3. Please cite this article in press as: Langard, B., et al. Collision risk management in passenger trans-
portation: A study of the conditions for success in a safe shipping company. Psychol. fr. (2014),
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For comparison purposes, the artisan systems deemed to be high-risk are characterized by a safety
level of 10−3 (Amalberti, 2006; Morel, Amalberti, & Chauvin, 2009). However, maritime accidents are
events that are particularly feared because of the cargo value, the presence of passengers, and the
pollution risks.
Maritime traffic is constantly growing. It has grown 240% in the space of 30 years and reached a
total of 8879 million tons of cargo in 2011. From 2005 to 2011, the number of ships grew 30.5%, and
the carrying capacity of the fleet grew 67.9% (UNCTAD, 2012). Despite these increases, the number of
maritime accidents shows a clear and continuous decline. Since the late 1970s, the number of total ship
losses went from over 450/year to fewer than 150/year (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, 1999–2009; OECD,
2001). The casualty rates of all types (i.e. the number of ship losses per 1000 operating vessels) has
been halved over a period of 15 years, from 3.1‰ in 1993 to 1.35‰ in 2008 (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay,
1999–2009).
Our research has focused specifically on passenger transport. To this end, we entered into part-
nership with a French shipping company specialising in cross-Channel transport in order to analyse
this subsystem from the perspective of risk management and more particularly that of collision risk.
Although collisions are the main cause of only 12% of total ship losses (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay,
1999–2009), data from the insurance companies show that collisions constitute one of the three pri-
mary causes of serious casualties4 (Graham, 2012). In European waters, collisions were the main cause
of accidents in 2010 (EMSA, 2011). The same year, collisions and contacts with infrastructure repre-
sented 45% of accidents5 (EMSA, 2011). Collisions also account for 50% of accidents in busy waterways
(Mou, van der Tak, & Ligteringen, 2010). Collisions thus constitute the main risk in Channel cross-
ings. Numerous studies have been carried out to identify the causes of accidents (e.g. Perrow, 1999;
Pourzanjani, 2001; MAIB, 2004). In general, human and organisational factors have been identified as
playing a central role in this type of maritime incident (Chauvin, 2011; Hetherington, Flin, & Mearns,
2006; Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010). A recent study based on investigation reports realised by the MAIB6
and the TSB7 (Chauvin, Lardjane, Morel, Clostermann, & Langard, 2013) showed the following results:
• 15.8% of collisions resulted directly from lack of signal perception;
• 30.8% resulted from attention deficit or work overload;
• 33.3% were directly related to loss of situation awareness.8
Most of the collisions were shown to result from lack of anticipation on the part of operators. The
analysis of 49 collision cases from the MAIB reports from 1999 to 2012 showed that in 75% of cases,
the Officer of the Watch (OOW) performed the required actions to avoid the collision with another
vessel, but too late. The analysis of watchkeeping conditions shows that in 38.8% of collision cases, the
OOW was alone (or sole person in charge of the watch, despite the presence of other crew members).
The causes of collisions (i.e. failures) in the domain of maritime transportation are thus well-known
and clearly chronicled in the available literature. This is not the case, however, for the “success” con-
ditions. According to Hollnagel, Pariès, Woods, and Wreathall (2011), this analysis phase is essential
because instead of focusing on failures, it highlights the conditions that make it possible to con-
trol a dynamic situation. The authors stress that examining the activities of decision makers gives
the opportunity of identifying the conditions for success, namely everything that is done to avoid
collisions.
This perspective is adopted in the present paper. The paper shows the analysis of the activities of
the bridge watchkeeping officers in order to identify the conditions for success in the perspective of
4
The other two causes of accidents are grounding and engine failure.
5
The Lloyd’s statistics are global, but take total losses only into consideration. The considerable difference between the Lloyd’s
figures (12% of total losses) and those from the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) (about 28% from graph reading) is
probably related to the fact that after a collision, vessels are not necessarily lost (i.e. they can be repaired).
6
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (United Kingdom).
7
Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
8
Endsley defines situation awareness as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and
space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36).
4. Please cite this article in press as: Langard, B., et al. Collision risk management in passenger trans-
portation: A study of the conditions for success in a safe shipping company. Psychol. fr. (2014),
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preventing collision risks. It is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with the theoretical framework,
based on the concepts of resilience, adaptation, and anticipation. Part 2 details the method of investi-
gation. The third part indicates the findings that are discussed in the final part/conclusion.
2. Theoretical framework
From a theoretical standpoint, we chose to examine the issue of collision risk from the perspective
of organisational resilience, as defined by Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson (2006). In this section, the
concept of organisational resilience is presented, along with the underlying concepts of adaptation
and anticipation.
2.1. Examining risk management from the perspective of resilience
Organisational resilience has been defined by Hollnagel et al. (2006) as the capacity of a system to
adapt to and cope with perturbations. As this definition indicates, the authors suggest that a resilient
system requires three key attributes:
• anticipation: preventing the occurrence of a perturbation;
• perception: preventing the worsening of the effects of the perturbation;
• response: recovering and surviving after the perturbation.
