1. Technical aspects of improving
acceptance of nuclear power
: dealing with catastrophe syndrome
Anil Kakodkar*
INSAC 2012
November 7,2012
*With inputs from Shri H. S. Kushwaha & Dr. R. K. Singh

2. Key issues in public acceptance
• Dealing with mind sets
 Small is beautiful
 Nuclear is evil
 Perceived external influence
 Trust deficit , NIMBY………
• Catastrophe syndrome
 Consequences (real or perceived)
larger than a threshold are
unacceptable regardless of low
probability
 TMI, Chernobyl and now Fukushima
have created adverse impact on public
mind
 That Fukushima was caused by nature’s
fury is an added factor

3. NEVER AGAIN
• Both TMI & Chernobyl were triggered by internally
initiated events
• Several lessons learnt, improvements implemented
and confidence restored
• Signs of nuclear renaissance were visible
• Chernobyl also led to valuable insights into
consequences in public domain
• Fukushima was triggered by an extreme external
natural event
• We must now ensure that an essential goal for nuclear
safety is “NEVER AGAIN” should there be any
significant off site emergency

4. Comprehensive approach to safety
1. Reassess the design basis assumptions for both new and existing
plants at two levels
• plant shall be able to cope without significant radioactive releases and without
irreparable damage
• plant should be able to cope without requiring significant off-site emergency response
2. Reassess plant response to severe accidents that cause extensive
reactor damage
3. Develop and implement effective on-site accident management
strategies
4. Reassess capabilities for off-site emergency management
5. Approach to old and new nuclear power plants
6. Reassess safety culture and quality of safety management
7. Ways to strengthen the international safety regime
8. Better ways to inform the media and the public on the severity of

5. Dual level design basis
• Design basis No impact in
(risk lowered to an public domain or
acceptable level) irreparable damage
to plant
• Extreme event* No significant off-site
(maximum potential) emergency
*Extra margin between design and ultimate load capacity
should be sufficient to cope with this
• Note: Nuclear Power Plants are Designed to withstand the loading due to
Natural and Man-induced external Events with low enough probability of
occurrence. Some of the man induced hazard are ruled out using SDV
Criteria.
• On a similar logic one could identify maximum potential loading for specific
engineered safety features / events at a site* and demonstrate them to be
within the margin beyond design basis capacity.
• *Core cooling capability, hydrogen mitigation, containment isolation,
earthquakes, tsunami, etc.etc.

6. Potential Natural and Man-Induced
Hazard Phenomena
• ATOMOSPHERIC Cyclones
Tornado
Tropical Storm
Lightening
• SEISMIC Ground Shaking / Fault Rupture
Liquefaction
Tsunami
• GEOLOGICAL Rock Fall
Land Slide
Debris Avalanches
• HYDROLOGICAL Flooding
Strom Surge
Erosion and Sedimentation
• Man-Induced Events Oil Storage & Refineries
Explosion
Missiles
Air Craft Crash
Terrorist Attack

7. BARC Containment (BARCOM) Test-Model (Design Pressure Pd 0.1413 MPa)
at BARC-Tarapur Test Facility with details of Embedded Sensors and Cable Panels
An overview of Sensors & Instrumentation Cable for concrete, rebar and tendons
Phase-II Test- Typical Response Pre-Test Predictions by Round Robin Participants

8. Jason-1 track 109 satellite (altitude 1300km) record
and
TSUSOL Predictions

9. 7
5.72 5.74
6 5.15
5 4.5
3.88 4.00
4
3
2 1.22 1.24
0.65
1
0
-1 -0.62 -0.50
SRI IGCAR IIT-M ICMAM NGRI ACRi
Prediction 4.5 5.15 5.72 3.88 4.00 5.74
Deviation 0.65 1.22 -0.62 -0.50 1.24
7 6.00
6
4.6
5 3.99 3.46 3.5
4 2.83
3
2 1.40
1
0
-1
-0.61
-2 -1.14 -1.1
-3
-1.77
SRI IGCAR IIT-M ICMAM NGRI ACRi
Prediction 4.6 3.99 6.00 2.83 3.46 3.5
Deviation -0.61 1.40 -1.77 -1.14 -1.1

