This motion seeks leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiffs-appellees in an appeal regarding damages for the injury of a pet. The motion argues that a statutory cap on damages for injury to a pet cannot limit the plaintiffs' constitutional right to full compensation for damages. It contends the cap was not intended to apply to actions by government entities and applying it retroactively would deprive the plaintiffs of vested rights. The motion asks the court to affirm the lower court ruling awarding damages exceeding the statutory cap.

1. IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
_______________
No. 01499, September Term, 2012
TIMOTHY BROOKS, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
ROGER JENKINS, et ux.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland
No. 10-C-10-003778, Hon. Marielsa A. Bernard, Specially Assigned
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE
MARYLAND ANIMAL LAW CENTER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES
E. Anne Benaroya, Esq.
5625 Hogenhill Terrace
Rockville, Maryland, 20853
(301) 603-8022
(410) 977-3331
eabenaroy@gmail.com

2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Maryland Animal Law Center (“MALC”) adopts the Appellees Statement of
the Case.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether pet owner damages whose pet has been tortiously injured are capped per
the “pet damages cap” instead of also being allowed to recover their own separate
damages for emotional harm suffered as a consequence of the injury to the pet.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
MALC adopts the Appellees Statement of the Facts.
ARGUMENT.
There is no question that there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict that the
Appellants violated the Jenkins’ constitutional rights by shooting their beloved pet,
“Brandi”, the real issue is that of damages.
Appellants and their amici contend that the Jenkins’ constitutional right to be
made whole, or to collect the full measure of damages available in any constitutional law
case, is limited, or capped by “the pet damages cap.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
(“CJP”) §Section 11-110 (2013). The argument degrades the Jenkins’ constitutional
rights, and should be an affront to any pet-owner; the obvious consequence is if a law
enforcement agency’s intrusions involve a pet, a living breathing companion, rather than
any other type of personal property, the human right to be made whole is significantly
1

3. diminished – in this instance, by a factor of one-hundred.1
Appellants’ argument is
counter-intuitive and asks this court to ignore the law of Maryland and the law of
common sense.
As a matter of record, the trial court reduced the jury’s initial award, $20,000 for
compensatory damages, economic damages, and future expenses, to $7,500, at
Appellants’ request pursuant to the “pet damages cap.”2
That subsection provides, “[a]
person who tortiously causes an injury to or death of a pet while acting individually or
through an animal under the person’s direction or control is liable to the owner of the pet
for compensatory damages. The damages awarded under.. this subsection may not
exceed $7,500.3
The issue is one of first impression; Appellants contend that the Jenkins’
constitutional right to be made whole, and to complete relief for the full amount of
money damages available for other constitutional violations is limited by the “pet
damages” cap. The argument has neither merit nor support since the “pet damages” cap
cannot limit the Jenkins’ constitutional rights, which include those of full compensation.
The “pet damages” cap, although broadly worded, does not expressly include local
1
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110 (2013) limits “compensatory
damages” to $7,500 and the verdict in this case, after having been remitted to the $7,500
for the actual damages pertaining to Brandi, was $607,500.
2
Id.
3
Id. §11-110(b) (emphasis added).
2

4. government law enforcement agencies; Appellants’ arguments are based on the flawed
assumption that silence equates with inclusion.
The Court of Appeals addressed an issue similar in Prince George’s County v.
Longtin,4
a false arrest case. The issue in Longtin was whether the constitutional cause of
action encompasses the right to collect the full measure of damages available at the time
the cause of action accrued, Longtin’s arrest. There, the court ruled that “[w]hat was at
stake was a fully accrued cause of action for complete recovery for constitutional
violations that were not previously subject to an assertion of either all or partial local
government immunity.” Id. The right to collect damages is a vested right and thus could
not be retroactively deprived. Id.
Prior to Longtin, the Court of Appeals analyzed the damages caps in the Local
Government Tort Claims Act’s damages cap (LGTCA).5
In Housing Authority v.
Bennett6
the Court analyzed the damages cap for the LGTCA in a lead paint claim
4
Court of Appeals, No. 35, (Sept. 2010 Term), filed 4/25/11, aff’g, 90 Md. App. 118,
128 (2011). The narrow issue in Longtin was retroactivity, whether the appellant’s
constitutional cause of action encompassed the right to collect the full measure of
damages he was entitled to at the time the cause of action accrued, a five-million dollar
verdict.
5
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) §5-304 (2001) or LGTCA limits the
amount a tort plaintiff can recover from a local government to $200,000 per individual
claim and $500,000 per total claims arising from the same occurrence. See CJP § 5-
303(a)(1). The jury awarded Longtin $5,025,000, a sum well in excess of the limits
provided in the LGTCA.
6
Housing authority v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 365 (2000) (citing, Gordon Family v. Gar,
348 Md. 129, 138 (1997); Blondell v. Baltimore Police, 341 Md. 680, 691(1996) (other
citations omitted). Bennett raised considerable legislative concern. In the following
legislative session, 2001, the General Assembly Amended the LGTCA to accommodate
the Bennett ruling. The court then revisited the LGTCA issues briefly in Longtin,
3

