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Selec%ve	
  blackholing	
  
How	
  to	
  use	
  &	
  implement	
  
	
  
	
  
Job	
  Snijders	
  
job@n=.net 	
  	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  
Who	
  am	
  I?	
  
Job	
  Snijders	
  
	
  
NTT	
  Communica%ons	
  
	
  
Founder	
  of	
  NLNOG	
  RING	
  
	
  
Twi=er:	
  @JobSnijders	
  
Email:	
  job@ins%tuut.net	
  
	
  
Hobbies:	
  IP	
  Rou%ng,	
  LISP,	
  MPLS,	
  IPv6,	
  RPSL	
  
	
  
Shoe	
  size:	
  45/EU	
  
	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   2	
  
Agenda	
  
•  What	
  is	
  “selec&ve	
  blackholing”?	
  
•  Defini%on	
  
•  Examples	
  based	
  on	
  RIPE	
  ATLAS	
  
•  How	
  to	
  set	
  up	
  selec%ve	
  blackholing	
  as	
  a	
  carrier	
  
•  Defining	
  scopes	
  
•  Route-­‐maps	
  
•  Some	
  python	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   3	
  
What	
  is	
  selec%ve	
  blackholing?	
  
Selec%ve	
  blackholing	
  ~	
  selec%ve	
  discarding	
  
	
  
	
  1.	
  Use	
  BGP	
  communi%es	
  to	
  instruct	
  your	
  Service	
  
Provider	
  to	
  discard	
  packets	
  when	
  certain	
  condi0ons	
  
are	
  met.	
  
	
  
	
  2.	
  A	
  region	
  of	
  space-­‐%me	
  from	
  which	
  gravity	
  
prevents	
  anything,	
  including	
  light,	
  from	
  escaping,	
  
except	
  the	
  colour	
  purple.	
  
	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   4	
  
What	
  does	
  it	
  ma=er?!	
  
Content	
  is	
  most	
  oben	
  the	
  vic%m	
  (webshop,	
  
gameserver,	
  webserver)	
  
	
  
Most	
  prefixes/content	
  have	
  a	
  geographical	
  
significance	
  which	
  decreases	
  as	
  distance	
  between	
  the	
  
sender	
  and	
  receiver	
  increases.	
  	
  
	
  (theorem	
  stems	
  from	
  sFlow	
  data	
  gathered	
  at	
  global	
  ISP).	
  
In	
  other	
  words:	
  Chances	
  are	
  a	
  Japanese	
  web-­‐shop	
  
owner	
  cares	
  most	
  about	
  Japanese	
  eyeballs.	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   5	
  
Scope	
  is	
  relevant!	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   6	
  
What’s	
  wrong	
  with	
  normal	
  
blackholing?	
  
Classic	
  blackholing	
  is	
  an	
  all	
  or	
  nothing	
  proposi0on:	
  
	
  
you	
  throw	
  away	
  all	
  revenue	
  generated	
  by	
  the	
  vic%m	
  
IP	
  address,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  avoid	
  conges%ng	
  your	
  
upstream	
  links.	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   7	
  
Damage	
  control	
  is	
  not	
  mi%ga%on	
  
Selec%ve	
  blackholing	
  should	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  yet	
  
another	
  tool	
  in	
  the	
  toolbox	
  when	
  under	
  duress.	
  
	
  
Asser%on	
  #1:	
  
	
  “it	
  is	
  be6er	
  to	
  remain	
  par&ally	
  reachable	
  than	
  not	
  
reachable	
  at	
  all	
  during	
  a	
  DDoS	
  a6ack”	
  
	
  
Asser%on	
  #2:	
  
	
  “I	
  can	
  take	
  a	
  percentage	
  of	
  the	
  DDoS	
  traffic,	
  but	
  
not	
  all”	
  
	
  
	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   8	
  
Effects:	
  
Discard	
  outside	
  1000	
  KM	
  radius	
  
Customer	
  connects	
  in	
  Amsterdam,	
  Netherlands	
  
White	
  dot	
  means	
  traffic	
  cannot	
  reach	
  des%na%on	
  
Colored	
  dot	
  implies	
  reachability	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   9	
  
