1. We are indeed proving too much, telling untellable stories and
saying more than we can possibly know if we suggest that
philosophy and metaphysics can either conclusively demonstrate
or successfully describe the reality of God. But we commit
these same errors if, at the same time, we suggest that
beliefs in at least some God-concepts are not therefore
epistemically justified, metaphysically plausible, normatively
defensible and existentially actionable in ways that can be at
least weakly truth-indicative even if not otherwise robustly
truth-conducive.
Still, theodicy problems, intellectual puzzles and conflicts
with life experiences will not be eliminated by new or revised
kataphatic affirmations of the reality of God for that would
entail falling into the paradigmatic trap of trying to solve a
problem with the same mindset that created it. Both the
reality of God and the absurdity of evil remain immersed in
mystery and neither will yield to rational explanations but
invite, rather, in addition to apophatic shoulder shrugs,
existential solutions that can be found in the answers to such
questions as: “To Whom shall we go?” and “What return shall we
make?”
A good natural theology requires philosophical rigor while a
good theology of nature aspires to liturgical splendor.
Natural theology asks questions about and frames approaches to
primal realities. Philosophically, it discovers what is
logically possible and metaphysically plausible (at least,
equiplausible).
Natural theology, properly considered, does not pretend to
successfully describe such realities or answer such questions
but it does suggest that many of these questions are not
unreasonable. Natural theology thus reveals why a belief in
certain God-concepts, at least as vaguely conceived, can be
both normatively defensible and existentially actionable
(pragmatically guiding us). And this may be very important to
those who would want to justify their fundamental trust in
uncertain reality. This also means that, while successful
descriptions of an incomprehensible God will necessarily evade
natural theology vis a vis our propositional cognition,
successful references to a supremely intelligible God are not
out of the question for a good theology of nature vis a vis
our participatory imagination. Eminently liturgical, a good
theology of nature can have significant evaluative import as
it formatively shapes our desires, as it both consoles and
enlivens us. And it can also have tremendous normative impetus
as compassion and mercy ensue both from the unitive aims of
love (emphasized in but not exclusive to the West) as well as
from the solidarity that flows in the wake of experiences of
unitary being (emphasized in but not exclusive to the East).
Finally, since ALL interpretive approaches regarding primal
realities are inescapably tautological and all metaphors
eventually collapse, one way science can enhance our
understanding of God’s word and creation is by providing more
accurate descriptions for our interpretations such that our
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2. metaphors are more robust (last longer before collapsing, as
we mine their meanings) and our tautologies are more taut
(tautologies do not provide new info but that doesn’t mean
they are not true or that all are equally true; there are
criteria for how well they “fit” reality). We don’t need a
root metaphor or metaphysic or system to successfully navigate
reality through the eyes of a lively faith, just common sense
(that is uncommonly self-critical), like that of Peirce and
Hartshorne.
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