ASIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT TIMOTHY J. LOMPERIS Saint Loui.docx

ASIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
TIMOTHY J. LOMPERIS
Saint Louis University
S cholars of Westem political thought have .not dis-puted the
fact that there is a rich body of political thought in Asia. They
lmve just not bothered to
incorporate it into their corpus. This chapter seeks to pro-
vide long-overdue recognition to this body of thought by
calling attention to the fact that despite its heavy religious
content (until modern times), the encounter with political
ideas in Asia is just as profound as it is in the West. In fact,
since these ideas in Asia are heavily fertilized by their
Western colonial legacy, the West has much to learn about
itself from these Asian borders to the West's material and
intellectual reach.
In this presentation of Asian political thought, what will
emerge is that the such central ideas as democracy,ji-eedom,
and equality were forn1ed in a historical context different
from the West. In the West, these ideas were expressed and
then refined through a prism of small city-states in Greece,
the universal empire of Rome, the subsequent collapse of this
imperium politically but its persistence intellectually in the
Thomist medieval synthesis, the smashing fem1ent (both
intellectually and institutionally) of the Renaissance and the
Reformation, and the birth of the modern nation-state in
the twin crucibles of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and
the French Revolution (1789-1795).

In Asia, these same ideas have been definitionally fil-
tered through a different historical stage in a play of three
acts. The first act is the traditional or classical era before
the Westem contact. We will see what from this period
endures as a mark today of"Asianness." The second act is
560
a scrutiny of the trauma of the colonial expericm:e. l Ji.,c
vast majority of Asian societies, either directly or mth,
rectly, came under Western eolonial eonlrol ur unikJ
spheres of Western influence. Ilow to react to thi:. in1m.:,;,11n1
precipitated a major ctisis but also resulted in a rid1 1md,
lectuaI fennent that produced the first articulu!il ,,i,. ,•I•
Asia's nationalisms. The third act is the modern t'-Cn<"'I
from the end of World War II to the present, when Asi,l ,,.,,,,.
set free on its own independent course. This has raised the
question, Whither modern Asia? Is Asia no dilforcnl lh•.m
a common globalizing world, or docs something llbtut.:,
tively Asian remain about its political thought'!
In these three acts, we will examine Asian conct.•p!s tiflhc
state and of statecraft, as well as or military grand s1m1cg1e:"'
and views on social equity and gender as they relate Ill th1..""'
three concepts. The focus will be on India um! Chinn
because these two ancient polities form the foundalillm1l p1J,
lam of Asia. Japan will also be given considerable atlcntiun.
along with some references to Korea. Southeast Asia will be
considered not so much as individual countries but us a
region tl1at has always been a tempestuous battleground
between Indian and Chinese ideas and institutions.
Theoretical Approach
Insofar as the political thought of Asia crune to the atten~
tion of Western political theorists, it tended to be painted.in

the broad brushes of overgeneralization. Karl Marx, In
outlining the global stages to his class struggle, wrote ol' an
"Asiatic mode of production" (quoted in Tucker, 1972,
p. 5), which he chanu.:terizcd as a labtir-inlcnsivc agricul-
tural society. Writing in this tradition, Karl Wlltfogcl
(1957) spelled this out as a form of "Oriental despotism"
ari::dng from the need to secure the necessary c()rvcc lnbor
to support the rice culture of what he termed "hydrau I ie soci-
ety." Taking a more cultural perspective, F. 8. ( •. Nm1hrnp
(l 946) distinguished Asia as having a more aesthetic
weltanschuuung than the scientific West. Ruther than the
clear subject object divide in the West, Asia, Northrop
contended, charted rculity along a mme l'lisctl aesllwtk
continuum, thereby creating different logics aml perel!p·
tions about the world.
More recuntly, such politit.:al scientists .is Lucian Pye
(1985) nml Duniel Bell (2000) have rl!nmrked on thu <lit:.
fcrent conceptions Asians bring to politics. To both, these
differencus require dcmocruey, in pnrticu lur. ltl undergo
considemble modiliculion for uny sm:ccssful transplanta-
tion to Asia. For Pye, the dwnges will have to allow for
a more dependent and paternal understunding (and accep-
tance) of pnwer. And ftir Bell, for Asia to be 1:0111fortable
with dcmocmcy, democracy will have tll give a special
place to knowledge over and above mere de111ucmtk
egalitarianism.
This is because idem; of <lcniocrncy, lh.:cdt1111, and
equality have developed llUt 01'11 historical context dillcr-
ent frnm the West':-. This conh:xt has led to cnndusions nn
the grnunding or these idl!as that are also ditforcnt from the
conclusions or the West. Put simply. We!itcrn pulitkal

thought is grounded in the individual as Liu: hash.: unit nf
politics, and in equality, in stm1c liirm, as the al·t·cptcd
basis for human relations ,md pnlitiL'al ruk. In the Asian
context, political thtiu~ht came lo h1: tn1t11Hk•d in the
group, not the individual. and in hicmn:hy. nut cqual1ty. As
shall be dear from the dL1scrir1tio11 ol' thi.: Ctlltcxt nr thn:L·
historical nets. the contact or the idem; ot' dcnwL·mcy. fret.··
dom, and equality with Asia calls liir some rcformulatiun.
In line, thi:; elrnpter explains that in 1assing these ll1rcL~
ideas lhrnugh an Asian histurical t:ncmmtcr. rnlL' L',111 ant n•
at l'icbl.!1 nmlticulturnl dcliliitions of sul'h scl'n1111~ly
11111-
versal political ideas.
Classical Asia
Asia has provided an arena for all the wnrld's value sys-
tems. Hinduism is the oldest. Its earliest forms wcrc
similar to the religion and idt:us or the ancient tircck:i.
Perhaps the Indo-Aryan invaders llf the lndiun subcun-
ti nent effaced the smne Triple Cfoddess m errun by
Jason and his Greek Argon11uts in the Black Seu city of
Colchis. In any case. Hinduism emerged in the first mil·
Jenni um BCE as 11 religion and political culture of conquest.
Buddhism amse later as a sort of L.utl1eran relbnnation to
Hinduism. ll held distinctly gentler political ideas. This
gentler failh, however, was literally obliterated by Muslim
Asian Political Tlumgllt • 561
invasions inlo the subcontinent that began in the 8th cen-
tury CE. (Buddhism went on lo thrive in China, Japan,
Korea, and Southeast Asia.) These new invaders oscil-
lated between two upproaches in !heir new dominions.
One was lo extenninule opposition and fon:c Islam by the
sword. The other wai; to cooperate with local power

groups and rule by accommodation. As it spread to
Southensl Asia, Islam became more modcrule and diffuse
in its ideas uml practices.
In ( 'hina around the 6th century llCE, Confucianism
devdopcd its own order among society, nature, and the
cosmos. This onlcring ririnciple, ul' the dual forces of yin
and ynng, was nn early portrait or u hisloricul dialectic sim-
ilar to that in the writings or I leraclitus, l Jegcl, und Marx.
Whill! ( 'onl'udanism prnpoundcd a rigidly hiernrchicul
sociopnlitkal order, the "turning or the wheel" from
I h1ddhism .ind the "rt.:version or the Dao" from Daoism
i1HrmluL:ed the idea or redprndty. Mencius politicized the
mlc or the emperor by entrusting him with the Mm1datc of
I leaven, but in tying this mandate lo rcciprodty, Mencius
also gave the pt.!nplc lhe right of revolution. Daoism aducd
the 111ystic:il and th! mugical to this mix. For all its order,
this ancient C 'hine:-.c system g.iw hirth lo II rom:111cc or
prntcst, with sage-knights :11.:ting as Robin I lomls. These
liilk hemes later inspired modern revolutionaries such ns
Man Zi..•dung ( Sehwarl/, I t>H5).
In this Asim1 tlranm. us in Europe. !here has been a grad-
ual gnmch ll( sl!cularism. But motkrn seculari:m1 has
lll'l.'I' been ,umplctcly succcssfiil in lndiu, and religion has
never d11:d III C 'hi1111. ln India, religion rl!prcsc11ts ll com-
pktL' ,alue system. This llca:ily religious value system,
hmn.' er. did nut predutk lengthy and systl!mmic trcal-
1111.•111 or p111iti17;d qucsti1111s. Tiu: cpk M11//ahh,m11a
eon-
1.1111, lung 11nhtiL'al t!ssa;·s 1111 st,ltl.'cra Ii, kingship. and
n11 ll1,1ry sllalcg~. One .mdcnt text. Kautilya 's :lrtlwshustm.
mtrndun::, all Mm:hiavdli's i,kas ;ibmu puliticul sur,,ivtd
nH11~· th,111 a lhm1sand yl!:11s carlii:r than The flrifl<'<'
cBasham. I ll~<lJ. < 'hma ,lc111t111stratcd a 1111)rc rnhust
tradi-

