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Devices, Connectivity, Signals (RF). 1
Who is Jan Geirnaert?
I am from Belgium. My wife is Malaysian Chinese.
I live in and work in Malaysia about 10 years.
I love to hike and cycle in the jungle.
Workwise, I am an IT/web-guy / IT-manager, Digital Marketing consultant, trainer,
database-builder, worked in big and small companies, IBM, Belgium Online, local
companies etc… I kept moving and learning.
https://my.linkedin.com/in/jangeirnaert
Security issues always kept happening on the ground (OTG) and online.
10 years ago I climbed
mount KK. Arrived early.
Did it again in 2016
Arrived at sunset 
2
Before we start… A few things.
All shown components and devices show are inactive or set to safe mode.
Hence no data is collected. I am giving a demonstration of their functions.
I don’t sell or import any of these devices.
I just want to know how they work for experimentation purposes.
I am not affiliated or paid by these manufacturers.
I don’t promote the destruction/theft of their electronic/digital property.
I am not a spy, private investigator, hacker or covert surveillance operative.
All the info you are about to see is available online.
Follow the laws and local regulations. If you need a license; Get one (PI).
Don’t try any of this at home or in your office. Follow the law & Regulations.
Be careful. Don’t make digital “bombs”. You might blow yourself up…
Learn self defense instead.
3
This is not death by PowerPoint.
I will try to speak English 
- this is not an IOT – Internet Of Things Course
- this is not a deep technical course
- This is not a thesaurus of everything…
- Anything not clear, do interrupt immediately
- Short questions please. 1 liners…
- We have 60 minutes.
- Scared of signals? Wear a tin foil hat 
4
Connectivity, Signals & Devices, Data.
brain
actions
Communication
linkslinks
links
observations
input
inputinput
Decisions/processing
Doubt
Uncertainty
Fear
5
data information
Data, Information, Usage
Comparison to the Concentric Circles Theory (Rogers) / 3 levels of consciousness
1. core self is the set
of values and
opinions that you
keep to yourself.
2. private self is your
performance to
your closest friends
and family.
3. public self is the
more superficial
version of your
identity.
Now we compare this to the machine & online world…
6
Security Layers.
Data, devices, information, usage.
Concentric model used in the security business Data that can be (ab)used when exposed.
P&C
data
Unknown device / signal
Unknown entity gets intel
A device captures data
7
So many devices.
 Huge amount of devices are on the market
 IOT >> even more and smaller devices.
 What are all they doing? Why are they there? Any
data collected?
 How to determine if you want those devices in
your network or proximity.
 There is no time to analyze what they are all
doing?
 The question is how to disable / identify / control
those (un)known devices?
9
20 years ago - quick comparison.
Bigger capacity, power & reach comes now in smaller and cheaper format. Easily
available. Mobile. Multi-functional.
Question: has human behavior/society it’s understanding (laws, enforcement)
adjusted enough to the risks that come with progress and any great inventions…
How much are we aware of the effects off increased processing power, signal
presence on our daily lives, work, companies/organizations…
(Bigfoot HDD
2 – 4 GB - 1996)…
SanDisk 32GB
Etc…
8
Lot’s of devices in use.
 GPS (maps, tracking)
 Cellphones, Smartphones, Mobile devices
 Fixed phones, landlines
 Game Consoles
 CCTV camera’s, Normal Camera’s
 Sound Recording devices, mp3 players
 Radio, TV, monitors
 Much more high powered sensors detect:
 Sound
 Vibration
 Motion
 Heat
 Water, humidity
 Electricity.
 EMP
 Dust & Chemical Components
 Etc..
Not just FM-radio, TV, Phones Walkie talkies / CB…
10
 Devices that use radio transmitter/receiver on a certain frequency (FCC regulations).
Surrounded by all sorts of signals.
UHF / VHF
Infrared
Laser..
Etc…
11
TV’s, Media Centers, Media Players
etc..
