How Social and Developmental Change are Linked

Linking Social Change and Developmental Change:
Shifting Pathways of Human Development
Patricia M. Greenfield
University of California, Los Angeles
P. M. Greenfield’s new theory of social change and human
development aims to show how changing
sociodemographic ecologies alter cultural values and learning
environments and thereby shift
developmental pathways. Worldwide sociodemographic trends
include movement from rural resi-
dence, informal education at home, subsistence economy, and
low-technology environments to
urban residence, formal schooling, commerce, and high-
technology environments. The former
ecology is summarized by the German term Gemeinschaft
(“community”) and the latter by the
German term Gesellschaft (“society”; Tönnies, 1887/1957). A
review of empirical research dem-
onstrates that, through adaptive processes, movement of any
ecological variable in a Gesellschaft
direction shifts cultural values in an individualistic direction
and developmental pathways toward
more independent social behavior and more abstract cognition—
to give a few examples of the
myriad behaviors that respond to these sociodemographic
changes. In contrast, the (much less
frequent) movement of any ecological variable in a
Gemeinschaft direction is predicted to move
cultural values and developmental pathways in the opposite
direction. In conclusion, sociocultural

environments are not static either in the developed or the
developing world and therefore must be
treated dynamically in developmental research.
Keywords: social change, culture, cognitive development, social
development, learning
The goal in this article is to develop a theory that links social
change with developmental change. It therefore deals simulta-
neously with two scales of development: change within a
lifetime
and change across succeeding generations. In the field of devel-
opmental psychology, one normally thinks of developmental tra-
jectories as a constant across historical time. Indeed, a
theoretical
problem is that theory and research in cultural psychology,
includ-
ing cultural developmental psychology, assume that cultures are
static rather than dynamic. This article, in contrast, presents a
theory that, paradoxically, sees change in developmental trajec-
tories as the constant. A major goal of the theory of social
change and human development is to explain how, as sociode-
mographic conditions change, cultural values and developmen-
tal patterns are transformed across generations. Because socio-
demographic conditions are changing throughout the world—in
the direction of greater urbanization, higher levels of formal
schooling, increasing commercialization, and ever higher levels
of technology—the influence of social change on developmen-
tal patterns is an important domain in which theory is needed to
guide empirical research and to understand children and youths
in the United States and around the world.
A major strength of the theory of social change and human
development is that it is not simply descriptive but also predic-
tive. This makes it unique among cultural theories of human

development. Given particular sociodemographic changes, the
theory is able to predict the effects of those changes on path-
ways of development in both the social and cognitive domains.
It is also unique in its parsimony. It utilizes the same principles
to understand changing trajectories of human development not
only in two domains of development but also in two major
contexts of sociocultural change: one in which families stay put
while the sociocultural environment changes and one in which
families immigrate to a different sociocultural environment.
Both theoretical roots and empirical evidence are multidisci-
plinary, as they come from developmental psychology, anthro-
pology, and sociology. Foundational is the notion that a strong
theory is not methodocentric but can be validated and illumi-
nated at different levels of analysis by widely varying methods
and methodology (Greenfield, 2000).
Patricia M. Greenfield, Department of Psychology and FPR-
UCLA Center
for Culture, Brain, and Development, University of California,
Los Angeles.
I developed this theory while a fellow at the Center for
Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences on the campus of Stanford University. I
am grateful
for the intellectual space and stimulation that this year at the
center provided
and for the financial support from the center and sabbatical
support from
UCLA that made it possible. I would like to express my deep
appreciation to
Hazel Markus, whose invitation to present a colloquium on the
theme of
cultural dynamics in the Faculty Seminar Series of the Stanford
Center for
Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity instigated the initial

development
of the theory. The inspiration of Heidi Keller’s conception of
prototypical
environments and the importance of her empirical research
permeate this
article. I am also very appreciative for input from the
Greenfield lab group,
especially Kristen Gillespie-Lynch, Adriana Manago, Goldie
Salimkhan,
Seinenu M. Thein, and Yalda T. Uhis, concerning later revisions
of this article.
Finally, I thank Oscar Baldelomar for the initial graphical
representation of the
theory and Ondine Jarl for the beautiful design and execution of
the figures
presented in this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Patricia M.
Greenfield, Department of Psychology, University of California,
Los Angeles,
Los Angeles, CA 90095. E-mail: [email protected]
Developmental Psychology © 2009 American Psychological
Association
2009, Vol. 45, No. 2, 401– 418 0012-1649/09/$12.00 DOI:
10.1037/a0014726
401
Two Sociodemographic Prototypes
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Theoretical Constructs
The terms Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (soci-

ety), introduced by the German sociologist Tönnies in 1887
(1957), are my theoretical starting points for describing
contrasting
sociocultural ecologies. They are prototypes, each with its own
particular characteristics, which are most visible at the
extremes.
Each prototypical environment has a corresponding
developmental
pathway (Abels et al., 2005; Keller, 2007). One pathway of de-
velopment is well adapted to Gesellschaft environments, the
other
to Gemeinschaft environments.
How Are Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft Environments
Defined?
These concepts have much in common with Redfield’s (1941)
anthropological contrast between folk society (corresponding to
Gemeinschaft) and urban society (corresponding to
Gesellschaft).
Anthropologists have traditionally studied rural, small-scale,
low-
tech, homogenous, relatively self-contained Gemeinschaft envi-
ronments, whereas sociologists have traditionally studied urban,
large-scale, high-tech, heterogeneous, and permeable
Gesellschaft
environments (Fiske, 1991). The two prototypes are defined by
contrasting demographic characteristics (see Figure 1).
Prototypes
are useful in analyzing change because they “establish the
‘outer
limits’ or standards by means of which the processes of change
or
intermediate forms can be comprehended from the perspective
of

[a] continuum” (Loomis & McKinney, 1957, p. 12). Hence, in
my
theory each prototypical environment comprises a set of
continu-
ous dimensions (see Figure 1), anchored by the extremes; the
framework does not utilize binary categories.
Illustrating the concepts with Redfield’s comparative ethnogra-
phy. Redfield (1941) portrayed a continuum of four
communities
on the Yucatán peninsula of Mexico; together, the communities
demonstrate the dimensionality (rather than a binary quality) of
relevant sociodemographic variables. (Here and elsewhere in
this
article, concepts from the figure or variables from the theory are
italicized.) At one end of the continuum, an indigenous village,
Tusik, approaches the Gemeinschaft prototype. Ecologically,
this
village was a small-scale rural community, population 106. Its
structure was simple, with little division of labor; specialists
were
Figure 1. Top level of the model in detail: Sociodemographic
dimensions differentiating Gemeinschaft
(community) from Gesellschaft (society). The double-sided
horizontal arrows indicate that the variables are
multivalued dimensions rather than binary concepts. The
vertical arrows indicate the dominant causal
relations.
402 GREENFIELD
restricted to priests, musicians, midwives, and basket makers.
Thatched houses bespoke the low level of technology in the

village,
which did not contain a school. Maya ancestry made the village
relatively homogenous. Without a road to it, the village was
extremely self-contained. Virtually everyone did subsistence ag-
riculture based on growing corn. In monetary terms, Tusik was
therefore poor. Lifelong social relations were exemplified by
the
permanent nature of marriage without any institution of divorce.
Interdependence of kin was enduring: A married couple had
life-
long relations not only to each other but also to each others’
relatives.
At the opposite, Gesellschaft end of the scale of four Yucatec
communities was the city of Mérida, which had a larger scale
population (96,660). In terms of social complexity, the city
direc-
tory listed almost 100 differentiated economic roles, such as
phy-
sician, banker, insurance agent, automobile dealer, and store-
keeper. These occupations depended on a higher level of
technology (e.g., medical technology and mechanics). Mérida
had
the highest literacy level in the state. It was heterogeneous: Its
residents came from all over the state, from all over Mexico,
and
from 56 foreign countries. As the communication center for the
state, it had regular contact with the outside world.
Economically,
most people lived by commercial activity (buying and selling
commodities, manufacturing goods, or providing services).
Instead
of subsistence, Mérida had a money economy, and it contained
an
extreme concentration of the state’s wealthy. Kin relations were
less enduring: Divorce was possible and marital desertion was

frequent. The fleeting relations that take place in commercial
transactions (e.g., with a store clerk) were also common. The
other
two Yucatec communities studied by Redfield had intermediate
values on all of these sociodemographic dimensions.
The social complexity of Gesellshaft environments: Nested Ge-
meinschaft communities. Note that the internal heterogeneity of
Gesellschaft means that it can have multiple relatively Gemein-
schaft communities nested inside it; small rural towns or immi-
grant communities furnish examples of more Gemeinschaft com-
munities nested inside a Gesellschaft society. Another aspect of
Gesellschaft heterogeneity is social class stratification, which
does
not exist in the very homogenous structure of pure
Gemeinschaft.
Relationship of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to the
Concepts of Individualism and Collectivism
Collectivism and individualism summarize social adaptations to
the two types of environment. Independence and
interdependence
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991) are more psychological variations
of
the same concepts. Collectivistic qualities, such as sharing
among
the extended family, are adapted to the daily practices of
Gemein-
schaft environments, such as living in a one-room house.
Individ-
ualistic values, such the value of privacy, are adapted to the
characteristics of Gesellschaft environments, such as houses
with
separate bedrooms. However, the terms individualism and
collec-