111111 111' sc·ularism, partly bc,·imsc tinnu:ianism never
r,•ally addn:s~cd the ,111est11m ti!' ( iud. Buddhism lilied this
~.:ap 1111: I i:}lahsrs a11cmptl.'d t11 plan' law as a hight'r
prin-
dpk of stil'.1al urdcnllJ! than cosntiL' rhytluns uf yin and
yan~i Bui d;,n;1stic mkrs prd~m:d the mnhiguitics or the
,:m,rnus to th1: l'.i1ncrch: l'Ullstraints ur the law. ln C 'hina,
11111, as tn ;111 Asia, r1.•ligion stayed on lop, li1:-i11g
society
am.I pulitks tu thL' sum:lity. sam:tiuns. und politicul pmtcc-
lltHI ur the ~.mb ( Schw.ir11. I tJX5 ).
Mme than 1m lop. lhc Y.um1111 cl.Ill in .htpan proclaimed
thl'llh,dH:s to he g.utls. In their :-;uccc:;s, they lmvc provided
Jupan with the lungcst single line nfldngs in world history
irnd 11 scnsL~ uf natkmalis111 and ethnic ic.lt::ntity thut runs
very dccf1. Although "divinely" rnled, the Japanese never
!MIW themselves us holding lhc gntewuy ttl heaven. They
were. then, nut averse tCl btim1wing, and they k1oked to
C'onfuchmism and Buddhism to order their slate and mean•
ing system. lronfo:nlly, integn1ting this borrowing into
indigenuus Shinto belie£.. became men's work. The further
562 • POLITICAL THOUGHT
development of Japanese culture-its novels, ceremonies,
and haiku poetry-was left to the creative talents of
women. Although gods reigned, warriors m led and warred
in Japan. A strong knightly code of Bushido steeled the rul-
ing samurai class in the political culture of the warrior-
ruler-knights (Yuzan, 1941).
Meanwhile, great kingdoms arose in Southeast Asia,
mostly on borrowed Hindu ideas transmitted by Theravada

Buddhism from Sri Lanka (Ceylon). There was the
Kingdom ofTen Thousand Elephants in Laos, Borobuddur
and Bali in Indonesia, and the Khmer empire in Cambodia.
The latter's capitol, Angkor Wat, is still the largest reli-
gious building complex ever built. Political ideas and insti-
tutions in this porous, vulnerable region were mostly
Indian (the Chinese influences in Vietnam were the notable
exception), but the societies of much of Southeast Asia
were ethnically Malay and were held together mainly by
their customa1y adat, or customs. These customs set up
three social classes (a ruling aristocracy, free land holders,
and slaves) bound together in a network of mutual obliga-
tions and responsibilities. In this adat, property and author-
ity could be held and inherited just as easily by women as
by men. When the Muslims came to Southeast Asia in the
13th and 14th centuries, they had about run out their polit-
ical tether and lacked the vehemence that they displayed in
India. They superimposed the veneer of their sultanates
on Malaya and Indonesia but were content to have the
sultanates upheld by Hindu and Buddhist political princi-
ples and by tl1e Malay social adat (Tambiah, 1976).
In classical Asia, then, politics were decidedly authori-
tarian, and more specifically tegal, rather than democratic.
In India, nevertheless, besides just guaranteeing order, or
danda, kings were obliged to promote the welfare of the
people. In China, this promotion extended to the principle
of reciprocity and even to tl1e right of the people to rebel.
Nevertheless, freedom in classical Asia was more of a reli-
gious goal than a political right: freedom from the cycle of
rebirths in India and in the cultivation of an inner peace of
the soul in China. Thus, in both societies, freedom was a
private preserve separate from the crush of public (com-
munal, religious, and political) responsibilities and duties.
ln these feudal systems of Asia, these responsibilities were
mainly to hierarchically ordered groups. Equality, then,

was a relative value and was tied to the status and position
of one's group compared with others. Any equivalence to
modem Western ideas of equality could be procured only
within one's group (and primarily for one's family), not
outside it.
Colonial Asia
The conquests of Western imperialism shattered this order.
Most of Asia was directly colonized. Even those who
escaped direct rule--like the Japanese, Koreans, Chinese,
and Thai-were still pulled into an international political
and economic system dominated by Western imperial
powers. Because Asian polities had unbroken insliluti<mal
histories for two millennia (in some cases), punclmllcd hy
their own moments of glory, the question ol' how to h<1th
accommodate and account for this Western imposi1inn
and superiority provoked deep soul-scan:hing among
Asians.
Nowhere was this more deeply felt than in India, which
became the crown jewel of the British Empire ur 50
colonies worldwide. Some Indians embraced Western civ·
ilization. The British Viceroy, Lord Thomas Macuulay,
was pa1tial1y successful in creating "a class of pen.tin!>,
Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion.
in morals, and in intellect" (Spear, 1961, p. 257). L,ucr.
these scions were called "Brown Sahibs." In lllrtl1emncc uf
this strategy, the British invested in a modern u11ivcr:s1ly
system for India. A proud accompl ishmenl or tit is sysl~m
was the Nobel Prize for Literature in I 9 l3 won hy the
Bengali intellectual Rubindranath Tagore, writing in the
King's English (Metcalf~ 200 l ).
Following in the wake of the British nti were legions l!f

Christian missionaries who preached their "good news" nnrd
practiced their social gospel with institutions tif Slll.'.utl
reform. Beyond a nationwide network of sclmols, !he) :-11.*l
up hospitals, orphanages, homes for widows, lcpru:owm·
ums, demonstration farms for peasant laborers, and s<l('1;1I
services for outcasts. Many Hindus, nlthough leery tif Ill<
"good news," eagerly took up this cause or social rcfnrm
and, in the Bmhmo Samaj of the 19th century. launched
their own social gospel of reform or some or the ills ,md
neglects of Hinduism. Muslims displayed a split rc.ic1nin
to the Empire. Since they were lndia's previous ruler,..,
some resisted, and they went down to defeat in the Mulm~
of 1857. Others, such as Sir Sayccc.l Ahmntl Khan. anii.:u,
lated a path of accommodation with the British, insisun~
that Islam had no objections to at least the polith!ul culturlZ
of the West. Indeed, as a monotheistic "religion ur thi:
Book," Islam was the more naturnl ally of this culture th;m
was polytheistic Hinduism. Still othern were nol so ~ur~
of either the Hindus or the British {Pye, 19K5). It ~;1,
Mohammed Iqbal--poet, theologian, aml political thcmbt
who gave eloquent voice to a separate destiny !hr Mm,hm~
in the subcontinent (Malik, 1971 ).
Although never a directly ruled colony, the reacliun m
China was equally intense. Tiananmen Square in Bcijini
was an architectural declaration that it wus the gateway h1
Heaven. British gunboats brought a string of military
humiliations that shattered this gateway. A man who
dreamed that he was the younger brother of Jesus Chri~t
proclaimed a new portal and led the biwrre Taipinl:l,
Rebellion of the 1850s and 1860s. The movement also
preached equality for women and, at first, democracy. In
its suppression, it might have been dismissed as one of
those oddities of history, were it not for tho subsequent
influence the rebellion had on Mao Zedong and other rev-
olutionary modernizers (Ogden, 2002).

Meanwhile, the Qing Dynasty, Chinn 's last, made
earnest attempts at rcthnn. Western education replaced
classical texts for imperial civil service examinations.
Principles of constitutional democracy and parliamentary
elections were introdul!cd, as were modern railroads, mili~
tary academies, and financial institutionH. ln 1911, the
mixture of protest and reform exploded into a nationalist
revolution and a nearly 40-ycar interregnum of ehaos.
Intellectually, the boiling cuuldron of this ferment was
known ns the Muy Fourth Movement. In I.he lrnmilintion of
the demands of the upstart .lapuncse for the Shamlong
Peninsula al the Peace Conlcrcncc at Vcrsail lcs in May
1919, Chinese intellectuals dcspcralcly cast about for :1
prescription for modern power: in the prnginalism and lib-
eralism of John Dewey and the United States, in the mi li-
tarism from Germany und Japan, in language rel'nrm and
mass education, in physical culture and the cmtmdpalion
of women, in the assassirrntions und eomnurncs ol' mwr-
chism, and even in the communism of Karl Marx and the
Bolshevism or Russia (Zhou, I %0).
Then: was ferment in Southeast Asia as wdl. Pemmnts,
in a series of protests a Iler World Wnl' I. decried the col-
lapse of 11 trnditional social and political order guaranteed
by a royalty and l'cudal rctuincrs lhut used to sali!guard
their livelihoods and provide a sense of place anti security
by the Mandate ol' lh:avcn (in Vietnam), tile will tif Alluh
(in Malaya and lndoncsiu), the mandalu pallcm t1f pnlitks
and international relations ( in Thailand und Camhmlia ),
and u transl'ernl or mcril from Buddha (in Burma anti
Laos). Arter an initial. if reluctunt, uccommodatiun with
Western power and political institutions, these peasants
and emerging intcllcctuuls searched for thdr own h:rms nf

modern survival. The Cao Dai sect in Vietnam, whkh wnr-
shippcd nn all-seeing cosmic eye as interpreted hy Vklor
Hugo, Jesus Christ, Confucius, l.no Till, and foan uf An:.
il!ustrntcd this perplexity. The mood of rcsil,!nation lo thl'sc
confusing, but powerllil, outside forces was captmcd h~
the popult11· J tJth-century cpk pnl"m in Vietnam. K.mr nm
Kie11. This poem was a creative remake of :rn oltl ( 'him:sc
stmy nf n liliu I daughter who slays lrnc !ti her 1mtk:scn inµ
folhcr in a lire of untold sulforing but stcmlfosl ticvnlmn.
These r,casant protests, then. grew out ol' lh1:-.tr;itinns 1i 1.•r
their dcvoli(lll lo u traditional structure that could no lunger
i;ccnre this order ( Kershaw, 200 I),
In Japan in IX53. the conuncrciid viiiit or the ll.S,
naval communder ( 'ommodurc Matthew Purry found the
Japanese nt a moment in their history when they were
ready for an opening frorn the outsil.le. Their mature lcu-
dal order had reached a point of stugnutitm. A knightly
class of samurai undergirded an aristocracy that hdli the
emperor ho::.tage, even a:. this monarchy as an insliluticm
provided continuity, identity, and n sense of co::.mic pluce
for all Japanese. In the name or restoring the emperor to
real power (somwjoi), aristCJcratic modernizers overthrew
this samurai-dominated regime in what was called 1he
Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Constitution established a
Asian Political Thm1gltt • 563
liberal parliamentary system in the name of the c11111cror.
But for all this constilutiomdism, the fapancse actually
modcrnizcc.l through a military path of war with China
lirsl ( 1895) uml then Russia ( 1905; Gluck, 1985 ). Along
with these impressive manilestations of modem power,
the continued hold of samumi vnlucs, for all this Mcij i
"liberalism," wus nurtured by the.: education of all
Japuncse school children in rne Stm:v <!l tlw 47 Ronin, in