 Many of these devices have become smart and are linked to the internet.
(meaning they require a login/identification and are getting data, ID’s.).
 Example: if x knows that your tv is on, then x knows you are home + watching this
that.
 Legal issues: Example Vizio Inc Settles Smart TV Data Gathering Charges for
$2.2M.
Issue: illegal collection of second-by-second data on consumers -- information
such as sex, age, income, marital status, household size, education level, home
ownership, and household value -- to sell to third parties, most of which would
target the consumers with advertisements http://www.cio-
today.com/article/index.php?story_id=021000OCI6XC
 Compare the issue to your own company, what data is being collected.
 In your own company the Data Protection Act also applies.
12
This is all regulated, “there is no issue”.
 Maybe, how about the small DIY boxes? (Arduino based, etc..)
 We are unable to trace violations, so why bother?
 How to enforce in our own environment?
 What are the risks and things happening now?
 How expensive is enforcement?
 What type of detection equipment is required?
 How to adjust internal regulations and contractual agreements?
 Legality of monitoring employees & their devices (example activtrak.com,
whoisonmywifi.com).
 Psychological effect on people of a police state like company culture (more VPN, more
hiding, cat & mouse game).
 Once you start listening; ask yourself who else is listening?
 You collect data. Is it stored safely and encrypted. Can it be hacked?
 How about the signals that are not regulated, hidden devices?
13
Frequency Allocation
Chart. Radio Spectrum.
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/2003-allochrt.pdf
14
Listening devices then 
Era: 2nd world war, cold war 1970
18
Hidden Listening Devices
Source: http://spymuseum.com/great-seal-bug/
• The Great Seal Bug (also known as the Thing) - Moscow, 1945
• a listening device was implanted within a copy of the Great Seal as a plaque to the
United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman.
• contained a listening device that was hidden in holes drilled under the beak of the
eagle in the plaque.
- powered on remotely by an electromagnet energy source making it very difficult to
detect.
- microphone hidden inside was passive and was only activated when the Soviets
decided to turn it on.
- did so from a van parked outside of the ambassador’s house in which they ultra-high
frequency beams at the house.
- Activated, the microphone would transmit any conversations coming from within
range of the bug. When they turned the beams off, the bug was virtually undetectable.
16
History is repeating itself
Today: some users will be fearful of data theft and
surveillance, hence they might buy into detection &
jamming systems if affordable and useful.
Growth of Cyber Security companies, professional hackers,
etc.. Since internet kicked into higher gear, after the 1990-
ties.
Correlates with uncertainty, visible violence in
society/public life, (cyber) terrorism, political climate… An
Example of new market: the preppers + gadgets
19
Now we are in a new type of cold war.
 Be prepared.
 This not is an alternate fact/reality. “they” are trying to make us live in fear
so we buy into certain products & services. Or vote for Donald Trump
(example).
 Action: do a simulation of a total breakdown of your infrastructure and see
how your company/organization would re-vive it’s core processes.
Simulate a crash (on paper and in reality).
 Establish contingency strategy and recovery procedures.
 Imagine how much it will really cost to go offline during an attack and
what will be permanently lost or damaged?
17
Listening Projects
now 
Example:
PRISM (NSA)
UTAH Data Centre
http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet
20
Example of simple listening device
 http://www.bug-transmitter.com/
 Simplier version Locally in KL: Pudu Market
Voyager 3 FM Bug UHF Transmitter
- Uses 9Volt battery (25 hours life)
- Special battery: 400+ hours
- size: 32mm x 15mm
- +800mr transmission range
in the open using a car FM radio
- 90mr upto 500mr using
handheld FM radio
- Frequency: 88Mhz – 112Mhz
- longer range if in line of sight
- link to a UHF walkie talkie (5km)
Listening Bugs are getting smaller
2 – 3 cm
DEMO
AUDIO
BUG
21
More Camera Spy gear…
Demo Ghost
Simple
Detection
device
Basically anything that runs on 12 or 5 volts / 2 amps can contains video, sound bugs.