10. Long term nuclear power development
- The challenge of the numbers.
• A per capita electricity use of about 5000 kWh/year appears to be needed for
reaching a state of reasonably high human development. Considering the
progressive depletion of fossil fuel reserves, and the urgent need for
addressing the global warming related concerns, nuclear energy is expected to
substantially contribute to meeting the future global energy requirements.
• Assuming that at least half of the total energy demand may need to be met
with nuclear, the world will need between 3000 to 4000 nuclear power
reactors of different capacities for electricity generation. The number may at least
double with the use of nuclear energy to provide an alternative to fluid fossil
fuels.
• A large number of these reactors may need to be located in regions with high
population densities and modest technological infrastructure with their sizes
consistent with local needs.
10

11. 
AHWR is a 300 MWe vertical pressure tube type, boiling light water cooled and
heavy water moderated reactor (An innovative configuration that can provide
low risk nuclear energy using available technologies)
AHWR 300-LEU would enable realisation of these advantages with competitive Uranium
use & without the need for concurrent recycle. This may be a necessity in many
countries.
Major objectives
 Significant fraction of energy
from Thorium
Top Tie Plate
 Several passive features Displacer
 3 days operator grace Water Rod
Tube
period Fuel
 No radiological impact in Pin
public domain
AHWR can be  Can address insider threat
configured to accept a scenarios
range of fuel types  Lower proliferation
including LEU, U- concerns
Pu , Th-Pu , LEU-Th
and 233U-Th in full  Design life of 100 years. Bottom Tie Plate
core  Easily replaceable coolant AHWR Fuel assembly

12. Peak clad temperature hardly rises
even with the extreme postulate of
complete station blackout and
simulteneous failure of both primary
and secondary shut down systems.

13. PSA calculations for AHWR indicate practically zero
probability of a serious impact in public domain
Plant familiarization & Level-3 : Atmospheric Dispersion With SWS: Service
identification of design Consequence Analysis Water System
aspects important to APWS: Active
Process Water
severe accident System
Release from Containment ECCS
HDRBRK:
ECCS Header
PSA level-1 : Identification Break
of significant events with LLOCA: Large
Break LOCA
large contribution to CDF Level-2 : Source Term (within SLOC MSLBOB: Main
Containment) Evaluation through SWS A Steam Line
63% 15%
Analysis Break Outside
Contribution to CDF Containment
Level-1, 2 & 3 PSA activity block diagram
10-10
10
-10
Frequency of Exceedence
10-11
10
-11
-12
10-12
10
10-13
10
-13
10-14
10
-14
1 10
mSv 0.1 Sv 1.0 Sv 10 Sv
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10
Thyroid Dose (Sv) at 0.5 Km Iso-Dose for thyroid -200% RIH + wired shutdown system
Variation of dose with frequency exceedence unavailable (Wind condition in January on western Indian
13
(Acceptable thyroid dose for a child is 500 mSv) side)

14. Generic Assessment Procedure for Determining
Protective Actions during a Reactor Accident
• Accident Assessment
• Emergency Classification
• Protective Action Decision Making
• Assessment of Environment Data
• Monitoring
• Operational Intervention Levels (OILs)

15. LNT Model is Inaccurate
The major cause of worry is the general public perceiving that
radiation is harmful no matter how low the dose.
Reality Real radiation danger levels
Crosses show the mortality of Chernobyl firefighters
(numbers died/total in each dose range )
.Colorado ,USA has a population over ( curve is for rats)
5 millions residents. According to
LNT model Colorado should have an
excess of 200 cancer deaths per year
but has a rate less than the national
average.
. Ramasar ,Iran, residents receive a
yearly dose of between 100-260 mSv.
This is several time higher than
radiation level at Chernobyl and
Fukushima exclusion zone. People
living in Ramsar have no adverse
health effect , but live longer and
healthier lives.
. We also know that China , Norway,
Sweden, Brazil and India have similar Above 4,000 mSv 27/42 died from Acute
areas where radiation level is many Radiation Syndrome (ARS),
times higher than 2.4 mSv/yr world not cancer.
average. Below 4,000 mSv 1/195 died.

