713 DOI: 10.1037/14045-040 APA Handbook of Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality: Vol. 1. Context, Theory, and Research, K. I. Pargament (Editor-in-Chief) Copyright © 2013 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved. C h a P t e r 4 0 AthEIStS, AgnoStICS, And APoStAtES Heinz Streib and Constantin Klein In the scientific study of religion in general and the psychology of religion in particular, atheists and agnostics have received limited attention, whereas believers and converts have stood in the center of interest. More recently, however, more attention has been given to atheists and agnostics, and several researchers have recommended studying atheists and agnostics in their own right (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Keysar, 2007; Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). This new interest may in part be due to indications of a con- siderable increase in the probability of religious nonaffiliation in the United States. According to one recent study, this probability has risen “from between .06 and .08 in the 1970s and 1980s to almost .16 in 2006” (Schwadel, 2010, p. 318). Although the question of who the “nones” are (cf. Pasquale, 2007) should be approached with care, these groups of unaffiliates and disaffiliates likely include a number of atheists and agnostics. Most of the research in this area takes a static and synchronic approach, contrasting belief versus unbelief or religiosity versus atheism or agnosticism. We believe that a more dynamic approach is called for, one that views atheism and agnosticism as pro- cesses. From the perspective of a dynamic approach, it is also necessary to include apostasy in this discus- sion, because people who leave their faith are in the process of a developmental change, a migration in the religious field that eventually may lead to exiting the religious domain altogether. Therefore, the three terms atheist, agnostic, and apostasy are interrelated and need to be studied together. For a deeper understanding of atheists, agnostics, and people who deconvert eventually to atheist and agnostic beliefs, it is imperative to know their moti- vations, the predictors of their stance toward reli- gion, and the effects of their religious approach on various outcomes. There are a number of particu- larly interesting questions about outcomes: Are the shifts to atheism, agnosticism, and apostasy associ- ated with an increase or a decrease in psychological well-being? How do these religious positions affect physical health? Do they lead to differences in pref- erences in the ways of coping with major life stress- ors? In this chapter, we address these questions, discuss the results from extant research, and suggest directions for future research. DEFINITIONS AND MODELS FOR uNDERSTANDING ATHEISTS, AGNOSTICS, AND APOSTATES We begin with a discussion of concepts and models. Some important questions have been raised or reopened on the theore.

1. 713
DOI: 10.1037/14045-040
APA Handbook of Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality: Vol.
1. Context, Theory, and Research, K. I. Pargament (Editor-in-
Chief)
Copyright © 2013 by the American Psychological Association.
All rights reserved.
C h a P t e r 4 0
AthEIStS, AgnoStICS,
And APoStAtES
Heinz Streib and Constantin Klein
In the scientific study of religion in general and the
psychology of religion in particular, atheists and
agnostics have received limited attention, whereas
believers and converts have stood in the center of
interest. More recently, however, more attention has
been given to atheists and agnostics, and several
researchers have recommended studying atheists
and agnostics in their own right (Hood, Hill, &
Spilka, 2009; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006;
Keysar, 2007; Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). This new
interest may in part be due to indications of a con-
siderable increase in the probability of religious
nonaffiliation in the United States. According to one
recent study, this probability has risen “from
between .06 and .08 in the 1970s and 1980s to
almost .16 in 2006” (Schwadel, 2010, p. 318).

2. Although the question of who the “nones” are
(cf. Pasquale, 2007) should be approached with
care, these groups of unaffiliates and disaffiliates
likely include a number of atheists and agnostics.
Most of the research in this area takes a static and
synchronic approach, contrasting belief versus
unbelief or religiosity versus atheism or agnosticism.
We believe that a more dynamic approach is called
for, one that views atheism and agnosticism as pro-
cesses. From the perspective of a dynamic approach,
it is also necessary to include apostasy in this discus-
sion, because people who leave their faith are in the
process of a developmental change, a migration in
the religious field that eventually may lead to exiting
the religious domain altogether. Therefore, the three
terms atheist, agnostic, and apostasy are interrelated
and need to be studied together.
For a deeper understanding of atheists, agnostics,
and people who deconvert eventually to atheist and
agnostic beliefs, it is imperative to know their moti-
vations, the predictors of their stance toward reli-
gion, and the effects of their religious approach on
various outcomes. There are a number of particu-
larly interesting questions about outcomes: Are the
shifts to atheism, agnosticism, and apostasy associ-
ated with an increase or a decrease in psychological
well-being? How do these religious positions affect
physical health? Do they lead to differences in pref-
erences in the ways of coping with major life stress-
ors? In this chapter, we address these questions,
discuss the results from extant research, and suggest
directions for future research.
DEFINITIONS AND MODELS

3. FOR uNDERSTANDING ATHEISTS,
AGNOSTICS, AND APOSTATES
We begin with a discussion of concepts and models.
Some important questions have been raised or
reopened on the theoretical level, questions that
relate to the conceptualization of religion and spiri-
tuality in general.
The Substantive Definition
The most widely accepted definition of atheism is
substantive in nature: Atheism is characterized by the
denial of the existence of God, whereas agnosticism is
characterized by skepticism about, or bracketing of,
the existence of God, the construction of worldview
and identity without any assumption that there is
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Streib and Klein
714

5. a God (Baggini, 2003; Mackie, 1982). Here atheism and
agnosticism are understood as interrelated but never-
theless different constructs. Both signify a turn away
from specific images of God, but atheism is more res-
olute than agnosticism, less open to a religious or
spiritual sentiment and quest. From this substantive
perspective, atheism and agnosticism can be under-
stood as beliefs (Hood et al., 2009; Martin, 2007),
although many atheists and agnostics do not see their
views as “faith based” (Saeed & Grant, 2004). Never-
theless, atheism and agnosticism are based on (even
though refusing or bracketing) a culturally dominant
and specifically theistic image of God.
In atheism, however, there is more at work than
simply substantive concepts of religion, such as the-
oretical, philosophical questions of whether God
exists; atheism also involves hostility toward orga-
nized religion in the name of reason, freedom, and
autonomy. Although “popular” atheism certainly
draws on the opposition against, and falsification of,
theistic beliefs, it is also accompanied by vigorous
claims about the irrationality and vanity of all reli-
gion and every belief in gods, spirits, or transcen-
dental entities (e.g., Dawkins, 2006; Hitchens,
2007). As C. Taylor (2007) maintained, modern
atheism emerged as a consequence of the Enlighten-
ment and the ethical fight for freedom in matters of
religion that gained most of its popularity in the
19th century.
Our understanding of atheism and agnosticism is
more comprehensive and not confined to the sub-
stantive paradigm. It draws on functional and struc-
tural perspectives on religion and includes such
dimensions as experience, meaning making, ritual,

6. or participation. On the basis of this broader con-
cept of religion, atheism and agnosticism can be
understood as disbelief in, hostility toward, or igno-
rance of a specific established religion. From this
point of view, atheism represents the hard core of an
antireligious sentiment, whereas agnosticism consti-
tutes a rather mild position of religious abstinence
(Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006).
The Varieties of Atheisms and
Agnosticisms and the Dynamics of Change
The association of atheism and agnosticism with
unbelief is also problematic, for it is plausible only in
a monoreligious environment or a culture with one
dominant and unchanging religion. If, however,
understandings of God vary and change, then
understandings of atheism will vary and change as
well. This means that there will be as many varieties
of atheism as there are varieties of belief in God
(Hyman, 2007). It follows that in multireligious cul-
tures, we must be even more specific and explicate
which God is called into question, what kind of reli-
gious experiences or rituals have become empty, and
which religious establishment is opposed. And occa-
sionally, atheist or agnostic developments in regard
to one religion go hand in hand with an appreciation
for another religion or spirituality.
What has been said about the conceptualization
of atheism and agnosticism also applies generally to
the conceptualization of apostasy. To respond to
some terminological uncertainty (cf. the discussion
about definitions in Hood et al., 2009, pp. 132–133),
we suggest a broad understanding of apostasy as dis-
identification and eventually disaffiliation from a