tivism do not adequately describe cognitive adaptations to the
two
types of environment; the ecologies therefore have greater
explan-
atory generality than do the value systems of individualism and
collectivism. Another theoretical problem with the term
collectiv-
ism is that it can be used to refer to any collectivity or ingroup;
however, adaptations to Gemeinschaft involve prioritizing the
family as the key collectivity. Perhaps most important,
individu-
alism and collectivism, as well as cultural values more
generally,
are, unlike earlier theories, no longer seen as the governing
causal
level. Instead, cultural values are seen as an intermediate level
that
is strongly influenced by sociodemographic factors in the
macro-
environment (Greenfield, 2004).
Implications of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft for
Learning Environments and Development:
Two Cultural Pathways
Each of the two sociodemographic complexes—Gemeinschaft
and Gesellschaft— has learning environments and patterns of
de-
velopment that yield two distinct cultural pathways through uni-
versal development (Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard,
2003). That is, there are a number of adaptations to each type of
environment on the levels of cultural values, learning environ-
ments, and human development. The pathway concept is
founded
on a multilevel causal model with sociodemographic

characteris-
tics of a community and individuals as the top level (see Figure
2).
The figure shows both a direct route (right side of Figure 2) and
an
indirect route, through cultural values (left side of Figure 2), by
which sociodemographic characteristics influence the learning
en-
vironment; this learning environment in turn shapes a develop-
mental pathway. Adaptation is an important concept. Cultural
values are seen as adapted to and therefore influenced by socio-
demographics. Learning environments are also seen as adapted
to
and therefore directly influenced by sociodemographics. Central
to
learning environments are the adaptations that parents make.
Figure 3 diagrams the two cultural pathways in early
development.
Figure 2. Multilevel causal model.
403LINKING SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENTAL
CHANGE
Empirical examples, including links between the levels, are dis-
cussed in detail below.
From sociodemographics to cultural values to learning envi-
ronments to development. Keller (2007) has extended the
behav-
ioral and cognitive implications of these environmental dimen-
sions to the developmental arena by studying cultural values
embodied in parental ethnotheories (culture-specific theories of
child development) and linking them to developmental pathways

via the child learning environments of infancy and toddlerhood.
Although she does not use the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
labels, her cultural prototypes reference the same environmental
types. Working in India, West Africa, India, China, Costa Rica,
Germany, and the United States, Keller concluded that parental
ethnotheories and infant socialization practices emphasizing
inter-
dependence (more extensive bodily contact and social
stimulation,
less extensive face-to-face contact, less object stimulation) are
adapted to the small agricultural village, relatively
Gemeinschaft
environments (see Figure 3). In contrast, she concludes that pa-
rental ethnotheories and socialization practices that emphasize
independence (less extensive bodily contact and social
stimulation,
more extensive face-to-face contact, more object stimulation)
are
adapted to urban middle-class environments, which are
relatively
Gesellschaft in nature. She and her colleagues have found that
earlier self-regulation (which develops the child for a social en-
vironment) and later self-recognition (which develops the
child’s
individual psychology) characterize the developmental pathway
adapted to a Gemeinschaft environment; in contrast, earlier self-
recognition and later self-regulation characterize the
developmen-
tal pathway adapted to a Gesellschaft environment. Although
others have found additional dimensions of social and cognitive
development linked with the same sociodemographic patterns,
Keller is unique in linking all the different theoretical levels
from
sociodemographic down to child development (see Figure 3).
The Case for Dimensions, not Binary Categories

Lest this be seen as a binary theory, let me emphasize that
intermediate values on the sociodemographic dimensions
should lead to intermediate results on the developmental vari-
ables. Like Redfield, Keller did not dichotomize the environ-
mental variables in her research settings but utilized environ-
ments that were intermediate between village and urban
environments (Keller, 2007). Keller’s intermediate environ-
ments were middle-class urban ecologies in traditionally inter-
dependent societies: Costa Rica, India, and China. The impli-
cation of these intermediate environments is that parents who
themselves were raised with an interdependence orientation will
be influenced in their own child rearing by their parents’
socialization values as well as by their own adaptation to their
present urban middle-class lifestyle. Keller confirmed this pre-
diction: Ethnotheories of middle-class urban Costa Ricans, In-
dians, and Chinese were in between those of the poor, rural
African or Indian villagers and the middle-class Germans or
Americans on both autonomy and interdependence.
Another Gemeinschaft socialization value is the expectation that
children will take care of their parents in old age (see Figure 3).
In examining the effect of the sociodemographic variable of ma-
ternal schooling, LeVine et al. (1991) divided a sample of
Mexican
mothers into three groups with three different levels of
schooling.
The less schooling a mother had, the more likely she was to
expect
aid from her adult children (see Figure 3). Still other studies
have
found links between sociodemographic dimensions and learning
environments and between learning environments and cognitive
development (see Figure 4). All of these studies go beyond
binary
categories and utilize intermediate values in both ecology and

development.
Figure 3. Cultural pathways through development: links
between sociodemographics, cultural values, learning
environment, and early development from Keller’s cross-
cultural developmental research (Keller, 2007). Link
between sociodemographics and cultural values from research in
Cuernavaca (LeVine et al., 1991). Citations
indicate which variables were measured and correlated in the
same population and study. The double-sided
horizontal arrows indicate that the variables are multivalued
dimensions rather than binary concepts. The vertical
arrows indicate the dominant direction of causality.
404 GREENFIELD
Social Change: A Motor for Shifting Pathways of
Human Development
The two prototypical environments are defined by a number of
sociodemographic variables (e.g., technology, urbanization,
eco-
nomic activity; see Figure 1). This theory predicts (and herein
lies
its innovation) that when any of these variables shifts in either
direction, either toward Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft, learning
environments and developmental pathways are also likely to
shift
in a corresponding direction. Sociodemographic change
becomes a
motor driving changes in cultural values, learning
environments,
and development. Sociodemographics refers not just to
character-

istics of a culture or a society as a whole but also to the
sociode-
mographics of particular families and children. This feature
allows
predictions to be made both on the group level and the
individual
level.
This is not a unidirectional model of social evolution. Figure 5
depicts shifts in both directions. The Gesellschaft direction is
noted
as dominant because the world is, in general, becoming more
commerce driven, richer (with greater disparities between rich
and
poor), more urban, more high tech, and more highly educated
(Georgas, Berry, van de Vijver, Kağitçibaşi, & Poortinga, 2006;
Kağitçibaşi, 2007; Keller & Lamm, 2005). There are certain
situ-
ations, though, in which environments become more
Gemeinschaft
over time. For example, the rural commune movement in the
United States involved voluntarily leaving the commercial city
for
a more subsistence lifestyle in the country; the theory would
predict corresponding changes in developmental pathways
(Weis-
ner, Bausano, & Kornfein, 1983).
Sometimes groups consciously try to maintain a more Gemein-
schaft milieu by forming homogenous, self-contained groups at
the
interior of a more Gesellschaft environment. A case in point is
urban Orthodox Jewish communities. The theory predicts corre-
sponding differences in socialization practices and
developmental
pathways compared with the broader society. Such cases are

small
minorities and are reactive against the surrounding culture.
None-
theless, we need to learn more about the underlying forces that
make these cultural forms very resistant to the
macroenvironment
and its shifts in the Gesellschaft direction and, thus, create
appar-
ent exceptions to the general rule.
In other cases, large-scale sociodemographic forces move whole
societies in the Gemeinschaft direction. The current economic
downturn in the United States is an example. The theory
predicts
that lesser economic means will move values and practices in
the
United States toward more Gemeinschaft adaptations; if
sustained,
these adaptations will include relevant shifts in values, learning
environments, and pathways of development.
But whatever the direction of change, the key theoretical pre-
diction is that all of the sociodemographic variables shown in
Figures 1 and 5 have a similar directional effect on socialization
and developmental variables. In other words, each value on the
left
(Gemeinschaft) side of Figures 1 and 5 moves developmental
and
socialization variables in the same direction, whereas each
value
on the right (Gesellschaft) side of Figures 1 and 5 moves devel-
opmental and socialization variables in the opposite direction.
Linking Sociocultural Change and Developmental Change

