3. Governance
The ācharacteristic processes by which
society defines and handles its
problems. In this general sense,
governance is about the self-steering of
society."
VoĆ et al. (2007)
āWe shall here define governance as the
process of steering society and the
economy through collective action and
in accordance with some common
objectives.ā ā Torfing et al. (2012)
Mindless
Torfing et al. (2007)
Thoughtless, careless, heedless,
inattentive, neglectful, rash, irreflective
Mindful
Aware, observant, thoughtful,
cognisant, attentive, conscious 3
6. Contagion channels ā From incubation to symptoms
ļ§ Valuation
ļ§ Leverage
ļ§ Funding
ļ§ Margin calls
ļ§ Uncertainty
ļ§ Social psychology
ļ§ Credit quality
Interactions among these
factors magnify systemic risks
European Central Bank (2008)
6
7. Zooming in ā The complex contagion channel of RMBS-CDO-CDO2
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission [FCIC] (2011) 7
8. Effects on growth, markets, banks, credit, and households
Internal Monetary Fund (2009a, 2009b) 8
9. The cost of the financial crisis in the U.S. in terms of output loss
*Atkinson, Lutrell, and Rosenblum (2013)
Scenario 2: Return to trend output per working-age adult*
9
14. Fitch et al. (2009)
Unemployment by age group Long-term unemployment (> 2 yrs)
Villar (2013)
Growing inequality
Increasing poverty
1
2
OECD (2013a)
Long-term effects on the population
Mental health and debt
4 3
14
16. BULLARD ā āMy sense is that the level of systemic risk associated
with financial turmoil has fallen dramatically. For this reason, I think
the FOMC should begin to de-emphasize systemic risk worries. [ā¦]
My sense is that, because the turmoil has been ongoing for some time,
all of the major players have made adjustments [ā¦]. They have done
this not out of benevolence but out of their own instincts for self-preservation.
[ā¦] I say that the level of systemic risk has dropped
dramatically and possibly to zero.ā
LACKER ā āI want to commend President Bullardās discussion of
systemic risk. [ā¦] To invoke the notion of systemic risk to support a
particular policy course requires [ā¦] some theory, some coherent
understanding of the way you think the world works. The Committee
might be surprised that the literature provides only relatively tenuous
rationalesāI think is a fair judgmentāfor policy intervention. To
invoke the notion of systemic risk to support a particular policy course
requires theory.ā
MISHKIN ā āI have to disagree very strenuously with the view that,
because you have been in a āfinancial stressā situation for a period of
time, there is no potential for systemic risk. In fact, I would argue that
the opposite can be the case.ā
BERNANKE ā āSystemic risk is an old phenomenon. There are
literally dozens and dozens of historical episodes that are suggestive of
that phenomenon. There is also an enormous theoretical literature.ā
Federal Reserve (2014)
-
-
+
+
What the FOMC 8/8 tells us
Appelbaum (2014)
Sharf (2014)
Federal Reserve (n.d.) 16
17. Greenspan: āI found a flawā
Mr. GREENSPAN. ā[ā¦] those of us who have looked to
the self-interest of lending institutions to protect
shareholders equity, myself especially, are in a state
of shocked disbelief.ā
Mr. GREENSPAN. āI found a flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical
functioning structure that defines how the world works, so to speak. ā
Chairman WAXMAN. āIn other words, you found that your view of the world, your
ideology, was not right, it was not working.ā
Mr. GREENSPAN. āPrecisely. Thatās precisely the reason I was shocked, because I had
been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was working
exceptionally well.ā
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators (2008)
17
Lanman and Mathews (2008)
Hearing by the House Oversight Committee, 23 Oct 2008
18. On ideology in economics
āAs everyone knows, however, there is with us
another source of confusion and another
barrier to advance: most of us, not content
with their scientific task, yield to the call of
public duty and to their desire to serve their
country and their age, and in doing so bring
into their work their individual schemes of
values and all their policies and politics - the
whole of their moral personalities up to their
spiritual ambitions.ā
āBut there exist in our minds preconceptions
about the economic process that are much
more dangerous to the cumulative growth of
our knowledge and the scientific character of
our analytic endeavours because they seem
beyond our control in a sense in which value
judgments and special pleadings are not.