7. religious tradition. Thus, the term apostate is similar
to deconvert, as Streib and colleagues (Streib, Hood,
Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009; Streib & Keller, 2004)
have defined it with reference to Barbour (1994),
and includes core criteria, such as the loss of reli-
gious experiences, intellectual doubt and denial,
moral criticism, and disaffiliation from a religious
community. From our point of view, all three
concepts—atheism, agnosticism, and apostasy—
are interrelated. Each construct is dynamic and
includes experiential, moral, ritual, and participa-
tory dimensions.
The Beliefs of the Nones
Atheism, agnosticism, and apostasy must not be
lumped together with the unspecified group of the
unaffiliated or “nones”—who might include nonat-
tending believers and private practitioners who still
feel attached to their (former) religious traditions
(Albrecht, Cornwall, & Cunningham, 1988; Fuller,
2001; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006). Pasquale
(2007) asked unchurched persons from the U.S.
Northwest about their worldviews. Although most
described themselves as humanists, others viewed
themselves as atheistic, secular, skeptical, or scien-
tific. Smaller groups in Pasquale’s (2007) study
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Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates
715
called themselves naturalists, agnostics, or antireli-
gious. All of them had very low scores in personal
religiosity and spirituality, but all rated their spiritu-
ality as slightly higher than their religiosity. Other
studies in the past decade have identified individuals
who define themselves “more spiritual than reli-
gious” or “spiritual, but not religious,” including
those who decline in their belief in a theistic God
and those who oppose religion and disaffiliate from
religious organizations (Hood, 2003; Marler &
Hadaway, 2002; Streib, 2008; Zinnbauer et al.,
1997). Apparently, the description of being more
spiritual than religious can also be used by atheists,
agnostics, or apostates, and it may reflect what has
been identified as “post-Christian spirituality” (cf.
Houtman & Aupers, 2007) or “holistic subjective-
life spirituality” (cf. Heelas, Woodhead, Seel,
Szerszynski, & Tusting, 2005).
To understand atheism and agnosticism, it is
important to realize that the symbolization of expe-
riences of transcendence can occur in terms of verti-
cal or of horizontal transcendence (cf. Hood et al.,
2009): Vertical transcendence involves the symbol-
ization of a heaven above with person-like beings; in
horizontal transcendence, experiences of transcen-

10. dence are symbolized as experience of the holy or
something of ultimate concern, but within this world,
such as Mother Earth in green spirituality (Kalton,
2000). The concept of horizontal transcendence
helps prevent the misunderstanding of “nones” who
self-identify as nontheists but who nevertheless
experience transcendence and ultimate concern in
this world—which also may be interpreted as
“implicit religion” (Bailey, 2001; Schnell, 2003).
There is some parallel between horizontal transcen-
dence and what C. Taylor (2007) called “immanent”
transcendence. This latter construct refers to those
who stand outside of organized religion but never-
theless have a sense of spirituality and of relation to
something transcendent or sacred (Fuller, 2001;
Heelas et al., 2005; Hood, 2003; Marler & Hadaway,
2002; Streib, 2008; Zinnbauer et al., 1997; Zinn-
bauer & Pargament, 2005). On the basis of this con-
ceptualization, it is no surprise that among atheists
and agnostics, we find versions of spirituality or
religiosity that may be primarily associated with
horizontal transcendence.
RESEARCH ON ATHEISTS, AGNOSTICS,
AND APOSTATES
The sections that follow pay special attention to the
psychological issues that are, and should be, dis-
cussed in research on atheists, agnostics, and apos-
tates. The discussion is based on summaries of the
most important extant research.
Survey Results on Atheists, Agnostics,
and Apostates
A number of surveys have documented changes in
religious preferences in the United States, including

11. atheism and agnosticism. These include the studies
of Fuller (2001), the Pew Religious Landscape Sur-
vey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2009),
Roof (1999), and Sherkat (2001). A few studies have
devoted special attention to atheists and agnostics,
including Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) and the
American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS;
Kosmin & Keysar, 2009). The documentation of the
past and the probability of future religious nonaffili-
ation and disaffiliation in the United States has been
presented by Schwadel (2010) on the basis of Gen-
eral Social Survey (GSS) data. Cross-cultural com-
parison of religiosity data, including atheist
tendencies, can be gleaned from the recent Religion
Monitor survey (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2009;
Meulemann, 2009). A cross-cultural and longitudi-
nal perspective can be generated from the World
Value Survey, which Houtman and Aupers (2007)
have used to demonstrate a trend toward “post-
Christian spirituality” in 14 Western countries.
Special attention should also be given to the survey
results of the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) as collected in the third round on religion
in 2008. The ARIS and ISSP data are of particular
interest for our theme.
Belief in God. The ARIS data allow for an assess-
ment of atheistic and agnostic milieus in the
United States (Keysar, 2007; Kosmin & Keysar,
2006, 2009). Results from 2008 identify atheists
and agnostics on the basis of a set of items prob-
ing beliefs about God: 2.3% agreed that “there is no
such thing”; 4.3% said “there is no way to know”;
5.7% were “not sure,” and 12.1% believed that
“there is a higher power but no personal God.”

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Streib and Klein
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Similar results in the United States emerged out of
the ISSP 2008 survey: 2.8% said “I don’t believe in
God”; 5.0% agreed to the statement, “I don’t know
whether there is a God and I don’t believe that there
is a way to find out”; and 10.3% agreed with “I
don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a
Higher Power of some kind.”
Of special interest for our topic are the data that
yield a perspective on biographical–diachronic change
and cross-cultural comparison at the same time. In the
ISSP data, a set of items asked about changes in beliefs
in God. Results demonstrated huge cross-cultural dif-
ferences. Specifically, eastern Germany appears to be
the most secular region of the world with only 14.5%
permanent believers in God and 65.3% who said that
they did not believe in God and never had (cf. also

14. Froese & Pfaff, 2005; Schmidt & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2003;
Zuckerman, 2007). On the other end of the spectrum,
in Turkey, 96.6% said that they had always believed in
God. Similar to Turkey, in the United States, 83.1%
indicated that they were permanent believers in God,
and 4.2% said they never believed in God.
Survey findings also point to cross-cultural differ-
ences in the loss of belief in God. Although only 5.4%
in the United States reported a loss of belief in God,
between 15% and 20% in Western Germany or other
European countries indicated a similar loss of belief.
Disaffiliation and nonaffiliation. A similar picture
of cross-cultural diversity emerges from surveys on
disaffiliation and nonaffiliation. In the ISSP data (for
calculations and some more details, see Streib, in
press), disaffiliation can be separated from nonaffilia-
tion by two variables, one asking for present religious
affiliation and the other asking in which religion, if
any, the respondent has been raised. Here again, East
Germans reported the highest proportion of those
nonaffiliated (52.1%); people from Great Britain
reported the highest disaffiliation rates (31.2%). In
the United States, fewer than 50% reported a stable
religious affiliation. This, however, reflects a large
number of religious switchers (33.1%) rather than a
large number of nonaffiliates. Only 16% of people in
the United States indicated no religious preference.
Atheist and agnostic worldviews. For a deeper
understanding of apostates, we have to go into more
detail and estimate the portions of atheists and
agnostics in the disaffiliate group. Atheist and
agnostic worldviews can be estimated when we