Over historical time, groups experience transformations in their
worlds, generally from more Gemeinschaft to more Gesellschaft
(Lerner, 1958). Because different qualities, skills, and social
rela-
tions become adaptive, this shift provides a motor for social and
psychological change. As a consequence, the theory predicts a
dynamic that shifts pathways of socialization, cultural values,
modes of learning, and individual development, so that
individual
developmental trajectories become better adapted to more
Gesell-
schaft conditions as the environment shifts in that direction.
Ad-
aptations include both those made by parents as they bring up
the
new generation and those made by the younger generation.
How-
ever, note that individuals are not passive pawns in this process;
Figure 4. Cultural pathways through cognitive development:
link between sociodemographics and learning
environment (Chavajay & Rogoff, 2002; LeVine et al., 1991)
and between learning environment and cognitive
development (Schliemann & Acioly, 1989). Citations indicate
which variables were measured and correlated in
the same population and study. None of these studies
investigated the level of cultural values. The double-sided
horizontal arrows indicate that the variables are multivalued
dimensions rather than binary categories. The
vertical arrows indicate the probable direction of causality.
405LINKING SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENTAL
CHANGE

instead, active individuals creatively construct adaptations to
changing conditions, a topic that is expanded later.
Two different kinds of processes can lead to shifts from more
Gemeinschaft to more Gesellschaft conditions. One is more en-
dogenous, the other is more exogenous. Relatively endogenous
change is exemplified in postwar Germany, as German society
became richer, more commerce driven, and more high tech,
while
educational opportunities expanded (Keller & Lamm, 2005). In
the
developing world, Maya communities in Mexico and Guatemala
exemplify the same direction of movement toward economic
com-
mercialization, high technology, and more formal education, al-
though in these communities each of these sociodemographic
variables started its dynamic path much closer to the
Gemeinschaft
prototype than it did in Germany (Chavajay & Rogoff, 2002;
Greenfield, 1999, 2004; Rogoff, Correa-Chávez, & Navichoc-
Cotuc, 2005). Change is always relative to the starting point.
The
theory’s predictions relate to directions of change, not to
absolute
endpoints.
But not only are ecologies and environments transformed; peo-
ple move from one ecology to another. This is the more
exogenous
source of change. The terms endogenous and exogenous as used
here are relative rather than absolute: Global economic develop-
ment affects individual countries’ economic and social develop-
ment; internal factors can impel immigration to other countries.
But for whatever reason, around the world, people from poorer,
more Gemeinschaft worlds often immigrate into richer, more

Ge-
sellschaft worlds. As they do, they cause contact and influence
from one world to another (Greenfield, 2006).
Under these conditions, the theory of social change and human
development predicts that children will be subject to cross-
cutting
currents, in that they will receive both socialization messages at
home that continue to be adapted to the more Gemeinshchaft
environment that their parents grew up in and conflicting social-
ization messages from representatives of the more Gesellschaft
host society, such as teachers (Greenfield, 2006). Eventually,
these
currents will shift immigrant development in a direction that is
more adapted to a Gesellschaft world (e.g., Suzuki &
Greenfield,
2002).
The effects of social change can be studied by comparing
generations at the same stage of life but at different historical
Figure 5. Directions of social change. The one-sided gray
horizontal arrows indicate directions of change over
historical time. The double-sided horizontal arrows indicate that
the variables are multivalued dimensions rather
than binary concepts. The vertical arrows indicate the dominant
causal relations.
406 GREENFIELD
periods (i.e., at different time points). One can also compare
different generations at the same time. In both designs,
intergen-
erational difference is the variable of interest. When the latter

design involves parents and children in the same family,
intergen-
erational conflict can be used to index intergenerational change.
The following two sections, one on endogenous change, the
other
on exogenous change, review virtually all the studies that
utilize
these designs, in order to provide empirical support for the
theory.
For each section, the organizing principle will be the links in
Figure 2.
Internal Social Change Shifts Developmental Pathways
Empirical research shows that endogenous shifts in the direction
of more Gesellschaft environments shift learning environments,
development, and cultural values in the predicted direction. In
what follows, I summarize studies testing various links in the
theoretical model. Because the theory of social change and
human
development is being used to explain data that preexisted the
theory itself, testing of the complete theory awaits future
research.
However, the fit of all the individual links—and, in a few cases,
multiple links in the same study—provides indication of its
validity.
In the empirical examples that follow, two points in the histor-
ical trajectory of a given group of people are compared. Starting
points on the Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft variables may be very
different, but that is irrelevant to the direction of change, which
constitute the independent and dependent variables of interest.
Linking Sociodemographic Change to Changing
Learning Environments

Rogoff et al. (2005) studied how historical change in a Maya
town in Guatemala influenced child learning environments.
Three
generations were studied over a period of 23 years. On the
socio-
demographic level (see Figure 5), the town of San Pedro had
increased its population, its diversity of occupations, and the
availability and importance of schooling. In effect, it had moved
from subsistence and agriculture to a money-based economy.
During this period, children’s learning environments also
changed (italics indicate key variables). As schooling increased
in
importance, informal education at home decreased, and there
was
a decrease in children’s opportunities to observe and therefore
learn adult activities in the family environment. As generally
happens in the shift away from subsistence lifestyles, family
size
was reduced. As there were fewer younger siblings and more
time
was spent in school, there was a decline in responsibilities as
sibling caregivers, which is the major influence in the develop-
ment of altruistic (as opposed to egoistic) behavior (J. M. W.
Whiting & Whiting, 1973). Relationships with unrelated peers
became more important, as multiage interactions in the family
decreased. Rogoff et al. (2005) showed how a rapid shift from a
Gemeinschaft to a Gesellschaft environment affects children’s
learning environments.
Linking Sociodemographic Change, Changing Learning
Environments, and a Shifting Trajectory of
Cognitive Development
Sociodemographic change affects learning environments,
which, in turn, affect cognitive development. Evidence for these

links from various sources follows. Note that unlike what many
macrosocial scientists do, the following studies link individual
or
family differences in sociodemographic characteristics to
individ-
ual differences in learning environment and/or cognitive
develop-
ment.
Mexico: The Zinacantec Maya. From 1969 to 1991, the Zina-
cantec Maya economy transitioned from agriculture and subsis-
tence to commerce and money. Figure 6 summarizes new
Gesell-
schaft characteristics in the environment. Most important,
subsistence activities, the key to a Gemeinschaft economy, were
reduced (weaving all the …
The Impact of Pretend Play on Children’s Development:
A Review of the Evidence
Angeline S. Lillard, Matthew D. Lerner, Emily J. Hopkins,
Rebecca A. Dore,
Eric D. Smith, and Carolyn M. Palmquist
University of Virginia
Pretend play has been claimed to be crucial to children’s
healthy development. Here we examine
evidence for this position versus 2 alternatives: Pretend play is
1 of many routes to positive developments
(equifinality), and pretend play is an epiphenomenon of other
factors that drive development. Evidence
from several domains is considered. For language, narrative,

and emotion regulation, the research
conducted to date is consistent with all 3 positions but
insufficient to draw conclusions. For executive
function and social skills, existing research leans against the
crucial causal position but is insufficient to
differentiate the other 2. For reasoning, equifinality is definitely
supported, ruling out a crucially causal
position but still leaving open the possibility that pretend play
is epiphenomenal. For problem solving,
there is no compelling evidence that pretend play helps or is
even a correlate. For creativity, intelligence,
conservation, and theory of mind, inconsistent correlational
results from sound studies and nonreplication
with masked experimenters are problematic for a causal
position, and some good studies favor an
epiphenomenon position in which child, adult, and environment
characteristics that go along with play
are the true causal agents. We end by considering
epiphenomenalism more deeply and discussing
implications for preschool settings and further research in this
domain. Our take-away message is that
existing evidence does not support strong causal claims about
the unique importance of pretend play for
development and that much more and better research is essential
for clarifying its possible role.
Keywords: pretend play, preschool, cognitive development,
social development
How does pretend play affect children’s development? Claims
for its positive impact are resounding. The National Association
for the Education of Young Children, the major preschool
accred-
iting body in the United States, stated in its recent position
paper,
“high-level dramatic play produces documented cognitive,

social,
and emotional benefits” (Copple & Bredekamp, 2009, p. 15). An
article aimed at parents states that play “is a significant
contributor
to the child’s cognitive, physical, emotional, and social
develop-
ment”1 (Hurwitz, 2002, p. 101). Some even maintain that
pretend
play’s impact is unique: A clinical report on the subject for the
American Association of Pediatrics opened, “play is essential to
development . . . so important . . . that it has been recognized by
the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights as a
right
of every child”2 (Ginsburg, the Committee on Communications,
&
the Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family
Health, 2007, p. 182). P. K. Smith (2010, pp. 28 –29) gave
many
other examples of the important and wide-reaching benefits
attrib-
uted to pretend play (see also Bredekamp, 2004; Brown &
Vaughan, 2009; Elkind, 2007; Tullis, 2011). American parents
concur (Roopnarine, 2011), and child development experts en-
dorse pretend play even more strongly (K. R. Fisher, Hirsh-
Pasek,
Golinkoff, & Gryfe, 2008). Entire preschool curricula are
designed
around pretend play because of the “unequivocal evidence for
[its]
critical importance” to children’s development (Zigler &
Bishop-
Josef, 2004, p. 9). Master teachers’ discussions of why pretend
play is so vital for children are convincing (e.g., Paley, 2005),
and
we agree: When we watch children in pretend play, it seems to

us
like a very important activity.
However, many non-Anglo cultures do not share this view of
pretend play’s importance, and perhaps as a result, children
grow-
ing up in those cultures pretend much less (Gaskins & Goncu,
1992; Lancy, 2007). A recent survey found that in only five of
16
1 Elsewhere it is clear that pretend play is intended; for
example, “in
play, everything and anything can happen: a sheet over a table
becomes a
castle” (Hurwitz, 2002, p. 101).
2 Pretend play is Ginsburg et al.’s (2007) focus; for example,
“play
allows children to create and explore a world they can master,
conquering
their fears while practicing adult roles” (p. 183).
This article was published Online First August 20, 2012.
Angeline S. Lillard, Matthew D. Lerner, Emily J. Hopkins,
Rebecca A.
Dore, Eric D. Smith, and Carolyn M. Palmquist, Department of
Psychol-
ogy, University of Virginia.
Matthew D. Lerner is now at the Department of Psychiatry and
Behav-
ioral Neuroscience, University of Chicago Medical Center,
Chicago, IL.
Preparation of this article was supported by National Science

