Sukaneka present( 3b)

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HaliMatun AZmi

NAMA : HALIMATUN BT MAT JALI
NO MATRIK : E20121004803
NAMA PENSYARAH : PROFESOR MADYA DATO’ DR ABDUL LATIF
BIN HAJI GAPOR

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Technology and Tourism - 2012.11.28.Malvern

Xiao Ma

The spatial spread of H5N1 avian influenza, significant ongoing mutations, and long-term persistence of the virus in some geographic regions has had an enormous impact on the poultry industry and presents a serious threat to human health. This study revealed two different transmission modes of H5N1 viruses in China, and indicated a significant role of poultry in virus dissemination. Furthermore, selective pressure posed by vaccination was found in virus evolution in the country. Phylogenetic analysis, geospatial techniques, and time series models were applied to investigate the spatiotemporal pattern of H5N1 outbreaks in China and the effect of vaccination on virus evolution. Results showed obvious spatial and temporal clusters of H5N1 outbreaks on different scales, which may have been associated with poultry and wild-bird transmission modes of H5N1 viruses. Lead–lag relationships were found among poultry and wild-bird outbreaks and human cases. Human cases were preceded by poultry outbreaks, and wild-bird outbreaks were led by human cases. Each clade has gained its own unique spatiotemporal and genetic dominance. Genetic diversity of the H5N1 virus decreased significantly between 1996 and 2011; presumably under strong selective pressure of vaccination. Mean evolutionary rates of H5N1 virus increased after vaccination was adopted in China.

Spatial, temporal and genetic dynamics of H5N1 in china

Harm Kiezebrink

Inception Promotional Campaign

ConorFay

Different environmental drivers operate on HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and wild birds in Europe. The probability of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry increases in areas with a higher human population density and a shorter distance to lakes or wetlands. This reflects areas where the location of farms or trade areas and habitats for wild birds overlap. In wild birds, HPAI H5N1 outbreaks mostly occurred in areas with increased NDVI and lower elevations, which are typically areas where food and shelter for wild birds are available. The association with migratory flyways has also been found in the intra-continental spread of the low pathogenic avian influenza virus in North American wild birds. These different environmental drivers suggest that different spread mechanisms operate. Disease might spread to poultry via both poultry and wild birds, through direct (via other birds) or indirect (e.g. via contaminated environment) infection. Outbreaks in wild birds are mainly caused by transmission via wild birds alone, through sharing foraging areas or shelters. These findings are in contrast with a previous study, which did not find environmental differences between disease outbreaks in poultry and wild birds in Europe.

Different environmental drivers of H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and wild birds

Harm Kiezebrink

During the Symposium on managing outbreaks of Avian Influenza in Taiwan, the main subject was managing the outbreaks without breaching animal welfare during the culling operations. Although it seams impossible, this can be done using the Anoxia method (see also www.N2GF.com for more information), under the condition that the entire process is been taking into account: killing of animals, carcass disposal, transport & logistic, Occupational Health & Safety, environmental issues, pest control, contact between animals and humans: all these factors contribute to the risks of spreading. If one factor fails, the virus can escape and infect the next flock, making it needed to kill more birds. For that reason, all factors are equally important to maintain animal welfare during outbreak situations. In a number of recently published studies, Professor Stegeman (University of Utrecht, Holland) explains that serologic spreading of viruses is related to human contacts with contaminated infected animals, carcasses, manure and materials infected/suspected animals; movements of farm labourers, products, equipment etc. Most of these contacts (and movements) take place prior, during, and after the culling procedure, whereas the quantity and the intensity of the contacts - thus this human contact/materials are decisive factors for the serologic spreading of viruses to enter farms and most likely play an important role in spreading between farms. Suspicion/infection of farm animals inevitably leads to preventive culling of all farm animals within the direct proximity. For that reason, the serologic spread of viruses has become a major animal welfare indicator that has to be taken into consideration as such. Each culling procedure features its own unique contact pattern between animals and humans and is based on applied culling, disposal and transport technique. These contact patterns related to the specific combination of applied methods, defines the major contribution factors for spreading of infections. Therefore should the potential risks of these procedures be evaluated and rated on the art and the intensity of the potential contact between animals and humans/materials, prior, during and after the procedure. Therefore, the entire procedure of killing, disposal and transportation is therefore considered as Major Interest, in terms of animal welfare.

Anoxia presentation during the AI symposium in Taiwan, March 2015

Harm Kiezebrink

September 2015: In Sweden, spent laying hens are killed either by traditional slaughter; on-farm with CO2 in a mobile container combined with a grinder; or with CO2 stable gassing inside the barn. The number of hens killed using the latter method has increased. During these killings a veterinarian is required to be present and report to the Swedish Board of Agriculture. Data were registered during four commercial killings and extracted from all official veterinary reports at CO2 whole-house killings in 2008–2010. On-farm monitoring showed that temperature decreased greatly and with high variability. The time until birds became unconscious after coming into contact with the gas, based on time until loss of balance, was 3–5 min. Veterinary reports show that 1.5 million laying hens were killed, in 150 separate instances. The most common non-compliance with legislation was failure to notify the regional animal welfare authorities prior to the killings. Six out of 150 killings were defined as animal welfare failures, eg delivery of insufficient CO2 or failure to seal buildings to achieve adequate gas concentration. Eleven were either potentially or completely unacceptable from the perspective of animal welfare. We conclude that, on the whole, the CO2 whole-house gas killing of spent hens was carried out in accordance with the appropriate legislation. Death was achieved reliably. However, there remain several risks to animal welfare and increased knowledge would appear vital in order to limit mistakes related to miscalculations of house volume, improper sealing or premature ventilation turn-off.

Berg et al. 2014 killing of spent laying hens using co2 in poultry barns

Harm Kiezebrink

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Technology and Tourism - 2012.11.28.Malvern

Spatial, temporal and genetic dynamics of H5N1 in china

Inception Promotional Campaign

Different environmental drivers of H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and wild birds

Anoxia presentation during the AI symposium in Taiwan, March 2015

Berg et al. 2014 killing of spent laying hens using co2 in poultry barns