15. include one item from the ISSP questionnaire, which
rates the statement: “I don’t believe in God” and
another item that rates the statement: “I don’t know
whether there is a God, I don’t believe there is a way
to find out.” On this basis, we calculate rather small
portions of atheists and agnostics in the groups of
nonaffiliates and disaffiliates in the United States:
Only 10% to 15% of nonaffiliates and disaffiliates
reported disbelief in God’s existence, and only 20%
of nonaffiliates and disaffiliates self-identified as
agnostics. Interestingly, a fourth of the nonaffiliates
and disaffiliates in the United States had no doubt
about God’s existence. Thus, in contrast to most
European countries, nonaffiliates and disaffiliates in
the United States include smaller portions of athe-
ists and agnostics than people who are convinced of
God’s existence.
Taken together (and referring to ISSP results),
survey data allow, for the United States, some esti-
mation of the—globally rather low—quantity of
nonaffiliates (4.6%) and disaffiliates (11.4%), of
nonbelievers in God (4.2% permanent and 5.5%
who lost believe in God), and of atheistic (2.9%)
and agnostic (4.6%) preferences. These survey find-
ings, however, are limited in some important
respects. Most of the surveys relied on one-item
measures that did not assess the broader variety of
atheistic beliefs (e.g., in evolution, science, rational-
ity, care for humanity) or distinctions between dif-
ferent nonreligious orientations. Furthermore, those
scales that have been developed to measure atheism
and agnosticism focus on what people do not do or
believe, the extent of their religious doubts (Alte-
meyer, 1988; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006),
rejection of religious beliefs (Greer & Francis,

16. 1992), or spiritual disengagement (Cole, Hopkins,
Tisak, Steel, & Carr, 2008). Only a few attempts
have been made to assess atheistic beliefs more com-
prehensively, such as the Post-Critical Belief Scale
(PCBS; Fontaine et al., 2003) and a scale by Gibson
(2010). The major limitation of survey data, how-
ever, involves the lack of information on psychologi-
cal factors that are relevant to atheism, agnosticism,
and apostasy. For that information, we turn to other
research findings.
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Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates
717
Psychological Research on Predispositions
of Atheist or Agnostic Orientation
and Apostasy
Religious socialization. Some research has focused
on religious socialization and its relation to apostasy,
atheism, and agnosticism. Developmentally, apos-

18. tasy appears to be more common in adolescence and
young adulthood than in other phases of life. This
is reflected, for example, in the results of the Pew
study (Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2009),
which document that for the 44% respondents who
do not belong to their childhood faith, most changes
of religious affiliation occurred in or before early
adulthood. The figures are even more striking for
the “secular exiters,” those who disaffiliate with
no reaffiliations: 79% of the former Catholics and
85% of the former Protestants reported disaffiliation
under the age of 25.
Does apostasy indicate a lack of parental empha-
sis on religion or is it a form of rebellion against reli-
gion and a radical demand for autonomy? This is an
unanswered question (for a review, see Hood et al.,
2009). There is some support for the assumption
that apostasy is the result of socialization processes
in families where religion is of low importance
(Hunsberger et al., 1993; Nelsen, 1981). On the
other hand, Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1997;
Hunsberger, 2000) comprehensive study of extreme
groups of “amazing apostates” and “amazing believ-
ers” who were identified through a major question-
naire study suggests the opposite explanation.
“Amazing apostates” came from highly religious
backgrounds but rejected their family’s religious
beliefs and scored very low on a measure of religious
orthodoxy; “amazing believers” came from families
with little emphasis on religion while growing up
but turned to religion and faith as adolescents or
adults. In the interviews, many “amazing apostates”
confirmed that because of their dedication to truth,
they had rejected the religious teachings of their
family. Despite strong pressure from their families

19. to hold on to their religious beliefs, “they gave up
their faith because they could not make themselves
believe what they had been taught” (Hunsberger &
Altemeyer, 2006, p. 42).
In their study of atheists in the San Francisco Bay
area, Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) found that
more than 70% of the atheists said they believed in
God before they found the teachings of their religion
“unbelievable” and became atheists. Similarly, in the
Bielefeld-Based Cross-Cultural Study on Deconver-
sion (Streib et al., 2009), a typology of four types of
deconverts could be identified on the basis of the
analysis of narrative interviews: “pursuit of auton-
omy” (long-term gradual process of stepping away
from the previous religious environment), “debarred
from paradise” (deconversion from a religious tradi-
tion, mostly high-tension organizations, which was
once chosen because it was supposed to solve all
problems), “finding a new frame of reference” (leav-
ing one’s childhood religious tradition in search of
a more structured religious environment), and “life-
long quests—late revisions” (leaving a religious
environment because it does not sufficiently meet
religious needs and expectations). The “pursuit of
autonomy” type is of special interest here because it
reflects a process of deconversion from the individu-
al’s established religious milieu. It is a search for
individuation and the critical development of new
perspectives that mostly leads to secular exits. Secu-
lar exiters make up 30% of the deconverts, another
30% leave organized religion for privatized or hereti-
cal forms of religiosity, and the rest remain within
some kind of organized religion.

20. Moving beyond issues associated with religious
upbringing, the relationship between children and
their parents in general may be of relevance to
atheism, agnosticism, and apostasy. In their psy-
chohistorical studies of the impact of “defective
fathering,” Koster (1989) and Vitz (2000) argued
that many famous atheists (like Darwin, Nietzsche,
or Freud) suffered in their childhoods under the
demands of their dominant and bigoted fathers
who failed to express feelings of love and esteem to
their sons. The sons became apathetic, unhappy,
and melancholic and tried to flee from their family
situations. In later life, they rebelled against the
demanding beliefs of their fathers, calling into
question the complete worldview in which they
were raised. The denial of their own roots, how-
ever, caused psychopathological symptoms, includ-
ing depression or self-hatred, so that their fight for
autonomy resulted in what Lepp (1963) called a
“neurotic denial of God.”
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718
Hood et al. (2009) have criticized the theories of
neurotic atheism because of their exclusive focus on
males and their fathers and the lack of broader
empirical support. More solid empirical data come
from research on religion and attachment (Gran-
qvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008; for an overview, see
Chapter 7 in this volume), which shows that in reli-
gious families, closer parent–child attachments in
childhood correspond with closer attachment to
God and more positive images of God in adulthood.
Secure parent–child attachments can thus lead to
more stable religiosity, whereas distant or avoidant
relationships between parent and child increase the
likelihood of sudden conversions and religious
switching or of secular exits (Granqvist & Hagekull,
2003; Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2004; Kirkpatrick,
1997, 1998).
Motives and developmental factors. A body of
research has focused on motives and biographical
factors associated with the development of atheism,
agnosticism, and apostasy. This research includes
studies about religious doubts (Brinkerhoff &
Mackie, 1993; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006) and
personal experiences of disappointment with reli-
gious professionals, communities, or God or anger
against God (Exline, 2002; Exline & Rose, 2005).
In a comprehensive content analysis of 1,226
statements that atheistic and agnostic Internet users
had posted on a Catholic webpage (http://www.
ohne-gott.de; “without God”), Murken (2008)