22
Credit-cards with NFC or RFID chips
 Visa PayWave,MasterCard PayPass, American Express ExpressPay and
Discover Zip.
 Problem with RFID cards (unless inside a protective cover) is that they can
be read or copied from a few inches with a portable RFID / NFC reader
 DIY NFC/RFID Reader
https://youtu.be/oVByBK6LJHY
https://youtu.be/w_vYuLyfw3E
23
Visa payWave is a form of chip card technology. Like chip
cards, it uses an advanced computer chip embedded in
the card's plastic to perform secure transactions
https://usa.visa.com/pay-with-visa/featured.../visa-paywave.html
Heat Signature on Keypads / ATM.
Thermal Imaging Device / FLIR
http://www.flir.com/flirone/ios-android/
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/thermal-imaging-devices-can-steal-your-pins-and-passcodes-090214.html
https://youtu.be/8Vc-69M-UWk
24
Digital Warfare - Norske Attack Map
 Global Attack Map of
know attacks.
 But what is happening in
your own network?
 Who is ‘attacking’ who?
 What is there to get?
 How to manage this?
http://map.norsecorp.com
25
War Driving
Scans while moving
Records automatically
Maps Wi-Fi Access Points
GPS-based (LAT/LON)
Data mapped on
Google Earth / Maps.
See also apps that show
Telecom Towers
26
Packet Sniffer, Mac Address listing, IP
Matrix
 Know that your packets,
passwords, messages can be
captured easily if not
encrypted.
 Not in the scope of this
presentation
http://www.colasoft.com/
27
So how about DEFCON Indicator for
your own local system?
 How many devices in the network now (FING,
WhoIsOnMyWifi.com etc..)
 How about a “simple” indicator instead of looking at the
processes and analytical expert software (comes later, done
by security IT people).
 How much total Gigabytes are going out / in now?
 Connected Devices Display (how many devices in your
network plus how many radio’s around you.
 Example: why would there be 100 radio signals in your office
when you have only 50 staffs. Make an inventory of the
function & location of these devices.
28
DEFCON Alert Levels –
Find the rat(holes)..
Make sure to be aware
Make a real system
Not just a policy
Mind the GAP
Hire the right people
Find the rat
Catch the thief
Find the spy
Get real!
28
Signal Jammers
High Power 12 Antenna Jammer that blocks WiFi / GPS / VHF UHF LoJack RF 315/433 / 3G 4G
 Useful for boardrooms, to keep the room signal free.
 What if disgruntled workers jam your signal?
 During communications failure hijacking might happen.
 What other alternative means of communications you have?
29
Drone Signal Jammer
 Scenario: drone invades your territory. How do you take it down?
 Market: Police / Enforcement / Security Companies.
Drone Jammer 6 Channels
Total Output 90W GPS WIFI
Backpack Signal Blocker Up To
200 Meters
30
show
Get a Signal Detection Device 31
Military Jammer Version (SWAT)
Issue: What if the bad guys use this
to block out communications?
How to detect jamming?
How are your procedures & Staffs equipped to deal with attacks?
How disturbing can a miniature version of this type of device be?
32
More devices available at very low cost
>> more wide spread usage.
 Many business opportunities arise here
 Many privacy and security issues also
 Anybody can buy this anywhere (eg. Lazada)
 Gearbest.com, banggood.com aliexpress.com…
 >> more reason to use detection agents.
33
Wi-Fi Jammer – smaller. 3.5usd
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQQhBdCQOTM
Cheap Wi-Fi 'Jammer' Device | NodeMCU
https://github.com/spacehuhn/esp8266_deauther
http://seytonic.com/2017/02/03/nodemcu-links/
34
Imagine Starbucks without Wi-Fi…
ESP8266 Wi-Fi
 3 – 5 usd (original or China copy)
 Easy to program via Arduino IDE software.
 https://github.com/esp8266/arduino
35
Very Small & Powerful
Anonymous Bluetooth, Wi-Fi
can be programmed into
anything. Untraceable.