This first view of organisational resilience was focused on the occurrence of perturbations solely
in the context of the management of unexpected or exceptional situations. The definition has moved
into the direction of taking ordinary situations into account. Hollnagel et al. have thus proposed a
new, expanded definition of organisational resilience. It is “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust
its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required
operations under both expected and unexpected conditions” (Hollnagel et al., 2011, pp. xxxvi). The
authors added a fourth characteristic of a resilient system: learning, namely learning from past
situations, based on feedback from both failure and success conditions.
The concept of resilience is related to that of anticipation. It is also closely linked to that of
adaptation, whether at individual or organisational level. When resilience is seen as a personality
trait, it covers a set of characteristics that enable individuals to adapt to the circumstances they
encounter (Connor & Davidson, 2003). At the system or organisational level, resilience refers to an
adaptive capacity in the face of changing circumstances and challenges (Woods, 2006).
2.2. The concepts of adaptation and anticipation
The concept of adaptation is central in all those branches of psychology that deal with the relation-
ships between individuals and their environment. It refers to “all the behaviour modifications that
are designed to ensure balanced relationships between an organisation and its environments and at
the same time the mechanisms and processes that underlie the phenomenon” (Bloch, Gallo, Dépret, &
Casalis, 2002, p. 29). Adaptive processes are implemented each time a situation entails one or several
new, unknown elements, or unfamiliar ones.
These mechanisms are particularly striking in a dynamic situation due to the unexpected events
inherent in the situation. They help operators meet their main goal: controlling the situation (Hoc,
Amalberti, Cellier, & Grosjean, 2004, p. 20). Hoc et al. (2004) explain that among the many characteris-
tics of adaptation in dynamic situations, temporal adaptation is particularly worth focusing on since it
responds to the dynamics of the situation. Two strategies are available to control a dynamic situation;
one is reactive, and the other is anticipative. Following a reactive strategy, operators respond to the
changing situation as it evolves. Following an anticipative strategy, operators anticipate the evolution
of processes, based on prior knowledge.
Cellier defines anticipation as “an activity that involves evaluating the future state of a dynamic
process, determining the kind of actions that need to be undertaken and the time when they need to
5. Please cite this article in press as: Langard, B., et al. Collision risk management in passenger trans-
portation: A study of the conditions for success in a safe shipping company. Psychol. fr. (2014),
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be implemented, precisely in terms of this representation of the process in the future, and finally, car-
rying out a mental evaluation of the possible consequences of these actions” (Cellier, 1996, p. 35). This
activity is based on calling up knowledge structures, mental models, or schemas. Amalberti (2001)
asserts that mental models involve people’s ability to react to feared events; thus, they produce rec-
tifications even though the actual execution of actions has not started yet. These rectifications often
lead to modifications in the execution of actions so as to prevent those potential events that people
would not know how to deal with (Amalberti, 2001). Mental models and schemas are used to predict
but also to produce expectations. Denecker (1999) distinguishes between these two mechanisms: the
first one (prediction) is symbolic, whereas the second (expectation) is subsymbolic.
Anticipating may also lead to planning. Van Daele and Carpinelli (2001) distinguish between plans
that are developed in high-risk situations under massive time pressure on the one hand, and plans
that are more “schematic” and developed in less risky situations under lower time pressure, on the
other. In the former case, plans that are developed before execution are quite specific so as to avoid
hard-to-implement modifications in the midst of execution. These plans show two characteristics.
They are established in just “sufficient” detail as to enable adaptation to unexpected events, and
they incorporate unforeseen events (or “contingent events”) and the necessary responses to these.
Such contingency plans have been highlighted in the domain of combat aircraft (Amalberti & Deblon,
1992; Guérin, Chauvin, Leroy, & Coppin, 2013). In less risky situations with a lower time pressure,
planning is carried out in real time. Plans are schematic and only gradually elaborated (Amalberti,
1996).
In all cases, anticipation involves – in dynamic situations – various symbolic (forecasting and plan-
ning) and subsymbolic (expectations) processes that are necessary for adaptation. Forecasting and
planning represent diachronic risk management mechanisms. Amalberti (1996) also identifies syn-
chronic management mechanisms such as task adaptation in terms of the work situation demands.
Such modulation affects the management of priorities, namely deciding between several tasks that
could be carried out simultaneously. Amalberti shows that the number of tasks that are managed
decreases as the workload increases, and task splitting also decreases (Amalberti, 1996). The strate-
gies that are implemented in order to perform a given task are also modulated. Sperandio (1977) has
shown that the workload represents an “intermediate” variable between the modes of operation used
by the operators and the task demands; the higher the task demands, the more economical the modes
of operation.
Thus, resilience refers to the capacity of adaptation of a given system, which is based on four
essential attributes, including anticipation. In terms of dynamic situations, anticipation is required
for adaptation. In order to identify the conditions for success in the domain of collision prevention
and to determine the level of resilience of the system under investigation, it is essential to identify
the diachronic (anticipation) and synchronic mechanisms (management of attentional resources) of
collision risk management. We hypothesize that the conditions for success are based on diachronic
and synchronic mechanisms implemented by the OOWs in the domain of passenger transport.