23. identified five clusters of statements that articulated
doubts, disappointments, and frustrations with
respect to religious beliefs and institutions: (a) an
opposition against Christianity because of faults of
the Catholic Church (e.g., the crusades or witch-
hunting, clergy sexual abuse) and its rigid sexual
morals regarding contraception, premarital sex, and
homosexuality; (b) experiences of religious hurt and
disappointment, in particular the feeling of being
abandoned by God in times of burden and loss; (c)
negative and critical images of God (e.g., the feeling
of incapacity to meet God’s demands and of being
supervised and punished by God); (d) the question
of theodicy (if God is just, loving, and all-powerful,
why does he allow evil and suffering to exist?);
and (e) the yearning for God and for faith to find
meaning and comfort. These factors may support the
emergence of skepticism against religious beliefs,
groups, and institutions and, as a consequence, raise
serious questions about religion in general.
In particular, experiences of personal suffering
can throw an individual’s fundamental system of reli-
gious beliefs into question, producing religious and
spiritual struggles marked by feelings of abandon-
ment and punishment by God as well as questions
about whether God really exists and is truly loving
and almighty (Pargament et al., 1998; Pargament,
Koenig & Perez, 2000; see Chapter 25 in this vol-
ume). Research shows that such experiences as
severe illness; the loss of a loved person; physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse; and other traumata can
provoke spiritual struggle that can transform former
beliefs and lead to spiritual disengagement, apostasy,
and atheism or agnosticism but potentially to spiri-

24. tual growth, too (Pargament, 2007). Pargament
(2007) and Pargament and Mahoney (2005) argued
that the experience of a desecration, the perception
that things that have been perceived as sacred (e.g.,
my body, my integrity, my beliefs, my relationships)
have been violated, is particularly likely to shake the
individual to the core. In a similar way, Novotni and
Petersen (2001) described “emotional atheism” as
the result of a process of repression and emotional
distancing from God. They view the conflict between
the need to blame God in difficult situations and the
recognition that God must not be blamed as a trigger
for the onset of emotional distancing. Thus, “emo-
tional atheism” emerges from the stepwise loss of an
unsatisfying faith. In short, experiences of spiritual
struggles (Exline & Rose, 2005; McConnell, Parga-
ment, Ellison, & Flannelly, 2006; Pargament, 2007)
represent important developmental factors that may
generate atheism or agnosticism.
Predictors of (dis)belief in God. Some scholars
have tried to identify sociodemographic predic-
tors of apostasy (Hadaway, 1989) and atheism or
agnosticism (Sherkat, 2008). Sherkat (2008) used
data from the 1988–2000 GSS to analyze the effects
of sociodemographic variables on (dis)belief in
God as measured by the single GSS item Belief in
God. Sherkat found that (dis)belief was predicted
by being younger, male, White, and more highly
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26. bu
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Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates
719
educated. These results are in line with findings that
the elderly (cf. Hout & Fischer, 2002), women (cf.
Francis, 1997), and Blacks (cf. Batson, Schoenrade,
& Ventis, 1993) display higher levels of religios-
ity. The effect of age has been explained in terms
of a rebellion against established authorities and
beliefs during younger phases of life or in terms of
generational and cohort effects (Hood et al., 2009;
Levenson, Aldwin, & D’Mello, 2005; see Chapter
29 in this volume). The gender difference has been
explained by the structural location of men and
women in society (working vs. staying at home
and caring for the children, including religious
instruction); by gender roles and personality fac-
tors (Francis, 1997); and recently, as a consequence
of lower risk aversion (calling religion into ques-
tion) among men (Collett & Lizardo, 2009; Miller
& Hoffmann, 1995). The effects of gender and race
have been understood in terms of the comfort and
self-esteem religion offers to members of socially
disadvantaged groups (Maselko et al., 2007; R. J.
Taylor, Chatters, & Levin, 2004; see Chapter 30
in this volume). In addition, familial factors play

27. a role because those who have never been married
and have no children are more likely to have an
atheistic orientation (Sherkat, 2008). This result
coincides with findings that atheists and agnos-
tics report slightly higher levels of introversion
(Bainbridge, 2005) and more feelings of loneliness
(Lauder, Mummery, & Sharkey, 2006) in compari-
son with religious persons. Living in rural areas and
in the southern states (the Bible Belt) of the United
States—where being nonreligious can even appear
to be “deviant” (Heiner, 1992)—decreases the
likelihood of being atheist. Finally, religious affili-
ation has predictive power, even after controlling
for the effects of other sociodemographic factors.
Compared with mainline Protestants or Jews,
belonging to a sect or to the Catholic Church
decreases the probability of atheism. Furthermore,
being unaffiliated is associated with a considerable
higher tendency toward atheism (Sherkat, 2008).
Psychological Correlates of Atheism,
Agnosticism, and Apostasy
Education and intelligence. The link between
higher education and atheism or agnosticism is a
classic finding within the psychology of religion
(Beit-Hallahmi, 2007; Hood et al., 2009): In 1916
and 1934, Leuba (an agnostic himself) found that
eminent scientists (mathematicians, physicists, biol-
ogists) showed higher rates of unbelief in God and
immortality (Leuba, 1916, 1934). Some 80 years after
Leuba’s first study, Larson and Witham (1998) tried
to replicate these findings. They surveyed members
of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and found
that this generation of scientists had become even
more strongly atheistic: Whereas 53% (1916) and

28. 68% (1934) of the respondents in Leuba’s studies
said that they did not believe in any God and 25%
(1916) and 53% (1936) reported no personal belief
in immortality, in the study by Larson and Witham
(1998), 72% reported no personal belief in God and
77% no belief in immortality. The beliefs of U.S.
scientists appear to differ strongly from those of the
U.S. public.
Such findings have led some researchers to
hypothesize that higher intelligence leads to an
atheistic orientation. For instance, Nyborg and col-
leagues (Nyborg, 2009; Lynn, Harvey, & Nyborg,
2009) argued that mean IQ scores show a declining
line, with atheists having the highest IQ scores,
dogmatic persons the lowest IQ scores, and agnos-
tics and liberals in the middle, and a similar line
from more atheistic nations to more religious coun-
tries because intelligence leads toward a worldview
that best fits cognitive complexity and brain effi-
ciency. Kanazawa (2009, 2010) postulated an evo-
lutionary principle that more intelligent individuals
are more likely to acquire and espouse novel values,
including atheism, liberalism, and—for men—
sexual exclusivity and monogamy. Kanazawa
claimed to have found a number of results support-
ing this hypothesis; however, the theories of
Nyborg and Kanazawa about intelligence and athe-
ism neglect a number of factors. The most impor-
tant is that a substantial number of well-educated,
highly intelligent people are still religious. Also, it is
not clear why an atheistic worldview is necessarily
more cognitively complex than a theological sys-
tem. Furthermore, Kanazawa’s evolutionary argu-
ment that more intelligent persons tend toward
atheism, liberalism, and sexual exclusivity is plausi-

29. ble only if it is assumed that evolution leads
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.
Streib and Klein
720
inevitably toward atheism. Finally, most of the find-
ings to which Nyborg, Kanazawa, and their col-
leagues referred are based on measures of school
achievement and education rather than intelligence.
Although education, school achievement, and intel-
ligence are highly correlated, they are not identical.
As an alternative to evolutionary explanations, the
tendency of higher education and better school
achievement to be associated with atheism could be
understood in terms of a particular “social inheri-
tance” within better educated families and institu-
tions of higher education, which transmit a
scientific worldview challenging religious beliefs.
The findings could then be interpreted as an indica-
tion that it is difficult and challenging to integrate a