5. against a local housing authority and ruled that the cap did not apply. In reaching that
ruling, the Court emphasized that the meaning of a statute must be interpreted in its
context or legislative scheme, particularly if constitutional issues are involved. Id. The
court began by reviewing the LGTCA damages cap in its broader statutory scheme,
“[l]local governments also lack immunity from tort liability for violations of federal
constitutional or statutory rights. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [citations omitted] local
governments, unlike state governments, may be sued when a local governmental statute,
regulation, policy, or custom causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Id.
(citations omitted).7
In interpreting the statute the court reasoned that constitutional
rights necessarily encompass all available remedies for violations of those rights; to rule
otherwise would enable erosion of those rights by attrition of remedies.
As a final matter, if this Court should rule that the “pet damages” cap does apply,
it may not apply to this case since it may not be applied retroactively. In addressing that
issue in Longtin, the court relied on Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md. Inc., 370 Md. 604,
625-30 (2002). In that case the court considered whether two statutes, with retroactive
effect that limited potential recovery by a party, deprived that party of a "vested right.”.
Holding that a "cause of action", constitutional or other, is a "vested right", and is
constitutionally protected, the court stated, “Although there may not ordinarily be a
where the court held that the plaintiff’s right to collect damages accrued at the time his
cause of action accrued against the police, the date of his false arrest.
7
The court ruled that the constitutional cause of action encompassed the right to collect
the damages available at the time of the arrest; however, the issue at hand is whether a
statutory damages cap diminishes a constitutional cause of action.
4

6. constitutionally protected vested property right in a particular... cause of action
accruing after a statute limits or abrogates the cause of action, (1993), there normally is a
vested property right in a cause of action which has accrued prior to the legislative action.
(Internal citations omitted). This Court has consistently held that the Maryland
Constitution ordinarily precludes the Legislature (1) from retroactively abolishing an
accrued cause of action, thereby depriving the plaintiff of a vested right, and (2) from
retroactively creating a cause of action, or reviving a barred cause of action, thereby
violating the vested right of the defendant.”. Id. at 632-33.8
CONCLUSION
Appellants and their amici contend that the Jenkins’ constitutional right to be
made whole, or to collect the full measure of damages available in any other property
destruction case, is limited, or capped by “the pet damages cap.” For the reasons above,
the argument has no merit, legal or otherwise, and this court should affirm the ruling
from the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland.
8
In Dua, the plaintiffs sought to recover monthly late fees which they had paid to
Comcast, to the extent that such fees exceeded six per cent per annum, the legal rate of
interest set forth in Maryland's constitution. One of the two statutes, passed after the
alleged illegal late fees were paid, established the validity of late fees in certain allowable
amounts, and stated that "[t]his Act shall apply to all late fees provided for in contracts
entered into, or in effect, on or after November 5, 1995. Ch. 59 of the Acts of 2000,
effective October 1, 2000." Had the statute applied retroactively, it would have limited
the plaintiff's claims for late fees during the five-year retroactive period by the amounts
exceeding the new statutory limit.
5

7. Dated: September 20, 2013 Respectfully Submitted,
______________________
E. Anne Benaroya, Esq.
5625 Hogenhill Terrace
Rockville, Maryland, 20853
(301) 603-8022
(410) 977-3331
eabenaroy@gmail.com
STATEMENT OF RULE 8-504 COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 8-504(a)(9), I certify that the foregoing brief is in Times New
Roman font with a 13-point typeface.
________________________
E. Anne Benaroya
6

8. CERTIFICATION BY SIGNING ATTORNEY
I certify that two copies of the foregoing were sent by first class U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, on September 20, 2013 to the following:
Daniel Karp
Michael Rynd
Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp
120 E. Baltimore Street, Suite 1850
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Cary J. Hansel, Esquire
Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A.
6404 Ivy Lane, Suite 400
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
Rebekah D. Lusk, Esquire
Thienel Law Firm, LLC
10624 Harpoon Hill
Columbia, Maryland 21044
________________________
E. Anne Benaroya
7