1. Spontaneous Versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior
Baba Shiv, University of Iowa
Alexander Fedorikhin, University of Southern California
Forthcoming: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Address All Correspondence to: Baba Shiv
University of Iowa
Henry B. Tippie College of Business
S 370, Pappajohn Business Building
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
Tel: (319) 335-0932
Email: baba-shiv@uiowa.edu

2. Abstract
This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can
influence choices: a “lower-order” route where choices are influenced through automatic processes by
lower-order, and a “higher-order” route where choices are influenced through controlled processes by
either higher-order affect or higher-order consequence-related cognitions. Across three experiments the
extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to
identify conditions under which lower-order affect, higher-order affect, or higher-order cognitions impact
choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive
affect, but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense
positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit-salad). Findings suggest that when the individual
makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by
lower-order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and
the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by
higher-order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other
situations choices are driven by higher-order consequence-related cognitions, and the alternative that is
superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective
reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.
Key Words: Affect, Cognition, Automatic, Controlled, Self-Control, Impulse

3. 1
Reason guides but a small part of man, and that the least
interesting. The rest obeys feelings, true or false, and passion,
good or bad–Joseph Roux.
With all its cleverness, however, decision theory is somewhat
crippled emotionally, and thus detached from the emotional and
visceral richness of life–George Loewenstein (1996, p. 289).
Much of research on choice behavior has been predominantly cognitive in nature, and the role of
affect has received relatively little attention (for criticisms of such inattention, see Bettman, 1993; Hoch and
Loewenstein, 1991; Loewenstein, 1996; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, and Ritov
1997). Recently, decision making and consumer researchers have shown considerable interest in redressing
this imbalance with both theoretical (e.g., Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991; Loewenstein, 1996) and empirical
accounts (e.g., Garbarino and Edell, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, and Payne, 1997; Mellers et al.
1997; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999) of how affect influences choice behavior. The broad purpose of this
article is to add to this growing body of research.
More specifically, the focus of this paper is on choice behavior as influenced by task-induced affect
(i.e., affective reactions that arise directly from the decision task itself) rather than ambient affect (i.e.,
affective states that arise from background conditions such as fatigue and mood); the latter has been the
predominant focus of previous work on the role of affect in decision making (for the distinction between task-
induced and ambient affect, see Arkes, Herren, and Isen, 1988; Yates, 1990; Schwarz, 1990). Further,
most previous empirical work examining the effects of task-induced affect on choice has focused on negative
affect arising from the structure or difficulty of the task (Garbarino and Edell, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce et al.
1997). In contrast, the focus of this article is on the effects of positive affect arising from the stimulus. (See
Fiske and Taylor, 1991, for a discussion of the importance of examining both negative and positive affect due
to their differential effects on memory, judgment, persuasion, and decision making.)

4. 2
A third difference between our work and previous empirical work is based on the distinction made by
Berkowitz (1993), Giner-Sorolla (1999), LeDoux (1996), and Wyer, Clore, and Isbell (1999) between
“lower-order” affective reactions, arising from relatively automatic processes, and “higher-order” affective
reactions, arising from relatively more controlled processes. The focus of most previous work has been either
exclusively on higher-order affect (e.g., Luce, 1998; Garbarino and Edell, 1997; Mellers et al., 1997) or
exclusively on lower-order affect (e.g., Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Zajonc, 1980). To the best of our
knowledge, little attempt has been made to investigate, in an integrative fashion, the two routes through which
affect can influence preferences.1 We contribute to the literature by focusing both on higher-order and lower-
order affect, delineating conditions under which each of these affective reactions are likely to influence
behavior.
Previewing briefly, we develop our conceptualization in the next section for choice-contexts that
individuals frequently experience, ones involving choices between options (e.g., chocolate cake) that are more
favorable on the affective dimension, but less favorable on the cognitive dimension, compared to other options
(e.g., fruit-salad). These contexts, involving familiar dilemmas analyzed under the rubric of “traps” by Cross
and Guyer (1980), “guilty pleasures” by Giner-Sorolla (1999), and “vices” by Wertenbroch (1998), pit the
positive affect associated with short-term rewards (both lower-order and higher-order affect) against the
negative deliberative thoughts about the long-term consequences (termed in this paper as consequence-related
cognitions).
We then present three experiments that explore conditions under which lower-order affect, higher-
order affect, or higher-order consequence-related cognitions influence behavior. Specifically, we examine the
effects of three factors on choice behavior: the extent to which the individual deliberates on the decision, the
extent to which the s/he is mentally preoccupied (i.e., is under cognitive load), and whether the choice options
are in full view of the individual when the decision is being deliberated upon. The experiments enable us to
make the following claims. First, the choice of guilty pleasures such as chocolate cake can be influenced by

5. 3
affect arising from both automatic and controlled processes. Second, when the individual makes the decision
quickly and is mentally preoccupied (i.e., is under cognitive load), the decision is driven by lower-order affect
resulting in a choice of guilty pleasures. Further, when the individual deliberates on the decision without being
mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, the
decision is driven by higher-order affect resulting again in a choice of guilty pleasures. Third, in all other
conditions involving different levels of deliberation, cognitive load, and exposure to the options, consequence-
related cognitions predominate the positive affect, causing the individual to refrain from choosing the guilty
pleasures. Finally, the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive goals.
Throughout, we collect process measures to further increase our certainty regarding the proposed mechanisms
that give rise to lower-order and higher-order affect.
The Affective-Cognitive Model
Consider a scenario where an individual decides to have a snack and encounters two options–a piece
of chocolate cake and a serving of fruit-salad. The chocolate cake is more affect-laden compared to the fruit
salad, but also less favorable in terms of the long-term consequences. According to theories proposed by
Berkowitz (1993), LeDoux (1995, 1996), and Wyer et al. (1999), two processes are likely to be set in motion
by this encounter (see Figure 1). First, the lower-order structures of the brain that constantly monitor the
environment for events of affective significance receive information (i.e., lower-order cognitions) related to
affect-laden chocolate cake. These cognitions trigger the onset of lower-order processes (the lower path in
Figure 1), which occur spontaneously and give rise to lower-order affective reactions. In line with the model
proposed by Wyer et al. (1999), these lower-order affective reactions may then impact action tendencies
(approach or avoidance) through the activation of basic appetitive or aversive goals.2 For the cake/salad
scenario just described, the affective reactions are likely to be positive, and, therefore, the goals that are
activated are likely to be appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) in nature, resulting in action tendencies that favor
choosing the cake rather than the fruit-salad.