Effects:	
  
Discard	
  outside	
  ‘this’	
  country	
  
White	
  dot	
  means	
  traffic	
  cannot	
  reach	
  des%na%on	
  
Color	
  dot	
  implies	
  reachability,	
  Customer	
  connected	
  in	
  Amsterdam,	
  NL	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   10	
  
White	
  dot	
  means	
  traffic	
  cannot	
  reach	
  des%na%on	
  
Color	
  dot	
  implies	
  reachability	
  
‘discard	
  outside	
  NL’	
  is	
  perfect	
  
reachability	
  inside	
  NL	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   11	
  
2914:664	
  -­‐	
  “only	
  blackhole	
  outside	
  the	
  
country	
  the	
  announcement	
  
originated”	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   12	
  
Part	
  2:	
  How	
  to	
  set	
  this	
  up	
  as	
  carrier	
  
Focus	
  on	
  four	
  features:	
  
Scope	
   End-­‐user	
  BGP	
  community	
  
Outside	
  ‘This’	
  country	
   15562:664	
  
Outside	
  ‘This’	
  con%nent	
   15562:660	
  
Outside	
  1000	
  KM	
  radius	
   15562:663	
  
Outside	
  2500	
  KM	
  radius	
   15562:662	
  
‘This’	
  means	
  ‘where	
  the	
  customer	
  interconnec%on	
  is	
  located’	
  
	
  
Distance	
  is	
  from	
  Edge	
  router	
  to	
  Edge	
  router	
  in	
  the	
  SP’s	
  network	
  “as	
  the	
  
crow	
  flies”	
  (not	
  actual	
  op%cal	
  fiber	
  path	
  length!).	
  Can	
  only	
  be	
  
guaranteed	
  for	
  own	
  backbone	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   13	
  
Assign	
  your	
  routers	
  some	
  integers	
  
name	
   Con0nent	
  
id	
  
ISO31661	
   City	
  ID	
   La0tude,	
  Longitude	
  
tky.jp	
   3	
   392	
   46	
   35.65671,	
  139.80342	
  
sjo.us	
   1	
   840	
   29	
   37.44569,-­‐122.16111	
  
dal.us	
   1	
   840	
   33	
   32.80096,	
  -­‐96.81962	
  
nyc.us	
   1	
   840	
   26	
   40.71780,	
  -­‐74.00885	
  
lon.uk	
   2	
   276	
   23	
   51.51173,	
  -­‐0.00197	
  
ams.nl	
   2	
   528	
   20	
   52.35600,	
  4.95068	
  
sto.se	
   2	
   752	
   22	
   59.36264,	
  17.95560	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   14	
  
Router	
  specific	
  configura%on	
  –	
  IOS’ish	
  
nyc.us:	
  
ip community-list THIS:METRO seq 5 permit 65123:10026
ip community-list THIS:COUNTRY seq 5 permit 65123:840
ip community-list THIS:CONTINENT seq 5 permit 65123:1000
lon.uk:	
  
ip community-list THIS:METRO seq 5 permit 65123:20023
ip community-list THIS:COUNTRY seq 5 permit 65123:276
ip community-list THIS:CONTINENT seq 5 permit 65123:2000
	
  
ams.nl:	
  
ip community-list THIS:METRO seq 5 permit 65123:20020
ip community-list THIS:COUNTRY seq 5 permit 65123:528
ip community-list THIS:CONTINENT seq 5 permit 65123:2000
	
  
……	
  etc!	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   15	
  
What	
  happens	
  where?	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   16	
  
iBGP	
  inbound	
  route-­‐map	
  
ip route 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 null0
route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 100
match community 15562:666 ! classic blackhole community
set ip next-hop 10.0.0.1 ! discard
route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 200
match community 15562:660 15562:662 15562:663 15562:664
continue 1100 ! Jump over regular ‘accept’ @ 1000
! towards scope checking
route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 1000
! No match statement == accept anything
route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 1100
match community THIS:METRO THIS:COUNTRY THIS:CONTINENT
! If match is found, accept prefix and stop
! evaluating the route-map
route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 1101 ! Anything that arrives here: discard
set ip next-hop 10.0.0.1
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   17	
  
Customer	
  facing	
  route-­‐map	
  
01. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 200
02. match ip address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES
03. match community 15562:666
04. set community no-export additive
05. set ip next-hop 10.0.0.1
06. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 300
07. match ip address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES
08. match community SCOPED:ACTION
09. continue 600 ! Remember this jump !
10. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 400
11. match ip address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES
12. set local-preference 650
13. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A deny 500
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   18	
  
Customer	
  facing	
  (cont.)	
  
