Slideshow given to a group of high-school "Model UN" participants, Washington DC, February 2008

1. Colombia: Origins of the
Conflict and U.S. Policy
Adam Isacson
Center for International Policy
1717 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 801
Washington DC 20036
(202) 232-3317 / isacson@ciponline.org
Prepared for NAIMUN,
February 15, 2008

2. 1. A Difficult Country to Govern
2. State Weakness and Impunity
3. Armed Groups
4. The U.S. Role
5. Disappointing Results
6. What is Next?
7. Alternative Proposals

3. 1. A difficult country to govern
Difficult Geography

4. 1. A difficult country to govern
Some of the World’s Worst
Economic Inequality
3. The Region’s Real Problems

5. 2. State Weakness and Impunity
State Weakness and Impunity

6. 2. State Weakness and Impunity
“Ungoverned Spaces”

7. 2. State Weakness and Impunity
Coca

8. 2. State Weakness and Impunity
Poverty and Coca

9. 3. Armed Groups
Conflict Throughout
Colombia’s National Territory

10. 3. Armed Groups
Illegal Armed Groups
3. Putumayo: Dynamic of the Conflict

11. Mapa 2.4 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas 3. Armed Groups
realizadas por las Farc, durante el período 1995-2002
Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República. 55
FARC (Revolutionary Armed
forces of Colombia)

12. 3. Armed Groups
Mapa 2.6 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas
realizadas por el ELN, durante el período 1995-2002
58 Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República.
ELN (National Liberation Army)

13. Mapa 2.8 Distribución espacial de acciones violentas 3. Armed Groups
realizadas por las Autodefensas, durante el período 1995-2002
62 Fuente: Dane, Marco Geoestadístico Nacional, 2001. Observatorio de Violencia–Presidencia de la República.
Paramilitaries

14. 3. Armed Groups
Approximate Responsibility for
Group Leader Annual income
Size civilian murders
Colombian Armed 220,000 military, President Álvaro Defense Budget $6
5-10%
Forces 180,000 police Uribe billion
FARC 30-40%
13,000-18,000, plus Manuel Marulanda,
(Revolutionary (most kidnappings, $250 million - $1
support personnel seven-member
Armed Forces of about half of forced billion
and urban militias secretariat displacement)
Colombia)
2,000-4,000, plus Nicolás Rodríguez,
ELN (National 0-5% Less than $10
support personnel five-member
Liberation Army) (many kidnappings) million
and urban militias central command
Very decentralized, Probably similar to
after a questioned
FARC; much
Paramilitaries 4,000-8,000 demobilization 50-60%
process, over 20 new income goes to
groups private fortunes
Narcotics At least 4,000 in Significant
More than $10
Trafficking 150+ gangs of Decentralized responsibility for
billion
Organizations varying sizes common crime
The Combatants

15. 3. Armed Groups
Failed Peace Processes

16. 4. The U.S. Role
The U.S. Role

17. 4. The U.S. Role
Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid
$1,000 million
$750 million
$500 million
$250 million
$0 million
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008, request
Millions of U.S. 2007, 2008,
dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
estimate request
Military and
306.6 743.6 236.9 398.9 624.4 614.8 597.8 632.2 615.9 603.4
Police Aid
Economic and
8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5
Social Aid
Total 315.4 975 238.3 514.4 761.1 749.3 732.5 764.4 748.1 742.9
$6.1 billion since 2000

18. 4. The U.S. Role
Top U.S. Military-Aid Recipients
1. Iraq
2. Israel
3. Afghanistan
4. Egypt
5. Pakistan
6. Colombia

19. 4. The U.S. Role
821,000 hectares (2.05 million
acres) sprayed 2000-2006.
That’s 33 acres per hour, 24
hours per day.