6. 4
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
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Second, information related to the stimulus may be subject to more deliberative processes (the upper
path in Figure 1), the outcome of which will depend on the focus of these higher-order processes. For the
cake/salad scenario, one possibility is that these higher-order processes will focus on the adverse
consequences of choosing the cake. The resulting consequence-related cognitions will activate avoidance
oriented goals (through the path linking higher-order cognitions and goals in Figure 1). The latter goals will
engender action tendencies inhibiting the approach-oriented tendencies that would be sparked initially by
lower-order processes. The ultimate outcome will, therefore, be one where the individual is less likely to
choose the cake.
Alternatively, the higher order processes may focus on the affect-laden attributes of the chocolate
cake, resulting in affectively significant higher-order cognitions. According to LeDoux (1995, 1996), the
limbic structures of the brain that give rise to lower-order affect also constantly receive information from the
higher-order cortical structures. If these higher-order cognitions turn out to be affectively significant, they are
likely to trigger the generation of higher-order affective reactions, and the activation of goals and action
tendencies (through the path linking higher-order affect and goals in Figure 1). For the cake/salad context,
the higher-order affective reactions are likely to be positive, and, therefore, are likely to activate goals that are
more appetitive (i.e., approach-oriented) in nature. The ultimate outcome will be one where the individual is
more likely to choose the cake. In the next section, we discuss factors that are likely to give rise to the
various scenarios delineated above. These factors, and their effects on the underlying processes and choice
outcomes, are presented in Table 1.
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

7. 5
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Factors Affecting Choice-Role of Cognitive Load, Decision Time, and the Nature of Stimulus Exposure
The discussion in the previous section suggests that lower-order processes occur spontaneously and,
therefore, impose few demands on processing resources. In contrast, higher-order processes are deliberative
in nature, and, therefore, impose demands on processing resources. Therefore, any factor that constrains
processing resources is likely to prevent the onset of higher-order processes, resulting in choices that are
influenced by lower-order processes, i.e., by lower-order affect. It is only when processing resources
become available that higher-order processes are likely to ensue. The question is, what are the factors that
influence the availability of processing resources, thereby, determining whether choices are influenced by
lower-order or by higher-order processes?
One factor that has been shown to influence processing resources is the level of cognitive load–the
greater the cognitive load, the lower the availability of such resources (see Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988;
Gilbert, Giesler, and Morris, 1995; Swann et al. 1990; Trope and Alfieri, 1997). A second factor that has
been widely known to influence the availability of processing resources is the time available to make the
decision–the availability of processing resources is higher when more time becomes available (see Jamieson
and Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski and Webster, 1991; Ratneshwar and Chaiken, 1991; Sanbonmatsu and Fazio,
1990). An examination of the two factors in combination suggests that when the level of cognitive load is high
and the time to make the decision is low (see the first column of Table 1), resources are likely to be least
available, which is when choices are driven by lower-order processes, i.e., by lower-order affect. The
findings reported in Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) are consistent with this prediction–when respondents were
under high cognitive load and when the time available to make the decision was low, they were more likely to
decide based on affect arising from lower-order processes and, therefore, more likely to choose chocolate
cake rather than fruit salad.
Extending the above logic, when the availability of processing resources is moderately high (i.e., when

8. 6
low cognitive load is combined with low time availability, or when high cognitive load is combined with high
time availability), or very high (i.e, when low cognitive load is combined with high time availability), higher-
order processes are likely to influence choices. The question is, under what conditions will these higher-order
processes focus on the negative consequences of choosing the guilty-pleasure to give rise to consequence-
related cognitions, or on the affect-laden properties of the guilty-pleasures to give rise to higher-order affect?
The work by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) suggests that when low cognitive load is combined with low time
availability (see column 2 of Table 1), choices are determined by higher-order consequence-related
cognitions. The findings reported in Shiv and Fedorikhin also suggest that when the time available for the
decision is low, higher-order affective reactions are less likely to be featured in the decision-making process
and that more time may be necessary for their generation.
To examine situations involving high time availability where higher-order affect or consequence-
related cognitions are likely to impact choice, we draw upon work by Mischel and his colleagues (e.g.,
Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1992). Using a “delay in gratification” paradigm, Mischel
and Ebbesen (1970) had children decide between an inferior, more immediate reward (fewer
cookies/pretzels) versus a superior, delayed reward (more cookies/pretzels). The nature of exposure to the
affect-laden stimulus was manipulated. In one condition, the reward was physically present in full view for the
entire time the children took to make their decisions. In another condition, the reward was presented for a
short duration and then removed from view. The results indicate that the children were less willing to choose
the delayed reward when the exposure to the affect-laden stimulus was high than when it was low. Though
the nature of processing that the children engaged in was not examined, it appears that increased exposure to
the affect-laden stimulus caused an increase in focus on the affect-laden properties of the reward, resulting in
higher-order cognitions that were related to these affect-laden properties. These cognitions, in turn, resulted
in positive affective reactions, appetitive goals, and, hence, approach-oriented action tendencies that caused
the children to give in to their temptations. In contrast, when the exposure was low, the children apparently

9. 7
focused less on the affect-laden properties of the reward. Therefore, the children were less likely to engage
in higher-order affective processes and more likely to engage in consequence-related higher-order processes
compared to when the exposure was high. These results suggest that, for the contexts examined in this paper,
when the time available to make a decision is high, and exposure to the options is also high, the choice is
more apt to be based on higher-order affective reactions.
A follow-up piece of work by Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1973), however, suggests that merely
having high exposure to the affect-laden option is not sufficient to generate higher-order affective reactions.
They again examined the willingness of children to wait for the superior delayed reward, but this time only
under conditions where the exposure to the reward was high. During the high exposure, some children were
instructed to think about the rewards while others were instructed to engage in distracting thoughts. Even
though the exposure to the rewards was high, children who were distracted waited longer than those who
were not. Presumably, the presence of cognitive load in the form of distractors caused a reduction in focus
on the affect-laden properties of the stimulus, which, in turn, reduced the occurrence of higher-order affect.
Together, the findings reported in Mischel and Ebbesen (1970) and Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1973)
suggest that, for the contexts being examined in this paper, when the time available to make the decision is
high and the exposure to the options is also high, (1) a higher level of cognitive load (see column 3 of Table 1)
will lead to a decrease in choice of the affect-laden option, and (2) a lower level of cognitive load (see column
4 of Table 1) will lead to an increase in choice of the affect-laden option.3
Finally, let us examine the effects that are likely to occur when the time available to decide is high but
the exposure to the options is low (columns 5 and 6 of Table 1). The findings reported by Mischel &
Ebbesen (1970) suggest that under such conditions, higher-order affective reactions are less likely to be
engendered, and choices are more likely to be influenced by consequence-related cognitions, which, in turn,
are likely to activate goals that are less appetitive in nature. Further, in line with dual-process theories (e.g.,
Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1999), a decrease in cognitive load is likely to result in a

10. 8
greater elaboration on the negative consequences of choosing the affect-laden option. Therefore, the pattern
of results is likely to be just the opposite of what we predict in conditions where the time available to decide is
high and the level of exposure is also high. Specifically as the level of cognitive load decreases goals are likely
to become less appetitive, and there should be fewer choices of the affect-laden option (see columns 5 and 6
of Table 1).
Summary of Predictions
As depicted in Figure 2, the discussion thus far gives rise to the following predictions. First, when the
time available for the decision is low, if the level of cognitive load is high, choices are more likely to be
influenced by lower order affect, and, hence, by goals that are more appetitive in nature. In contrast, if the
level of cognitive load is low, choices are more likely to be influenced by higher-order consequence-related
cognitions, and, hence, by goals that are less appetitive in nature. Therefore, as the level of cognitive load
decreases, choice of the affect-laden option is likely to increase.
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
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Second, when the time available for the decision is high, the pattern of results under high versus low levels of
cognitive load will depend on the nature of exposure to the options. If the exposure to the options is high,
and cognitive load is low rather than high, choices are more likely to be influenced by affect and goals that are
more appetitive. In other words, the pattern of results on choice is likely to be just the reverse of what we
predict in the conditions where the time available for the decision is low. Finally, if the time available to
decide is high but the exposure to the options is low, then, as cognitive load increases, choice of the affect-
laden option will decrease.
In the next section, we report three experiments that were carried out to test these predictions.
Experiment 1 tested the first two predictions in a context involving a choice between chocolate cake and fruit