Though mostly allied with these, they deserve
to be separated from them and to be discussed
independently. We shall call them Ideologies.ā
Schumpeter (1949)
18
19. World views, mindsets, groupthink
āif the Federal Reserve [ā¦] is not capable of
confronting this type of problem, I think it is telling us
something about the nature of the problem which
itself is incapable of being handled in the way we all
would likeā
Alan Greenspan, Congressional hearing Oct 2008
āI stood up at a Fed meeting in 2005 and said, āHow
many anecdotes [on mortgage fraud] makes it real? ...
How many tens [of] thousands of anecdotes will it
take to convince you that this is a trend?ā
Margot Saunders, National Consumer Law Centre
Patricia McCoy called it the āclassic Fed mindsetā: āIf
you cannot prove that it is a broad-based problem that
threatens systemic consequences, then you will be
dismissedā
Patricia McCoy, Fed Consumer Advisory Council
FCIC (2011)
@Federal Reserve
19
20. World views, mindsets, groupthink
@International Monetary Fund
āThe IEO found that the IMFās ability to identify
the mounting risks was hindered by a number
of factors, including a high degree of groupthink;
intellectual capture; and a general mindset that a
major financial crisis in large advanced
economies was unlikely. Governance
impediments and an institutional culture that
discourages contrarian views also played
important roles.ā
āWhat is it that despite continued prodding and
nudging by evaluations and investigations into
the Fundās workings makes this organisation so
resistant to change?ā
Independent Evaluation Office (2011)
20
21. Governance: āthe process of steering society and the economy through collective action and
in accordance with some common objectives.ā
Possible sources of failure:
Torfing et al. (2012)
ā¢ The process and outcomes of āsteeringā
ā¢ The way collective action is decided, conducted, and who it affects
ā¢ The nature of the common objectives and how they are determined
ā¢ The impossibility to reflect on governance and its underlying assumptions and
premises
Reflexive governance: āReflexive governance refers to the problem of shaping societal
development in the light of the reflexivity of steering strategies ā the phenomenon that
thinking and acting with respect to an object of steering also affects the subject and its ability
to steer.ā
āReflexive governance thus implies that one calls into question the foundations of
governance itself, that is, the concepts, practices and institutions by which societal
development is governed, and that one envisions alternatives and reinvents and shapes
those foundations.ā
Voss, Bauknecht, and Kemp (2006)
A crisis of governance?
21
24. Mindfulness is an approach āto reduce cognitive vulnerability to
stress and emotional distressā
Two-component model of mindfulness
āThe first component involves the
self-regulation of attention so
that it is maintained on immediate
experience, thereby allowing for
increased recognition of mental
events in the present moment.ā
āThe second component involves
adopting a particular orientation
toward oneās experiences in the
present moment, an orientation
that is characterized by curiosity,
openness, and acceptance.ā
Bishop et al. (2004)
Mindfulness in clinical psychology
24
25. Mindfulness in financial trading
Goal: Translate key elements of
mindfulness into the domain of
financial decision-making and
developing approaches to online
delivery of mindfulness training.
Study showed that less experienced
traders had lower ability to regulate
their levels of emotional arousal
during stressful trading than more
experienced traders.
The fact that more experienced
traders had learned to regulate their
emotions pointed to emotion
regulation as a skill that could be
trained.
Studies using physiological sensors
with student participants identified
mindfulness as a valid technique
for managing emotional arousal.
Peffer et al. (2012)
Fenton-OāCreevy et al. (2011)
xDelia project
25
26. Mindfulness in social psychology
āMindfulness is a flexible state
of mind in which we are actively
engaged in the present,
noticing new things and
sensitive to context.ā
āWhen we are in a state of mindlessness,
we act like automatons who have been
programmed to act according to the sense
our behaviour made in the past, rather
than the present.ā
Langer (2000).
