Talk for the Rethinking Regulation Group of the Duke University's Kenan Institute for Ethics.

1. Regulatory Governance and Institutions: the
Brazilian Ministério Público
Daniel Lima Ribeiro

2. Brazil
Democracy
26 states and Capital
Separation of Powers
30 branches of MP
13508 members
State of Rio de Janeiro
population 16M
903 members MP

3. Redemocratization
begins
1979 1981
National Environmental
Policy Act
1985
Public Civil
Action Act
1988
Constitution
constitutional transformation: rights and principles revolutions
transformation of the MP
prosecutorsEurope
14th century

4. The 80s’ transformations:
institutional
MP becomes independent from the Executive
and can file civil lawsuits to protect
constitutional “rights" (even against the
Executive)

5. The 80s’ transformations (cont’d):
legal / constitutional
social and collective rights in the Constitution
(welfare, health, safety, environment, etc…): if
it is not a right, it is a principle (ex.: “free
enterprise”).

6. # of words in the Constitution
81,000
4,543
US Constitution Brazilian Constitution

7. The 80s’ transformations (cont’d):
political
“If it’s in the constitution, it is an enforceable
norm”: rise of judicial activism
(“neo-constitutionalism”)

8. Constitutional position of Latin American MPs
Executive
Judicial
Autonomous
0 3 6 9 12
Latin American MPs with powers to file civil suit
40%
60%
Only criminal Also civil
MP in other Latin American countries:

9. 0
200
400
600
800
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
# Google hits: ”New Constitutionalism" in Spanish

10. Brazil in the Ranking of Corruption Perception Index
0
20
40
60
80
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
source: Transparency International

11. but… how to enforce a constitutional "right" or a "principle"?
what exactly is a right "to a clean environment", "to safety”?
solution (?):
principles (proportionality, polluter-pays, precautionary)

12. The proportionality principle:
step #1 minimum rationality
step #2 cost-effectiveness (LRM)
step #3 tradeoff analysis
based on… judicial intuition!

13. Without a rulemaking record or legislative history?
No APA neither RIA equivalent in Brazil

14. # of hits “proportionality principle” on Google Brazil
0
2750
5500
8250
11000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

15. Number of opinions by the Brazilian Supreme Court applying the proportionality principle
0
22.5
45
67.5
90
country prop_tot_90 92 94 96 98 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

16. Examples:
1. the new Forest Code
2. Burning waste from sugar
cane plantations

17. Regulatory Systems: Comparing the US and Brazil
US Brazil
legal procedure /
analytics
APA + RIA "Principles"
Rulemaking
power
agencies and independent
agencies
President, agencies (and
commissions)
Regulatory
oversight
courts (APA),
Executive (OIRA/RIA)
courts
Actors
stakeholders with standing +
automatic (rules triggering RIA)
stakeholders with standing +
MP

18. regulations
judicial
review
impact assessment?
could RIA fill the gap? MP
instead of "principles"

19. Regulatory Systems: Comparing the US and Brazil
US Brazil
legal procedure /
analytics
APA + RIA RIA
Rulemaking
power
agencies and independent
agencies
President, agencies (and
commissions)
Regulatory
oversight
courts (APA),
Executive (OIRA/RIA)
courts + Executive (RIA)
Actors
stakeholders with standing +
automatic (rules triggering RIA)
stakeholders with standing +
MP

20. Average rules/year in Brazil
0
100
200
300
400
President Congress Agencies (11) Environment
Source: estimated average based on the list of rules for 2012 and 2013 — websites of
Congress, ANATEL, AVISA, ANTT, ANEEL, and CONAMA

21. Signs of change:
OECD and RIA
Influenced by OECD, Brazil is taking initial
steps to implement a pilot RIA program (…
not applicable to Presidential decrees)

22. Improving Latin American regulatory governance:
“Neo-constitutionalism”, rights- and principle-
based approaches are not conducive to good
governance, neither to good quality regulation.
Evidence-based policy making and regulatory
impact assessment could provide the missing
structure to proportionality and other standards
of regulatory oversight.

23. Improving Latin American regulatory governance (cont’d):
New institutional designs required when the
President has significant regulatory powers
(e.g., MP?)

24. Thank you!
Daniel Lima Ribeiro, LL.M
SJD Candidate
Duke University School of Law
daniel.ribeiro@lawnet.duke.edu