11. 9
salad. Process measures related to the basis of making the decision (affect versus consequence-related
cognitions) and to the focus of processing were also collected. Experiment 2 tested all three predictions in a
context involving a choice between pizza and soup. A measure related to the nature of the goals that
influenced choices was also collected. Experiment 3 delved into the role of goals in giving rise to the second
and third predictions (i.e., experiment 3's focus was restricted to situations where the time available for
deciding was high). Using a context involving choosing between a “party” vacation and a “body-toning”
vacation, experiment 3 manipulated appetitive goals as a means of testing our conceptualization.
Experiment 1
Design and Participants
Experiment 1 used a two-factor between-subjects design, with decision-mode as one factor (low
decision-time versus high decision-time, accompanied by high levels of exposure), and cognitive-load as
the second factor (high versus low). One hundred and ninety-five undergraduate students were randomly
assigned to the four conditions arising from the two factors.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in two different rooms, with respondents leaving the first room, one
at a time, and making their choices on their way to the second room after being subject to the experimental
manipulations (first to cognitive-load and then to decision-mode), completely out of sight and earshot of the
other respondents. This was to control for social and normative factors, which could have otherwise
influenced respondents’ decisions. To disguise the actual purpose of the study, respondents were provided
with instructions at the beginning of the session stating that the experiment was about the effects of
background sounds and a change in environment on consumers’ memories for information and that, as part of
the study, they would be asked to go to another room. Further, respondents were told that they would be
provided with a choice of snacks as compensation for participating in the study (no mention was made of the
nature of the snacks; also note that the procedure was such that, as far as respondents were concerned, the

12. 10
choice task was incidental to the main experiment).
On exiting the first room, respondents were told of the procedure–they would first memorize a
number, then walk over to a first cart, which had two speakers, and listen to some background sounds that
would last for a minute and a half (the sounds emanating from these speakers could be controlled remotely by
the experimenter; neutral sounds were chosen based on a pretest4). They were told that after the sounds
stopped, they were to proceed to a second cart where they would find two snacks on display, decide which
snack they would like to have, choose a ticket for a snack, and then proceed to the second room. Before
respondents proceeded toward the “speakers” cart and then to the “snacks” cart, the cognitive-load
manipulation was carried out by adopting a procedure that has been widely used in the literature (e.g.,
Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Swann et al., 1990; Trope & Alfieri,
1997). One group of respondents (high cognitive-load condition) was requested to memorize a seven-digit
number; another group (low cognitive-load condition) was requested to memorize a two-digit number.
When a respondent was ready to proceed to the carts and then to the second room, the experimenter
opened an envelope, displayed briefly the number to be memorized, and then closed the envelope.
To manipulate the time available to decide, for one group of respondents (high decision-time
condition), the “speakers” cart was placed close to the “snacks” cart so that subjects knew about their choice
options and could, therefore, deliberate on their decision for the entire minute and a half that they were
listening to the background sounds. This procedure also ensured that the level of exposure to the snacks
would be high when the decision was being deliberated upon for a longer duration. For the other group of
respondents (low decision-time condition), the carts were placed far apart, and the “snacks” cart was
covered on three sides so that the snacks were not visible when respondents were listening to the background
sounds for a minute and a half. Only when the respondents in this condition got to the front of the “snacks”
cart did the snacks become visible. As in Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), most subjects in the low decision-time
condition took only 3 to 6 seconds to make their decisions (compared to the minute and a half in the high

13. 11
decision-time condition). Note that all subjects listened to the background sounds for a minute and a half,
but one group did so in the presence of the snacks, while the other did so in their absence.
After respondents had picked up the ticket for their chosen snack, they proceeded to the second
room, where they completed the various measures described below and then were debriefed. The ticket that
indicated each respondent’s choice of snacks was collected by a second experimenter and stapled onto the
experimental booklet. The experimenter also noted the time of day when the session was carried out to use
as a covariate in the various analyses.
Stimuli
Two snacks–a piece of chocolate cake with cherry topping and a serving of fruit salad–were on
display in transparent plastic containers that were placed on the second cart stationed between the two
rooms. To control for the prices and the supplier of these two snacks, a price sticker ($1) obtained from a
local grocery store was affixed to each of the containers that were on display. The snacks were chosen
based on findings reported in Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999) which suggest that cake elicits more intense positive
affect, but is associated with less favorable cognitions related to the consequences of consumption compared
to the fruit salad.
Measures
Respondents first recalled the number they had been asked to memorize and then responded to the
remaining measures. Except for the first (thought protocols) and the last (covariates) set of these remaining
measures, the scales for all the other measures were identical to the ones used by Shiv and Fedorikhin
(1999).
Respondents were first asked to describe, as completely as possible, whatever went through their
minds while they were deciding between the two snacks. The protocols were coded by two independent
judges for any mentions of rehearsals of the number that subjects had been instructed to memorize (interjudge
agreement was 100%). These thought protocols gave us an opportunity to check if the cognitive-load

14. 12
manipulation was successful–more respondents were expected to indicate that they had been busy rehearsing
the number when the level of this factor was high (i.e., when the number was long) than when it was low.
As in Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), each respondent was then asked to indicate the basis of his/her
choice on five seven-point items that were presented after the statement “My final decision about which snack
to choose was driven by—” These items were anchored by: “my thoughts (1)/my feelings (7),” “my
willpower (1)/my desire (7),” “my prudent self (1)/my impulsive self (7),” “the rational side of me (1)/the
emotional side of me (7),” and “my head (1)/my heart (7).” The Cronbach alpha for these items measuring
the basis for respondents’ decisions was 0.88, suggesting that the
responses to the five items could be averaged to form a single variable (Decision-Basis).
Finally, respondents indicated their gender, whether they were health-conscious individuals, and
whether they were cake and fruit salad fanatics (the last three measures were obtained using 7-point items
anchored by “seldom would describe me/ usually would describe me”). These measures, and the time-of-
day when each respondent participated in the experiment served as covariates in the various analyses. Of
these measures, respondents’ gender and the time-of-day did not covary significantly with any of the
dependent measures, and hence will not be discussed further.
Results
Manipulation Check. Respondents’ mentions in the thought protocols of having rehearsed the
number that they had been instructed to memorize served as a manipulation check for the cognitive-load
factor (more mentions were expected from respondents who memorized the 7-digit number than those who
memorized the 2-digit number). A logistic-regression with mention of mental rehearsal as the dependent
variable (coded as “mention=1" and “no mention=0"), and cognitive-load and decision-mode as the
independent variables revealed a significant main effect of cognitive-load (P2=71.7, p=.0001); none of the
other treatment effects were significant. The proportion (weighted average) of respondents mentioning that
they had rehearsed the number was significantly higher in the high cognitive-load condition (90.2%) than in