Founda-
tion (NSF) Grant 1024293, a Brady Education Foundation grant,
and a
University of Virginia Sesqui award to Angeline S. Lillard; the
American
Psychological Foundation’s Elizabeth Munsterberg Koppitz
Fellowship,
the James H. and Elizabeth W. Wright Endowed Fellowship
from the
Jefferson Scholars Foundation, and grants from the American
Psycholog-
ical Association and the Association for Psychological Science
to Matthew
D. Lerner; and an NSF graduate fellowship to Eric D. Smith.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Angeline
S. Lillard, Department of Psychology, University of Virginia,
P.O. Box
400400, Charlottesville, VA 22904. E-mail: [email protected]
Psychological Bulletin © 2012 American Psychological
Association
2013, Vol. 139, No. 1, 1–34 0033-2909/12/$12.00 DOI:
10.1037/a0029321
1
countries surveyed (the United States, the United Kingdom, Ire-
land, Portugal, and Argentina) do the majority of mothers say
their
children (ages 1–12) often participate in imaginative play (D. G.
Singer, Singer, D’Agostino, & Delong, 2009). Even within the
United States, there is individual variation in how much
children

pretend (Fein, 1981). Should infrequent pretenders be
pretending
more? Would doing so help their development? Is the evidence
strong enough to warrant designing curricula around pretend
play
and deriding preschools that do not encourage it? Here we
examine
evidence cited in support of pretend play’s importance to deter-
mine whether there is a convincing case. The evidence concerns
six domains of development, chosen because they are frequently
claimed to be assisted by pretend play (e.g., see Ashiabi, 2007;
Bergen, 2002; Ginsburg et al., 2007; Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff,
Berk,
& Singer, 2009; Isenberg & Quisenberry, 1988; Lillard, 2001a)
and because we found at least a half dozen studies concerning
each: nonsocial cognitive aptitudes (with five subdomains),
social
cognition, social skills, language, narrative skills, and self-
regulation (with the subdomains of executive function and
emotion
regulation).
First we define pretend play and review three theoretical posi-
tions on whether and how it affects development generally.
Next,
we describe patterns of evidence that would support each
position,
then review and discuss the evidence domain by domain. Finally
we consider one position more deeply, address the implications
of
our review for educational settings, and make suggestions for
future research on this topic.
Defining Pretend Play
A preliminary issue is to define pretend play. Play itself is a

notoriously difficult concept to pin down (Burghardt, 2011). For
our purposes the four criteria of Krasnor and Pepler (1980) will
define play: flexibility, positive affect, nonliterality, and
intrinsic
motivation (cf. Sutton-Smith & Kelly-Byrne, 1984). Flexibility
denotes that play behaviors vary from real ones in form (they
might be exaggerated, or truncated) and/or content (one might
play
at eating with a stick instead of a spoon). Positive affect
touches on
the idea that people look like they are having fun when they
play.
Nonliterality refers to the fact that, in play, behaviors lack their
usual meaning while paradoxically retaining it; Bateson (1972)
famously pointed out that, “the playful nip denotes the bite, but
it
does not denote what would be denoted by the bite” (p. 317).
Intrinsic motivation suggests voluntariness: One engages in the
activity by choice for its own sake.
Pretend play activities are the subset of play activities charac-
terized by an “as-if” stance (Garvey, 1990). Beyond being
simply
nonliteral, in pretend play a “pretense” is layered over reality
(Austin, 1979); specifically, a pretender knowingly and
intention-
ally projects some mentally represented alternative on to the
pres-
ent situation in the spirit of play (Lillard, 1993). Sometimes
pretend play is social: A group of children share an alternative
reality that they project, perhaps acting like they are different
people in another place and time. Other times pretending is a
solo
activity. Pretend play can involve projecting imaginary objects
and
properties, or using one object as if it were another (Leslie,

1987).
It is most prominent in early childhood, with ages 3 to 5 being
declared its “high season” (D. G. Singer & Singer, 1992),
although
it does continue into middle childhood and beyond (E. D. Smith
&
Lillard, in press).
There are several other forms of play besides pretend (see
Pellegrini, 2009; P. K. Smith, 2010); in particular there is a
small
but important literature on physical play (such as hopscotch and
rough-and-tumble play), which has been well reviewed
elsewhere
(Pellegrini & Bohn, 2005; Pellis & Pellis, 2009). Such forms of
play assist sustained attention in conventional school situations
(Pellegrini & Bohn, 2005); they also (in the case of rough-and-
tumble play fighting) assist emotion regulation, social coordina-
tion, and normal sexual behavior, at least in some rodents and
nonhuman primates (Pellis & Pellis, 2009). Pretend play can
overlap with these and other types of play. For example,
physical
play overlaps with pretend play when children pretend to be
fighting warriors. Object play overlaps with pretending when a
child animates those objects.
The literature is not always clear as to when pretend play
specifically, versus play more generally, or some other specific
type of play is at issue; this can be seen in the quotes with
which
we opened (but see footnotes 1–2), and probably arises because
young children’s play is so often infused with pretense. Our aim
here is not to resolve this ambiguity but rather to consider
studies
used to support claims that play is crucial to positive develop-

ments, excluding the physical play literature just mentioned,
and
retaining focus on pretend play as much as possible. Our main
exception to this is in two subdomains of nonsocial cognitive
aptitudes, creativity and problem solving, because for those
skills
several studies concerning manipulative play with small objects
(which might or might not involve pretending) are often cited as
showing play’s cognitive benefits. When a study contrasted pre-
tend play with some other form of play (like construction play,
as
in building with blocks) we focused on the pretend condition.
Many studies strain the voluntary aspect of play in that children
were told to play or were instructed in acting out a story, but
because those studies have been cited as showing play’s
benefits,
they are reviewed here.
To locate studies, the first author began with references sup-
porting claims of play’s benefits in articles like those in the
opening paragraph, then back referenced those studies in a
snow-
ball fashion. Through this process she arrived at the six main
topics
and six subdomains of nonsocial cognitive skills; the subdomain
of
mathematics was subsequently eliminated due to an insufficient
number of studies. From there a search engine (Google Scholar)
was employed, searching by keywords (“social skills, pretend
play”) and the “referenced by” and “related articles” features,
as
well as continuing to back reference from within articles. To
avoid
an unwieldy review, we passed over studies of atypical
populations
or cultural variation, and largely confined ourselves to

published or
in press peer-reviewed studies.3
Theoretical Background
P. K. Smith (2010) laid out three theoretically possible relation-
ships between pretend play and positive developmental
outcomes.
3 Exceptions were made for particularly important unpublished
studies
reported in other published work by the author or thesis advisor,
and for
one article under review.
2 LILLARD ET AL.
The first is that pretend play is crucial to optimal development.
The second, which Smith supported, is equifinality: Pretending
helps some developments, but it is only one possible route.
Other
activities can work as well or better. The third possibility is that
pretending is an epiphenomenon or byproduct of some other
selected-for capability, but in and of itself makes no
contribution
to development; rather, the other activity or condition to which
it
is sometimes attached is the actual contributor. Two major
devel-
opmental theorists, Vygotsky and Piaget, align with the first and
third views, respectively.
For Vygotsky (1978), pretense has a crucial developmental role,
because it is the activity by which children learn to separate

referent from object. In play, children first understand that
actions
(and objects on which one might act) can be separated from
reality
and can be based on the meaning of a given situation rather than
on the physical properties of objects (Vygotsky, 1967). In this
way,
for example, a banana could become a phone in a pretense situa-
tion and the child could act on it as if it were a phone,
inhibiting
how he or she would act on it if it were a banana. The upshot of
this is that children develop abstract thought through pretend
play
(Vygotsky, 1967). In addition, because reality must be
inhibited,
children also develop inhibitory control through pretending
(Bodrova & Leong, 1996). Because of these features, “in play,
it is
as though [the child] were a head taller than himself”
(Vygotsky,
1978, p. 102); play takes a child to the upper end of his or her
“zone of proximal development” (p. 86).
In contrast, for Piaget (1962), pretend play is more an index
than
a promoter of development.4 Its appearance around 18 months
indicates the development of the semiotic function, which also
allows for deferred imitation and language. The semiotic
function
separates an idea from its referent, a memory from its context,
and
an object from its label, allowing one to entertain and elaborate
on
mental content that is separate from the physical, present
reality.