31. religious worldview and scientific education.
Personality factors and values. Some reviews
and meta-analyses (Piedmont, 2005; Saroglou
2002, 2010; Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle,
2004) are relevant to the personality and value
characteristics of less religious and nondenomi-
national people. These studies, however, have
not focused on atheists or agnostics explicitly.
It would be inappropriate to conclude that athe-
ists and agnostics are less conscientious and less
agreeable (Saroglou, 2010) because high scores on
several religiosity measures are significantly cor-
related with conscientiousness and agreeableness.
What is needed are studies that compare the per-
sonalities of atheists, agnostics, and apostates to
those of religious people.
In the Bielefeld-Based Cross-Cultural Study of
Deconversion (Streib et al., 2009), the NEO Five-
Factor Inventory personality measure (Costa &
McCrae, 1985), the Ryff Scale on Psychological
Well-Being and Growth (Ryff & Singer, 1996), the
Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992), and the Right-Wing Authoritari-
anism Scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) were included
for both members of religious communities and for
deconverts in the United States and in Germany.
Across both cultures, deconverts scored significantly
higher on openness to experience and, interestingly,
somewhat higher on neuroticism. Compared with
members of religious communities, deconverts also
manifested considerably lower scores on religious
fundamentalism and RWA. Finally, deconverts
reported a significantly higher sense of personal

32. growth and autonomy (Ryff Scale) than members of
religious traditions.
In their comprehensive study of U.S. and Cana-
dian atheists, Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006)
found similar results. Atheists indicated less preju-
dice against ethnic minorities and homosexuals than
did highly religious people. In general, compared
with the highly religious group, atheists were found
to be less dogmatic and zealous in their worldviews,
with little need to proselytize, although they
regarded religious fundamentalists as enemies. Huns-
berger and Altemeyer attributed the lower dogma-
tism and zealotry of atheists to their lower scores on
RWA. Comparing atheists and agnostics, Huns-
berger and Altemeyer found agnostics to be even
less dogmatic and zealous than atheists, although
they had slightly higher levels of prejudice and
RWA. Maybe this result is due to the more cohesive
and resolved worldview of the atheists.
Similarly, according to the findings of Baker and
Smith (2009), atheists are more strongly opposed to
religious teachings and the public presence of the
church than are agnostics. Unchurched believers
were found to be as opposed to religion in the public
sphere as atheists, but they displayed higher levels
of spirituality and personal religiosity than atheists
or agnostics. Findings from both the United States
and the United Kingdom illustrate that atheists,
agnostics, and unchurched believers hold patterns
of individualistic values and very liberal political
stances concerning abortion, divorce, drug use,
euthanasia, stem cell research, or gay marriage
(Baker & Smith, 2009; Farias & Lalljee, 2008).

33. Research on values in Belgium using the PCBS
gives further insight into the dynamics of atheism or
agnosticism and value orientations. The scale distin-
guishes between an exclusion and an inclusion of
transcendence in combination with a distinction
between a literal and a symbolic understanding of
these different beliefs (Fontaine et al., 2003; see also
Wulff, 1997). Hence, the PCBS assesses two alterna-
tive atheistic orientations, the literal external critique
(denial of transcendence because the stories told in
sacred scriptures cannot be literally true) and the
symbolic relativism (denial of transcendence while
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Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates
721
accepting an existential truth of sacred scriptures as
an expression of human wisdom). Although nonreli-
gious orientations in general were found to correlate
with self-enhancing values, such as hedonism or

35. stimulation, external critique was associated with
conservative values, such as security and power, and
relativism showed significant associations with uni-
versalism and benevolence (Fontaine et al., 2005)—
values that indicate an openness to change (Schwartz,
1992, 1994). Other findings with the PCBS elaborate
on these results: External critique is positively corre-
lated with more cultural conservatism (Duriez, 2003),
more racism (even after controlling for RWA; Duriez,
2004), and lower agreement with moral attitudes
(Duriez & Soenens, 2006). Interestingly then, it
appears to be the case that the correlates of a literal
understanding of atheism resemble those of literal
religious beliefs. Research with the PCBS makes the
crucial point that to understand value orientations,
we must consider not only whether someone is reli-
gious or atheist but also the way in which religious or
atheistic contents are processed.
Although there seem to be at least some charac-
teristic patterns of atheists’ and agnostics’ personal-
ity and value orientations, we conclude that the
existing data do not allow causal interpretations:
Whether an agnostic or atheistic position is the
result of more openness and more tolerant and self-
enhancing values, or whether an agnostic or atheist
worldview leads to such values, is answerable only
through future longitudinal studies.
ATHEISM, AGNOSTICISM, AND APOSTASY,
AND THEIR RELATION TO HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING
A large body of research has demonstrated relation-
ships between religion, coping, health, and well-
being. On the psychological level, many findings

36. illustrate associations between higher religiosity and
less depression (see Smith, McCullough, & Poll,
2003; see also Volume 2, Chapter 12, this hand-
book), less addiction (Geppert, Bogenschutz, &
Miller, 2007; see also Volume 2, Chapter 15, this
handbook), higher life satisfaction and well-being
(Hackney & Sanders, 2003), and differential effects
of religious coping (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2005;
Pargament, 1997; see also Chapter 19 in this vol-
ume). Higher religiosity has been related to better
physical health, perhaps as a result of lifestyle factors
and psychoneuroimmunological processes (Chida,
Steptoe, & Powell, 2009; Koenig, McCullough, &
Larson, 2001; see also Chapter 11, this volume and
Volume 2, Chapter 14, this handbook). It could be
tempting to reason that the converse would be
true—that is, atheism and agnosticism would be
associated with poorer health.
Low scores on religious measures should not be
equated with atheism, agnosticism, or apostasy.
Indexes of organizational and individual religiosity
(e.g., church attendance, prayer, intrinsic and
extrinsic orientation, religious affiliation) are poor
indictors of atheism or agnosticism. According to
Hall, Koenig, and Meador (2008), these measures of
religiousness can be understood as reverse-scored
indexes of “secularism.” Doubts persist, however,
whether the concept of secularism fully captures the
characteristics of atheism, agnosticism, and apostasy
as described in this chapter. Thus, although there is
strong evidence for an overall positive correlation
between religiosity and mental and physical health,
this does not automatically imply that lower religi-
osity or secularism is identical with high atheism or

37. apostasy. Neither does it indicate that atheism,
agnosticism, and apostasy are associated with poorer
health, coping and well-being. It therefore would be
helpful and challenging to study mental health and
well-being of atheists and agnostics in their own
right with comprehensive measures of these
dynamic processes (Hwang, Hammer, & Cragun,
2009; Whitley, 2010).
Comparative research on atheists, agnostics,
apostates, and religious people might help clarify
those studies that do not support the assumption
that religiosity is generally associated with better
health and well-being. In this vein, Baker and
Cruickshank (2009) compared the depressive symp-
toms of atheists, agnostics, and religious groups and
found that their health scores did not differ. Simi-
larly, O’Connell and Skevington (2009) found no
differences between atheists, agnostics, and religious
persons with respect to their quality of life except
between their scores on spiritual well-being.
Also, although apostasy is often accompanied by
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38. P
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on
.