15. 13
the low cognitive-load condition (9.78%), suggesting that the manipulation of the cognitive-load factor was
successful.
Choice. We predicted that if the time available to make the decision was low, choice of the cake
would be higher when the level of cognitive load is high than when it is low. In contrast, if the time available
to make the decision is high and the level of exposure to the options is also high, choice of the cake would be
lower when the level of cognitive load is high rather than when it is low. Consistent with our predictions, a
logistic regression analysis revealed a significant decision-mode by cognitive-load interaction (P2=4.29,
p=.04, D2=.04)5.
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
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Further, as shown in Figure 3, the choice-proportions across the various levels of the decision-mode
and cognitive-load factors were in line with our conceptualization. When the time available for the decision
was low, the proportion of subjects choosing the cake was higher when the level of cognitive load was high
(50.0%) than when it was low (29.8%; z=1.99, p<=.05). In contrast, when the time available for the decision
was high, the proportion of subjects choosing the cake was lower when the level of cognitive load was high
(36.5%) than when it was low (56.0%; z=1.97, p<.05).
Decision-Basis. The variable Decision-Basis (higher numbers indicate that respondents’ choices were
based more on affect than on cognitions) served to ascertain whether the decisions across the different
conditions were based on respondents’ affective reactions or cognitions. As shown in Figure 3, the pattern of
results for Decision-Basis mirrored that for choice. As with choice, an ANCOVA with Decision-Basis as the
dependent variable, and decision-mode and cognitive-load as the independent variables revealed a significant
2-way interaction (F1,191=9.87, p=.002, T2=.06). An examination of the means across various levels of
decison-mode and cognitive-load revealed that the results were consistent with our conceptualization. When

16. 14
the time available for the decision was low, subjects rated their choices as having been driven more by affect
when the level of cognitive load was high (M=4.00) than when it was low (3.28; F1,191=4.68, p=.03). When
the time available for the decision was high, subjects rated their choices as having been driven more by affect
when the level of cognitive load was low (M=4.05) than when it was high (3.32; F1,191=4.41, p=.04).
A test was carried out to examine if the significant interactive effect of the two independent variables on
choice (reported in the previous section) was mediated by Decision-Basis. According to Baron & Kenny
(1986), mediation is said to exist if three criteria are met: (1) the independent variable(s) (here, the interaction
between decision-mode and cognitive-load) influences the potential mediator (Decision-Basis), (2) the
potential mediator influences the dependent variable (choice), and (3) the relationship between the independent
and dependent variables is weakened when the mediator is introduced as a covariate. An ANOVA revealed
that the first criterion for mediation was supported by a significant interactive effect of the three independent
variables on Decision-Basis (F1,187=9.87, p<.002). A logistic regression analysis provided support to the
second criterion for mediation by revealing a significant effect of Decision-Basis on choice, (P2 =26.03,
p<.0001). Another logistic regression analysis provided support to the third criterion for mediation. The
significant 2-way interaction (reported in the previous section under the heading choice) was no longer
significant once Decision-Basis was included as a covariate in the model (P2=.004, p=.95). Thus, complete
support was obtained for all three criteria, suggesting that Decision-Basis did serve as a mediator between the
independent variables and choice.
Discussion
The results of experiment 1 indicate that, in a binary choice context, where one alternative (chocolate
cake) is superior on the affective dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension to the other (fruit salad),
choices are influenced by the time available for the decision and the level of cognitive load. As predicted, when
the time available for the decision was low, choice of the affect-laden option was higher when the level of
cognitive load was high than when it was low. When the time available for the decision was high, and

17. 15
respondents were exposed to the options for the entire duration when they were deliberating their decisions, the
pattern of results was just the opposite of when the time available for the decision was low–choice of the affect-
laden option was lower when the level of cognitive load was high than when it was low. Support for our
conceptualization was also obtained by using a process measure, Decision Basis, which indicated whether
respondents’ choices were driven by their affective reactions or by their cognitions. Results for this Decision-
Basis variable mirrored those for choice and tests revealed that Decision-Basis mediated the effects of
independent variables on choice.
Experiment 2
One purpose of experiment 2 was to replicate the core findings of experiment 1 using different choice-
options (pizza and soup). Another purpose of experiment 2 was to delve into the psychological processes that
potentially gave rise to findings related to the two key factors, decision-time and cognitive-load, in experiment
1. Specifically, the purpose of experiment 2 was to examine a third prediction that arose from our
conceptualization, one related to the moderating role of the nature of stimulus exposure. Note that in
experiment 1, respondents in the high decision-time conditions were also subject to high levels of exposure to
the options (i.e., the snacks were in full view during the entire time they deliberated on the decision). According
to our conceptualization, the pattern of results obtained in the high decision-time conditions of experiment 1
(choice of the affect-laden option increasing with a decrease in the level of cognitive load) will occur only when
the level of exposure is high. If the level of exposure is low, the pattern of results ought to be consistent with
dual-process theories–choice of the affect-laden option will get attenuated as the availability of processing
resources increases with a decrease in cognitive load.
Design and Procedure
Experiment 2 used a 3 (decision-mode) X 2 (cognitive-load) between-subject design. Two of the
three levels of the decision-mode factor remained the same as in experiment 1–in one level, the time available
for the decision was low (we label this level as low decision-time); in another level, the time available for the

18. 16
decision was high, as was the level of exposure to the options (we label this level as high decision-time/high
exposure). In the third level of the decision-mode factor, the time available for the decision was high, but the
level of exposure to the options was low (we label this level as high decision-time/low exposure). The
procedure was similar across the various conditions. As in experiment 1, subjects first memorized either a 7-
digit or a 2-digit number, then listened to background sounds for a minute and a half, and then picked a ticket
for the food item of their choice (pizza or soup). Also, as in experiment 1, subjects in the low decision-time
conditions listened to background sounds without the food options being present, then moved to a second
cart that carried the food options, and then chose between the two options. (As in experiment 1, the time
taken for making the decision was low, ranging from 3 to 6 seconds, in this condition.) Again, as in
experiment 1, subjects in the high decision-time/high exposure conditions listened to the background
sounds in the presence of the choice options. In the high decision-time/low exposure conditions,
respondents were briefly exposed to the choice options before they moved to the “sound” cart, where they
then listened to the sounds with the choice options behind them and out of sight. To ensure that the
instructions were similar across the various conditions, subjects were told the following when they emerged
from the first room: “You will now memorize a number and then walk up to the speakers out there.” In the
high decision-time/low exposure conditions, the following instruction was added: “But before you do that,
please take a look at the food-items you will be choosing from today.” Subjects were then told, “When you
get to the speakers, this device will be switched on and you will listen to background sounds for a minute and
a half. Now, these are meant to be background sounds, so you could be thinking of whatever you want
when you listen to the sounds.” In all conditions involving high decision times, the following instruction was
added: “For example, you could be thinking of which food-item you will choose today, or anything else you
may desire.”
Stimuli
Instead of the cake and fruit salad that were used as stimuli in experiment 1, experiment 2 used two