Here we consider which of these views is best supported by the
evidence. Each view is compatible with a particular pattern of
evidence from correlational and experimental (short-term and
training) studies, shown in Table 1 (cf. P. K. Smith, 2010, Table
9.2, p. 187). These patterns assume methodologically sound
stud-
ies including sufficient duration and sample sizes. First, if
pretend
play does crucially cause positive developments (Vygotsky’s
po-
sition), then strong positive correlations between pretend play
and
those developments should consistently be found; if a child pre-
tends more, whether naturally (in a correlational study) or due
to
an experimental manipulation, the development should increase.
If
pretend play causes creativity, then children who pretend more
will
generally be more creative. Additional predictors, like
intelligence,
are also possible, but if pretending is truly the important causal
factor, the unique and important relationship to pretend play
should hold even when those other predictors are partialled out.
Conversely, if Smith’s equifinality position is correct, then one
would generally expect positive relationships between play and
the
outcome but also correlations with other predictors that
engender
the outcome. For example, if social pretend play develops
theory
of mind and so does adult talk about mental states, then correla-
tions should be found for both variables. Interventions
increasing
mental state talk and pretend play might have an additive effect

when combined, which could lead to even larger effects (but not
if
there was a ceiling on development for that age). There could be
cases when although equifinality is the best model, pretend play
fails to evince a significant effect. This might occur, for
example,
when there is substantial multicollinearity, or when an alternate
predictor’s effect is much larger, masking pretend play’s effect.
Thus equifinality does not insist on 100% consistent results, but
it
generally expects them.
The third, or epiphenomenon, position is supported if pretend
play coincides with some other causal circumstance; in such
cases
pretend play might mistakenly be considered causal. For
example,
if social pretend play is related to theory of mind because adults
who engage in a lot of mental state talk also happen to
encourage
pretend play, then perhaps what is actually leading to the
increased
theory of mind is not the pretend play, but the mental state talk;
social pretend play is secondary or epiphenomenal to the mental
state talk–theory of mind relationship. If pretend play is an
epiphe-
nomenon then one might find inconsistent correlations with
outcomes
(because pretend play does not always go along with the real
predic-
tors) but consistent correlations between real predictors and
outcomes.
Because different studies measure different possible predictors,
the
true predictors might not always be evident. Here we evaluate

the
patterns of evidence with an eye to each of these positions.
Before
beginning to do so, it is useful to note some recurring problems
in this
literature (see also Cheyne, 1982).
Common Methodological Problems
Several problems recur in the literature on whether pretend play
helps development. Sometimes these problems occur because
the
4 Others have claimed Piaget gives pretense a stronger role in
develop-
ment; for example, Singer and colleagues, citing Piaget (1962),
claimed he
“concluded that play was a vital component to children’s normal
intellec-
tual and social development” (D. G. Singer et al., 2009, p. 285).
In our
reading the closest Piaget (1962) comes to this is when he says
it is
undoubtedly “a preparation for imaginative aptitudes” (p. 155),
where
imagination (as in pretend play) is the assimilative pole of
thought (in
contrast to accommodation), and creative imagination arises
only when one
integrates the two. This is essentially the position taken by
Harris (2000)
and D. G. Singer and Singer (1992): Pretending assists
imagination. But
whereas for these modern authors this is a reason to centralize
pretend play,
our reading of Piaget’s text on play suggests that this role in

imaginative
development was a minor concern; pretend play was primarily
an offshoot
of the symbolic function. Perhaps confusion has arisen because
elsewhere
Piaget assigns manipulative activities (Piaget, 1929) and peer
interaction
(Piaget, 1932) as important to development, and pretend play
often in-
volves these other activities. But in considering manipulative
activity,
Piaget refers more to what is now referred to as embodied
cognition
(“manual work is essential to the child’s mental development”;
Piaget,
1929, p. 383), and regarding peer involvement Piaget’s own
focus on
pretend play was particularly as a solitary activity. Piaget
(1962) did think
pretending served an egoistic function in that it allowed the
child to fulfill
wishes that he or she could not fulfill in reality. A child who
wants to be
a mother can simply pretend to be one. But Piaget was
concerned with
cognitive development, not personality development, and
pretend play was
pre-operational because it indicated what the child lacked. For
Piaget,
children outgrow pretending as they develop the ability to
accommodate
reality. Here he followed some major figures of his time in
child psychol-
ogy, such as Freud (1955, as discussed by Harris, 2000) and
Montessori
(1989). Aligning with our own reading, Sutton-Smith (1966)

colorfully
summarized Piaget’s view of pretending as “a buttress to an
inadequate
intelligence” (p. 108). For further discussion, see P. K. Smith
(2010, pp.
31–37).
3PLAY DEVELOPMENT
research was conducted when experimental standards were not
as
high as they are today, pointing to the need to modernize the
evidence base. In more recent studies, perhaps scholars did not
apply more rigor because of a deep belief in the power of play
(Elkind, 2007), what P. K. Smith (1988) dubbed the “play
ethos”
and Sutton-Smith (1995, p. 279) the rhetoric of “play as
progress.”
Here we strive to overcome the tendency to favor pretend play
by
holding all studies to a high standard.
One common problem in discussions of the impact of play on
development is that correlational findings are often discussed as
if
they were causal. When children who play more do better on
some
other measure, of course it does not mean that the play
definitely
caused the outcome. Positive correlations between pretend play
and a development are only a necessary precondition to pretend
play being causal. Likewise prominent authors have described
elaborate pretend worlds they constructed as children, and one
might see the earlier behavior as causing their subsequent

literary
genius (Root-Bernstein, in press), but it is as plausible that their
creativity led to conjuring up elaborate imaginary worlds at
both
time points.
A second recurring problem is failure to replicate. For example,
one study shows increases in empathy associated with pretense
training (Saltz & Johnson, 1974) and another does not (Iannotti,
1978), and typically only the positive finding is cited. If other
key
experimental factors are essentially equal, either the reported
pos-
itive result reflects a Type I error or the failure reflects a Type
II
error. Inconsistent findings in correlational studies contradict
the
causal view but would be expected with either the equifinality
or
epiphenomenalism. For equifinality, nonreplications would
occur
when the alternate route was stronger in one study, and
including
it masked the effect of pretend play; for the epiphenomenon
position, nonreplications would occur because the underlying
cause sometimes accompanied pretend play and sometimes did
not. In the literature extolling play’s benefits, failures to
replicate
are often ignored.
A third problem concerns experimenter bias. Every under-
graduate research methods course should impart the importance
of experimenters being “masked” insofar as possible: that is,
unaware of (a) the hypotheses being tested and (b) participants’
conditions. Yet cognitive development research rarely uses

masked experimenters. This might usually be fine: Child de-
velopment researchers and the kinds of tests they give might not
be vulnerable to experimenter bias under the usual circum-
stances. For example, we know of no research suggesting that
false belief or conservation errors occur at certain ages only
when experimenters are unmasked. However, for research on
the benefits of pretend play there are several cases where results
obtained with knowledgeable experimenters went away when
masked ones were employed (Christie, 1983; Guthrie & Hud-
son, 1979; Pepler & Ross, 1981; Simon & Smith, 1983, 1985;
P. K. Smith, Simon, & Emberton, 1985; P. K. Smith & Whit-
ney, 1987). Nonreplications with masked experimenters make a
strong case for being cautious about pretend play results ob-
tained with knowledgeable experimenters.
Besides correlational data, nonreplication, and unmasked ex-
perimenters, other recurrent problems are very small sample
sizes, nonrandom assignment, confounding implementer with
intervention (particularly concerning when there is only one
implementer per condition and interventions last for several
months), control conditions that differ beyond pretend play,
confounding content with pretend play, and unsound statistical
practices like using subsets of data and one-tailed tests without
prior rationale.
Methodological problems are so prevalent in this literature that
meta-analysis is precluded. E. P. Fisher (1992) did a meta-
analysis
of the impact of play (generally) on development, despite
aware-
ness of these limitations (see “Shortcomings of the Studies,” pp.
164 –168), but he also did not have a consistent even-handed
approach to which statistics he included, and further, he used
some
wrong statistics that inflated his result. As a particularly
egregious