39. Streib and Klein
722
emotional suffering, the process of becoming an
apostate does not necessarily end in a “neurotic
denial of God.” Recall too that deconverts in the
United States reported higher scores on the auton-
omy and personal growth subscales than the mem-
bers in religious organizations (Streib et al., 2009).
Taken together, firm conclusions about the relation-
ships between health and atheism, agnosticism, or
apostasy cannot yet be drawn (Stefanek, McDonald, &
Hess, 2005).
Some studies in which atheists and agnostics
have been explicitly identified have detected a
U-shaped relationship in which the most and least
religious groups report fewer symptoms of mental
illness or better well-being scores than the moder-
ately religious group (Donahue, 1985; Riley, Best, &
Charlton, 2005; Shaver, Lenauer, & Sadd, 1980).
These findings are in line with the classical assump-
tion of William James (1902/1985) that the certitude
of an individual’s beliefs might be of more impor-
tance for his or her well-being than specific belief
contents. It seems that these curvilinear effects are
easier to find in more secular contexts than the
United States, such as the United Kingdom (Baker &
Cruickshank, 2009; Riley, Best, & Charlton, 2005)
or Germany (Klein, 2010; Zwingmann et al., 2006)
where religious and existential beliefs have become
increasingly personalized, detached, and heteroge-
neous (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere, 1995). Con-

40. versely, clear associations between religion and
mental health seem to be more difficult to detect in
these more secularized contexts. Additionally,
research in more secular European contexts shows
that scales for the study of religious coping from the
United States demonstrate effects primarily within
specific, highly religious subsamples (Pieper, 2004);
however, other forms of existential or spiritual cop-
ing are more common and perhaps more predictive
of health-related outcomes in European populations,
including the Netherlands (van Uden, Pieper, &
Alma, 2004) and Sweden (Ahmadi, 2006).
To make sense of this complex pattern of find-
ings, it may be helpful to recognize that each study
of the religion–health nexus offers insights only into
one particular sociocultural context. The results of
each study might therefore best be understood as
one part of a U-curve describing the complete
relation between (non)religious orientation and
mental health. Given the differences in religiosity
levels between the United States and the more secu-
lar parts of Europe—for instance, although 62% of
the U.S. population can be rated as highly religious,
only 19% of the U.K. population or 18% of the Ger-
man population can be labeled as highly religious
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2009; Huber & Klein,
2007)—U.S. samples are likely to include more reli-
gious persons and less likely to include those who
are agnostics or atheists. Such samples, however,
capture the middle to the right part of the U-curve,
and findings from these studies would typically
reveal a positive linear relationship between religion
and health or well-being (see Figure 40.1).

41. Samples from more secular contexts, however,
are more likely to cover the middle and the left part
of the U-curve, including not only some religious
persons, but also a substantial number of doubting,
agnostic, and atheistic persons. Hence, such samples
might yield contradictory findings, including nega-
tive relationships between religion and health and
well-being. The curvilinear character of relation-
ships between religion and health may emerge only
if the full range of beliefs and nonbeliefs is repre-
sented in the research. Of course, this explanation is
only hypothetical, but it highlights the need for
cross-cultural studies of the religion–health nexus in
ways that might reveal the interactions among the
sample, the larger cultural context, and the local
salience of diverse beliefs.
Although the relations between atheistic and
agnostic orientations and well-being have not been
studied in detail yet, a growing number of reports
from physicians, therapists, and nurses both from
the United States (Josephson & Peteet, 2007;
Moadel et al., 1999; Peteet, 2001) and Europe
(O’Connell & Skevington, 2005) indicate that non-
religious patients in hospitals and psychotherapy
express as much need as religious people to talk
about existential issues, such as the meaning of life.
We would caution against interpreting this interest
in existential issues per se as a “spiritual” interest
(as some authors do): Such an inflationary usage
might be terminologically misleading because it
camouflages existing differences between exclu-
sively immanent existential issues and “spiritual”
Co
py

42. ri
gh
t
Am
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an
P
sy
ch
ol
og
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A
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oc
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r

43. di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
.
Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates
723
interests—for example, there are patients with com-
pletely secular, neither religious nor spiritual inter-
ests, too (Koenig, 2008; Pargament, 1999). It
nevertheless should be clear that atheists, agnostics,
and apostates deserve attention as substantial groups
in their own right and should be treated with respect
and appreciation for their distinctive beliefs
(D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007; Saeed & Grant, 2004).
OuTLOOK ON FuTuRE RESEARCH
We conclude with four suggestions for future
research. First, with some exceptions, only a few
studies have compared atheists, agnostics, and apos-
tates with religious people in terms of classical psy-
chological constructs such as personality factors,
coping, well-being, and health. Thus, we need not
only studies that focus specifically on atheists and
agnostics but also studies of classical psychological

44. constructs among actively committed atheists using
measures that delve more deeply and comprehen-
sively into atheists’ and agnostics’ worldviews. Sec-
ond, longitudinal studies of atheism, agnosticism,
and apostasy are also needed to shed light on the
dynamic, evolving character of these processes.
Third, cross-cultural comparisons of religious, athe-
istic, and agnostic milieus in the United States and
other cultures around the globe are needed to clarify
the religion–health nexus. Tests of the hypothesis
of a cross-culturally U-shaped relation between
(non)religiousness and health might be particularly
illuminating. Finally, it is important to pay special
attention to the “spiritual” self-identification of
some atheists, agnostics, and apostates: Echoing
Hood et al.’s (2009) recommendation, we encourage
closer investigations of the reasons why a consider-
able portion of atheists and agnostics self-identify as
“spiritual, but not religious.” Perhaps this group
understands “spirituality” as a process of searching
for and finding meaning—and perhaps a sense of
the sacred—in domains that are not traditionally
“religious,” such as the ecological movement and
the concern for the preservation of Mother Earth.
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nonbelievers. The current two studies quantitatively examined
nonbelievers’ self-reported reasons
for nonbelief through developing the Reasons of Atheists and
Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s
Existence Scale (RANGES). We developed an initial pool of 64
items using prior published
research, revised by a panel of experts including researchers
and thought leaders in nonbelief
communities. Both studies included participants from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (Study 1 & 2
Ns � 520 & 369), all of whom reported not believing in god(s).
In Study 1, our exploratory factor
analysis suggested nine factors across 35 items. In Study 2, we
confirmed the nine-factor structure
using 38 items (35 from Study 1 plus three new items for better
coverage of factors with few items)
with adequate fit. Across both studies, the RANGES subscales

74. showed good reliability, convergent
validity (e.g., positive correlations with previous lists of
reasons for religious doubt), predictive
validity (e.g., positive and negative feelings toward God and
religion), and discriminant validity
(e.g., subscales were not unexpectedly associated with other
measures). Our 1-year follow-up with
a subset of Study 2 participants (N � 132) found different
levels of stability among the RANGES
subscales. This measure can promote further understanding the
motivations, identities, and experi-
ences of nonbelievers across cultures.
Keywords: atheism, agnosticism, nonbelief, religion,
personality
Belief in god is declining in America (Kosmin & Keysar,
2009), with everything from individualism (e.g., Twenge, Ex-
line, Grubbs, Sastry, & Campbell, 2015) to apostasy (e.g.,
Streib & Klein, 2013) being credited for rises in nonbelief.
Prior
theorizing focused through psychoanalytic (e.g., Vitz, 1999)
and evolutionary (e.g., Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013) lenses
developed a framework for why some people may not believe in
a god or gods. However, empirical studies building on these
frameworks remain sparse. The present work seeks to answer
this question by developing a nuanced measure of reasons
atheists and agnostics give for nonbelief in a god or gods.
Nonbelief, Atheism, and Agnosticism
The term atheism usually refers to the belief that no god(s)
exist,
or that there is insufficient evidence to justify belief in god(s)
(Nielsen, 2013). Agnosticism generally refers to the belief that
it is