36
EMP – Fry or Jam the radios…
Source: http://www.instructables.com/id/Destroy-Any-Device-With-EMP-Jammer/
An Electromagnetic pulse jammer could be a nuisance and
even dangerous around medical equipment.
Issue: how do you know if these devices are present?
37
Wi-Fi Tin Can Directional Antenna. Demo
material
Issue:
- big problem since easy to make:
- Difficult to trace
- Attacker can be far away
Counter-measures:
- Hide SSID
- Don’t expose wifi to roadside
- Special window-blinds / maze to keep beams out
- Etc.
39
Hack Rifle. Wi-Fi Rifle.
The Wi-Fi card is an Alfa AWUS 036H.
The gun itself is an airsoft rifle.
Cheaper than a real assault rifle body and much lighter.
40
How to detect these signals?
(indoor device example)
 Frequency Counters & Scanners >> detect and determine the signal.
41
Apps.
 Glint Finder (show demo)
 Electro magnetic field detector
 Fing Network scanner
 Spy Monitor (what is connected from where)
 No root Firewall (block access in/out)
42
Simple Things work, start today.
 Indicator that shows how many devices are live (tx/rx) in your area,
building, office or home
 Simple display that security staff can understand
 Low cost bug detectors that indicate the presence of 10Mhz to 6000 Mhz
frequency
43
What to take away from all this?
 Implement simple solutions NOW to detect radio devices.
 Use jammers and blockers to enforce on the spot
 Adjust procedures & policies.
 Start listing risks and make an inventory of your weak spots
 Do a total breakdown simulation. Test emergency response systems.
 imagine the disastrous effect of sound recording of p&c meetings leaking
out on social media (PR disaster)
 imagine the difficulties in legal affairs if the “enemy” has recorded
conversations or is listening in to current conversations
 Your points….
44
World of Signals - Devices - Connectivity - Signals - RF - Cyber Security.

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World of Signals - Devices - Connectivity - Signals - RF - Cyber Security.

  • 2. Who is Jan Geirnaert? I am from Belgium. My wife is Malaysian Chinese. I live in and work in Malaysia about 10 years. I love to hike and cycle in the jungle. Workwise, I am an IT/web-guy / IT-manager, Digital Marketing consultant, trainer, database-builder, worked in big and small companies, IBM, Belgium Online, local companies etc… I kept moving and learning. https://my.linkedin.com/in/jangeirnaert Security issues always kept happening on the ground (OTG) and online. 10 years ago I climbed mount KK. Arrived early. Did it again in 2016 Arrived at sunset  2
  • 3. Before we start… A few things. All shown components and devices show are inactive or set to safe mode. Hence no data is collected. I am giving a demonstration of their functions. I don’t sell or import any of these devices. I just want to know how they work for experimentation purposes. I am not affiliated or paid by these manufacturers. I don’t promote the destruction/theft of their electronic/digital property. I am not a spy, private investigator, hacker or covert surveillance operative. All the info you are about to see is available online. Follow the laws and local regulations. If you need a license; Get one (PI). Don’t try any of this at home or in your office. Follow the law & Regulations. Be careful. Don’t make digital “bombs”. You might blow yourself up… Learn self defense instead. 3
  • 4. This is not death by PowerPoint. I will try to speak English  - this is not an IOT – Internet Of Things Course - this is not a deep technical course - This is not a thesaurus of everything… - Anything not clear, do interrupt immediately - Short questions please. 1 liners… - We have 60 minutes. - Scared of signals? Wear a tin foil hat  4
  • 5. Connectivity, Signals & Devices, Data. brain actions Communication linkslinks links observations input inputinput Decisions/processing Doubt Uncertainty Fear 5 data information