19. 17
food-items, a slice of pizza and a bowl of tomato soup, the former being associated with more positive affect
but less favorable cognitions compared to the latter as revealed in a pretest.
Measures
The measures used were similar to those in experiment 1. In addition respondents were asked to
indicate on a 7-point scale (disagree [1]/agree [7]) the extent to which their thoughts focused on the number
they had been asked to memorize when listening to the background sounds. This measure served to check if
the cognitive-load manipulation was successful. Further, each respondent was asked to indicate, on 7-point
scales, the extent to which appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals were brought to bear in the decision.
These items were anchored by “my goal was one of avoiding gratification (1)”/ “my goal was one of seeking
gratification (7),” my goal was one of avoiding indulging (1)”/ “my goal was one of indulging (7),” my goal
was one of avoiding pleasure (1)”/ “my goal was one of seeking pleasure (7),” and “my goal was one of
keeping my impulses in check (1)”/ “my goal was one of satisfying my impulses (7).” The Cronbach alpha for
these four items was 0.90, so the responses were averaged to form a single variable (Decision-Goal), with
higher numbers indicating that the goal was more appetitive or gratification-seeking in nature.
Results
Manipulation Check. Respondents’ ratings of the extent to which they thought about the number they
had been asked to memorize served to assess the success of the cognitive-load manipulation. An
ANCOVA with decision-mode and cognitive-load as the two independent variables revealed a significant
main effect of cognitive-load (F1,204=20.4, p=.0001), and none of the other treatment effects were
significant. The extent to which respondents thought about the memorized number was significantly higher in
the high cognitive-load condition (M=6.37) than in the low cognitive-load condition (M=4.79).
Choice. We predicted a replication of the results obtained in experiment 1, i.e., as the level of
cognitive load decreases, choice of the affect-laden option, i.e., the pizza will (1) get attenuated in the low
decision-time conditions, and (2) get enhanced in the high decision-time/high exposure conditions. In

20. 18
addition, we predicted that in the high decision-time/low exposure conditions, the pattern of results will
follow dual-process theories–attenuation as the level of cognitive load decreases. A logistic regression
analysis revealed a significant decision-mode by cognitive-load interaction (P2=10.93, p=.0009, D2=.10).
As can be seen in Figure 4, experiment 2 replicated the core findings of experiment 1. In the low decision-
time conditions the proportion of respondents choosing the pizza was higher when the level of cognitive load
was high (78.1%) than when it was low (51.4%; z=2.28, p<.01). In the high decision-time/high exposure
conditions, the proportion of respondents choosing the pizza was lower when the level of cognitive load was
high (51.4%) than when it was low (78.4%; z=2.39, p<.01).
____________________________________
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
_____________________________________
The pattern of results in the high decision-time/low exposure conditions was different than that in the
high decision-time/high exposure conditions. The proportion of respondents choosing the pizza was 55.6%
and 45.2% respectively in the high and low cognitive-load conditions respectively. Though the difference in
proportions was not statistically significant, the pattern of results was directionally consistent with our
conceptualization related to dual-process theories.
Decision-Goal. The variable Decision-Goal served to ascertain whether appetitive goals were
activated in conditions where the choice of the pizza was high. As shown in Figure 4, the pattern of results
for Decision-Goal mirrored that for choice. As with choice, an ANCOVA with Decision-Goal as the
dependent variable, and decision-mode and cognitive-load as the independent variables revealed a
significant 2-way interaction (F2,200=4.24, p=.01, T2=.09).
Consistent with our conceptualization, in the low decision-time conditions, respondents rated their
choices as having been influenced more by gratification-seeking goals when the level of cognitive load was
high (M=5.55) than when it was low (4.83; F1,200=5.05, p=.03). In the high decision-time/high exposure

21. 19
conditions, respondents rated their choices as having been influenced more by gratification-seeking goals
when the level of cognitive load was low (M=5.29) than when it was high (4.74; F1,200=3.55, p=.06). In the
high decision-time/low exposure conditions, respondents’ ratings of appetitive goals were directionally
consistent with dual-process theories–higher when the level of cognitive load was high (M=4.90) than when it
was low (4.70; p=n.s.).
A Baron & Kenny (1986) test was carried out to examine if the significant interactive effect of
cognitive-load and decision-mode on choice (reported in the previous section) was mediated by Decision-
Goal. An ANCOVA revealed that the first criterion for mediation was supported by a significant interactive
effect of the two independent variables, decision-mode and cognitive-load, on Decision-Goal (F2,200=4.24,
p=.01). A logistic regression analysis provided support to the second criterion for mediation by revealing a
significant effect of Decision-Goal on choice, (c2 =45.4, p<.0001). Another logistic regression analysis
provided support to the third criterion for mediation–the effect of the independent variable on choice (the 2-
way interaction that was significant at the 0.0009 level) was weakened when Decision-Goal was included as
a covariate in the model (c2=6.06, p=.01). Thus, complete support was obtained for all three criteria,
suggesting that Decision-Goal served as a mediator between the independent variables and choice.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the core findings of experiment 1 using a different set of stimulus material. The
findings of experiment 2 also indicate that the pattern of results obtained in high decision-time conditions in
experiment 1 occurs only when the level of exposure to the options is also high. As predicted, when the time
available for the decision was high, but the level of exposure was low, the results seemed to be directionally
consistent with dual-process theories. Specifically, the choice of the
affect-laden option seemed to decrease as the level of cognitive load decreased. Support for our
conceptualization related to the activation of appetitive goals was also obtained by using a process measure,
Decision-Goal, which indicated whether respondents’ choices were driven more or less by appetitive (i.e.,

22. 20
gratification-seeking) goals. Results for this Decision-Goal variable mirrored those for choice, and tests
revealed that Decision-Goal mediated the effects of independent variables on choice.
Experiment 3
The purpose of experiment 3 was to examine, using a different set of stimuli (non food-related, unlike
experiments 1 and 2), the underlying processes in conditions where the time available for the decision is high
and the level of cognitive load is low. Recall that the pattern of results observed thus far has been contrary to
dual-process theories in the high decision-time/high exposure conditions and consistent with such theories in
the high decision-time/low exposure conditions. To account for these pattern of results, we have argued that
it is the physical presence of the affect-laden option during longer decision times and low cognitive loads that
causes an activation of appetitive goals, which, in turn, causes a shift in preferences to the affect-laden option.
Further, we have argued that if, under these conditions, the affect-laden option is only briefly presented, such
shifts in preferences will not occur because appetitive goals are less likely to get activated.
Experiment 3 served to test these arguments by having Decision-Goal as an independent variable
rather than as a dependent variable (which was how we tested our conceptualization 2). Decision-Goal was
then crossed with the level of exposure, the other independent variable of interest in experiment 3 (note that
the cognitive-load factor was dropped, i.e., cognitive load was maintained at low levels in this experiment).
The logic that was used to test our conceptualization in experiment 3 was as follows. If it is true that when the
decision time is high and cognitive load is low, the higher choice of the affect-laden option at high levels of
exposure is caused by the activation of appetitive goals, then activating these goals through a priming task
should cause choices in the low exposure conditions to resemble those in the high exposure conditions. In
other words, one should expect an interaction between the level of exposure and the decision goal with the
following pattern of choices: when appetitive goals are not primed, the pattern of results in experiment 2
ought to be replicated (higher choice of the affect-laded option when the level of exposure is high than when it
is low); when appetitive goals are primed, the pattern of results should be similar irrespective of the level of

