2. Decline of Support for Regime
(until December 2011)
Endemic corruption
Lack of rule of law
Censorship
Government's opaqueness
Economic hardship
New, richer, more self-respecting middle class
Increased civic responsibility
Proliferation of the Internet
3. Decline of Support for Regime
(up until December 2011)
January 2011: «Party of Crooks and Thieves»
September 24, 2011: Putin, Medvedev switch
seats
November 27, 2011: Putin booed at a wrestling
match
December 4, 2011: Duma elections
4. Duma Elections
(December 4, 2012)
Widespread fraud and irregularities (ballot
stuffing, multiple voting, fake protocols etc.)
Level of fraud not much higher than earlier
elections
Better publicized thanks to new technologies
More attention to and interest in elections
Significant drop of official figures for UR, below
50%
5. Inter-elections Protests
(December 2011 — February 2012)
Until December 2011, most protests had had at
most 3,000 to 5,000 participants (usually under
500); Moscow had been considered «too
wealthy to revolt»
Between elections, four major rallies were held
in Moscow that gathered 20,000 to 120,000
participants
100+ cities joined, but had significantly lower
figures (up to 15,000 in Saint Petersburg)
A number of journalists, writers, actors etc.
expressed support for the protests
6. Inter-elections Protests
(December 2011 — February 2012)
The vast majority of participants were ordinary
citizens, not activists
Old opposition leaders (both systemic and non-
systemic) negotiated with the authorities and did
technical organizing, but barely controlled the people
Facebook (along with Twitter, Vkontakte, LiveJournal)
was the main tool for raising awareness, mobilizing,
and discussing the protest
The protests were explicitly non-violent, non-
confrontational; «change, not revolution»
Extensive use of creativity and humour
7. Regime's Reaction
(December 2011 — February 2012)
First attempts to counter protests failed
One-way concessions: more democratic party &
election legislation, return of gubernatorial elections,
removal of Surkov, webcams at polling stations
Desertions & attempts of dialogue
Counter-propaganda against protesters' leaders; «anti-
Orangist», anti-American campaign
Gathering big pro-regime rallies (February 4&23)
8. Presidential Elections
(March 4, 2012)
Only «approved» candidates
Putin's overwhelming presence on TV
Mobilization of supporters
Outright fraud (except Moscow)
GOTV: Go Observe The Vote campaign in
Moscow
Russia: 64% for Putin; Moscow: 47% (fewer
votes than ever before)
9. Movement's Fatigue
(March 2012)
Smaller, more confrontational (but still non-
violent) demonstrations
Despair, infighting among activists and leaders
Too high expectations lead to disappointments
10. Preliminary Results
Pro-democracy movement has become
mainstream
Thousands of new, smart and enthusiastic
people have become active in promoting
democracy's cause
Regime's legitimacy was badly damaged by
revealed election-rigging and protests
New laws partially dismantle Putin's system of
«managed democracy»
11. Future: Regional Outreach
April 1: Hundreds activists from Moscow go to
Yaroslavl to observe local mayoral elections;
opposition candidate Urlashov wins runoff with
70% of votes
April 14: 5,000-strong protest in Astrakhan
(1500 km South of Moscow) against stolen
mayoral elections; hundreds supporters from
Moscow and other cities participate
Next up: Omsk, Krasnoyarsk
12. Future: Parties & Elections
New legislation simplifies creation of political
parties and participation in elections: takes only
500 members (instead of 40,000), signature-
gathering waived or simplified
Non-systemic opposition will at last have a
chance to participate in most elections
Municipal and regional level elections can be
won even under Putin's «managed
democracy»: proved in Yaroslavl
Small victories are important to prove
seriousness and legitimacy of the opposition
13. Future: New Initiatives
Many of those who «woke up» since December
are professionals occupied in business, design,
IT, education, etc., i.e. so-called «creative
class»
Some of them will channel their energy in new
initiatives, projects, and groups dealing with
various issues, from corruption to censorship to
environment problems
The next year or two will see much more civic
activism of different sorts
14. Future: How It's Going to End
The protests have changed Russia forever
The regime won't regain legitimacy
More active and capable civil society will
increase pressure on the government
New protests will be dedicated to other issues
Any event or series of events can spark a new,
stronger wave of protests that will finish off the
regime