Before discussing the elements relating to the method used for this study, it is necessary to describe
the tasks required of the OOWs and, in particular, the conditions of watchkeeping duties and related
rules. The differences between the prescribed work programme and the actual work performed reveal
the operators’ adaptation.
3. Description of the prescribed work on the bridge
3.1. Dense safety requirements
Within maritime transportation, safety requirements are extremely important. A number of inter-
national regulations are applied (COLREG,9 SOLAS,10 STCW,11 etc.). Moreover, various internal safety
9
COLREG: The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
10
SOLAS: The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
11
STCW: The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers.
6. Please cite this article in press as: Langard, B., et al. Collision risk management in passenger trans-
portation: A study of the conditions for success in a safe shipping company. Psychol. fr. (2014),
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procedures arise from the ISM code12 that forces all shipping companies to possess a safety manage-
ment system (SMS). Compliance with all the regulations is controlled though a set of internal and
external audits. At the local level (i.e. the ship level), the master’s permanent instructions supplement
this already dense set of regulations.
3.2. The organisation of the deck department and the bridge watchkeeping
3.2.1. The deck department
The passenger ship personnel is distributed across three departments:
• the deck crew who carry out navigation, docking and mooring operations, loading and unload-
ing operations, and contribute to ship maintenance (exterior deck, garages, fire fighting and safety
equipment, etc.);
• the engine room crew who ensure the propulsion of the ship, the generation of energy, and contribute
to ship and installation maintenance;
• the hotel operations department crew who ensure reception, catering, entertainment, and accom-
modation of passengers.
These three departments report directly to the master. For this study, we focused on the deck crew
who con the ship and in particular on the management of collision avoidance activities. As far as the
deck department is concerned, the master is responsible for navigation and the safety of the ship and
the people being transported. He/she may temporarily delegate his/her responsibilities to the chief
mate or the ship officers.
3.2.2. Bridge watchkeeping conditions
The deck officers take turns to provide the bridge watchkeeping operations. Once on watchkeep-
ing, the OOWs assume responsibility for the ship’s navigation and safety. They are responsible for
the watch, which is both visual and auditory (by sight and sound), and is maintained to provide for
contingencies detrimental to safety. Thus, the OOWs are responsible for taking the vessel to the port of
arrival, following the course as set by the master, while ensuring safety and, in particular, avoiding the
risks of collision with other vessels in strict compliance with the international “steering and sailing”
rules of COLREG7 (IMO, 1972).
The OOWs must comply with three regulation levels:
• COLREG. This regulation issues the “steering and sailing” rules applicable to all vessels. It requires
vessels to maintain a permanent visual and auditory watch. It defines the various collision risk
situations and the procedures that need to be followed to avoid these. When two power-driven
vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel, which has the other one on her
starboard side shall keep out of the way (Rule 15). She is the “give-way” vessel. The other one – the
“stand-on” vessel shall keep her course and speed (Rule 17). However, COLREG does not specify
the conditions (distances13 or TCPA14) required for vessels to manoeuvre to avoid collision. Hence,
the OOWs need to evaluate the situation. Cockcroft and Lameijer (2011) recommend a DCPA of 1
to 1.2 NM15 and that the distance between vessels at the time of manoeuvre should be 2 to 3 NM.
The analysis of manoeuvres in the English Channel has shown that passenger ships usually keep
a passing distance of 1 NM (DCPA) and manoeuvre at a distance comprised between 5 NM and
12
ISM: International Safety Management Code.
13
DCPA: Distance at Closest Point of Approach; Estimation of the distance between the two vessels when they are closest to
one another if they keep the same course and speed.
14
TCPA: Time to Closest Point of Approach; Estimation of the time remaining before the two vessels on a collision route reach
DCPA if they keep the same course and speed.
15
One nautical mile (NM) corresponds to 1.852 km.
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portation: A study of the conditions for success in a safe shipping company. Psychol. fr. (2014),
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8 NM (Chauvin, 2001). The distance is closer in high-density traffic zones; in the Dover Straits, the
car-ferries carry out manoeuvres at a distance of 3 to 3.5 NM (Chauvin & Lardjane, 2008);
• company internal procedures. These define the role and obligations of the OOWs, and reinforce the
COLREG requirements. Hence, on the vessels of the company under investigation, a two-person team
is responsible for the bridge watchkeeping duties. The officer is systematically accompanied by a
deckhand. The role of the watchkeeping deckhand, who is always on the bridge, is to monitor the
waters at all times and to report any potential danger to the OOW. These procedures also require the
bridge presence of the master, the chief mate (or an officer), and a helmsman for delicate operations
such as port manoeuvres and fairway navigation. The company procedures also determine the rou-
tine procedures for watchkeeping shift handover and establish general safety regulations (calling
the master in case of difficulties, doubts, or reduced visibility; watching the VHF safety channels;
etc.). It should be noted, however, that this second level of regulations always allows the OOWs to
assess the situation;
• the master’s permanent instructions. These follow the company regulations but give more detail on
certain features (e.g. the DCPA to adhere to or the proper watchkeeping conditions in foggy weather).