which linal loyalty was still given to extreme profossinns
of honor, in the nmnc of the cmpcrur. It was u path that
tumbled Japan into World Wur [I, its grculcst national
disaster (Bcncdict, 1946).
The fonnent touched off by European imperialism in
Asia was uot exclusively one wny. Eumpcans who had
prolonged coutad with Asian srn.:ictics were ol'tcn sur-
prised at what they saw. Despite their political wcuknusscs,
thc:;c sm:ictics revealed sophisticated and well-articulated
cultures. A lwst or scholars called "Oricnlnl ists," muny of
whom had served us colonial mlministrutors, begun to
trm1sl:rte hack for Eumpcun m1dicnces the ''pearls of the
Orient": thc philnsophk Upam):lwcls und the twin epics,
lite Me1lwhlwratll und the Ramaymw. from India, and tl1c
Analects 11( C1111/iwiu.~ nnd the J.>cw d<• Jing of Luo Dzc
( Lao Tzu) from C'hinn. Thc 111,ist mnbiti11us ,1 l' these rro-
jccts wai; thl.' I 11lh-ccntury "Ooldcn Bough" i,;crics of trans-
lations into Fnµlisl1. sponsm·cd by I lnrvard University, of
nwsl of' Asi,1 's linesl truditional work$. Thb impact, hnw-
evcr, was nmrc llum just inlhrmntivc. tdcas Ihm, these
trnnslatinns wor'ked their way into the transl:cntlcntulism
of the New Fn~land liM·ati (particularly on Ralph Waldo
Fmcrsun "m,crsntil"), us well us into lhc philosophic
syst~·ms o!' Martin l lcidcggcr and Fl'icdrich Nictzscl1c
and cwn into the 1111vcl:,; of' I krman flcssc, among others
tUarkc, PN7J.
l ln/<Htunatcly, some uf this nunantic "llricntulism"
tumi.nl p·ncrsc. ln thi:-. disc1wcry ,11'thc deep 1.:ulll1ral
ronls
,11' Asta. so1111.: Wcstcm sdmlars. partirnl.irly Uennau,
bt:g.111 h1 s1.•c llwmsclvl.'s ,ls dc!>ccndants or an elite lndo-
Ary,111 hru1h1:rhoud thal 1.•xtcmlcd from lhl.' Indus River hi
tht• Rhme ( M ulkr, It) 19 t ( icnnan natitmal sncinlism sub-
scqmmtly appr,1priatcll th!.' andeut I lrndu symhnl li.1r uni-

versal hrnthcrhnnd ns the i:cntcrptcL·e lo iii; !lag, !he
s,~ astil-.a
At lirst lfollcrcd by this ,11tcnlio11, mrnlcrn Asi,1n inkl-
kduals for their part hi.'.gun to resist this drnrnctcrizutiun
of a si:p.iwtc t1ric111albm us 1ant:111m11nt to u
i.:ivilizutimrnl
dismiss,11 similar tn the "sep,1rntc but cquul" kg:il <lm:trine
in the t Jnitcd States lhut scrvcll In perpchmlc racinl dis-
crimination. Whether intdlcdual trnditions prnduuc cul-
turally distinct idem, nr whether universal ideas fhrm uml
recllmbinc tlu~mselvcs 11rnuml different inlellectual tnu.Ji-
tions is II pervasive isi.ue of cpisternolt1gy. For the !ltudy of
political though! in Ash1, however, the unfortunate effect
of c,ricn1ali:.m has been to dismiss pol itic11I Lhllughl in Asia
as being lou cfosely Lied to religious constructiuns to be
worthy of secular analytical scrutiny.
Modern Asia
World War II (1939-1945) brought disaster to Europe.
Even in victory, the power of Britain and France collapsed,
and, with that collapse, their empires unraveled and their
hold over Asia ended. In independence, not always easily
gained, Asia was now free to find itself and define politics
in ways authentic to a free Asia and to the particular set of
traditional legacies and aspirations of each of its societies.
In this mix of the traditional and the colonial, what set of
political ideas and institutions would serve independent
Asian nations still having to fend for themselves in an
international system of Western creation and continued
dominance? In Asia's postwar trajecto1y of growing eco-

nomic prosperity and rising global political influence,
answers to this question have produced rich and innovative
contributions to the ongoing development of political
thought per se.
After World War II, all of Asia wanted to regain what
Asian counh·ies saw as their lost importance in the world.
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India,
expressed these hopes for all Asians when, in his exultant
Independence Day speech on August 15, 194 7, he
declared, "Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny,
and now the time comes when we shall redeem our
pledge" (cited in Hardgrave & Kochanek, 2000, p. 53).
Colonialism, he argued, had drained the wealth and ener-
gies of Asia, and now it would just flow back (Nehm,
1959). Although it certainly did not flow back right away,
in the opening years of the 21st centu1y, this tryst with a
recaptured Asian global importance seems well within
reach.
The Indian subcontinent, however, has been plagued by
serious differences both as to how to attain an independent
India and as to what it would look like. The towering fig-
ures in this agony were Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi.
Gandhi was the moral father of modem India. After travel-
ing around India for 4 years after his return from South
Africa at the age of 41 in 1915, Gandhi discovered his
three themes of poverty, unity, and indepe11dence. As he
made the continuation of British rule untenable, he won-ied
about an India "in pursuit of Lakshmi" (wealth), freed
from the moderating restraints of religion. Thus, even as he
dete1mined to entrust the future course of India to Nehru,
he was troubled by the younger man's Hamlet-like agnos-
ticism (Gandhi, 1957),
Nehru epitomized Macaulay's "Brown Sahib," and

Nehru's highly cerebral autobiography, The Discovery of
India (1946/1959), was really an m1iculation of his own
divided soul. His professed admiration for the ancient
Hindu scriptures and epics was profoundly philosophical
and somewhat idealized. He prefen·ed to highlight the
moments of unity and power and gloss over the divisions
and wars oflndia's past. He could not bring himself to take
this philosophical appreciation to a spiritual awakening.
For Nehru, the influences of a secular English liberalism
were too strong for this. To him, the best (ll' India lay in ii,
moments of unity around a clwkravarti11, or unh·cr::;.;tj
emperor, such as Ashoka, Harsha, or Akbar. lkcatbC or
India's deep religious and social divides, Nchm felt that
this unity could come, in modern times, only under a ~c,
ular India united by Western principles of lihcrnl <lcmoc~
racy. The Congress Party was rounded with this as its cor~
credo. Unfortunately, Nehru dulled his ccom1mks h~
embracing the socialism of the British Fuhi:ms 11nd lh~
Russian Bolsheviks (he expressed a continual admimtii1ri
for the accomplishments of the 5-year pluns of the Smil.'!t
Union). Under Nehru's lcadcrshi11 as prime 1m1w,ter
(l 947-1964), Lakshmi, the goddess or wt:ullh, rcmainql
aloof (Nehru, 1946/1959).
Although Gandhi and Nehru were the gi,mh, ,•1111:r
voices arose in the subcontinent. lronknlly cm111f.!h.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father or mmh:rn P.iJ..1,tiln.
shared Nehru's secularism cwn as he insislcd utt .1 ""r-t-
rate Muslim state. 01hers in Pakistan ct1llcd for thi., ,1a1c !11
be subservient lo the Jslmnh: Shari'a. This tlni~Ml h;t~
brought the country to the brink of im11lnsiu11 o',;:f the
never-healing sore ol' Kashmir and the recent rc.:rhtr.1.
tions of Islamic radicalism lhm1 Al'glmnishm ,md d•.:.
where in the Muslim wmld. There huvc 1-»!cll ~t,nl
voices in Hinduism a.s well. The terrorism c"~m,<J

B. K. Tilak heforc World Wur I and the foi.l.'.bm ul :,iubt,Jt,
Chandra Bose in World War II round exprc,,u,n 111
Hindu commtmalism or !-;anlar Vullahhhlmi fl,itd, S<ltni
co-prime minister in tht: lirst 2 yc.ir.. ol' imkf"Cltt!,;rt;,;,t
Patel died of u heaii attack, but these :-;c·cral d1 MH"
~,~i1~.h
collected into the I lindu nationalism or Mr .. l . :tlur,,i
the Bharaliyu Janata Prniy, whkh is now a crn:,10,1! 11,~,i,,,i,
•• r
rival to the secular Congn.:ss Party, J ndia :md l',1!..1~tu1
confront each other us nuclear powl.'r,. ;m~I ,a,1,,>f-h,;r.
chnkrnvartin, in this lcnxe sube~intinent. b n,• h~~.: i:i
(Mehta, 1996).
ln China. the lirst coherent voit:I..' tu nrlt:'11t1t· ..;i
modernization out or the swirling slt;1ml, nl
Fourth Movcnicnl was Sun Y,ll·scn, ht1 ,hl1.,i,,,.l1c~£ 1
min cl111yi (thrnc people's prindplci.l tit' l"'-'''l'k',.
hoot!, people's rule, aml pcopk:'s na1i111rnli"m lh.:
to uphold China's traditional Mandatc ul' lk.1'l'.!I lt,i:
was translated into rural lil'c as "lm1d tu the U!lt·11"
1,H:~0;r:..:
that the communists later tried to cull their 1m nl t
second principle, tkmocrm;y, Sun culkd l!if ;1
to constitutional democracy in ('hinu th1,•uih 1IM:i,i
stages of tutelage. In pructic<!, Sun's p-ohtn;;:il
Gumnindang, could not pull it utl It hin.::b'l;d
between the Christian sucial gospel of the Nt'iil
Movement and an Italian-like fascism or Bill(;' ShtJ1
pline, all the while continuing in a reluclJUlOI: •~
power. Even as Sun's ideology tailed in ChtnL rl
the basis for the subsequent ecunomic mime:le <m
It also desctibes the long path taken by South
economic prosperity and a lagged followint4, of
perity to full democracy (Wells, 200 I),