16. Projected health consequences from low
doses to large sections of population are
questionable
IN CASE OF CHERNOBYL
SOME ESTIMATED CONSEQUENCES Driven by over
AN ESTIMATE IN 2006—93,000 WILL DIE DUE conservative
TO CANCER UP TO THE YEAR2056 ANOTHER
linear no
ESTIMATE IN 2009---985,000 DIED TILL 2004
threshold
principle (which
ACTUAL CONSEQUENCE is not
TOTAL DEATHS;
62 (47 PLANT, 15 DUE TO THYROID CANCER ) substantiated by
ACUTE RADIATION SYNDROME; surveys in high
134 (OUT OF WHICH 28 HAVE DIED) natural radiation
INCREASED CANCER INCIDENCE; background
AMONG RECOVERY WORKERS
THYROID CANCER; (CURABLE, WAS AVOIDABLE) areas) we tend to
6000 ( 15 HAVE DIED) create avoidable
trauma in public

17. Looking back at Fukushima
. It has become apparent at Fukushima that the
evacuation from the “exclusion Zone” has been
excessive. Some of the areas that have been
evacuated probably suffered so little contamination
that they could be reoccupied.
. As per WHO report most of the people in Fukushima
prefecture would have received a radiation dose of
between 1-10 mSv during first year. Two places the
dose were between 10- 50 mSv still below harmful
level. Almost all other places were below the
internationally agreed reference level for the public
exposure due to radon in dwelling (about 10 mSv).

18. Chernobyl Psychosomatic effects
‘Besides the 28 fatalities among rescue workers and employees of the power station due to
very high doses of radiation (2.9 - 16 Gy), and three deaths due to other reasons
(UNSCEAR 2000b), the only real adverse health consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe among approximately five million people living in the contaminated regions
were the epidemics of psychosomatic afflictions. These appear as diseases of the
digestive and circulatory systems and other post-traumatic stress disorders such as
sleep disturbance, headache, depression, anxiety, escapism, “learned helplessness”,
unwillingness to cooperate, overdependence, alcohol and drug abuse and suicides
(Forum 2005). These diseases and disturbances could not have been due to the minute
irradiation doses from the Chernobyl fallout (average dose rate of about 1 - 2 mSv/year),
but they were caused by radiophobia (a deliberately induced fear of radiation)
aggravated by wrongheaded administrative decisions and even, paradoxically, by
increased medical attention which leads to diagnosis of subclinical changes that
persistently hold the attention of the patient.
Bad administrative decisions made several million people believe that they were “victims
of Chernobyl” although the average annual dose they received from “Chernobyl”
radiation was only about one third of the average natural dose. This was the main
factor responsible for the economic losses caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe,
estimated to have reached $148 billion by 2000 for the Ukraine, and to reach $235

19. . The Health Physics Society's position Statement
first adopted in Jan. 1996, as revised in July 2010,
states: In accordance with current knowledge of
radiation risks, the Health Physics Society
recommend against quantitative estimation of
health risks below an individual dose of 5 rem(50
mSv) in one year or a lifetime dose of 10 rem (100
mSv) above that received from natural sources.
. French Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Medicine published a report in 2005
that rejected the LNT model in favour of a
threshold dose response and a significantly
reduced risk at low radiation exposures.

20. What do we need to do?
• Realistic worst case assessment in public
domain at each site taking margins beyond
design basis into account
• Pragmatic evidence based intervention
levels ( not biased by LNT) to be articulated
in advance
• Credibly demonstrate best estimate impact
in public domain (expected to be much
lower)
• Develop and deploy systems that do not
cause any adverse impact in public domain

21. Thank you
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