3.2.3. Additional tasks
Added to their OOW duties, the officers perform various administrative tasks; these relate to
personnel management, relations with the shipping company departments, inventory monitoring,
and the updating of charts and nautical documents. They are also required to contribute to the
general upkeep of the bridge and its navigation equipment and the sick bay management (if there
is no medical staff). They also have to attend the regular ISM meetings and carry out the safety tests
as part of the testing programme for all safety and rescue equipment. Furthermore, they actively
participate in the training of the crew regarding safety.
4. Method
4.1. The selected application domain
In order to determine the conditions for success in collision prevention, we chose to investigate a
shippingcompanyconsideredsafe that had never been involvedin a collision (Source: Bureau Enquêtes
Accidents Mer). The ships of the company under study do more than 5000 crossings a year. For the
past year alone more than 800,000 nautical miles were travelled (approx. 1.5 million km a year).
This French shipping company is specialised in cross-Channel transport. These high-density traffic
navigation zones mean that the company ships are strongly exposed to collision risks.
4.2. The situation under investigation
4.2.1. Observation framework
Observations were conducted on board cross-Channel ferries over a period of 14 days and for 9
crossings (see Table 1). These crossings enabled us to observe and describe the general activities of the
Table 1
Duration of the observations according to the watchkeeping schedule.
Watchkeeping schedules Duration of the observations %
23 h 00–3 h 00 14:43:33 32
03 h 00–7 h 00 6:47:23 15
07 h 00–11 h 00 8:36:29 19
11 h 00–15 h 00 7:42:30 17
15 h 00–19 h 00 4:54:33 11
19 h 00–23 h 00 2:49:10 6
Total 45:33:38 100
The lower representation of the 19:00–23:00 watch is due to the systematic port stop-over for at least one hour and a half
during this watch period (at least, since in adverse weather, the start was sometimes delayed).
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Fig. 2. A typical day for the deck crew.
time elapsed between the discovery and the manoeuvre “t1” (min), the time elapsed between the
discovery and the passing “t2” (min).
5. Findings
The presentation of findings is divided into two parts. The first part describes the activities of the
OOWs. The second part shows the results related to the management of 38 encounter situations with
other vessels in the waters (i.e. collision avoidance activities).
5.1. Description of the activities of the OOWs
The deck crew consists of the master, the chief mate (1st officer), three officers (including one all-
rounder), the bosun, four assistant bosuns and six deckhands (midshipmen may be present depending
on the time periods). The person in charge is the chief mate.17 Fig. 2 shows one typical day for the
deck crew. The general activities focus on the watch, manoeuvres, maintenance, and administrative
task management.
For example: officer 11-3 keeps the 23:00 to 03:00 watch and the 11:00 to 15:00 watch. Officer
3-7 keeps the 03:00 to 07:00 watch and the 15:00 to 19:00 watch. The all-rounder officer keeps the
07:00 to 11:00 watch (plus the 19:00 to 23:00 watch in the engine room). Finally, the chief mate also
keeps the 19:00 to 23:00 watch. It should be remembered that in this company, the deckhands are
also involved in the watchkeeping activity in a systematic way.
As far as the OOWs are concerned, the procedures do not provide for additional tasks during
the watch. Officers are remunerated on the basis of 9 h and 30 min of work per day. In addition to
the 8 h spent keeping watch, they thus have one hour and a half available to perform those addi-
tional tasks. However, depending on the seasons (faster turnaround times in summer), this time
frame may not be sufficient. Officers then keep watch for an extra 30 min so as to release the chief
mate. The latter’s schedules are more split (see Fig. 2), and he/she also needs to carry out impor-
tant administrative management tasks (i.e. management of the deck crew). These constraints thus
cause a deviation from the regulations, since the OOWs have to perform additional tasks during the
watch.
The analysis of the 45 h and 33 min of activity chronograms revealed three types of activities
performed when keeping watch. These are:
17
The master is at the top of the hierarchy but delegates part of his/her responsibilities to his/her department heads: the
chief mate (for the deck service), the chief engineer (for the engine room), and the chief steward (for the hotel operations
department).
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• watchkeeping and conning the vessel. The OOWs spend 72.4% of their time on this activity, which
involves carrying out a visual and auditory watch of the waters and conning the vessel. To this end,
they have a set of instruments such as radar, binoculars, ECDIS,18 AIS,19 etc.;
• watchkeeping and carrying out a double task (keeping the bridge logbook, carrying out actions on
the engine supervision system, etc.), which accounts for 22.5% of their activities. In all cases, they
keep direct watch on the waters. It should be noted that communications with the outside world
or with other departments and informal discussions between the officer and the deckhand are also
included in the double task category, accounting for 65.5% of activities;
• other tasks (computerised administrative management, toilet visits, etc.) that account for 5.1% of
the OOWs’ working time. These tasks do not fall under watch or conning activities. While they are
being performed, the OOWs are no longer keeping watch over the waters, and the task is delegated
to the on-watch deckhand.