illustration of this, from Christie (1983) he used the statistic
pertaining to a variable named variable (F � 257.67), reflecting
the overall sample scores on five variables, when the far smaller
Variable � Time � Condition statistic (F � 0.49) is what
should
Table 1
Three Possible Relationships Between Pretend Play and
Development
Expected pattern of results Crucial (Vygotsky) Equifinality (P.
K. Smith) Epiphenomenon (Piaget)
Correlational studies Strong, unique, and consistent. Generally
consistent but not unique.
Including other causal variables
could mask pretend play’s
effects, so correlations could be
inconsistent.
Inconsistent, but consistent with other variables
that are causal. For example, if presence of
certain toys increases pretending in children
who are more creative, but other objects
have no impact, then correlations between
pretending and creativity will be seen only
in environments with those toys.
Experimental (short-term and
training) studies
Strong, unique, and consistent. Strong and consistent but not
unique, so other conditions could
also affect development. For
example, skills training and
pretend play training could both

increase the development.
Effects found only if the crucial underlying
factor(s) is (are) influenced by the
intervention. For example, suppose pretend
play only assists development when
intensive adult interaction is part of that
training; when children pretend but there is
no intensive adult interaction, the pretend
play does not increase the development; in
addition, another condition might show that
intensive adult interaction alone increases
the development, even in the absence of
play.
4 LILLARD ET AL.
have been used. Careful reading reveals many more problems,
yet
this article is often cited (126 times, Google Scholar, as of May
28,
2012) as evidence that play helps development (e.g., Bergen,
2009;
Ginsburg et al., 2007; Wyver & Spence, 1999).
Because so many studies in this area are methodologically
unsound, the current literature base is best suited to a
descriptive
review, on which we now embark. In each section, we begin
with
theoretical and construct issues, then review studies. A series of
10
tables compiles the studies pertinent to each domain or
subdomain

of development.
After reviewing the studies, each section concludes by dis-
cussing the evidence with respect to the three views (summa-
rized in Table 12). In these discussions, we sometimes rely on
the absence of evidence to support a position. We do this with
caution, since one can never prove that a relationship does not
exist (Altman & Bland, 1995). However, inconsistent correla-
tion patterns across studies with similar samples and methods
and reliable coders are against a causal view. Likewise, when
sound experimental methods yield null effects or even effects
showing play is less positive than the alternative, this is also
relevant. Finally, doubt is also cast on a causal view when
masking experimenters or equalizing other aspects of interven-
tions nullifies previous findings.
A final note before treading into the evidence concerns the
“straw person” element of the crucial causal view. When put on
the stand, perhaps few would endorse the position that pretend
play is crucial (in the sense of essential or vital) for various
aspects of development. Yet the quotes with which we opened
and additional references throughout this review show that this
stance is taken in the literature, so we consider it here.
Nonsocial Cognitive Aptitudes
As was seen in our opening paragraph, many scholars have
asserted that pretend play produces cognitive benefits. One way
pretend play could help cognition is by predisposing children to
a
generally playful attitude (Dansky & Silverman, 1973) that
could
lead to production of unusual ideas, creative problem solving
(Vandenberg, 1980), and then to other cognitive aptitudes. This
view is compatible with Fredrickson’s (2001) broaden-and-build
theory of positive emotions, with play eliciting joy, which in

turn
leads to a broadening of individuals’ thought–action repertoires.
Vygotsky’s ideas on symbolic and abstract thought, just
reviewed,
also suggest how pretend play could assist cognitive abilities.
Here
we discuss evidence that pretend play assists development in
five
subdomains: creativity, problem solving, intelligence, conserva-
tion, and reasoning.
Creativity
Although creativity has been operationalized in a number of
ways, in the studies on play it has typically been defined as the
ability to produce original content relevant to a particular task
(Wallach & Kogan, 1965). The most commonly used measure of
creativity in this literature is the alternate uses task (R. C. …
Research in Human Development, 11: 247–254, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1542-7609 print / 1542-7617 online
DOI: 10.1080/15427609.2014.967045
INTRODUCTION
Rethinking Developmental Science
Carolyn M. Aldwin
Oregon State University
The articles in this issue are all based on the invited addresses
given by the authors at the 2013 biennial
meeting of the Society for the Study of Human Development.

All of the authors address the unfolding
paradigm shift in developmental sciences, from reductionism to
relational developmental system the-
ories. This theoretical stance involves the recognition of
Individual ←→ context transactions, with
multiple coacting partners existing in dynamic relationships
across the life span and life course. The
articles address not only theoretical issues, but also
methodological advances and their applications.
Although acknowledging the importance of new data collection
and analytical techniques that permit
the testing of more complex theoretical models, the articles
demonstrate that well-designed questions
from this theoretical perspective can also yield novel findings
which are highly relevant to current
real-world problems and social policy issues.
This issue of Research in Human Development (RHD) is special
for two reasons. First, it com-
prises invited addresses from the 2013 biannual meeting of the
Society for the Study of Human
Development (SSHD), in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As such, I
cannot really take credit for the
compilation of this issue—that honor rightfully belongs to
Willis (Bill) Overton, who organized
the conference as president-elect of the SSHD and invited this
group of luminaries in the field
of developmental science, and who is providing the commentary
to this issue. Nonetheless, it
has been a privilege to work with these authors, who have been
highly instrumental in spear-
heading cutting-edge issues in developmental science and who
have contributed really terrific
articles.
Second, this is my last issue as editor of RHD. I started in the

summer of 2009, taking over
from Erin Phelps, who ably shepherded this journal for several
years. It has really been a tremen-
dous amount of fun (and work). RHD is an unusual journal in
several ways. It is one of the few
Address correspondence to Carolyn M. Aldwin, Human
Development and Family Sciences, College of Public
Health & Human Sciences, Oregon State University, 424 Waldo
Hall, Corvallis, OR 97330. E-mail: [email protected]
oregonstate.edu
mailto:[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]
248 ALDWIN
journals that is life span, multidisciplinary, and embraces
multimethod approaches. Further, we
publish only special issues. Thus, we welcome proposals that
have articles representing all stages
of life, and from several disciplines, including psychological,
sociology, philosophy, and biology.
The topics of our issues in the past 5 years have ranged from
epigenetics and evolutionary biol-
ogy (Greenberg, 2014; Wanke & Spittle, 2011) and systems
science (Urban, Osgood, & Mabry,
2011) to the life course effects of military service (Spiro &
Settersten, 2012) and immigrant
families (Marks & Abo-Zena, 2013) to wisdom (Trowbridge &
Ferrari, 2011) and mindfulness
(Frank, Jennings, & Greenberg, 2013). We also have a strong
focus on tremendously excit-
ing methods—which are often our most-cited articles—
including not only quantitative articles

addressing longitudinal methods that treat time in some quite
astonishing ways (e.g., Gersdorf,
Haupmann, & Ram, 2014; Ram & Gersdorf, 2009) to qualitative
issues studying unusual sam-
ples in depth, providing remarkable insights (Catania & Dolcini,
2012). Given that this is my last
issue, I would like to join my colleagues in reflecting upon the
tremendous advances that have
been made in the developmental sciences and the challenges
still to come.
Living Through a Paradigm Shift
As Antonucci and Webster (this issue) aptly observed, we have
the good fortune to be living
in the interesting times of a paradigm shift in developmental
science. This shift from radical
behaviorism that was the dominant paradigm in psychology
when I was an undergraduate in the
1970s to today’s relational developmental systems paradigm is
remarkable. A little reflection on
how we got here might prove useful.
In the old radical behaviorism, all behavior could be reduced to
environmental contingencies,
and thought but the conditioned reflexes of throat muscles.
Luckily, I went to Clark University,
whose psychology department was the bastion of German
organismic developmental theory, with
its emphasis on development throughout the life span reflecting
qualitative shifts in the relation-
ship among components of a system. The legacy of Heinz
Werner lived on through Seymour
Wapner and Bernie Kaplan, who challenged the reductionistic
behaviorist paradigm that so dom-
inated much of the 20th-century psychology. This school also

influenced the Human Development
and Family Sciences program at the Pennsylvania State
University through K. Warner Schaie and
Paul Baltes, who were also instrumental in organizing a year
series of seminars and books at
West Virginia University that promoted various aspects of
developmental theory in the 1970s and
1980s. Urie Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory at
Cornell University challenged dis-
ciplinary boundaries, as did Feyerabend’s (1975) denunciation
of methodological monism—the
idea that one method was the only means of discovery.
There was also a growing emphasis on interdisciplinary
education. My graduate program at
the University of California at San Francisco in adult
development and aging provided immersion
into the psychology, sociology, and anthropology of aging and
was one of the first in the country
to have a graduate group, whose members spanned multiple
disciplines and campuses. I also had
the good fortune to work with Richard Lazarus, who was one of
the originators of the “cognitive
revolution” in psychology, reinstating the central roles of
thought—and subjectivity—through
emphasis on the importance of the stress appraisal processes.
He emphasized the importance
of transactions—that neither reductionism nor interactionism
adequately reflected appraisal
INTRODUCTION TO A SPECIAL ISSUE 249
processes, which resulted from a transaction between the person
and the environment, which