Add/Rewrite	
  scoping	
  informa%on	
  when	
  a	
  ‘scoped	
  ac%on’	
  is	
  used	
  
14. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 600 ! Here is 600 again
15. match community OUTSIDE:1000KM:RADIUS:DISCARD ! 15562:663
16. set community 65123:10029 additive
17. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 700
18. match community OUTSIDE:2500KM:RADIUS:DISCARD ! 15562:662
19. set community 65123:10033 65123:10029 additive
20. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 900
21. match community OUTSIDE:THIS:COUNTRY:DISCARD ! 15562:664
22. set community 65123:840 additive
23. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 1100
24. match community OUTSIDE:THIS:CONTINENT:DISCARD ! 15562:660
25. set community 65123:1000 additive
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   19	
  
What	
  happens	
  where?	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   20	
  
But	
  wait	
  a	
  second…	
  how	
  do	
  you	
  figure	
  out	
  what	
  
needs	
  to	
  be	
  rewri=en	
  to…	
  what?	
  
	
  
Gratis download!
http://instituut.net/~job/example_community_calculator.py
	
   APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   21	
  
Proof:	
  Sobware	
  is	
  cool	
  –	
  SDN	
  finally	
  arrived!	
  
derp:~ job$ wget -q http://instituut.net/~job/example_community_calculator.py
derp:~ job$ python example_community_calculator.py
r1.lon.uk - rewrite targets:
1000 km: 65123:20020 65123:276
2500 km: 65123:2000
r1.dal.us - rewrite targets:
1000 km: 65123:10033
2500 km: 65123:840
r1.sjo.us - rewrite targets:
1000 km: 65123:10029
2500 km: 65123:10033 65123:10029
r1.nyc.us - rewrite targets:
1000 km: 65123:10026
2500 km: 65123:10026 65123:10033
<snip>
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   22	
  
The	
  integers	
  in	
  essence	
  provide	
  
groupings	
  of	
  routers,	
  which	
  the	
  
sobware/route-­‐maps	
  use	
  
COMM
/RTR	
  
:276	
   :2000	
   :10033	
   :840	
   :10029	
   :10026	
   :30046	
   :20022	
   :20020	
  
ams.nl	
   X	
   X	
  
lon.uk	
   X	
   X	
  
sto.se	
   X	
   X	
  
nyc.us	
   X	
   X	
  
dal.us	
   X	
   X	
  
sjo.us	
   X	
   X	
  
tky.jp	
   X	
  
(incomplete	
  table,	
  but	
  you	
  get	
  the	
  gist…	
  )	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   23	
  
Considera%ons	
  
•  Automate	
  all	
  route-­‐map	
  deployments	
  (actually,	
  automate	
  everything!)	
  
•  Use	
  or	
  make	
  a	
  CMDB	
  where	
  you	
  store	
  integers	
  
•  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
  is	
  a	
  pre=y	
  advanced	
  feature..	
  
	
  with	
  very	
  li=le	
  router	
  specific	
  configura%on	
  J	
  
•  Can	
  be	
  deployed	
  on	
  any	
  vendor.	
  Crappy	
  vendors	
  are	
  
	
  not	
  an	
  excuse.	
  This	
  requires	
  no	
  extra	
  CAPEX	
  
•  Customers	
  don’t	
  ask	
  for	
  this	
  
	
  feature	
  because	
  they	
  don’t	
  
	
   	
  know	
  it	
  exists	
  (yet)	
  
	
  
•  Saves	
  both	
  the	
  service	
  provider	
  
	
  and	
  customer	
  money:	
  win/win	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   24	
  