āMost of the reigning theories held that human
behaviour was the product of rational, calculated
thoughtā
āLanger showed that instead of cognition
determining behaviour, thinking ā and sometimes the
absence of it ā often emerges from behaviour.ā
Source: Feinberg (2010)
āMindfulness without mediationā ā Ellen Langer
26
27. Mindfulness in leadership
āMindful leadersā¦
ā¢ ā¦are preoccupied with possibility of something going wrong
ā¢ ā¦know that bad news does not move upwards
ā¢ ā¦lie awake at night worrying
ā¢ ā¦feel 'chronic unease'
ā¢ ā¦go an find out for themselvesā
Source: Preview to mindful leadership training by Prof. Andrew Hopkins (http://goo.gl/pFVa68)
Andrew Hopkins
27
29. The organisational perspective on crises
Congressional hearings, the FCIC, and academic writings on the financial
crisis have largely ignored insights and lessons from organisational
research into change and crises. Important themes from that literature
are:
ā¢ Normal accident theory
ā¢ High reliability organisations
ā¢ Organisational learning
ā¢ Sense making
ā¢ Safety drift
ā¢ Normalisation of deviance
ā¢ Resilience engineering
ā¢ Mindful organisations
29
31. CAIB: History, organisation, culture
āThe Board recognized early on that the accident was
probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather
likely rooted to some degree in NASAŹ¼s history and the
human space flight programŹ¼s culture. Accordingly, the
Board broadened its mandate at the outset to include an
investigation of a wide range of historical and organizational
issues. [ā¦] this report, in its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations, places as much weight on these causal
factors as on the more easily understood and corrected
physical cause of the accident.ā
Cultural traits and organizational practices
detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including:
ā¢ reliance on past success as a substitute for
sound engineering practices
ā¢ organizational barriers that prevented effective
communication of critical safety information
and stifled professional differences of opinion
ā¢ lack of integrated management across program
elements
ā¢ the evolution of an informal chain of command
and decision-making processes that operated
outside the organisationŹ¼s rules.
MINDFUL of key mechanisms leading to organisational failure
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
CAIB (2003)
31
32. FCIC: Choice, responsibility, blame
āThese conclusionsmust be viewed in the context of human nature and individual and
societal responsibility.
ā¢ First, to pin this crisis on mortal flaws like greed and hubris would be simplistic. It
was the failure to account for human weakness that is relevant to this crisis.
ā¢ Second, we clearly believe the crisis was a result of human mistakes,
misjudgements, and misdeeds that resulted in systemic failures for which our
nation has paid dearly.ā
āWe do place special responsibilitywith the public leaders
charged with protecting our financial system. [ā¦] These
individuals sought and accepted positions of significant
responsibility and obligation.ā
āBut as a nation, we must also accept responsibility for what
we permitted to occur. Collectively, but certainly not
unanimously, we acquiesced to or embraced a system, a set
of policies and actions, that gave rise to our present
predicament.ā
āThis is our collective responsibility. It falls to us to make
different choices if we want different results.ā
āIf we do not learn from history, we are unlikely to fully recover from it.ā
But how?
No reference to any of the highly relevant organisational literature
LESS MINDFULL of key mechanisms leading to organisational failure
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
FCIC (2011)
32
33. The ignorance of what is going on is
organisational and prevents any attempt
to stop the unfolding harm. Then, what
can be done?
ā¢ āorganizations must go beyond the
easy focus on individual failure to
identify the social causes in
organizational systems, a task
requiring social science input and
expertise.ā
ā¢ Target leaders, culture, and signals
ānormalisation of deviance means that people within the
organization become so much accustomed to a deviant
behaviour that they don't consider it as deviantā
ā[ā¦] for years preceding both [space shuttle] accidents, technical
experts defined risk away by repeatedly normalizing technical
anomalies that deviated from expected performanceā
Asymmetry of proof requirement
Prove there is a problem versus prove there is no problem
At one point the key [NASA] engineer said, Ā«You know, I canāt prove
it. I just know itās away from goodness in our data base.Ā» But in that
culture, that was considered an emotional argument, a subjective
argument, it was not considered a strong quantitative data
argument in keeping with the technical tradition at that time.ā
the āclassic Fed mindsetā: āIf you cannot prove that it is a broad-based
problem that threatens systemic consequences, then you
will be dismissedā
Patricia McCoy, Fed Consumer Advisory Council
Lessons
for the
GFC?
Normalisation of deviance
Diane Vaughan
Starbuck and Farjoun (2005)
CAIB (2003), FCIC (2011).
Starbuck and Farjoun (2005), CAIB (2003).
33
34. Safety failure cycle
What can be done? From the high reliability organisation literature:
ā¢ strong safety cultures
ā¢ good managerial control systems
ā¢ effective learning
ā¢ greater attention to near-accidents
āThe nature of latent
errors and ambiguous
feedback about the state of
safety in the organization
requires a healthy
disbelief in current
performance indicators.ā
Starbuck and Farjoun (2005)
Lessons
for the
GFC?
34
Safety drift
Moshe Farjoun
35. Near misses in financial markets?
During the week of August 6, 2007, a number of high-profile
and highly successful quantitative long/short equity hedge
funds experienced unprecedented losses.
International Atomic Agency (2005)
Khandani and Lo (2007)
Lessons
for the
GFC?