mutually influenced each other. Coping was also influenced by
personal preferences and environ-
mental contingencies, and was a fluid, proactive process that
changed as a function of changing
environmental contexts and appraisals. In health psychology,
though, the function of coping with
stress was to return an organism to homeostasis. My
contribution was to add a developmental
perspective to this transactional model, examining coping with
stress as either a deviation ampli-
fying or deviation countering process, setting off positive
developmental trends, negative spirals,
or a return to homeostasis (Aldwin & Stokols, 1988). Thus, it
was delightful to see Lerner’s work
on developmental systems theory (Ford & Lerner, 1992) and
Reese and Overton’s (1970) classic
work on developmental theory, now evolved into relational
developmental systems theory (see
Lerner, Agans, DeSouza, & Hershberg, this issue; Overton, this
issue). Thus, it is not surprising
that the contributors to this issue were all involved in some
aspects of this paradigm shift.
As Lerner et al. (this issue) so cogently argued, developmental
science has been undergoing a
remarkable shift from reductionism to a relational
developmental perspective, with its emphasis
on mutually influencing components in dynamic change patterns
over time. This is seen quite
dramatically in the shift from the old behavioral genetics, with
its failed attempt to reduce psy-
chological processes to an out-of-date Mendelian genetics, to
the new emphasis on epigenetics
and the recognition that the genes are a dynamic system that
change quite rapidly over rather short
time scales. An argument can be made that it is not only

developmental science that is undergoing
this paradigm shift, but that much, if not all, of science is
turning from reductionistic models to
ones involving systems approaches. Certainly subatomic
particles are especially stubborn in their
refusal to follow reductionistic strictures. And though molecular
genetics is still the dominant
paradigm in biology, epigenetics, ecological models, and
systems biology are all following this
paradigm shift. In public health, systems approaches are also
gathering momentum, supported
by the emphasis on systems science methods within the National
Institutes of Health Office of
Behavioral and Social Sciences Research
(http://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/
systems_science/).
As Lerner et al. (this issue) point out, the emergence of this
paradigm is supported by a plethora
of new statistical methods. After all, if the only method
available is analysis of variance, it is dif-
ficult to think outside the box of discrete variables having main
effects, and, if one were lucky,
interaction effects. For a long time, our theories outstripped the
methods, but now there is a variety
of statistical models that permit more sophisticated questions to
be asked and analyzed. Structural
equation modelling allows for the examination of mediating and
moderating effects in models
with multiple variables, pathways, and outcomes, and
longitudinal cross-lagged terms allow for
examination of mutual influences over time. Multilevel models
permit within-person analyses,
examining individual and contextual differences in how
variables covary. Group-based multilevel
modelling can examine patterns of individual differences in how

individuals change over time.
In personality theory, for example, Lachman (1988) stated that
the question of “Does personal-
ity change over time” was far too simplistic, and needed to be
replaced by more sophisticated
questions such as “Which personality variables change, for
whom, and in what circumstances.”
However, as Liben’s (this issue) and Connidis’ (this issue)
contributions so aptly show,
hypertrophied methods are not necessary to asking sound
research questions from a relational
developmental perspective. Liben’s work emphasizes that
development is not an individual
process—rather, it occurs within an individual ←→ context
nexus, resulting from coaction
250 ALDWIN
between constructive and contextual processes. She describes
developmental intergroup theory,
which “posits the operation of relational processes in which
child and context inextricably give
and take meaning to and from one another” (p. 274). One of the
most troublesome social
phenomena is the social prejudice that arises as a function of
group membership. This funda-
mental identity is often the source of outgroup prejudice and is
one of the sources of much of the
nastier sources of conflict in the world, including prejudice
against the Jews, African Americans,
and other racial/ethnic minorities, apartheid in South Africa, the
Serbian-Bosnian conflict, the
Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Israelis and the Palestinians,

and centuries-old conflict between
Shia and Sunni Muslims. Developmental processes are involved
in the development and in the
maintenance and modification of stereotypes and prejudices.
Understanding this process is crucial
to the development of effective intervention programs, as Liben
so ably documented with regard
to gender stereotyping. How these types of programs might be
enacted in adulthood, though, is
an open question. The model is purposively a general one,
applicable to a wide range of topics,
and theoretically at least, should be applicable to adults as well.
Connidis (this issue) did take a life course perspective. As she
noted, most of the work in
the relational developmental area focuses on individuals and
their immediate contexts, but, as
such, this perspective is also applicable to bridging the micro-
and macrodivide. In particular,
understanding individuals as actors within a larger relational
system allows one to transcend the
zero-sum perspective that pervades much of social policy. For
example, it is widely assumed
that the “greedy old geezer” lobby protects its own social
programs at the expense of children’s
programs. However, from a life course relational perspective, it
can be that older generations
devote a considerable amount of their resources to younger
generations, and young adult financial
stability and opportunities can result in supporting older
generations. Thus, understanding how
family, intergenerational, and public policy systems coact can
inform more productive social
policy and programs.
Antonucci and Webster (this issue), also celebrate this paradigm

shift to a relational develop-
mental systems perspective. They not only cite the growing
spread of systems theory perspectives,
but also celebrate the plethora of new types of data collection,
from functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) that allows us to examine how different parts of
the brain work together to better
ways of tracking eye movements to study attention as the
interplay between the person and the
environment. New computerized data collection techniques
allow for data collection in real time
(e.g., ecological momentary assessment) to the use of the
Internet to examine “big data.” We now
have the capabilities of multiple perspectives, data collection,
and analytical techniques to really
examine issues from cells to society. The impact of stress on
development is a great example.
Stress and stress-reducing processes exist at the cellular levels,
affect mental and physical health,
transact with the immediate environment, and are strongly
influenced by social policy. At the
genetic level, stress hormones can result in the methylation and
down regulation of genes that
regulate the stress process, perhaps leading to greater
vulnerability in adulthood (Miller, Chen, &
Parker, 2011).
Antonucci and Webster (this issue) also caution that the
flowering of conceptual and method-
ological opportunity also creates inherent dangers—it is simply
not possible for any one person to
span all of cells to society research, nor to be equally facile
with all of the new data collection and
analytical techniques. Thus, pace Liben, it is likely that we will
see the continuation of ingroups
and outgroups within academia, as witnessed by the battles

between molecular geneticists and
ecologists within biology, or the disciplinary differences in
preferred statistical methods.
One new developmental perspective that is not well represented
in this issue involves purposive
development. In the old radical behaviorism, agency was simply
absent, with operant and/or
classical conditioning being the dominant process. This
gradually gave way to behavior as a
function of gene–environment interactions, which still neglected
agency. One of the most positive
aspects of relational developmental system theories is their
emphasis on agency and coaction—
that individuals actively construct the meaning of their
environment, as well as their transactions
with the environment, and thus construct themselves as well.
With this coconstruction comes the
opportunity for change and development. However, how agency
develops is not addressed well
by this system.
We have argued elsewhere (Aldwin, 2007) that adult
development is purposive—that is, that
individuals can make conscious decisions to change aspects of
themselves. In Brandstädter,
Wentura, and Rothermund’s (1999) theory, this is accomplished
by setting goals and striving
towards those goals. Stress also forms a context for adult
development—that major stressors
can challenge individual’s assumption systems, including their
assumptions about themselves,

and can afford the opportunity for better insight into ourselves
and our relationships with others
(Aldwin, 2007). Having a minor heart attack, for example, can
prompt changes in health behav-
ior habits. Going through one’s third divorce may require
serious consideration about how one
relates to others. We have also argued that development in
adulthood changes as much through
loss of negative aspects of the self as through acquisition of
more positive aspects (Levenson,
Aldwin, & Cupertino, 2001).
Thus, agency—or what Baumeister (2008) termed “free will”—
must reflect developmental
processes, in which individuation from contextual influences
occurs, allowing for the deploy-
ment of free will. Levenson and Crumpler (1996) argued that
Habermas’ (1971) emancipatory
knowledge-constitutive interest is the goal of adult
development—that is, increasing freedom
from biological and social conditioning. Thus, it is not that
classical and operant conditioning
processes are invalid—they do indeed demonstrably exist—but
that individuals cannot make con-
scious choices if they are not aware of what influences them—
what McKee and Barber (1999)
called “seeing through illusion.”
Not surprisingly, this “seeing through illusion” is also a major
element of the development of
wisdom. While there is currently no one accepted definition of
wisdom, one such published in
RHD held that:
Wisdom is a practice that reflects the developmental process by
which individuals increase in self-

knowledge, self-integration, nonattachment, self-transcendence,
and compassion, as well as a deeper
understanding of life. This practice involves better self-
regulation and ethical choices, resulting in
greater good for oneself and others. (Aldwin, 2009, p. 3)
Lerner et al. (this issue) argue that the ultimate goal of
relational developmental systems the-
ories is to optimize human development and to promote social
justice, defined as “providing
opportunities for all individuals to optimize their chances of
positive, healthy development”
(p. 258), enhancing the lives of all individuals and groups. As
such, developmental science
provides an
intellectual “tool box,” the means to work to promote a better
life for all people, to give diverse
individuals the requisite chances needed to maximize their
aspirations and actions aimed at being
active producers of their positive development, and to promote
a more socially just world. (p. 266)
252 ALDWIN
As admirable as this goal is, and as much as I agree with it, von
Neumann-Morgenstern’s theo-
rem cautions that it is not possible to maximize all variables in
an equation at once—that choices
must be made as to which variable (or person or group) to
maximize at any given time. By hiring
one individual to hopefully improve the functioning of an
organization, one is by definition not
providing the other candidates with that same opportunity.