Selec%ve	
  blackholing	
  at	
  NTT	
  /	
  AS2914	
  
	
  
available	
  today!	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   25	
  
BGP	
  Community	
   Rou0ng	
  policy	
  
2914:666	
   Global	
  discard	
  /	
  classic	
  blackhole	
  
2914:660	
   Only	
  blackhole	
  outside	
  the	
  region	
  
2914:664	
   Only	
  blackhole	
  outside	
  the	
  country	
  
2914:661	
   Only	
  blackhole	
  inside	
  the	
  region	
  
2914:663	
   Only	
  blackhole	
  inside	
  the	
  country	
  
And	
  you,	
  as	
  a	
  customer?	
  
Announce	
  the	
  selec%ve	
  blackhole	
  prefix	
  but	
  
don’t	
  blackhole	
  it	
  yourself!	
  To	
  achive	
  “blackhole	
  
outside	
  this	
  region”	
  
This is probably bad:

set routing-options rib inet6.0 static route
2001:67c:208c::2/128 discard community 2914:660
Something like this is better:

set routing-options rib inet6.0 static route
2001:67c:208c::2/128 no-install community 2914:660
NANOG63	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   26	
  
Ques%ons?	
  
Ask	
  now,	
  or	
  email	
  job@n=.net	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   27	
  
Resources	
  &	
  Credits	
  
Technical	
  narra%ve	
  in	
  text	
  form:	
  
	
  
h=p://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2014-­‐February/064381.html	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
I	
  want	
  to	
  thank	
  Saku	
  Yw,	
  Torsten	
  Blum	
  and	
  Peter	
  van	
  Dijk	
  
for	
  contribu%ng	
  to	
  this	
  methodology.	
  
	
  
APRICOT	
  2015	
  	
  -­‐	
  Job	
  Snijders	
  -­‐	
  Selec%ve	
  Blackholing	
   28	
  

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Selective blackholing - how to use & implement

