounsel,toalter,rewrite,orpartlyfill inanypart of the application,includingthe oath ordeclaration,after
executionof the oathor declarationbythe applicant.”MPEP§ 605.04(a).