At first glance, the proportion of “other tasks” could appear considerable. However, it is impor-
tant to remember that in the shipping company under investigation, bridge watchkeeping duties are
performed by one officer and one or two deckhands. Bridge watchkeeping is not limited to the offi-
cer’s watch on the waters; it is fully shared. The role of the watchkeeping deckhand, who is always on
the bridge, is to monitor the waters at all times and to report any potential danger to the OOW. The
presence on the bridge of a second watchkeeping person thus provides a guarantee of safety. It also
enables the officers to perform additional tasks without compromising the ship’s safety, all the more
so as the average duration of these “other tasks” is less than one minute.
During a crossing, the task demands vary. Three periods can be distinguished:
• period 1 is called “fairway navigation”. It follows the docking and departure manoeuvres and involves
navigating in confined waters. This is a critical, demanding period, since it involves managing navi-
gation and collision avoidance activities while avoiding the major risk of grounding. The master and
the chief mate are systematically present during all the fairway operations;
• period 2 is called “sea navigation”. The vessel navigates from the departure port’s exit channel to the
arrival port’s entry channel. This is the least demanding navigation period. It involves few encounter
situations with other vessels (although there are occasional encounters with groups of fishermen);
• period 3 is called “navigating the lane” following the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS). The TSS is an
area where maritime traffic is dense, with all the vessels from the Dover TSS going in the direction
of the Ushant TSS.20
This is the area where the collision risks are most serious. Vessels enter an area where collision
avoidance manoeuvres are numerous and particularly difficult to manage.
Crossing the Channel thus involves a succession of navigation periods: fairway navigation after
departure, then “sea navigation” before crossing the traffic lane, then another “sea navigation” period
before arriving at the entry channel of the port of arrival (see Fig. 3).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the three activity categories (i.e. watchkeeping and conning
the vessel, double task, and other tasks) in terms of these three periods (i.e. fairway navigation, sea
navigation, and traffic lane). It can be observed that the proportions of watchkeeping only are more
important in periods 1 and 3. Instances of double tasks and additional tasks are consequently less
important than in period 2. This finding must be correlated with the officers’ workload that is more
important in periods 1 and 3. Hence, the OOWs adjust their activities according to the work situation
demands.
18
The Electronic Charts Display Information System (ECDIS) is an electronic chart display and information system.
19
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system used on ships and by vessel traffic services to
transmit information such as vessel position, speed, course, etc.
20
The Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is a traffic management system that regulates traffic in certain areas and makes vessels
take either the upstream or the downstream lane.
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Fig. 3. The three navigation periods for a passenger ship.
Table 2
Distribution of the three categories of activities in terms of the navigation period.
Categories of activities Period 1
Fairway
Period 2
Sea navigation
Period 3
Traffic lane
All three
periods
Watchkeeping and conning the ship 4:00:00
95.7%
23:29:02
67.7%
5:30:29
82.6%
32:59:31
72.4%
Double task 0:08:44
3.5%
9:02:42
26.1%
1:02:26
15.6%
10:13:52
22.5%
Other tasks 0:01:59
0.8%
2:10:53
6.3%
0:07:18
1.8%
2:20:15
5.1%
Duration 4:10:43 34:42:37 6:40:18 45:33:38
The average duration of the observation periods were as follows: fairway navigation: 29 04 (SD = 12 47 ), Sea navigation:
2 h 31 07 (SD = 1 h 02 52 ), navigating the lane period: 54 11 (SD = 15 33 ).
Cooperation within the officer/deckhand team was not investigated. Cooperation varies greatly from one team to the next. The
prescribed role of the on-watch deckhand is to carry out a visual and auditory watch of the waters and to warn the OOW of any
vessel on a collision route.
5.2. The management of encounter situations
The radar video clips enabled the identification of two different types of vessel course alterations:
course alterations and collision avoidance manoeuvres. The latter include three distinct phases:
• phase 1: between the detection of signals on the waters (i.e. from the other vessel) and the execution
of the avoidance manoeuvre (course alteration);
• phase 2: between the execution of the avoidance manoeuvre and the actual passing of the two
vessels;
• phase 3: return to the planned route.
We identified and analysed 38 collision avoidance manoeuvres.
5.2.1. General findings
Table 3 shows the general data related to these 38 collision avoidance manoeuvres.
The average time t1 observed is 9.53 min (SD = 9.91). Collision avoidance manoeuvres are performed
at an average TCPA of 26.37 min (SD = 15.67); in other words, the officer manoeuvres on average 26 min
before a potential collision. This corresponds to an average distance dman of 7.82 NM21 (SD = 4.35). At
21
7.55 NM ≈ 14 km.
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Table 3
General data related to the 38 collision avoidance manoeuvres identified.
t1 (Min) t2 (Min) ␣barre (◦
) dman (NM) DCPAman (NM) TCPA (Min) DCPApass (NM)
Average 9.53 36.00 10.95 7.82 0.64 26.37 1.81
Standard deviation 9.91 18.48 9.21 4.35 0.36 15.67 1.39
Min 1.00 12.00 3.00 2.50 0.10 9.00 0.80
Max 47.00 91.00 40.00 24.00 1.20 81.00 6.20
Median 6.50 33.00 7.50 6.85 0.70 21.50 1.35
25th Percentile 2.00 21.00 5.00 4.50 0.30 13.00 1.00
75th Percentile 15.00 52.00 12.00 10.50 0.90 34.00 2.00
the time of the manoeuvre, both vessels are effectively on a collision route since the average DCPAman
observed is under 1 NM.