  • 1. Selec%ve  blackholing   How  to  use  &  implement       Job  Snijders   job@n=.net     APRICOT  2015  
  • 2. Who  am  I?   Job  Snijders     NTT  Communica%ons     Founder  of  NLNOG  RING     Twi=er:  @JobSnijders   Email:  job@ins%tuut.net     Hobbies:  IP  Rou%ng,  LISP,  MPLS,  IPv6,  RPSL     Shoe  size:  45/EU     APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   2  
  • 3. Agenda   •  What  is  “selec&ve  blackholing”?   •  Defini%on   •  Examples  based  on  RIPE  ATLAS   •  How  to  set  up  selec%ve  blackholing  as  a  carrier   •  Defining  scopes   •  Route-­‐maps   •  Some  python   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   3  
  • 4. What  is  selec%ve  blackholing?   Selec%ve  blackholing  ~  selec%ve  discarding      1.  Use  BGP  communi%es  to  instruct  your  Service   Provider  to  discard  packets  when  certain  condi0ons   are  met.      2.  A  region  of  space-­‐%me  from  which  gravity   prevents  anything,  including  light,  from  escaping,   except  the  colour  purple.     APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   4  
  • 5. What  does  it  ma=er?!   Content  is  most  oben  the  vic%m  (webshop,   gameserver,  webserver)     Most  prefixes/content  have  a  geographical   significance  which  decreases  as  distance  between  the   sender  and  receiver  increases.      (theorem  stems  from  sFlow  data  gathered  at  global  ISP).   In  other  words:  Chances  are  a  Japanese  web-­‐shop   owner  cares  most  about  Japanese  eyeballs.   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   5  
  • 6. Scope  is  relevant!   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   6  
  • 7. What’s  wrong  with  normal   blackholing?   Classic  blackholing  is  an  all  or  nothing  proposi0on:     you  throw  away  all  revenue  generated  by  the  vic%m   IP  address,  in  order  to  avoid  conges%ng  your   upstream  links.   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   7  
  • 8. Damage  control  is  not  mi%ga%on   Selec%ve  blackholing  should  be  considered  as  yet   another  tool  in  the  toolbox  when  under  duress.     Asser%on  #1:    “it  is  be6er  to  remain  par&ally  reachable  than  not   reachable  at  all  during  a  DDoS  a6ack”     Asser%on  #2:    “I  can  take  a  percentage  of  the  DDoS  traffic,  but   not  all”       APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   8  
  • 9. Effects:   Discard  outside  1000  KM  radius   Customer  connects  in  Amsterdam,  Netherlands   White  dot  means  traffic  cannot  reach  des%na%on   Colored  dot  implies  reachability   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   9  
  • 10. Effects:   Discard  outside  ‘this’  country   White  dot  means  traffic  cannot  reach  des%na%on   Color  dot  implies  reachability,  Customer  connected  in  Amsterdam,  NL   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   10  
  • 11. White  dot  means  traffic  cannot  reach  des%na%on   Color  dot  implies  reachability   ‘discard  outside  NL’  is  perfect   reachability  inside  NL   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   11  
  • 12. 2914:664  -­‐  “only  blackhole  outside  the   country  the  announcement   originated”   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   12  
  • 13. Part  2:  How  to  set  this  up  as  carrier   Focus  on  four  features:   Scope   End-­‐user  BGP  community   Outside  ‘This’  country   15562:664   Outside  ‘This’  con%nent   15562:660   Outside  1000  KM  radius   15562:663   Outside  2500  KM  radius   15562:662   ‘This’  means  ‘where  the  customer  interconnec%on  is  located’     Distance  is  from  Edge  router  to  Edge  router  in  the  SP’s  network  “as  the   crow  flies”  (not  actual  op%cal  fiber  path  length!).  Can  only  be   guaranteed  for  own  backbone   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   13  
  • 14. Assign  your  routers  some  integers   name   Con0nent   id   ISO31661   City  ID   La0tude,  Longitude   tky.jp   3   392   46   35.65671,  139.80342   sjo.us   1   840   29   37.44569,-­‐122.16111   dal.us   1   840   33   32.80096,  -­‐96.81962   nyc.us   1   840   26   40.71780,  -­‐74.00885   lon.uk   2   276   23   51.51173,  -­‐0.00197   ams.nl   2   528   20   52.35600,  4.95068   sto.se   2   752   22   59.36264,  17.95560   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   14  
  • 15. Router  specific  configura%on  –  IOS’ish   nyc.us:   ip community-list THIS:METRO seq 5 permit 65123:10026 ip community-list THIS:COUNTRY seq 5 permit 65123:840 ip community-list THIS:CONTINENT seq 5 permit 65123:1000 lon.uk:   ip community-list THIS:METRO seq 5 permit 65123:20023 ip community-list THIS:COUNTRY seq 5 permit 65123:276 ip community-list THIS:CONTINENT seq 5 permit 65123:2000   ams.nl:   ip community-list THIS:METRO seq 5 permit 65123:20020 ip community-list THIS:COUNTRY seq 5 permit 65123:528 ip community-list THIS:CONTINENT seq 5 permit 65123:2000   ……  etc!   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   15  
  • 16. What  happens  where?   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   16  