23. 21
the level of exposure.
Design and Procedure
Experiment 3 used a 2 (goal-priming: yes versus no) X 2 (decision-mode) between-subject design.
Two of the three levels of the decision-mode factor that were used in experiment 2 were used in experiment
3–those involving high decision times (i.e., high decision-time/high exposure and high decision-time/low
exposure; the low decision-time conditions were dropped). The procedure that was employed was similar to
that used in the high decision-time conditions of experiment 2, except that subjects did not have to memorize
the number before listening to the background sounds (since the cognitive-load factor was not included in
experiment 3). One other difference between experiments 3 and 2 was that the background sounds were
changed from “sounds on a cliff” to just plain static. The reason was that one of the choice options involved a
“party-vacation” in Bora Bora, and “sounds from the cliff” might have caused respondents to think that we
expected them to choose the “party-vacation.”
The procedure for manipulating appetitive goals was adapted from Chartrand & Bargh (1996) and
Ramanathan (2000). The experiment was introduced as three separate studies being carried out by different
faculty. In the “first study,” purportedly about consumers’ opinions on various products, respondents were
presented with three scenarios, one involving purchase of a car, another involving renting an apartment, and
the third involving purchase of a mattress. After reading each scenario, respondents evaluated the product
described in the scenario. For one group of respondents, only gratificatory attributes were presented in the
scenario (e.g., “luxurious leather trim,” “new-car smell,” and “sunlight streaming down the sunroof” for the
car; “bright and sunny with an awesome fireplace,”and “an artfully decorated living room with hardwood
floors” for the apartment; “cozy and warm,” and “soft velvety fabric that will be gentle on your skin” for the
mattress). For another group, only more utilitarian attributes were presented (e.g., “high reliability,” “good
workmanship,” and “one that will last a long time” for the car; “apartment that will help you quickly repay

24. 22
your college loans” and “a good neighborhood, but otherwise a simple, down-to-earth, nothing-fancy” for the
apartment; “inflate quickly” and “retain the air-pressure for a full night” for the mattress). The various
attributes were selected based on separate pretests that were adapted from Dhar & Wertenbroch (2000)
and Strahilevitz and Myers (1998), and the expectation was that appetitive goals will be activated for the
former group of respondents and not for the latter. Respondents then took part in a “second study,” which
served as a filler task, and then a “third study” whose procedure was similar to that used in experiments 1 and
2.
A concern that we had was that the procedure used to manipulate goals will also affect mood states,
resulting in a potential confound. Specifically, subjects who would be evaluating products described on
gratificatory attributes could be put into mood states that were more positive than those who would be
evaluating products described on utilitarian attributes. To reduce the viability of this alternative account, we
carried out a pretest, the procedure of which was quite similar to the “first study” of Experiment 3. Thirty-six
subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Following the “first study,” which was identical to
the one that formed part of Experiment 3, subjects took part in a “second study” purportedly about the
development of some scales for future research. As part of this study, subjects were presented with 20 items
from Watson, Clark, & Tellegen’s (1988) PANAS scales to assess their mood states. Responses to 10
items were averaged to form the Positive Affect variable, while the remaining 10 items were averaged to form
the Negative Affect variable. Between-subject ANOVA’s with the Positive Affect and Negative Affect
variables as the dependent variables revealed no significant effects (F<1), reducing the possibility that mood
served as a potential confound in Experiment 3.
Stimuli
Instead of the pizza and soup that were used in experiment 2, experiment 3 used two vacation-
packages, a party vacation in Bora Bora, and a body-toning vacation in the foothills of the Rockies. Subjects

25. 23
were told in the first room that they would be entered in a lottery and that the winner of the lottery could choose
between two vacations worth around $900 (the vacation-packages were not mentioned). As will be discussed
shortly, measures were collected in experiment 3 to ensure that the vacation-packages had the desired
characteristics–the “party” vacation being associated with more positive affect but less favorable consequence-
related cognitions compared to the “body-toning” vacation.
Measures
The measures used were similar to those in experiment 2. In addition, respondents were asked to
rate if the following statements were apt descriptions of each of the two vacation packages (one at a time,
with the order counterbalanced–none of the treatment effects involving the order of measurement was
significant in the relevant analyses): “I could sense a desire to take it,” “I felt a strong, irresistible urge to take
it,” “I felt an impulse to take it,” and “The emotional side of me was aroused when I saw it.” These items
were anchored by “description not apt (1)/description apt (7).” Cronbach’s alpha for these items measuring
the affective nature of the two vacation packages was 0.87 for the “party” vacation and 0.91 for the “body-
toning” vacation, suggesting that the items could be averaged to form one variable for each of the two
vacation packages (Affectparty and Affectbody). Respondents’ cognitions about the consequences of taking the
two vacation packages were obtained on four 7-point items for each of the two packages (one at a time, with
the order counterbalanced–again, none of the treatment effects involving the order of measurement was
significant in the relevant analyses). The scales were anchored by “harmful (1)/beneficial (7),” “not good for
health (1)/good for health (7),” “a foolish choice (1)/a wise choice (7),” and “useless (1)/useful (7).”
Cronbach’s alpha for these items was 0.88 for the “party” vacation and 0.83 for the “body-toning” vacation,
and, therefore, the responses were averaged to form one variable for each of the two vacations (Cogparty and
Cogbody).
Finally, to rule out demand effects respondents were asked 4 open-ended questions adapted from

26. 24
Chartrand & Bargh (1996) and Ramanathan (2000): “What do you think was the purpose of this study?”
“Do you think any of the different studies that you took part in thus far are related to one another (please
elaborate)?” “Do you think anything you did or did not do on any one of the studies affected anything you
did or did not do on any other study (please elaborate)?” and “Did you find anything unusual about any of the
studies you took part in thus far (please elaborate)?” None of the responses to these four questions were in
the affirmative, suggesting that the observed effects were not due to experimenter demand.
Results
Stimulus Characteristics. Within-subject analyses with the affect and cognitions related to the
vacation packages as the dependent variables and the type-of-vacation, priming, and decision-mode as the
independent variables revealed significant main-effects of type-of-vacation for both of the dependent
variables, and none of the other treatment effects were significant. Affectparty (M=5.48) was significantly
greater than Affectbody (M=2.52; F1,199=524.02, p=.0001), and Cogparty (M=4.28) was significantly lower
than Cogbody (M=6.18; F1,199=300.85, p=.0001). These results suggest that the stimulus-material had the
desired characteristics.
Choice. We predicted a replication of the results obtained in the high decision-time, low cognitive-
load conditions of experiment 2 when appetitive goals are not primed–choice of the affect-laden option
(“party” vacation) will be higher when the level of exposure is high than when it is low. In contrast, we
predicted that, when appetitive goals are primed, choice of the affect laden option in the low exposure
condition will increase to approach the choice levels in the high exposure condition.
Consistent with our predictions, a logistic regression analysis revealed a significant decision-mode by
priming interaction (P2 =4.27, p=.04, D2=.04), in addition to main effects of decision-mode (P2=5.12,
p=.02, D2=.06) and priming (P2=4.43, p=.04, D2=.05). More specifically, as can be seen in Figure 5,
under conditions where appetitive goals were not primed, choice of the affect-laden option (“party” vacation)