r
I
Another failure was the Hu Shih liberals, who
embraced linguistic reform and lJ.S."style demrn.:racy. This
faction was discredited by President Woodrow Wilson's
treachery at the Treaty of Versailles (in acquiescing to
granting the Concession of lhe Slrnndong Peninsula lo
Japan, mther than his public promise that it would he
returned to China), even us it went on to discredit itself
domestically by joining with the left-wing branch of the
Guomindang in the strategic historical error of siding with
the Japanese in their puppet stnlc of Manchukuo.
The communists were the ultimate victors in holh the
civil war with the Guomindang um] in the articulation of
modern China. Although the form or government came
straight from Lenin, Mm1 Zedong; frirmulaled u 110vel strat-
egy of revolution-e•people's war an<l introdw.:ed :;cveral
innovative political projects and organizations, most or
them disastrous. It was Deng Xiao Ping. the architect ol"
China's unprccl.!denled current economic gmwth, who
reintroduced to China a pragmatism worthy or both
Machiavelli and Adam Smith. This was reflected in his
legendary question about the importance of the color oflhe
cal as long as it could cutch mice. The credit !hr this prag-
matism, however, lay in the Four Modernizations of
Deng's earlier protector, Zhou Enlai, who quietly made a
career of fixing many of the excesses or Mao ·s zeal. It was
an uneasy Gandhi-Nehru-like relationship. and China st!I'..
fored for it- -but might have suffered more without it
(Goldman, 1994).
The truly novel definition or modernity in Asia came

from Japan. Utterly dcl'catcd in World War 11 and under
foreign occupation afterwurds { l 945 1952) fnr the lirst
lime in its history, Japan, in Article IX or its new constitu-
tion, outlawed war as an instn11nent ur li.ireign policy and
forbade the country to have a11ything hut a minimal "Sdr-
Defensc Force" as a militury institution. ls a sovereign
state, in what was called the Yoshida Dm:trine, Japan
placed its security in the hands of the llnitcd States and
dedicated its own energies exclusively toward Cl'Olllllllil.'
prosperity. Si nee then, in tile era alkr the ,.:old war, scwral
intcllcctuul and political voices have gmwn rcstin.' umler
this nrrungement. One popular political writer. a limnl.'r
mayor of Tokyo, titled his recent hook • .lust ,'11y .'11 lo
the United States. Others question the concept orrmtional·
ity us an unwekomc Western transplant even us they mlil··
ulate a distinctive identity and place for Japan (Sakai, de
Bary, & Toshio, 2005 ).
Southeast Asia has continued to lament its strategic
weakness. For nearly all Southeast Asian natkms. modem·
ization has been :iccompanied by ou!bursls o!' imlig.cnous
violence. It was convulsive in Indonesia in I 965 und again
in 1998-1999. Burma, Thailand, Philippim:s, Mu layu,
Vietnam, Cambodia, an<l Laos ull were wracked by immr-
gencies. Except for Malaya, the United States intervened
in all ofthem, massively so in Vietnam. In these struggle:;,
each country sought lo define its own modem national
identity in attempts to fashion integnitive polities that
Asf1111 P<Jlititx,l Tlwug!,t • 565
coul<l overeome the separatist groups and ideologies fuel-
ing lhc insurgencies. With most of these convulsions over
by the start of the new millennium (2000 ), these countries
have now endeavored to integrnte regionally. Their organi-
zation, the Association of Soulh!.!ast Asian Nations, repre-

sents an interesting institutional countcrpt1ise in intcniational
!'elations lo the more developed European Union.
Conclusion: Cultural
Grounding of Concepts
This considcmtion of the politicnl thought of Asia as it has
responded to the three contextual challenges of the classi-
cal. colnuial, and nrndcrn pcriods brings us to the question
or an Asian distinctiveness regarding nwdcrn Asian con-
ccplinns nl' denwcracy and its emnpaninn ideas of li·ccdom
and equality. illlmugh the constitutions ol' many Asian
slates, those ol' l11diu and Jap:m in particular, hear the
imprint of Western ideas and institutions, lite sources or
these idem; emerge from dillbrent cultures and hi:,;torical
cxpcriern.:cs. Asian ones. tt rnol, although there is nothing
in Asian experience or culture to preclude democracy
itself: what may require ~lill'crcnl institutional expression
of rhis 1irim:iple is the fundnmcntal di ffercncc hclwcen
Asitt and the West over the balance between the individual
uml !he family. In ull Asian countries. fornily anti its tics to
the stnh.• and its loyalties come before the freedom lo churl
individual destinies. In the West, on the other hand, indi-
viduals arc cm.:ourngcd to cut loose from family tics lo
frcdy chart their individual fi.irlm11.:s with mi inequalities in
status dtlwr wilhin the thrnily or in the larger sncicly (nl
11.:ast in tlwnry l. This di ffcrcnl hahml'C calls for a dillcn:nt
ddinitiunal rl•l:11innship uf freedom an,I etJuulity tn
dclllol·ral·y. Nt1 rnic hus made this dislinctilln more clear
titan I.cc Kw.in Yew, the former prillll' minister of
Sinµaplln.'. wlw hils insisted that dcnu11:racy in Asia must
still hi.' ~11h111dinah.· to fomily tlisl·iplinc and lhcrcliirc
lllalk no apnloµics for authori1inµ the: p11blk caning or
Western ;alnlcst:cnts for vandalism in the streets nfhis city
(lkll. ~(J(l(I)

J fcnt:l'. to dtsrnss dcmrn:r.11:y 111 Asia. Wl' need to bring
utl11:r words aml Clllll'Cpls inl11 play. Jh:ally, dl·moerncy in
Asia should he .i:l in a disl'Ussilln of :-.talcnafl and politi·
cal authority. llu:st: bsucs. in Asia, were fticuscd on creat-
ing order a11d preserving sol.'ial hiL·1-.irchy. altlmugh nil
Asian polith:al li;ts!crns rccu1,1ni1cd that statccrun and
political authority were he~! scrn:d hy reciprocity and the
legitinmting nf 1hcir uctions in ways that earni!d public
supr,ori. untl uppmval. There ,m..' cuntcxtuul gmunds, then,
for th.:mocniL:y in A:.iu, but not on the sumc cguli!uriun
friundations us in the Wt:st. Pye ( l lJX:'i). for example, tulks
nt'dcmocracy in Asia us best urising out of u hishirical con-
tcx;l of paternal authority and what he culls 11 politics <f
de/H!lltlt•m·,•. Hell (2000) has pmposed an Asian bicameral
legislature, willl one house bused cm popular egnlilarian
representation and the other on knowledge, a "House of
Scholars." Parenthetically, this notion brings us around the
intellectual circle to Plato's insistence on ultimate rule by
philosopher-kings (Lomperis, 1984).
Similarly, the Westem centerpiece, freedom, needs to
be recast in Asia as well Rather than all the human rights
guaranteed to individuals in the West through a constitu-
tional Bill of Rights and the like, freedom in Asia has been
differently defined in at least three ways. First, in Asia,
freedom is more of a group concept than an individual
one. Indians could pursue swanlj (self-rule) against the
British, but to its greatest champion, Gandhi, for indi-
viduals swaraj meant more communal responsibilities to
autonomous little communities (ashrams), not more indi-
vidual human rights.

Thus, second, freedom for the individual boils down to
relative degrees of autonomy from the multilayered oblig-
ations of these all-encompassing social structures. The
overarching value here is responsibility. Freedom is the
leftover. Daoist knights-errant and Hindu kshatriya war-
riors had the freedom of battle and of strategy, but only
within the parameters of their larger duties to the Heavenly
Mandate in China and the cosmic dharma (duties) of their
souls in India. In the Indian epic Mahabharata, the hero
Arjuna was not allowed the freedom to be a pacifist and
opt out of the cosmic baitle at Kurekshetra because the
duty of his kshatriya caste compelled his martial service to
uphold order. For women, duties were equally stark. In
China, the vittues of high-class women were secured by
footbinding. High-caste widows in ancient India had the
"freedom" of avoiding the dejected status of widowhood
or humiliating pollution of remarriage by committing
suttce (self-immolation on a funeral pyre).
Third, the fullest expression of freedom in Asia is reli-
gious. In China, Buddhism offered release, or nirvana,
from the world and its politics. Daoism cultivated a free-
dom of the soul within the external responsibilities and
rituals of Confucianism. And in India, the householder
(the responsible citizen, in Western pal'!ance) could hon-
orably flee to the forests, after discharging his many
social and political duties, and seek moksha, the release
that comes from enlightenment. Until the insertion of
Western politics and ideas, freedom, in Asia, did not lie
in politics.
Finally, the overarching Western ethos of equality has
had a strong impact on all Asian societies. Indeed, this idea
became the linchpin to undennining the Western imperium
itself. But even with this wave of Western egalitarianism,