The angle of the course alterations performed during collision avoidance manoeuvres, namely
␣helm, gives information regarding the degree of anticipation of the manoeuvre. As a general rule, the
less anticipation, the more ␣helm must be important to avoid the collision. Our observations revealed
that the average ␣helm was 10.95◦ (SD = 9.21). The standard deviation is important as 6 manoeuvres
required ␣helm well over the average value. However, the value of the 75th percentile shows that
75% of the manoeuvres observed did not require ␣helm over 12◦. The amplitude remains low, but is
sufficient for the manoeuvre to be perceived by the other vessel. The first overall results thus show
that collision avoidance manoeuvres are performed with anticipation.
The average DCPAcpass represents a fundamental element, since it is the only one that is expressly
prescribed in the company under investigation. It is part of the master’s permanent instructions: “All
manoeuvres must be performed clearly and well on time. As far as possible, a DCPA of 2 nautical
miles22 (NM) must be held to for large vessels. It is necessary to avoid a DCPA lower than 1NM when
passing a vessel off the bow and when the visibility conditions are deemed to be poor”. The perma-
nent instructions also stipulate that “Navigation safety takes priority over the timetable”. The average
DCPApass observed for the 38 manoeuvres is 1.81 (SD = 1.39). The 5 DCPApass lower than 1 NM (and
superior to 0.8 NM) involved passing fishing vessels along the coast. Passing merchant vessels always
involved a DCPApass superior to 1 NM. Out of the 17 encounter situations of this type, 8 involved a
DCPApass superior to 2 NM, and 9 involved a DCPApass between 1 and 2 NM. Of those 9 cases, 4 involved
manoeuvres off the bow of a vessel. In general, it thus appears that the instructions laid down by the
company are adhered to.
These overall results clearly show anticipative management of encounter situations. OOWs
manoeuvre very early, by anticipation, so as to remain within a safety net where collision risks are
controlled, in accordance with the company prescriptions. To narrow down results, we show the data
in terms of:
• the crossing period (i.e. traffic lane vs. sea navigation);
• the “status” of the other vessel (i.e. “stand-on” vessel vs. “give-way” vessel);
• the type of vessel (i.e. merchant vs. fishing).
5.2.2. The collision avoidance manoeuvres depending on the crossing period
Table 4 shows the data according to crossing periods (to note: there were no collision avoidance
manoeuvres during the fairway period).
Findings show that dnav, TCPA at the time of the manoeuvre, and DCPApass are significantly higher
when the vessel is in a lane period, namely in a zone where maritime traffic is dense. The situations
observed concerned primarily interactions with merchant vessels. When in the lane, these vessels
follow a well-defined course, which makes it possible for the OOWs to manoeuvre very early. This
anticipation strategy enables them to keep room for manoeuvre to manage new conflict situations in
optimum conditions.
22
One nautical mile (NM) is equivalent to 1.852 km.
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Table 4
Characteristics of collision avoidance manoeuvres depending on the crossing period.
Traffic lane
(14 manoeuvres)
Sea navigation
(24 manoeuvres)
t ddl p-value
␣helm (◦
) 10.46 13.20 .69 36 .50
SD = 10.08 SD = 12.40
dman (NM) 11.60 5.86 4.93 36 .000018**
SD = 4.89 SD = 2.33
DCPAman (NM) 0.74 0.58 1.25 36 .22
SD = 0.35 SD = 0.37
TCPA (Min) 39.00 19.80 4.37 36 .0001**
SD = 18.75 SD = 8.45
DCPAcrois (NM) 2.64 1.40 2.75 34 .0096**
SD = 1.82 SD = 0.91
t1 (Min) 14.07 9.96 .81 36 .42
SD = 20.92 SD = 10.51
t2 (Min) 48.84 37.32 .95 36 .35
SD = 19.44 SD = 41.19
**
p < .01.
Table 5
Collision avoidance according to the preferential right of the vessel.
Stand-on vessel Give-way vessel t dll p-value
␣helm (◦
) 9.50 13.00 1.05 35 .30
SD = 7.83 SD = 8.36
dman (NM) 7.15 10.77 2.07 36 .045*
SD = 3.32 SD = 6.99
DCPAman (NM) 0.65 0.57 .52 36 .61
SD = 0.36 SD = 0.40
TCPA (Min) 24.58 34.29 1.5 36 .14
SD = 13.22 SD = 23.46
DCPAcrois (NM) 1.65 2.38 1.27 35 .21
SD = 1.27 SD = 1.75
t1 (Min) 8.97 12.00 .73 36 .47
SD = 8.15 SD = 16.27
t2 (Min) 32.90 49.71 2.30 36 .027*
SD = 15.73 SD = 24.52
*
p < .05.
5.2.3. Collision avoidance manoeuvres depending on the status of the vessel (give-way or stand-on
vessel)
Table 5 shows the data according to the status of the vessel. Rules 15, 16, and 17 of COLREG (IMO,
1972) stipulate that when two power-driven vessels follow courses that intersect, in such a way that
there is a collision risk, the vessel that has the other on her own starboard side (i.e. the give-way
vessel) must keep out of the way. The stand-on vessel must maintain her course and speed. Yet, seven
collision avoidance manoeuvres designed to avoid give-way vessels (six merchant vessels and one
fishing vessel) were observed.