27. 25
was higher when the level of exposure was high (80%) than when it was low (49%; z=3.16, p<.01). In
contrast, when appetitive goals were primed, choice of the affect laden option was similar across the high
(81%) and low levels of exposure (79.5%; p>.20).
_____________________________________
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
_____________________________________
Decision-Goal. The variable Decision-Goal served to ascertain whether gratification-seeking goals
were activated in conditions where the choice of the “party” vacation was high. As shown in Figure 5, the
pattern of results for Decision-Goal mirrored that for choice. As with choice, an ANCOVA with Decision-
Goal as the dependent variable, and decision-mode and priming as the independent variables revealed a
significant 2-way interaction (F1,185=4.17, p=.04, T2=.04), in addition to significant main-effects of decision-
mode (F1,185=8.35, p=.004, T2=.08) and priming (F1,185=5.86, p=.02, T2=.06).
Consistent with our conceptualization, under conditions where goals were not primed, respondents
rated their choices as having been influenced more by appetitive goals when the level of exposure was high
(M=5.50) than when it was low (M=4.38; F1,185=12.14, p=.0006). When goals were primed, respondents
rated their choices as having been influenced by appetitive goals both in the high (M=5.62) and low levels of
exposure (M=5.43) conditions (p>.20).
A Baron & Kenny (1986) test was carried out to examine if the significant interactive effect of
cognitive-load and decision-mode on choice (reported in the previous section) was mediated by Decision-
Goal. An ANCOVA revealed that the first criterion for mediation was supported by a significant interactive
effect of the two independent variables, decision-mode and priming, on Decision-Goal (F1,185=4.17, p=.04).
A logistic regression analysis provided support to the second criterion for mediation by revealing a significant
effect of Decision-Goal on choice, (P2 =39.5, p<.0001). Another logistic regression analysis provided

28. 26
support for the third criterion for mediation–the effect of the independent variable on choice (the 2-way
interaction that was significant at the 0.04 level) was weakened when Decision-Goal was included as a
covariate in the model (P2 =3.07, p=.08). Thus, complete support was obtained for all three criteria,
suggesting that Decision-Goal did serve as a mediator between the independent variables and choice.
Discussion
By manipulating appetitive goals, experiment 3 demonstrated that the pattern of results observed in
the high decision-time, low cognitive-load conditions of experiment 2 occur due to the activation of
appetitive goals when the level of exposure is high, and a lack of activation when the level of exposure is low.
Further support for our conceptualization related to the activation of appetitive goals was obtained by using a
process measure, Decision-Goal, which indicated whether respondents’ choices were driven more or less by
appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals. Results for this Decision-Goal variable mirrored those for choice
and tests revealed that Decision-Goal mediated the effects of independent variables on choice.
General Discussion
Summary of Findings
The purpose of this article was to examine the effects of “lower-order” affect and “higher-order” affect
and cognitions on the choice of options often termed as guilty pleasures (Giner-Sorolla, 1999) or vices
(Wertenbroch, 1998). Based on the Affective Cognitive Model, we made three primary predictions. First,
we predicted that if the time available for the decision is low, choices are more likely to be influenced by affect
(lower-order) and by goals that are more appetitive in nature when the level of cognitive load is high than when
it is low. Hence, choice of the affect laden option is likely to be higher when the level of cognitive load is high
than when it is low. Second, if the time available for the decision is high, the pattern of results under high
versus low levels of cognitive load will depend on the nature of exposure to the options. If the exposure to the
options is high, choices are more likely to be influenced by affect (higher-order) and by goals that are more

29. 27
appetitive in nature, when the level of cognitive load is low than when it is high. In other words, we predicted
that the pattern of results on choice would be just the reverse of what we predicted in the conditions where the
time for the decision is low. Third, if the time available to decide is high but the exposure to the options is low,
choices are less likely to be influenced by affect (higher-order), and, in line with dual-process theories, choice
of the affect-laden option is likely to be attenuated when cognitive load decreases.
The above propositions were tested in binary choice contexts in which one of the alternatives
(chocolate cake, pizza, a party vacation in experiments 1, 2, and 3 respectively) was superior on the affective
dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the other alternative (fruit salad, soup, and a
body-toning vacation in experiments 1, 2, and 3). Findings from the three experiments supported our
predictions. Moreover, findings related to two process measures, a self-reported measure of the basis of
respondents’ decisions and a self-reported measure of the goals that were brought to bear in the decision,
supported our conceptualization. In the conditions where choices of the affect-laden options were high,
subjects were more apt to indicate that their choices had been influenced primarily by affect and by appetitive
goals than in conditions where choices of the affect-laden options were low.
Theoretical and Managerial Implications
Our work, together with recent empirical research by Garbarino & Edell (1997), Luce (1998),
Mellers et al. (1997), and Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999), clearly point to the importance of examining the role of
task-induced affect in choice behavior. Previous empirical work in this area suggests that choices can be
influenced by affect arising from higher order processes, such as making trade-offs between attribute values
(Luce, 1998), expending high cognitive effort (Garbarino & Edell, 1997), and making risky decisions (Mellers
et al., 1997). Choices can also be influenced by by affect arising from the stimulus in a relatively spontaneous
manner, with little involvement of higher order cognitive processes (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). But, to the best
of our knowledge, our research is the first attempt to integrate these two broad themes, and examine the
effects of both lower-order and higher-order affect.

30. 28
Our findings have implications for consumers and marketers as well. The core findings related to the
effects of constrained processing resources and low levels of exposure on choice suggest that when consumers
don’t spend too much time on making a decision (as is often the case for many consumer packaged goods
[see Dickson & Sawyer, 1990]), any factor that increases cognitive load in the shopping environment is likely
to increase buying based on affect rather than cognitions. Consumers, therefore, need to be aware of potential
actions that marketers might take to influence decisions involving actions designed to constrain processing
resources, such as having distracting music or displays in the shopping environment. Another consequence,
which derives from anecdotal evidence that we obtained from a local grocery-store manager is that reducing
the check-out time can also cause consumers to deliberate less about what’s in their shopping carts and make
them more prone to leaving the store with products they chose on impulse. Alternatively, our findings related
to higher-order affective processes suggest that consumers would be better off not choosing guilty pleasures or
vices by avoiding “excessive” exposure to such products.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The conclusions in this article are made with the usual caveats about decision making experiments that
are conducted in controlled environments. Even though the experiments used real alternatives rather than
scenarios, they were conducted in a binary choice context and in a non-shopping environment. In other
words, the propositions arising from our affective-cognitive model were tested in a context that was devoid of
much of the richness that surrounds real world choices. It is quite possible that as research in this topic area
moves closer to reflecting how people behave in the real world, further refinement to the theorizing and
conclusions presented in this article will be needed. Delineated below are several promising research
directions.
The traditional view of affect-driven behavior as being irrational has had a long history, dating back to
as early as the turn of this century with work in psychoanalysis (Freud, 1911), a view that is still shared by
contemporary researchers (e.g., Rook, 1987; Rook & Fisher, 1995). One question that future research needs

31. 29
to address is how decision makers view such behaviors and how these views translate into the choices they
make. Preliminary results from our follow-up work suggest that, in contrast to researchers’ view of affect-
based behavior, decision makers don’t seem to view such behavior as normatively inappropriate, at least
immediately after the behavior occurs. In an experiment that was similar to the ones reported in this article,
respondents who had been subject to cognitive load were asked, immediately after they had indicated their
choices, how satisfied they were with their decisions and whether they would like to change their mind about
the option that they chose. To our surprise, as high as ninety-percent of respondents who chose the affect-
laden option stated that they would not change their minds, a percentage that was no different than that of
respondents who chose the non-affect-laden option. Satisfaction with the decision was not different between
these two groups either, despite cognitions about consuming the affect-laden option being unfavorable, as
reported in this article. An interesting question for future research is whether these results will hold with the
passage of time following the decision or whether the short-run satisfaction will turn into regret as time passes,
a possibility that arises from recent work on regret (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1995).
In this paper, the affective-cognitive model was applied to the context of choice behaviors. An
attempt to widen the applicability of the model will be to examine it in non-choice contexts as well. For
example, the model may be applied to explain seemingly conflicting findings on the role of affect in
counterfactual thinking. While recent work by Roese & Hur (1997) suggests that negative affect is a key
antecedent to counterfactual thinking, previous work suggests that negative affect is actually a consequence of
counterfactual thinking (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993;
Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995). It is quite possible that negative outcomes spontaneously engender
“lower-order” negative affect, which, in turn activates “higher-order” counterfactual thinking. These “higher-
order” counterfactual thoughts could then engender “higher-order” affective reactions if the decision-maker
dwells on these thoughts for a sufficiently long period of time in the absence of distractors (see Roese, 1997
and Roese & Hur, 1997 for similar arguments to explain the bi-directional causal linkage between affect and