35
36. Mindfulness in high-reliability organisations
āIn an unknowable, unpredictable world, ongoing
mutual re-adjustment is a constant, and it is this
adaptive activity that generates potential information
about capability, vulnerability, and the environment.
That information is lost unless there is continuous
mindful awareness of these variations. By this line of
argument, unreliable outcomes occur when cognitive
processes vary and no longer stay focused on failures,
simplifications, recoveries, situations, and structuring, or
when patterns of activity fail to vary and unexpected
events are normalized.ā
Karl Weick
Lessons
for the
GFC?
Example āSimplificationā ā Members of all
organizations handle complex tasks by
simplifying the manner in which the current
situation is interpreted. These simplifications,
variously referred to as worldviews,
frameworks, or mindsets, basically allow
members to ignore data and keep going. [ā¦]
Simplifications increase the likelihood of
eventual surprise. They allow
anomalies to accumulate, intuitions to be
disregarded, and undesired consequences
to grow more serious.
Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (1999)
36
38. No simple cause of the (a) financial crisis
Imprudent &
fraudulent
mortgage lending
Housing bubble Global imbalances Securitisation
Rating agencies
Mark-to-market
accounting
Deregulation Shadow banking
Bank-type runs
Lending via off-balance
sheet
vehicles
Failure of risk
management
Financial
innovation
Originate-to-distribute
business
model
Greed and fear Complexity
Broken computer
models
Excessive leverage
Balkanisation of
regulators
Credit default
swaps
Short-term
incentives
Lack of systemic
risk regulator
Minsky moment
Tail risk
Black swan
Federal home
lending
programmes
Jickling (2010)
38
39. Jickling 2010. Causes of the financial crisis.
A ā B
B ā A
C ā A & B
A ā B
We observe that two events co-occur:
A and B. What is their causal relation?
Correlation does not imply
causation
INUS ā insufficient but non-redundant
part of an unnecessary
but sufficient condition
(A&B&C or D&E&F or G&H&I) ā E
A: short circuit; E: house fire
A: housing bubble; E: SIVs, CDOs;
H: rating agencies
The pitfalls of causal explanations
Bank of England (2006)
39
40. The curse of the prediction neurosis
Greenspan testimony at the 23 Oct 2008 congressional hearing
āSo, it strikes me that if you go back and
ask yourself how in the early years
anybody could realistically make a
judgment as to what was ultimately going
to happen to subprime, I think you are
asking more than anybody is capable of
judging. And we have this extraordinarily
complex global economy which, as
everybody now realizes, is very difficult
to forecast in any considerable detail.ā
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators (2008)
The view from mindful organising
āA very significant amount of regulation in the economic area is based on
a forecast to know in advanceāā
āIf we are right 60 percent of the time in forecasting, weāre doing
exceptionally well. That means we are wrong 40 percent of the time, and
when you observe the extent of the broad failure, the difficulty is that
nobody can forecastā
āWe can try to do better, but forecasting is neverānever gets to the point
where itās 100 percent accurate.ā
āWe cannot expect perfection in any area where forecasting is required,
and I think we have to do our best, but not expect infallibility or
omniscience.ā
āJust let me say quickly, the Federal Reserve has an as sophisticated a
modelling structure and capable people as any organization I am aware
of. It did not forecast what is happeningā
"For complex phenomena, Hayek maintains that it is
difficult to predict individual events. Instead he
argues that many events must be observed. Often the
events being observed form a pattern. It is the
pattern which is potentially predictable rather than
individual events. For many patterns, prediction
may give way to a weaker criterion. At most what
may be achieved is an explanation of the principle or
the central factors which give a systemic pattern its
characteristic appearance."
No preoccupation
with forecasting
Colander (2002) 40
41. Positivism Critical realism
Empirical
Real
induction
deduction
Empirical
Actual
induction
deduction
Real
retroduction
Empirical
Induction
VaR Mechanisms = Real
past future
Dispositional metaphysics
Explanations and critical realism
41
42. It is my own view that a much better case can be made for the kind of instrumental conception of
science set forth in general terms by Peirces Dewey, and their successors. In this view, scientific
activity is perpetual problem solving. No area of experience is totally and completely settled by
providing a set of basic truths; but rather, we are continually confronted with new situations
and new problems, and we bring to these problems and situations a potpourri of scientific
methods, techniques, and concepts, which in many cases we have learned to use with great
facility.