20. 4. The U.S. Role
•More than 90 helicopters granted since 1999
•At least 56,364 trainees since 1999
•Over $200 million per year for aircraft maintenance
•Nearly half of U.S. aid given through contractors
•About $150 million for pipeline protection
•Army Counternarcotics Brigade; Commando
Battalion; Anti-Kidnapping units; Mobile Special
Forces Brigades; Police Carabinero units; Navy
Riverine Brigade
•Support for “Plan Patriota” military offensive
Other Military Aid Initiatives

21. 4. The U.S. Role
“White Elephants”

22. 4. The U.S. Role
Another Sprayed AD Project
5. Plan Colombia: Alternative Development

23. 5. Disappointing Results
U.S. Finds No Change in Coca Cultivation

24. 5. Disappointing Results
“Because cocaine production in South America appears to be stable or increasing,
cocaine availability could return to normal levels during late 2007 and early 2008.” -
Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, October 2007
Cocaine Prices in the United States

25. 5. Disappointing Results
Security Gains?
1. Who gets the credit?
2. Rural Areas
3. Extrajudicial Executions
4. Paramilitarism
5. Military Scandals
6. Guerrilla Military Capacity

26. 6. What is Next?
(Demobilized paramilitaries eradicate coca in Antioquia)
Manual Eradication
9. What Is To Come

27. 6. What is Next?
“Integrated Action”: The Same Old
Militarized Counterinsurgency?

28. 6. What is Next?
“Peace is born from soldiers and police, even though the civilian
government must do the negotiating.” - Alvaro Uribe, August 2007
Militarization

29. 6. What is Next?
Troubled Peace Efforts

30. Orito, Putumayo 7. Alternative Proposals
A Better Policy
10.A Better Policy

31. 7. Alternative Proposals
No More Shortcuts:
Demilitarize the Policy
1. Rural Governance
2. Displacement, Land and Victims
3. The Justice System
4. A Strategy for Peace
5. Put Our Own House in Order

32. 7. Alternative Proposals
2000: Obey amendment to H.R. 3908 would have delayed most U.S. military aid to Colombia. Lost 186-239.
2000: Ramstad amendment to H.R. 3908 would have cut out most U.S. military aid to Colombia. Lost 159-262.
2001: Lee-Leach amendment to H.R. 2506 to shift funding from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to the Global
AIDS Trust Fund. Lost 188-240.
2001: McGovern et al amendment to H.R. 2506 to cut $100 million from the Andean aid to pay for increased
assistance for anti-tuberculosis programs. Lost 179-240.
2002: McGovern-Skelton amendment to H.R. 4775 to cut language broadening the mission of U.S. military
assistance in Colombia to include combat against illegal armed groups. Lost 192-225.
2003: McGovern-Skelton amendment to H.R. 2800 to cut military aid for Colombia and transfer it to HIV-AIDS
programs. Lost 195-226.
2003: McGovern-Skelton-DeLauro amendment to H.R. 1559 to cut military aid for Colombia that was included in
a bill to fund the Iraq war. Lost 209-216.
2005: McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment to H.R. 3057 to cut military aid for Colombia. Lost 189-234.
2006: Opposition to Burton amendment to H.R. 4939 to increase military aid to Colombia by cutting Iraq prison
construction from supplemental funding bill. Lost 172-250.
2006: McGovern-Leach-Payne et al amendment to H.R. 5522 to move $30 million in military aid from the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Account. Lost 174-229.
Many Amendments

33. 7. Alternative Proposals
Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid
$800 million
$600 million
$400 million
$200 million
$0 million
2005 2006 2007 2008 est 2009 req
Millions of U.S.
dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008, estimate 2009, request
Military and
306.6 743.6 236.9 398.9 624.4 614.8 597.8 632.2 615.9 603.4 442.1
Police Aid
Economic and
8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5 240.8
Social Aid
Total 315 975 238 514 761 749 733 764 748.1 742.9 682.9
A Small Step in the Right Direction

34. Online Resources from CIP
“Plan Colombia Database of U.S. Colombia
and Beyond” Aid to the Program Home
Blog: Americas: Page:
www.cipcol.org www.justf.org www.ciponline.org/
colombia