32. 30
counterfactual thinking).
Another direction that future research may take is to test our affective-cognitive model in different
contexts. One such context could be where the focus is on negative affect, for example disgust, an emotion
that has been widely examined in the literature (e.g., Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994; Rozin, Markwith, &
Stoess, 1997). More specifically, one could examine a binary choice context involving disgust, where the
negative affect elicited by one alternative is more intense, but the cognitions are more favorable, than for the
other alternative. For example, one could envisage a situation where the decision maker is choosing between
irradiated meat which is slightly discolored and, consequently, may elicit reactions related to disgust, but is
more healthy than non-irradiated meat. Examining the proposed affective-cognitive model in such different
contexts will considerably bolster its validity.
Finally, from a theory-building perspective, future research needs to follow-up on recent advances in
neuropsychology on emotions (e.g., LeDoux, 1996). For example, one direction could be to examine
neurological and physiological changes that occur when decision makers are behaving based on “lower-order”
versus “higher-order” affect, and to assess how well the measures of affect that have been used by us and
others correlate with neurological and physiological measures. Research in this direction will serve to integrate
psychological and biological approaches to understanding affect, a strategy that is being advocated by a
number of researchers (e.g., Isen, 1990; Lang, 1993) to increase “our understanding of all these phenomena
and the processes that contribute to them” (Isen, 1990, p. 89).
Conclusion
In much previous decision making research, people have been characterized as “thinking machines,”
driven purely by cognitions. We believe that this is a poor reflection of reality. Moreover, the work by
Dickson and Sawyer (1990), examining how people actually make decisions in various shopping contexts,
suggests that people are not always “mindful” decision makers as has often been portrayed in the literature, but
tend to make their decisions “mindlessly” as well. This article was an attempt at integrating these two broad
themes with the hope that it will infuse more life and realism into an already exciting area of research in decision

33. 31
making.

34. 32
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FOOTNOTES
1. We thank Bob Wyer for bringing this fact to our attention.
2. In Figure 1, the path from lower-order cognitions to goals has been represented as a dotted line because
of the ambiguity that exists in the literature on this issue. LeDoux (1995, 1996) argues that action
tendencies arising from lower-order processes occur only through the generation of spontaneously
evoked lower-order affective reactions. In contrast, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) propose that
goals, and hence action tendencies, can be activated independently by lower-order cognitions. A
resolution of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper. However, note that for the contexts
being examined in this paper, the valence of both lower-order cognitions and affective reactions is
likely to be the same (positive) and, hence, our core proposition related to the impact of lower-
order processes on choice is unlikely to be affected whether or not we include the direct path from
lower-order cognitions to goals.
3. Note that in conditions where the decision time is high and the level of exposure is also high (columns 3
and 4 of Table 1) we are predicting a reversal in the pattern of results compared to conditions where
the decision time is low (columns 1 and 2 of Table 1). This reversal in the pattern of results might, at
first blush, seem to contradict traditional dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). According to these theories, in the high decision-time conditions a decrease in
the level of cognitive load should lead to an even further decrease in the choice of the affect-laden
option. In other words, we should be observing an amplification of the effect rather than its reversal.
However, as per recent formulations of dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999;
Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1999), for an
amplification of effects to occur, decision goals need to remain unchanged as the level of processing

41. 39
resources changes. As shown in Figure 1, what we predict is a shift in goals within the high
decision-time condition as the level of cognitive load changes, giving rise to the predicted reversal in
choices. The predicted results are, therefore, not inconsistent with dual-process theories.
4. Six different sounds– “traffic at a busy intersection,” “rain in a tropical forest,” “thunderstorm,” “sounds
on a cliff,” “mall parking lot,” and “mountain stream” were each evaluated by sixteen pretest subjects
from the same population as the main experiment. The sounds were evaluated on three 7-point
items anchored by “bad (-3)/good (+3),” “unpleasant (-3)/pleasant (+3),” and “not likable (-
3)/likable (+3).” Since the Cronbach alpha was 0.89 for these items, they were averaged to form
one evaluation for each of the six different sounds. The mean rating for “sounds on a cliff” was
found to lie closest to the mid-point, which was anchored by “neither (lower anchor) nor (upper
anchor).”
5. The effect sizes obtained in this and the other two experiments are comparable to those commonly
observed in consumer research. For example, in a meta-analysis of effect sizes, Peterson, Albaum,
and Beltramini (1985) report average sizes with college students of .105 for main effects and .05 for
interactions.

42. 40
AUTHOR NOTE
Baba Shiv is an Assistant Professor at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242-1000, and
Alexander Fedorikhin is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
90089-0443. The authors wish to thank Jim Bettman, Cathy Cole, Irwin Levin, Debbie MacInnis, Suresh
Ramanathan, Dennis Rook, Gary Russell, Bob Wyer, the participants of the Affect and Decision Making
Camp, Ohio State University, and the Judgment and Decision Making Seminar Series at the University of
Iowa for their invaluable feedback and guidance at various stages of this project. The authors also wish to
thank the associate editor and three reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier versions of the
manuscript. Finally, the authors extend their thanks to Hisashi Kurata, Sangkil Moon, Angelo Licursi and
Sam Farrington for their help in administering the experiments and coding the thought protocols.

43. Table 1
Predicted Effects of Cognitive Load, Decision Time and Level of Exposure on Processing Resources, the Nature of Underlying Processes,
Focus of Underlying Processes, Goals, and Choice
Low Decision Time High Decision Time
High Level of Exposure Low Level of Exposure
High Low High Low High Low
Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive
Load Load Load Load Load Load
Availability of Processing Very Low Moderately Moderately Very High Moderately Very High
Resources High High High
Nature of Underlying Lower- Higher- Higher- Higher- Higher- Higher-
Processes Order Order Order Order Order Order
Focus of Underlying Lower- Higher- Higher- Higher- Higher Higher-
Processes Order Order Order Order Order Order
Cognitions Cognitions Cognitions Affect Cognitions Cognitions
Goals Appetitive Aversive Aversive Appetitive Aversive Very Aversive
Likelihood of Choice Cake Fruit-salad Fruit-salad Cake Fruit-salad Fruit-Salad
(For the cake/salad (more so than in
scenario) the previous column)

44. Figure 1. Affective-Cognitive Model.
Higher-order Higher-order
Cognitions Affect
Action
Stimulus Goals Behavior
Tendency
*
Lower-order Lower-order
Cognitions Affect
See footnote # 2
*
4
2

45. 43
Figure 2. Predicted Pattern of Results on Choice, Positive Affect, and
Appetitive Goals as a Function of Cognitive Load, Decision Time,
and Level of Exposure
High Cognitive Load
Low Cognitive Load
Low Decision High Decision High Decision
Time Time/High Time/Low
Exposure Exposure