Findings show that dman and t2 are significantly higher when the car-ferry is the stand-on vessel
and manoeuvres so as to avoid a give-way vessel. So as not to act in contravention of the regulations,
the avoidance manoeuvres must be executed at a distance that is sufficiently long for COLREG not to
be applicable yet. However, there are no significant differences regarding the TCPA and ␣helm applied
to these manoeuvres.
5.2.4. Collision avoidance manoeuvres according to the type of other vessel
Collision avoidance manoeuvres according to the type of other vessel. Table 6 shows the data
according to the type of other vessel.
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Table 6
Collision avoidance manoeuvres according to the type of vessel.
Merchant vessels Fishing vessels t dll p-value
␣helm (◦
) 9.06 10.90 .69 35 .50
SD = 4.54 SD = 9.63
dman (NM) 11.05 5.47 5.02 36 .000014**
SD = 4.27 SD = 2.55
DCPAman (NM) 0.68 0.60 .73 36 .47
SD = 0.38 SD = 0.35
TCPA (Min) 34.75 20.27 3.12 36 .0035**
SD = 16.77 SD = 11.79
DCPAcrois (NM) 2.44 1.35 2.52 35 .016*
SD = 1.68 SD = 0.92
t1 (Min) 11.06 8.29 .85 36 .40
SD = 12.31 SD = 7.53
t2 (Min) 44.71 28.95 2.85 36 .0071**
SD = 19.4 SD = 14.64
*
p < .05;**
p < .01.
When comparing the 17 encounter situations with merchant vessels with the 21 encounter situ-
ations with fishing vessels, findings show that the OOWs manoeuvre significantly later in the case of
fishing vessels. Consequently, the distance dnav at which the officers manoeuvre is also significantly
smaller. The same applies to t2. The anticipation difference between fishing and merchant vessels is
explained by activity differences, and, therefore the different behaviours of these two types of vessels.
Fishing vessels navigate at a speed of 3 or 4 knots23 when they are fishing and a speed of 6 or 10 knots
when they are full ahead. In contrast, merchant vessels navigate at a much higher speed, which can
go up to 25 knots for some (e.g. container ships). Moreover, merchant vessels follow a well-defined
course, whereas fishing vessels often change direction in order to exploit a particular area. The move-
ments of fishing vessels may thus appear to the OOWs as more random, hence unpredictable. Hence,
the OOWs will tend to wait longer before beginning a collision avoidance manoeuvre so that the lat-
ter is not nullified by a course alteration from the vessel involved. However, there are no significant
differences between fishing vessels and merchant vessels in terms of ␣helm applied to manoeuvres.
The low speeds of fishing vessels mean that action may be taken later in complete safety.
5.2.5. Instances of double tasks
We also examined the instances of double tasks, but this time specifically in terms of collision
avoidance activities (i.e. the 38 manoeuvres identified). During the management of collision avoidance
activities by the OOWs, the instances of additional tasks and/or double tasks equal or superior to 30 s
were recorded (n = 174). Findings show that the instances are significantly less frequent during Phase
1 (i.e. between the detection of signals from the other vessels on the waters and the execution of the
avoidance manoeuvre) than during Phase 2 (i.e. between the execution of the avoidance manoeuvre
and the actual passing of the two vessels) (t(68) = 2.37, p < .05). These findings may be interpreted as
follows: once signals are detected, officers start manoeuvring so as to release attention resources,
which then enables them to execute other tasks synchronously during Phase 2.
Differences exist, however, when narrowing down results in terms of the status and type of
the other vessel. When OOWs manoeuvre for give-way vessels, they perform less watchkeeping
(F[1.27] = 6.08, p < .05) and more additional tasks (F[1.27] = 11.50, p < .01). Moreover, the time spent
watchkeeping is significantly more important (F[1.27] = 9.2, p < .05) for fishing vessels (82% of the
activity) than for merchant vessels (67% of the activity), whereas the time spent on additional tasks
and double tasks is significantly higher for merchant vessels (respectively: F[1.27] = 4.65, p < .05 et
F[1.27] = 5.02, p < .05). In contrast, the number of instances of double tasks and of additional tasks is sig-
nificantly lower when dealing with fishing vessels rather than merchant vessels (t(33) = −2.14, p = .05).
23
The knot is a unit of speed equal to one nautical mile per hour (1 NM/h = 1.852 km/h).
15. Please cite this article in press as: Langard, B., et al. Collision risk management in passenger trans-
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The officers’ cognitive resources are consequently more brought into play in the case of encounter
situations with fishing vessels.
6. Discussion/conclusion
The goal of this research study was to identify the conditions for success for preventing collisions
in the area of passenger transport. We selected a shipping company considered safe, one that has
never been involved in a collision. The analyses focused on the activities of the OOWs, particularly
the collision avoidance activities, and they were designed to identify the diachronic mechanisms (i.e.
anticipation) and the synchronic mechanisms implemented in the context of managing the collision
risk.