  • 6. Data, Information, Usage Comparison to the Concentric Circles Theory (Rogers) / 3 levels of consciousness 1. core self is the set of values and opinions that you keep to yourself. 2. private self is your performance to your closest friends and family. 3. public self is the more superficial version of your identity. Now we compare this to the machine & online world… 6
  • 7. Security Layers. Data, devices, information, usage. Concentric model used in the security business Data that can be (ab)used when exposed. P&C data Unknown device / signal Unknown entity gets intel A device captures data 7
  • 8. So many devices.  Huge amount of devices are on the market  IOT >> even more and smaller devices.  What are all they doing? Why are they there? Any data collected?  How to determine if you want those devices in your network or proximity.  There is no time to analyze what they are all doing?  The question is how to disable / identify / control those (un)known devices? 9
  • 9. 20 years ago - quick comparison. Bigger capacity, power & reach comes now in smaller and cheaper format. Easily available. Mobile. Multi-functional. Question: has human behavior/society it’s understanding (laws, enforcement) adjusted enough to the risks that come with progress and any great inventions… How much are we aware of the effects off increased processing power, signal presence on our daily lives, work, companies/organizations… (Bigfoot HDD 2 – 4 GB - 1996)… SanDisk 32GB Etc… 8
  • 10. Lot’s of devices in use.  GPS (maps, tracking)  Cellphones, Smartphones, Mobile devices  Fixed phones, landlines  Game Consoles  CCTV camera’s, Normal Camera’s  Sound Recording devices, mp3 players  Radio, TV, monitors  Much more high powered sensors detect:  Sound  Vibration  Motion  Heat  Water, humidity  Electricity.  EMP  Dust & Chemical Components  Etc.. Not just FM-radio, TV, Phones Walkie talkies / CB… 10
  • 11.  Devices that use radio transmitter/receiver on a certain frequency (FCC regulations). Surrounded by all sorts of signals. UHF / VHF Infrared Laser.. Etc… 11
  • 12. TV’s, Media Centers, Media Players etc..  Many of these devices have become smart and are linked to the internet. (meaning they require a login/identification and are getting data, ID’s.).  Example: if x knows that your tv is on, then x knows you are home + watching this that.  Legal issues: Example Vizio Inc Settles Smart TV Data Gathering Charges for $2.2M. Issue: illegal collection of second-by-second data on consumers -- information such as sex, age, income, marital status, household size, education level, home ownership, and household value -- to sell to third parties, most of which would target the consumers with advertisements http://www.cio- today.com/article/index.php?story_id=021000OCI6XC  Compare the issue to your own company, what data is being collected.  In your own company the Data Protection Act also applies. 12
  • 13. This is all regulated, “there is no issue”.  Maybe, how about the small DIY boxes? (Arduino based, etc..)  We are unable to trace violations, so why bother?  How to enforce in our own environment?  What are the risks and things happening now?  How expensive is enforcement?  What type of detection equipment is required?  How to adjust internal regulations and contractual agreements?  Legality of monitoring employees & their devices (example activtrak.com, whoisonmywifi.com).  Psychological effect on people of a police state like company culture (more VPN, more hiding, cat & mouse game).  Once you start listening; ask yourself who else is listening?  You collect data. Is it stored safely and encrypted. Can it be hacked?  How about the signals that are not regulated, hidden devices? 13
  • 14. Frequency Allocation Chart. Radio Spectrum. https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/2003-allochrt.pdf 14
  • 15. Listening devices then  Era: 2nd world war, cold war 1970 18