75. not possible at this time to say whether or not a god or gods
exist,
either because an individual currently lacks evidence regarding
the
existence of such beings or because it is fundamentally
impossible
to have said evidence (Le Poidevin, 2010). It is possible to inte-
grate agnosticism with a religious or spiritual identity or set of
beliefs, though holding agnostic beliefs about the existence of
god(s) still precludes active belief in the existence of god(s). In
this
sense, atheism and agnosticism are not identical, but are both
forms of nonbelief in the existence of a god or gods.
Not all people whose views suggest atheism or agnosticism self-
identify with the label atheist or agnostic. One study using a
U.S.
sample found that 2% are atheists and 10% are agnostics based
on
their stance on the existence of God, but less than 1% labeled
themselves atheists or agnostics (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009).
Another
study, using several indirect techniques, estimated that 28% of
people
do not believe in the existence of God, though far fewer would
admit
nonbelief directly (Gervais & Najle, 2017). Regardless of the
exact
prevalence of nonbelief in the population, it is clear that
holding
nonbeliefs does not directly align with self-labeling as a
nonbeliever.
Since our study focuses primarily on beliefs, we defined our
nonbe-
liever sample based on beliefs rather than self-labels.

76. David F. Bradley, Julie J. Exline, Alex Uzdavines, and Nick
Stauner,
Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve
University;
Joshua B. Grubbs, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green
State Uni-
versity.
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the John Templeton
Founda-
tion (Grant 36094 and 59916) in funding this project. Portions
of this
article appear in a published M.A. thesis written by the David F.
Bradley.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
David F.
Bradley, Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western
Reserve
University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106-7123.
E-mail:
[email protected]
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Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
© 2018 American Psychological Association 2018, Vol. 10, No.
3, 263–275

81. 1941-1022/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000199
263
mailto:[email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000199
Reasons for Nonbelief in the Existence of God(s)
Norenzayan and Gervais (2013), using a genetic and cultural
evolution framework, conceptualized four potential origins of
non-
belief, each related to the failure or relatively less activation of
an
evolved mechanism that would typically foster belief in a god
or
gods. However, because many of the evolutionary and cultural
factors identified often occur below the level of conscious
aware-
ness, it is unclear whether nonbelievers would identify them as
reasons for their nonbelief.
Studies of deconversion narratives, or the process of disaffilia-
tion and exit from a particular religious affiliation, point to
several
common themes that may also serve as potential reasons for
nonbelief in the existence of god(s). It is important to note that
deconversion is distinct from the development and maintenance
of
nonbelief in the existence of god(s), as individuals can
deconvert
to other religious traditions or leave organized religion while
maintaining theistic beliefs. Additionally, individuals who
never
believed in the existence of god(s) cannot be said to be

82. deconverts
at all. Nonetheless, examining the deconversion literature may
point to reasons for nonbelief relevant to at least some
nonbeliev-
ers. A recent mixed-methods examination of deconversion,
build-
ing on previous conceptual work, identified five characteristics
associated with deconversion: loss of religious experiences,
intel-
lectual doubts, moral criticism of religion, experiences of emo-
tional suffering, and disaffiliation from religious communities
(Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009).
Recent studies (Bradley, Exline, & Uzdavines, 2017; Exline,
Bradley, Uzdavines, Grubbs, & Stauner, 2017) focusing on non-
believers’ explicitly stated reasons for nonbelief in the
existence of
god(s) grouped these nonbeliefs into six broad categories: intel-
lectual, emotional, socialization, bad experiences with religion,
experiential, and intuitive. In these studies, participants rated
the
importance of these categories of reasons in contributing to
their
nonbelief. Intellectual reasons were by far the most endorsed,
but
all categories of reasons received some endorsement. We
expand
on these categories and provide a review of prior work pertinent
to
them below.
Intellectual. A belief is a stance on the truth or falsehood of
an idea. One generally accepted way to determine an idea’s
verity
or falsity is to apply intellectual reasoning to the idea. Indeed,
the

83. phrasing of the question – reasons for nonbelief—may suggest a
preference for rational argumentation based on logic,
philosophy,
or science rather than other potential reasons for nonbelief. This
is
especially true if the person receiving the explanation is an out-
group member (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002), as researchers
might
be perceived to be. In the case of nonbelief in a god or gods
specifically, arguments based on evidence or rationality are part
of
nonbeliever culture, with many tomes devoted to scientific or
philosophical arguments against the existence of a god or gods
(e.g., Dawkins, 1986; Dennett, 2006; Martin, 1990; Smith,
1979;
Stenger, 2007, 2009).
Relational. Nonbelief in the existence of god(s) may reflect
attitudes about the character or actions of particular (or
hypothet-
ical) gods. People often see gods as relational figures with
whom
one can have human-like relationships (e.g., Beck & McDonald,
2004; Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2013). In their study of reasons
for
belief in God Exline and colleagues (2017) found that relational
reasons, such as experiences of trust, security, or love focused
on
God, were among the most highly endorsed reasons for belief.
Bradley and colleagues (2017) found that some atheists
endorsed
relational reasons for nonbelief as well, including experiences
of
disappointment, anger, or mistrust focused on a God once
believed

84. to exist, or conceiving of God as cruel or punishing. Since many
nonbelievers at one time believed in the existence of a god or
gods
(Kosmin, Keysar, Cragun, & Navarro-Rivera, 2009), it is
reason-
able to assume that relational reasons for nonbelief may remain
relevant for some nonbelievers.
Early and current socialization. Popular beliefs often seem
more credible than unpopular or rare beliefs. In their study of
atheists and believers, Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) found
that atheists, compared to believers, experienced less emphasis
on religion during their upbringing. Another survey showed that
27% of religious “nones” (individuals who reported having no
religious affiliation) had at least one nonreligious parent, a
figure much higher than the general population (Kosmin et al.,
2009). These findings cannot clarify whether nonbelievers’
caregivers actively pushed them toward nonbelief in the exis-
tence of god(s) or simply did not push toward religious belief.
However, data from surveys of professional scientists suggest
that some professions contain concentrations of people with
negative views of religious beliefs (Ecklund & Park, 2009),
which may result in active socialization pressure toward non-
belief. While the presence of socialization pressure may be a
reason for nonbelief, such pressure often affects beliefs sub-
consciously (Asch, 1956; Bond & Smith, 1996) and may be
rarely explicitly endorsed as a reason for nonbelief.
Antireligion. Positive experiences with religious people and
institutions may lend more credence to the existence of a god or
gods, and negative experiences may lead to nonbelief in the
existence of god(s). Victims of clergy sex abuse, for example,
report lower levels of belief in God (Rossetti, 1995). The effect
of
perceived victimization at the hands of religion may extend to
the