Asian societies retain an even more profound rootedness in
hierarchy. Western ideas of equal treatment and equal
dignity have woven their way into the fabric of all Asian
societies. But the "rightness" of hierarchy remains
(Dumont, 1970). Gandhi, for example, called members of
the "untouchable" caste haxijans, or "children of God," but
still supported the moral virtue of the hierarchical caste
system itself. Echoes of the old Confucian hierarchy
remain strong in China, as do patterns of the samurai ritual
and hierarchical obligations in Japan, particularly in its
unique corporate culture. Thus, equalily in Asia, with lhis
hierarchical persistence, is better rendered as equity. which
is a word that gives more mom for social laddern in a for-
mulation of fairness and justice.
Illustratively, then, in passing these three universal
political concepts of democracy, freedom, and equality
through the analytical prism of the historical context of
Asia, we find that all Asians persist in holding onto two
anchors. First, Asians retain a strong rrelcrence for groups,
particularly the extended family, over individunls ns the
primary unit of society. Second, in this preforcncc lbr
groups, Asitms continue to choose a hierarchicnl ordering
of these groups over any comrrehcnsive notions of l'ull
social equality. The persistent hold (lf these two tinclmrs
necessitates an Asian rcfonnulation or these corn.:cpt:,;,
which have heretofore been defined only l'rom a Western
context. Thus, the expression of individual lhicdmn or
rights from the West must in Asia be tcmpcrcll by a greater
consideration for group rcsronsibilities so lhat freedom in
Asia is merely a relative autonomy from them. Similarly,
the penchant for hierarchy in Asia imposes equity as an
appropriate expression of fairness, rather than equality.
Tuming to politics from these two reformulations, ,kmoc~
racy in Asia, therefore, will need lo be constrw.:tecl and

expressed in political arrangements that value groups aml
legitimate hierarchy. Thus, the cultural scllings of such
seemingly universal politicul conccpls as dcmocrncy. free-
dom, and equality achieve richer meaning and nmmcc
when analyzed comparatively through their cvt1lutiun in
other cultures, including those in Asia.
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Wit!liigcl. K. A. t I '1!'i7). Orit•111,,i dt•.vp11fi.1·m. New
lluvi:n, CT:
Yak U11iv1crsity Press.
Yu1.m. !). 11 11.11 }. fht· rm/t• 11/lht• .v1111111mi ( A. 1..
Sudler. Trans.).
Rull.ind, VT: Charles I:. Tulllc.
/hm1. ( 'c11111ii. I l '1(1(1). TIit' Mai· l·'u11nh IIIO't'lllt'!I(:
/111el/{'ct1111/
r,·rnl11t11111 ill mml,•m ( 'hiua. Stauford. ( 'A: Stanford
I iniwrsi1y Pre~,,
..-.. Borrower: DVP Call Number:
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I-
CHAPTER I
THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF
INDIGENOUS AFRICA N POLITICAL
SYSTEMS A ND INSTITUTIONS
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
(5) Every individual has a right to life and to defend his/her
personal
integrity. Consequently, any attempt at taking someone else's
life 1vill be
punished by death; (16) In addition to their daily chores, women
must be
involved in all levels of government; (22) Vanity is a sign of
weakness, and
humility a sign of greatness; (24) In Mali, never mistreat a
foreigner; (25)
In Mali, the envoy is always safe.
-Selected articles from the Mande Charter (1240)

[La Charte de Kurukan Puga], 45, 47, 49, 51
INTRODUCTION
Highly advanced and sophisticated African civilizations,
cultures, societ-
ies, and states-such as Ancient Egypt, Kush/Nubia, Axum,
Ghana, Mali,
and Asante-evolved throughout the continent from the ninth
century
before the Christian era (BCE) to the nineteenth century CE.
African politi-
cal systems and institutions were traditionally based on kinship
and lineage
(i.e., c ommon ancestry), sanctioned by a founding myth. The
lineage was
a powerful and effective force for unity and stability in ancient
Africa. Each
lineage had its head, chosen on the basis of age, maturity, and
relation to
ancestors. The old (respectfully referred to as "elders") were
often chosen
as lineage heads because old age was usually associated with
wisdom. Each
ethnic group had its own system of government. In all
indigenous African
societies, political organization began at the lineage or village
level. Religion
defined moral duties and controlled conduct; it informed laws
and customs,
as well as accepted norms of behavior. In African systems of
thought, religion
is an essential part of life; indeed, religion and life are
inseparable. What this

12 AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
description accurately portrays is "the belief held among
African communi-
ties that the supernatural powers and deities operate in every
sphere and
activity of lite. Religion and lite are inseparable, and lite is not
comparted [sic]
into sacred and secular." 1
INDIGENOUS AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND
INSTITUTIONS: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
AND DEMOCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS
In indigenous African political systems, the rules and
procedures of gover-
nance were established by custom and tradition rather than by
written con-
stitutions. In addition, these systems were based on the rule of
/a�that
is, respect for ( and adherence to) customary ways of resolving
disputes and
upholding the traditions governing political behavior. More
important, cus-
tomary African laws were subject to foll public debate and
scrutiny; in fact,
chiefs and kings could not promulgate laws without the consent
of the coun-
cils. In Pharaonic Egypt-as in other indigenous African
societies-every
individual was equal before the law: "Pharaonic law remained
resolutely indi-
vidualistic. In relation to royal decisions and to legal procedure

and penalties,
men and women of all classes seem to have been equals before
the law. "2
Indigenous African political systems were democratic in many
respects.
First, they were based on an elaborate system of checks and
balances; such
institutions as the Inner or Privy Council and the Council of
Elders acted as
effective checks on the potential abuse of power by the leader (
chief, king, or
emperor).3 Second, political succession was carefully
institutionalized in such
a way that family, clan, and ethnic competition for power was
minimized and
(physically or mentally) unfit leaders were automatically
eliminated. Third,
the basic political unit was the village assembly, where major
decisions con-
cerning the society were adopted and ordinary people were able
to express
their opinions, have their voices heard, and actively participate
in a politi-
cal decision-making process based on majority rule. A specific
socioprotes-
sional group ( or caste )-such as the griots ( or praise-singers) in
the Western
Sudan-were the custodians of tradition and the living historical
memory of
the society.
INDIGENOUS AFRICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEMS AS SECULAR AND SACRED

In indigenous African societies, the social order was informed
by the belief--
passed on from generation to generation-that the ancestors
constituted
the link between the present, the past, and the future . The
African concept
of power fused the secular and the sacred. The leader was both a
secular
and religious leader and acted as intermediary between the
living and the
dead-between the people and their ancestors. The following
quote from
K. A. Busia perfectly captures the essence of this concept as it
relates to the
case of the Asante:
THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
In traditional African communities, it was not possible to
distinguish between
religious and non-religious areas of life. All life was religious
... for in tradi-
tional African communities, politics and religion were closely
associated. In
many tribes, the chief was the representative of the ancestors.
This enhanced his
authority. He was respected as the one who linked the living
and the dead ...
The most important aspect of Ashanti [Asante] chieftaincy was
undoubtedly
the religious one. An Ashanti chief filled a sacred role ... The
chief was the link
between the living and the dead, and his highest role was when
he officiated

in the public religious rites which gave expression to the
community values ...
This sacral aspect of the chief's role was a powerful sanction of
his authority.4
13
The religious authority of the leader meant that he was also
custodian of the
land bequeathed to the group by the ancestors and held in sacred
trust by the
leader on behalf of the whole people; this explains why the land
could under
no circumstance be individually appropriated. While some
indigenous Afri-
can political systems were more elaborate and institutionalized
than others-
the so-called state societies-all of them had some form of
centralized power
and authority. 5
POWER AND AUTHORITY IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
In indigenous African political systems, the power of leaders
was derived from
the founding ancestors and was hereditary in the sense that it
was reserved
for certain lineages by right of ancestry. Thus, in the Mali
Empire, Keita was
customarily the ruling clan by virtue of the fact that the empire
was founded
in 1235 by Sunjata Ke"ita against tremendous odds.6 Similarly,
as documented
by Elliott Skinner, in the Massi kingdoms, political power was

linked to close-
ness to the ancestors: "To the Mossi, the power to rule was
intimately linked
to closeness of descent from the royal ancestors. The
supernatural power of
these ancestors, and the vigilance they were believed to
maintain over the
affairs of their descendants, were regarded as important factors
in Massi gov-
ernment ... Ritual and the supernatural thus played an extremely
important
role in the cohesiveness of the Mossi kingdoms and in the
functioning of
their governmental processes."7 The leaders were customarily
appointed by
members of the royal lineage ( who constituted the Inner or
Privy Council).
In the Mali Empire, in addition to the Keita ruling clan, the
aristocratic clans
represented in this council were Koulibaly, Soumano, and
Konate.8 As the
guardian of the social order and the "soul of the nation," the
leader needed
to be endowed with certain personal and moral qualities; he was
expected
to be strong, generous, humble, courageous, bold in warfare,
and devout in
everyday life. As they derived their power from their ancestors,
African lead-
ers were endowed with (and exercised) both religious and
secular powers.
Wealth and property did not belong to the leader personally, but
rather to the
office. Thus in the kingdom of Ghana ( eighth to eleventh
centuries), gold
( the basis of the kingdom's wealth) was held in trust for the

people by the
king, who could not appropriate it for personal use. According
to El Bekri,
"All nuggets of gold that are found in the mines of this empire
belong to the
king; but he leaves to his people the gold dust that everyone
knows. Without
this precaution gold would become so plentiful that it would
practically lose
its value . "9 Similarly, in Asante ( central Ghana), the "Golden
Stool" was the
symbol of the office of the Asantehene (Supreme Chief of the
Asante) and
was said to embody the spirit of the whole Asante nation. Thus
the Golden
Stool-presented to the Asante as enshrining the "soul of the
nation"-
constituted an emblem of unity and formed the religious basis
of the Asante
Confederation.10 This explains why (as reported by Colin
Turnbull) the out-
rageous demand on the part of a junior British officer to be
allowed to sit
on the Golden Stool was perceived as an insult that resulted in a
bloody war
between the Asante and the British: "What he [ the junior
British officer] did
not know was that the Golden Stool was not a throne ... to be sat
upon. It
was the sacred symbol of the unity of the Ashanti [Asante]
nation, and it was