  • 16. Hidden Listening Devices Source: http://spymuseum.com/great-seal-bug/ • The Great Seal Bug (also known as the Thing) - Moscow, 1945 • a listening device was implanted within a copy of the Great Seal as a plaque to the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman. • contained a listening device that was hidden in holes drilled under the beak of the eagle in the plaque. - powered on remotely by an electromagnet energy source making it very difficult to detect. - microphone hidden inside was passive and was only activated when the Soviets decided to turn it on. - did so from a van parked outside of the ambassador’s house in which they ultra-high frequency beams at the house. - Activated, the microphone would transmit any conversations coming from within range of the bug. When they turned the beams off, the bug was virtually undetectable. 16
  • 17. History is repeating itself Today: some users will be fearful of data theft and surveillance, hence they might buy into detection & jamming systems if affordable and useful. Growth of Cyber Security companies, professional hackers, etc.. Since internet kicked into higher gear, after the 1990- ties. Correlates with uncertainty, visible violence in society/public life, (cyber) terrorism, political climate… An Example of new market: the preppers + gadgets 19
  • 18. Now we are in a new type of cold war.  Be prepared.  This not is an alternate fact/reality. “they” are trying to make us live in fear so we buy into certain products & services. Or vote for Donald Trump (example).  Action: do a simulation of a total breakdown of your infrastructure and see how your company/organization would re-vive it’s core processes. Simulate a crash (on paper and in reality).  Establish contingency strategy and recovery procedures.  Imagine how much it will really cost to go offline during an attack and what will be permanently lost or damaged? 17
  • 19. Listening Projects now  Example: PRISM (NSA) UTAH Data Centre http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet 20
  • 20. Example of simple listening device  http://www.bug-transmitter.com/  Simplier version Locally in KL: Pudu Market Voyager 3 FM Bug UHF Transmitter - Uses 9Volt battery (25 hours life) - Special battery: 400+ hours - size: 32mm x 15mm - +800mr transmission range in the open using a car FM radio - 90mr upto 500mr using handheld FM radio - Frequency: 88Mhz – 112Mhz - longer range if in line of sight - link to a UHF walkie talkie (5km) Listening Bugs are getting smaller 2 – 3 cm DEMO AUDIO BUG 21
  • 21. More Camera Spy gear… Demo Ghost Simple Detection device Basically anything that runs on 12 or 5 volts / 2 amps can contains video, sound bugs. 22
  • 22. Credit-cards with NFC or RFID chips  Visa PayWave,MasterCard PayPass, American Express ExpressPay and Discover Zip.  Problem with RFID cards (unless inside a protective cover) is that they can be read or copied from a few inches with a portable RFID / NFC reader  DIY NFC/RFID Reader https://youtu.be/oVByBK6LJHY https://youtu.be/w_vYuLyfw3E 23 Visa payWave is a form of chip card technology. Like chip cards, it uses an advanced computer chip embedded in the card's plastic to perform secure transactions https://usa.visa.com/pay-with-visa/featured.../visa-paywave.html
  • 23. Heat Signature on Keypads / ATM. Thermal Imaging Device / FLIR http://www.flir.com/flirone/ios-android/ https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/thermal-imaging-devices-can-steal-your-pins-and-passcodes-090214.html https://youtu.be/8Vc-69M-UWk 24
  • 24. Digital Warfare - Norske Attack Map  Global Attack Map of know attacks.  But what is happening in your own network?  Who is ‘attacking’ who?  What is there to get?  How to manage this? http://map.norsecorp.com 25
  • 25. War Driving Scans while moving Records automatically Maps Wi-Fi Access Points GPS-based (LAT/LON) Data mapped on Google Earth / Maps. See also apps that show Telecom Towers 26
  • 26. Packet Sniffer, Mac Address listing, IP Matrix  Know that your packets, passwords, messages can be captured easily if not encrypted.  Not in the scope of this presentation http://www.colasoft.com/ 27
