David Hume studied law but lost interest, turning instead to literature and philosophy, which were his great passion. In this chapter, Hume argues against the view that all human actions are motivated solely by self-interest. He acknowledges that some philosophers have claimed that even generous friendship stems from self-love. However, Hume objects that this view is contrary to common feelings and observations of human nature, which show emotions like benevolence, love, friendship and compassion. Hume also argues that positing both selfish and disinterested benevolent motives in human nature actually results in a simpler system than trying to reduce all motives to self-interest alone.

1. CHAPTER 21
EGOISM IS MISTAKEN
BY DAVID HUME
KEVIN BRYAN
20190700003

2. About The Author
David Hume (1711-1776) studied law at the University of
Edinburgh but soon lost interest. He turned to the study of
literature and philosophy; in his words, they were the “ruling
passion of my life, and the great source of my enjoyments.” His
philosophical writings are noted for their empirically constructive
skepticism of knowledge and religion. Hume’s History of England
in six volumes was quite successful at the time, and his analysis of
causality continues to be influential.

3. The Self-Interest Hypothesis
a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral
sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved disposition, so in its turn it tends still
further to encourage that depravity.
There is another principle, somewhat resembling the former; which has been much insisted on by
philosophers, and has been the foundation of many a system; that, whatever affection one may feel, or
imagine he feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most generous friendship,
however sincere, is a modification of self-love

4. Cases Of Benevolence
I esteem the man whose self-love,
by whatever means, is so directed as to give him a concern for others, and
render him serviceable to society.
question concerning the universal or partial selfishness of
man be not so material as is usually imagined . It may not, therefore be
unsuitable, in this place, to bestow a few reflections upon it.
objection to the selfish hypothesis is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced
notions. To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions
as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude.

5. Presupposition of Simplicity
The nature of the subject furnishes the strongest presumption, that no better system will ever, for the future,
be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, and reduce all
the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect simplicity

6. Pleasure Not Directly Sought
if we consider rightly of the matter, we shall find that the hypothesis which allows of a disinterested
benevolence, distinct from self-love, has really more simplicity in it, and is more conformable to the
analogy of nature than that which pretends to resolve all friendship and humanity into this latter principle.