believed to contain the soul of the Ashanti [Asante] people.
Therefore what
the officer proposed was ... to defile the sacred stool, desecrate
the soul of
the nation, and so destroy its very existence. "11
Another democratic feature of indigenous African political
systems was the
decentralization of political authority and the delicate balance
between central
and regional power, which allowed each lineage or village to
manage its own
affairs and gave ordinary people a say in local governance.
Again, the Asante
political system, as described by K. A. Busia, perfectly
illustrates this situation:
The Ashanti [Asante] were careful to prevent their chief from
becoming tyran-
nical, and they developed a delicate balance between central
authority and
regional autonomy . . . In matters of administration, each
lineage or village
managed its own affairs ... each chiefdom was run on a policy
of decentral-
ization, and there was a careful balance between the central
authority of the
chief on the one hand and the local autonomy of the component
units of the
chiefdom on the other. If the chief abused his power, his
subordinate chiefs,
the members of his Council, could destool him. On the other
hand, if a subor-
dinate chief or councilor tried to become too powerful, the chief
could destool
him ... In the Ashanti system, the fact that each lineage, village,

or part of a
chiefdom managed as much of its own affairs as was consistent
with the unity of
the whole chiefdom enabled many to share in decision-making
in local affairs;
for the head of each unit was, like the chief at the center,
obliged to act only on
the concurrence and with the advice of his own local council.12
The African leader was fully accountable for his actions at all
times. In theory,
the leader ruled for life, but in practice, he ruled only as long as
the people
allowed it: "However autocratic a chief was permitted to appear,
he really
ruled by the consent of the people. There was a balance between
authority
on the one side, and obligation on the other." 13 The leader
would be aban-
doned, be removed, or-in the worst-case scenario-be the victim
of a ritual
murder if he did not perform according to customs and
expectations or if
his people so wished, irrespective of how long he had been in
office. Thus
THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 15
K. A. Busia describes the circumstances leading to the
customary "destool-
ment" (i.e., removal) of the chief in Asante in the following
manner:
The Ashanti [Asante] had a constitutional practice which

ensured that the will
of the people was given consideration. They had ultimately the
constitutional
right to destool a chief. As the fundamental principle was that
only those who
elected a chief could destool him, a destoolment required the
consent of the
elders. Sometimes they initiated a destoolment themselves
when, for example, a
chief repeatedly rejected their advice, or when he broke a taboo,
or committed
a sacrilegious act . .. A chief was also destooled ifhe became
blind, or impotent,
or suffered from leprosy, madness, or fits, or if his body was
maimed in a way
that disfigured him . 14
Similarly, aggrieved or oppressed peasant subjects could always
"vote with
their feet" by deserting the village to create a new one, leaving
the chief
alone ( a social death sentence in African culture) . In most
African societies,
natural disasters (such as droughts, famines, and epidemics)
were generally
attributed to the fact that the chief or king had not ruled well
and thus should
be deposed or killed (regicide). Ritual murders of kings deemed
morally or
physically unfit to rule were commonly practiced among the
Serer of Senegal,
the Junkun and Yoruba of Nigeria, and the Shilluk of the Nilotic
Sudan.
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN

An elaborate system of checks and balances ensured that the
power and
authority of the African leader was strictly circumscribed. In
exercising his
functions and discharging his duties as the ultimate political,
legal, and reli-
gious authority---essentially the maintenance oflaw and order
and the man-
agement of public affairs for the good of the community-the
leader had to
take the advice and counsel of two key advisory bodies: the
Inner or Privy
Council and the Council of Elders. The Inner or Privy Council
represented
the aristocratic clans and constituted the inner circle of the
chief: relatives
and friends, as well as prominent members of the community.
This system
is well described by K. A. Busia in the case of Asante: "The
political system
of the Ashanti [Asante] . . . had checks and balances. The chief
... was
given a Council to hold him in check. The chief was bound by
custom to
act only with the concurrence and on the advice of his Council.
If he acted
arbitrarily, and without consultation and approval by his
Council, he could
be deposed ... Those who elected the chief, also had the power
to depose
him if he did not perform the duties of his office satisfactorily.
" 15 The Inner
or Privy Council was appointed (and thus could be dismissed)
by the leader.
On the other hand, the Council of Elders represented the non-

aristocratic
lineages and the commoners and thus could not be dismissed by
the chief.
This body reached its decisions by consensus and aimed at
unanimity rather
than majority. Failure on the part of the leaders to consult with
the Council
of Elders could result in their removal. 16
At the village level, ordinary African people acted as the
ultimate judge and
final authority on contested issues. Thus the Village Assembly
was convened
whenever the Council of Elders could not reach unanimity on a
contested
issue. In Bantu societies (Central and Southern Africa), Village
Assemblies
also ratified all new laws. Meeting procedures in the Village
Assemblies were
essentially democratic. First, the chief-addressing the assembly
through a
spokesman-would explain the purpose of the meeting, merely
stating the
facts. The chief's advisors would then open the debate, followed
by headmen
and elders. Then, anybody else wishing to speak or ask
questions ( common-
ers, women, etc.) could do so. Decisions were usually taken by
consensus;
if that proved impossible, majority rule prevailed. Total
freedom of expres-

sion-in the form of open debate and free dissent-was the rule.
Thus Afri-
can political systems were truly democratic in the sense that
they allowed
ordinary people to have their voice heard and influence political
decision
making: "The Ashanti [Asante] system provided opportunities
for the 'com-
moners,' those who were ruled, to express criticism, either
through their
lineage heads, or through a chosen leader recognized as
spokesman for the
commoners; through him the body of free citizens could
criticize the govern-
ment and express their wishes ... in the last resort, they could
depose their
rulers. " 17
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN
Women played a key role in African societies, as well as in
African political sys-
tems and institutions. In Ancient Egypt, women were master of
their homes
and senior to their husbands, and children were named after
them. 18 In gen-
eral, honors were showered on the mothers, wives, and
daughters of the king.
It is interesting to note that there were four women pharaohs in
Ancient
Egypt: Nitokris, Sebeknefru, Hatshepsut, and Tauosre. Women
played a key
role in the political system. Also noteworthy is the fact that
Ahmosis-Nefer-

tari (under Amenhotep I) and Ahhotep (under Amasis) wielded
consider-
able influence in political and religious matters.19 One of the
most intriguing
characters of the New Kingdom (1580 to 1085 BCE) was the
ambitious
Queen Hatshepsut, only child of Queen Ahmosis and
Thoutmosis I and the
very first female monarch in world history. In the fifth year of
her reign,
she was powerful enough to declare herself supreme ruler of the
country.
The two peaceful decades of her reign were prosperous ones for
Egypt. She
gave priority to the country's internal affairs, commissioned a
number o f
important building projects, and revived-after a military
expedition-the
trade to Punt (present-day Somalia), which had lapsed for
several hundred
years.20 According to Maspero (quoted by Cheikh Anta Diop),
Hatshepsut's
rights of succession were superior to those of her male relatives
(husba n d,
brother, and father), as she claimed Amon-Re as her "father."
Consequently,
she appeared, in the eyes of the people, as the legitimate heir to
the ruling
Egyptian dynasties. One could conclude from this that in
Ancient Egypt,
women naturally inherited political rights.21

In Kush-the ancient Nubian rival kingdom of Egypt-the queen
mother
played a crucial role in the political system. In religious
matters, the queen
was second only to the king. Queens could also act as co-
regents when they
assumed power after the death of their husbands. Sometimes,
queen mothers
directly assumed political office. According to Hakem, many of
these queen
mothers became famous, and "in Greco-Roman times, Meroe
was known to
have been ruled by a line of Candace, Kandake or queen-
regnant." These
Kandake were extremely powerful figures, often able to act as
the full-fledged
rulers o f the kingdom and, in such cases, to be buried with full
royal rituals.22
The Mande Charter stipulates that because they are mothers,
women
should always be treated with respect; it also rules that in
addition to their
domestic duties, women should also be part of the political
decision-making
process.23 Maninka women enjoyed a high social status and a
high degree
of freedom. Thus, until the middle of the fourteenth century, the
first wife
of the mansa (emperor) of Mali was the second most senior
person in the
politico-administrative hierarchy of the empire. The key
province of Jenne
was under her direct authority.24

CUSTOMARY LAW AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
In African societies-as in any other society-disputes arise in any
family or
social group with regard to property. Various mechanisms and
institutions
were created to resolve these disputes. In Africa, individual
attachment to lin-
eages always carried the potential risk of transforming personal
disputes into
broader group conflicts, as was often the case among the Ganda
(Uganda)
and the Nuer (Sudan). As a result, the principles of custom,
tradition, and
fairness were paramount, and particular emphasis was placed on
the peaceful
resolution of disputes and the promotion of social harmony.
Thus the Arusha
of Tanzania strongly believed that disputes should be settled
peacefully "by
persuasion and by resort to the established procedures for
settlement." Simi-
larly, the Tallensi of Ghana abhorred killings and the violent
resolution of
conflicts. During the Golib festival, all feuds and hostilities
between clans
were prohibited, and "the themes of food, harmony, fecundity,
and the com-
mon interests of the people as a whole" were emphasized.25
Peace and security prevailed in most indigenous African states.
Thus the