Global warming is good in the short
term for some species of beetles which no longer experience
population die offs over the winter,
but terrible for the forests that sustain them. Thus, social justice
requires the exercise of wisdom,
which involves the self-transcendence of one’s own immediate
needs in service of the greater
good, and the perspicacity to see the multiple possible outcomes
of any given action, as well as
compassion for the suffering of others.
Examples of this on a grand scale include Nelson Mandela, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Gandhi,
Desmond Tutu, Mother Teresa, and the Dalai Lama. For
example, Mandela could have promoted
the dominance of his own ethnic group over others in South
Africa, as unfortunately the leaders
in the fledgling democracies in Africa and the Middle East
appear to be doing today. However,
he saw the wisdom of forgiveness and had compassion for the
fears of the all of the groups in his
country, and worked toward unification.
Wisdom is also a coconstruction between the individual and the
environment. Few develop
wisdom in the absence of role models, and the importance of
wisdom does not lie so much in the
individual’s well-being, but in the well-being of the community.
As Antonucci and Webster (this
issue) noted, abusive parenting can be transmitted across
generations, but positive parenting—
even adoptive parenting—can also be transmitted. Thus,
research is needed to examine whether
wisdom is also transmitted intergenerationally, and if the
presence of wise individuals results in
greater community well-being.

One offshoot of this paradigm shift toward relational
developmental systems is the idea of con-
scious evolution—that we as a species have the capacity to
consciously influence the course of
evolution (e.g., Laszlo, 2007). That is, the choices that we make
influence not only our own devel-
opment and that of our community, but the well-being of other
species as well. We can engage
in policies that will result in massive environmental change, and
rapid dying off of many species,
or we can expand our understanding of morality to include
aspects of our ecology. Templeton
and Eccles’ (2008) work on “expanding circle morality” also
reflects these concerns. Thus, with
this understanding of human plasticity and developmental
capacity, and the fundamental inter-
relationship of all things, comes the moral imperative to act in
an ethical manner towards all
beings. In Tibetan Buddhism, humans are the “eyes of the
world”—that part of the world which
is conscious and thus can lead to self-knowledge and intrinsic
freedom for all (Longchenpa,
2000)—a lofty and probably unrealizable goal, but one with
great implications for moral and
human development.
In a small way, editing RHD has allowed me the opportunity to
contribute to this paradigm shift
in developmental theory, for which I am grateful. The incoming
editors are Richard Settersten and
Megan McClelland, who are also eminent scholars with broad
interdisciplinary backgrounds.
I look forward very much to seeing the further evolution of
RHD.

FUNDING
Preparation of this article was supported by National Institutes
of Health Grant AG032037.
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ABSTRACTLiving Through a Paradigm
ShiftFUNDINGREFERENCES

Cognitive Development Theories
Program Transcript
NARRATOR: Developmental psychology has a variety of
classical and
contemporary theories. Dr. Nina Bennett describes some of
these theories and
their importance in the study of lifespan development.
NINA BENNETT: Cognition, of course, is a theory that was
proposed by Jean
Piaget. And he talked about how we make sense of our world
and we develop
schemes. One of the first stages of cognitive development is the
sensorimotor
stage, and if you break those two words up, you have "senses"
and "motor." And
so we make sense of our world by moving through our
environment and using
our senses to develop those schemes. So the more motorized we
are, the more
we can navigate our environment, the more we can make sense
of our world, the
more schemes that we can develop. If we have limited motor
development, that
means we're limited in the space, in the environment, in the area
that we can

move through, and so that's gonna impact our cognitive
development. The
second stage is the preoperational stage, the third stage is the
concrete
operational stage, and then the final stage is the formal
operational stage. And
you'll notice when you look at Piaget's theory, it begins at birth,
his stages, and
they end at adolescence. So basically what that says is that our
sense of
development, when we talk about cognitive development, pretty
much is in place
by the time we reach adolescence, and then what happens after
that as we grow
into adulthood is, we simply build on those first four stages.
The other thing about
Piaget is that he said that those stages work in order. You have
to go from one
stage to the next stage to the next stage. So you can't
necessarily skip a stage.
The other thing is that those stages have some variation in them,
and so even
though the first stage is from birth to two years, a child may
move into the second
stage maybe at 15 months or 18 months. But what he did say is
that
development ends; it's done by the time we reach adolescence.
Vygotsky is one
of my favorite theorists, and the reason why I like Vygotsky so
much is because
unlike the other theorists, he includes the sociocultural aspect.
He includes the
impact of culture on cognitive development. One of the things
that Vygotsky
talked about is that he said that learning takes place in
collaboration with other

people, that no man is an island unto himself and that children
learn better when
they are teamed up with other children who have more skills
than they do. And
so he introduced the concept of scaffolding. And so scaffolding
is a teaching
strategy that teachers can use to see where a child is and where
they need to go.
And so I can build on the information that you have. I don't
have to repeat the
information that you already know. I can assess what you do
know and then build
on that so that you can go further, and so with Vygotsky, the
interesting thing
about him is that he looked at the individual as an interactive
person in terms of
their environment, that their environment has an impact on their
cognitive ability,
and when we team children up with other children, they tend to
want to do as well
as that other child that they have been teamed up with. And who
better to teach a
child how to do something than another child? It's not as
intimidating. They want
© 2016 Laureate Education, Inc. 1

to learn a little bit more. And so Vygotsky left us with so much
that we can draw
upon to help us better understand cognitive development.
Information Processing Theories
NINA BENNETT: When you think about information
processing, think about a
computer. You have your hard drive, and you have the soft
drive. And so when
researchers develop information processing, it's just what it
says: how we
process information. We have our mental hardware, and we have
our mental
software. We have the hardware, our brain, which is what we're
born with. It's
already pre-wired. But then what we do is, we add information

to that that
enables us to do the things that we do, that enable us, for
example, to go to
school and learn our ABCs, that enable us to do a speech, or
that enables me to
sit here in front of you and to explain to you about human
development. That was
because of experiences that I've had, and so that adds to the
hardware. Now, if
the hardware is damaged, in other words, if there's some brain
delay, if there's
some damage to the brain, it may not work as we would like for
it. So that means
that the software that I use is going to have to be a little bit
different, because the
hardware, the hardwiring, has been damaged to some extent.
Developmental Theories
NINA BENNETT: Erik Erikson provided us with eight stages of
socioemotional
development. The wonderful thing about Erikson is that his
stages went all the
way to older life, went in to the 60s. And what he said was that
at each one of
these stages, we experience a crisis or crises and that crises has
to be resolved
in order for us to move on to the next stage. When we look at
the first three
stages of socioemotional development, we're looking at children
from birth right
up to maybe about preschool, and the first three stages: the first
stage is trust
versus mistrust, the second stage is autonomy versus shame and
doubt, and this
third stage is initiative versus guilt. And so those three stages

are very, very
important because they lay the foundation for how we will
interact with other
people later on in life. Let's look at the first stage. It's trust
versus mistrust. This is
from birth to about two years. How does the primary caregiver
build trust in that
infant? It's by meeting their needs. It's by responding to their
cries. And
remember, he said that--Erikson said that there is a crises. So
it's trust versus
mistrust. And so I'm at this crossroad. I'm either going to learn
to trust the adults
in my life, or if I don't resolve that crisis, I'm going to have
mistrust of adults in my
life. How does this translate to later life? I'm untrusting of
adults. The second
stage is autonomy versus shame and doubt. Autonomy is about
independence.
Now you have a toddler who's two years old who's saying, "I
can do it. Let me do
it. Mine, mine. This is mine." And so do we encourage
autonomy, and how do we
do that? We encourage autonomy, for example, by allowing
them to pick out their
clothes that they want to wear. The other way is, when they
bring home their
scribble from school, we have no idea what it is. It just looks
like some scribble
on a page, but we want to encourage autonomy, so what do we
say? "Oh, my!

Look at that. Tell me what that is. That's a horse? Oh, wow.
That is a beautiful
horse." Or we can encourage shame and doubt. "That's a
horrible picture. I'm not
gonna put that on my refrigerator." And then the third stage is
initiative versus
guilt. Do I want my child to be a self-starter? Do I want them to
be motivated to
do things on their own, or do I want them to--do I want to cause
them to feel
guilty about doing things? And so those first three stages are
very, very
important, and they translate to the interactions that we will
have later in life.

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