We hypothesized that the conditions for success (i.e. controlling the collision risk) were based on
diachronic mechanisms and synchronic mechanisms. The findings shown validate this hypothesis. As
far as the synchronic management is concerned, we have shown that the OOWs adjust their activities
in terms of the work situation demands. The modifications occur in two directions:
• when the task demands are important (e.g. interactions with fishing vessels), the time devoted to
tasks additional to watchkeeping and conning the ship is reduced;
• conversely, anticipation leads to the release of attention resources, since the proportion of the time
devoted to tasks that are additional to the main task increases when manoeuvres are executed at an
early stage.
As far as the diachronic management is concerned, we have shown that the OOWs control both the
external risks (the collision risk) and the internal risks (the cognitive costs). This control is based on
their ability to anticipate and, in some cases, to avoid encounter situations. In some cases, in particular
as regards interactions with give-way vessels, we have shown that OOWs execute a manoeuvre, even
when they are the stand-on vessel, in order to avoid having to fall within the scope of a COLREG rule.
Chauvin and Lardjane (2008) made the same observation from a study of the car-ferries crossing the
Dover Straits.
OOWs anticipate manoeuvres in order to remain within a safety net (as described by Amalberti,
1996) and to retain a workload level that enables them to manage efficiently all the activities for which
they are responsible. Anticipation – which is an essential characteristic of organisational resilience – is
thus a key factor in this system and contributes largely to the conditions for success regarding collision
risk prevention. At this stage of our research, it is not possible to determine the degree of resilience of
the system under consideration, insofar as the other three characteristics of resilience have not been
investigated in a reasoned and systematic way.
Conning a ship is part of the category of activities that control a process in dynamic situations. In
this respect, it shares a number of characteristics with car driving (Chauvin & Saad, 2004) and with
air traffic control. In these three domains, various studies have also shown the operators’ anticipa-
tion strategies. In the car driving domain, Van der Hulst, Rothengatter, and Meijman (1998) have
shown that drivers use a hierarchy of adaptive strategies designed to control the time pressure. They
anticipate a lot, when they can do so (in normal conditions of visibility). When anticipation con-
ditions are reduced, they compensate by reducing speed so as to be able to respond to potential
danger. When this compensatory strategy cannot be implemented, drivers need to maintain a high
attention level so as to be able to respond appropriately to events that may occur. These authors
have observed that whenever possible, drivers try to reduce the time pressure and its related driving
costs; they will choose a strategy that demands a high attention level only when no other option is
available.
These strategies are sometimes mentioned in terms of different styles or profiles: some operators
prefer acting sooner while others prefer waiting until all elements of a situation are available (Martin,
2013; Martin, Hourlié, & Cegarra, 2013). This observation can be made in terms of the Efficiency
– Thoroughness – Trade-Off (ETTO) principle, as defined by Hollnagel (2009). Hollnagel explains that
the existence of a sustainable system depends on the trade-off between efficiency (acting before
it is too late) and thoroughness (ensuring that the situation is fully understood and that actions are
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appropriate to the goals). Hence, there are different cognitive styles depending on whether individuals
favour efficiency or thoroughness.
In the maritime domain, Habberley and Taylor (1989) have identified two types of officers: some
engage manoeuvres at an average distance of 5.3 NM and reach an average passing distance of 1
NM (DCPA), while others engage manoeuvres at an average distance of 3.2 NM to reach a DCPA of
0.5 NM. The authors have shown that there is a relationship between anticipation and expertise.
The most highly skilled officers manoeuvre earlier, with greater amplitude, to reach higher CPAs.
Similarly, Chauvin and Lardjane (2008) have shown that car-ferries engage manoeuvres earlier than
cargo vessels, and that the car-ferry officers thus anticipate more than officers working on other types
of vessels.
Martin (2013) uses the notion of maturing-time (MT) proposed by Averty Athènes, Collet, and
Dittmar (2002) to analyse the time elapsed between conflict detection and the moment when the
resolution action plan is implemented. The examination of the average participant MT shows impor-
tant variations depending on individual participants, as its value varies by up to 100%. The descriptive
analysis of the distribution of MT values has shown three distinct groups of air traffic controllers: those
who act soonest; those who use an intermediate MT value; and those who wait. Martin et al. (2013)
explain that when operators assess the action-related uncertainty level as too high, they may decide
to delay the action until the most appropriate time.
In our study, maturing-time corresponds to the time elapsed between detection and manoeu-
vre “t1”. Our results thus show the profile of OOWs who act as soon as possible when conditions allow
it. Only encounter situations with fishing vessels may compel them to wait, which demands increased
attention on their part. In general, OOWs favour efficiency over thoroughness.
Limitations of the study. The study was carried out on only one ship that belonged to a shipping
company considered safe and over a period of 57 h only. Furthermore, it was not possible to establish
comparisons between the OOWs in light of the small crew size. In future, it would thus be worth
extending this study to several vessels in the same company and with longer observation times. Finally,
only one of the four characteristics of resilience, namely anticipation, was examined. Investigating the
other three characteristics of resilience would thus be another fruitful extension of this study.
Disclosure of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest concerning this article.
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