A philosophically principled pluralism: ā[a
pluralism] that regards the various āschoolsā of
economics, including neoclassicalism, as offering
different windows on economic reality, each
bringing into view different subsets of economic
phenomena . . . [and] rejects the idea that any
school could possess final or total solutions, but
accepts all as possible means for understanding
real-life economic problems.ā
ā[P]luralism is a meta-methodological
position. It
offers no specific methodological
advice to economists.ā
āMethodological pluralism makes
no epistemological claims; it is
not grounded in any theory of
truth.ā
āAdvocates of [a monistic] approach to methodology
generally choose one criterion of demarcation to
distinguish science from nonscienceā
In mainstream economics,
one such criterion is
rationality. In science more
generally, Popper put forward
falsifiability as a
demarcation criterion.
Pluralism in economics
Suppes (1978)
Fullbrook (2003)
Caldwell (1988)
42
43. Mindfulness and evidence-based financial consumer protection
ā[N]o podemos pensar que un minorista es
un ignorante financiero y tampoco un
jubilado que cobra una pensiĆ³n es un
ignoranteā
ā[Ellos eran] responsables de lo que
firmaban, de lo que leĆan o no leĆan, porque
en el folleto y en el trĆptico estaba toda la
informaciĆ³nā
Guindal (2014) De BarrĆ³n (2014)
43
44. Itās the skills, stupid (not the information)
By occupation By education
Level 2 Level 3 Level 2 Level 3
OECD (2013b) 44
47. 377
Compare the per cent of change in Dioxin level from 1975 to 1985 to the
per cent of change in Dioxin level from 1985 to 1995. Which per cent of
change is larger, and explain your answer.
OECD (2005)
Adult literacy survey
Quiz 3 ā High difficulty
<1%
correct
47
48. Invest ā¬1,000 with us and we
double your money in 7 years.
Fixed annual interest: 10%
380
Adult literacy survey
380
Quiz 4 ā Highest difficulty
<<1%
correct
OECD (2005)
This is the most difficult numeracy exercise that interviewees were
asked to do. It is much less complex than the typical decisions that
consumers have to make when dealing with their banks.
Question: Will you in fact double your money
in 7 years when they pay you a 10% interest
every year?
Only a fraction of the 1% of the almost 50,000
subjects (7 countries) responded correctly to
this question.
OECD (2013)
48
50. Conventional modes of steering and regulation
What are the assumptions?
ā¢ Definition of goals ā The goal, i.e. the
direction of the steering attempt is defined
clearly and unambiguously.
ā¢ Analysis of system dynamics ā Predictive
knowledge on system dynamics can be
developed, allowing the effects of action to
be assessed.
ā¢ Organisation of collective action ā The
power to control influential factors for
system development is given or can be
organized.
These assumptions are unlikely to hold in the
context of systemic risk.
Where are the problems?
Goals
ā¢ Conflict of goals
ā¢ Vagueness of goals
Knowledge
ā¢ Heterogeneity of interacting factors
ā¢ Feedback loops and emergent
dynamics
Power
ā¢ Horizontal distribution of power
ā¢ Vertical distribution of power
50
VoĆ et al. (2007)
52. Political sciences
Governance ā āWe shall here define governance as the process of
steering society and the economy through collective action and in
accordance with some common objectives.ā
Interactive governance ā āThe complex process through which a
plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact
in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by
means of mobilizing, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules,
and resources.ā
Quasi
markets
Partnerships
Governance
networks
Conditions of emergence of interactive governance
ā¢ āthe presence of capable and resourceful actors
ā¢ a high degree of trust among public and private actors
ā¢ the possibility of ensuring voluntary complianceā
ā¢ āpolitical cultures and traditions
ā¢ the need to enhance input and output legitimacy
ā¢ the capacity to metagovern interactive
governanceā
Interactive governance
Torfing et al. (2012)
52
Torfing et al. (2007)
53. VoĆ et al. (2012)
Sustainable development
Reflexive governance
Governance ā āthe characteristic processes by which society defines
and handles its problems. In this general sense, governance is about
the self-steering of society.ā
VoĆ et al. (2007)
Reflexive governance = governance becoming part of the problem
ā[It] involves the establishment of institutions and process which
facilitate the actors within a domain for learning not only about policy
options, but also about their own interests and preferences. Learning,
within open and deliberative processes, might cause participants not
only to conceive of better techniques or instruments but also, beyond
policy solutions, to reorder the way that the policy problems are
conceived and prioritisedā
53
Radulova (2007)
55. References (1)
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Editor's Notes
Flickr: http://goo.gl/IjRy8k - mamasuco ......un peu absent
Flickr: http://goo.gl/IjRy8k - mamasuco ......un peu absent [changed]