  • 27. So how about DEFCON Indicator for your own local system?  How many devices in the network now (FING, WhoIsOnMyWifi.com etc..)  How about a “simple” indicator instead of looking at the processes and analytical expert software (comes later, done by security IT people).  How much total Gigabytes are going out / in now?  Connected Devices Display (how many devices in your network plus how many radio’s around you.  Example: why would there be 100 radio signals in your office when you have only 50 staffs. Make an inventory of the function & location of these devices. 28
  • 28. DEFCON Alert Levels – Find the rat(holes).. Make sure to be aware Make a real system Not just a policy Mind the GAP Hire the right people Find the rat Catch the thief Find the spy Get real! 28
  • 29. Signal Jammers High Power 12 Antenna Jammer that blocks WiFi / GPS / VHF UHF LoJack RF 315/433 / 3G 4G  Useful for boardrooms, to keep the room signal free.  What if disgruntled workers jam your signal?  During communications failure hijacking might happen.  What other alternative means of communications you have? 29
  • 30. Drone Signal Jammer  Scenario: drone invades your territory. How do you take it down?  Market: Police / Enforcement / Security Companies. Drone Jammer 6 Channels Total Output 90W GPS WIFI Backpack Signal Blocker Up To 200 Meters 30 show
  • 31. Get a Signal Detection Device 31
  • 32. Military Jammer Version (SWAT) Issue: What if the bad guys use this to block out communications? How to detect jamming? How are your procedures & Staffs equipped to deal with attacks? How disturbing can a miniature version of this type of device be? 32
  • 33. More devices available at very low cost >> more wide spread usage.  Many business opportunities arise here  Many privacy and security issues also  Anybody can buy this anywhere (eg. Lazada)  Gearbest.com, banggood.com aliexpress.com…  >> more reason to use detection agents. 33
  • 34. Wi-Fi Jammer – smaller. 3.5usd https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQQhBdCQOTM Cheap Wi-Fi 'Jammer' Device | NodeMCU https://github.com/spacehuhn/esp8266_deauther http://seytonic.com/2017/02/03/nodemcu-links/ 34 Imagine Starbucks without Wi-Fi…
  • 35. ESP8266 Wi-Fi  3 – 5 usd (original or China copy)  Easy to program via Arduino IDE software.  https://github.com/esp8266/arduino 35
  • 36. Very Small & Powerful Anonymous Bluetooth, Wi-Fi can be programmed into anything. Untraceable. 36
  • 37. EMP – Fry or Jam the radios… Source: http://www.instructables.com/id/Destroy-Any-Device-With-EMP-Jammer/ An Electromagnetic pulse jammer could be a nuisance and even dangerous around medical equipment. Issue: how do you know if these devices are present? 37
  • 38. Wi-Fi Tin Can Directional Antenna. Demo material Issue: - big problem since easy to make: - Difficult to trace - Attacker can be far away Counter-measures: - Hide SSID - Don’t expose wifi to roadside - Special window-blinds / maze to keep beams out - Etc. 39
  • 39. Hack Rifle. Wi-Fi Rifle. The Wi-Fi card is an Alfa AWUS 036H. The gun itself is an airsoft rifle. Cheaper than a real assault rifle body and much lighter. 40
  • 40. How to detect these signals? (indoor device example)  Frequency Counters & Scanners >> detect and determine the signal. 41
  • 41. Apps.  Glint Finder (show demo)  Electro magnetic field detector  Fing Network scanner  Spy Monitor (what is connected from where)  No root Firewall (block access in/out) 42
  • 42. Simple Things work, start today.  Indicator that shows how many devices are live (tx/rx) in your area, building, office or home  Simple display that security staff can understand  Low cost bug detectors that indicate the presence of 10Mhz to 6000 Mhz frequency 43
  • 43. What to take away from all this?  Implement simple solutions NOW to detect radio devices.  Use jammers and blockers to enforce on the spot  Adjust procedures & policies.  Start listing risks and make an inventory of your weak spots  Do a total breakdown simulation. Test emergency response systems.  imagine the disastrous effect of sound recording of p&c meetings leaking out on social media (PR disaster)  imagine the difficulties in legal affairs if the “enemy” has recorded conversations or is listening in to current conversations  Your points…. 44