85. societal level as well. Some nonbelievers spend considerable
time
and energy combating what they perceive to be the negative
influence of religious teachings on society (e.g., Christina,
2012;
Hitchens, 2007).
Intuitive. People can make decisions, including evaluations of
truth claims, based on preconscious factors that cannot be easily
articulated. These preconscious factors are sometimes called
intu-
ition (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007). People may make objectively
rational decisions before they are able to explain their decisions
in
rational terms (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1997).
However, these intuitive processes do not always lead to objec-
tively rational decisions or judgments. Regardless of their
veracity,
intuitions can be powerful and hard to override with deliberate
cognitive processes (for a review, see Kahneman, 2011). Indeed,
people often superimpose rational explanations for conclusions
reached via intuition rather than give up their intuitions (e.g.,
Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).
Emotional. Positive and negative emotions can influence con-
scious thoughts (Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2000). Arguments
using the peripheral pathway aim to change emotional-
attitudinal
positions on a given topic. Peripheral arguments can, at times,
be
more effective than arguments using the central pathway, which
use high-quality facts or rational arguments to alter beliefs
(Hov-
land, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). For this
reason, it is important to consider the possibility that nonbelief

86. in
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264 BRADLEY, EXLINE, UZDAVINES, STAUNER, AND
GRUBBS
a god or gods could reflect general positive affect about
nonbelief
or negative affect about belief (separate from feelings about
god(s)
as relational figures).
Agnostic. Agnostic nonbelief involves abstaining from both
belief and active disbelief in the existence of a god or gods.
Agnostic nonbelief may be seen as a sort of epistemic humility
concerning the existence of a proposed god or set of gods.
Alter-
natively, agnostic nonbelief can be a statement about the
strength
of arguments for and against the existence of a god or gods,
namely that neither is persuasive at this moment, and as a result
belief is not warranted.
Existential. According to Yalom (1980), humans have four

91. basic concerns that arise as a matter of human existence: to find
meaning, to feel connected to others and the universe, to face
the
specter of an unavoidable death, and to face one’s essential re-
sponsibility for one’s actions. Belief in the existence of a god or
gods may be appealing in part because it addresses these
concerns.
Those who have other ways of resolving these concerns, find
religious approaches to these concerns inadequate, choose to not
resolve these existential concerns, or do not feel the weight of
these concerns may be less likely to believe.
The Present Studies
As described above, individuals may endorse many reasons
for nonbelief in god(s) (Exline et al., 2017). Developing a
measure that asks nonbelievers to respond to a range of differ-
ent reasons for nonbelief may allow for the assessment of
nuanced reasons for nonbelief previously available only
through in-depth qualitative interviews (see Streib et al., 2009).
This measure may help describe intragroup variation among
nonbelievers and clarify the previously identified reasons for
nonbelief. In doing so, the measure may help further the public
understanding of nonbelievers and their reasons for nonbelief in
the existence of god(s). This measure may also inform theories
as to what causes individuals to become nonbelievers and, more
broadly, what prevents individuals from simply adopting the
dominant beliefs in their culture (i.e., in this U.S. sample,
theistic and especially Christian beliefs). Additionally, this
measure may serve as one way of measuring and understanding
cross-cultural differences in how nonbelievers conceptualize
belief, nonbelief, and the role of religion and religious people in
their society.
Our aim for the present project was to develop and psycho-
metrically evaluate the Reasons of Atheists/Agnostics for Non-

92. belief in God’s Existence Scale (RANGES). We developed
items based on prior literature, previous unpublished research
by the authors, and feedback from academic and nonacademic
experts in atheism. In Study 1, we used exploratory factor
analysis to examine factor structure and inform item reduction
efforts. In Study 2, we used confirmatory factor analysis with
new data to fit a model informed by the EFA results from
Study 1.
Both studies included tests of reliability and validity. We antic-
ipated low cross-factor loadings (i.e., cross-loadings �.30) and
strong internal reliability (i.e., � � .70) for all final subscales.
We
also examined stability over one year in a subset of Study 2
participants. Both studies included several tests of convergent,
discriminant, and predictive validity.
Study 1: Measure Development and Initial Evaluation
Method
Participants and procedure. We recruited 520 U.S. adults
(267 female, 238 male, 15 transgender or “other”; Mage �
32.39,
SDage � 11.71) to provide survey responses through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system and paid them $2.00 after sur-
vey completion. MTurk allows researchers to quickly and inex-
pensively collect high-quality data with more demographic
diver-
sity than other Internet sampling methods (Buhrmester, Kwang,
&
Gosling, 2011). MTurk samples provide results that are psycho-
metrically similar to samples recruited in other ways (e.g.,
Mason
& Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).

93. Measures. Measures are listed below in the order in which
they appeared in the survey. Table 1 reports demographics.
Table
2 reports descriptive statistics.
Belief in God’s existence. As in a prior study (Exline, Park,
Smyth, & Carey, 2011, Study 5), participants completed a
forced-
choice item adapted from the General Social Survey: 1) I know
that no god or gods exist, and I have no doubts about it. 2)
While
it is possible that a god or gods exist, I do not believe in the
existence of a god or gods. 3) I do not know whether there is a
god
or gods, and I do not believe there is any way to find out. 4) I
do
not know whether there is a god or gods, but it may be possible
to
find out. 5) I find myself believing in a god or gods at some of
the
time, but not at others. 6) While I have doubts, I feel that I do
believe in a god or gods. 7) I know that a god or gods really
exist,
and I have no doubts about it.
Options 1 and 2 suggest atheist beliefs, and 3 and 4 suggest
agnostic beliefs. Participants who chose options 5, 6, or 7 were
excluded from the rest of the survey and analyses.
Religious/nonreligious identity. Participants responded to,
“How would you describe your present religious/spiritual
tradition,
if any?” via a text box.
Desire for a god or gods to exist. Participants used a slider bar
to respond to, “Regardless of how much you actually believe in

94. the
existence of a god or gods: How much do you WANT a god or
gods to exist?” The slider ranged from 0 (I do not want a god or
gods to exist) to 100 (I want a god or gods to exist).
Reasons of Atheists/Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s Exis-
tence Scale (RANGES). Participants responded to 64 items after
receiving the following prompt:
People can have many reasons for not believing in the existence
of a
god or gods. Below is a list of potential reasons. Some of the
reasons
listed below use the word “God.” Please interpret “God” to
stand for
whatever image or idea you primarily associate with that term,
such as
a specific god you used to believe exists or a specific god that
other
people believe exists.
On a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (extremely
important),
how important is each of the following items in explaining why
you
currently do not believe in the existence of God?
Past beliefs about and attitudes toward God. Participants
were asked whether they believed in a god or gods in the past.
Those participants who indicated past belief were asked how
long they had not believed in god(s). As in previous studies
(Bradley et al., 2017; Exline et al., 2011), we also asked
participants, “Looking back over your entire life, how often
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265RANGES DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION
have you had positive feelings toward God?” They responded
on a scale from 0 (never) to 10 (always). They then completed
similar items focused on religion and God, including past anger
toward God, past feelings that God is angry at you, past positive
and negative feelings toward religion, and past negative expe-
riences with religious people.
Religious and spiritual struggles. Participants completed the
26-item Religious and Spiritual Struggles Scale (RSS; Exline,
Pargament, Grubbs, & Yali, 2014). They rated the extent to
which
they had experienced each type of struggle over the past few
months, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). The
RSS includes six subscales: Divine, Demonic, Interpersonal,
Moral, Ultimate Meaning, and Doubt. We scored participants’
responses by averaging across the individual item responses
within
each subscale.
Complexity of approach to religion and spirituality. Participants
completed the 8-item Complexity subscale of the Multidimen-
sional Quest Orientation Scale (Beck & Jessup, 2004).
Participants