  • 17. iBGP  inbound  route-­‐map   ip route 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 null0 route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 100 match community 15562:666 ! classic blackhole community set ip next-hop 10.0.0.1 ! discard route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 200 match community 15562:660 15562:662 15562:663 15562:664 continue 1100 ! Jump over regular ‘accept’ @ 1000 ! towards scope checking route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 1000 ! No match statement == accept anything route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 1100 match community THIS:METRO THIS:COUNTRY THIS:CONTINENT ! If match is found, accept prefix and stop ! evaluating the route-map route-map INBOUND-IBGP permit 1101 ! Anything that arrives here: discard set ip next-hop 10.0.0.1 APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   17  
  • 18. Customer  facing  route-­‐map   01. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 200 02. match ip address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES 03. match community 15562:666 04. set community no-export additive 05. set ip next-hop 10.0.0.1 06. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 300 07. match ip address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES 08. match community SCOPED:ACTION 09. continue 600 ! Remember this jump ! 10. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 400 11. match ip address prefix-list CUSTOMER-A-PREFIXES 12. set local-preference 650 13. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A deny 500 APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   18  
  • 19. Customer  facing  (cont.)   Add/Rewrite  scoping  informa%on  when  a  ‘scoped  ac%on’  is  used   14. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 600 ! Here is 600 again 15. match community OUTSIDE:1000KM:RADIUS:DISCARD ! 15562:663 16. set community 65123:10029 additive 17. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 700 18. match community OUTSIDE:2500KM:RADIUS:DISCARD ! 15562:662 19. set community 65123:10033 65123:10029 additive 20. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 900 21. match community OUTSIDE:THIS:COUNTRY:DISCARD ! 15562:664 22. set community 65123:840 additive 23. route-map IMPORT:FROM:CUSTOMER-A permit 1100 24. match community OUTSIDE:THIS:CONTINENT:DISCARD ! 15562:660 25. set community 65123:1000 additive APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   19  
  • 20. What  happens  where?   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   20  
  • 21. But  wait  a  second…  how  do  you  figure  out  what   needs  to  be  rewri=en  to…  what?     Gratis download! http://instituut.net/~job/example_community_calculator.py   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   21  
  • 22. Proof:  Sobware  is  cool  –  SDN  finally  arrived!   derp:~ job$ wget -q http://instituut.net/~job/example_community_calculator.py derp:~ job$ python example_community_calculator.py r1.lon.uk - rewrite targets: 1000 km: 65123:20020 65123:276 2500 km: 65123:2000 r1.dal.us - rewrite targets: 1000 km: 65123:10033 2500 km: 65123:840 r1.sjo.us - rewrite targets: 1000 km: 65123:10029 2500 km: 65123:10033 65123:10029 r1.nyc.us - rewrite targets: 1000 km: 65123:10026 2500 km: 65123:10026 65123:10033 <snip> APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   22  
  • 23. The  integers  in  essence  provide   groupings  of  routers,  which  the   sobware/route-­‐maps  use   COMM /RTR   :276   :2000   :10033   :840   :10029   :10026   :30046   :20022   :20020   ams.nl   X   X   lon.uk   X   X   sto.se   X   X   nyc.us   X   X   dal.us   X   X   sjo.us   X   X   tky.jp   X   (incomplete  table,  but  you  get  the  gist…  )   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   23  
  • 24. Considera%ons   •  Automate  all  route-­‐map  deployments  (actually,  automate  everything!)   •  Use  or  make  a  CMDB  where  you  store  integers   •  Selec%ve  Blackholing  is  a  pre=y  advanced  feature..    with  very  li=le  router  specific  configura%on  J   •  Can  be  deployed  on  any  vendor.  Crappy  vendors  are    not  an  excuse.  This  requires  no  extra  CAPEX   •  Customers  don’t  ask  for  this    feature  because  they  don’t      know  it  exists  (yet)     •  Saves  both  the  service  provider    and  customer  money:  win/win   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   24  
  • 25. Selec%ve  blackholing  at  NTT  /  AS2914     available  today!   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   25   BGP  Community   Rou0ng  policy   2914:666   Global  discard  /  classic  blackhole   2914:660   Only  blackhole  outside  the  region   2914:664   Only  blackhole  outside  the  country   2914:661   Only  blackhole  inside  the  region   2914:663   Only  blackhole  inside  the  country  
  • 26. And  you,  as  a  customer?   Announce  the  selec%ve  blackhole  prefix  but   don’t  blackhole  it  yourself!  To  achive  “blackhole   outside  this  region”   This is probably bad:
 set routing-options rib inet6.0 static route 2001:67c:208c::2/128 discard community 2914:660 Something like this is better:
 set routing-options rib inet6.0 static route 2001:67c:208c::2/128 no-install community 2914:660 NANOG63  -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   26  
  • 27. Ques%ons?   Ask  now,  or  email  job@n=.net   APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   27  
  • 28. Resources  &  Credits   Technical  narra%ve  in  text  form:     h=p://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2014-­‐February/064381.html         I  want  to  thank  Saku  Yw,  Torsten  Blum  and  Peter  van  Dijk   for  contribu%ng  to  this  methodology.     APRICOT  2015    -­‐  Job  Snijders  -­‐  Selec%ve  Blackholing   28