Mande C harter specifically states that in Mali foreigners should
never be
harmed and that the security of foreign envoys is inviolable. 26
lbn Battuta's
observations on the Mali Empire are pertinent in th.is regard:
"Among these
qualities [ of the Blacks] there is also the prevalence of peace in
their country,
the traveler is not afraid in it, nor is he who lives there in fear
of the chief or
of the robber by violence.
,
m The maintenance of peace within most African
communities was based on four fundamental legal principles:
settlement of
disputes by deliberation and discussion, rather than by force;
correction of
wrongdoing by compensation ( except in serious offences such
as murder);
assessment and adjudication by elders, who were considered to
be impartial;
and fairness.28 Thus the Mande Charter ruled that two
inviolable principles
should prevail in relations among the people of Mali:
sanankunya (joking
relation) and tanamannyonya ( blood pact). As a result, respect
of the other
and peaceful settlement of disputes were the rule. 29
CONCLUSION

This chapter began by observing that advanced African
civilizations, cultures,
societies, and states-such as Ancient Egypt, Kush/Nubia, Axum,
Ghana,
Mali, and Asante-evolved throughout the continent, from the
ninth cen-
tury BCE to the nineteenth century CE.
Indigenous African political systems and institutions were
traditionally
based on kinship and common ancestry. These systems were
based on the rule
of la1:v, and the rules and procedures of governance were
established by cus-
tom and tradition. In these systems, succession was
institutionalized in such a
way that family, clan, and ethnic competition for power was
minimized. The
African concept of power fused the secular and the sacred; the
leader was
both a secular and religious leader, and he acted as intermediary
between the
living and the dead-between the people and their ancestors.
Indigenous African political systems were essentially
democratic in the
sense that ( l) they were based on an elaborate system of checks
and balances
according to which advisory bodies-such as the Inner or Privy
Council and
the Council of Elders-acted as effective checks on the potential
abuse of
power by the leader ( chief, king, or emperor) and ( 2) through
the agency
of the village assemblies these systems allowed ordinary people

to have their
voices heard and influence political decision making. Moreover,
the African
leader was accountable for his actions at all times. In theory,
the leader ruled
for life, but in practice he ruled only as long as the people
allowed it. In addi-
tion, women played a key role in African societies, as well as in
Indigenous
African political systems and institutions.
Indigenous African political systems did not all follow the same
pattern of
state formation. Each differed depending on the conditions
facing it, resource
availability, military strength, leadership style, population,
types of state, and
size. In indigenous Africa, power and authority varied from
highly central-
ized (kingdoms and empires) to highly decentralized structures
of gover-
nance. States were either centralized under one leader or federal
systems in
which the people in the periphery paid tribute to the leader. The
reference to
"indigenous" should not be read as a nostalgic "golden age," but
rather as a
way of analyzing which institutions can be modified to be
incorporated in a
reconstituted modern African state.
FURTHER READING

Ayittey, George B. N ., Indigenous African Institutions
(Ardsley-on-Hudson, NY:
Transnational Publishers, 1991).
CELTHO, La Charte de Kurukan Puga: Aux sources d,une
pensee politique en Afrique
[The Mande Charter of 1340] (Paris: L' Harmattan/SAEC, 2008
).
Davidson, Basil, The African Genius: An Introduction to
African Cultural & Social
History (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969).
Diop, Cheikh Anta, Precolonial Black Africa (Chicago:
Lawrence Hill Books, 1987 ).
Pyle, C. Magbaily, Introduction to the History of African
Civilization; Volume I: Pre-
Colonial Africa (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1999).
H arris, Joseph E., Africans and Their History, 2nd revised
edition (New York: Merid-
ian/ Penguin Books, 1998).
Shinnie, Margaret, Ancient African Kingdoms (London: Edward
Arnold, 1965 ).
CONCLUSION
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER
OF IDEAS AND VALUES

TOWARD PEACE, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
.funcan political thought refers to the original ideas, values, and
blueprints
for a better Africa that inform African political systems and
institutions from
the ancient period to the present. African political thought also
refers to
political theories and ideologies developed by various African
scholars and
statesmen, as enunciated in their speeches, autobiographies,
writings, and
policy statements. Political thought usually precedes and
informs political
action; the latter, in turn, influences political thought. Political
theory and
political practice are thus inextricably linked. In other words,
African politi-
cal thought provides practical solutions to political, economic,
social, and
cultural problems, and it varies according to historical
circumstances and a
constantly changing African and world political environment.
A major distinction was made between indigenous and modern
African
political thought. The former was developed during the so-
called golden
age of African history and refers to the governance of ancient
kingdoms and
empires ( such as Egypt, Kush/Nubia, Axum, Ghana, Mali,
Songhay, and
Kanem-Bornu), but it was also developed by such scholars as
Ibn Khaldun,

Al Bekri, and Ibn Battuta and is associated with indigenous
African politi-
cal systems and institutions. Modern African political thought
emerged in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and was
developed by Afri-
can scholars such as James Africanus Horton, Edward Wilmot
Blyden, and
Kofi A. Busia.
All the modern African authors/statesmen surveyed in this book
exhibit
a number of common characteristics. First, they are both
political think-
ers and political statesmen/ activists, linking theory and
practice as all great
philosopher-kings have done throughout history. Second, all
have, to various
degrees, been influenced by the Marxist- Leninist ideology.
Third, they are all
truly dedicated to the welfare and well-being of their countries
and people.
As such, they were all dedicated African nationalists. Fourth,
they ruled for
a relatively short period of time ( sometimes not at all), and
many died in the
prime of their lives ( often at the hands of agents of Western
powers), as the
cases of Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon, Patrice Lumumba,
Thomas Sankara,
Agostinho Neto, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, and Steve

Biko clearly
illustrate. As a result, these statesmen/activists were unable to
see their poli-
cies mature and bear fruit.
This textbook is, to the best of our knowledge, the very first
attempt to
synthesize African political thought into one single thematic
volume . There
are other features that make this volume unique and original.
For one thing,
it is the first book in which indigenous African political ideas
and values ( from
antiquity to the nineteenth century) are examined alongside
modern African
political ideas (from the nineteenth century to the present).
Furthermore,
it is also the very first time that the emergence of Islamic values
and ideas
on governance between the second and eighth centuries in
North, Vest-
ern, Central, and Eastern Africa are studied in relation to
indigenous African
values and ideas on governance. Finally, contrary to existing
works on the
subject, this textbook focuses primarily on the ideas and the
common themes
that bind them rather than on the individualJ-whether scholars,
statesmen,
or leaders-themselves.
Chapter 1 consisted of an overview of the political ideology of
indigenous
African political systems and institutions, from antiquity to the
nineteenth
century. We showed that those systems and institutions were

traditionalh·
based on kinship, ancestry, and the rule oflaw; furthermore,
they were essen-
tially democratic in that they were based on an elaborate system
of checks and
balances, and they involved ordinary people in the political
decision-making
process. Moreover, the African leader was accountable for his
actions at all
times. The purpose of this analysis is not to reclaim a nostalgic
"golden age ''
but rather to identify the still functioning elements of the
indigenous African
political systems and institutions that could be incorporated into
a recon-
figured African state and fused with the positive elements of
modern Afri-
can political systems, as advocated by such scholars as Daniel
Osabu-Kle and
Mueni wa Muiu and as experimented in practice by Amilcar
Cabral, SamorJ.
Machel, Thomas Sankara, and Julius Nyerere.
In Chapter 2, we examined the influence of Islamic values and
ideas on
indigenous African political systems and institutions, from the
tenth to the
nineteenth centuries . Islam as a religion and way of life is one
of the funda-
mental aspects of African civilization . The period from the
seventh to the
sixteenth centuries witnessed the progressive Islamization of the
states and
societies of North Africa, the Western and Central Sudan,
Ethiopia, Somalia,
the East African coastal areas, and the Indian Ocean islands. In

West Africa,
Islam spread mostly to the urban commercial and political
centers among the
ruling elite and the aristocracy, leading to the emergence of a
clerical class
TRANSFORMATJVE POWER OF IDEAS 155
( ulama) in these urban centers. The majority of the people-
mostly peas-
ants living in the rural areas-were barely influenced by Islam
and remained
faithful to their indigenous African beliefs. As a result, Islam in
the Western
Sudan was very much a mixed religion that included elements of
the Berber
and other indigenous African religions.
The available historical evidence shows that from the eleventh
to the eigh-
teenth century, a process of Africanization of Islam took place.
This process
of mutual cross-fertilization resulted from a fusion of elements
of Islamic
religion, culture, and values with elements of indigenous
African religion,
culture, and values that produced a mixed religion retaining
aspects of both.
Nineteenth-century Islamic revival in the Western Sudan took
the form of a
militant Messianic movement and a social revolution, leading to
the creation
of a new political entity, the Islamic theocratic state, which
collided with

preexisting indigenous African political systems and
institutions. Unfortu-
nately, the two systems could not be reconciled, and the
theocratic states
failed primarily because they were not based on indigenous
values, traditions,
and institutions.
Chapter 3 begins with an overview of the image of Africa as the
"Dark
Continent" and Africans as "primitive" and "uncivilized"
constructed by
Europeans-under the influence of social Darwinism-from the
sixteenth
century onward. The chapter then focused on the French
colonial policies
of assimilation and association as well as on the British policy
of "Indirect
Rule"; it also examined the rise of economic and political
liberalism in nine-
teenth century Europe as a background to the rise of
"humanitarianism."
The next section focused on a small Western-educated West
African intel-
lectual elite-Edward W. Blyden, James Africanus Horton, and
Joseph E.
Casely Hayford-which attempted to reconcile Western systems
of thought
with African values, culture, and traditions-or Western
liberalism with Afri-
can democracy. The last section examined the ideas of two
prominent African
advocates of liberal democracy: Kofi Busia of Ghana, who
believed in the
universal character of liberal democracy, and Kenneth Kaunda
of Zambia,

who advocated the political ideology of African humanism.
Chapter 4 examined Pan-Africanism and African unity, from
ideal to prac-
tice. According to the standard-bearers of Pan-Africanism
during the early
post-independence period-Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Ben Bella,
Patrice
Lumumba, Ahmed Sekou Toure, and Modibo Kei:ta-the African
states
should aim for immediate political and economic integration in
the form of a
"United States of Africa" consisting of an African Common
Market, African
Monetary Union, African Military High Command, and a
continent-wide
Union Government. Alas, the continental organization that was
eventually
set up on May 25, 1963-the Organization of African Unity
(OAU)-
reflected the views of the functionalist/ gradualist African
leaders ( such as
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Jomo
Kenyatta), who advo-
cated a gradual, step-by-step approach to African integration
based on coop-
eration in non-controversial, technical, and economic areas.
After Kwame
Nkrumah's demise in February 1966, Muammar Qaddafi of
Libya assumed
the mantle of leader of the Pan-Africanist movement and

actively promoted
the project of a Union of African States as advocated by
Nkrumah in Africa
Must Unite ( 1963 ). Unfortunately, the African Union (AU)
that was created
in May 2002 does not significantly differ from its predecessor,
the OAU, as
it is modeled on the European Union.
The chapter then surveyed past and current proposals for a
revision of
the map of Africa and a reconfiguration of the African states put
forward
by various authors, notably Cheikh Anta Diop, Marc-Louis
Ropivia, Makau
wa Mutua, Arthur Gakwandi, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Daniel Osabu-
Kle, Godfrey
Mwakikagile, Pelle Danabo, and Mueni wa Muiu. These projects
are pre-
mised on the belief that unity is an essential prerequisite to the
achievement
of development, peace, and security in Africa. While each of
these proposals
has merit, most are not grounded in an overarching political
framework, and
they lack specificity in terms of the actual structure and
functioning of the
reconfigured states. We concluded that only with the realization
of Mueni wa
Muiu's project for state reconfiguration in Africa-A Federation
of African
States (FAS) based on five subregional units and total political
and economic
integration with a rotating presidency-will African's "Dream of
Unity"
finally become reality. 1

Chapter 5 surveyed the political, economic, social, and cultural
dimen-
sions of the socialist-populist ideology from a distinctly
socialist perspective.
Note that in the socialist-populist ideology, the emphasis is on
socialist. The
common characteristics of the leaders associated with this
ideology-Patrice
Lumumba, Ahmed Ben Bella, Amilcar Cabral, and Samora
Machel-are their
short tenure of office, their preference for democratic
governance, their pop-
ulism, and ( for the last three) the fact that they achieved
independence as a
result of an armed struggle. We noted striking similarities in the
political ide-
ologies of Amilcar Cabral and Samora Machel: the need for an
ideology and
to link theory and practice, the primacy of the political, the
need to return to
the source and create a new man, and acknowledging that the
people must
be the agents and main beneficiaries of democracy and
development. Not
surprisingly, the same common characteristics apply to the
socialist-populist
leaders surveyed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 continued the survey-started in Chapter 5-of the
political,
economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the socialist-
populist ideol-
ogy from a distinctly socialist perspective. The chapter focused
specifically
on the statesmen who, in spite of their socialist rhetoric, used

the socialist-
populist ideology primarily as an instrument of control and
coercion: Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, Modibo
Keila of Mali,
and Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania. We observed a significant
degree of con-
vergence in the way in which Nkrumah, Toure, and Kei:ta
conceived of Afri-
can socialism. These three leaders all viewed African socialism
as grounded in
African indigenous values, culture, and traditions; as people-
centered, aiming
at the creation of"a new man"; and as aiming at creating a
Union of African
States as a first stage toward the eventual establishment of a
United States of
Africa. We also remarked that Julius Nyerere's concept of
African socialism
TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF IDEAS 157
( U.famaa ) differed somewhat from that of the previous three
leaders. For
Nyerere, African socialism was a universal concept and an
"attitude of mind";
it was firmly grounded in African culture and traditions, and it
was realized
through a self-reliant strategy of development. What all these
statesmen have
in common is a deep and abiding faith in the power of African
socialism to
radically and durably transform their societies in a way that
would satisfy

the basic economic and social needs of their peoples, thereby
significantly
improving their standard of living.
Chapter 7 consisted of an overview of the political, economic,
social, and
cultural dimensions of the populist-socialist ideology from a
distinctly populist
perspective, from the early 1960s to the present. By "populist-
socialist" we
refer to states that adhere to socialism but do not stress ( or
even reject) Marx-
ism. The intellectuals/statesmen reviewed in that chapter were
both theoreti-
cians and practitioners who genuinely sought to improve the
living conditions
of their people by attempting to implement policies of political,
economic,
social, and cultural transformation . In that chapter, we noted
the striking simi-
larities between the political ideas of Frantz Fanon and Thomas
Sankara: the
essential nature of ideology; the need for a specifically African
political thought
based on African values, culture, traditions, and history;
cultural liberation and
mental decolonization, leading to an African consciousness and
the creation
of a "new man"; the need for the people to be the main actor and
beneficiary
of democracy and development in Africa; and the need for
African unity to be
based on the people rather than on the governments and the
elites.
The third section of the chapter focused on Muammar Qaddafi's

Third
Universal Theory, as exposed in the three volumes of The Green
Book; it
advocates "people power" in the form of a direct democracy
with popular
assemblies and people's committees, a socialist economy based
on equitable
distribution of resources among citizens, and the achievement of
a substan-
tial degree of political and economic unity in the form of a
Union of African
States. Finally, the fourth section of that chapter surveyed Steve
Biko's ideol-
ogy of Black Consciousness, an ideology of psychological
liberation and cul-
tural emancipation of the African man in South Africa. A major
dimension of
this ideology is its redefinition of "non-whites" as "blacks" to
designate the
African, Colored, and Indian/ Asian communities in the country.
What this survey of the political thought of Fanon, Sankara,
Qaddafi, and
Biko teaches us is that if popular democracy and development
are to succeed
in Africa, African people must stop blindly following the West
and must be
bold and innovative. In other words, it is essential that Africans
develop their
own ideas, concepts, and institutions on the basis of African
values, culture,
and traditions. This alternative path to Western liberal
democracy and capital-
ist development is precisely the line of thinking of an emerging
African schol-
arship exemplified by Daniel Osabu-Kle, Claude Ake, Godfrey

Mwakikagile,
and Mueni wa Muiu, whose political ideas were examined in
Chapter 8 .
The Africanist-populist scholars surveyed in Chapter 8 have
heeded Fanon's
admonition to Africans that they must be bold and innovative
and develop
their own ideas, concepts, and institutions based on African
values, culture,
and traditions . Thus Daniel Osabu-Kle, Claude Ake, Godfrey
Mwakikagile,
and Mueni wa Muiu-who all have the best interest of Africa and
its people
at heart-have, each in their own way, developed ideas for a new,
free , and
self-reliant Africa.
As previously stated, African political thought provides
practical solutions
to political, economic, social, and cultural problems, and it
varies according to
historical circumstances and a constantly changing African and
world politi-
cal environment. The fact that Africa is currently facing a
multidimensional
crisis-political, economic, social, and cultural-of epic
proportions is not
in dispute. Ethno-regional and religious conflict, intra and
interstate wars,
droughts, famine, diseases, epidemics, malnutrition, and state

collapse, frag-
mentation, and disintegration are the norm rather than the
exception in Africa
today. There is no doubt that the extreme severity of the African
crisis-or,
rather, of the African predicament-calls for drastic solutions and
radical
remedies. As the French saying goes, "aux grand maux les grand
remedes"
(extreme crises call for drastic remedies). Mueni wa Muiu and I
concluded
Fundi wa Afrika by addressing the following call to action to
every African:
Africans, is this the Africa we want? How many more of us will
have to die as
a result of senseless wars before we realize that our own
salvation and that the
solution to all our problems lie not without, but within
ourselves? Let us move
beyond mere survival; let us refuse to remain passive victims of
a perceived
pre-ordained fate and let us become the initiators and agents of
our own devel-
opment. Indeed, as Fanon urges us to do, let us create a new
African. Therein
resides the secret of Africa's resolution of its predicament, and
the key to its
future development. 2
Ideas matter. The majority of the statesmen/scholars reviewed
in this
book demonstrate the power of political ideas as they helped
transform the
various African societies involved. An ideology is essential as a
guide to action

in a new society. Political theory and political practice are
inextricably linked.
As Fanon cogently remarked, "the greatest danger that threatens
Africa is
the absence of ideology. " 3 Heeding Fanon's admonition to
"turn over a new
leaf," "work out new concepts," and "set afoot a new man," 4
the Africanist-
populist scholars-exemplified by Claude Ake and Mueni wa
Muiu-haYe,
indeed, been bold and innovative in their quest for new ideas
and new con-
cepts-based on African values, culture, and traditions-to create
a free
and self-reliant Africa and a new African. More specifically,
these Africanist-
populist scholars offer an Africanist perspective based on the
conviction that
the solution of African problems lie within African themselves;
they consider
the people as the agent, means, and main beneficiary of
democracy and deYel -
opment; and they are all convinced Pan-Africanists, variously
calling for the
advent of a Union of African States, United States of Africa, or
Federation
of African States. May they inspire a new generation of African
scholars to
follow in their footsteps, take up the challenge, and come up
with new ideas
and concepts for peace, development, and democracy in Africa.

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